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Here’s how European fires differ from those in the American West.

With late-season fires on Portuguese Madeira and Spanish Tenerife recently brought under control, European nations can finally begin to relax after a historic and deadly wildfire season. The mainland continent experienced “far more fires and a larger burned area [in 2023] than in an average fire season,” The New York Times reports, including the single largest wildfire in the EU since record-keeping began in 2000, in Greece.
In the United States, we’re used to words like “historic” and “deadly” when it comes to our wildfires. American fire researchers often point to the U.S. Forest Service’s long history of wildfire suppression as a big reason why we have the cycle of megafires that we do today. Fire had long been a natural part of the ecosystem of the American West; if the land is prevented from burning, plants grow up thick in the underbrush, turning forests into explosive tinderboxes that, once ignited, burn out of control. This is part of why U.S. fire managers emphasize the importance of prescribed burns and teaming up with Indigenous fire practitioners, whose centuries of stewardship helped to keep the North American landscape healthy.
But what’s the deal with Europe, where there isn’t the same legacy of outlawing managed burns and wildfires still seem to be getting bigger and worse by the year?
The first thing to understand is the ways in which U.S. and European fires are the same. Both are being fanned by the same global conditions: “Climate change has led to numerous environmental changes that can increase the frequency and magnitude of dangerous fire weather — increased drought, high air temperatures, low relative humidity, dry lightning, and strong winds, resulting in hotter, drier, and longer fire seasons,” a 2022 United Nations report found. A 2021 study supported by NOAA in the U.S. likewise describes climate change as “the main driver of the increase in fire weather in the western United States.”
The second thing to understand is the ways in which the fires on the two continents are different.
In the U.S., the danger of wildfires to human life and property tends to be exacerbated by the way development has expanded further and further into the vast, unmaintained, “empty” wildlands that make up most of the land in the West. By contrast, fire problems that arise in Europe are largely because people have left the landscape.
Humans have been lighting fires on the European continent for a very, very long time. “The latest studies show that human-driven fires [were already affecting] landscape transformation in the Central European Lowlands 8,500 years ago,” researchers at the University of Latvia explain in a 2021 paper about European fire frequency. The main purpose of those human-started fires had been to clear land for agriculture and grazing, but the practice has gone on for so long that it “has left [regions of Europe] with a complex pattern of land-covers and fire occurrence that shows little if any resemblance of a natural fire regime,” a separate study in the Journal of Environmental Management explains.
Until fairly recently, this more or less worked out okay: People managed the land they lived on, set low-intensity fires to burn new pastures or fields, and sometimes put out fires if they happened to threaten property or life. The problems began when people started moving away from farms and into the cities during the 20th century. In a study by the Journal of Environmental Management researchers, which looked at Italy, there was a 20% drop in agricultural areas and a 74% increase in flammable forest cover between 1960 and 2000.
The abandonment of the countryside was particularly pronounced in Eastern Europe, where the collective farms of the Soviet Union were left to go fallow after the fall of the Iron Curtain — from “Poland through Slovakia to Ukraine, an estimated 16 percent of farmland has been abandoned since 1988,” Wired reports — but southern Europe has also seen a land-use shift due to aging farming populations and general rural decline. “In the past three decades,” Wired goes on, “Europe has seen a net loss of farmland larger than Switzerland.”
What that means in practice is that land that had once been managed by rural farmers has been left to return to its original and unmonitored state, whether that’s grasslands, shrublands, or, especially, forests. While it’s taken them a few decades to spring up, these new trees are especially prone to burning: The European Data Journalism Network (EDJNet) reports that in Spain, for instance, forests made up 27% of the overall acres burned by wildfires between 2000 and 2005, but jumped to 42% between 2017 and 2022. In the same time frame, forest fires went from making up a quarter of wildfire-affected lands in Finland to 40%. As EDJNet adds, “The current fire map of Europe is, in this sense, an illustration of the rural exodus and abandonment of the countryside.”
In trying to fight these new forest fires, Europe has fallen into the same “fire paradox” that we have in the United States: the better you are at putting out fires, the more chances you give to fire-prone vegetation between the trees to grow out of control, so when the next fire hits, it’s much worse. This is also where climate change comes back into play: By drying out dead grasses and other plants in these newly abandoned landscapes during the hot summers, the warming planet makes the forests especially vulnerable to flare-ups.
Though the U.S. and Europe have, in a sense, largely had opposite land-use problems — in the American West, people are moving too deep into the countryside, while in Europe, people are typically moving out — the solutions might actually be the same. Fire managers on both continents are encouraging local communities and governments to revitalize farmland as a means of combating worsening fire seasons. In the U.S., this might work by surrounding urban areas with a “buffer” of farms, in order to separate human development from a naturally fire-prone landscape. In Europe, it might take the form of agroforestry, or mixed-use forest-and-farmland, to help break up otherwise homogeneous and flammable swaths of forest or fields.
It might be easier said than done: the number of farmers and size of farmland has been on the decline in both the U.S. and Western Europe for decades, and it will take enormous socioeconomic shifts to reverse that trend. But while American and European fires might be different beasts with their own histories, their overlap also poses an opportunity. The U.S. European Command has helped fight fires in Greece; Portugal is one of the international wildfire partners of the U.S. Department of the Interior. And while fire season might be largely over on both sides of the Atlantic this year between now and the first flare-up of spring, there will be so much to learn — from each other.
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Rob catches up with the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Ilaria Mazzocco.
China’s electric vehicle industry, it’s now well understood, is churning out cars that rival or exceed the best products coming out of the West. Chinese EVs are cheaper, cooler, more innovative, and have better range. And now they’re surging into car markets around the world — markets where consumers are hungry for clean, affordable transportation.
On this week’s episode of Shift Key, Rob talks to Ilaria Mazzocco about her new report on how six countries around the world are dealing with the rise of Chinese EVs. Why do countries welcome Chinese-made EVs, and why do countries resist them? How do domestic carmakers act when Chinese EVs come to town? And are climate concerns still driving uptake?
Mazzocco is the deputy director and senior fellow with the Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Shift Key is hosted by Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap, and Jesse Jenkins, a professor of energy systems engineering at Princeton University. Jesse is off this week.
Subscribe to “Shift Key” and find this episode on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Amazon, or wherever you get your podcasts.
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Here is an excerpt from our conversation:
Ilaria Mazzocco: Chinese batterymakers have persisted in focusing on LFP batteries with some spectacular results, I would say. And partly I think that’s been thanks to just being able to deploy them at really large scale and just testing and getting them out there.
But I think BYD is really a great example of that. They invest so much in R&D that it’s really hard to compete with them on some of these things. That’s really the big challenge, where, if you want to make a cheap car, you need LFP. That’s why Ford sought out that licensing deal with CATL, was to acquire LFP battery technology. And LFP batteries are really something that Chinese batterymakers have really excelled at.
Now, there could be breakthroughs in other chemistries. There could be a catchup game with non-Chinese batterymakers that actually become good at making LFP. That’s entirely possible. But right now, if you’re an Indian carmaker and you want to make a cheap car, your best bet is probably to get it from BYD or CATL, or maybe Gotion or something like that. That’s really what you’re looking at.
Robinson Meyer: It also, though, really changes how we talk about a lot of the development of auto industries abroad. Because I mean, I realize this is how cars were made for a long time, but I think … basically like if you were to say, Oh yeah, we make our own internal combustion cars here, we simply import the engines from Detroit, and then we place them in our otherwise finished vehicles that we’ve made domestically, and then we put it under a domestic label. We’re very proud of that. That’s essentially what is happening when countries import batteries. The batteries are so central to the operation of the EVs and what the EVs are capable of that when you import your batteries, you’re really relying on your trade partner for a lot of the core physical capacity of that vehicle, and a lot of the core, underlying chemical engineering capability that that vehicle affords you.
It suggests to me that in terms of when you think about the global EV industry, there are companies that are dependent on some kind of Chinese battery export. There are companies that are dependent on some kind of Korean battery export. There’s a few American entrants — mostly Tesla. There’s a few European entrants. And that’s kind of it. Everyone else is piggybacking on the back of one of those core technologies.
Mentioned:
Ilaria’s new report: The Global EV Shift: The Role of China and Industrial Policy in Emerging Economies
Previously on Shift Key: How China’s EV Industry Got So Big
This episode of Shift Key is sponsored by …
Heatmap Pro brings all of our research, reporting, and insights down to the local level. The software platform tracks all local opposition to clean energy and data centers, forecasts community sentiment, and guides data-driven engagement campaigns. Book a demo today to see the premier intelligence platform for project permitting and community engagement.
Music for Shift Key is by Adam Kromelow.
A trio of powerful climate hawks are throwing their weight against the SPEED Act.
Key Senate Democrats are opposing a GOP-led permitting deal to overhaul federal environmental reviews without assurances that clean energy projects will be able to reap the benefits. Winning these lawmakers’ support will require major concessions to build new transmission infrastructure and greater permitting assistance for renewable energy projects.
In an exclusive joint statement provided Tuesday to Heatmap News, Senate Energy and Natural Resources ranking member Martin Heinrich, Environment and Public Works ranking member Sheldon Whitehouse, and Hawaii senator Brian Schatz came out against passing the SPEED Act, a bill that would change the National Environmental Policy Act, citing concerns about how it would apply to renewable energy and transmission development priorities.
“We are committed to streamlining the permitting process — but only if it ensures we can build out transmission and cheap, clean energy. While the SPEED Act does not meet that standard, we will continue working to pass comprehensive permitting reform that takes real steps to bring down electricity costs,” the statement read.
As I wrote weeks ago, there’s very little chance the SPEED Act could become law without addressing Senate climate hawks’ longstanding policy preferences. Although the SPEED Act was voted out of committee in the House two weeks ago with support from a handful of Democratic lawmakers, it has yet to win support from even moderate energy wonks in that legislative body, including Representative Scott Peters, one of the Democratic House negotiators in bipartisan permitting talks. Peters told me he would need to see more assurances dealing with the renewables permitting freeze, for example, in order for him to support the bill.
Observers had initially expected a full House vote on the SPEED Act as soon as this week, but an additional hurdle arose in recent days in the form of opposition from House conservative Republicans, led by Representative Chip Roy. The congressman from Texas had requested additional federal actions targeting renewables projects in exchange for passage of the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, which effectively repealed the Inflation Reduction Act. What followed was a set of directives from the Interior Department that all but halted federal solar and wind permitting. Roy’s frustration with the SPEED Act concerns a relatively milquetoast nod to renewables permitting problems that would block presidents from rescinding already issued permits. This upset appears to have delayed a vote on the bill in the House.
There’s an eerie familiarity to this moment: Almost exactly one year ago, the last major attempt at a permitting deal, authored by Senators Joe Manchin and John Barrasso, died when then-Majority Leader Chuck Schumer declined to bring it up for a vote in the face of opposition from the House. Unlike the SPEED Act, that bill offered changes to transmission siting policy that even conservative estimates said would’ve hastened the pace of national decarbonization.
Having Schatz, Heinrich, and Whitehouse — the three most powerful climate hawks in Congress — throw their weight against the SPEED Act casts serious doubt on the prospects for that legislation becoming the permitting deal this Congress. It also exposes an intra-energy world conflict, as it appears to position these lawmakers in opposition to American Clean Power, an energy trade group that represents a swath of diversified energy companies and utilities, as well as solar, wind, and battery storage developers.
Last week, ACP joined with the American Petroleum Institute and gas pipeline advocacy organizations to urge Congress to pass the SPEED Act. In a letter to House Speaker Mike Johnson and Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries, ACP and the fossil fuel industry trade groups said that the legislation “directly addresses” the challenges facing their interests and “represents meaningful bipartisan progress toward a more stable and dependable permitting framework.” The only reference to potential additions came in a single, vague line: “While the SPEED Act makes important progress, there are additional ways Congress can facilitate the development of reliable and affordable energy infrastructure as part of a broader permitting package.”
This letter was taken by some backers of the renewable energy industry to be an endorsement without concessions. It was also a surprise because just days earlier, American Clean Power responded to the bill’s passage with a vaguely supportive statement that declared “additional efforts” were needed for “transmission infrastructure,” without which “energy prices will spike and system reliability will be threatened.” (It’s worth noting that the committee behind the SPEED Act, House Natural Resources, has no authority over transmission siting. No other proposal has yet emerged from Republicans in that chamber for Republicans to address the issue, either.)
One of the renewables backers taken aback was Schatz, who took to X to sound off against the organization. “Congratulations to ‘American Clean Power’ for cutting a deal with the American Petroleum Institute, but to enact a law both the house and the Senate have to agree, and Senators are finding out about this for the first time,” Schatz wrote in a post, which Whitehouse retweeted from one of his official X accounts.
In a subsequent post, Schatz said: “I am not finding out about the bill’s existence for the first time, I am tracking it all very closely. I am finding out that ACP endorsed it as is without anything on transmission, for the first time.”
By contrast, the statement from the three senators aligns them with the Solar Energy Industries Association, which sent a letter from more than 140 solar companies to top congressional leaders requesting direct action to fix a bureaucratic freeze on permit-related activity that has already helped kill large projects, including Esmeralda 7, which was the largest solar mega-farm in the United States.
In its message to Congress, the trade association made plain that while the SPEED Act was a welcome form of permitting changes, it was nowhere close to dealing with Trumpian chicanery on the group’s priority list.
We’ll have more on this unfolding drama in the days to come.
One longtime analyst has an idea to keep prices predictable for U.S. businesses.
What if we treated lithium like oil? A commodity so valuable to the functioning of the American economy that the U.S. government has to step in not only to make it available, but also to make sure its price stays in a “sweet spot” for production and consumption?
That was what industry stalwart Howard Klein, founder and chief executive of the advisory firm RK Equities, had in mind when he came up with his idea for a strategic lithium reserve, modeled on the existing Strategic Petroleum Reserve.
Klein published a 10-page white paper on the idea Monday, outlining an expansive way to leverage private companies and capital markets to develop a non-Chinese lithium industry without the risk and concentrated expense of selecting specific projects and companies.
The lithium challenge, Klein and other industry analysts and executives have long said, is that China’s whip hand over the industry allows it to manipulate prices up and down in order to throttle non-Chinese production. When investment in lithium ramps up outside of China, Chinese production ramps up too, choking off future investment by crashing prices.
Recognizing the dangers stemming from dysfunction in the global lithium market constitutes a rare area of agreement between both parties in Washington and across the Biden and Trump administrations. Last year, a Biden State Department official told reporters that China “engage[s] in predatory pricing” and will “lower the price until competition disappears.”
A bipartisan investigation released last month by the House of Representatives’ Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party found that “the PRC engaged in a whole‐of‐government effort to dominate global lithium production,” and that “starting in 2021, the PRC government engaged in a coordinated effort to artificially depress global lithium prices that had the effect of preventing the emergence of an America‐focused supply chain.”
Klein thinks he’s figured out a way to deal with this problem
“They manipulated and they crushed prices through oversupply to prevent us from having our own supply chains,” he told me.
It’s not just that China can keep prices low through overproduction, it’s also that the country’s enormous market power can make prices volatile, Klein said, which scares off private sector investment in mining and processing. “You have two years, up two years down, two years up, two years down,” he told me. “That’s the problem we’re trying to solve.
His proposal is to establish “a large, rules-based buffer of lithium carbonate — purchased when prices are depressed due to Chinese oversupply, and released during price spikes, shortages, or export restrictions.”
This reserve, he said, would be more than just a stockpile from which lithium could be released as needed. It would also help to shape the market for lithium, keeping prices roughly in the range of $20,000 per ton (when prices fall below that, the reserve would buy) and $40,000 to $50,000 per ton, when the reserve would sell. The idea is to keep the price of lithium carbonate — which can be processed as a material for batteries with a wide range of defense (e.g. drones) and transportation (e.g. electric vehicles) applications — within a range that’s reasonable for investors and businesses to plan around.
“Lithium has swung from like $6,000 [per ton] to $80,000, back down to $9,000, and now it’s at $11,000 or $12,000,” Klein told me. “But $11,000 or $12,000 is not a high enough price for a company to build a plan that’s going to take three to five years. They need $20,000 to $25,000 now as a minimum for them to make a $2 billion dollar investment.” When prices for lithium get up to “$50,000, $60,000, or $70,000, then it becomes a problem because battery makers can’t make money.”
Both the Biden and Trump administrations have taken more active steps to secure a U.S. or allied supply chain for valuable inputs, including rare earth metals. But Klein’s proposed reserve looks to balance government intervention with a diverse, private-sector led industry.
The reserve would be more broad-based than price floor schemes, where a major buyer like the Defense Department guarantees a minimum price for the output from a mine or refining facility. This is what the federal government did in its deal with MP Materials, the rare earths miner and refiner, which secured a multifaceted deal with the federal government earlier this year.
Klein estimates that the cost in the first year of the strategic lithium reserve could be a few billion dollars — on the scale of the nearly $2.3 billion loan provided by the Department of Energy for the Thacker Pass mine in Nevada, which also saw the federal government take an equity stake in the miner, Lithium Americas.
Ideally, Klein told me, “there’s a competition of projects that are being presented to prospective funders of those projects, and I want private market actors to decide, should we build more Thacker Passes or should we do the Smackover?” referring to a geologic formation centered in Arkansas with potentially millions of tons of lithium reserves.
Klein told me that he’s trying to circulate the proposal among industry and policy officials. His hoped is that as the government attempts to come up with a solution to Chinese dominance of the lithium industry, “people are talking about this idea and they’re saying, Oh, that’s actually a pretty good idea.”