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The tech giant’s $650 million deal with Talen Energy has a lot to unpack.

When Talen Energy, which owns a 90% interest in the Susquehanna nuclear power plant in Northeastern Pennsylvania, announced it was selling a data center site adjacent to its power plant to Amazon Web Services, it raised some eyebrows in the energy world. The surprise was not because a large tech company made a big deal with a carbon-free power provider, or even that a tech company made a deal to buy power generated by a nuclear power plant. It was because Amazon was making this deal.
Amazon is a massive buyer of renewable power — it claims to be the world’s largest and says it’s responsible for 28 gigawatts of clean energy capacity — signing contracts with new wind and solar projects all over the world.
But a divide has opened up among tech giants when it comes to energy, with Amazon on one side and Alphabet and Microsoft on the other. The difference hinges on how much it matters where and when the new carbon-free power a company buys in order to match its electricity use.
What’s odd about the Talen deal is that it fits awkwardly into either approach, especially Amazon’s. Amazon does not count nuclear towards its renewable power goals, and in any case, it’s not a “new” source of carbon-free power. Instead, it allows Amazon to siphon somewhere between 480 and 960 megawatts of capacity from the 2,500 megawatt plant.
“Amazon needs power, they’re getting it at cheap rates. They don’t even want to talk about it like a climate thing,” Mark Nelson, the founder of Radiant Energy Group, told me.
In the past decade or so, technology companies have gone on a clean-power buying spree, funding new wind and solar projects all over the world. But there has been a divergence in what is thought to be the best way to go about it.
In 2019, Amazon announced a goal to add enough renewable power to the grid to match its own emissions by 2030 (since moved up to 2025) and to reach net zero by 2040.
Google has been 100% renewable in terms of buying clean power in the same amounts that it consumes since 2017. So in 2020, it set a new goal: to “run on 24/7 carbon-free energy on every grid where we operate by 2030.” This would mean not just matching total renewable purchases with total emissions, as Amazon is seeking to do, but also trying to get every hour of data center operation “matched” with an hour of renewable generation on the same grid.
Microsoft has a similar goal, and as a result, both companies have shown much more interest in nuclear power of late than is typical in the technology world.
“A huge bottleneck for growth for Amazon, Google, Microsoft, Facebook is access to constant electricity,” Nelson told me. Nuclear is a carbon-free electricity resource that can run at a steady output 24 hours a day, whereas wind and solar are both inherently variable.
Microsoft signed a deal with Constellation to supply power to data centers in Virginia and hired an official from the Tennessee Valley Authority to be its director of nuclear and energy innovations, while Microsoft founder Bill Gates and Sam Altman, the head of Microsoft-backed OpenAI have both invested in nuclear startups, as has Google.
Amazon’s approach — which it shares with several other large companies, including Meta — is not to match 24 hours of its operations with clean power bought locally, but rather to develop and purchase new wind and solar at the same scale of the power it consumes, especially in areas with dirty grids, thus matching the emissions from its consumption with the emissions reductions of new renewables projects. While a 24/7 matching approach may be naturally complementary with nuclear power, Amazon’s strategy doesn’t require it.
“We believe a focus on emissions is the fastest, most cost-effective and scalable way to leverage corporate clean energy procurement to help decarbonize global power grids at the fastest pace,” an Amazon spokesperson told me. “This includes procuring renewable energy in locations and countries that still rely heavily on fossil fuels to power their grids, and where energy projects can have the biggest impact on carbon reduction.”
Contracting out new renewable energy projects can have more bang for your buck in dirty grids, according to proponents of the Amazon philosophy, known as carbon matching. The hypothesis is that a renewable project in a fossil fuel-heavy grid will displace more dirty power than one that’s located near a datacenter in an already relatively clean grid like California or Washington State.
Princeton researchers who examined the carbon matching (Amazon) and temporal matching (Google and Microsoft) strategies argued that the carbon matching approach does not necessarily lead to more renewables — or less fossil fuels — on the grid than would have occurred in the absence of the tech companies, and thus does not actually greatly lower emissions. The temporal approach, on the other hand, can meaningfully displace fossil fuel power that would otherwise have to be on the grid to meet demand.
Nuclear advocates are clear-eyed that this deal won’t cause a new generating unit to sprout up out of the Susquehanna Valley. But they still see it as the kind of deal that can help ensure nuclear plants’ continued survival. Amazon’s $650 million buys it a 10-year agreement to purchase power from the plant, as well as “additional revenue from AWS related to sales of carbon-free energy to the grid,” which an Amazon spokesperson explained as a reference to the deal “ensur[ing] that the nuclear plant has stable revenues to continue generating clean power to the grid for the foreseeable future.”
Nelson, a passionate advocate for nuclear power, lamented the mass shutdown of nuclear power plants in the 2010s thanks to cheap natural gas knocking them out of power markets that didn’t value reliability or carbon-free energy. But now, he says, things are different.
“Now nuclear is getting valued for its climate properties, reliability, and low cost. We’re seeing nuclear plants cash in,” Nelson told me. “Long term PPAs with cold hard cash help me sleep better at night.”
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The Paris Agreement goal of limiting warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius is now all but impossible. Limiting — and eventually reversing — the damage will take some thought.
For the second year in a row, the United Nations climate conference ended without a consensus declaration that tackling global warming requires transitioning away from fossil fuels. The final agreement at COP30 did, however, touch on another uncomfortable subject: Countries resolved to limit “the magnitude and duration of any temperature overshoot.”
In the 2015 Paris Agreement, 197 nations pledged to try to prevent average temperature rise of more than 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial temperatures. Now 10 years later, scientists say that exceeding that level has become inevitable. It may be possible to turn the thermostat back down after this “overshoot” occurs, though — a possibility this year’s COP agreement appears to endorse.
The idea demands a far meatier discussion than world leaders have had to date, according to Oliver Geden, a senior fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, and a key contributor to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s scientific reports. If limiting warming to 1.5 degrees now requires surpassing that level and coming back to it later, and if this is something that countries actually want to attempt, there are a lot of implications to think through.
Geden and Andy Reisinger, an associate professor at Australian National University and another IPCC author, published an article last week spelling out what it would mean for policymakers to take this concept of “temporary overshoot” seriously. For example, the final agreement from COP30 encourages Parties to align their nationally determined contributions towards global net zero by or around mid-century.” Net zero, in this case, means cutting CO2 emissions as far as possible, and then cancelling out any residuals with efforts to remove carbon from the atmosphere.
Scientists now estimate that if the world achieves that balance by 2050, we’ll pass 1.5 and bring warming to a peak of about 1.7 degrees above pre-industrial levels. At that point, the planet will not begin to cool on its own. Ensuring that an “overshoot” of 1.5 degrees is temporary, then, requires removing even more carbon from the atmosphere than is being emitted — it requires achieving “net-negative” emissions.
Suffice it to say, you will not find the words “net negative” in any COP agreements. “If 1.5 degrees C is to remain the core temperature goal, then net zero can no longer be seen as an end point but only as a transition point in climate policy,” Geden and Reisinger wrote. The two stress that this wouldn’t prevent all of the harms of going past that level of warming, but it would reduce risk, depending on the magnitude and duration of the overshoot.
I spoke to Geden on Thursday, while the UN climate conference was still underway in Belém, Brazil, about what policymakers are missing about overshoot and the 1.5 degree goal. Our conversation has been lightly edited for clarity.
I’ve had scientists tell me they don’t like the term “overshoot” because the 1.5 degree boundary is arbitrary. How do you think about it?
You can apply the concept of overshoot to any level. You could also apply it to 2 degrees or 1.6 or 1.7. It’s just saying that there is a defined level you care about, and it’s about exceeding that level and returning to it later. That is the basic concept, and then 1.5 is the logical application right now in terms of where climate policy is. That return idea is not very well represented, but that’s how it has been used in the IPCC for quite some time — exceedance and return.
What was the impetus for writing the article with Reisinger and what was your main message?
We wanted to explain the concept of overshoot because it seems that it’s now being discussed more. The UN secretary general started using it in a speech to the World Meteorological Association two weeks before Belém, and now has continuously done so. It also led to some irritation because people interpret it as, He just called 1.5 off, although he usually says, “Science tells us you can come back to it.”
These overshoot trajectories and pathways for 1.5 degrees have been around since at least the Special Report on 1.5 Degrees in 2018, and then increasingly dominated the modeling of 1.5. But we feel that the broader climate policy community never quite got the point that it is baked into these trajectories whenever scientists say 1.5 is still possible. But then this element of, what does this now mean? Who has to do what? How is it possible to get temperature down? That’s even more obscure, in a way, in the political debate, because it means net-zero CO2 is not enough. Net-zero CO2 would halt temperature increase. To get it down, you need to go net negative. And then the obvious question, politically, would be, who’s going to do that?
In the paper, you write that the amount of net-negative emissions required to reduce global average temperatures by just 0.1 degrees is about equal to five years of current annual emissions, or 100x our current annual carbon removal, which is mostly from planting trees. Given that, is it realistic to talk about reversing warming?
That’s not for me to say. If you think about the trajectory — how would, let’s say, a temperature trajectory in the 21st century look? What you would get now is a peak warming level above 1.5. Then really the question is, what happens afterwards? If everybody only talks about going to net-zero CO2 then we should assume it’s that new peak temperature level, and then we just stay there. But if you want to say the world needs to go back down to 1.5 by the end of the century then we have to talk about net-negative levels, and we still may find out that it’s not realistic.
This kind of circumvents the conversation of how good we look on getting to net zero. We all assume that’s doable. I also assume that’s doable. But you cannot forget the fact that right now, our emissions are still rising.
One of the policy implications you write about in the piece is that if Europe were to set a target to go net negative, its carbon pricing scheme could go from a source of income to a financial burden. Can you explain that?
If you have carbon pricing and you have emitters, you can finance carbon dioxide removal through the revenues from carbon pricing. But if you want to go net negative, you need more removals than you have emissions. The question is, who’s going to pay for it? You would always have residual emitters, but if you want to go deeply into net negative, you will run out of revenue sources to finance these removals.
One of the big problems is, conceptually, a government can say, Okay, your factory does not have a license to produce anymore, and you can force it to close down. But you cannot force any entity to remove CO2 for you. So how can a government guarantee that these removals are really going to happen? Would the acceleration of this carbon dioxide removal actually work? Which methods do we prefer? Do we have enough geological storage? It’s all unresolved. This paper is not a call to Europe to say hey, just make a promise. [It’s saying,] can you please really think about it? Can we please stop assuming somebody is going to organize all this to go net negative and then it magically happens? You need to make a serious plan. And you may find out that it’s too hard to do.
Another question is, how will other actors react? I think that’s part of the reluctance to talk about going net negative. The mental model right now of being a frontrunner is going down to the net zero line and then waiting there for the others to come. But if you enter net negative territory, it becomes basically bottomless. So every developing country could, reasonably so, demand ever higher levels of you. In the European Union, where you have 27 member states, even there, you would get into distributional challenges because some member states may ask others to go net negative because they are disadvantaged.
Also, which sectors would be forced to go net negative, which ones can stay net positive? Agriculture, at least as long as you have livestock, will be net positive. Then you have a country like Ireland, with 30% of the emissions coming from agriculture. They will stay a net-positive country, probably, and then others would have to go net negative. So you can imagine what kind of tensions you would get in.
I know you’re not in Belém, but from what you’ve read and from what you’re hearing, do you think that overshoot and all of these questions that you raise are being discussed more there? Do you get the sense that they are making their way into the conversation more?
A bit. The talk you hear is only just about 1.5 and 1.5-aligned, and it makes you wonder what governments or NGOs think, how this is going to happen. In the text presented by the Brazilian government, overshoot is mentioned, and “limiting or minimizing magnitude and duration of overshoot.” But it does not talk about what that actually means.
The whole 1.5 conversation, I think it’s hard for governments to understand. At the same they’re getting told, “if you just look at the pledges, you will end up at 2.6 or 2.7 or 2.8 by the end of the century, you have to do more.” Of course they all have to do more, but to really get to 1.5 they have to do more than they can imagine. If the world does not want to cross 1.5, never ever, it would need to be at net-zero CO2 in 2030, between 2030 and 2035. And if you go later, then you have to go net negative. It’s actually quite easy, but it seems to be uncomfortable knowledge. And then the way we communicate the challenge — governments, scientists, media — it’s not very straightforward.
All these temperature targets are special in the sense that they set an absolute target. Usually policymakers, governments, set relative targets, like 0.7% of national GDP for overseas development aid — you can miss that every year, but then you can say, next year we’re going to meet it. That logic does not apply here. Once you are there, you are there. Then it’s not enough to say that next year we are going to put more effort into it. You just then can limit the extra damage.
Current conditions: Thunderstorms are rolling through eastern Texas today into Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi • More than 11,000 people in seven Malaysian states say they’re affected by heavy flooding • America’s two most populous overseas territories at opposite sides of the planet are experiencing diverging rip tides, with a dangerously powerful undertow in Guam but a weak pull this week in Puerto Rico.

The final resolution that concluded the United Nations climate summit in Brazil made no mention of fossil fuels, in what The New York Times called “a victory for oil producers like Saudi Arabia and Russia.” But the so-called COP30 confab in the northeastern Amazonian city of Belém made some notable progress. This was the first conference to seriously broach the effects of mining the metals needed for the energy transition, as I wrote here last week. The event had other firsts, as the Financial Times noted: It was the first completely spurned by the U.S. administration, “the first since the world hit 1.5 degrees Celsius of global warming for an entire calendar year,” and — it turned out — “the first with a venue plagued by extreme heat, flooding — even a fire that brought the talks to a standstill for much of their second-last day.” But, FT columnist Pilita Clark continued, Brazil’s turn at the yearly summit “still managed something these huge annual gatherings should have done years ago: a shift away from showy pledges to tackling the real world complexities of cutting carbon emissions.”
The COP30 statement “does not spell out the implications or required response as bluntly as many want to see,” Heatmap’s Emily Pontecorvo wrote, “It does, however, introduce an important new concept that could become a key part of the negotiations in the future. For the first time, the text references a resolve to ‘limit both the magnitude and duration of any temperature overshoot.’ This not only acknowledges that it’s possible to bring temperatures back down after warming surpasses 1.5 degrees, but that the level at which temperatures peak, and the length of time we remain at that peak before the world begins to cool, are just as important. The statement implies the need for a much larger conversation about carbon removal that has been nearly absent from the annual COPs, but which scientists say that countries must have if they are serious about the Paris Agreement goals.”
The U.S. Export-Import Bank plans to invest $100 billion in overseas energy projects to promote President Donald Trump’s global energy dominance. The first tranche of funding will go to projects in Egypt, Pakistan, and Europe. In his first interview since taking office in September, the federal lender’s newly-appointed chair, John Jovanovic, told the FT the administration was focusing the bank on “efforts to secure U.S. and allied supply chains for critical minerals, nuclear energy, and liquified natural gas to counter western reliance on China and Russia.” In short, Jovanovic said, the Ex-Im Bank is “back in a big way, and it’s open for business.”
Wyoming Governor Mark Gordon last week announced $4 million in state matching funds to study building a second coal-fired unit at the Dry Fork Station power plant in Gillette. The move, Cowboy State Daily reported, “could be the first step toward building a new coal-fired power plant” in the sparsely populated state’s third-largest city. “This is clear proof that coal is not dead and a reminder that Wyoming’s strength has always come from our ability to innovate without abandoning our values,” Gordon, a Republican, said in a statement. If built, the plant would be the first new coal-fired unit to open in the U.S. since 2013.
The Trump administration is trying to keep existing coal plants open. But it’s running into the problem that their equipment keeps breaking down, as Heatmap’s Matthew Zeitlin wrote. The trend toward coal isn’t unique to Trump’s America. Coal demand is rising globally.
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Oregon Governor Tina Kotek ordered state agencies last week to speed up the government’s performance on permitting, energy efficiency, electrification, and low-carbon fuel. In a speech, the Democrat said her administration would pursue the cheapest pathway to the state’s 2040 target of decarbonizing electricity, E&E News reported. “We’re talking about what we really need to meet our [climate] goals in an affordable way… where we’re not getting help from the federal government,” Kotek said Wednesday at a press conference.
Democratic states are largely in a moment of flux on climate policy. California eased permitting restrictions and passed a series of bills on energy and emissions, as Emily laid out at the time. As I reported here last week, Pennsylvania took the opposite approach and withdrew from the multi-state cap-and-trade market under pressure to contain costs. New York, meanwhile, has required a federal judge to intervene to force its government to enforce climate regulations. It's all part of the emerging tension between Democrats' affordability campaigns and the party's desire to cut planet-heating pollution, as Heatmap's Robinson Meyer wrote.
Regular readers of this newsletter scarcely need reminding of two basic realities about the American oil and gas industry right now: Trump is opening virtually everywhere he can to production, but drilling has largely remained flat. But the market is looking good to the British developer Harbour Energy. In an interview with The Wall Street Journal, Linda Cook, the company’s chief executive, said Harbour Energy is exploring a potential acquisition or merger with rivals in the U.S. offshore and onshore drilling business as a way to enter “the biggest market in the world” where the London-headquartered firm isn’t already present. In a sign of confidence in Trump’s as-yet-unrealized promise to “drill, baby, drill,” Harbour Energy has widened its scope from its past inquiries into only U.S. offshore assets to also look at onshore drilling.
Beyond COP30, Brazil has at least one more first. The country’s National Nuclear Energy Commission approved construction of Latin America’s first nuclear waste repository, set to start next year, World Nuclear News reported. While Brazil is one of the only nations in the region with atomic energy, the country has just two reactors. Despite approaching nuclear power more hesitantly than neighboring Argentina, breaking ground on the first storage site would signal a significant step forward for the nascent industry in South America.
Here’s what stood out to former agency staffers.
The Department of Energy unveiled a long-awaited internal reorganization of the agency on Thursday, implementing sweeping changes that Secretary of Energy Chris Wright pitched as “aligning its operations to restore commonsense to energy policy, lower costs for American families and businesses.”
The two-paragraph press release, which linked to a PDF of the new organizational chart, offered little insight into what the changes mean. Indeed, two sources familiar with the rollout told me the agency hadn’t even held a town hall to explain the overhaul to staffers until sometime Friday. (Both sources spoke on condition of anonymity out of fear of reprisals.)
After conversations with multiple former agency staffers, including a senior political appointee who helped lead the Biden-era reorganization in 2022, here’s what stood out to me:
The spring 2022 overhaul Jennifer Granholm, former President Joe Biden’s secretary of energy, oversaw came with a detailed legal memo and extensive explanations about what the changes would mean.
“Overall, this seems sloppy,” the former senior staffer who led that process told me this morning. “If you’re trying to carry out a very coherent energy dominance strategy, you’d at least explain which boxes are moving where and what’s sitting under those boxes.”
Announcing the changes with so little detail, the former official said, “seems like a fundamental lack of leadership.”
“This, to me, just seems reckless,” the appointee continued. “People who are sitting within these offices don’t know where they’re going to work virtually on Monday.”
That, of course, may change by the end of today once the Energy Department holds its town hall meeting.
It’s unusual for an office at the agency to report directly to the secretary. Those that do typically straddle multiple types of responsibilities within the agency. For example, the Office of Technology Transitions reported directly to Granholm under the Biden administration because its purview fell under both research and deployment. The Office of Policy functions similarly. But the newly-created Office of Critical Minerals and Energy Innovation absorbed not only various mining-related sections of the agency, but also the now-defunct Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy. That puts a lot of money and grant-making powers under the new office.
Leading the Office of Critical Minerals and Energy Innovation will be Audrey Robertson, who was confirmed last month as the assistant secretary for the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy. A former investment banker and oil executive, Robertson served on the board of directors of Wright’s former company, the fracking giant Liberty Energy, until earlier this year. Another agency source familiar with the organization said “it makes no sense for this office not to answer to an undersecretary of energy.”
“Audrey is Wright’s person,” the source told me.
That, the other former agency official told me, creates some political liabilities for Wright.
“For departmental oversight reasons, that’s a lot of grant-making money and authorities that typically you’d want to layer under additional oversight before it goes to the secretary,” the ex-official said. “This is the thing that sticks out like a sore thumb.”
All that said about the new Office of Critical Minerals and Energy Innovation, no one can blame Wright for wanting to consolidate some of the bureaucracy. One way to read the decision to eliminate certain offices, such as the Office of Manufacturing and Energy Supply Chains or the Office of State and Community Energy Programs, is that the new administration wanted to undo the changes made under its predecessor in 2022. While manufacturing work included a lot of what the U.S. is doing with batteries, funding for that work fell under the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy in the 2021 Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act.
“A lot of the moves that they’re doing to re-consolidate offices aligns with what was technically under the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, which directed battery work to go through EERE,” one of the sources told me. “So some of this is realignment back to the original congressional direction.”
The stop-gap funding bill that reopened the government after the longest shutdown in history included a measure to prevent any dismissals until January 30.
But it’s unclear whether the agency plans to terminate workers as part of the reorganization starting in February.
In a sign that the Trump administration is taking efforts to commercialize fusion energy technology more seriously, the reorganization gives fusion its own office, moving the work out of the Office of Science.
“Overall this is a win for the private-fusion sector, and further cements a move from a discovery-based research model to milestone-driven, commercialization-focused policy,” Stuart Allen, the chief executive of the investment company FusionX Group, wrote in a post on LinkedIn. “All signs point to a federal strategy increasingly aligned and enmeshed with the rapid advancement of fusion energy.”
Under the new structure, geothermal and fossil fuels will live together under the new Hydrocarbons and Geothermal Energy Office.
There are some obvious synergies. The new generation of geothermal startups racing toward commercialization rely on drilling techniques such as fracking to tap into hot rocks in places that conventional companies couldn’t. Oil and gas companies are excited about the industry; Sage Geosystems, one of the big players, is led by the former head of Shell’s fracking division. And notably, most of the big companies, including Sage, Fervo Energy, and XGS Energy (whom I have written about twice recently in these pages) are all headquartered in Big Oil’s capital of Houston, Texas.
Nuclear power has long had its own office at the Energy Department, and that won’t change. But you’d think that the other source of clean baseload power that the Trump administration has anointed as one of its preferred generating sources might get slotted in with geothermal. Instead, however, hydropower is in Robertson’s mega-office.
Unsurprisingly, the bulk of the Energy Department’s work that deals with the nation’s nuclear arsenal was largely left untouched by the changes. Perhaps the agency had enough drama from the Department of Government Efficiency’s dismissals of critical workers in the early days of the administration, which led to an embarrassing effort to reverse the firings.
As was widely expected, the reorg killed the Biden-era Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations, which the new administration had already gutted. What becomes of key programs that office managed is still a mystery. Chief among them: the hydrogen hubs.
The Energy Department yanked funding for the two regional hubs on the West Coast last month, as Heatmap’s Emily Pontecorovo reported at the time. A leaked list that the administration has yet to confirm as real proposed defunding all seven of the hubs. It’s unclear whether that may happen. If it doesn’t, it’s unclear where those billions of dollars may go. The most obvious place is under Robertson’s portfolio, ballooning the budget under her control by billions.
When Wright announced the first totally new loan issued under the agency’s in-house lender earlier this week, he trumpeted his new approach the Loan Programs Office. He wanted to refashion the entity with its lending authority of nearly $400 billion as a source of funding primarily for the nuclear industry. The first big loan issued Tuesday afternoon went to utility giant Constellation to finance the restart of the functional reactor at the Three Mile Island nuclear station. But at a press conference last month, Wright hinted at the new branding, as Emily called in this piece. It’s now the Office of Energy Dominance Financing.
The new office isn’t just the LPO, however. The $2.5 billion Transmission Facility Financing Program will also fall under the new so-called EDF — an acronym it will aptly share with France’s biggest utility, which came under state control recently as part of Paris’ efforts to refurbish and expand the country’s vast nuclear fleet.
I’ll leave it to my source to level a critique at my colleagues in this industry:
“Even in The New York Times today there’s an article that says all these offices are eliminated,” one of the sources told me. “Their names were eliminated, but a lot of the projects for whatever remains that they haven’t terminated are just being reassigned.” The Wall Street Journal had a similar angle.
The actual thing to watch for, the source said, was how job descriptions change.
“What’s going to be more telling is when they have a new, updated mission of the Office of Electricity or a new, updated mission of the Office of Critical Minerals and Energy Innovation.”