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The EV transition is facing a reality check. Can the planet afford it?

Once, it seemed like a major coup d’etat in the global war on carbon emissions: The United Kingdom, even under the conservative leadership of Prime Minister Boris Johnson at the time, announced in 2020 that it was 10 years away from banning the sale of new diesel and gasoline cars. In other words, any new cars sold in 2030 and beyond — and 1.6 million of them were purchased last year — would need to be zero-emission vehicles, likely electric cars but also some hydrogen cars as well.
Fast forward a bit to a year that’s seen more uneven EV adoption than many anticipated, a situation exacerbated by a shaky post-pandemic global economy. Now, the British government under Prime Minister Rishi Sunak hits reverse: Did we say 2030? Oh, we mean 2035 instead.
Sunak announced this week that the UK will, in his words, “ease the transition to electric vehicles,” allowing sales of new internal combustion cars until 2035. His decision is a disappointing one for climate reasons and, allegedly, even for some automakers hinging big hopes and potentially trillions of dollars on transitioning to EVs. (More on that later.) But the bigger question is, is this rollback just the start of a bigger trend?
Unfortunately, it probably is. Because what we’re finding with EVs is that saying you’re going to do something is a lot easier than actually doing it.
Sunak’s decision quickly outraged scientists and green groups, especially since it came during Climate Week, a time when leaders from all over the world (including Prince William) gathered in New York to discuss how to mitigate the greatest crisis of our lifetimes. It even angered some drivers in the U.K., according to The Guardian; people who were counting on a more robust used EV market and now worry about a slower rollout for public charging.
Transparently, I’m no expert on the U.K.’s climate politics. My own country gives me plenty of headaches on that front, thanks very much. But Sunak’s points aren’t entirely unreasonable here. He blames the high cost of EVs and fears an effectively all-electric new car market will put an undue financial burden on ordinary people already squeezed by inflation, high energy costs, and an uncertain economy. “We seem to have defaulted to an approach which will impose unacceptable costs on hard-pressed British families,” Sunak said in his speech this week. And he’s not wrong; as is the case in the U.S., EVs are still considerably more expensive than internal combustion cars, and Britain has its challenges with a woefully inadequate and unreliable charging infrastructure.
I’ll also give Sunak, who like Johnson is a conservative, some credit for actually admitting that climate change is an existential problem. “No one can watch the floods in Libya or the extreme heat in Europe this summer, and doubt that it is real and happening,” he said in his remarks this week, while touting Britain’s gains in reducing carbon and fighting pollution. That’s more than we get here in America, where our conservatives can barely admit that human-driven global warming is real — let alone say we need to do anything about it. (The bar is extraordinarily low over here!) Finally, Sunak is also not entirely off-course when he says the 2035 target aligns with what Germany, Canada, Sweden, and U.S. states like New York and California are planning too.
But that’s about as magnanimous as I’m willing to be here with Sunak’s arbitrary-seeming decision. It’s extremely unclear what Sunak expects to happen by giving this an extra five years, except further delay solving some of the very problems he describes here; after all, more EVs on the road and more EV production in Britain (thanks to increased demand) will lower prices the same as any consumer product, and push the charging infrastructure forward, too. Any improvements on those fronts just lost a sense of urgency that could’ve made them happen sooner.
Then there’s the domino effect problem. At worst, this move could provide ammunition for those governments — and car companies, and energy providers, and anyone else crucial to this transition — to slow-walk a move to zero-emission transportation.
If the U.K. can move its target date back, why wouldn’t Germany, which is also fretting about what this shift means for its ultra-important car industry? Why wouldn’t New York or California, which are struggling in similar ways with high costs of living, housing affordability, and the challenge of building out vast and reliable charging networks? (Yes, even California isn’t good enough there yet.)
And is five years “enough” to stave off intense EV competition from China? What does “enough” even mean in that context? Moving the targets, as Sunak has done, feels like a step away from what was once such an ambitious move for the United Kingdom — a country that, in spite of all of these challenges, is seeing fast and record EV growth this year; it could be as high as 23% of the market in 2024, about twice what America’s tracking for. It’s making progress on the electric front, so why kneecap that progress now?
Then there are the automakers themselves; the phrase “trust, but verify” always comes to mind when I hear about their commitments to going all-electric. Not all of them are setting firm dates to swear off internal combustion. But most, if not all, are making aggressive and enormous investments into EVs and battery plants; any delays or uneven regulations could throw a wrench into those plans, leading them to invest a ton of money into cars people may not want to buy.
Some of them even hit back at Sunak’s decision, including officials from Kia and Volkswagen; "Our business needs three things from the U.K. government: ambition, commitment, and consistency. A relaxation of 2030 would undermine all three," Ford U.K. Chair Lisa Brankin said. It could also be equally troublesome for the U.K.’s perpetually beleaguered auto industry. Just last week, Mini’s parent company BMW announced a major investment to make the brand fully electric and keep production British instead of Chinese — all by 2030, too. Mini’s future finally seemed secure after years of uncertainty between Brexit and the decline of small car sales; now it gets hit by a curve ball (or whatever soccer, cricket or rugby equivalent fits best) from its own government that will torpedo demand for all those new EVs for years to come.
At the same time, many automakers are hedging their bets here too, even if they won’t admit it openly. Ultimately, their duty is to shareholders, not the planet. In the U.S., Ford is dialing back some of its aggressive EV targets and focusing a little more on hybrid cars amid uneven electric adoption and production troubles this year. General Motors has committed to going all-electric eventually, but it’s also coming out with a new gasoline V8 to power its next generation of big trucks and SUVs, which drive basically all of its profits. (They’re not even hybrid engines.) And other automakers would rather rely on a network of parts suppliers, factories and dealers they’ve set up over a century to sell gas cars than make an electric pivot they won’t all survive.
In other words, give them an excuse — say, pushing back internal combustion bans — and they may not do it at all. I could easily see a reality where a car company like GM, which has committed to going all-electric by 2035, says it’s going to be 2040 now. And then 2045. And then, “Look at all these efficient gasoline cars we have now!” or “But have you seen the new Escalade? We’re throwing in the air filtration system as standard — massaging seats, too!” Like I said: trust, but verify.
In short, I fear the British government’s decision this week will lead other governments and their leaders to dial back some of their most aggressive climate commitments, even if they take this challenge more seriously than much of America does. It’s like a crack in a dam: It sometimes starts with just a few small ones right before the flood happens. After all, even the ultra-tough European Union left the door open to internal combustion sales past 2035, provided they run on deeply unproven “e-fuels.”
Sunak is right when he says this will be a difficult transition to zero-emission cars — which will almost certainly be EVs and not other types of vehicles in the near term. It’s hard and expensive. The automakers probably also hate it, deep down, because it’s hard and expensive. And no one should believe the world can “fix” climate change with EVs, especially when they’re $60,000 SUVs.
But moving to zero-emission cars is about laying the long-term groundwork for a world where automotive transportation creates vastly less pollution than it does now. For the United Kingdom, that goal just moved five more years down the road. Let’s hope it doesn’t move any further.
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The data center boom is everywhere you look in U.S. economic and emissions data.
This is an edition of Heatmap Daily, an evening review of the day’s news written by our executive editor. Sign up for it here.
It isn’t exactly a new thought, but I’ve been struck recently by how many trends in America’s economic and environmental data are fundamentally about the data center boom and the return of electricity demand:
First, the Energy Information Administration reported this week that U.S. emissions grew by more than 2% last year, driven by surging electricity demand and an increase in coal-fired generation. What caused that higher power demand? New factories and data centers — as well as record summertime cooling demand.
Second, many of the new factories driving that higher power demand are themselves producing goods that are … let’s say … data center-adjacent. There are the enormous new semiconductor fabs, of course. But Ford and General Motors have also set up new production lines (or repurposed old ones) to manufacture grid-scale batteries to meet power demand.
Third, take a look at the recent U.S. spending on private non-residential construction — in other words, everything American companies are building that is not houses, condos, or apartments.
The construction industry’s spent almost $60 billion on data centers over the past year, which is more than it spent on all other office buildings combined (and more than it spent building warehouses, too). Just a handful of categories — data centers, power plants, electricity infrastructure, and certain kinds of electronics manufacturing — now make up a third of all U.S. private non-residential construction investment. They’ve never made up such a large share of construction spending since data collection began in 2014.
As The New York Times recently noted, the American economy is unusually dependent on the American stock market right now — and the stock market is unusually dependent on artificial intelligence. This week, investors started to balk at the enormous spending hyperscalers are planning to keep building out the AI boom; Alphabet’s shares dropped 8% this week after it boosted its planned 2026 capital expenditure and signaled 2027 will be even bigger. If the data center boom started to slow down in earnest, then more than just that budget will change.
Speaking of which, my colleague Emily Pontecorvo wrote earlier this week about how many businesses are struggling to even estimate their carbon emissions from artificial intelligence. The carbon accounting startup Watershed recently unveiled a new formula to help companies get a sense of their AI-related emissions.
But even that formula is still limited by the amount of data hyperscalers publish — and they don’t publish that much. Google, for instance, is the only AI company that has (laudably) provided estimates of its emissions on a per-prompt basis. Yet no company has published its per-token emissions, or how emissions sync up with particular models or regions.
So Emily asked Google: Why aren’t you — or any other model provider — disclosing this kind of data yet?
The tech company didn’t get back to us until after we’d published Emily’s story. But its response was interesting enough that I wanted to quote some of it here.
The problem is “industry consensus,” Cooper Elsworth, a Google spokesperson, told us. “There is currently very little consensus on how to comprehensively and fairly measure the serving environmental impact of generative AI (such as text generation),” he wrote. “Without standardized, ‘apples-to-apples’ frameworks, it is difficult to compare different providers accurately.”
That’s partly because energy use — and emissions data — can vary from site to site and depend on “custom-built hardware, software compilers, and advanced inference techniques.” And he claimed Google doesn’t always have the measurement hardware in place to provide such specific estimates: “Providing precise, repeatable data requires highly advanced measurement infrastructure,” he said. “For example, software-based energy monitoring tools often suffer from sampling biases. For our study, we had to step away from top-down averages and directly measure actual energy at the physical power supply unit (PSU) level across our deployed fleet. Not all providers have the telemetry or data sets required to benchmark their operations at this level of granularity.”
Read Emily’s story to understand the other reasons why estimating — or even “guesstimating” — AI-related carbon emissions is so challenging.
A conversation with Emma Uridge of the Kansas Health Institute.
This week’s conversation is with Emma Uridge, analyst with the Kansas Health Institute. Uridge spent copious hours analyzing state and local laws on data center development to best understand how policymakers are responding to the potential environmental public health impacts of large AI infrastructure, including power and water. The report, which came out this week, also goes in depth into those health impacts. I reached out to her to discuss what she sees as must-watch territory for our readers on this emerging policy arena.
Our conversation was lightly edited for clarity.
What is actually being done on policy when it comes to data centers — beyond moratoria of course?
So first I’d like to just talk about the point of moratoria. It’s helpful to talk about how these policies emerge in the first place. One area where moratoria are helpful is when a data center is proposed but the county has no approach for how they’d like to potentially regulate them. That’s temporary, most of the time. It lets local governments conduct research on the various impacts and also negotiate community benefits, ones that can mitigate any potential negative impacts — like Lancaster Pennsylvania, which instituted a community benefit agreement that maximized the potential benefits of development while mitigating what large data centers can do. That agreement looked at capping municipal water use at 20,000 gallons per day and requiring 100% clean energy. It had financial penalties for non-compliance. The company also committed $20 million to their local economic development and clean energy fund. There are ways to negotiate with developers.
We also see amendments to existing zoning. Data center proposals are increasingly popping up in rural areas, many of which are unzoned, so there’s no way a county can negotiate unless there’s a moratorium in place.
Other policy solutions include different performance standards or requiring on-site renewable energy, like what Jefferson County, Missouri, looked at. Also setback requirements, mandatory noise buffers, ending by-right zoning.
Where are local governments getting ideas for regulating data centers?
A lot of the technical information comes from developers. That can in cases be seen as a biased source of information. I wouldn’t say there’s a dedicated group providing assistance to local governments when a project is proposed — which is a similar story to wind industry development, where we have only a handful of consultants who provide technical advice. It can be really helpful to get a multi-disciplinary approach to hearing information. It can be helpful to have the utility commission, public health folks, those in academia, as well as the developer.
As of right now, especially in rural areas, local governments have a hard task of balancing pushback while getting the most accurate, evidence-based, neutral information to make decisions. That balance can be contentious.
What is the federal government doing on data center policy? How is the Trump administration approaching it?
A few things there. In the early days, the drive was for AI expansion and to be competitive with foreign adversaries. Now due to the amount of public pushback in red and blue localities and a more cautious approach.
I’m not seeing a lot of actual policy movement at this time.
I know the EPA is looking at the chemicals used in cooling data centers because when that water is cycled through the system, some of it is discharged into the water system, so they’re looking at the Toxic Substances and Control Act for monitoring that.
How much of an impact does this minimal federal role have on industry behavior?
Y’know, this isn’t specific to data centers. This is true for all kinds of large-scale development: there’s a need to require some sort of federal monitoring and regulation.
That’s where I see an emerging role for public health. At the federal level, there could be policy movement towards requiring some sort of environmental monitoring at data centers to make sure they’re operating responsibility. Looking at specific water use relative to water availability and what happens when there’s a time of severe, persistent drought. With air quality too — we’ve seen areas where the grid isn’t as reliable so their diesel generators are kicking on more and affecting air quality for residents.
We’re just not seeing all of that right now. We need corporate disclosure.
What do you see as the most important public health impacts from data center development?
It varies by localities. The most discussed obviously is water usage. One thing I’d note about my conversations with folks enthusiastic around emerging tech is, there are still questions that need to be asked about the capacity of localities to support a data center. Like a small town in Kansas may only be using 40% of their water for their utility needs. If a data center came online, how much of that water goes to the data center?
One area underexplored within the public health discipline is energy poverty and energy security. The ability of a household to meet the needs of everything energy provides in our lives. It’s known we have an aging electric grid but we’re not talking enough about large-scale blackouts when the grid is not sufficient to support some of these new data centers.
Plus more of the week’s big development fights.
1. Laramie County, Wyoming — Meta is fighting the fine it received in the Cheyenne data center water pollution controversy, and the conflict between the tech giant and the city’s small board of public utilities is continuing to spill out into the public.
2. Niagara County, New York — This county just rejected a solar project’s highway work permits in a show of retaliation against the state’s Office of Renewable Energy Siting.
3. Barron County, Wisconsin — The anti-solar protest is the new campaign stop in deep red Wisconsin.
4. Chesapeake, Virginia — A large battery storage project on the Virginia coastline is on the rocks amidst rampant local opposition.
5. Lewis County, West Virginia — West Virginia is now a key battleground in the fight over transmission, as a line spanning all of West Virginia and Maryland — and cutting through Data Center Alley in Virginia — causes compounding consternation.