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They can be an effective wildfire prevention tool — but not always.

Once the fires stop burning in Los Angeles and the city picks itself up from the rubble, the chorus of voices asking how such a disaster could have been prevented will rise. In California, the answer to that desperate query is so often “better forestry management practices,” and in particular “more controlled burns.” But that’s not always the full story, and in the case of the historically destructive L.A. fires, many experts doubt that prescribed burns and better vegetation management would have mattered much at all.
Controlled burns are intentionally set and supervised by land managers to clear out excess fuels such as shrubs, trees, and logs to reduce wildfire risk. Many habitats also require fire to thrive, and so ensuring they burn in a controlled manner is a win-win for natural ecosystems and the man-made environment. But controlled burns also pose a series of challenges. For one, complex permitting processes and restrictions around when and where burns are allowed can deter agencies from attempting them. Community backlash is also an issue, as residents are often concerned about air quality as well as the possibility of the prescribed fires spiraling out of control. Land management agencies also worry about the liability risks of a controlled burn getting out of hand.
Many of the state’s largest and most destructive fires — including the Camp Fire in 2018, lightning complex fires in 2020, and Dixie Fire in 2021 — started in forests, and would therefore have likely been severely curtailed had the state done more controlled burns. According to ProPublica, anywhere between 4.4 million and 11.8 million acres used to burn annually in prehistoric California. By 2017, overzealous fire suppression efforts driven by regulatory barriers and short-term risk aversion had caused that number to drop to 13,000 acres. While the state has increased the amount of prescribed fire in recent years, the backlog of fuel is enormous.
But the L.A. fires didn’t start or spread in a forest. The largest blaze, in the Pacific Palisades neighborhood, ignited in a chaparral environment full of shrubs that have been growing for about 50 years. Jon Keeley, a research scientist with the U.S. Geological Survey and an adjunct professor at the University of California, Los Angeles, said that’s not enough time for this particular environment to build up an “unnatural accumulation of fuels.”
“That’s well within the historical fire frequency for that landscape,” Keeley told my colleague, Emily Pontecorvo, for her reporting on what started the fires. Generally, he said, these chaparral environments should burn every 30 to 130 years, with coastal areas like Pacific Palisades falling on the longer end of that spectrum. “Fuels are not really the issue in these big fires — it’s the extreme winds. You can do prescription burning in chaparral and have essentially no impact on Santa Ana wind-driven fires.”
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We still don’t know what ignited the L.A. fires, and thus whether a human, utility, or other mysterious source is to blame. But the combination of factors that led to the blazes — wet periods that allowed for abundant vegetation growth followed by drought and intensely powerful winds — are simply a perilously bad combination. Firebreaks, strips of land where vegetation is reduced or removed, can often prove helpful, and they do exist in the L.A. hillsides. But as Matthew Hurteau, a professor at the University of New Mexico and director of the Center for Fire Resilient Ecosystems and Society, told me bluntly, “When you have 100-mile-an-hour winds pushing fire, there’s not a hell of a lot that’s going to stop it.”
Hurteau told me that he thinks of the primary drivers of destructive fires as a triangle, with fuels, climate, and the built environment representing the three points. “We’re definitely on the built environment, climate side of that triangle for these particular fires around Los Angeles,” Hurteau explained, meaning that the wildland-urban interface combined with drought and winds are the primary culprits. But in more heavily forested, mountainous areas of Northern California, “you get the climate and fuels side of the triangle,” Hurteau said.
Embers can travel impressive distances in the wind, as evidenced by footage of past fires jumping expansive freeways in Southern California. So, as Hurteau put it, “short of mowing whole hillsides down to nothing and keeping them that way,” there’s little vegetation management work to be done at the wildland-urban interface, where houses bump up against undeveloped lands.
Not everyone agrees, though. When I spoke to Susan Prichard, a fire ecologist and research scientist at the University of Washington School of Environmental and Forest Sciences, she told me that while prescribed burns close to suburban areas can be contentious and challenging, citizens can do a lot on their own to manage fuel risk. “Neighborhoods can come together and do the appropriate fuel reduction in and around their homes, and that makes a huge difference in wildfires,” she told me. “Landscaping in and around homes matters, even if you have 100-mile-an-hour winds with a lot of embers.”
Prichard recommends residents work with their neighbors to remove burnable vegetation and organic waste, and to get rid of so-called “ember traps” such as double fencing that can route fires straight to homes. Prichard pointed to research by Crystal Kolden, a “pyrogeographer” and associate professor at the University of California Merced, whose work focuses on understanding wildfire intersections with the human environment. Kolden has argued that proper vegetation management could have greatly lessened the impact of the L.A. fires. As she recently wrote on Bluesky, “These places will see fire again. I have no doubt. But I also know that you can rebuild and manage the land so that next time the houses won’t burn down. I’ve seen it work.”
Keeley pointed to the 2017 Thomas Fire in Ventura and Santa Barbara Counties, however, as an example of the futility of firebreaks and prescribed burns in extreme situations. That fire also ignited outside of what’s normally considered fire season, in December. “There were thousands of acres that had been prescribed burned near the eastern edge of that fire perimeter in the decade prior to ignition,” Keeley explained to Emily. “Once that fire was ignited, the winds were so powerful it just blew the embers right across the prescribed burn area and resulted in one of the largest wildfires that we’ve had in Southern California.”
Kolden, however, reads the Thomas Fire as a more optimistic story. As she wrote in a case report on the fire published in 2019, “Despite the extreme wind conditions and interviewee estimates of potentially hundreds of homes being consumed, only seven primary residences were destroyed by the Thomas Fire, and firefighters indicated that pre-fire mitigation activities played a clear, central role in the outcomes observed.” While the paper didn’t focus on controlled burns, mitigation activities discussed include reducing vegetation around homes and roads, as well as common-sense actions such as increasing community planning and preparedness, public education around fire safety, and arguably most importantly, adopting and enforcing fire-resistant building codes.
So while blaming decades of forestry mismanagement for major fires is frequently accurate, in Southern California the villains in this narrative can be trickier to pin down. Is it the fault of the winds? The droughts? The humans who want to live in beautiful but acutely fire-prone areas? The planning agencies that allow people to fulfill those risky dreams?
Prichard still maintains that counties and the state government can be doing a whole lot more to encourage fuel reduction. “That might not be prescribed burning, that might actually be ongoing mastication of some of the really big chaparral, so that it’s not possible for really tall, developed, even senescent vegetation — meaning having a lot of dead material in it — to burn that big right next to homes.”
From Hurteau’s perspective though, far and away the most effective solution would be simply building structures to be much more fire-resilient than they are today. “Society has chosen to build into a very flammable environment,” Hurteau put it. California’s population has increased over 160% since the 1950’s, far outpacing the country overall and pushing development further and further out into areas that border forests, chaparral, and grasslands. “As people rebuild after what’s going to be great tragedy, how do you re-envision the built environment so that this becomes less likely to occur in the future?”
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Behind both the Anthropic IPO and the Iran War negotiations sits the energy transition.
When you get down to it, two stories are dominating the American economy at the moment.
The first is the artificial intelligence boom. The second is the Iran war — and the wavering peace talks, and unprecedented energy transformation, that accompany it. Both stories advanced on Monday.
In the morning, the frontier AI lab Anthropic announced that it had confidentially filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission for an initial public offering, a widely anticipated step that could see its shares start trading as early as the fall.
The Iran news was perhaps less bullish. Iran announced this morning that it was suspending negotiations after it traded missile and bomb attacks with the United States through the weekend. Oil prices surged on the news before relaxing somewhat after President Trump personally intervened to keep Israel from bombing Lebanon. Trump claimed peace talks with Iran “are continuing, at a rapid pace.”
Still, oil ended the day higher than where it started. The global Brent crude benchmark rose more than 4.5% to over $95 per barrel. The American benchmark, WTI, rose more than 5% to around $92. While neither benchmark has reached its highs from earlier in the war, the episode seemed to remind investors that an oil crisis is still happening and that talks could fall apart at any time. The Strait of Hormuz remains (mostly) closed.
Taken together, the two stories suggest generally good news — or at least, that’s what investors thought. Most major U.S. stock indices crept up slightly through the day; the S&P 500 closed up a quarter of a percent. (It helped that Nvidia — whose head of sustainability I interviewed for Heatmap’s podcast, Shift Key, last week — also unveiled a new consumer laptop chip this morning, sending its shares surging.)
Viewed from another angle, though, you can see a common energy story in these updates. The Anthropic filing — taken together with last week’s news that “mind-blowing growth” is about to propel the lab behind the Claude AI assistant into its first profitable quarter — is a reminder that surging electricity demand is now a dependable part of our electricity system. Demand will in turn remain strong for anything that can help supply that electricity — solar panels, batteries, wind turbines, and (yes) natural gas paraphernalia.
Meanwhile, who knows what will happen in a week or two, but for now, the Iran-induced oil shortage has caused so much demand destruction in China — and seemed to encourage so much switching to electric vehicles — that it seems almost manageable. The commodity researchers at JP Morgan last week mused that the world may be learning to live with 9% less oil. It helps, of course, that China — and the rest of the world — is drawing down its strategic reserves; price action has remained muted in part because oil investors believe Trump is desperate for a deal. But if East Asia and Europe respond to the oil shortage by permanently deleting at least part of their oil demand, it will be by switching from oil and diesel-burning technologies to power-sipping EVs and batteries.
Behind both of the economy’s biggest stories, in other words, sits the great global transition to electricity.
A climate scientist goes back to the numbers to argue that we’re overestimating the cost of the energy transition.
I’ve long been struck by how hard it is to predict the evolution of our energy system even a few years in advance, never mind 25 or 30 years. I still remember the “peak oil” craze in the mid-2000s, when people were telling me the end of oil was nigh. It sounded convincing right up until it turned out to be wrong.
Let me show you how bad previous predictions have been for the electricity sector.
Each plot below shows predictions of how a particular source of electricity will evolve, as well as what actually happened. The data comes from the Energy Information Administration and covers the U.S. electricity sector.
We’ll start with coal. In the first plot, the black line shows actual U.S. coal-fired electricity generation. The blue lines are predictions made each year since 2008.
In 2008, coal was expected to produce increasing amounts of electricity into the future. Instead, it immediately started to decline. It took until 2023 for the EIA to begin predicting a long-term decline in coal, despite the fact that coal had been declining for 15 years.
Natural gas, by contrast, has generated an increasing share of U.S. electricity. This is largely due to the tidal wave of cheap natural gas from hydraulic fracturing. The predictions, on the other hand, did not anticipate this.
The takeaway here is that predicting the evolution of our energy system is not just difficult in the long run, e.g., 30 years from now, but also that it’s difficult even in the short run.
If we combine coal and gas, the forecasts look better. This reflects the fact that natural gas has largely replaced coal over the years, so that the underestimate for gas helps cancel out the overestimate for coal.
But even for the combined category, the forecasts vary widely.
Moving on to renewables, here’s solar, including both utility and residential solar:
And here’s wind:
For both energy sources, predictions before 2015 were really bad. What changed after that I can’t say — my guess is they got sick of being so wrong.
Across all energy sources, the 2023 and 2025 forecasts differ sharply from the 2026 forecast. The predictions made for those years assume the persistence of Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act, while 2026 predictions assume the reversal of those policies.
The difference between 2025 and 2026 is an estimate of the role that politics plays in the future evolution of our electricity sector. That we cannot confidently predict who will win future elections or what their policies will be is another very good reason why it’s so hard to predict the future of our energy system.
Why is it so hard to predict the energy mix in our electricity system? One big reason is that it is hard to predict the future rate of innovation. We can see this in a plot of the cost of energy:
I’m using levelized cost of energy as my measure of the cost to produce power from each source. I understand the limitations of LCOE, but for an energy developer, LCOE is the number that counts. Yes, wind and solar are intermittent, but that’s a grid problem. All that matters to the developer is which low-LCOE energy source they can build.
You can see that the price of wind and solar plummeted in the early 2010s, reflecting enormous innovation in the production of renewable energy. That was not predicted by most mainstream forecasts, as confirmed by predictions of wind and solar above.
There has also been a lot of innovation in fossil fuel production, most importantly fracking and horizontal drilling. These technologies drove down the cost of natural gas in the late 2000s and changed the economics of electricity generation almost overnight. Coal plants that had looked like safe long-term investments suddenly faced a cheaper competitor.
Yet this, too, was largely missed. In the late 2000s, many utilities were still trying to build coal plants, unable to see that coal was entering a precipitous decline. TXU Corp., for instance, tried to build 11 new coal plants in Texas in the mid-aughts. Though it was the state’s largest utility at the time, it ultimately got bought out by private equity, who compromised with environmental groups and agreed to build just three of the original 11 proposed plants, two of which are still in operation.
Meanwhile, the restructured TXU declared bankruptcy in 2014, after natural gas prices collapsed.
All of this goes to show that coal was not beaten by a single technology. It was beaten by a sequence of technologies that forecasters failed to anticipate.
Based on economics, coal is now a stone-cold loser. Its remaining advantage is not cost, nor is it speed of construction or flexibility. It is politics. The Trump Administration is forcing coal-fired plants to stay open, and recent reporting suggests these interventions are raising costs for consumers.
In the competition between solar, wind, and natural gas, solar and wind are the cheapest. The combination of low costs and short construction times with the price volatility of natural gas gives wind and solar a huge market advantage, explaining their exponential growth.
Yes, solar and wind are coming for natural gas.
The LCOE plot also shows the profound disadvantage nuclear faces. Nuclear energy costs nearly $200 per megawatt-hour, around four times the cost of wind and solar. And it takes a decade or two to get it online. Without government mandates or heavy policy support, I would say there is little likelihood we will see a nuclear renaissance.
Much of the debate in climate policy centers on the cost, difficulty, and timeline for phasing out fossil fuels in order to achieve net zero. You constantly hear pundits and analysts throwing around eye-popping numbers, confidently claiming, e.g., that “it will cost XXX trillions of dollars to reach net zero in our economy by 2050.”

But if the forecasting failures of the past 20 years have taught us anything, it’s this: We simply have no idea how much decarbonization will cost.
You should treat numbers like McKinsey’s estimate above as guesses. They could be right, but historically speaking, they probably aren’t.
To summarize, here are the reasons why the true cost of reaching net zero remains so uncertain:
Overall, the uncertainty in these long-term forecasts is enormous. And if history is any guide, the errors are not random. They usually point in the same direction — they overestimate the cost of the energy transition.
One reason is that traditional forecasting models tend to assume slow, steady technological progress. But energy technologies do not always improve that way. Solar, wind, batteries, and fracking all show that costs can change fast when conditions line up. Most models, which assume gradual change, will miss these breaks.
Another problem is that fossil fuels are often treated as stable, low-risk alternatives. They are not. Their prices can swing wildly, and their supply chains are exposed to wars, political instability, and global market shocks. Those costs are real and hard to predict, so they are left out of these estimates.
That is the central point: Estimates of the cost of the energy transition should be treated as conditional guesses built on assumptions about technology, fuel prices, politics, and geopolitics, all of which have repeatedly surprised us.
The lesson of the past 20 years is not that the energy transition will be easy or hard — we really don’t know. Anyone claiming to know the cost decades in advance should be treated with skepticism.
Editor’s note: A version of this article originally appeared in the author’s newsletter, The Climate Brink, and has been repurposed for Heatmap.
Current conditions: The Atlantic hurricane season officially began today, in what’s expected to be a relatively mild year • A powerful storm with winds of up to 80 miles per hour is walloping broad swaths of millions of Australians • Temperatures in Oman are approaching 120 degrees Fahrenheit.

The United States’ offshore wind industry is, at this very moment, booming — at least in terms of the turbine arrays finally coming online in recent weeks. But there are no new projects underway as President Donald Trump pulls out all the stops to kill the industry in what I have previously called a death by a thousand cuts. That’s despite the fact that demand for electricity is soaring in the U.S. Luckily for Americans, our nation’s aging network of power grids overlaps with our northern neighbor’s. And Canada is now looking at a potential offshore wind boom. Last summer, Nova Scotia started laying the groundwork for offshore wind projects. Now Ming Yang, the world’s third-largest manufacturer of wind turbines, is considering investing in a project off Canada’s Pacific coast. The proposed project in the Hecate Strait off British Columbia would add up to 2 gigawatts of offshore wind capacity to Canada’s portfolio, according to Renewables Now. It’s part of Ming Yang’s broader push into Western markets, as my colleague Matthew Zeitlin reported last October.
Just days after New York State delayed its carbon-cutting plan and loosened the rules on how it counts greenhouse gases, California mounted its own retreat on climate goals. On Friday, Bloomberg reported that the California Air Resources Board had voted to give as much as $4 billion of free allowances to oil refiners and other industrial polluters to make compliance with the state’s 13-year-old carbon market easier. At least New York Governor Kathy Hochul “had the decency” to signal publicly that she intended to roll back the state’s climate law, said Danny Cullenward, an economist and lawyer who wrote a book on climate policy. “Here in California we do the same in private and call it climate leadership,” Cullenward wrote of California Governor Gavin Newsom and CARB Chair Lauren Sanchez in a post on Bluesky.
Kudos to the Trump administration, then, for being so open about its plans to render the SEC something that might more appropriately serve as an acronym for Salting the Earth of Climate disclosures. Last month, I told you that the Securities and Exchange Commission was reviewing a Biden-era rule requiring companies to disclose the risk climate change posed to their businesses. On Friday, the agency formally proposed eliminating the regulation. “SEC disclosure obligations should comply with the Commission’s statutory authority, be guided by materiality as the North Star, avoid the practical effect of dictating corporate behavior, and be imposed only when the expected benefits justify the likely costs and burdens,” SEC Chairman Paul S. Atkins said in a statement.
Rehlko isn’t a household name, but it used to be: The 106-year-old firm was previously called Kohler Energy. But since spinning out from the titan of American manufacturing of kitchen sinks and bathroom toilets, Rehlko has honed its business as a leading producer and installer of generators and the infrastructure to house the diesel-, gas-, or hydrogen-fired power sources. Now, I can report exclusively for this newsletter, the company is preparing to expand its factory in Wisconsin as its backlog of orders for generators to power data centers stretches beyond 13 months. In an interview on Friday, Rehlko CEO Brian Melka told me that this facility is part of a plan “to increase the size and the output of the business about four to five times, or 400% to 500%, over the next five or six years.” The Wisconsin plant is specifically designed to assemble the company’s “e-frame” product, a generator enclosure that looks like a shipping container and includes the wiring and fire suppression tools needed to safely house one of Rehlko’s proprietary generators, which provide off-grid back-up power to data centers, hospitals, and other large power users. In addition to beefing up its capacity to manufacture more generators and enclosures, the company is expanding its engineering team for larger projects in which Rehlko uses another firm’s gas turbines for full-time power generation.
“We want to maintain that competitive edge, not only to be able to deliver the product faster but also to deliver the entire solution faster,” Melka said. “This is going to significantly increase our capacity as we go into 2027 with this new facility to be able to build many more fully enclosed units. The demand keeps pushing out. We essentially sold out the capacity for that building for 2027 and 2028 before we even signed the lease.”
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Unlike Russia, France, Japan, and China, the U.S. doesn’t recycle its nuclear waste. That is, until now. Roughly half a dozen companies are competing to be the first to create a beachhead for a new recycling industry in the U.S. Now one of those startups, Curio, has kicked off the pre-application process for a Nuclear Regulatory Commission permit. It’s just an inaugural step: Submitting a letter of intent to the agency to establish a docket and start providing documents to the regulator. But Curio plans to build a plant that could process up to 4,000 metric tons of used commercial light water reactor fuel per year. “The initiation of this application process marks a key and decisive moment for Curio and our nation as we commercially deploy what will be the world’s most advanced and capable used nuclear fuel recycling facility based on our game-changing NuCycle technology,” Curio CEO Ed McGinnis said in a statement, referring to the brand of the company’s reprocessing technology that was recently validated by four of the Department of Energy’s national laboratories.
South Korea, meanwhile, wants to start enriching and reprocessing its own fuel, and has garnered support from the Trump administration to do so. In the meantime, the democratic world’s most competent builder of civilian nuclear plants is doing what it does best and starting construction on a new reactor. On Friday, World Nuclear News reported that crews had poured the first concrete for Shin Hanul nuclear plant’s fourth reactor.
In January, I told you when Century Aluminum overhauled its plans to build the first new aluminum smelter in the U.S. to include an investment from an Emirati company. At the time, the Energy Department hailed the deal as a sign that Trump’s tariffs were working. On Friday, Mining.com published a feature building off a report from the advocacy group Industrious Labs that examined the recent push for new aluminum smelting in the U.S. The analysis concluded that, while 50% tariffs bolstered the sector, “access to industrial-scale electricity — and increasingly industrial-scale clean electricity — is the pain point,” said Annie Sartor, senior campaigns director at Industrious Labs. “Aluminum producers are being scooped by data centers and hyperscalers. They can simply pay more for the power.”
Among the more exciting concepts for supplying the market with cheap, clean, and affordable hydrogen is finding the stuff in naturally-formed underground reservoirs, allowing oil and gas drillers to do their thing for a green fuel. Now Oman, the Arab world’s diplomatic equivalent of Switzerland, is making progress in drilling the first wells for natural hydrogen. HyTerra, the Australian startup exploring for hydrogen in the country, told the Oman Observer that the successful pilot well boded well for tapping “one of the best source rock systems” for natural hydrogen yet discovered in the world. Given the latest heat wave in the country, the value of a fossil fuel replacement is likely becoming more obvious.