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This transcript was automatically generated.
Robinson Meyer:
Hi, I’m Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap News.
Jesse Jenkins:
[1:28] And I’m Jesse Jenkins, a professor of energy systems engineering at Princeton University.
Robinson Meyer:
[1:32] And you are listening to Shift Key, Heatmap’s weekly podcast about decarbonization and the shift away from fossil fuels. Jesse, happy new year.
Jesse Jenkins:
[1:40] Happy new year. I’m back.
Robinson Meyer:
[1:42] It’s good to see you. It’s so good to talk. Look at this. We’re doing a Shift Key episode. I feel just like, feels like October 2025 in here.
Jesse Jenkins:
[1:52] If only.
Robinson Meyer:
[1:55] We have an exciting show planned for you today. We’re going to talk about, I think, one of the most interesting series of events to happen in the U.S. energy markets recently, in a little bit. But first, we have some housekeeping news for you that we want to talk about. We have some exciting, but also somewhat sad, changes at Shift Key. We have some good news and bad news that affects the show. And Jesse, I want to start with the bad news. So do you want to share anything with the class?
Jesse Jenkins:
[2:20] Yes. I’m going to be stepping back from my regular co-host role here on Shift Key and leaving you and Rob’s capable hands and transitioning to more of a guest host role. I will be back on the show, but less regularly than before. That’s to make time for a new startup venture that I have co-founded called Firma Power that I’ve started with Scott Burger and Brent Alderfer, my co-founders. We are working hard right now to scale the company up and we are working on supplying clean, reliable electricity to data centers to meet the pressing demand growth challenge that’s happening right now by trying to unlock more capacity and load enabling capacity from wind, solar and storage resources that are often overlooked as resources that can support big loads like data centers. We think that’s the fastest way to get more capacity onto the grid and to make sure it’s clean. And so excited to be working on that at Firma, but it is taking up a lot more of my time. And so to ease the load a little bit, I’m going to be transitioning to a guest role here and we’ll be with you less often.
Robinson Meyer:
[3:17] Jesse, little did we know when we started talking about the AI electricity surge that it was going to change energy so much that it would take you away from us.
Jesse Jenkins:
[3:27] That’s right. It was going to change Shift Key too.
Robinson Meyer:
[3:29] It was going to change Shift Key too. Well, that’s the bad news. The good news is that while we’re very sad to lose Jesse, the moment of his departure gives us a chance to loosen up the schedule a little bit, shift to a more dynamic Shift Key product. I will be taking over primary hosting duties as Jesse announced, but we’ll also be welcoming a new set of occasional co-hosts, much like Jesse, who will start rolling out in the next few weeks. We’re very excited for that change. I think it’s going to lead to a newsier, maybe more dynamic Shift Key. The core of the show will stay the same. We’re going to keep bringing you the best discussion we can and the best insights and reporting we can into the energy transition, the shift away from fossil fuels and the state of this giant ...
Robinson Meyer:
[4:10] Energy, fossil, climate, clean energy story that we cover all around the world. So let me also take this opportunity to thank you for listening to Shift Key
Robinson Meyer:
[4:17] and encourage you to stick around. And with that news, on this week’s episode of Shift Key, we are talking about power grids in the winter and specifically the American power grid in the winter. The Northeast United States and the Mid-Atlantic just experienced, I would say, a relentlessly frigid three weeks, which rivaled recent records for the longest periods of time where temperatures did not get above freezing. I think we came just short of the record here in New York City because in the middle of this three-week span, temperatures just peaked once slightly above freezing, but otherwise we actually would have smashed the all-time record for a number of days below freezing in a row, which is kind of funny, of course, given climate change. I should note that North America is in an anomalously cold bubble in the world right now. A lot of the rest of the planet is much warmer than usual. But for whatever reason.
Jesse Jenkins:
[5:11] Including the including west of the Rockies, actually, which is undergoing a very warm snow drought with no, you know, very little snow across the Sierras and Rockies and Cascades this year.
Robinson Meyer:
[5:21] I was hanging out with friends from Denver this weekend and they in D.C. And they were like, we’re going to go home. It’s going to be 65 degrees and very weird. And it was, of course, yeah, below 20 degrees. It was like wind chill of negative three degrees Fahrenheit, exactly, in D.C. Because of these very cold temperatures, the electricity grid was stressed and stressed in pretty profound ways. So at the peak of the winter storm in New England, oil and really diesel fuel generated 40% of New England’s electricity, which, given that oil and diesel normally generate roughly zero percent of New England’s electricity, is a marker of just how stressed the grid was. It means grid operators were looking for any source of marginal generation they could find. They had exhausted all the usual alternatives and they had moved to the dirtiest and rarest form of electricity generation, which is diesel.
Robinson Meyer:
[6:13] I wanted to talk about that. I also wanted to talk about it because when we talk about winter grid performance, it’s a bit of a preview of what’s to come. Because while historically in the mid-Atlantic and northeastern U.S., the summer has been the time of year where we use the most electricity. It’s because it’s the time of year where everyone cranks their air conditioner up really high. As we continue to see electrification make way as data centers and new factories get built. And as people electrify not only their vehicles, but also their heating, we expect the winter, especially in New England, to take over as the most electricity intensive time of year from the summer. And so in some ways, when we see these moments of high winter grid stress, we’re previewing the future of the electricity grid. And we’re also seeing the moments that we most need to be worried about on the electricity grid, because there are some more straightforward forward ways we could proceed to reduce carbon emissions during the summer, the winter is a
Robinson Meyer:
[7:12] little bit of a trickier challenge. Let’s actually start the conversation off there. Jesse, can you give us some context on like what just happened in the Mid-Atlantic and Northeastern power grid in the United States and like how should we be thinking about it?
Jesse Jenkins:
[7:27] Yeah, I mean, this was, as you mentioned in the setup, quite unique for the length of frigid temperatures. So it wasn’t the coldest temperatures we’ve ever experienced in this sort of period. In PJM, at least, the largest market in the U.S. that expands the Mid-Atlantic to the Great Lakes region. And we didn’t quite set a new winter peak in demand. January 29th and 30th fell as number six and number eight in the top 10 winter peaks in PJM. But it was the fact that we had many, many days in a row, two, three weeks, really, of prolonged stress conditions where every power plant available was being called into action when natural gas pipelines were strained to deliver a simultaneous peak in demand for heating fuel and power generation from gas-fired power plants. And when frigid temperatures were increasing forced outages, you know, knocking offline power plants as they dealt with those extreme cold conditions that they’re not typically planning for, they’re much more designed to plan for the summer. This is sort of an example of like, these are the one in every, I don’t know, 10- or 20-year events that become design basis events for the grid, right? These are the kinds of circumstances that we have to be able to get through.
Jesse Jenkins:
[8:31] And for the most part, we did. There were outages that were obviously difficult to endure for people who lost power in the middle of a subzero windchill day. But most of those outages were the result of, really, I think all of those outages were the result of transmission and mostly distribution network failures, which remains our kind of critical vulnerability in the grid, and not generation adequacy from the wholesale power supplies. Power prices got high. We burned a lot of gas. We burned a lot of oil. We can talk more about that. But the supplies remained adequate and system operations managed to get through this prolonged stress period pretty well, I should say. This was not like the Winter Storm Uri in 2021 that really crippled Texas’ grid or even Winter Storm Elliott, which hit in 2023 and was really the kind of most recent stressor event for the larger Eastern interconnection of which PJM and ISO New England are part of, where we saw much higher reductions in gas availability and much higher forced outages. Since both of those events, I think that the grid operators and gas network and power plant operators have done more to prepare for these kind of winter events, and that seems to be showing up in more favorable outcomes this time around.
Robinson Meyer:
[9:39] And just to put some numbers on this, PJM saw 139 gigawatts of demand on January 29th, 138 gigawatts on January 30th. That’s below the all-time winter high, which is 143 gigawatts, which was last January, actually almost exactly a year ago. Looking forward this summer, we expect PJM is probably going to set an all-time demand record for any season of about 160 gigawatts. We won’t know exactly where it will come out, but it will break a record last set 20 years ago, thus showing that we are fully out of our 20-year period of flat electricity demand in the mid-Atlantic United States. So look, 140 gigawatts, you’re still 20, 21 gigawatts below what we expect the summer demand to be this summer. But it’s like a very different demand profile because at least when I think about the summer, I think about afternoon and evening peak periods of demand on the grid. So folks turn on their air conditioner. And yes, you know, electricity demand goes up a little bit maybe when they wake up. But when they wake up around dawn or around 7am tends to be the coolest part of the day.
Robinson Meyer:
[10:45] Electricity demand really gets cranking in the summer, like starting afternoon and then going into the peak like 7 to 9pm period. And so when I think about it, I’m like, okay, well, that’s a fairly straightforward challenge to solve with solar and batteries. and to some degree solar and batteries is like very well designed for that challenge. You know, solar generation peaks around noon or 1pm and all you have to do is.
Robinson Meyer:
[11:12] Hold on to that electricity generated by your peaking solar for another five or six hours and then dump it on the grid during periods of peak demand. Winter is tough because in winter, yes, you have this afternoon peak when folks get home and they cook dinner and they run the laundry machine and all of that. But you also have this tricky morning peak when folks wake up, they maybe turn on space heaters in their home, they crank up the thermostat. Really before the sun has fully come up, there’s a surge in power demand right at the beginning of the workday.
Jesse Jenkins:
[11:43] I mean, that’s challenging. It’s less, I think, that it’s happening right in the morning because you could keep your battery at a full state of charge from yesterday at noon. The bigger problem, of course, is that in the winter, there’s not as much sun. And so you’re not going to be able to charge your batteries reliably midday with very inexpensive electricity. Power prices may stay relatively high during the day and gas generators are likely setting the price throughout the day, as opposed to these periods of solar excess that might be more common in summer periods, especially as solar penetration increases in regional grids. If we look at kind of the periods of peak pricing in PJM, this sort of occurred most recently on February 9th from about 5.45 a.m. To 8 a.m. So you’ve got like, you know, two, three hours in the morning, little blips again in the evening hours. But the biggest ones are those early morning hours when it’s the coldest out in terms of the exterior temperature and people wake up, throw those warm blankets off and start turning on the heaters and getting ready for the day. So if you had other sources to charge from, batteries still do help quite a bit in these circumstances. Those peaks are not 12 hours long, they’re two, three hours long, and batteries are still quite capable of supplying winter peaking capability. And if you look at the kind of ratings that batteries get in the capacity markets, where they accredit the kind of percentage of capacity that’s expected to be available, they do pretty well still in winter months in different parts of the country. But solar is going to effectively get derated over time to zero in the winter because it’s just not going to be able to contribute.
Robinson Meyer:
[13:12] When you say derated, what do you mean? Sorry.
Jesse Jenkins:
[13:14] That means like, so if I want to make sure I’ve got a megawatt, I can support a megawatt of peak demand. I need more than one megawatt of supply because gas generators fail, their gas supply gets reduced because of competing demands for heating. Wind farms aren’t always, you know, turning, solar panels aren’t always cranking out, batteries run out of juice. So for all of those reasons, you know, coal piles freeze, everything has deratings that mean that they’re worth less than their rated capacity in terms of how much peak demand they can support. So if I want 100 megawatts peak demand, I might need, you know, 180 or 250 megawatts of, you know, install capacity. And that ratio depends on the kind of individual contribution of each resource at those peak demand periods. Most MISO and SPP, the mid-continent ISO and the Southwest Power Pool that operate in kind of the middle of the country, they’ve already moved to seasonal accreditation of capacity in these markets. So they recognize that solar is worth quite a bit in the summer, but it’s worth a lot less in the winter. For example, gas plants face a much higher derate in the winter because of struggles around equipment, freezing and fuel availability than they do in the summer. So they’re kind of recognizing those different contributions. ISO New England is moving that direction as well towards summer and winter. PJM eventually will, but at the moment it has a single annual rating. What’s interesting is that annual derating has become set by winter stress conditions
Jesse Jenkins:
[14:33] like this, even though they peak demand in the summer.
Robinson Meyer:
[14:37] Yeah, well, one statistic that I don’t think I mentioned in the intro, but that really stuck out to me is that winter loads are growing. Winter electricity demand is growing three times faster than summer electricity demand.
Jesse Jenkins:
[14:47] And so it’s going to be even more of a stress issue in the future. Yeah, I think ISO New England predicts that winter peaks will exceed summer peaks by as early as 2030. So this is not some distant 2050 electrification scenario. Like, it’s coming.
Robinson Meyer:
[15:00] No, this is like an imminent problem with grid management that is going to matter.
Jesse Jenkins:
[15:03] Within the planning horizon today, yeah.
Robinson Meyer:
[15:05] Not only within the planning horizon, but like fully within the political horizon. Yes, that’s true. Like current policymakers are going to be judged on decisions they make now because they may still be in office by the time that these constraints become really pressing on the grid. So I want to back up because we’ve kind
Robinson Meyer:
[15:19] of been talking around this, but I want to ask it directly. Like, what was your takeaway from watching PJM and ISO New England, which we’re calling ISO New England? It’s just the New England power grid. And conveniently, it covers exactly the states of New England, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Vermont, New Hampshire, and Maine. New York also has its own power grid and was subject to some of these dynamics, too. So watching this whole swath of the country, really Virginia and Indiana up into Maine, what was your takeaway from how the grid performed over the past three weeks?
Jesse Jenkins:
[15:51] So again, I think kudos to system operators and to the generation owners who were working hard to keep these plants online. It really wasn’t a constraint. It cost a lot of money, right? You know, prices that we had to pay for fuel at peak periods, the prices that marginal generators were setting in terms of electricity market prices were very elevated. So it’s going to show up in a big way in our bills when those kinds of wholesale prices end up actually hitting our retail bills. But we did not have widespread rolling blackouts anywhere. Those blackouts that occurred, again, were due to distribution network failures, mostly from freezing rain and sleet and heavy snow impacting distribution lines, trees falling or power poles coming down, which is, again, like that’s, you know, I would say 90%, 95% of all power disruptions that people experience are due to those distribution network failures. But that’s not because there aren’t risks at the grid level. It’s just because those grid level risks have been managed very effectively. And we focus a lot of attention on them because when things go wrong there, it’s not just one neighborhood that loses its power. It’s the entire region. So you have an event like Winter Storm Uri in Texas, where, you know, a third of their power is unavailable and people all over the state are freezing. I’m not trying to minimize the generator challenges. It’s just that we have done a very good job, I think of mostly solving them. But I think if we go through each generator type, we start to see some of the previews of these challenges that we’ll face in the future. I already talked about solar. Obviously, you can’t count much on solar in the winter.
Robinson Meyer:
[17:17] Man, I was in PJM for some of this wintery period. I was being a good reporter, Jesse. I was going in the field, in PJM, yes. And the town where I grew up has some community solar and local municipally owned solar projects. And I was driving past them right around the 22nd, 23rd at the peak demand. And, Those solar panels, I will tell you, covered in snow. They were covered in snow. I was like, man, they might be generating 10% of it.
Jesse Jenkins:
[17:47] Oh, I doubt it. Yeah. Even that. I mean, look, we got 10 to 12 inches of snow in much of the region around here and then a nice layer of sleet on top of it. So we’ve been living here in Princeton with basically an ice sheet on top of a foot of snow everywhere. Think about that on top of your solar panels and your roof. And it hasn’t warmed up enough to melt that. So if you weren’t lucky enough to like shovel out your driveway or your parking spot before the sleet hit, like you were dealing with giant ice chunks,
Robinson Meyer:
[18:14] You could send someone up to go. Periodically clean them off, but then your operation cost is much higher for the solar panels. That’s right.
Jesse Jenkins:
[18:22] Or if you are a large enough utility scale project, you could put like resistive heaters into your panels that you turn on in the winter. There are ways to weatherize them. But yeah, so, you know, the other big issue, of course, is it’s been cloudy and it’s winter. So the solar production is already lower. We just need to be clear that solar is a useful resource. It provides a lot of low marginal cost electricity throughout the year. When it does, it’s displacing other more costly resources. And for the moment, with the exception of maybe California, it’s still contributing quite a bit to the summer peaks because those do occur and do stress the system as well. And so it’s, you know, one of the pieces of a broader system that we need, but we shouldn’t be counting on it in the winter. That’s not a shocker to system operators. Wind power, depending on where you are in the country, can help in the winter. Other times it doesn’t. And so it’s a very location-specific resource because the wind patterns are much more geographically particular.
Robinson Meyer:
[19:12] Is that because of the wind patterns or is that because of in some places it makes sense to invest in winterizing your wind turbines and in other places it doesn’t?
Jesse Jenkins:
[19:20] I was thinking more of the former. The latter is also true. You know, if you’re in a region that very rarely gets cold, it doesn’t make a lot of sense to invest the extra money to make sure that they don’t get iced up once every five years versus, you know, wind turbines in North Dakota are clearly all planning to deal with those conditions all the time. But more that just wind patterns are much more localized than solar patterns. Solar tends to be less variable over geography, whereas the wind can be affected much more by local topology and differences between land and sea temperatures or lake and land temperatures or mountain passes, things like that. So wind, not a huge factor for PJM or New England at the moment because they don’t have a lot of installed wind capacity onshore, at least. But it is more relevant in places like the middle of the country, the MISO and SPP, where I think it did have differing contributions over the course of the last couple of weeks.
Robinson Meyer:
[21:42] Nothing has convinced me yet that the Trump administration is going to be successful in stopping these four or five big offshore wind projects from coming online. I mean, are those projects designed to work in the sleet and snow, or is that going to be like a summer overnight resource?
Jesse Jenkins:
[21:57] I assume that those are going to be winterized to operate in the kinds of waters that they’re operating in here. But that’s a good question. I don’t know definitively the answer to that. I haven’t done this, but it would be a really great, I think, useful exercise to look at the projected wind production from a wind farm off Long Island, and maybe look at Block Island or South Fork Winds production during this period, and then scale that up to think about how much it might have saved in energy costs over the week, the last couple of weeks, while power prices were really elevated and gas prices were high. My guess is we look at that, there are periods of time when it was contributing quite a lot and periods of time when it’s contributing very little. And so mostly it’s providing energy, which again could be used to charge batteries and wait for that system peak, but it may or may not align exactly with that early morning peak. That said, I do think, you know, offshore wind and coastal wind do tend to produce the most in the morning and the evening when you get this land-sea temperature differential that drives a shore breeze or an ocean breeze. So it may be that those are positively correlated periods.
Jesse Jenkins:
[22:59] My takeaway from all this, and I’ve said this before, I said this in Congress, as I testified after the Winter Storm Uri, is that wind and solar are contributors of energy in different seasons and at different times. They may contribute some fraction of their capacity now to meet these peak demand periods, but their primary contribution to the grid is not capacity, it’s energy. And that energy can then be stored in batteries and used to provide capacity. So they’re synergistic with batteries in that sense, just like the summer peak scenario you talked about, Rob. But they’re reliably unreliable. We know that, right? And we’re not planning our system around them. We are planning our system around our firm generating technologies and increasingly energy storage.
Jesse Jenkins:
[23:39] And I think it’s really critical in these winter periods to look at the kinds of vulnerabilities that those technologies face. Because when they fail, like they did in Texas in Uri in 2021, the system fails because those are the technologies that we’re counting on to show up. They’re the ones carrying the system on their backs. I think in this circumstance, they performed quite well overall, although there were elevated outages for gas and coal generators across the region. Overall, we had enough of them online and operating to get through the peak demand period here. I think what’s helpful is to think about the difference between summer and winter stresses on these thermal plants. Because again, it is a very different type of risk. In the summer, the main risk is the ambient temperature, ambient water temperature that they’re using as their heat sink gets higher. And the efficiency of thermal power plants is basically proportionate to the difference between their combustion temperatures or inlet temperatures and that heat sink. It doesn’t have a huge effect, but it can knock several percentage points off of the available capacity of your thermal power generators in really hot summer conditions. There may be just mechanical stresses from running over prolonged periods and having some equipment failure. The winter has a whole different set of challenges. And the biggest one is around fuel availability.
Jesse Jenkins:
[24:51] And the fuel handling equipment at these facilities. So coal plants, picture a giant coal plant, they consume trainloads worth of coal every day. That coal sits in giant coal piles and then is taken by conveyor belts up into crushers that crush and pulverize that coal and then blast it into the furnace and combust it. If any piece of that delivery chain freezes up, then the coal plant can’t get fueled into the boiler, even if you have a giant pile of coal on site. And that that is a frequent occurrence during these circumstances. You do have freezing of the coal supply and that will knock off power plants in the winter and it’s not an issue in the summer.
Jesse Jenkins:
[25:28] And for gas generators, which are increasingly the mainstay of our grid, especially in these regions, as I mentioned, I think before, it’s not just that the power grid is at its maximum, the heating demand from gas networks is also at its maximum. And that’s not true in the summer when we’re not running all our heaters on. And so what that leads to is a few different ways in which gas generators can lose supply as well.
Jesse Jenkins:
[25:49] One is that if they’re connected to a local load serving distribution utility on the gas side, they are allowed to curtail non-firm customers. And that includes typically gas generators who are not willing to pay the extra kind of standby cost to have firm access to the grid to be first in line and uninterruptible. And so gas generators can just get turned off when there’s not enough supply for the local distribution grid and the distribution operator is prioritizing households and heating over the power generators. That’s one of the key vulnerabilities. The other is that as demand goes up, gas pressures can drop in the system, and that can lead to sort of less through foot being received by the generators. And finally, this happened in particular during Elliott and Uri, the gas fields themselves can lose production. If the gathering lines and compressors and other equipment that’s exposed to the cold gets cold enough, that equipment can freeze up. Some of the valves and sensors can also freeze, which might lead to compressors turning off. And you get a drop in production. And because we don’t have a huge gas storage system, the pipelines themselves are basically the storage in most of the country. If production falls in the gas fields, that will also impact available supply pretty quickly, like within hours. And this is an area where this year, actually, the gas producers did much better than they have in the past. It seems they have been learning from previous winter events and weatherizing the system.
Robinson Meyer:
[27:13] Let’s zoom in on two specific challenges that New England in particular experienced during this winter storm. The first is something I referenced in the intro, which is that at peak, New England was actually generating 40% of its electricity from oil and really from diesel, which is crazy. I mean, oil and diesel, I think it’s crazy.
Jesse Jenkins:
[27:35] For me, I’m like- Everybody else thinks it’s crazy. I’ll tell you why I don’t think it’s crazy in a minute.
Robinson Meyer:
[27:38] Okay, well, let’s talk about this is a throwback. I mean you look at 40% of New England’s electricity coming from oil. This is like a throwback and, to the 1970s when the U.S. got a ton of electricity from oil, really only effectively cut off by the beginning of the Arab oil embargo and the energy crisis in the 1970s, ultimately prompting a return to coal, at least way back then. I don’t know. I look at this and I go, something really has gone wrong. If New England’s getting 40% of its electricity from oil, that’s like the most possible polluting thing other than coal you could generate electricity from. But what do you think? I don’t know.
Jesse Jenkins:
[28:14] I look at it and I say, that’s probably what the future is going to look like in a lot more places across the country if we transition to a winter peaking system. And here’s why. So yeah, 40%, but for how many hours? For a week? For two weeks? That’s probably half a percent to one and a half percent of annual generation in New England.
Jesse Jenkins:
[28:30] So a lot of capacity, very little energy, right? That’s the perfect thing for peaking, right? And for prolonged to events like this. The alternative to that is you oversize gas pipelines and you oversize gas production to meet that extra 40% of New England generation that only occurs once every two years for 1% of the hours of the year. While there has been local environmental opposition and political opposition to building greater pipelines into the Northeast, the economics of that also don’t necessarily line up. Gas generators had the option in New England to sign firm gas contracts that would have meant they were uninterruptible by local distribution companies. Those firm gas contracts could then help finance new gas pipeline construction or expansion. They chose not to do that. They chose instead to install oil tanks, diesel tanks on site, and to convert to dual fuel generators for these kinds of circumstances. And the reason for that is that when you’re dealing with this sort of very infrequent event, what you want is something that costs very little upfront, but maybe has a very high variable cost when you consume it. Because you’re not going to consume very much of it, and you’re going to do it very infrequently. And so you don’t want a big fixed cost just sitting there all the time. Well, guess what a gas pipeline is? A giant fixed cost sitting there all the time.
Jesse Jenkins:
[29:44] Oil, on the other hand, is a consumable. It’s very expensive. Power prices go up when we’re using it, right? They’re a couple hundred dollars a megawatt hour at least.
Jesse Jenkins:
[29:53] But you can store many days worth of fuel on site in oil tanks in a fairly compact landscape. Oil is our default long duration energy storage right now, right? Until we invent something better and cleaner. And so for these kinds of rare events that only happen a couple percent of the hours of the year, just like we would like to have more batteries and more long duration energy storage to replace this in the near term, this is a sensible way to manage gas pipeline capacity peaks, right? Otherwise, we’re building, I don’t know what percentage, maybe 10% more total gas pipeline capacity. And that extra 10% increment, we’re basically never using. We don’t need it in the summer. We only need it 1% or 2% of the times when the
Jesse Jenkins:
[30:35] System is at the sort of peak stress.
Jesse Jenkins:
[30:37] And so it’s a very logical economic solution to this problem. And while yes, it is dirty during the periods when we’re burning that oil, we are burning very little of it and for very short periods of time. You know, it’s a week or two every couple of years.
Robinson Meyer:
[30:51] Can I kind of lean in on that, though? Because I think that, yes, right now it makes sense for New England to have all this oil capacity on site. They store it, they burn it during these peak freezing events. We were just saying, though, how winter load is growing three times faster than summer load. And so what’s driving that?
Jesse Jenkins:
[31:10] Winter heating electrification, which is displacing gas consumption on the heating side.
Robinson Meyer:
[31:15] I see.
Jesse Jenkins:
[31:16] So yes, in its worst case, if you’re running resistance heating and EVs.
Robinson Meyer:
[31:20] I mean, EVs are driving that too.
Jesse Jenkins:
[31:21] Yeah, EVs as well, but they should also be more flexible when they charge. But yeah, that’s true. And data centers, although there’s not a lot of those in New England.
Jesse Jenkins:
[31:27] That’s true in PJM. There is an interesting dynamic here. This is one that my group is actually researching and modeling right now for a New England case study. As we displace gas demand for heating, Yes, we’re building electricity demand, which may rely more on gas generators in the winter or oil fire generators in the winter. We’re also relieving some of the pipeline stresses that are driven by the peak heating demand. And so the key then is to make sure that winter electrification is more efficient when you account for the power plant losses than gas furnaces and boilers. And you can do that with heat pumps, right? If it’s resistance heating, if you’re burning gas in a gas generator, you lose roughly half of that gas, and then the resistance heating is more or less 100% efficient. So you have about a 50% efficient pathway there to heat your home, as opposed to a furnace, which is maybe 80%, 85% efficient. So in that case, we would be consuming more gas to power heating from the grid than we would to fuel heating in a furnace. But if it’s a heat pump, the coefficient of performance of heat pumps that are sized appropriately for winter conditions are greater than two. And if it’s a ground source heat pump, they’re greater than four or five or six. And so in that case, we could actually be relieving gas demand even as we build up the winter electricity peak. And so these sort of dynamics are careful to think about, especially when we’re talking about whether or not we want to build a new pipeline or not. We may want more gas generators. I was going to say more dual fuel generators.
Robinson Meyer:
[32:51] You’re talking about a world where you build. Yeah, exactly. So what I’m hearing here is you don’t need a bigger pipeline or you don’t.
Jesse Jenkins:
[32:58] Maybe. I’m going to say this is just these are the dynamics that you have to be very clear about. It’s not so obvious. I mean, I know like it’s easy to look at that 40% from oil and say, well, obviously we need another pipeline. It’s not so obvious because that 40%, yes, it’s 40% for a few hours, but the savings of that oil cost would have to justify building the pipeline. And it’s not like gas is cheap right now either. Gas prices were as high as $1,000 an MMBTU when they’re normally two or three. So the relative savings from gas versus oil is not as high as you might think to justify building that pipeline. If total baseload gas demand is increasing, maybe we want a new pipeline to satisfy that. But these peak events are best satisfied with storage, ideally in the long-term clean power storage, but in the short-term oil on site. That’s the logical solution. When we’re thinking about whether that baseload demand is going to go up, we do have to be very careful to think about what the dynamics are around electrification. And are we doing electrification in a way that is as efficient as possible?
Jesse Jenkins:
[33:56] That has an extra cost at the household level, right? If I build a bigger heat pump that can handle extreme winter conditions, or I invest in a ground source heat pump, that costs me more up front, but I’m avoiding big fixed costs on the grid. And which one is cheaper is the question for society as a whole to figure out. And then whichever one’s cheaper needs to be appropriately compensated. And right now, we don’t pay for peak capacity at the household level. You pay by volume, and that’s backwards. So we’re going to have to find some way to convey to people that it is worth it to you to install that more efficient, bigger heat pump if you’re gonna electrify or to do the weatherization upgrade or to go for a ground source heat pump because it’s avoiding a bunch of sunk capital that would otherwise just sit there on the grid And, you know, if one is cheaper than the other, you should be putting it in your house as opposed to on the grid. But our rate design doesn’t convey that. Our policies don’t convey that. And that tradeoff is one that we really need to drill into as we think about the best pathway through the winter.
Robinson Meyer:
[34:52] This is extra complicated in New England, though, because New England is already bringing in LNG from the Caribbean to power its summer peak, though, right?
Jesse Jenkins:
[35:01] But again, that’s a variable cost, right? It’s a pure variable cost. I guess you have a terminal that you need to build, but they already built it. You’ve got a basically a pure variable cost to add some additional peaking capacity. Yes, it’s expensive. Is it enough in fuel savings to displace that by building a pipeline with a lot of fixed costs that you only use some of the time? So yeah, I’m not saying that I’ve done the math and said that that doesn’t make sense. I’m just saying it is more complicated than it initially looks.
Robinson Meyer:
[35:25] Well, and I’m kind of carping for the pipeline here, but I’m not actually saying we should go build the pipeline. I’m just trying to think through what all the different sides of this are because you hear about the LNG as much as you hear about the oil winter fuel generation. The other thing I want to talk about before we close is that in mid-January, the New England Clean Energy Connect transmission line opened. And this is a 1,200-megawatt line. It’s been in the news for a long, long time. It connects New England to the abundant hydroelectric resources in Quebec. This has been something that climate advocates and folks have fought over for a long time. It was overturned by a referendum in Maine. That referendum was canceled out by a Supreme Court decision in Maine. But it was successfully built. It turned on in mid-January. It’s a big old transmission line. It’s going to reduce emissions on the New England grid. It’s very exciting. And then a few days into its operation, this winter storm hits, and imports of electricity into New England basically dropped to zero. And so, Quebec stopped sending any new electricity over the line to New England at a moment when New England is just absolutely screaming for electricity. And over that weekend, starting around the 24th, New England actually exported electricity back into Quebec. Now, not that much, but still.
Jesse Jenkins:
[36:39] Yeah, it turns out it was cold in Quebec too. And so they were actually willing to pay more than New England was for that power at that time.
Robinson Meyer:
[36:45] Here’s my question. We’re about to connect new york city to the hydro quebec yeah resource chippy big power line going to run down the hudson river plug directly into new york city grid it’s going to cut our emissions go to reducing some of the uh generation that was previously provided by indian point the local nuclear plant that was shut down a few years ago should.
Jesse Jenkins:
[37:05] We think about this
Robinson Meyer:
[37:06] Yes i here’s my question should we think about hydro quebec and this and this montreal hydroelectricity resource a little differently now, given that during the first big test of its ability to supply generation to the winter New England grid, it kind of failed.
Jesse Jenkins:
[37:23] No, it did exactly what the contract said. So this is an area where again, like, yes, if you were counting on it to provide winter peak with 100% firm reliability, then that was a mistake. You shouldn’t have counted on that. That’s not what the contract said. No one who built the line and was familiar with those contracts thought that that was the case. It didn’t fail. It did exactly what we expected. It is not a firm winter peaking capacity resource. It will contribute energy during winter events, even during some of these periods, right? It didn’t stop exporting for two weeks solid. But like solar, it is not a winter capacity resource that you should count on. And so you got to add up the right mix of system resources to also get your summer capacity. It does provide energy. It provides energy through the winter. It provides energy in the summer. I think it does provide firm supply in the summer, most likely, because temperatures are warmer in the south and their demand is higher than it is in quebec the way to think about those lines is as a big battery that you just tucked up to where when power prices are lower in new england than they are there you can send power north and bank it and when the reverse is true you can take power back the other way just like norway does that for denmark and germany for example and so it is a very valuable resource for the region it will supply a lot of clean energy and it will supply a lot of flexibility.
Jesse Jenkins:
[38:39] But is it a winter capacity resource? No, it was an interruptible winter contract. They knew that when they signed the contracts. And so it’s important for everybody to understand that and to plan the system accordingly. Of course, ISO New England knew that and they did plan the system accordingly. They were not counting on it to be there. So this is again, like at the high level, power systems are systems that each individual resource does not need to be dependable all the time. None of them are, right? Gas plants lose fuel, coal plants freeze, wind turbines ice up, hydro, So Quebec stops exporting, like all of these things have potential vulnerabilities. What you need is a system that as a whole is resilient enough to get through these events. And largely we built that system right now. The question is, can we keep it that resilient as winter demand grows and as we shift away from fossil fuels? So we are less reliant on the resources that today carry the brunt of that load. What will replace them? Will we have to rely on diesel stored on site to run in these winter peak scenarios? Or will we have long duration batteries that we can rely on? Or will we have more hydropower in the reservoirs we can rely on? Or will we have other new clean firm technologies like geothermal and nuclear that can help carry the load in the winter? That’s the key challenge going forward. And we have to think about the demand side just as much as the supply side, as I talked about, how do we ensure we’re not driving up electricity demand more than we should be?
Robinson Meyer:
[39:53] If you could add one resource to the New England winter grid or to the New England grid in general, where they said, look, yeah, we burned a lot of oil. It works fine, but we’re worried about winter loads are going to keep going up. Maybe we can’t synchronize all our demand as well as we might wish. What is the one resource we should add to the grid in order to make sure we can meet these winter events?
Jesse Jenkins:
[40:16] On the demand side, it’s ground source geothermal heat pumps. Because every...
Robinson Meyer:
[40:21] Which we’ll link back to the episode we’ve done on these in the show notes, because we’ve talked to a company producing ground source winter heat pumps.
Jesse Jenkins:
[40:28] With Dig Energy, who I advise. So the reason I say that is because every unit of heating you get from ground source heat pumps, while it does increase electricity demand by one unit, would displace natural gas demand by probably three units. So you want to relieve pipeline constraints in the winter? Ground source geothermal is a big bang for your buck. Now, of course, we’ve got to be able to install those at a reasonable cost. That’s, again, what Dig is trying to work on and others. But if I could wave my wand and have some breakthrough technology or some new technology come to market to expand our toolkit in the winter, ground source heat pumps are the thing, especially for northern climates. On the supply side, in New England or New York, it’d be nuclear power, right? Technology that doesn’t rely on an external fuel supply, does not rely on coal piles that can freeze up. As long as it’s appropriately winterized, it’s auxiliary systems and cooling. It does quite well in the winter. It doesn’t deal with the summer stresses that I talked about with cooling water temperatures. It’s an excellent winter resource. And that’s why it’s such a shame that New England and New York both shuttered Pilgrim and Indian Point, which we’re now sort of barely replacing with these long distance transmission lines to Quebec, many years later. Those were excellent winter reliability resources. And if we could, again, wave our magic wand and be able to build nuclear power plants at a reasonable cost and on a reasonable timeframe, it would be a very good option for the Northeast to turn to for the winter.
Robinson Meyer:
[41:45] And we should give credit to New York’s governor, Kathy Hochul here, who has already solicited contracts to build one gigawatt of new nuclear upstate somewhere in New York, and has said that she wants to build ultimately at least five gigawatts of new nuclear at some point upstate. And that would, by the way, go toward helping these New England electricity
Robinson Meyer:
[42:05] problems as well, because there’s a lot of transmission capacity between New York and New England. And by the way, we should add one more thing, which is that this too ties into a cross-border U.S.-Canadian project because New York State, if you read between the lines, you can tell that New York State might be talking to Ontario, which is itself trying to build new nuclear capacity to meet rising demand. And so, I don’t know, maybe a feel-good story for those of us who still value American Canadian economic integration. There’s lots of ongoing projects to knit those particular grids tightly together and to also go in together on building new kinds of generations, such as small nuclear reactors that could help relieve some of these problems. Okay, Jesse.
Jesse Jenkins:
[42:47] Yeah, let’s leave it there. I hope you all stayed warm over the last couple of weeks.
Robinson Meyer:
[42:50] Of course. I live in a radiator building. I got to say the problem was not staying warm. The problem was how much can you open the windows overnight? I know.
Jesse Jenkins:
[42:59] Let’s do less of that, too.
Robinson Meyer:
[43:01] Exactly. Before we go, we’re not going to have time for an up shift down shift today. But I do want to note the Rivian R2, we’ll stick it in the show notes. The first test drives of the Rivian R2 are coming out, the affordable, roughly, at least it’s going to start at $45,000 crossover that’s coming from Rivian at some point during the first half of this year. We’ll stick a link to a test drive in the show notes. It’s getting pretty good reviews. We don’t know final range yet. We don’t know final price. And we don’t know when they’ll start delivery. But other than that, other than that, seems to be getting pretty good reviews. And one of them is that it’s, you know, 10% to 80% percent charge in 30 minutes. Yeah, that’s pretty solid. Decent.
Jesse Jenkins:
[43:39] I also I texted you last night about that. They have these prototype units out for testing right now that look awesome. They’ve got this really cool print paint job on them. I really hope that they sell some of those to the public. Go Google it. Check it out. They look so cool.
Robinson Meyer:
[43:52] We’ll stick in the show notes. I cannot tell if that is.
Jesse Jenkins:
[43:55] I assume it’s just the prototypes,
Robinson Meyer:
[43:57] But I assume it’s the prototype to. We’ll see.
Jesse Jenkins:
[43:59] If enough Shift Key listeners write to Rivian, perhaps they’ll release some with those trims.
Robinson Meyer:
[44:04] RJ Scarange, if you’re listening, release the prototype paint job. Emily Panicova, my colleague, was like, are they going to sell it with those stripes? And I was like, I don’t think they are. But we’d love to be wrong. I’d love to be proven wrong.
Jesse Jenkins:
[44:15] They should.
Robinson Meyer:
[44:15] That will do it for us this week. Jesse, You know, it’s the end of one chapter, but it is not the end of your relationship with Schiffsky. We will have you back. That’s right.
Jesse Jenkins:
[44:24] The journey continues.
Robinson Meyer:
[44:25] The journey continues. We will have you back in the weeks to come. We have some very exciting episodes coming up, episodes we’ve already started planning.
Jesse Jenkins:
[44:32] I can say I love listening now to episodes that I don’t know what they’re going to say. It’s a delight to be on the other end of the other side of things.
Robinson Meyer:
[44:40] You can follow Jesse on Bluesky or LinkedIn at his name, right? Anything you should add?
Jesse Jenkins:
[44:46] Yes. Jesse D. Jenkins. Yeah.
Robinson Meyer:
[44:48] Yeah, at Bluesky, LinkedIn, at my name, Robinson Meyer. If you enjoyed Shift Key, please leave us a review on your favorite podcast app. Share this episode with a friend. Shift Key, as always, is a production of Heatmap News. Our editors are Jillian Goodman and Nico Lauricella. Multimedia editing and audio engineering is by Jacob Lambert and by Nick Woodbury. My full-time co-host is Jesse Jenkins. For the last time ever, he’ll be returning in the future as a guest co-host.
Robinson Meyer:
[45:08] Our music is by Adam Kromelow. Thank you so much for listening and see you next week.
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Robinson Meyer:
Hello, it’s Wednesday, September 2. I cannot believe it is already September. Last month, it became clear we’re witnessing a new kind of natural gas build out in the United States. Just think of the announcements we got in a few days in the middle of August. First, around August 11, the market intelligence service Cleanview identified that Amazon was behind a 7.6-gigawatt natural gas plant in Texas called Gigawatt Ranch. So just for comparison, that is huge. That would be the country’s biggest natural gas power plant. In fact, it would be the country’s biggest power plant, period. It’s about half a gigawatt bigger than the Grand Coulee Dam in Washington State, the largest power plant in America for like half a century. Then, just a week later, we learned that OpenAI and Nvidia are working together on a 9.2-gigawatt gas plant in Ohio.
Robinson Meyer:
That plant would obviously dwarf the Grand Coulee Dam. It would be the biggest power plant in America by far. But it would also even rival the Jebel Ali Power and Desalination Facility in Dubai as the world’s largest natural gas power plant of any kind. It would be a truly gargantuan facility. My colleague Emily Pontecorvo recently tried to identify the scale of the ongoing gas buildout. And she found a number of power plants, of projects that I think weren’t on my radar, weren’t generally on people’s radar. It’s been interesting because we’ve been getting a sense of the scale of this buildout at the same time that it’s become clear that the data center buildout is enormously unpopular in itself. If you’ve been reading Heatmap News, you know that according to a Heatmap Pro and Embold research poll conducted also in early August, 75% of Americans are now opposed to a data center being built near where they live, including a majority of Democrats, Republicans, independents, rural voters, urban voters, suburban voters, basically any demographic you can think of. They don’t seem to want a data center near them right now.
Robinson Meyer:
I recently sat down with Emily, a Heatmap founding staff writer, to talk about her reporting on the gas buildout, how she identified the 10 largest gas power projects now under construction or being permitted or being proposed in the United States, and how to think about this messy period. Also, how to think about the fact that it’s tech companies, who often have some of the most ambitious climate policies in America, who are now behind, a natural gas buildout on the scale that could actually increase the country’s, greenhouse gas emissions from the power sector, or at least increase them compared to the baseline. How should we think about these net zero commitments from companies like Amazon, Microsoft, Google, when often it’s those same companies that are now building some of the biggest fossil fuel projects ever proposed in the United States? And what would a good net zero commitment or climate commitment look like from those companies? We get into all of it in this conversation. It was a really generative, really interesting conversation for me. I’m Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap News, and it’s all coming up on this episode of Shift Key. Emily Pontecorvo is here. Welcome to Shift Key.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Thanks, Rob. Glad to be here.
Robinson Meyer:
So you recently wrote a piece for us about the scale of the natural gas buildout in the United States that’s happening to service data centers and to service AI. And I think it’s quite interesting because we will talk about this, but I don’t know if we understood just how large this buildout was going to be as recently as the beginning of this year.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Yeah, I think that’s right.
Robinson Meyer:
What I think back to is, we did our poll, our annual poll of climate insiders, which are kind of sources and experts and former officials and chief sustainability officers. And we asked them at the end of last year, do you think the AI build out is going to significantly slow down decarbonization? And most people said no. And at the time, I don’t know how I would have answered, but ... I feel like we’re much closer to a place where the AI buildout is slowing down decarbonization now than we were even eight months ago. And so just to start off, can you put the scale of this gas buildout in context for us? So how many plants have been proposed? How many of these plants are going to happen? What do we understand about the scale of this next generation of gas that is being planned across the United States right now?
Emily Pontecorvo:
Yeah, so I will say to start that a lot of this information is very slippery because there’s been so many announcements. The announcements are constantly kind of changing. And so we have some numbers, but they’re definitely estimates. So last week, the Global Energy Monitor, which is this group that tracks oil and gas projects all over the world, they put out a report saying that they counted 189 gigawatts of natural gas plants in the U.S. that have either been announced, that are in a pre-construction phase, like they have some permits, or that are under construction. And that is nearly double the amount that they found at the end of last year, which was about 97 gigawatts.
Robinson Meyer:
And is that entirely behind the meter plants, or are those any kind of natural gas plant being planned across the United States, kind of for any purpose on the grid or off the grid?
Emily Pontecorvo:
So these numbers, 189 gigawatts up from 97 six months ago, those are projects that are specifically being motivated by data centers. So some of them are being built on the grid that utilities are building to kind of meet new demand room data centers. And a lot of them are off-grid projects that are being directly tied to data centers.
Robinson Meyer:
And I guess you’ve kind of alluded to this already, but like, So it’s almost 200 gigawatts of gas plants coming online. Do we know, like, how large is the existing U.S. gas fleet?
Emily Pontecorvo:
Yeah, so I, you know, had to look this up for this story. But as of last year, the existing natural gas generation capacity in the U.S. was 512 gigawatts.
Robinson Meyer:
Wow. It’s like 40% of the gas fleet we’re going to add to our existing fleet. Like, this is not a small change to the size of the gas fleet. This is like a major expansion of U.S. generation capacity.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Yeah. And the thing is, the numbers I gave earlier, those are just projects that have some relationship to the data center build out. The report also gave an estimate of just total natural gas generation that’s being planned across the country. And that number is 378 gigawatts. So it’s almost, you know, nearly doubling what we have today. And what was really interesting was I went back and looked at when was a lot of the existing natural gas generation built? Was there a time in the past where we ... Natural gas plants this quickly. And there’s like a pretty clear kind of analogous time period in the early 2000s where we built, what was it, like nearly, it was like more than 150 gigawatts in just four years. I saw different estimates. It was like maybe closer to 200. But that was a very different build out where this time the plants are much, much bigger. And so many of them are being built off-grid.
Robinson Meyer:
It is actually crazy to me the scale of the build-out that is not being built to service AI, first of all, because I would have assumed that basically the number, that upfront number, was basically all the gas because all of it would be going to AI. So the fact that there’s another, what, 150, 140 gigawatts going to just general generation is pretty crazy.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Yeah, I will say it is possible that some of that is duplicative. Like I was talking to Brendan Pierpont from Energy Innovation. He is on their electricity team, and he was pointing out that they’re seeing that in a lot of cases, the developers will go to the utilities first and ask for a certain amount of capacity. And then when they see how long that’s going to take, then they’ll kind of turn to an off-grid project. And so it’s possible that both of those are getting included in this data, but it’s so hard to really pinpoint what the numbers are.
Robinson Meyer:
So how should we think about these 189 gigawatts? Because as you said at the top of this episode, like there’s a haziness to all of this because sometimes the same gigawatt, so to speak, of demand gets requested in multiple different venues, either in different grids or at different locations, or they ask for it on grid and then they try to build it off grid. At the same time, One through line of this AI story since the beginning has been the difficulty of getting any kind of bead on demand and on the scale of demand. And it seems entirely possible to me that these 189 gigawatts are not going to all get built, but that we are going to add 189 gigawatts because maybe there’s another 100 gigawatts of demand that’s waiting to be requested. And, you know, if we build 70% of these requested gigawatts and 30% of those requested gigawatts, we’re still hitting 190 gigawatts, we’re still hitting 200 gigawatts. And so how do you think about the likelihood that this demand becomes like real capacity in the economy?
Emily Pontecorvo:
I think that the demand is real. I don’t know that 189 gigawatts of natural gas fired power plants, and especially the particular list that this report comes up with, I don’t know that those are real. But I think between data centers and a lot of other kinds of demand that we’re putting on the grid, air conditioning, electric vehicles, manufacturing, like absolutely 189 gigawatts is real. I think that the really big question is how real are these natural gas projects and how quickly will they get built? What kinds of equipment, what kinds of technology they’ll use? So
Emily Pontecorvo:
I basically went through this exercise of trying to identify the 10 biggest projects. And my initial list and my final list are not the same because as I was like researching each individual one, everything felt like sand slipping through my fingers. Like I would see one press release and then one, you know, news article with rumors about XYZ. And then the company’s website said one thing and the permit said another thing. And it was really hard to get a good grasp of, here’s a developer with a project that they say can meet five gigawatts of demand someday. And yet, in the near term, they’re actually just going to build 150 megawatts.
Emily Pontecorvo:
And so, like, should we think about that? Right, exactly.
Robinson Meyer:
This is the case for the OpenAI facility. I wrote about this for Heatmap Daily, our daily afternoon newsletter that everyone should hopefully be subscribed to. But there is this big OpenAI Department of Energy data center that is being planned in Ohio. It’s being built on a kind of ex-nuclear site that the DOE owns. And I think one of the interesting things, I mean, there’s a lot of interesting things about this project. But first of all, it’s massive. It’s nearly 10 gigawatts. It would rival the largest natural gas power plants in the world. I think it’s going to be right now.
Robinson Meyer:
Neck and neck. If the whole thing gets built, it would be right around the same size as the Jabal Ali power and desalination gas plant in Dubai. And it’s all going to go to an open AI data center. It’s backstopped by Nvidia. We learned that last month, it’s really going to increase the likelihood that this facility gets built out. But what’s interesting is that the natural gas plant is going to be built on federal land, on Department of Energy land. It’s going to be owned by the DOE and financed by Japan as part of this Trump-Japan trade deal. Now, I think there’s still a lot of questions about how much this gets built. But to your point, what’s difficult about thinking about this plant is that they want to eventually build more than nine gigawatts of power. They plan to initially build 800 megawatts of gas, which is a lot of gas, but not like a Grand Coulee Dam’s worth of gas. That is a very large gas plant, but it is not a unprecedentedly large gas plant. And how do you assess the scale of that demand, right? Do you think of it as an 800 megawatt gas plant that could literally grow 10x over the next few years? Or do you think of it as a nine and a half gigawatt gas plant, and therefore the largest power generation project in American history?
Emily Pontecorvo:
Right. I mean, so there’s like so many projects that are in this data, that are in that 189 gigawatts, like Fermi America, the big project in Texas.
Robinson Meyer:
The Rick Perry associated project, yes.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Yes. And so they’re also aspiring to even bigger than the OpenAI project. I believe their stated total power generation for the site is like 17 gigawatts, 11 gigawatts of natural gas, plus a bunch of nuclear and some other stuff. Just completely pie in the sky numbers. they already have a permit for the 11 gigawatts of natural gas though or actually no i’m sorry they have a permit for the first six and submitted a permit for the next five but
Robinson Meyer:
Big plant that’s still a really big.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Plant it’s a really big plant and yeah there’s all these projects in the list that have these huge numbers but then what’s actually happening is they’re being built in phases and the first phase might just be a couple hundred megawatts or one gigawatt or between one and two is what I’ve mostly seen. And so whether that first phase is successfully built will determine whether the additional phases are built will determine how much of that 189 gigawatts.
Robinson Meyer:
Right. Well, and also like if the AI boom is still going strong in 2028 and 2029 and 2030, then they can keep building gas to service it. Who knows what the economy will be like by then? You and I will work for AI map or something.
Robinson Meyer:
Can we talk a little bit about like, why are companies building gas? Clean energy advocates talk a lot about how wind and solar, especially solar and batteries are the cheapest source of electricity. I would say when you talk to electricity traders, too, like when you talk to people in the market every day, they also talk about how cheap solar is. So why are companies building gas and not solar to service these facilities?
Emily Pontecorvo:
So there’s like, a lot of different reasons that are all kind of coming together. Maybe the biggest one of all are the bottlenecks to connecting to the grid, the transmission bottlenecks. And that’s really pushing a lot of these companies to look for off-grid solutions.
Robinson Meyer:
And specifically just to like play that out, because they cannot site enough acreage of solar on the site where they would put a data center to generate the power they need, which means they need a grid hookup. But if they need to generate their own power on their own acreage, then you need an extremely energy-dense form of generation, and that means you go to gas. Right, right.
Emily Pontecorvo:
And then I think that’s coming together with a bunch of political factors, like the Trump administration has a strong interest in pushing natural gas. They have gotten rid of the tax credits for clean energy. They’ve made renewable energy, wind and solar, really hard to build with all of these permitting freezes and permitting obstacles for renewables. I think another element is just like the extreme speed and kind of urgency that AI companies are expanding at and demanding power at, which I guess kind of circles back to the interconnection issue and just not wanting to wait to be connected to the grid. And then the last one that I think is important is this issue with affordability in data centers where people are really worried about the build out, increasing their energy bills. And a lot of data center developers are pushing this idea that by bringing their own generation, by building these gas power plants on site, not connecting to the grid, they’re kind of putting their project in a box and ensuring that it doesn’t have any impact on regular rate payers.
Robinson Meyer:
It’s interesting to me, the ratepayer protection pledge from Trump pledges that, data centers won’t make electricity rates go up. And the solution to this for a lot of these companies, as you were saying, when they look at the set of constraints that they’re working within that include acreage, cost, regulation, local grid interconnection capacity, speed to power, they solve this set of constraints by going with gas. And I mean, I think there’s a few interesting aspects about it. First of all, it’s not clear to me that it makes data centers any more popular. He recently did polling that made a lot of news that found that 75% of Americans at this point would oppose the data center being built near where they live. I’m not convinced that adding a fossil fuel power plant to a proposed data center project makes it any more popular because it’s taking a quasi-industrial site and turning it into a full-on industrial site. But that being said, one of the promises made by adding gas generation at the data center is that by generating your own electricity, you’re not increasing local demand for electricity and therefore not increasing anyone’s rates. Now...
Robinson Meyer:
There’s a whole separate conversation to have here about whether adding marginal large-scale loads to electricity grids outside of markets like the Mid-Atlantic, which are structured in a particular way where that jacks up everyone’s rates. There’s a whole separate question and discussion to have here about basically, if you add large customers to an electricity grid because of how electricity rates are designed, that may actually bring down everyone’s bills. But I don’t want to have that conversation now. But like, it’s not clear to me that they are actually like, companies build gas to protect everyone’s electricity rates from going up nearby. And whether or not that is a good idea, and whether or not that is true, what gets left out of that conversation is whether they’re protecting everyone else’s gas rates. And the natural gas system is also a fixed system. And unlike the electricity system where you’re moving electrons around, so to speak, and you can re-rate lines, you can up-rate existing transmission lines, like you are moving molecules around with natural gas. And one thing I have wondered is like, if we’re adding gigawatts and gigawatts of gas generation to an existing gas grid.
Robinson Meyer:
Are we about to see natural gas prices go up around the country, especially when you take into effect that LNG demand is also about to double over the next few years? And so there’s like we were already worried about LNG export driving up natural gas rates. Now we’re adding LNG and a nine gigawatt scale natural gas power plant is basically like a medium sized LNG plant’s worth of demand. You’re just exporting carbon dioxide into the sky and producing electricity right so like hyperscalers can protect electricity rates by building local gas generation it’s not clear to me they can protect gas rates.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Yeah I, I mean we’ve talked about this. I, I think it’s a ... I did talk a little bit about this with folks when i was reporting on this gas build out, and I think the natural gas international natural gas market is complicated, and it’s not like there’s like a one-to-one, you know, increased demand here prices go up here…
Robinson Meyer:
It’s also like when you talk about natural gas pricing like what drives natural gas pricing in the united states is like number one weather and then like ... dot dot dot ... like a gap as big as the grand canyon and then number two like, local supply constraints and then number three is like local demand you know like there’s the number one thing driving natural gas rates remains weather but I don’t know whether these.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Things wonder yeah like if any of these mega projects get built to this the scale that they are trying to and like will they be fighting with lng exports for capacity it’s hard to it’s hard to imagine
Robinson Meyer:
Of these 10 projects, like what surprised you most? Or what project kind of wound up on the list that you did not expect to see on the list at the beginning?
Emily Pontecorvo:
So, you know, going back to a few things that we’ve talked about, like, why is this happening? Why are why gas plants? There were two projects on the list that I was surprised to learn about that were, I think, have been sort of overshadowed by the OpenAI project. But there are two additional natural gas mega projects that are coming out of this U.S.-Japan trade deal that are going to be financed by Japan and owned by the U.S.
Robinson Meyer:
I think they’re financed by Japan, owned by SoftBank’s new energy subsidiary.
Emily Pontecorvo:
In this case, SoftBank is not involved. So NextEra is building a big project in Pennsylvania. They haven’t said where yet. And a big project in Texas, neither is like has a data center attached to it. It’s a little bit unclear whether there will be a data center attached to it. The Pennsylvania one might connect to the grid. But nonetheless, these deals have been advertised as being sort of motivated by increased data center demand. And so just going back to what we were talking about before, like, I do think that a significant amount of this buildup is the Trump administration wanting to build gas plants. Like, that’s nearly 20 between these three projects, the OpenAI one and the two NextEra projects. That’s nearly 20 gigawatts of natural gas fired capacity that the Trump administration is behind through this trade deal.
Robinson Meyer:
That’s crazy. Do we know for the 180 gigawatts built-to-service AI, for the hundreds of gigawatts that we think might be coming online for these 20 gigawatts, do we know what ... Kind of power plant they’re going to build. Because as we’ve discussed on previous episodes of Shift Key, there’s several different kinds of gas plants that are being built. The most efficient tend to be these combined cycle plants, which use the exhaust from generating electricity to then generate more electricity. And then that can kind of scale up through a peaker plant all the way to just basically now people are running jet engines to generate electricity. That matters a lot to the emissions profile of these plants because it matters a lot to their energy efficiency in just a very kind of classical sense. Do we have any sense of how efficient this nearly 190 gigawatts could be?
Emily Pontecorvo:
No, we don’t. In the case of these three projects that came out of the U.S.-Japan trade deal, it’s a little bit fuzzy still what technologies they’ll be using. I think in the case of the OpenAI plant, they said that they have the initial generation equipment secured, which maybe that just leads me to think that it’s combined cycle turbines since those are in shorter supply.
Robinson Meyer:
The hardest to get. Or maybe it means that they absolutely don’t have combined cycle turbines. Maybe, maybe.
Emily Pontecorvo:
But in going through this list, what I learned is that like, yeah, a lot of these projects are the ones that are permitted where, you know, you get really specific information about exactly what technology they’re using. A lot of them are using these combustion engines, just putting like dozens of them on site and,
Robinson Meyer:
Let’s ask the question that I think is nearest and dearest to both of our hearts. Like, what does this mean for U.S. emissions? Do we have any ability to estimate what a gas build out of the scale, what does this mean for U.S. emissions?
Emily Pontecorvo:
I tried to answer that question for this story, and I think it’s one that I’m going to continue to look into. It’s really hard to say at this point because so much of it is speculative. We don’t know, you know, is a third of this real? Is half of it real? Will it all eventually be real? What technologies will they end up using? How much of it will be on-grid versus off-grid? Like all of those questions will impact what it means in the long run. I think the best kind of estimate that I found was to look at the Rhodium Group’s taking stock report. They just put out their latest version of this last month. And this report they put out annually, it basically looks at, you know, if we take current policy, energy, technology trends, and we project them out into the future, what happens to emissions. So they found power sector emissions could decline 24 to 48% by 2040.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Compared to today, yeah. So, you know, that maybe it’s hard to tell, like, is that good? Is that bad? That is a significantly worse outcome than what they found two years ago when they did the same exercise and the Inflation Reduction Act was kind of in full swing. At that point, their estimate was power sector emissions would decline by at least 42%, so near the high end of the current estimate, by 2035, so five years earlier. Both of those reports did take into account lots of data center demand growth, but they did not, neither of them took into account the potential for a lot of that demand growth to be met with off-grid natural gas combustion engines. And so, you know, those are much worse from a mission standpoint. And the other thing, when I spoke to Ben King, one of the authors, and he was saying, you know, not only are these less efficient systems, these combustion engines and simple cycle turbines, but putting them off-grid also, they’ll be running around the clock. Whereas like if they were on the grid, you have this amazingly efficient system that’s, they’re being called upon when they’re needed, but they’re not necessarily...
Robinson Meyer:
Right, you have price-based dispatch.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Yeah, yeah.
Robinson Meyer:
What does this mean for corporate net zero goals? And to what extent is the AI high boom kind of turning corporate net zero goals into a dead letter?
Emily Pontecorvo:
So, you know, all of these companies, the biggest AI hyperscalers, Microsoft, Google, Meta, Amazon, those four specifically, they are still the biggest clean energy buyers in the world. Like Amazon has funded, you know, has more clean energy PPAs than any other company in the world. At the same time, Amazon is behind this natural gas power plant in Texas that’s going to be 7.65 gigawatts, depending on what else gets built, could be the biggest natural gas plant in the U.S. So it’s really hard.
Robinson Meyer:
For about a week, we thought it was the biggest natural gas plant in the U.S. And then this OpenAI project got announced.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Right, right. So yeah, it’s very hard to square these two sides of the coin where like these companies, on the one hand, seem to be totally throwing out their net zero goals and just trying to build as quickly as possible with whatever they can get. And on the other hand, they are still publicly stating their commitment to the net zero goal and still publicly signing power purchase agreements with clean energy. I don’t know that we have a good accounting yet of how much gas are they helping get built versus how much renewables. And I don’t know if that exercise is possible, but if you know, reach out to me. But there is something sort of absurd or like it just feels so implausible that these companies could still say we’re committed to go net zero and meanwhile be supporting these natural gas mega projects.
Robinson Meyer:
How many of these companies are still pledging to hit net zero by 2030?
Emily Pontecorvo:
Those four, the big, like Amazon, Microsoft, Meta, Google, the thing is
Robinson Meyer:
They all still have 2030 net zero goals.
Emily Pontecorvo:
They’re either 2030 or 2035. But I mean, on one hand, Google calls it a moonshot. And they have language like that, where they’re like, this is our guiding principle. This is our aspiration. But even that if this is your guiding principle how is it guiding you to support it
Robinson Meyer:
We did get to the moon, do you know what i mean a lot companies the government does this now too like public sector organizations they use moonshot to refer to something they want to do but are not probably going to do but in fact the whole thing about the moonshot was we did in fact get to the moon.
Emily Pontecorvo:
The thing is, like, is it still possible for a company like Microsoft or Google to hit net zero emissions by whatever date they choose on paper? Probably. That will maybe depend on the corporate standards that rise up in the next couple of years that determine what they are allowed to say on paper and how we account for certain things like carbon removal and clean energy purchases, those accounting rules can really change what these companies say they’ve accomplished. Will they have achieved net zero in the true spirit of trying to get the whole world to go net zero? I think that seems a lot less likely.
Robinson Meyer:
Well, this is, I mean, you’ve written about this too, but I guess what all this suggests to me is that corporate net zero goals and arguably even national net zero goals are not even the right thing to be training on because, and I’m not trying to make excuses for the tech companies here, because I completely agree with you that this gas build-out is not at all in line with their climate commitments. However if they were to basically give up on their climate commitments, and pull out their investments in all these other technologies that are crucial for global decarbonization and those technologies never got developed that would be a tragedy, like that would be really bad and to some degree if google, or microsoft with their investments that they’re making to meet their net zero goal, were to seed, a technology that is crucial to overall global decarbonization. To some degree, that is more important than whether Google is able to make a zero appear on its books in 2035 or 2040.
Robinson Meyer:
And I don’t mean to be too glib about this, but I do think we actually accept this logic in the case of other industries. I would argue, I think climate advocates would argue pretty forcefully that like the coal that was an input into the Chinese solar industry ultimately at this point has been overwhelmed by the emissions reductions from the Chinese solar industry, number one. But it was number two, it was like important because now we have the Chinese solar industry, which is able to produce solar panels at this unprecedented scale for global decarbonization. And setting aside the particular kind of security implications of that, it just seems to me that like, It is bad that these companies are doing this, but it would in some ways be worse for them to kind of stop.
Emily Pontecorvo:
I don’t know why one precludes the other.
Robinson Meyer:
I mean, well, just because I think that the charge here is not hypocrisy. I would rather they remain hypocritical, but doing something for net zero. I would like them to stop emitting. But if they are going to emit, I don’t mind that they’re hypocrites, I guess is maybe what I’m saying.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Sure. I mean, I do think that there is a potential problem with using net zero as the kind of defining goal.
Robinson Meyer:
Yes, yes. Right. In fact, the goal is a bad one.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Yeah, I mean, I would love for these companies to come up with a new set of commitments that continue to motivate them to make the kind of transformative investments that they’re making, but that don’t lead people to believe that achieving this balance of inputs and outputs is not only feasible, but is like for one company by itself to do that is important.
Emily Pontecorvo:
And it’s much more important to look at the kind of global picture.
Robinson Meyer:
How do you think about this whole build out in context of climate? I mean, at this point, Heatmap has written extensively about the unpopularity of data centers. It’s clear that some people hate data centers because of their emissions impact, but it doesn’t seem to be driving that trend. Though in some ways that trend is so big, so generalized, and so amorphous in some ways that like everything is kind of driving it. How has your recent reporting made you think about the AI build out broadly?
Emily Pontecorvo:
I mean, I’d come back to the fact that we really don’t know the scale of it yet, because there are so many unknowns. So much of this development is speculative. How much natural gas will actually get built? We don’t know. I think there are some other kind of exciting unknowns, like will we be able to speed up the development of geothermal and some nuclear and some other cleaner sources that could maybe displace some of this gas? And then I also started to think about some other questions, which are like, in a future administration that wanted to do something about climate or a future Congress that had more capacity to do something about emissions, what kind of new constituencies does this build? Like, I wonder if, you know, in the past, companies like Microsoft and Google have been supporters of emissions regulation and clean energy policy. But if they suddenly have all this natural gas on their books, are they going to still support regulating emissions? Like, they might have a vested interest in fighting natural gas power plant controls.
Robinson Meyer:
It’s been so fascinating watching the political backlash to data centers. And I think especially because data centers threaten to be this massive emissions bomb, right? But also because that doesn’t really seem to be what the backlash is about. And I am filled with a little bit of a sense of foreboding watching this because I know the scale of infrastructure change that is going to have to happen to decarbonize. And it is smaller than the data center build out. Now, I think we have a lot more to offer people in some ways than AI does. But I don’t know that, for instance, the faces of that decarbonization infrastructure change will be any more trusted than the faces of this infrastructure build out. And so, you know, Tom Perriello, former congressman, actually was in climate philanthropy for a long time.
Robinson Meyer:
Was a fairly important figure in climate philanthropy, is now running for Congress again. His odds aren’t great, but he’s running in this Republican district near Charlottesville, Virginia. And he just came out with an ad that was against transmission lines. It was against a transmission line. And it was also kind of against data centers because there’s an unpopular transmission line in his district. And listen, he’s a politician, right? He’s going to do what he needs to do to win that election. But like, if Tom Perriello, of all people, is willing to nod along to the threats of transmission lines, which are non-existent and, in fact, essential to the energy transition. I can’t look at the data center backlash and be entirely like, yes, only good can happen, to paraphrase our president.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Yeah. I mean, the one thing that I, when I think about comparing, if we didn’t have this crazy data center build out, and instead what we had was a huge surge of electric vehicles and heat pumps that created this energy crisis that, you know, where we needed to build a lot of power plants. I think the main difference in those two scenarios is the speed of it. Like, less the scale. I think the scale is somewhat equivalent, but it would at least have happened or it can still happen in the it might have been, people wouldn’t have been bombarded with a project in their backyard in every county in the country.
Robinson Meyer:
That’s not happening. And there’s an interesting angle here. We’ve talked about it on previous shows, but we always expected load growth to come back in the 2030s. In fact, we kind of need it to come back in the 2030s if we’re anywhere close to hitting climate goals. And if the economy not only decarbonizes, but modernizes in the way that we would like it to modernize, it will require load growth to go up. But I wonder if climate advocates are a little lucky that the people eating, the initial wave of load growth, the people who are kind of the clarions of load growth, as it were, are not decarbonization industries, but the big tech companies, which already had their own PR issues.
Emily Pontecorvo:
I don’t know. Well, a second ago, you were wondering if this doesn’t bode poorly for...
Robinson Meyer:
I think it ... I don’t know. I don’t know. I managed to feel bad about it either way. We’re going to have to leave it there. Emily Panacorvo, thanks so much for joining us on Shift Key.
Emily Pontecorvo:
Thanks, Rob.
Robinson Meyer:
And that will do it for us today. I hope you enjoy the dwindling days of your summer. Remember to stick around after the show for a conversation between Heatmap Labs and the sponsor of this episode, Verse. It should be really, really interesting. Until then, Shift Key is a production of Heatmap News. Our editors are Jillian Gibbon and Nico Loricello. Multimedia editing and audio production is by Jacob Lambert and by Nick Woodbury. Our music’s by Adam Cromelow. Thanks so much for listening. See you next time.
Mike Munsell:
My name is Mike Munsell, and I’m the Vice President of Partnerships with Heatmap News. In my last conversation with Seyed Madaeni, we talked about Versus’ business model helping data centers and large energy consumers connect to power. In today’s conversation, we chat about Versus’ recent Series B, and we go deep on speed to power. Let’s talk about speed to power. Why is everyone talking about this concept today, and how is Versus helping to accelerate that deployment? Very good question. And I think this is the billion dollar question, if not a trillion dollar question. So as we know, AI is compute, and compute needs power. So the first order of business, if you’re, I’m just going to use an example, if you’re developing 100-megawatt data center, the size of these data centers are measured in units of power. Let’s say for the sake of the argument when we talk about 100 megawatt data center if you apply for interconnection meaning that you want to power your facility so your chips start running and your AI models start training that takes a long time the reason that it takes a long time is utilities need to do planning studies they’re basically answering two questions one is there enough energy at the grid level to serve your consumption and your demand? Second, if there is, is there enough transmission and distribution wires to get the power to your location?
Seyed Madaeni:
Given this enormous amount of growth, the answer usually fails on both fronts. And as days go by and our grid becomes more and more saturated, the wait times are going to be even longer and longer because the world of power and energy doesn’t move at the speed of AI. It takes years to build transmission lines. It takes years to build power facilities. So how do we solve this problem? Is there a magic wand that we can use to accelerate the time for in a connection of these large loads the answer is yes in a nutshell is to bring your own generation to the mix and that is by deploying behind the meter assets behind the meter assets that are capable of
Seyed Madaeni:
Charging up energy giving it back to the grid like energy storage or solar or nimble gas plants. So really the solution is to pair your data center with these large physical assets such that when you are being studied by the local utility, you’re not no longer seen as a 100 megawatt fixed load that consumes electricity around the clock. You have the capability to shape and form your energy profile. But those physical assets, they’re not just going to drive themselves. They need software. Ironically, they need AI to solve the AI compute problem. And that’s where we come in. We control these assets on a second by second basis to, again, make sure the needs of the utilities are met, the needs of the data center is met. And then plus, we can give back to the grid and be grid grid citizens by participating electricity markets and really trying to offer that capacity to suppress electricity prices. That’s the solution that’s really being adopted. And we play a role in kind of controlling those assets on a 10, 15 year basis.
Mike Munsell:
And I saw you recently completed a Series B of which Nvidia and Google Ventures were big backers. Can you talk more about that and why Nvidia and Google are invested in versus success? And is it related to that speed to power equation?
Seyed Madaeni:
We just closed the Series B round. It was led by Bessemer Venture Partners. They’re an amazing group of folks, have more than a century of experience in investing. You’re absolutely right. Nvidia backed us. Also, Google Ventures, which led our Series A round. They also took part in our Series B round. Essentially, the value prop that we have in the investment thesis that these investors try to pursue is, can Verse be the entity to solve the grid problem so we can be good grid citizens and also simultaneously win the AI race? That was the fundamental investment thesis. and we managed to prove that we are the team, we are the platform. And as a result, they did participate. Now we’re working alongside Nvidia to integrate with their DSX platform and kind of be that part of the standard reference design, which we are working towards. Obviously, Google has a big need of data centers. Plus, we’re also serving a lot of hyperscalers and we have a deep backlog in the queue to kind of help contribute to bring these CapEx online.
Seyed Madaeni:
But we also have a very good angle that we can look back and not only we solve the problem, but we also help towards sustainability because believe it or not, solar and storage is the quickest and cheapest solution that you can deploy. We’re at the moment of time that CFOs like clean energy because it’s economic and clean, which gives us momentum to try to solve this problem.
Mike Munsell:
Let’s get into that. What is VERS deploying today? And what does the system look like when you integrate it with a data center?
Seyed Madaeni:
We as a company, we are AI software driven. So we are not really developing the physical projects. That requires financing, that requires a balance sheet, that requires expertise in EPC and construction. That’s why we have partners like Calibrand and And they’re top notch, not from the kind of physical development, but understanding how the systems work, holding the hands of these customers to understand what the value proposition is. Our work is mostly on the software side. Just think about it when you build an amazing car. That car needs a driver. And in this case, these assets need a driver, but it can’t be a human driver because you’re making decisions every millisecond, whether to fire up the battery, curtail the solar. Draw from the grid so we’re you need a autonomous self-driving car and this is like self-driving assets so ironically we’re using ai to train our models to control these assets but that’s the role that we play and in terms of the underlying assets that we’re seeing a lot of lithium-ion batteries systems from tesla influence and etc.
Seyed Madaeni:
A lot of solar and some nimble gas generators that can and be part of the mix and the solution. But we have integrations with a lot of these OEMs, SCADA systems, meters to be able to effectively control.
Mike Munsell:
And you mentioned Calibrand. Can you talk more about your partnership with them and how they’re helping you deploy today?
Seyed Madaeni:
Yeah. So basically, as we announced in our Series B, I would look at them, the OG of energy infrastructure development, and they’ve made significant progress in this field. So they’re deploying assets, they’re financing assets, they’re their owner and operator. And our partnership, our involvement is on the software side because this is not a software and AI problem. You can’t build amazing software like the one that we have and just use it up in the air. You need to deploy it on physical assets. And it takes a whole team to do that from people that understand hardware, understand financing, understanding project development, and people who understand AI models and software platforms, we fit in more of the latter camp.
Mike Munsell:
Can you talk more about your project pipeline right now and maybe how your Series B is helping to deploy technology faster, perhaps?
Seyed Madaeni:
Yeah, so basically our backlog is pretty deep. We are in the business of managing assets at the end of the day. So we have gigawatts on the management. We’ll soon come out with some press releases in terms of showcasing what those numbers are. And then our backlog, it’s on the kind of plain vanilla contract management, utility bill management, a lot of enterprises ranging from retail to hyperscalers to manufacturing, steel companies. But on the dispatch intelligence, which is part of ARIA, we have a deep backlog and commitment from a lot of blue chip hyperscalers that need speed to power tomorrow. So really, our mix of customer base is, I would say, enterprises that spend $100 million and above on electricity, which by frame of reference, some of them spend billions of dollars. So that’s really our target ICP. And so far, the traction has been amazing.
Mike Munsell:
That wraps up today’s conversation with Sayed Medini, CEO of Verse. Stay tuned after the next episode of Shift Key to learn more about Verse’s next five years and what Sayed believes is needed for U.S. energy policy.
Rob talks with Heatmap’s Emily Pontecorvo about how the data center boom is changing our emissions trajectory.
The United States is staring down a natural gas buildout of gigantic proportions.
Amazon wants to build what would be the country’s largest power plant in Texas — and run it entirely on natural gas. Not to be outdone, OpenAI is plotting an even larger power plant in Ohio that, if built, would become the world’s largest gas power facility. How should we think about this boom — and about the AI and technology companies behind it, who remain some of the world’s biggest buyers of clean energy?
On this episode of Shift Key, Rob is joined by Emily Pontecorvo, a Heatmap founding staff writer. They discuss what Emily learned identifying the country’s 10 biggest gas projects, what surprised her most, and what this means for the country’s climate trajectory — and Big Tech’s corporate net-zero goals.
Shift Key is hosted by Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap News.
Subscribe to “Shift Key” and find this episode on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Amazon, or wherever you get your podcasts.
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Here is an excerpt from their conversation:
Robinson Meyer: Can we talk a little bit about , why are companies building gas? Clean energy advocates talk a lot about how wind and solar — especially solar and batteries — are the cheapest source of electricity. I would say, when you talk to electricity traders, too, like when you talk to people in the market every day, they also talk about how cheap solar is. So why are companies building gas and not solar to service these facilities?
Emily Pontecorvo: So there’s a lot of different reasons that are all kind of coming together. Maybe the biggest one of all are the bottlenecks to connecting to the grid, the transmission bottlenecks. And that’s really pushing a lot of these companies to look for off-grid solutions.
Meyer: And specifically, just to play that out, because they cannot site enough acreage of solar on the site where they would put a data center to generate the power they need, which means they need a grid hookup. But if they need to generate their own power on their own acreage, then you need an extremely energy-dense form of generation, and that means you go to gas.
Pontecorvo: Right, right. And then I think that’s coming together with a bunch of political factors, like the Trump administration has a strong interest in pushing natural gas. They have gotten rid of the tax credits for clean energy. They’ve made renewable energy, wind and solar, really hard to build with all of these permitting freezes and permitting obstacles for renewables.
I think another element is just the extreme speed and urgency that AI companies are expanding at and demanding power at, which I guess kind of circles back to the interconnection issue and just not wanting to wait to be connected to the grid. And then the last one that I think is important is this issue with affordability in data centers, where people are really worried about the buildout increasing their energy bills. And a lot of data center developers are pushing this idea that by bringing their own generation, by building these gas power plants onsite, not connecting to the grid, they’re kind of putting their project in a box and ensuring that it doesn’t have any impact on regular ratepayers.
Meyer: It’s interesting to me — the Ratepayer Protection Pledge from Trump pledges that data centers won’t make electricity rates go up. And the solution to this for a lot of these companies, as you were saying, when they look at the set of constraints that they’re working within that include acreage, cost, regulation, local grid interconnection capacity, speed to power — they solve this set of constraints by going with gas. And I mean, I think there’s a few interesting aspects about it.
First of all, it’s not clear to me that it makes data centers any more popular. We recently did polling that made a lot of news that found that 75% of Americans, at this point, would oppose the data center being built near where they live. I’m not convinced that adding a fossil fuel power plant to a proposed data center project makes it any more popular because it’s taking a quasi-industrial site and turning it into a full-on industrial site. But that being said, one of the promises made by adding gas generation at the data center is that by generating your own electricity, you’re not increasing local demand for electricity and therefore not increasing anyone’s rates.
You can find a full transcript of the episode here.
Mentioned:
The U.S. Is Building Natural Gas Power Twice as Fast as China
Emily on Amazon’s Gigawatt Ranch
Rob on OpenAI and the PORTS-Pike Technology Campus
This episode of Shift Key is sponsored by ...
Verse's software platform Aria helps data centers connect to the grid faster and optimize power operations in real time. Learn more at verse.inc.
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Music for Shift Key is by Adam Kromelow.
Everything is getting more expensive — except for government debt.
Across the developed world, yields on government debt are rising, driving up the cost of borrowing with potentially particularly dire effects for renewable and clean energy.
“Nearly every issue of government bonds at every maturity for all G7 countries is trading at a higher rate today than it was in February, pushing up the amount that governments must pay to sell new debt,” the Financial Times reported on Sunday.
These government bonds — especially U.S. government bonds — serve as benchmarks for lending across the economy. The 10-year Treasury is currently trading at a yield of 4.8%, up from 4% in February before the war in Iran began.
The rising yields are due in part to the ongoing war being waged by the United States and Israel, which has driven up the prices of core commodities and touched off inflation across the globe. A number of wealthy countries, including the United States, are also running large budget deficits, which means there’s lots of government debt floating around. Inflation erodes the value of that debt, however, driving up the returns investors demand for government bonds and driving down what they’re willing to pay.
I have written extensively about how high borrowing costs exact an especially steep toll from renewable energy development. That’s because the bulk of spending on a renewable project — say a solar farm — comes up front as capital expenditure that often has to be financed through borrowing. For a gas-fired power plant, on the other hand, the spending is split more evenly between upfront costs and operational costs (namely fuel), which can be paid for out of cash flow from operating the plant. Where the cost of operating a gas plant is at the mercy of natural gas prices, for a renewables project, interest rates can dominate the economics.
Sure enough, that inflationary pressure showed up in the second-quarter results of America’s renewables companies. Solar installer Sunrun, for instance, has seen declining sales growth. In an August earnings call, Sunrun CEO Mary Powell said the company’s results were “reflecting a higher capital cost as interest rates have inched up.” Wind developer Orsted, meanwhile, told investors that it had incurred a nearly $200 million loss on its U.S. offshore wind business “as a result of an increase in the long-dated U.S. interest rates.”
But macroeconomic indicators like deficits, inflation, and interest rates show just one side of the picture. After all, it’s not just governments that borrow, and it’s not just money that’s necessary for any sort of big project, including renewable and clean energy.
At the same time governments are borrowing more, bond market investors are also being offered hundreds of billions of dollars of debt from hyperscalers and other technology companies looking to build out data centers to power artificial intelligence. Bond markets will have to ingest over $500 billion of AI-related debt issuance this year, according to Morgan Stanley, and they’ll be called upon again to help fund an estimated $1.2 trillion in capital expenditures in 2027. Across the economy as a whole, “more than half of the capex growth this year can likely be ascribed to the buildout related to AI,” Federal Reserve Chair Kevin Warsh said in a speech last week.
That boom is driving economic activity — and high prices — throughout a number of sectors, including materials and labor.
Cleveland Fed President Beth Hammack told CNBC in June that inflation was “too high,” citing “insatiable” demand from data center developers for inputs such as electric switchgears. (Hammack was a dissenting voice at the July meeting of the Federal Open Markets Committee, voting for a higher interest rate against the Fed majority who decided to keep rates unchanged.)
And it’s not just software engineers who are seeing high salaries as a result of the AI boom. The technology buildout has also raised the wages of laborers and tradespeople essential to both data center and energy projects, especially for specialized trades like electricians.
“Skilled workers were difficult to find in a range of fields, notably technicians and tradespeople,” the Federal Reserve reported in its July report on economic conditions.
While this is great news for electricians and their families, it’s also the type of thing that can make central bankers nervous.
The “AI investment surge could trigger nonlinear price increases,” Dallas Fed President Lorie Logan said in July. “The risk is that the pressures broaden as AI demand touches construction, power generation, and other sectors.”
That’s the silver lining for renewable energy — and all energy developers. While the costs of capital, materials, and labor are going up, electricity itself has never been in greater demand.
The energy developer and utility NextEra told investors on its July earnings call that it’s been able to sign new contracts on existing assets at a $20 per megawatt-hour premium over recent prices, a process known as “recontracting,” indicating solid demand for power.
Overall, NextEra chief executive John Ketchum said, “Hyperscalers and other large load customers are increasingly focused on speed, certainty, and scalability. That plays directly to our strengths.”
Chirag Lala, vice president of research at the Center for Public Enterprise, explained to me that it’s this demand that’s balancing out the higher financial and material costs renewable developers face. “That’s why we are still getting solar and battery builds. There’s demand on the system,” he told me.
The industry is in a kind of tug of war between financial and structural factors pulling it back, and demand factors pushing it forward. “That buildout could absolutely be faster and bigger if a variety of structural and financial variables were mitigated,” Lala said.