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China’s electric vehicle industry has driven itself to the center of the global conversation. Its automakers produce dozens of affordable, technologically advanced electric vehicles that rival — and often beat — anything coming out of Europe or North America. The United States and the European Union have each levied tariffs on its car exports in the past few months, hoping to avoid a “China shock” to their domestic car industries.
Ilaria Mazzocco has watched China’s EV industry grow from a small regional experiment into a planet-reshaping juggernaut. She is now a senior fellow with the Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
On this week’s episode of Shift Key, Rob and Jesse talk with Ilaria about how the industry got so big, what it means for the world, and how to think about its environmental and national security impacts. Shift Key is hosted by Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap, and Jesse Jenkins, a professor of energy systems engineering at Princeton University.
Subscribe to “Shift Key” and find this episode on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Amazon, or wherever you get your podcasts.
You can also add the show’s RSS feed to your podcast app to follow us directly.
Here is an excerpt from our conversation:
Jesse Jenkins: I want to ask you a question that I’ve actually gotten from a couple of friends and colleagues — you know, normies, folks that don’t think about energy all the time. This is a question they’ve asked me over the last couple of weeks: Do we actually need 100% tariffs to compete? Is that where we’re at now?
So I’m curious, I mean, is this just politics? Is this just the Biden administration kind of responding to Trump’s chest-beating and anti-China rhetoric as we run up to the election here? Or is it, are we really at the point where we dug ourselves such a hole that we need not just a 25% tariff, which was the level before this — already quite substantial — but a 100% tariff in order to compete? Or to protect the opportunity for the U.S. automakers to get to those economies of scale and have time to grow?
Ilaria Mazzocco: I think that’s a good question because — look, I testified in front of the USCC last year. And you know, I brought the data, and I was like, look, theoretically, these companies have a cost advantage. They could come to the U.S. You know, a 25% tariff isn’t going to stop them.
And I made that argument, but — first of all, I didn’t think that was going to be something that was going to be a problem in nine months, but you know, that’s a different issue. But the argument, though, that was just a cost thing, right? Then there’s a whole argument of, like, what does the American consumer want? What does the Chinese producer want to do, right? What is their strategy? American consumers are very different from Chinese consumers, right? Chinese consumers are much more similar to European consumers in terms of commuting time, preference for smaller vehicles, right? Americans like pickup trucks, which — you know, I just went to China in May. I saw a lot of EVs of all kinds. I did not see any pickup trucks, right? That’s like a pretty American kind of thing. It’s not clear that Chinese automakers would be able to compete on that, right?
So I think it’s quite possible that there would be a very interested part of the American market in these Chinese EVs, especially maybe the lower cost ones — maybe urban households that want a cheaper second vehicle, or something of the sort.But is that going to take over a huge portion of the American market? Is that really going to be competition for GM, or for the F-150? Like, I don’t know, actually. I think there’s an open question there, but clearly the Biden administration didn’t want to take any chances on that.
So I think there’s also this element where we also have preconceptions of what the American consumer wants, and clearly we’re not going to put that to the test, right? We’re not going to have these lower cost EVs come into the market and maybe reshape how people approach this. And as I said before, I just don’t think it’s realistic. A world in which an American government allows, the Detroit Three to fail is just not particularly realistic. But I do worry — and I mean, I’ve said this before, that it is a game, right? It is a balance that you need to get when you’re playing with tariffs. Because when you protect an industry, you give them time, but you also need to give them incentives. And the IRA does that. But you need to give them some pressure, right?
And so I think, where’s the pressure going to come from? Is it going to come from emissions standards? Or is it going to come from competition? Clearly it’s not going to come from competition from China. Is it going to come from competition with Korean automakers or Japanese automakers? Question mark, right? We don’t know.
This episode of Shift Key is sponsored by…
Watershed’s climate data engine helps companies measure and reduce their emissions, turning the data they already have into an audit-ready carbon footprint backed by the latest climate science. Get the sustainability data you need in weeks, not months. Learn more at watershed.com.
As a global leader in PV and ESS solutions, Sungrow invests heavily in research and development, constantly pushing the boundaries of solar and battery inverter technology. Discover why Sungrow is the essential component of the clean energy transition by visiting sungrowpower.com.
Music for Shift Key is by Adam Kromelow.
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Rob catches up with the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Ilaria Mazzocco.
China’s electric vehicle industry, it’s now well understood, is churning out cars that rival or exceed the best products coming out of the West. Chinese EVs are cheaper, cooler, more innovative, and have better range. And now they’re surging into car markets around the world — markets where consumers are hungry for clean, affordable transportation.
On this week’s episode of Shift Key, Rob talks to Ilaria Mazzocco about her new report on how six countries around the world are dealing with the rise of Chinese EVs. Why do countries welcome Chinese-made EVs, and why do countries resist them? How do domestic carmakers act when Chinese EVs come to town? And are climate concerns still driving uptake?
Mazzocco is the deputy director and senior fellow with the Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Shift Key is hosted by Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap, and Jesse Jenkins, a professor of energy systems engineering at Princeton University. Jesse is off this week.
Subscribe to “Shift Key” and find this episode on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Amazon, or wherever you get your podcasts.
You can also add the show’s RSS feed to your podcast app to follow us directly.
Here is an excerpt from our conversation:
Ilaria Mazzocco: Chinese batterymakers have persisted in focusing on LFP batteries with some spectacular results, I would say. And partly I think that’s been thanks to just being able to deploy them at really large scale and just testing and getting them out there.
But I think BYD is really a great example of that. They invest so much in R&D that it’s really hard to compete with them on some of these things. That’s really the big challenge, where, if you want to make a cheap car, you need LFP. That’s why Ford sought out that licensing deal with CATL, was to acquire LFP battery technology. And LFP batteries are really something that Chinese batterymakers have really excelled at.
Now, there could be breakthroughs in other chemistries. There could be a catchup game with non-Chinese batterymakers that actually become good at making LFP. That’s entirely possible. But right now, if you’re an Indian carmaker and you want to make a cheap car, your best bet is probably to get it from BYD or CATL, or maybe Gotion or something like that. That’s really what you’re looking at.
Robinson Meyer: It also, though, really changes how we talk about a lot of the development of auto industries abroad. Because I mean, I realize this is how cars were made for a long time, but I think … basically like if you were to say, Oh yeah, we make our own internal combustion cars here, we simply import the engines from Detroit, and then we place them in our otherwise finished vehicles that we’ve made domestically, and then we put it under a domestic label. We’re very proud of that. That’s essentially what is happening when countries import batteries. The batteries are so central to the operation of the EVs and what the EVs are capable of that when you import your batteries, you’re really relying on your trade partner for a lot of the core physical capacity of that vehicle, and a lot of the core, underlying chemical engineering capability that that vehicle affords you.
It suggests to me that in terms of when you think about the global EV industry, there are companies that are dependent on some kind of Chinese battery export. There are companies that are dependent on some kind of Korean battery export. There’s a few American entrants — mostly Tesla. There’s a few European entrants. And that’s kind of it. Everyone else is piggybacking on the back of one of those core technologies.
Mentioned:
Ilaria’s new report: The Global EV Shift: The Role of China and Industrial Policy in Emerging Economies
Previously on Shift Key: How China’s EV Industry Got So Big
This episode of Shift Key is sponsored by …
Heatmap Pro brings all of our research, reporting, and insights down to the local level. The software platform tracks all local opposition to clean energy and data centers, forecasts community sentiment, and guides data-driven engagement campaigns. Book a demo today to see the premier intelligence platform for project permitting and community engagement.
Music for Shift Key is by Adam Kromelow.
A trio of powerful climate hawks are throwing their weight against the SPEED Act.
Key Senate Democrats are opposing a GOP-led permitting deal to overhaul federal environmental reviews without assurances that clean energy projects will be able to reap the benefits. Winning these lawmakers’ support will require major concessions to build new transmission infrastructure and greater permitting assistance for renewable energy projects.
In an exclusive joint statement provided Tuesday to Heatmap News, Senate Energy and Natural Resources ranking member Martin Heinrich, Environment and Public Works ranking member Sheldon Whitehouse, and Hawaii senator Brian Schatz came out against passing the SPEED Act, a bill that would change the National Environmental Policy Act, citing concerns about how it would apply to renewable energy and transmission development priorities.
“We are committed to streamlining the permitting process — but only if it ensures we can build out transmission and cheap, clean energy. While the SPEED Act does not meet that standard, we will continue working to pass comprehensive permitting reform that takes real steps to bring down electricity costs,” the statement read.
As I wrote weeks ago, there’s very little chance the SPEED Act could become law without addressing Senate climate hawks’ longstanding policy preferences. Although the SPEED Act was voted out of committee in the House two weeks ago with support from a handful of Democratic lawmakers, it has yet to win support from even moderate energy wonks in that legislative body, including Representative Scott Peters, one of the Democratic House negotiators in bipartisan permitting talks. Peters told me he would need to see more assurances dealing with the renewables permitting freeze, for example, in order for him to support the bill.
Observers had initially expected a full House vote on the SPEED Act as soon as this week, but an additional hurdle arose in recent days in the form of opposition from House conservative Republicans, led by Representative Chip Roy. The congressman from Texas had requested additional federal actions targeting renewables projects in exchange for passage of the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, which effectively repealed the Inflation Reduction Act. What followed was a set of directives from the Interior Department that all but halted federal solar and wind permitting. Roy’s frustration with the SPEED Act concerns a relatively milquetoast nod to renewables permitting problems that would block presidents from rescinding already issued permits. This upset appears to have delayed a vote on the bill in the House.
There’s an eerie familiarity to this moment: Almost exactly one year ago, the last major attempt at a permitting deal, authored by Senators Joe Manchin and John Barrasso, died when then-Majority Leader Chuck Schumer declined to bring it up for a vote in the face of opposition from the House. Unlike the SPEED Act, that bill offered changes to transmission siting policy that even conservative estimates said would’ve hastened the pace of national decarbonization.
Having Schatz, Heinrich, and Whitehouse — the three most powerful climate hawks in Congress — throw their weight against the SPEED Act casts serious doubt on the prospects for that legislation becoming the permitting deal this Congress. It also exposes an intra-energy world conflict, as it appears to position these lawmakers in opposition to American Clean Power, an energy trade group that represents a swath of diversified energy companies and utilities, as well as solar, wind, and battery storage developers.
Last week, ACP joined with the American Petroleum Institute and gas pipeline advocacy organizations to urge Congress to pass the SPEED Act. In a letter to House Speaker Mike Johnson and Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries, ACP and the fossil fuel industry trade groups said that the legislation “directly addresses” the challenges facing their interests and “represents meaningful bipartisan progress toward a more stable and dependable permitting framework.” The only reference to potential additions came in a single, vague line: “While the SPEED Act makes important progress, there are additional ways Congress can facilitate the development of reliable and affordable energy infrastructure as part of a broader permitting package.”
This letter was taken by some backers of the renewable energy industry to be an endorsement without concessions. It was also a surprise because just days earlier, American Clean Power responded to the bill’s passage with a vaguely supportive statement that declared “additional efforts” were needed for “transmission infrastructure,” without which “energy prices will spike and system reliability will be threatened.” (It’s worth noting that the committee behind the SPEED Act, House Natural Resources, has no authority over transmission siting. No other proposal has yet emerged from Republicans in that chamber for Republicans to address the issue, either.)
One of the renewables backers taken aback was Schatz, who took to X to sound off against the organization. “Congratulations to ‘American Clean Power’ for cutting a deal with the American Petroleum Institute, but to enact a law both the house and the Senate have to agree, and Senators are finding out about this for the first time,” Schatz wrote in a post, which Whitehouse retweeted from one of his official X accounts.
In a subsequent post, Schatz said: “I am not finding out about the bill’s existence for the first time, I am tracking it all very closely. I am finding out that ACP endorsed it as is without anything on transmission, for the first time.”
By contrast, the statement from the three senators aligns them with the Solar Energy Industries Association, which sent a letter from more than 140 solar companies to top congressional leaders requesting direct action to fix a bureaucratic freeze on permit-related activity that has already helped kill large projects, including Esmeralda 7, which was the largest solar mega-farm in the United States.
In its message to Congress, the trade association made plain that while the SPEED Act was a welcome form of permitting changes, it was nowhere close to dealing with Trumpian chicanery on the group’s priority list.
We’ll have more on this unfolding drama in the days to come.
One longtime analyst has an idea to keep prices predictable for U.S. businesses.
What if we treated lithium like oil? A commodity so valuable to the functioning of the American economy that the U.S. government has to step in not only to make it available, but also to make sure its price stays in a “sweet spot” for production and consumption?
That was what industry stalwart Howard Klein, founder and chief executive of the advisory firm RK Equities, had in mind when he came up with his idea for a strategic lithium reserve, modeled on the existing Strategic Petroleum Reserve.
Klein published a 10-page white paper on the idea Monday, outlining an expansive way to leverage private companies and capital markets to develop a non-Chinese lithium industry without the risk and concentrated expense of selecting specific projects and companies.
The lithium challenge, Klein and other industry analysts and executives have long said, is that China’s whip hand over the industry allows it to manipulate prices up and down in order to throttle non-Chinese production. When investment in lithium ramps up outside of China, Chinese production ramps up too, choking off future investment by crashing prices.
Recognizing the dangers stemming from dysfunction in the global lithium market constitutes a rare area of agreement between both parties in Washington and across the Biden and Trump administrations. Last year, a Biden State Department official told reporters that China “engage[s] in predatory pricing” and will “lower the price until competition disappears.”
A bipartisan investigation released last month by the House of Representatives’ Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party found that “the PRC engaged in a whole‐of‐government effort to dominate global lithium production,” and that “starting in 2021, the PRC government engaged in a coordinated effort to artificially depress global lithium prices that had the effect of preventing the emergence of an America‐focused supply chain.”
Klein thinks he’s figured out a way to deal with this problem
“They manipulated and they crushed prices through oversupply to prevent us from having our own supply chains,” he told me.
It’s not just that China can keep prices low through overproduction, it’s also that the country’s enormous market power can make prices volatile, Klein said, which scares off private sector investment in mining and processing. “You have two years, up two years down, two years up, two years down,” he told me. “That’s the problem we’re trying to solve.
His proposal is to establish “a large, rules-based buffer of lithium carbonate — purchased when prices are depressed due to Chinese oversupply, and released during price spikes, shortages, or export restrictions.”
This reserve, he said, would be more than just a stockpile from which lithium could be released as needed. It would also help to shape the market for lithium, keeping prices roughly in the range of $20,000 per ton (when prices fall below that, the reserve would buy) and $40,000 to $50,000 per ton, when the reserve would sell. The idea is to keep the price of lithium carbonate — which can be processed as a material for batteries with a wide range of defense (e.g. drones) and transportation (e.g. electric vehicles) applications — within a range that’s reasonable for investors and businesses to plan around.
“Lithium has swung from like $6,000 [per ton] to $80,000, back down to $9,000, and now it’s at $11,000 or $12,000,” Klein told me. “But $11,000 or $12,000 is not a high enough price for a company to build a plan that’s going to take three to five years. They need $20,000 to $25,000 now as a minimum for them to make a $2 billion dollar investment.” When prices for lithium get up to “$50,000, $60,000, or $70,000, then it becomes a problem because battery makers can’t make money.”
Both the Biden and Trump administrations have taken more active steps to secure a U.S. or allied supply chain for valuable inputs, including rare earth metals. But Klein’s proposed reserve looks to balance government intervention with a diverse, private-sector led industry.
The reserve would be more broad-based than price floor schemes, where a major buyer like the Defense Department guarantees a minimum price for the output from a mine or refining facility. This is what the federal government did in its deal with MP Materials, the rare earths miner and refiner, which secured a multifaceted deal with the federal government earlier this year.
Klein estimates that the cost in the first year of the strategic lithium reserve could be a few billion dollars — on the scale of the nearly $2.3 billion loan provided by the Department of Energy for the Thacker Pass mine in Nevada, which also saw the federal government take an equity stake in the miner, Lithium Americas.
Ideally, Klein told me, “there’s a competition of projects that are being presented to prospective funders of those projects, and I want private market actors to decide, should we build more Thacker Passes or should we do the Smackover?” referring to a geologic formation centered in Arkansas with potentially millions of tons of lithium reserves.
Klein told me that he’s trying to circulate the proposal among industry and policy officials. His hoped is that as the government attempts to come up with a solution to Chinese dominance of the lithium industry, “people are talking about this idea and they’re saying, Oh, that’s actually a pretty good idea.”