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Key projects for the Energy Department’s hydrogen hubs are dropping like flies. And it’s really not obvious why.
Three hubs DOE selected for potential federal support have lost projects that were linchpins. Industrial giant Fortescue is no longer publicly committing to a hydro-powered hydrogen production plant proposed in Washington state that was key to the Pacific Northwest hub. News of a pause at the project was previously reported, but the company notably declined to even say the project was still getting built when asked about it this week.
“While Fortescue will continue to maintain a portfolio of other projects for the future, our financial discipline always comes first. We will never do projects that are not currently economically viable,” the company said in a statement provided to me this morning.
Meanwhile CNX, a natural gas company, has indefinitely put the kibosh on a blue hydrogen ammonia plant in West Virginia crucial to the Appalachian hydrogen hub known as ARCH2. Marathon Petroleum’s midstream subsidiary MPLX also confirmed to me they’ve canceled a hydrogen storage facility planned for that hub, and Chemours is no longer involved with the hub either.
Another blue hydrogen ammonia plant in North Dakota crucial to a different hub – known as the Heartland hub – has been canceled by Marathon and TC Energy.
In other words: a year after the Biden administration made a big announcement about the seven hubs that could potentially receive billions of dollars in government funding, almost half of them are running into serious trouble.
The companies that have quietly pulled out or paused projects are laying blame on implementation of the federal hydrogen production tax credit, claiming rules enforcing the “three pillars” and carbon intensity requirements are too onerous. Meanwhile critics of the hydrogen hubs are seizing on project cancellations and delays to argue against their construction outright; the Ohio River Valley Institute, an environmental group opposed to the ARCH2 hydrogen hub, has received a lot of press in recent days for a report claiming the hub is “coming apart.”
I’m already hearing whispers from industry insiders in D.C. who are trying to spin these cancellations as evidence the credit implementation has been too favorable to climate activists and is constraining growth in the nascent hydrogen space.
But what’s really going on?
Conversations with experts and stakeholders indicate to me this could be evidence of broader macroeconomic issues hitting the hydrogen industry, from inflation pushing up the price of electrolyzers to the stubbornly low price of natural gas. We saw this with the Plug Power project in New York, which we were first to report problems with. These market issues may be overpowering the subsidies and demand-side benefits of the bipartisan infrastructure law and Inflation Reduction Act.
These hiccups may also be a calm before a storm of hydrogen investment and a reshuffling of capital that’ll become more evident after the IRA’s production tax credit is fully implemented with final regulations. Perhaps it’ll take final rules to see the companies supportive of the “three pillars” move more projects forward.
It could also be a mixture of these things and other factors, like issues with the specific sites companies had selected for their plants.
No matter the cause for these hubs stuttering, these projects falling out of the fold is a shock to no one, especially supporters of the “three pillars” approach to the tax credit. Though it may indicate flaws with a disorganized approach to the energy transition.
“I’m not surprised if at the end of the day some of the many projects supported by DOE are not viable in the end,” said Jesse Jenkins, an assistant professor at Princeton University and expert in energy systems engineering. In addition to co-hosting Heatmap’s Shift Key podcast, Jenkins leads the REPEAT Project, which produced influential policy analysis supporting the “three pillars” approach to Treasury’s implementation of the hydrogen production tax credit.
Irrespective of the reasons, it’s important to remember that on some level both industry and the Biden administration stumbled into this mess. That’s because Congress passed the bipartisan infrastructure law mandating the creation and financing of these hubs before the IRA was even introduced. The infrastructure law itself required DOE to start soliciting proposals for hub funding mere months after it was enacted. This means the hub program was crafted independent of a tax subsidy boosting supply.
The hubs may be lobbying for a specific version of the hydrogen production credit to be implemented, as many D.C. lobbyists like to point out, but the program wasn’t referenced in the tax credit’s statute either.
As Jenkins put it, any conflict between the hubs and tax credit provisions is evidence “that reflects that many of the projects [selected] are not compliant.”
Biden administration officials spoke to me for a half hour this morning about the canceled projects on the condition of anonymity to candidly discuss the tax credit and hubs. To them, this can be explained as the process working as intended, and they emphasized how the credit and hub are independent programs. They also expect more capital to be unleashed after the credit is finalized, as companies who’ve supported the “three pillars” get certainty to make final investment decisions.
The administration’s view sounded akin to the optimistic vision relayed to me by Clean Air Task Force’s Conrad Schneider: “This is what progress looks like. It’s slow, it’s steady. It’s not [a] steady state though.”
My take? This is further proof we live in a disorganized energy transition. So far in The Fight, we’ve covered the struggles to get projects built because of opposing forces at a grassroots level. That same dynamic applies to the federal climate programs incentivizing a switch from carbon-intensive business practices. And sometimes, there’ll be tug-of-war competing interests between the climate programs themselves.
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A war of attrition is now turning in opponents’ favor.
A solar developer’s defeat in Massachusetts last week reveals just how much stronger project opponents are on the battlefield after the de facto repeal of the Inflation Reduction Act.
Last week, solar developer PureSky pulled five projects under development around the western Massachusetts town of Shutesbury. PureSky’s facilities had been in the works for years and would together represent what the developer has claimed would be one of the state’s largest solar projects thus far. In a statement, the company laid blame on “broader policy and regulatory headwinds,” including the state’s existing renewables incentives not keeping pace with rising costs and “federal policy updates,” which PureSky said were “making it harder to finance projects like those proposed near Shutesbury.”
But tucked in its press release was an admission from the company’s vice president of development Derek Moretz: this was also about the town, which had enacted a bylaw significantly restricting solar development that the company was until recently fighting vigorously in court.
“There are very few areas in the Commonwealth that are feasible to reach its clean energy goals,” Moretz stated. “We respect the Town’s conservation go als, but it is clear that systemic reforms are needed for Massachusetts to source its own energy.”
This stems from a story that probably sounds familiar: after proposing the projects, PureSky began reckoning with a burgeoning opposition campaign centered around nature conservation. Led by a fresh opposition group, Smart Solar Shutesbury, activists successfully pushed the town to drastically curtail development in 2023, pointing to the amount of forest acreage that would potentially be cleared in order to construct the projects. The town had previously not permitted facilities larger than 15 acres, but the fresh change went further, essentially banning battery storage and solar projects in most areas.
When this first happened, the state Attorney General’s office actually had PureSky’s back, challenging the legality of the bylaw that would block construction. And PureSky filed a lawsuit that was, until recently, ongoing with no signs of stopping. But last week, shortly after the Treasury Department unveiled its rules for implementing Trump’s new tax and spending law, which basically repealed the Inflation Reduction Act, PureSky settled with the town and dropped the lawsuit – and the projects went away along with the court fight.
What does this tell us? Well, things out in the country must be getting quite bleak for solar developers in areas with strident and locked-in opposition that could be costly to fight. Where before project developers might have been able to stomach the struggle, money talks – and the dollars are starting to tell executives to lay down their arms.
The picture gets worse on the macro level: On Monday, the Solar Energy Industries Association released a report declaring that federal policy changes brought about by phasing out federal tax incentives would put the U.S. at risk of losing upwards of 55 gigawatts of solar project development by 2030, representing a loss of more than 20 percent of the project pipeline.
But the trade group said most of that total – 44 gigawatts – was linked specifically to the Trump administration’s decision to halt federal permitting for renewable energy facilities, a decision that may impact generation out west but has little-to-know bearing on most large solar projects because those are almost always on private land.
Heatmap Pro can tell us how much is at stake here. To give you a sense of perspective, across the U.S., over 81 gigawatts worth of renewable energy projects are being contested right now, with non-Western states – the Northeast, South and Midwest – making up almost 60% of that potential capacity.
If historical trends hold, you’d expect a staggering 49% of those projects to be canceled. That would be on top of the totals SEIA suggests could be at risk from new Trump permitting policies.
I suspect the rate of cancellations in the face of project opposition will increase. And if this policy landscape is helping activists kill projects in blue states in desperate need of power, like Massachusetts, then the future may be more difficult to swallow than we can imagine at the moment.
And more on the week’s most important conflicts around renewables.
1. Wells County, Indiana – One of the nation’s most at-risk solar projects may now be prompting a full on moratorium.
2. Clark County, Ohio – Another Ohio county has significantly restricted renewable energy development, this time with big political implications.
3. Daviess County, Kentucky – NextEra’s having some problems getting past this county’s setbacks.
4. Columbia County, Georgia – Sometimes the wealthy will just say no to a solar farm.
5. Ottawa County, Michigan – A proposed battery storage facility in the Mitten State looks like it is about to test the state’s new permitting primacy law.
A conversation with Jeff Seidman, a professor at Vassar College.
This week’s conversation is with Jeff Seidman, a professor at Vassar College and an avid Heatmap News reader. Last week Seidman claimed a personal victory: he successfully led an effort to overturn a moratorium on battery storage development in the town of Poughkeepsie in Hudson Valley, New York. After reading a thread about the effort he posted to BlueSky, I reached out to chat about what my readers might learn from his endeavors – and how they could replicate them, should they want to.
The following conversation was lightly edited for clarity.
So how did you decide to fight against a battery storage ban? What was your process here?
First of all, I’m not a professional in this area, but I’ve been learning about climate stuff for a long time. I date my education back to when Vox started and I read my first David Roberts column there. But I just happened to hear from someone I know that in the town of Poughkeepsie where I live that a developer made a proposal and local residents who live nearby were up in arms about it. And I heard the town was about to impose a moratorium – this was back in March 2024.
I actually personally know some of the town board members, and we have a Democratic majority who absolutely care about climate change but didn’t particularly know that battery power was important to the energy transition and decarbonizing the grid. So I organized five or six people to go to the town board meeting, wrote a letter, and in that initial board meeting we characterized the reason we were there as being about climate.
There were a lot more people on the other side. They were very angry. So we said do a short moratorium because every day we’re delaying this, peaker plants nearby are spewing SOx and NOx into the air. The status quo has a cost.
But then the other side, they were clearly triggered by the climate stuff and said renewables make the grid more expensive. We’d clearly pressed a button in the culture wars. And then we realized the mistake, because we lost that one.
When you were approaching getting this overturned, what considerations did you make?
After that initial meeting and seeing how those mentions of climate or even renewables had triggered a portion of the board, and the audience, I really course-corrected. I realized we had to make this all about local benefits. So that’s what I tried to do going forward.
Even for people who were climate concerned, it was really clear that what they perceived as a present risk in their neighborhood was way more salient than an abstract thing like contributing to the fight against climate change globally. So even for people potentially on your side, you have to make it about local benefits.
The other thing we did was we called a two-hour forum for the county supervisors and mayor’s association because we realized talking to them in a polarized environment was not a way to have a conversation. I spoke and so did Paul Rogers, a former New York Fire Department lieutenant who is now in fire safety consulting – he sounds like a firefighter and can speak with a credibility that I could never match in front of, for example, local fire chiefs. Winning them over was important. And we took more than an hour of questions.
Stage one was to convince them of why batteries were important. Stage two was to show that a large number of constituents were angry about the moratorium, but that Republicans were putting on a unified front against this – an issue to win votes. So there was a period where Democrats on the Poughkeepsie board were convinced but it was politically difficult for them.
But stage three became helping them do the right thing, even with the risk of there being a political cost.
What would you say to those in other parts of the country who want to do what you did?
If possible, get a zoning law in place before there is any developer with a specific proposal because all of the opposition to this project came from people directly next to the proposed project. Get in there before there’s a specific project site.
Even if you’re in a very blue city, don’t make it primarily about climate. Abstract climate loses to non-abstract perceived risk every time. Make it about local benefits.
To the extent you can, read and educate yourself about what good batteries provide to the grid. There’s a lot of local economic benefits there.
I am trying to put together some of the resources I used into a packet, a tool kit, so that people elsewhere can learn from it and draw from those resources.
Also, the more you know, the better. All those years of reading David Roberts and Heatmap gave me enough knowledge to actually answer questions here. It works especially when you have board members who may be sympathetic but need to be reassured.