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The world’s biggest, most functional city might also be the most pedestrian-friendly. That’s not a coincidence.

For cities that want to reduce the number of cars, bike lanes are a good place to start. They are cheap, usually city-level authorities can introduce them, and they do not require you to raise taxes on people who own cars. What if you want to do something more radical though? What would a city that genuinely wanted to get the car out of its citizens’ lives in a much bigger way do? A city that wanted to make it possible for most people to live decent lives and be able to get around without needing a car, even without needing to get on a bicycle?
There is only one city on Earth I have ever visited that has truly managed this. But it happens to be the biggest city on the planet: Tokyo, the capital of Japan.
In popular imagination, at least in the West, Tokyo is both incredibly futuristic, and also rather foreign and confusing. Before I first visited, in 2017, I imagined it to be an incredibly hectic place, a noisy, bustling megacity. I was on holiday and trying to escape Nairobi, the rather sprawling, low-height, and green city I was living in at the time, and I picked Tokyo largely because I wanted to get as far away from Africa as I could. I needed a break from the traffic jams, the power cuts, the constant negotiation to achieve anything, and the heat. I was looking for an escape somewhere as different as I could think of, and I wanted to ride trains around and look at high-tech skyscrapers and not worry about getting splattered by mud walking in the street. I was expecting to feel bowled over by the height of the buildings, the sheer crush of people, and the noise.
Yet when I emerged from the train station in Shibuya, blinking jetlagged in the morning light after a night flight from Amsterdam, what actually caught me off guard was not the bustle but rather how quiet the city is. When you see cliched images of Tokyo, what invariably is shown are the enormous crowds of pedestrians crossing the roads, or Mount Fuji in the background of the futuristic skyline. I expected something like Los Angeles in Blade Runner, I suppose — futuristic and overwhelming. From photos, Tokyo can look almost unplanned, with neon signs everywhere and a huge variety of forms of architecture. You expect it to feel messy. What I experienced, however, was a city that felt almost like being in a futuristic village. It is utterly calm, in a way that is actually rather strange.
And it took me a little while to realize why. There is simply no traffic noise. No hooting, no engine noise, not even much of the noise of cars accelerating on tarmac. Because there are so few of them. Most of the time you can walk in the middle of the street, so rare is the traffic. There are not even cars parked at the side of the road. That is not true of all of Tokyo, of course. The expressways are often packed. Occasionally, I was told, particularly when it snows, or during holidays when large numbers of people try to drive out to the countryside, jams form that can trap drivers for whole days. But on most residential streets, traffic is almost nonexistent. Even the relatively few cars that you do see are invariably tiny, quiet vehicles.
Among rich cities, Tokyo has the lowest car use in the world. According to Deloitte, a management consultancy, just 12 percent of journeys are completed by private car. It might surprise you to hear that cycling is actually more popular than driving in Tokyo — it accounts for 17 percent of journeys, though the Japanese do not make as much of a big deal out of it as the Dutch do. But walking and public transport dwarf both sorts of vehicles. Tokyo has the most-used public transport system in the world, with 30 million people commuting by train each day. This may sound rather unpleasant. You have probably seen footage of the most crowded routes at rush hour, when staff literally push people onto the carriages to make space, or read about young women being groped in the crush. It happens, but it is not typical. Most of the trains I rode were busy but comfortable, and I was able to get a seat.
And what makes Tokyo remarkable is that the city was almost entirely built after the original city was mostly flattened by American bombers in the Second World War. Elsewhere in the world, cities built after the war are almost invariably car-dependent. Think of Houston, Texas, which has grown from 300,000 people in the 1950s to 10 times that now. Or England’s tiny version, Milton Keynes, which is the fastest-growing city in the country. Or almost any developing world city. Since the advent of the automobile, architects and urban planners worldwide have found it almost impossible to resist building cities around roads and an assumption that most people will drive. Tokyo somehow managed not to. It rebuilt in a much more human-centric way.
It may come as a surprise that Japan is home to the world’s biggest relatively car-free city. After all, Japan is the country that gave the world Mitsubishi, Toyota, and Nissan, and exports vehicles all over the world. And in fairness, a lot of Japanese people do own cars. Overall car ownership in Japan is about 590 vehicles per 1,000 people, which is less than America’s rate of about 800 per 1,000, but comparable to a lot of European countries. On average, there are 1.06 cars per household. But Tokyo is a big exception. In Tokyo, there are only 0.32 cars per household. Most Japanese car owners live in smaller towns and cities than the capital. The highest rate of car ownership, for example, is in Fukui Prefecture, on the western coast of Honshu, one of Japan’s least densely populated areas.
And car ownership in Japan is falling, unlike almost everywhere else on Earth. Part of the reason is just that the country is getting older and the population is falling. But it is also that more and more people live in Tokyo. Annually, Japan is losing about 0.3 percent of its population, or about half a million people a year. Greater Tokyo, however, with its population of 37 million, is shrinking by less than that, or about 0.1 percent a year. And the prefecture of Tokyo proper, with a population of 14 million, is still growing. The reason is that Tokyo generates the best jobs in Japan, and it is also an increasingly pleasant place to live. You may think of Tokyoites as being crammed into tiny apartments, but in fact, the average home in Tokyo has 65.9 square meters of livable floor space (709 square feet). That is still very small—indeed, it is less than the size of the average home in London, where the figure is 80 square meters. But the typical household in London has 2.7 people living in it. In Tokyo, it is 1.95. So per capita, people in Tokyo actually have more space than Londoners.
Overall in fact, people in Tokyo have one of the highest qualities of life in the world. A 2015 survey by Monocle magazine came to the conclusion that Tokyo is the best city on Earth in which to live, “due to its defining paradox of heart-stopping size and concurrent feeling of peace and quiet.” In 2021 The Economist ranked it fourth, after Wellington and Auckland in New Zealand, and another Japanese city, Osaka. Life expectancy overall is 84 years old, one of the highest levels of any city on the planet. A good part of this has to do with the lack of cars. Air pollution is considerably lower than in any other city of equivalent size anywhere in the world. Typical commutes are, admittedly, often fairly long, at 40 minutes each way. But they are not in awful smoggy car traffic.

So how has Tokyo managed it? Andre Sorensen, a professor of urban planning at the University of Toronto, who published a history of urban planning in Japan, told me that Japan’s history has a lot to do with it. Japan’s urbanization happened a little more like some poorer countries — quickly. At the start of the 20th century, just 15 percent of Japanese people lived in cities. Now 91 percent do, one of the highest rates of urbanization in the entire world. That rapid growth meant that Tokyo’s postwar growth was relatively chaotic. Buildings sprawled out into rice paddies, with sewage connections and power often only coming later. Electricity is still often delivered by overhead wires, not underground cables. And yet somehow this haphazard system manages to produce a relatively coherent city, and one that is much easier to get around on foot or by public transport than by car.
Part of the reason, Sorensen explained to me, is just historical chance. Japanese street layouts traditionally were narrow, much like medieval alleys in Europe. Land ownership was often very fragmented, meaning that house builders had to learn to use small plots in a way that almost never happened in Europe or America. And unlike the governments there, the government in postwar Japan was much more concerned with boosting economic growth by creating power plants and industrial yards than it was with creating huge new boulevards through neighborhoods. So the layouts never changed. According to Sorensen’s research, 35 percent of Japanese streets are not actually wide enough for a car to travel down them. More remarkably still, 86 percent are not wide enough for a car to be able to stop without blocking the traffic behind it.
Yet the much bigger reason for Tokyo’s high quality of life is that Japan does not subsidize car ownership in the way other countries do. In fact, owning a car in Tokyo is rather difficult. For one thing, cars are far more enthusiastically inspected than in America or most of Europe. Cars must be checked by officials every two years to ensure that they are still compliant, and have not been modified. That is true in Britain too, but the cost is higher than what a Ministry of Transport test costs. Even a well-maintained car can cost 100,000 yen to inspect (or around $850). On cars that are older than 10 years, the fees escalate dramatically, which helps to explain why so many Japanese sell their cars relatively quickly, and so many of them end up in East Africa or Southeast Asia. On top of that there is an annual automobile tax of up to 50,000 yen, as well as a 5 percent tax on the purchase. And then gasoline is taxed too, meaning it costs around 160 yen per liter, or about $6 a gallon, less than in much of Europe, but more than Americans accept.
And even if you are willing to pay all of the taxes, you cannot simply go and buy a car in the way that you might in most countries. To be allowed to purchase a car, you have to be able to prove that you have somewhere to park it. This approval is issued by the local police, and is known as a shako shomeisho, or “garage certificate.” Without one, you cannot buy a car. This helps to explain why the Japanese buy so many tiny cars, like the so-called Kei cars. It means they can have smaller garages. Even if the law didn’t exist though, owning a car in Japan without having a dedicated parking space for it would be a nightmare. Under a nationwide law passed in 1957, overnight street parking of any sort is completely illegal. So if you were to somehow buy a car with no place to store it, you could not simply park it on the street, because it would get towed the next morning, and you would get fined 200,000 yen (around $1,700). In fact, most street parking of any sort is illegal. There are a few exceptions, but more than 95 percent of Japanese streets have no street parking at all, even during the day.
This, rather than any beautiful architecture, explains why Tokyo’s streets feel so pleasant to walk down, or indeed to look at. There are no cars filling them up. It also means that land is actually valued properly. If you want to own a car, it means that you also have to own (or at least rent) the requisite land to keep it. In rural areas or smaller towns, this is not a huge deal, because land is relatively cheap, and so a permit might only cost 8,000 to 9,000 yen, or about $75 a month. But in Tokyo, the cost will be at least four times that. Garages in American cities can cost that much too, but in Japan there is no cheap street parking option, as in much of New York or Chicago. Most apartment buildings are constructed without any parking at all, because the developers can use the space more efficiently for housing. Only around 42 percent of condominium buildings have parking spaces for residents. Similarly, even if you own a parking space, it is almost never free to park anywhere you might take your car. Parking in Tokyo typically costs 1,000 yen an hour, or around $8.50.
This is a big disincentive to driving. Sorensen told me that when he lived in Tokyo, some wealthy friends of his owned a top-end BMW, which they replaced every few years, because they were car nuts. But because they did not have anywhere to park it near their home, if they wanted to use it, they had to take public transport (or a taxi) to get to it at its garage. As a result, they simply did not use their car very much. In their day-to- day life, they used the trains, the same as everybody else, or took taxis, because that was cheaper than picking up the car. This sort of thing probably helps to explain why the Japanese, despite relatively high levels of car ownership, do not actually drive very far. Car owners in Japan typically drive around 6,000 kilometers per year. That is about half what the average British car owner drives, and less than a third of what the average American does.
Parking rules are not, however, the limit of what keeps cars out of Tokyo. Arguably, an even bigger reason is how infrastructure has been funded in Japan. That is, by the market, rather than directly by taxes. In the 1950s and ’60s, much like Europe and the United States, Japan began building expressways. But unlike in Europe and America, it was starting from a considerably more difficult place. In 1957, Ralph J. Watkins, an American economist who had been invited to advise the Japanese government, reported that “the roads of Japan are incredibly bad. No other industrial nation has so completely neglected its highway system.” Just 23 percent of roads were paved, including just two-thirds of the only highway linking Osaka, Japan’s historical economic hub, to Tokyo.
But unlike America, the idea of making them free never seemed to cross politicians’ minds, probably because Japan in the postwar era was not the world’s richest country. Capital was not freely available. To build the roads, the national government formed corporations such as the Shuto Kōsoku-dōro Kabushiki-gaisha, or Metropolitan Expressway Company, which was formed in greater Tokyo in 1959. These corporations took out vast amounts of debt, which they had to repay, so that the Japanese taxpayer would not be burdened. That meant that tolls were imposed from the very beginning. The tolls had to cover not just the construction cost, but also maintenance and interest on the loans. Today, to drive on the Shuto Expressway costs from 300 to 1,320 yen, or $2.50 to $11 for a “standard-size” automobile. Overall, tolls in Japan are the most expensive in the world — around three times higher than the level charged on the private autoroutes in France, or on average, about 3,000 yen per 100 kilometers ($22 to drive 62 miles).
What that meant was that, from the beginning, roads did not have an unfair advantage in their competition with other forms of transport. And so in Japan, unlike in almost the entire rest of the rich world, the postwar era saw the construction of enormous amounts of rail infrastructure. Indeed, at a time when America and Britain were nationalizing and cutting their railways to cope with falling demand for train travel, in Japan, the national railway company was pouring investment into the system. The world’s first high-speed railway, the Tokaido Shinkansen, was opened in 1964 to coincide with the Tokyo Olympics, with a top speed of 210 kilometers per hour. That was almost double what trains elsewhere mostly managed. From 1964 to 1999, the number of passengers using the Shinkansen grew from 11 million annually to more than 300 million.
Sorensen told me about how in the 1950s and ’60s, the trains were a huge point of national pride for the Japanese government, a bit like car industries were elsewhere. “And justifiably! It was a fantastic invention. To say we can make electric rail go twice as fast. What an achievement.” Thanks to that, the railways ministry became a huge power center in government, rather than a neglected backwater as it often had become elsewhere. In rail, the Japanese “built up expertise in engineering, in bureaucratic resources and capacities, and political clout that just lasted,” he told me. “Whereas the road-building sector was weak.” Elsewhere, building roads became a self-reinforcing process, because as more was poured into constructing them, more people bought cars and demanded more roads. That did not happen in Japan. Instead, the growth in railway infrastructure led to growth in, well, more railway infrastructure.
If you visit Tokyo now, what you will find is that the most hectic, crowded places in the city are all around the train and subway stations. The reason is that Japan’s railway companies (the national firm was privatized in the 1980s) do not only provide railways. They are also big real estate investors. A bit like the firm that built the Metropolitan Railway in the 1930s in Britain, when Japan’s railway firms expanded service, they paid for it by building on the land around the stations. In practice, what that means is that they built lots of apartments, department stores, and supermarkets near (and directly above) railway stations, so that people can get straight off the train and get home quickly. That makes the trains more efficient, because people can get where they need to go without having to walk or travel to and from stations especially far. But it also means that the railways are incredibly profitable, because unlike in the West, they are able to profit from the improvement in land value that they create.
What this adds up to is that Tokyo is one of very few cities on Earth where travel by car is not actively subsidized, and funnily neither is public transport, and yet both work well, when appropriate. However, Tokyo is not completely alone. Several big cities across Asia have managed to avoid the catastrophe (cartastrophe?) that befell much of the western world. Hong Kong manages it nearly as well as Tokyo; there are just 76 cars per 1,000 people in the city state. So too does Singapore, with around 120 per 1,000 people. What those cities have in common, which makes them rather different from Japan, is a shortage of land and a relentless, centralized leadership that recognized early on that cars were a waste of space.
Unfortunately, replicating the Asian model in countries in Europe, America, or Australia from scratch will not be easy. We are starting with so many cars on our roads to begin with, that imposing the sorts of curbs on car ownership that I listed above is almost certainly a political nonstarter. Just look at what happens when politicians in America or Britain try to take away even a modest amount of street parking, or increase the tax on gasoline. People are already invested in cars, sadly. And thanks to that, there is also a chicken-and-egg problem. Because people are invested in cars, they live in places where the sort of public transport that makes life possible for the majority of people in Tokyo is simply not realistic. As it is, constructing rail infrastructure like Japan’s is an extraordinarily difficult task. Look at the difficulties encountered in things like building Britain’s new high-speed train link, or California’s, for example.
And yet it is worth paying attention to Tokyo precisely because it shows that vast numbers of cars are not necessary to daily life. What Tokyo shows is that it is possible for enormous cities to work rather well without being overloaded by traffic congestion. Actually, Tokyo works better than big cities anywhere else. That is why it has managed to grow so large. The trend all over the world for decades now has been toward greater wealth concentrating in the biggest metropolises. The cost of living in somewhere like New York, London, or Paris used to be marginally higher than living in a more modest city. That is no longer the case. And it reflects the fact that the benefits of living in big cities are enormous. The jobs are better, but so too are the restaurants, the cultural activities, the dating opportunities, and almost anything else you can think of. People are willing to pay for it. The high cost of living is a price signal — that is, the fact that people are willing to pay it is an indicator of the value they put on it.
Especially in this post-pandemic era where many jobs can be done from anywhere, lots of New Yorkers could easily decamp to, say, a pretty village upstate, and save a fortune in rent, or cash in on their property values. Actually, hundreds of thousands do every year (well, not only to upstate). But they are replaced by newcomers for the simple reason that New York City is, if you set aside the cost, a pretty great place to live. And yet, if everyone who would like to live in a big city is to be able to, those cities need to be able to grow more. But if they continue to grow with the assumption that the car will be the default way of getting around for a significant proportion of residents, then they will be strangled by congestion long before they ever reach anything like Tokyo’s success. People often say that London or New York are too crowded, but they are wrong. They are only too crowded if you think that it is normal for people to need space not just for them but also for the two tons of metal that they use to get around.
The sheer anger of motorists might mean that banning overnight parking on residential streets proves difficult. But if we want to be bold, some of Tokyo’s other measures are more realistic. We could, for example, do a lot more to build more housing around public transport, and use the money generated to help contribute to the network. According to the Centre for Cities, a British think tank, there are 47,000 hectares of undeveloped land (mostly farmland) within a 10-minute walk of a railway station close to London or another big city. That is enough space to build two million homes, more than half of which would be within a 45-minute commute to or from London. The reason we do not develop the land at the moment is because it is mostly Metropolitan Green Belt, a zoning restriction created in the late 1940s by the Town and Country Planning Act intended to contain cities and stop them sprawling outward. But the problem with it as it works in Britain at the moment is that it does not stop sprawl — it just pushes it further away from cities, into places where there really is no hope of not using a car.
Developing the green belt too would not be popular. People have an affection for fields near their homes, and they do not necessarily want the trains they use to be even more crowded. But there are projects that show it is possible to overcome NIMBYism. In Los Angeles in 2016, voters approved the Transit Oriented Communities Incentive Program, which creates special zoning laws in areas half a mile from a major transit stop (typically, in L.A., a light rail station). This being Los Angeles, it is fairly modest. One of the rules is that the mandatory parking minimums applied are restricted to a maximum of 0.5 car parking spaces per bedroom, and total parking is not meant to exceed more than one space per apartment, which is still rather a lot of parking. But nonetheless, it does allow developers to increase the density of homes near public transport, and it has encouraged developers to build around 20,000 new homes near public transport that probably would not have been constructed otherwise. These are small but real improvements.
Ultimately, no city will be transformed into Tokyo overnight, nor should any be, at least unless a majority of the population decides that they would like it. I am trying to persuade them; for now, not everyone is as enamored with the Japanese capital as I am. But NIMBYism and other political problems can be gradually overturned, if the arguments are made in the right way, even in the most automotive cities.
This article was excerpted from Daniel Knowles’ book Carmageddon: How Cars Make Life Worse and What to Do About It, published by Abrams Press ©2023.
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Current conditions: Another atmospheric river is deluging the West Coast, this time in the Pacific Northwest • Dozens of U.S. cities notched record high temperatures in October • At least 11 of Thailand’s southern provinces are under emergency warnings for flooding and nearly 7-foot waves amid a surge of monsoon conditions.
The 31st annual global climate summit kicked off this morning in Antalya, a Turkish resort city on the country’s southern Mediterranean coast. Known as the 31st Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, or COP31, the event marks the second year in a row that virtually every nation on Earth will gather except the United States, after President Donald Trump withdrew the country from both the landmark 2015 Paris Agreement and from the larger global body shortly after his return to office last year. The biggest item on this year’s agenda, reports my colleague Emily Pontecorvo, is the “35x35” pledge, Turkey’s proposal to electrify 35% of the world’s final energy use by 2035. Today the world uses electricity for just 21% of end-use energy. As I reported last week, the latest projections from the Rhodium Group put the likely electrification rate worldwide at 28% by 2035.
Senate negotiators on Saturday released an update to the text of the bipartisan permitting reform deal, known as the “manager’s amendment.” The new version of the Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act, or BAAJA, overhauls the provisions to make building transmission lines easier, addressing concerns that a proposal to allow federal and state permitting to begin at the same time threatens states’ power. It also adds benefits for power lines renovated with advanced transmission technologies to allow them to carry more electricity. “There’s something in these changes for everyone — environmentalists, tribes, utilities,” my colleagues Robinson Meyer and Jael Holzman wrote over the weekend, “but it remains to be seen if they put the bill into a Goldilocks zone.” Perhaps most importantly from a political perspective, the revised legislation veers away from some proposals Native American groups had called an infringement on tribal sovereignty. “Definitely not enough to satisfy all tribes — there are 575 across the U.S. — but nonetheless, notable and probably approaching something large tribes and tribes with significant interest in energy development can live with,” Julian Brave NoiseCat, a writer and the first Oscar-nominated Indigenous North American filmmaker, wrote in a post on X. Still, in a sign “that there’s real effort here to try to honor tribal consultation,” he noted that the manager’s amendment excludes the records tribes share with federal and state governments from Freedom of Information Act, which would “keep sensitive sacred sites from exposure.”
The chamber is scheduled to hold a procedural vote on the bill later today. Last night, Trump himself finally endorsed BAAJA, urging “all senators” to vote for the bill on Monday, calling it a “big win for U.S. energy independence and dominance” in a post on Truth Social.
Anthropic has struck a deal for 1.7 gigawatts of gas-fired engines to power its data centers. Valued at $3.4 billion, the Claude maker has agreed to help with engineering and construction to install the generators as part of the deal with San Antonio, Texas-based equipment supplier OnePWR Solutions, the Financial Times reported over the weekend. Anthropic stopped short of acquiring OnePWR itself, instead taking over the generator orderbook previously pledged to construction giant Caterpillar.
The deal got plenty of notice in the financial newswires, and yet the news was largely overshadowed in the artificial intelligence world by the blockbuster revelation that Jensen Huang, the chief executive of AI chipmaker Nvidia, had an extramarital relationship with a Chinese spy, prompting an investigation by his company’s board of directors.
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Jean-Luc Mélenchon, France’s far-left presidential hopeful and the No. 2 candidate behind the far-right Marine Le Pen, has pledged to shut down the 18 nuclear power plants that provide the overwhelming majority of the country’s power and render its grid one of the cleanest in Europe. “We advocate a mixed economy guided by the ecological imperative,” Mélenchon said in a speech Saturday, in which he also promised to send French warships to Gaza to confront the Israeli military head on. The current nuclear power program, he said, “is dangerous, costly, and risky. We will abandon it.” Instead, he said, France would generate all its power from renewables, buttressing wind and solar with as-yet-unproven wave and tidal power technology. “If you criticize nuclear power in the same breath as you promote marine power, your policy isn’t a clown but rather the entire circus,” Seaver Wang, an oceanographer turned energy expert at the Breakthrough Institute in the U.S., wrote in a post on X.
Meanwhile, a political crisis in remote Paraguay has cast one of Latin America’s more promising would-be nuclear newcomers into uncertainty. Just last week, a source familiar with U.S. government plans to export nuclear technology told me Paraguay was near the top of the list of countries looking to set up a civilian nuclear program under Washington’s guidance. The two nations signed a memorandum of understanding in August, and U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau visited the country just last month as part of a trade delegation. Whether the landlocked South American nation bought reactors or not, Asunción had plans to ramp up mining of uranium and titanium, Mining.com reported. But President Santiago Peña’s abrupt resignation Thursday amid the collapse of Ueno Bank appears to bring any further progress to a halt, at least for now.
China’s registrations of new wind and solar projects fell over 11% in September compared to the previous month as the number of distributed renewable projects dipped. The country registered 3,536 solar projects and 15 wind projects that month, versus 3,972 solar and 29 wind projects in August, according to a Renewables Now analysis of official government data. That isn’t to say solar is slowing down. Newly registered utility-scale solar projects more than doubled to 53 in September from 23 in August.
Democrats’ strategy of finding candidates with strong local appeal continues paying off, even on the most down-ballot of races. Over the weekend, the Associated Press declared Democrat Brian Matlock the winner of the Arizona Mine Inspector race. With a white handlebar mustache, he certainly looks the part of the Southwestern mine inspector if ever there were one.
A new version of the bill strives to address environmental and tribal concerns while strengthening some of its transmission provisions.
We now have the updated final text of the bipartisan Senate permitting deal. Will it be enough to get the bill across the finish line?
On Saturday morning, senators released a reworked version of the Bipartisan Affordability and American Jobs Act. This version, known as a “manager’s amendment” under parliamentary procedure, aims to address many of the concerns and criticisms raised about the bill and will become the official legislative text that ultimately gets a vote in the Senate. There’s something in these changes for everyone – environmentalists, tribes, utilities – but it remains to be seen if they put the bill into a Goldilocks zone.
Let’s walk through some of the most significant changes. There are a lot of changes, and we’re sure people will spend the coming weeks poring over them, but here are a few key ones.
The amendment preserves — and even strengthens — many of the bill’s most important (and praised) transmission provisions, while addressing and easing some of the loudest Republican criticisms of the bill.
The new text leaves the bill’s core transmission mechanisms intact: Every grid region will have to run a long-term planning process with its neighbors, overseen by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, focused on how it can build more interregional lines. The bill lays out how these new power lines should be paid for, via a cost allocation formula that says customers who benefit from the lines need to pay for them. And it creates a new federal siting backstop, which allows the federal government to step in and approve the route for a line if a state has refused to do so.
The amendment deals with one of the provisions that faced the most criticism from former Republican regulators and ends one — but not all — of the bill’s mandates for vertically integrated monopoly utilities, which are largely in the Southeast.
In return, it strengthens the bill’s federal backstop siting provision for transmission lines, and it makes the overall bill more useful for transmission developers. It also clarifies that transmission developers can use some of the bill’s expedited powers without needing to use all of them.
“I think there’s some really good improvements in [the new text], and they provide more flexibility for more types of projects to go through,” said Rob Gramlich, a longtime advocate of federal transmission reform and the president of Grid Strategies, a power sector consulting firm.
In the original bill, a transmission developer could apply for state permits and the FERC federal backstop permit at the same time. A former Republican FERC Commissioner Mark Christie had savaged that provision, arguing recently in Utility Dive that it “effectively renders the state proceeding meaningless, and states will perceive it exactly that way.”
Now, for some advocates, rendering the state process moot was the whole point. But it also wasn’t clear whether developers would ever actually go to FERC and states simultaneously. Doing so would shove a finger in the eye of state regulators, essentially telling them, “We can do this the easy way or the hard way.” The amendment removes the possibility of a simultaneous process; now developers must go to states for a year before they apply for the federal backstop.
The new version of the bill also exempts vertically integrated utilities that aren’t in an electricity market from an otherwise mandatory new process that will require utilities to plan their long-term transmission and their power plant expansion at the same time. That new process is inspired by the planning process used in the Southwest Power Pool, a Midwestern electricity market Midwestern grid.
The Southeast’s monopoly utilities, which are vertically integrated and don’t participate in a regional transmission organization, had disliked that provision, and it wasn’t clear the bill as written actually worked for their operations. That requirement has now been removed from the bill. Utilities won another victory by preserving existing rights of first refusal to build transmission infrastructure in federal law.
But they didn’t win every fight. These utilities will still be subject to the mandate requiring them to participate in an interregional planning process for transmission.
And the utilities will remain subject to a provision, particularly praised by anti-monopoly advocates, that allows states and FERC to exercise oversight over local transmission projects that can drive up electricity costs. The new bill clarifies that state public utility regulators are responsible for asking FERC to investigate these types of projects, and that a utility can invite scrutiny even if it’s replacing an old line, not just building a new one.
“I am relieved that the section survived generally, given what a target this was for utility lobbying. It was strengthened significantly by covering replacement of local facilities in addition to new-build,” David Pomerantz, the executive director of the utility watchdog the Energy and Policy Institute, said in a statement.
In return, Democrats secured a few big changes in the bill that could benefit transmission developers. First, transmission projects will now be able to use the bill’s cost allocation formula even if they don’t use the federal backstop authority. Second, transmission developers will be able to use the bill’s cost allocation formula for only part of their projects.
This makes the bill better in a few ways for transmission developers. First, a developer could get a route entirely approved by the states without having to come up with a new way to pay for it — they can use the formula that’s already in the bill. It also means a power line could use the formula to monetize one of its benefits to the grid without using them all. That could sweeten the economics for projects meant to, say, arbitrage power between two regions, allowing it to make money off its reliability benefits without altering its broader economics.
The amendment also clarifies that the new federal backstop siting authority applies to state-owned land. That closes a potential loophole in which a state government could acquire land from a property owner in order to block a federally approved project from getting built.
The bill also makes some technical changes to the 230-kilovolt floor for projects that can use the federal backstop. It establishes that a line using advanced conductoring technology — which generally allows more electricity at lower voltage — can use the backstop even if it’s not at least 230 kilovolts. But it must have a throughput roughly similar to what a conventional line of 230 kilovolts would have.
The amendment also makes it clear that a utility can’t decline to upgrade a piece of infrastructure — even one at lower voltage — in order to block a transmission line. In 2021, the utility NextEra had fought a major power line in Maine because it required the utility to upgrade a single power circuit at its Seabrook nuclear plant in New Hampshire.
These provisions broadly strengthen the most popular parts of the bill and may address some concerns from southeastern utilities, which could have torpedoed the bill in the House of Representatives.
At the same time, new text attempts to assuage opposition in both the environmental and tribal advocacy spaces, and it’s undeniable that on first blush, the manager’s amendment does address complaints from those camps about the bill. But as we’ll explain however, it’s unclear if this will be good enough for either community to lay down their arms.
First, Senate negotiators clearly took complaints about the “project certainty” provision seriously, including by dealing with language that would allegedly protect unlawful actions. Under the new bill text, agencies will be explicitly allowed to revoke or alter permits “in response to an order by a court”. The prior text of the bill did not grant federal agencies this explicit jurisdiction and said it could only rely on court orders to make those permit changes if a judge required it. As our colleague Emily Pontecorvo recently wrote, some environmental lawyers were concerned that this original text would inadvertently protect individual permits granted under policies that violated the law.
Other changes are similarly geared towards addressing complaints in the environmental legal space. The original text of the bill allowed companies to sue the federal government for “disparate treatment” against their industry, which would theoretically assist renewable energy companies gain legal leverage against the Trump administration’s permitting freeze. However, the old text used a 5-year baseline of past projects for determining “disparate treatment,” which could mean the president’s anti-wind and pro-fossil actions weren’t built into the baseline. The new bill extends that baseline to 10 years, potentially diluting the influence of Trumpian permitting practices over the next administration.
New language would explicitly stipulate that court settlements brought under these lawsuits must be approved by a court, an apparent nod to claims from critics that this provision could encourage more offshore wind buyouts.
The new text also cuts out or modifies reforms to the National Historic Preservation Act geared towards addressing complaints from Native American tribes. It strikes a controversial attempt to define “property of traditional religious or cultural importance” that was in the original text, and it eliminates a much-maligned provision that would let the Interior Secretary assume the role of a tribal historic preservation officer in certain cases.
These changes were insufficient to thaw the bloc of tribes opposed to the bill. The 106 Coalition, a group of tribal organizations including the National College of American Indians, sent a statement to media saying they’ll still oppose the bill and want the entire section of NHPA changes removed. The leader of the Coalition of Large Tribes, which has pushed for technical fixes to the bill but not opposed it outright, said in a statement it was “grateful to see many positive changes for tribes” but added there was “still room for improvement.”
Lastly, the new version of the bill adds another provision to address concerns that it doesn’t do enough to address the national backlash to data centers, which opponents have argued is necessary.
As we’ve explained, the bill already would create the toughest measure against data centers ever enacted – a ratepayer protection program that would let states and utilities require data centers to pay full freight for system upgrades. And now the bill would additionally create a new federal Data Center Community Assistance Program within the Energy Department whereby local communities could request assistance from agencies to get information and technical expertise on how data centers work and what impacts specific projects could have on their areas. The language mirrors legislation introduced last month by Sens. John Curtis of Utah and Lisa Blunt Rochester of Delaware.
Such a program could be a big deal. But it’s important to emphasize that the text leaves a lot of details to be worked out. It does not say how this program would be set up within the Energy Department and the provision does not explicitly lay out funding authorization language.
The amendment also closes a loophole that might have allowed data centers with behind-the-meter natural gas power plants to profit by selling excess power to the grid. The original bill contained a provision meant to force grids to allow more residential batteries or the creation of virtual power plants. But that provision, as written, could have applied to behind-the-meter gas plants at data centers. The new text clarifies that the requirement only applies to resources below 5 megawatts, which is smaller than a data center power source.
It remains to be seen whether these changes and the myriad other tweaks to the bill’s project certainty and historic preservation titles will win over lawmakers previously hesitant to vote yes.
The Wilderness Society, whose president is Tracy Stone-Manning, Biden’s former director of the Bureau of Land Management, released a statement shortly after the new bill text was released reaffirming its opposition. “Americans deserve permitting reform that isn’t crafted behind closed doors and rushed to the Senate floor,” Manning said in a statement. Meanwhile, House Natural Resources Jared Huffman provided comments to Punchbowl News reacting to the text that said some of the changes to the permit certainty provision represented an “improvement” but “we could improve it further in this and other areas with a hearing and a more open negotiation process with more Democrats in the room.”
It’s unclear these voices would ultimately ever support this bill. “Manager’s [amendment] does a good job of accounting for the stated concerns of anybody looking to get to yes,” Liam Donovan, a veteran GOP political strategist, wrote on the social network X.
The Senate is scheduled to vote Monday on a motion invoking cloture – ending debate – on the permitting bill, per the Senate cloakroom. The motion will require at least 60 votes to pass. Senators are probably hoping for far more than 61 votes though, because as we’ve explained, House legislative rules may require overwhelming bipartisan support to get the measure to the president’s desk.
The “35x35” electrification pledge and an AI pledge are on the table.
World leaders are flocking to the Mediterranean resort town of Antalya, Turkey, this weekend for the 31st United Nations Climate Change Conference, also known as COP31. The U.S., of course, will once again not attend, as President Trump not only withdrew the country from the Paris Agreement but also from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the umbrella group that organizes the annual conferences. Still, 194 other governments will be there, putting their heads together on how to move another few inches toward a safer future.
This year, as with the last several convenings, the meeting arrives against a backdrop of geopolitical instability, worsening climate impacts, and growing concern about energy security and affordability. While conflicts like the Iran war in some ways bolster the case for the energy transition by surfacing the risks of fossil fuel dependence, prioritizing energy security can manifest as countries turning inward and showing less willingness to work for the global good.
Perhaps the biggest item on this year’s agenda is the “35x35” pledge, Turkey’s proposal to electrify 35% of the world’s final energy use by 2035, up from about 23% today. That would mean switching from gas-powered cars to electric vehicles and from burning fuels for heat to electric heat pumps. It would not necessarily mean generating all of the electricity to power those devices from clean sources, although countries have committed to triple renewable energy capacity during previous COPs. Turkey itself does not have a plan to phase out fossil fuels, and its use of coal and natural gas-fired power plants has been growing alongside renewables.
It’s not yet clear whether Turkey will encourage countries to sign onto the pledge outside of the main negotiations or try to get it into the final decision text of the conference. In a twist, the conference has two countries sharing the presidency this year, with Turkey playing host and overseeing the “action agenda” — the announcements, commitments, and dealmaking that happen outside the official negotiations — and its co-chair, Australia, mediating the formal talks.
In addition to the electrification goal, Turkey is also inviting countries to sign an artificial intelligence pledge declaring a “shared ambition to make AI part of the climate solution — sustainably powered, efficiently designed, transparently measured and available to all.” The pledge has no teeth, however, as it explicitly states that it creates “no new obligations” and notes that it should be implemented according to national priorities and circumstances.
Although there will be no big agreement like there was in Paris in 2015, the two weeks of talks will end, per usual, with a consensus document that summarizes the outcomes of the negotiations. The final text from last year’s conference in Belém, Brazil, set a new goal to triple finance for climate adaptation by 2035. Countries also agreed to create a “Just Transition Mechanism,” a program to help fossil fuel-based economies navigate the socioeconomic consequences of shifting to clean energy. But the final text at COP30 did not ultimately mention the creation of a roadmap to transition away from fossil fuels, despite more than 80 countries supporting the idea, and didn’t, in fact, mention “fossil fuels” at all.
Much of the work this year will be about building on those outcomes. The climate adaptation finance goal, for example, is still fuzzy, as the parties did not agree on a baseline year from which to triple the funding, or define what types of finance count toward the goal, meaning it’s unclear what the actual target amount for 2035 is. The Just Transition Mechanism is similarly skeletal — negotiators will need to hammer out how to operationalize it into something useful. Countries are also supposed to make progress on the Global Goal on Adaptation, an as-yet ill-defined goal first established in the Paris Agreement that negotiators are still working out how to implement.
Then there’s the overarching theme of finance. As I’ve written in the past, every annual climate conference is ultimately a fight over money — specifically how much developed countries are sending to developing countries to help them fight climate change and respond to its effects.
To date, countries have agreed to mobilize $1.3 trillion annually in climate finance from all sources for developing countries by 2035, with $300 specifically coming from developed countries. Climate finance reached record levels in 2024, the most recent year with comprehensive data, with total global flows hitting $2 trillion and funding from developed to developing countries reaching $136.7 billion.
But progress is uneven. Only 2% of global investment in renewable energy over the past two decades went to Africa, said Brian Mukhaya, a senior manager on the Clean Air Task Force’s Africa team, during a recent media briefing. Finance challenges may also collide with the conference’s electrification goal. More than 550 million people in sub-Saharan Africa lack access to electricity, Mukhaya said, and the continent will need seven to eight times current investment levels to achieve universal electricity access by 2030. Also, while the rising cost of capital is becoming an impediment to building clean energy projects everywhere in the world, the problem is acute in Africa, where the average cost of capital for power-sector investments is three to five times higher than in Europe and North America.
At COP31, negotiators will try to make progress on questions such as what form climate finance should take (grants, concessional loans, private finance, etc), how it can be more effectively distributed, and what it should be used for.
Another question hanging over this year’s conference is whether the final text will acknowledge the likelihood of surpassing 1.5 degrees Celsius of warming above pre-industrial levels, the more ambitious target laid out in the Paris Agreement. Last year’s decision text contained a tacit admission, with countries resolving to limit “the magnitude and duration of any temperature overshoot.” Doing so requires a more serious discussion of carbon removal strategies than delegates have engaged in to date.
With the world seemingly careening past the 1.5 degrees target, the annual climate talks have lost some of their luster. Critics increasingly call for a new approach. Ani Dasgupta, the president and CEO of the World Resources Institute, for example, wants the COPs to center more on accountability and holding countries to their commitments. He also recommends developing a new decision-making process that does not allow a handful of countries to block decisions. Since the substance of the negotiations is becoming more and more about how to finance the transition, he argues the conference should also broaden its tent to bring in finance ministers and central banks.
“Where we are today is different from 1992 when COPs were set up,” he said during a recent press call. “The world is different. The broader needs are different. We are at a different place in the transition. And we actually haven't reformed the system.”