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A conversation with the most interesting man on the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

It’s not every day that a top regulator calls into question the last few decades of policy in the area they help oversee. But that’s exactly what Mark Christie, a commissioner on the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the interstate power regulator, did earlier this year.
In a paper enticingly titled “It’s Time To Reconsider Single-Clearing Price Mechanisms in U.S. Energy Markets,” Christie gave a history of deregulation in the electricity markets and suggested it may have been a mistake.
While criticisms of deregulation are by no means new, that they were coming from a FERC commissioner was noteworthy — a Republican no less. While there is not yet a full-scale effort to reverse deregulation in the electricity markets, which has been going on since the 1990s, there is a rising tide of skepticism of how electricity markets do — and don’t — reward reliability, let alone the effect they have on consumer prices.
Christie’s criticisms have a conservative bent, as you’d expect from someone who was nominated by former President Donald Trump to the bipartisan commission. He is very concerned about existing generation going offline and has called activist drives against natural gas pipelines and other transportation infrastructure for the fossil-fuel-emitting power sources a “national campaign of legal warfare…[that] has prevented the construction of vitally needed natural gas transportation infrastructure.”
Since renewables have become, at times, among the world’s cheapest sources of energy and thus quite competitive in deregulated markets with fossil fuels (especially when subsidized), this kind of skepticism is a growing issue in the Republican Party, which has deep ties to oil and gas companies. The Texas state legislature, for instance, responded to Winter Storm Uri, which almost destroyed Texas’ electricity grid in 2021, with its own version of central planning: billions in low cost loans for the construction of new gas-fired power plants. Former Texas Governor Rick Perry, as secretary of energy in the Trump administration, even proposed to FERC a plan to explicitly subsidize coal and nuclear plants, citing reliability concerns. (FERC rejected it.) Some regions that didn’t embrace deregulation, like the Southeast and Southwest, also have some of the most carbon-intensive grids.
But Christie is not so much a critic of renewable resources like wind and solar, per se, as he is very focused on the benefits to the grid of ample “dispatchable” resources, i.e. power sources that can power up and down on demand.
This doesn’t have to mean uncritical acceptance of existing fossil fuel infrastructure. The idea that markets don’t reward reliability enough can help explain the poor winterization for fossil fuel generation that was so disastrous during Winter Storm Uri. And in California, the recognition that renewables alone can’t power the grid 24 hours a day has led to a massive investment in energy storage, which can help approximate the on-demand nature of natural gas or coal without the carbon pollution.
But Christie is primarily interested in the question of just how the planning is done for a system that links together electric generation and consumers. He criticized the deregulated system in much of the country where power is generated by companies separate from the utilities that ultimately sell and distribute that power to customers and where states have less of a role in overall planning, despite ultimately approving electricity rates.
Instead, these markets for power are mediated through a system where utilities pay independent generators a single price for their power at a given time that is arrived at through bidding, often in the context of sprawling multi-state regional transmission organizations like PJM Interconnection, which covers a large swath of the Midwest and Mid-Atlantic region, or the New England Independent System Operator. He says this set-up doesn’t do enough to incentivize dispatchable power, which only comes online when demand spikes, thus making the system overall less reliable, while still showing little evidence that costs have gone down for consumers.
Every year, grid operators and their regulators — including Christie — warn of reliability issues. What Christie argues is that these reliability issues may be endemic to the deregulated system.
Here is where there could be common ground between advocates for an energy transition and conservative deregulation skeptics like Christie. While the combination of deregulation and subsidies has been great for getting solar and wind from zero to around 13 percent of the nation’s utility-scale electricity generation, any truly decarbonized grid will likely require intensive government supervision and planning. Ultimately, political authorities who are guiding the grid to be less carbon-intensive will be responsible for keeping the lights on no matter how cold, warm, sunny, or windy it happens to be. And that may not be something today’s electricity “markets” are up for.
I spoke with Christie in late June about how FERC gave us the electricity market we have today, why states might be better managers than markets, and what he’s worried about this summer. Our conversation has been edited for length and clarity.
What happened to our energy markets in the 1990s and 2000s where you think things started to go wrong?
In the late ‘90s, we had this big push called deregulation. And as I pointed out in the article, it really wasn’t “deregulation” in the sense that in the ‘70s, you know, the trucking and airlines and railroads were deregulated where you remove government price regulation and you let the market set the prices. That’s not what happened. It really was just a change of the price-setting construct and the regulatory construct.
It took what had been the most common form of regulation of utilities, where utilities are considered to be natural monopolies, and said we’re going to restructure these utilities and we’re going to let the generation part compete in these regional markets.
And, you know, from an economic standpoint, okay, so far so good. But there’s been a lot of questioning as to whether there’s really true competition. Many parts of the country also just didn’t do it.
I think there’s a serious question whether that’s benefiting consumers more than the cost of service model where state regulators set the prices.
So if I’m an electricity consumer in one of the markets that’s more or less deregulated, how might reliability become an issue in my own home?
First of all, when you’re in one of these areas that are deregulated, essentially you’re paying the gas price. If it goes up, that’s what you’re going to pay. If it goes down, it looks really good.
But from the reliability standpoint, the question is whether these markets are procuring enough resources to make sure you have the power to keep your lights on 24/7. That is the big question to a consumer in a so-called deregulated state: Are these markets, which are now the main vehicle for buying generation resources, are they getting enough generation resources to make sure that your lights stay on, your heat stays on, and your air conditioning stays on?
Do you think there’s evidence that these deregulated markets are doing a worse job at that kind of procurement?
Well, let’s take, for example, PJM, which came out with an announcement in February that said they were going to lose in the next five years over 40 gigawatts. A gig is 1,000 megawatts, so that’s a lot of power, that’s a lot of generating resources. And the independent market monitor actually has told me it is closer to 50 gigawatts. So all these units are going to retire and they’re going to retire largely for economic reasons. They’re not getting sufficient compensation to stay open.
The essence of restructuring was that generating units are going to have to make their money in the market. They’re not going to get funding through what's called the “rate base,” which is the regulated, traditional cost-of-service model. They have to get it in the markets and theoretically, that sounds good.
But in reality, if they can’t get enough money to pay their cost, they’re going to retire and then you don’t have those resources. Particularly in the RTOs [regional transmission organizations, i.e. the multi-state electricity markets], you’re seeing these markets result in premature retirements of generating resources. And so, now, why is that? It’s more of a problem in the RTOS than non-RTOS because in the non-RTOS, they procure resources under the supervision of a state regulator through what’s called an integrated resource plan or IRP.
The reason I think the advantage and reliability is with the non-RTOS is that those utilities have to prove to a state regulator that their resource plan makes sense, that they’re planning to buy generating resources. Whether they’re buying wind or solar or gas, whatever, they have to go to a state regulator and say, “Here’s our plan” and then seek approval from that regulator. And if they’re shutting down units, the state regulator can say, “Wait a minute, you’re shutting down units that a few years ago you told us were needed for reliability, and now you’re telling us you want to shut them down.” So the state regulator can actually say , “No, you’re not going to shut that unit down. You’re going to keep running it.”
That’s why I think you have more accountability in the non-RTOS because the state regulators can tell the utility, “you need more resources, go build it or buy it,” or “you already have resources, you’re not going to shut them down, we’re not going to let you.”
You don’t have that in an RTO. In an RTO, it’s all done through the market. The market decides, to the extent it has a mind. You know, it’s all the result of market operations. It’s not anybody saying whether it’s a good idea or not for a certain unit to shut down.
I find it interesting that a lot of the criticism of the deregulated system — and a lot of places that are not deregulated — come from more conservative states that would generally not think of themselves as having this kind of strong state role in economic policy. What’s different about electricity? Why do you think the politics of this line up differently than it would on other issues?
I don’t know. That’s an interesting question. I haven’t even thought about it in those terms.
I think it goes back to when deregulation took place in the mid-to-late ‘90s. Other than Texas, which went all the way, the states that probably went farthest on it were in the Northeast. Part of the reason why is because they already had very high consumer prices. I think deregulation was definitely sold as a way to reduce prices to consumers. It hasn’t worked out that way.
Whereas you look at the Southeast, which never went in for deregulation. The Southeastern states, which are still non-RTO states, had relatively very low rates, so they didn’t see a problem to be fixed.
The other big trend since the 1990s and 2000s is the explosive growth of renewables, especially wind and solar. Is there something about deregulated electricity markets, the RTO system, that makes those types of resources economically more favorable than they would be under a different system?
Well, if you’re getting a very high subsidy, like wind and solar are getting, it means you can bid into the energy markets effectively at zero. So if you can bid in at zero offering, you’re virtually guaranteed to be a winner. In a non-RTO state, a state that's doing it through an integrated resource plan, the state regulator reviews the plan. That's why I think an IRP approach is better actually for implementing wind and solar because you can implement and deploy wind and solar as part of an integrated plan that includes enough balancing resources to make sure you keep the lights on.
To me an Integrated Resource Plan is a holistic process, where you can look at all the resources at your disposal: wind, solar, gas, as well as the demand side. And you can balance them all in a way that you think, “Okay, this balance is appropriate for us for the next three years, or four years, or five years.” Because you’re typically doing an IRP every three to five years anyway. And so I think it’s a good way to make sure you balance these resources.
In a market there’s no balancing. In a market it’s just winners and losers. And so wind and solar are almost always going to win because they have such massive subsidies that they’re going to get to offer in at a bid price of zero. The problem with that is they’re not going to get paid zero. They’re going to get paid the highest price [that all electricity suppliers get]. So they offer in at zero, but they get paid the highest price, which is going to be a gas price. It’s probably going to be the last gas unit to clear, that’s usually the one that’s the highest price unit. And yet because of the single clearing price mechanism, everybody gets that price. So you can offer it at zero to guarantee you clear, but then you’re going to get the highest price, usually a gas combustion turbine peaker.
Do you think we would see as much wind and solar on the grid if it weren’t for the fact that a lot of the resources are benefiting from the pricing mechanism you describe?
I don’t think you can draw that conclusion because there are non-RTO states that have what’s called a mandatory RPS, mandatory renewable portfolio standard. And so you can get there through a mandatory RPS and a cost to service model just as you can end up in a market. And actually, again, I think you can get there in a more balanced way to make sure that the reliability is not being threatened in the meantime.
To get back to what we’re talking about in the beginning, my understanding is that FERC, where you are now, played a large role in encouraging deregulation in the formation of RTOs. Is this something that your staff or other commissioners disagree with you about? How do you see the role you’re playing, where you’re doing public advocacy and reshaping this conversation around deregulation?
First of all, we always have to give the standard disclaimer, you never talk about a pending case. But FERC was really the driving force behind a lot of this deregulation. So obviously, they decided that that’s what they wanted to push, and they did. And so I think it’s appropriate as a FERC regulator to raise questions. I think raising questions about the status quo is an important thing that we do and should do. Ultimately, you advocate for what you think it ought to be and if the votes come eventually, it might take several years, but it’s important.
One of the things I try to do is, I put the consumer at the center of everything I do. It is absolutely my priority. And I think that it should be every regulator’s priority, particularly in the electric area because most consumers in America — in fact, almost all consumers in America — are captive customers. By captive. I mean, they don’t get to choose their electric supplier.
Like, where do you live, Matthew?
I live in New York City.
You don’t get to choose, right? You’re getting electricity from ConEd. And you don’t have any choice. So you’re a captive customer. And most consumers in America are captive customers. We tried this retail choice in a few states that didn’t work. You know, they’re still doing it. I’m not going to say whether it’s working or not, but I know we tried it in Virginia, and it didn’t work at all because of a lot of reasons.
I always put customers first and say, “Look, these customers are captive. We have to protect them. We have to protect the captive customers by making sure they’re not getting overcharged.” So that’s why I care about these issues. And that’s why I wrote this article. I think that customers in a lot of ways in America are not getting treated fairly. They’re getting overcharged and I think they’re not getting what they should be getting. And so I think a big part of it is some of this stuff that FERC's been pushing for the last 25 years.
Our time is running out. So I will leave with a question that is topical: It’s already been quite hot in Texas, but outside of Texas and in FERC-land, where are you concerned about reliability issues this summer?
Well, I’m concerned about everywhere. It’s not a flippant remark. I read very closely the reliability reports that we get from NERC and we have reliability challenges in many, many places. It’s not just in the RTOs. I think we have reliability challenges in the South. Fortunately, the West this year, which has been a problem the last couple of years, is actually looking pretty good because all the rain last winter — even flooding — really was great for hydropower.
I’m from California, and I think it’s the first time in my adult life that I remember stories about dams being 100 percent, if not more than 100 percent, full.
The rains and snowfall were so needed. It’s filled up reservoirs that have been really dry for years. And from an electrical standpoint, it’s been really good for hydro. So they’re looking at really good hydro availability this summer in ways they haven't been for the last several years. So the West actually, because of all the rain and the greater available of hydro, I think is in fairly good shape.
There’s a problem in California with the duck curve, the problem is still there. If you have such a high solar content, when the sun goes down, obviously the solar stops generating and so what do you do you know for the next four to five hours? Because the air conditioners are still running, it’s still hot, but that solar production has just dropped off the table. So they’ve been patching with some battery storage and some gas backup.
But I’m worried about everywhere. I watch very closely the reports that come out of the RTOs and you can’t be shutting down dispatchable resources at the rate we’re doing when you’re not replacing them one to one with wind or solar. The arithmetic doesn’t work and it’s going to catch up to us at some point.
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A new dashboard from the Sustainable AI Group, founded by artificial intelligence alums, estimates the relative energy intensity of proprietary tools.
The rise of artificial intelligence is driving an historic surge in electricity demand that’s boosting fossil fuel use and threatening climate progress. All this electricity doesn’t power AI in some generalized, always-on way, though. Data centers’ energy consumption is a function of the millions of individual queries users submit to AI programs such as Claude and ChatGPT.
When it comes to how efficiently models process those queries and generate responses, AI models are not interchangeable. Some are more like gas guzzlers, others more like Priuses. When a user engages an AI chatbot or AI agent, however, there’s essentially no way for them to know which kind of vehicle they are stepping into. They may know which company built it, and even the precise model name and number, but no AI company has published information about how much energy one model uses compared to another.
In the absence of corporate disclosure from the big three proprietary AI developers — Anthropic, OpenAI, and Google — researchers with the Sustainable AI Group, a research and advisory company, developed a backdoor method to estimate and compare the amount of energy these developers’ models consume. They published their findings on Tuesday in an interactive dashboard that ranks AI programs by energy intensity.
“We think this is an important next step to get some science-based information out there to help folks start making better decisions,” Boris Gamazaychikov, the CEO of the Sustainable AI Group, told me. “We also hope that if the model providers think that this is really wrong, that they can come out and prove it with some actual data.”
In general, the researchers found that larger, higher-capability models, such as Anthropic’s Opus and OpenAI’s Sol, used nearly four times as much energy on average as smaller, nimbler models from those companies, Haiku and Terra. Newer iterations of each model also weren’t necessarily more efficient than their predecessors.
While the group has yet to evaluate the latest models that hit the market during the research period, so far the researchers found that for the same task, the least efficient models can consume more than 30 times the energy of the most efficient models. They also found a significant difference between “chat” sessions, where a user asks an AI chatbot a question, and “agentic” sessions,” where a user asks the AI to perform a series of tasks. A typical agentic session used 27 times more energy, on average, than a typical chat session conducted using the same AI model.
The Sustainable AI Group was founded by Sasha Luccioni, the former AI and climate lead at the open source AI platform Hugging Face, and Gamazaychikov, who previously led AI sustainability at Salesforce. In their earlier roles, the two collaborated on a project called AI Energy Score, which is similar in spirit to the Environmental Protection Agency’s EnergyStar program for home appliances. They developed a method to directly measure the energy efficiency of “open-weight” AI models, or those that fully disclose their inner workings, and published the results in a public leaderboard.
Luccioni and Gamazaychikov founded the Sustainable AI Group because they wanted to give AI users, particularly large corporate users, the tools to understand the relative emissions impacts of proprietary AI models. Gamazaychikov told me that Salesforce had tried to get energy-use data from its AI providers for years to no avail.
Their first hire was Nidhal Jegham, a graduate student at the University of Rhode Island who published a landmark paper last year called “How Hungry is AI?” Jegham and his co-authors developed a method to estimate the energy, water, and carbon effects of proprietary models at the level of a single prompt or query. The paper was accepted by the journal Communications of the Association for Computing Machinery, and the peer-reviewed version will come out in January.
The approach the Sustainable AI Group developed builds on both Jegham’s paper and the AI Energy Score project. The work began with testing open-weight models to see how they perform in realistic deployment configurations and directly measuring their energy consumption. From there the researchers identified mathematical relationships between various open models’ energy use and other measurable statistics, such as their size.
The next step was to take those statistical relationships from the open-weight models and apply them to similarly-sized proprietary models. The problem is, no one knows how “big” proprietary models are. The size of an AI model usually refers to the number of parameters it contains, i.e. the quantity of numerical representations of what the model has learned that it uses to produce a response.
“When we have a closed model, we don't have the model size. We don't have the deployment conditions. We don't have anything, so we need to find things we can observe from this closed model that can reflect its size,” Jegham explained to me. One key discovery, he said, was that “knowledge retention,” or how well the model can remember factual information, is a strong predictor of model size. A company called Artificial Analysis tests models for knowledge retention, so the researchers compared those results to model size for open models and applied the same statistical relationship to estimate the size of closed models.
This is a simplified explanation — there were many other variables and data points that went into the Sustainable AI Group’s estimates. The researchers also had to develop a separate methodology to evaluate Google’s models, since those mostly run on the company’s proprietary “tensor processing units,” rather than the Nvidia chips the researchers’ initial measurements were based on.
The group’s main findings are based on a per-token estimate of each model’s energy use, i.e. the energy required to process the smallest units of data that an AI deals with. Every time you type a question into a chatbot, the model breaks down the words into smaller bits — i.e. tokens — each just a few characters long, usually. The model also first formulates its response in tokens before translating it to text, an image, or whatever you’re requesting; input tokens are less energy-intensive than the tokens the models spit out. The Sustainable AI Group reports each of its per-token estimates as a range to reflect uncertainty.
For now, the firm is keeping its per-token estimates behind a paywall, but it has already started to use them to advise corporate clients in estimating their AI-related emissions, Gamazaychikov said. For example, he mentioned working with Etsy to help the online retailer develop a “model router,” essentially some software that routes a given query to the most appropriate model for the task, taking into account carbon and cost. It’s also partnering with the corporate emissions accounting platform Watershed to explore how to integrate its model-specific energy numbers into Watershed’s system.
Instead of displaying per-token energy use, the Sustainable AI Group’s public dashboard ranks models’ energy intensity per “typical” session, whether chat or agentic. It defines a typical chat session as “a short back-and-forth” with “a question, an answer, and a follow-up or two to refine or clarify it,” whereas a typical agentic session is “an hour or two of the assistant reading files, making changes and checking its own work across a project.” There are also results for a “heavier” or “lighter” session — generally tasks that take more or less time or require greater or fewer back-and-forths with the AI.
The least efficient AI model for both a typical chat and agentic session, per the dashboard, is Anthropic’s Claude Fable 5. A typical agentic session uses 76 watt-hours, according to the Sustainable AI Group’s estimate, or about the amount of electricity it would take to charge four smartphones, per Department of Energy estimates. The most efficient model for a typical chat session was Claude Haiku 4.5, while the most efficient model for a typical agentic session was Open AI’s GPT-5 nano.
Jegham said the point of the dashboard is not to villainize particular companies or models or to argue that more efficient models are superior. He acknowledged that a more complex task may require a larger model, and a larger model is likely going to be more energy intensive than a smaller one.
The ranking is also flawed in that it assumes every model delivers responses with the same amount of verbosity. In reality, some models may use more words, and therefore more tokens, to answer the same question. Jegham gave the example of Anthropic’s Sonnet and Opus models: Sonnet is less energy intensive per token, but it typically requires more tokens for the same task, so sometimes it’s more energy intensive than Opus. The dashboard doesn’t reflect these differences.
While energy intensity is the core of the dashboard’s function, it also includes estimates of each model’s carbon emissions per session. That calculation opens up many more cans of worms, since actual emissions depend on where in the country the hardware that’s processing the AI session is located and what’s powering it. There’s no easy way to know which data center is processing a given AI request. Instead, the dashboard offers users the option to toggle between different emissions intensities to reflect different scenarios — a data center powered by behind-the-meter natural gas plants, for example, versus one located on a relatively clean grid.
A typical agentic session with Claude Fable 5 powered by a behind-the-meter gas plant emits roughly 52 grams of CO2, it says, while a heavy session emits just over 200 grams — equivalent to driving about half a mile in a gasoline-powered vehicle.
I reached out to OpenAI and Anthropic to ask why they don’t publish energy intensity data, whether there are barriers to doing so, and whether they have plans to do so in the future. A spokesperson from OpenAI told me the company relies “on infrastructure partners to operate the data centers that run our models, so we don’t directly collect the underlying energy data. That’s an important consideration in how we assess and provide this information.” Anthropic declined to comment.
Google, on the other hand, has published an energy use estimate for “the median Gemini Apps text prompt in May 2025,” but has not provided an update for subsequent model versions. In response to my request for comment, the company reiterated statements from Cooper Elsworth, a senior technical manager for AI energy, which Google shared with me for a previous story on Watershed’s efforts to calculate AI-related emissions. He said there is no industry consensus for how to measure and disclose the environmental footprint of frontier AI models. He also echoed OpenAI’s comments, noting that gathering accurate energy use data requires “highly advanced measurement infrastructure,” which not all AI providers have access to.
“We believe there is immense value in aligning the industry on comparable metrics to fairly compare and incentivize action,” he said.
Current conditions: Last weekend’s nor’easter caused up to $13 billion in damages across the Mid-Atlantic and Northeast regions of the United States • Hurricane Nolo shut down a major highway on Hawaii’s Big Island • A heat dome forming over eastern Africa is driving temperatures in Juba, the impoverished capital of South Sudan, past 100 degrees Fahrenheit.
At last, right after hopes dimmed, we have a deal. Senate negotiators reached a bipartisan agreement on a package of federal permitting reforms, locking in what Politico described as “the contours of long-sought legislation to speed up approvals for new energy projects in the U.S.” Democratic negotiators Senators Martin Heinrich of New Mexico and Sheldon Whitehouse of Rhode Island told the news outlet they were withholding endorsements of a final deal as “the last five yards” of the agreement are hammered out. Whitehouse cautioned that he needed “more clarity from the Trump administration” on what their easing of the blockade on wind and solar approvals would mean. Neither Democrats nor Republicans released text of the bill, which both parties said should come out this week.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is set to issue only its second construction permit for a novel type of nuclear reactor in decades. At 11 a.m. EDT, the agency is scheduled to give the Tennessee Valley Authority the go ahead to begin building what could be the nation’s first commercial small modular reactor, a 300-megawatt unit at the federally-owned utility’s Clinch River site. The project is one of two the Department of Energy is financing to support deployment of third-generation SMRs, a technology based on existing large-scale reactors but shrunken down to force developers to buy more and help the industry bring down the cost of atomic power through repeatedly building the same design. (The second one is Holtec’s expansion of the Palisades nuclear plant in Michigan.) The permit comes six months after the NRC gave TerraPower, the Bill Gates-backed fourth-generation nuclear developer, the green light to start constructing its liquid sodium-cooled reactor at the site of an old coal plant in Kemmerer, Wyoming. The unit planned at Clinch River is a BWRX-300, a boiling water reactor from GE Vernova Hitachi Nuclear Energy that borrows from the technology behind roughly a third of the American nuclear fleet. Boiling water reactors, pioneered by General Electric in the mid-20th century, traditionally represented a competitor to the more dominant pressurized water reactor invented by Westinghouse. By the time Clinch River comes online, North America may already have its first BWRX-300 in operation in Canada, where Ontario Power Generation is building the first reactor at its Darlington plant. TVA has said it plans to bring its debut BWRX-300 online by the end of 2033 at the latest. Yet, despite the forthcoming permit, no start date for construction has been announced.
The NRC, meanwhile, has sought to advance plans to restart the functional reactor at Constellation Energy’s Christopher Crane Clean Energy Center, the facility formerly known as Three Mile Island. Last week, the agency issued an environmental assessment finding no significant impact from plans to begin generating electricity at the plant again. While America’s attempt at restarting a permanently shuttered reactor for the first time are largely going according to plan, regulators are investigating what the Detroit Free-Press described as a “mishap” in the handling of fuel for Holtec’s Palisades nuclear plant in Michigan, which could come online in a matter of weeks. The company said nuclear fuel rods “tipped” during installation, halting the refueling process and forcing plant operators to return to the NRC for approval to retrieve the assembly from within the reactor vessel.
Arevia Power marketed itself as a renewable energy powerhouse led by solar industry veterans. Now, my colleague Jael Holzman reported yesterday, the company is making data centers and gas turbines central to its business. “Arevia is an energy company that delivers reliable and affordable electricity to the communities and utilities we serve,” Ricardo Graf, the company’s chief development officer, told her via email, acknowledging that “in some cases, that energy may be solar; in others, it may be gas.” He added that “yes, we also develop data center projects, but ones with accompanying power solutions to ensure ratepayers are not impacted by the data center’s energy needs.”
The shift in focus comes right as American solar offers a major new business opportunity. Solar panels are aging, and newer technologies are as much as 70% more efficient than those designed and built two decades ago. “All across the United States, solar panels are withering on the vine. Equipment installed 10 to 15 years ago is still capturing sunlight and pumping out electricity, but significantly less of it than when the cells were new,” my colleague Emily Pontecorvo wrote yesterday about a new report examining the potential to swap out the country’s existing panels for new ones. “This is not a story about decline, however, but about growth. America’s aging solar farms represent an opportunity to expand clean energy capacity without using more land — and potentially without having to wait years for new projects to get through the grid’s interconnection queue.”
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The TVA isn’t the only government-owned utility making progress on clean power plants. The New York Power Authority — the state electrical company that then-Governor Franklin Delano Roosevelt established in the 1930s and later used as a model for New Deal investments such as the TVA — said Monday that it will take a 51% stake in a 240-megawatt solar plant in the state’s rural northern reaches, according to the Watertown Daily Times. The Rich Road solar farm in Canton, near the Canadian border, will follow a model promoted by progressive legislators with a bill meant to encourage the state to finance and own renewable projects to speed up decarbonization of the grid. Governor Kathy Hochul, a Democrat, has used that authority to support her plans to build at least 1 gigawatt of new nuclear power through NYPA. (That effort, as I told you yesterday, has drawn some blowback from left-wing Democrats who oppose nuclear energy.) EDF Power Solutions North America, a subsidiary of the French electrical giant, will own the other 49% share of the project, which is set to begin construction next year. Once completed, the facility is expected to provide credits to low-income New Yorkers to lower bills.

When I used to think about the Rhine River, the first thing that came to mind was a song off my favorite album from high school. Written and performed by Beirut, the stage name of an American guy who galavanted around Europe making folksy songs that sounded straight out of an American teenager’s romantic notion of an Old World beer hall, the song was called “Rhineland.” Over mournful horns and a plunky mandolin, the song repeats a refrain: “Life, life was all right on the Rhine,” bringing to mind some kind of bucolic interwar existence in an ill-fated era of European history. Two decades later, I can’t tell which has changed more, me or the place I was imagining. The correct answer is probably “both,” but the clearest answer today is the latter. Levels at a key gauge of the mostly German waterway dropped to 1.2 inches below the threshold ship operators use to determine how much cargo their vessel can safely carry down the river without risking damage or running aground, Bloomberg reported. Despite a slight recovery on Monday, the cost of shipping diesel from Rotterdam to Karlsruhe hit a record €260 per ton (equal to just under $296), after more than doubling this month amid the aftershocks of the summer’s record heat waves and droughts.
The latest trouble comes as the Trump administration weighs the merits of a ban on diesel exports. At Heatmap’s Climate Week event last Wednesday, Secretary of Energy Chris Wright ruled out such a step. But Trump said he was “very seriously” considering the step, despite warnings from Goldman Sachs that doing so would raise prices in Europe.
TotalEnergies may be taking up President Donald Trump on his legally sketchy offer of nearly $1 billion to abandon its offshore wind ambitions in the U.S. But the French energy giant — the second-largest European oil company after Shell — sees the energy shock brought on by the U.S. war against Iran as a boon to that very business. CEO Patrick Pouyanne said “high oil prices” are “accelerating electrification,” according to a snippet shared on X by Bloomberg columnist Javier Blas. “We have seen a huge surge in EV sales,” he added, noting that sales are booming well beyond China, in India, Latin America, and Europe. Increased profits from higher crude prices spurred the company to start buying back roughly $5 billion in shares over the next two quarters.
By neutering the Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards, the Trump administration cements the country’s dependence on oil and liquid fuels.
This is Heatmap Daily, a weekday news digest written by our executive editor.
President Trump’s big fuel efficiency rollback is here. This afternoon, the Department of Transportation significantly weakened the Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards, the federal government’s rules that encourage new cars and trucks to get gradually more fuel-efficient over time. Instead of mandating that new cars and trucks hit a target of more than 50 miles per gallon, as the old Biden-era rules had required, new vehicles sold in the U.S. will now need to average only 34.9 miles per gallon.
That target is below the level that most automakers have already achieved in their vehicle fleet. (For reasons too obscure to recount here, the regulatory standard of 34 miles per gallon aligns to real-world gas mileage in the mid-to-high 20s — something my 15-year-old hatchback manages to achieve without much straining.) The new rules also retroactively rewrite the standard back to 2022, meaning that automakers whose fleets once broke the law may now be in the clear.
These changes, in other words, render the fuel economy law, first enacted in 1975, is now moot. But Republicans in Congress had arguably already achieved this last year, when they zeroed out all of the law’s fines for automakers as part of the president’s tax and spending bill. These two changes, taken together, mean that the Trump administration has successfully neutered the U.S. fuel efficiency rules.
We are digging into the rule-making here at Heatmap, and I hope to have more on the documents in the days to come. But one of the lasting ironies of President Trump’s approach to fuel efficiency will be that his own presidency demonstrates its strategic inadequacy.
The Corporate Average Fuel Economy law, after all, did not originate as an environmental policy — climate change had scarcely emerged as a pressing issue in the mid-1970s — but as a national security and economic sovereignty measure. In the aftermath of the oil embargo, American politicians realized that the U.S. economy was far too dependent on oil for its long-term good. This set off a scramble to find new energy sources, prompting a dash back to coal in the electricity sector and a surge in federal R&D spending on alternative energy. (This funding boost eventually created the modern solar, wind, battery, and fracking industries.)
It also led to a successful push to regulate gas mileage. Crucially, this effort did not limit emissions from any one type of vehicle, as the Environmental Protection Administration’s toxic air pollution rules aim to do. Rather, it targeted the average fuel efficiency of cars and light-duty trucks sold in the United States in each model-year. The point was not to regulate any one type of vehicle out of existence, but to increase the country’s overall fuel efficiency over time.
That decades-long effort was never perfect. It created in American statute, for instance, a lasting distinction between cars and trucks, which has bedeviled regulators as SUVs have taken up a larger portion of the new vehicle fleet. But it has also inarguably succeeded: The United States ekes far more value out of every barrel of oil today than it did half a century ago.
Yet the time is ripe to keep making progress. President Trump’s administration has illustrated the persistence of our oil dependence — and the political and strategic problems that it can still engender. Even though the United States has since become the world’s largest producer of oil, the linked and globalized nature of fuel markets means that a supply shock anywhere leads to price hikes everywhere. When an oil crisis arrives — even a largely self-inflicted one, as in the case of the Iran war — then the price of moving things and people rises, the economy suffers, and the president’s popularity falls. Countries can protect themselves from these shocks on a short-term basis by stockpiling oil (as the United States, in fact, does), but they can avoid them only by switching to a far more efficient and electrified transportation system.
President Trump, in other words, may regret the current oil and refining crisis. But by gutting the fuel economy standards — and waging war on electric vehicle incentives more broadly — he is increasing the likelihood that America will face many more crises like it in future years. Consider it his particular gift to his successors.