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Robinson Meyer:
Hello, it’s Tuesday, March 26, and the second unofficial day of summer here in the United States. yesterday was the first. And at least as of when markets closed last week, the chip maker NVIDIA was the world’s most valuable company. It currently has a market cap of around $5.3 trillion. The next biggest company, Alphabet or Google, is worth $4.6 trillion. Just last week, NVIDIA released its financial results for the first quarter, and it was another blowout. It was expected to generate just under $79 billion in revenue. Instead, it delivered $82 billion. That’s up 20% from the previous quarter and up 85% year over year. NVIDIA has now beaten Wall Street expectations for 14 quarters in a row.
Robinson Meyer:
I go into all of this, not because Shift Key is a technology business podcast, we are not, but to illustrate the centrality of NVIDIA to artificial intelligence and I think to the broader American economy right now.
Robinson Meyer:
NVIDIA produces the physical infrastructure behind the AI and data center boom. And since that boom is the biggest story in electricity, climate, and even energy, NVIDIA is probably the most important company to energy, electricity, and climate too. After all, America’s tech companies are building solar panels and batteries and gas turbines specifically to power NVIDIA chips. When we talk about data centers being built across American communities, we’re talking about warehouses holding NVIDIA chips. Utilities are tripping over themselves to power and have access to warehouses powering NVIDIA chips. NVIDIA chips are where America’s dominance of the global software and AI industries meets America’s physical economy. That is the actual electrons, copper wires, gas molecules, and infrastructure that runs through America’s towns and cities. So I’m excited to welcome to the Shift Key today, Josh Parker. He is NVIDIA’s Head of Sustainability, a role he’s held since 2023. Before that, he was Head of Sustainability and Assistant General Counsel at Western Digital. Josh and I had a good conversation last week. We talked about why he thinks AI is a net good for climate change, about whether AI and NVIDIA are already cutting emissions on the power grid, and about NVIDIA’s work with clean energy companies, as well as fossil fuel companies. It’s a very interesting conversation. I learned a lot from it. I’m Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap News, and it’s all coming up on Shift Key.
Robinson Meyer:
Josh, welcome to Shift Key.
Josh Parker:
Thanks, I’m thrilled to be here.
Robinson Meyer:
So you joined NVIDIA in August 2023, which was right a few months after ChatGPT came out and completely changed the AI conversation. What did you walk into at the time? And where was the internal conversation around sustainability and climate at that moment in NVIDIA?
Josh Parker:
It was a really unique and wonderful time to join NVIDIA. You know, the company was just doing amazing things. the whole world was starting to wrap its head around the fact that AI was useful and was finally here in ways that would transform the world, transform the economy, and really our existence. And so the timing was fantastic for me, really thrilling just based on where the company was, what it was doing, and the whole conversation around it. The sustainability conversation was one of growing interest at NVIDIA. Jensen, our CEO, really has this vision of technology helping to solve the world’s biggest challenges. And sustainability is, of course, one aspect of that. Things like climate change and materials resources and water conservation. And he believed that AI had a very critical role to play in sustainability in the near future. And the company was looking to expand its sustainability program and efforts. And so I was very fortunate to come in at a time when the company was really trying to accelerate that program and find new ways to use tech for good and also to be a responsible organization ourselves.
Robinson Meyer:
How do you think about NVIDIA and sustainability today? What are the goals that you have? Because obviously at this point depends slightly on the day, but recently it’s the world’s most valuable company. It’s driving this enormous infrastructure boom. NVIDIA provides the physical infrastructure of the AI boom. And so to some degree, it’s an every sector of the economy story. And I wonder, given the company’s enormous importance right now, how do you think about its sustainability goals and what you focus on?
Josh Parker:
NVIDIA is a pretty unique company just across all the metrics. The culture here is very unique, very dynamic, and we could get into that and have a whole podcast on it. But the sustainability space follows that same pattern. We have a very unique approach to sustainability, I think, based on NVIDIA’s role in the ecosystem.
Josh Parker:
One of the first things that I did when I joined NVIDIA was to start some analyses.
Josh Parker:
Some incredible third-party validated products carbon footprints for some of our high-volume projects to figure out what does the data show us about where our lifecycle impacts are. So if you look in gaming or in AI or 3D modeling, pro-visualization, what are the kind of soup to nuts, cradle to grave hotspots for emissions in particular and then other impacts as well? And when you look at that, you very quickly realize that NVIDIA’s direct footprint, and this is something most people would understand just conceptually, NVIDIA’s direct footprint is a tiny, tiny fraction of the total lifecycle impacts of our products. So while traditional sustainability programs, especially tech companies that involve manufacturing and perhaps downstream use as well, really focus on their own footprint, if we focus myopically on our own footprint, we’re missing the forest for the trees. So very quickly realized that Jensen’s vision about sustainability and about AI’s potential to impact sustainability issues was much, much more significant than NVIDIA’s direct impacts through our operations. And so as a result of that, we’ve been focused from day one, really, on trying to unlock applications of AI for sustainability and to work with our value chain partners, both upstream and downstream.
Josh Parker:
To decarbonize, to manage impacts, et cetera, across the value chain. So it’s a lot more outward-focused sustainability program than most, which I think makes a lot of sense based on where NVIDIA sits in the ecosystem.
Robinson Meyer:
And can you talk a little bit maybe about why that is because i think what many listeners i expect will understand but just to be clear here nvidia designs its chips and it operates them as well but it doesn’t actually produce the chips the chips are usually produced by tsmc or another outside chip fab and so I guess from your standpoint, then, that makes these external projects especially important. But like, where did the emissions, I guess, in NVIDIA’s world come from? Do you focus on emissions as, you know, a key metric here?
Josh Parker:
Yes, our top issue for sustainability since I arrived at NVIDIA has been emissions and climate change. So that has been the top focus for us. And yeah, if you look at the value chain emissions and those product carbon footprints that I mentioned, we’ve published summaries of those that are cradle to gate. So they start from the very beginning of the value chain and end kind of when we ship our products to our customers, because we don’t have as good a visibility to how our customers are using our platform. But we are, as a company, historically, it’s accurate to say we were a chip design company. Nowadays, we’re more of kind of a platform infrastructure solutions company, but we are focused very much on the design. So on the AI side, we do very advanced networking. We have CPUs, GPUs, data center architecture. We co-design things like cooling solutions for data centers, and we publish reference designs for those. And then we work with manufacturing partners, contract manufacturers to actually build the systems and then to sell them. And then we do operate some data centers, but most of our business is really selling the tools, the infrastructure to the companies that go out and build great things with that infrastructure.
Robinson Meyer:
What’s the most important metric to focus? I mean, we were talking about emissions, but in terms of understanding kind of NVIDIA sustainability goals, what’s the most important metric to focus on?
Josh Parker:
I think at a moment when AI is growing rapidly, transforming the world, the most useful metric is one that takes into account both the footprint and the handprint. So it takes into account the impacts as well as the potential offsets, the benefits, the transformational impacts down the road. Now, consolidating that into a single metric is really difficult, but there are some studies that have tried to look at least the net impact on greenhouse gas emissions of AI broadly. So that’s, I think, the best indication of, is AI a hero or a villain or somewhere in between in terms of climate change and greenhouse gas emissions in particular? And the very rapidly growing consensus is that AI is most likely to lead to net emissions reductions, especially if it’s deployed broadly. So organizations like the International Energy Agency, World Economic Forum, Boston Consulting Group, Grantham Institute, have all come to that conclusion that AI, because of its transformational impacts on other sectors in particular around energy efficiency and so forth, is poised to drive net emissions reductions. So if I were to pick a metric, I would say, what’s the net impact on emissions that AI is creating? And it’s really a positive one if you look at those studies.
Robinson Meyer:
Can you... So... I think that this is like get set to some degree, the question that I want to talk about while we have your time, which is that there’s enormous focus on the on the energy use from AI, right? And of course, the energy use from chips. And we can talk about chip efficiency and what NVIDIA is doing there. And I think it’d be good to talk about it. But it does seem like to kind of step back that we are in this moment of massive infrastructure investment in AI. And that infrastructure investment is going to happen. And regardless, at this point, I think it’s just AI is too valuable. It’s too obviously useful for that infrastructure investment not to happen. And what we track at Heatmap and we look at data centers get built across the country and we become aware, for instance, that there’s a lot of off-site, you know, behind the meter gas being built to service these data centers. Obviously, there’s going to be a surge in electricity demand and there’s ways
Robinson Meyer:
in which electricity demand increases can be good. But just as we think through the next five years, given that at this point, the AI investment boom is happening and to some degree, you know, the AI story is a foregone conclusion. What needs to be true for AI to have been good for the climate or for NVIDIA’s efforts here to have been good for the climate?
Josh Parker:
The biggest variable in that analysis of what’s the net impact of AI is really, again, if you look at those studies that I mentioned, including the International Energy Agency, is how broadly we apply it in the near term. So yes, the infrastructure is getting built, it’s getting used, And contrary to what most of us consumers conceive of as AI, the vast majority of the really useful cases of AI is not the chatbots that you’re engaging with. It’s not the dogs surfing in Hawaii videos and photos that people create in their spare time. It’s the commercial applications where AI is saving energy. It’s saving material resources and so forth. And that infrastructure is being deployed for that purpose, in addition to the chatbots. And the real opportunity for us is to say, okay, we’ve got these amazing models. You’ve got Claude, you’ve got Gemini, ChatGPT, X.
Josh Parker:
They’re really, really powerful and obviously just growing in capabilities month over month. There’s so much potential there for those to transform manufacturing, for example, digital twins. And we see proof points of AI reducing energy in manufacturing by around 30% across the board if AI is deployed to optimize manufacturing for energy. That happened at one of our manufacturing partners in Guadalajara, Mexico, for example, a 30% reduction in energy. And so the opportunity is, and the risk is that if we build out all this infrastructure and we don’t use it effectively, if we don’t apply the AI to these big problems, then we may miss out on those significant emissions reductions. So what needs to be true, the biggest variable here is, are we taking advantage of what we’ve built? Because the infrastructure, like you said, is being built and it’s being used, but can we deploy it more broadly And can we bring in some of the sustainability-focused organizations to deploy it for good? How do we intentionally use AI for good in addition to the kind of regular efficiency, revenue, and cost-driven allocations that are happening very naturally and have very, very significant gains across sustainability? There are also very purpose-driven applications of AI that can have big impacts as well.
Robinson Meyer:
Do you think that AI by itself increases efficiency where it’s applied in that, you know, if you apply it to manufacturing, for instance, or another one of these industrial uses that it’s going to just increase the efficiency of that process by dint of its application and being very intelligent and finding, you know, ways to streamline processes or skip processes or augment processes that maybe wouldn’t have been considered otherwise? Or does it need to be applied in an intentional way where people say we need to look at this for efficiency or for emissions and that should be our main focus here.
Josh Parker:
So that’s the beauty of the concept of efficiency in free market is that the incentives to reduce costs are really well aligned with sustainability goals of reducing impacts, reducing consumption, and so forth. And so what we are seeing, and I think this will even grow more over time once we get out of this kind of Cambrian explosion of tech innovation that we’re in right now, which is a little chaotic, is that you’ll see optimization of, okay.
Josh Parker:
Using a huge LLM for this problem might be good, but it might not be the best tool for that particular task. Can we use a lighter weight model? And you see tons of innovation in this space. Mixture of experts has been around for a long time. We’re seeing a lot more innovation around how to use more efficient models and target them to specific applications. But the market and kind of customer demands and everything is really driving us. Plus supply constraints, compute constraints are really driving us towards efficiency and to optimize allocation of those resources. And if AI doesn’t end up being the right tool for every task, then it won’t be used there. And we can continue to use traditional techniques. But efficiency does happen to be one of AI’s kind of low-hanging fruits, one of its superpowers that is really easy to unlock and unlocks value immediately across the board. So it is very fundamentally true in general that AI does drive efficiency very, very rapidly in most areas.
Robinson Meyer:
I think what I hear you saying is that a lot of the good that will ultimately come from this build out there will be done from intentionally applying AI to intentional sustainability problems. Is that wrong? Or is it also just the diffusion? I mean, we were just talking about efficiency. So I guess that’s on the other side. But in your kind of first answer, I did hear a sense that a lot of the most important work on sustainability will come from NVIDIA intentionally applying its technology to sustainability problems.
Josh Parker:
I would say that’s important, mostly because it does require us to think about it and to do something. It’s not being driven necessarily automatically by existing incentives and market dynamics. So the market dynamics and the efficiencies that are being driven by that, like a 30% reduction in manufacturing efficiency, it’s really mind-boggling. When you think about we’re concerned about the energy that is being consumed by AI, AI still represents less than 1% of total electricity consumption worldwide. Now, it’s obviously higher in some regions, higher in the United States.
Robinson Meyer:
And it’s about to go up a lot too, is the other side.
Josh Parker:
No, it’s expected to double by 2030. So it’s growing very rapidly. But if you think about AI’s existing footprint, again, less than 1% of global electricity right now, even if it doubles, doubles again, doubles again, it’s still going to be a small share of global electricity. If, as we’re seeing the proof points for, it can reduce energy in much, much larger energy consuming sectors like transportation, like buildings, like industry, which are each in the 20 to 40% range of global electricity, then those savings dwarf AI’s footprint unambiguously. And that incentive is there because companies want to reduce costs. They want to reduce their energy consumption, especially when we’re in this environment of energy constraint, particularly in the United States, the incentives are there. So that is going to happen. I think that’s kind of inevitable because it’s an opportunity. There’s value and there’s sustainability. It’s good for everybody and the stars have aligned. The...
Josh Parker:
Additional piece is applications of AI intentionally for sustainability. And that’s where maybe it won’t happen unless we think about it, unless we try to apply it there. And the potential is just phenomenal. When you think about the way AI is already transforming drug discovery and healthcare and material science, there’s potential in nuclear fusion, advanced fission, geothermal, and carbon capture and storage just across the board. When you add intelligence to these sustainability challenges, you arrive at this wonderful inflection point where we might finally have a technology that can sufficiently complement policy to help us actually prevail on some of these sustainability challenges, help us to kind of reverse things and make progress that we otherwise wouldn’t have the opportunity to do.
Robinson Meyer:
There’s two types of AI that we’re talking about here, and I wonder if we can disambiguate them a little bit, in part just for my understanding. So there’s the large language models, which I feel like are the charismatic megafauna of AI. This is Claude, it’s ChatGPT, it’s Grok. Those are the models that I think people are most likely to have experienced when they think of AI. But there’s also this whole other set of AI applications, which I feel like you’ve alluded to, applying it to manufacturing, applying it to drug discovery, applying it to energy. And my sense is that type of ai it doesn’t look like Claude or it doesn’t look like ChatGPT it might have the same kind of organic structure where it was trained on a large data set and kind of allowed to self train itself on that data but it doesn’t have the same interface it’s much more kind of machine brains than maybe the LLMs of the world and to the extent you could share this data to what extent is ai demand and nvidia’s demand and energy use coming from the LLMs of the world like claude and Grok and ChatGPT versus these other AI applications.
Josh Parker:
It is true. There are very different applications of AI depending on the sector, and the consumer-facing chatbots that you see are one small use case and not where you see the biggest opportunities for advances in sustainability through AI, of course. Things like digital twins, for example, and that’s a really interesting marriage of NVIDIA’s expertise in 3D modeling and AI. And that is a very fundamentally valuable concept and technology for things like the manufacturing optimization that I was talking about.
Robinson Meyer:
You build a digital simulation of a real-life factory or physical space, right? Right.
Josh Parker:
That’s right. Yeah. And they become, it’s a lot more than what it sounds like at first blush, just a 3D rendering of a building. You actually can simulate robots going through this factory, simulate the airflow through the factory and the cooling system and all of the impacts of various factors on it. So it’s very complicated, and the emulations enabled by the AI really make the technology as valuable as it is today. That’s one example of something that is obviously not a chatbot that is fundamentally just extremely valuable when it comes to sustainability applications of AI. But there is actually substantial overlap. So when you see Anthropic training Claude Opus and devoting all of these resources to training that huge LLM, so many parameters, and same thing with ChatGPT and Gemini.
Josh Parker:
Those very large, large language models end up being really useful tools for helping us create more bespoke, lighter weight custom models as well that can do other things. So the multimodality functionality of modern day LLMs is just going through the roof. And the result of that is that these foundational models become even more valuable for lighter weight, more tailored applications of AI. So it’s true that the actual application of them in other areas probably won’t be the exact same model that was the huge foundational model that you started from, but through distillation and other techniques, you may end up using that as the basis for one of those other models.
Robinson Meyer:
There’s been a lot of excitement and i believe nvidia has invested in a number of companies or at least emerald ai companies that are look looking at whether data centers can be flexed up or down to meet the grid needs of the moment so instead of data centers simply being a huge energy suck on the grid they could modulate their usage and their they could modulate their compute and therefore their energy usage to kind of meet the grid’s needs i know nvidia is invested in this Can you give us a sense of where does that project stand right now in between, say, white paper and deployed scale?
Josh Parker:
So we are actively deploying this technology at our data centers. We’re building a data center right now in Virginia that will come online, I believe, later this year, that is, we think, the world’s first entirely flexible data center for AI. And we do see this as the future because it leads to a situation where we’re making better use of existing energy resources. And this is something that’s really, I think, underappreciated. And it might be a little nuanced for most people who don’t follow this to appreciate, but the concept of AI data centers becoming grid assets is really powerful because they’re being deployed rapidly. They’re using a lot of energy. And if they end up being good citizens of the electrical grid, then that can have actually a profound reductive impact on energy prices for retail consumers like you and me. The concept here is you have a grid that is built for peak load. So in the middle of the summer in Texas, when everybody’s running their AC units and you’re consuming the maximum energy that the system can deliver, that is what the system is designed for. So when you’re not at peak load, what does that mean? That means that all of those resources that you’ve built for the peak load are being underutilized.
Josh Parker:
This leads to the conversation about smart grids and virtual power plants, where I think everybody that looks into this closely wants to get where we’re saying, okay, how can we be more flexible, both primarily with our demand, but also on the variable generation side, how can we make better use of wind and solar that aren’t for power sources?
Josh Parker:
Data centers play a huge role in that, especially as they become a higher percentage of electricity consumption in the United States. If a data center can say, okay, I’m in Texas, I’m in the ERCOT region, and it’s a hot day in late July, everybody’s running their AC, I’m going to curtail my electricity draw slightly for a few hours until the system can get back to below peak load, and then I’ll ramp back up. That ends up becoming a net asset because you’re able to soak up the electrons when they’re more available and then reduce your load when they’re less available, which means we’re paying money for electricity that is otherwise being unused with existing grid infrastructure. So it’s fantastic for consumers. It’s fantastic for the energy sector. And it’s good for data centers because it means we can build them sooner and take advantage of existing resources. And one last comment on this, you may know that the concept of Emerald AI and this data center flexibility ties back to a study last year by Tyler Norris at Duke University, who said there’s 100 gigawatts.
Robinson Meyer:
And a Shift Key listener, I believe.
Josh Parker:
Yes, as am I. Yeah, I just want to get that in there as well.
Robinson Meyer:
Thank you.
Josh Parker:
Yeah, no, it’s fantastic work that you do, Shifky and heatmap. So 100 gigawatts, that is a ton of energy that could be accessed if we just ask data centers to be flexible for 1% of the year. And so that’s the concept here. It’s making the energy sector electrical generation more efficient, which leads to lower prices over time and better utilization.
Robinson Meyer:
I think when Tyler’s paper came out last year and when there was the initial wave of discussion about flexible data centers, the thought was that data centers would be flexing their compute, that they would change the operation, the programming, or the level of training that was happening in the data center at that moment to match real-life grid conditions. Since then, the focus has shifted more to data centers flexing how much energy they draw from the grid, but maybe the training itself or whatever compute is happening being more stable. It’s just the question is whether the facility is drawing from the grid or from battery storage that’s on site. When you talk about this data center in Virginia, or when you talk about flexible data centers going forward, are they flexing the compute mostly, or are they mostly flexing their grid use and where they draw electricity from? And sometimes they’re drawing electricity from the grid, and sometimes they’re drawing it from on-site batteries. But most of the flexibility per se is coming from where the electricity is coming from and not how much electricity is being used.
Josh Parker:
It’s really a mix. And where we end up will really depend on what customers the data center is serving, whether it’s a mix, whether they’re being served locally, whether it’s focused primarily on training versus inference. So what we’ll end up seeing is there will be a wide variety, I think, of data centers with different types of flexibility, perhaps, based on the needs of the data center. So if you have a data center that is running critical infrastructure and needs to be available even at peak load, then you may have more incentive to build out a large array of batteries so that you can continue to use that compute even when you’re at peak load on the grid and you can still be a good.
Josh Parker:
Citizen of the electrical grid by reducing your draw from the grid. But there are three different types of flexibility that we’re building into this framework. One of them is what you mentioned with batteries, where you can say, okay, grid’s at peak load. I’m going to use my batteries now temporarily instead. Good citizen. The second is also what we’ve been discussing, which is when you just ramp down your compute, you can say, some of the workloads that I have, I can pause on for a couple hours without deteriorating service or having any significant problems, it’s okay to pause right now. The third type of flexibility that doesn’t get spoken about as much, but that is rapidly developing is geographic flexibility. So if you have workloads that are really vital, but maybe you don’t have the battery storage on site to keep your compute running full steam all the time, you could actually transmit that workload to a different geography. Maybe somewhere in the Pacific Northwest, they’re not experiencing the same heat wave that they are in Texas. And the way a lot of interaction with AI works, that additional latency due to the different geography isn’t a huge factor because there’s already some delay built into the compute.
Robinson Meyer:
So latency is less of a... Is that training or inference that you would move geographically? Like, would you send the inference out to the Pacific Northwest? Or is this, you would actually send a training task out to the Pacific Northwest. And then it doesn’t matter in some ways because training doesn’t happen on a scale that the customer is always aware of.
Josh Parker:
Technically, either is possible. Training, because it’s kind of a large workload, chunking it up into discrete bits and then moving the data to the location where you need to continue the training, does have some additional complexities to it. Inferencing is a little easier to move because it’s smaller chunks, smaller amounts of data. And either one, again, because of the different latency requirements for AI compared to a traditional data center service, are feasible for a lot of workloads. Some inference workloads, the latency doesn’t matter if you’re doing real-time robotics and things like that. You do care about latency, so I don’t want to overstate this. But there’s a lot of inference that can happen where the latency is not a huge issue, and so those types of workloads could be shifted.
Robinson Meyer:
In some ways, the geographic flexing kind of addresses this. But when we talk about flexing compute or flexing grid use and turning data centers into grid assets, I do have to ask, I mean, are data centers getting built in the places where that capacity or that flexibility is useful? Because it often seems like, especially at this point, they’re getting built in places where there’s just energy that’s efficient or profitable to use because compute and energy are so constrained at this moment. And maybe not in the places where, say, that flexibility is useful. Do you see that changing or are we going to go in and maybe make existing data centers flexible in places like, say, the Mid-Atlantic or Texas where that flexibility could be actually useful to customers?
Josh Parker:
Again, I think we’ll end up with a mix. So right now, especially because of the challenges that we see in getting access to energy in the near term, as we’re rushing to build AI, because it’s so valuable and so important to us, you do see data centers being built just where they can get online, where there is electricity available.
Josh Parker:
And you do see increasingly some of these companies bringing their own energy, building new solar farms because they need it, sometimes bringing online new gas. But the good news is this flexibility is available in the future when we need it. And the companies that are bringing their own energy to their data centers, I haven’t heard of any that really want to be off grid. It makes a lot of sense economically and conceptually for data centers to be part of the grid so that they can be assets. They can take advantage of the shared resources, offer benefits to the grid through improved utilization, et cetera, especially with the flex technology. So I think where we end up will be a highly interconnected mesh of data centers that can flex and can transmit data. But we do have some hurdles that we need to cross to get there, especially in the United States. So permitting reform, transmission, of course, the things that we always talk about in the energy sector. This could be the golden moment where there is enough consensus around the importance of AI from an economic development, national security.
Josh Parker:
Scientific discovery, sustainability perspective, that we can find a way to make progress on these important issues and break through some of those backlogs. If we can do that, what we’ll end up with is a smarter grid, more robust economic development, more sustainable outcomes. It really will be good for society generally and help with energy affordability as well.
Robinson Meyer:
So the data center that we were discussing earlier, you said, is set to come on later this year. I think a lot of this conversation about data center flexibility is future focused, is looking at improvements that could happen in the future. Is there a substantive example of using AI on the grid right now to improve the supply side or the overall efficiency of the grid?
Josh Parker:
If you’re asking about kind of the data center flexibility piece, we have run several pilots. In conjunction with Emerald AI in Chicago, Virginia, and the UK to demonstrate that this is viable and it works. I’m not aware of it being implemented fully at a data center yet. I think this Virginia one that we’re building now is going to be the first one that is really built around that concept. But the pilots that we’ve run, the demonstrations have been really impressive. They’ve kind of hit all the metrics that we were hoping to achieve. So we think that it’s been demonstrated conceptually, and we’re excited to see it work in real life with this new Virginia facility.
Robinson Meyer:
So when I think about the AI electricity and AI energy use story, I’m thinking back almost to 2023. I think when AI was first forecast or projected to be a very large user of energy, frankly, from a lot of folks I talked to, including guests we had on very early episodes of this podcast, there was a lot of skepticism. Because if you go back 10 or especially 20, 25 years at the end of the dot-com boom and the beginning of the aughts, there was a lot of fears that electricity, that computers, personal computers in that case, and server farms to a lesser extent, as we called them then, were going to be a major user of electricity across the U.S. And they really weren’t. Those concerns really never panned out. And that’s because the actual chips, the computers themselves, got more efficient. Now, of course, it’s become a big user of electricity. it’s totally transforming the energy system. We’re compute constrained. We’re energy constrained. We’re in a very different moment. And...
Robinson Meyer:
That has put these efficiency gains that NVIDIA has made in its chips in a totally different light. And so NVIDIA has unlocked enormous efficiency gains in recent chips. The new AI chips are far more efficient, I think 95% more efficient than previous generations. But this seems to be contributing to a dynamic like a so-called Jevons paradox where we’re using them more. I wonder how you think about the Jevons paradox and AI and do you think we’re going to get to a point where the raw efficiency gains from AI ultimately do lead to a leveling off of energy or right now are just all those efficiency gains from NVIDIA going basically to just using AI more?
Josh Parker:
So I love Devin’s paradox in this context, because I think it says something really fascinating about the unique moment that we’re in. So absolutely, the efficiency gains that we’re seeing in AI are just astounding. And I’m not aware of any technology in history that has seen the type of efficiency gains, the magnitude of efficiency gains that we’ve seen in AI over the past decade or so. So we’re talking 100,000-time improvement in energy efficiency in the past decade. And the IEA, their estimate, which is actually a little lower than ours, is that on average, we see a 10x improvement in energy efficiency year over year with AI. And that improvement, which means, by the way, if you’re running an AI task now and you run the same AI task in five weeks, on average, it will use half the electricity in just five weeks. Again, aggregate and average if you’re doing the same task.
Josh Parker:
So that is a huge countervailing variable in terms of aggregate energy use by AI. But of course, the reason we’re building out more data centers and we need more energy for them is because AI is so incredibly valuable that even despite those energy efficiency gains, we need more of it. The scaling laws are holding so that more compute does translate into significantly more intelligence. And that intelligence is what is driving value across sectors in so many different areas. So to answer your question about where do we end up, I think it’s very clear based on what we’ve seen over the past couple of years, aggregate energy is growing, that it’s focused on AI. Still relatively low baseline globally again, but it’s growing and we expect it to continue to grow rapidly. Now, the question is, is that a problem? And I think if you look at it, there’s, again, this risk of losing the forest for the trees. On the sustainability front.
Josh Parker:
Do we care if AI uses more energy consumption if at the same time it’s reducing energy in other sectors at a much faster rate? So what we care about with emissions is net emissions. What we care about in energy, it’s actually less clear because sometimes energy growth is actually a good thing for sustainability through advancements in clean energy and so forth. But if you just look at the emissions side, what matters globally is the net. And even if AI grows, doubles, doubles, doubles, and doubles its emissions as well, which I don’t think is the case based on the data, you’ll end up in a world that has emissions reductions because of the huge impacts
Josh Parker:
that it’s having positively in other sectors.
Robinson Meyer:
Is there a current sector, though, where we can point and say emissions reductions are happening on a scale commensurate to the increase in data center electricity use?
Josh Parker:
In the near term, at the sectoral level, I don’t think that’s true. And that’s because we’re not deploying AI rapidly enough. Back to the earlier point about what is the key variable to capturing those emissions reductions. And again, going back to the manufacturing case, that kind of makes sense. Because for the economics of energy efficiency to convince you to tear down your existing manufacturing facility and build a new one that’s optimized, that’s a much harder case. But as everything gets naturally upgraded, as you’re ready to build a new factory, because the old one is ready to come offline, AI is undoubtedly going to be utilized in those circumstances. So over the course of the next decade, we will see entire sectors, I think, driving those net reduction that we’re already seeing the proof points for.
Robinson Meyer:
But it does sound, we are kind of in an interesting moment here where we are making a big infrastructure bet. And I understand why we’re making this infrastructure bet. And it’s kind to be reversible. And we think there’s a benefit on the other side, but we don’t fully know that yet, at least on the emissions front.
Josh Parker:
I would say that’s true, but I don’t think, I haven’t heard any arguments that suggest that the fundamentals don’t compel us in that direction. So again, sticking with manufacturing, but transportation and buildings are similar. If you’re building a new building and you have the option of using AI to manage the HVAC, manage the energy consumption, and you expect a 15 to 20% reduction in your builds, of course you’re going to use it and the economics just work out. So I don’t think it’s a question of if, it’s just a question of how rapidly the AI gets used for those purposes.
Robinson Meyer:
NVIDIA is working with a lot of companies and industries who I think have a very natural and mechanistic interest in improving their efficiency and who are very interested in improving their efficiency. NVIDIA is also working with SLB, which I think of still being called Schlumberger, putting together an AI factory for energy and for conventional energy and unlocking more fossil fuels. And it does seem to me that this is the place where AI could run against some of these sustainability goals, that instead of improving efficiency everywhere, it could cause, in the same way that we’re talking about Jevons Paradox, it could cause a general acceleration and unlock more fossil fuels and unlock more oil and gas and have those fuels be cheaper and have them crowd out the clean energy that I know NVIDIA is also working with clean energy companies too. Can you talk about how your work with SLB fits into the sustainability goals? And it does seem to me, doesn’t it kind of push against this idea that AI applied to every industry is going to make everyone more sustainable and reduce our emissions?
Josh Parker:
Yeah, so that’s a good question. And the truth is, AI really does, back to your original point, drive efficiency very easily across whatever purpose you’re trying to apply it for. So if you want to be more efficient at extracting fossil fuels, it can help with that. Now, where we end up, again, if the important thing is the net.
Josh Parker:
Then we need to look at, okay, is AI poised to accelerate fossil fuels more than it’s poised to accelerate clean energy adoption? And I think the data pretty clearly demonstrates that clean energy is likely to benefit at least as much as fossil fuels, not least because clean energy is already in many cases, if not most cases, the most economic and most secure form of energy that can be used. And then when you layer in things like this growth in energy demand that’s being driven by AI, the companies that build out those AI data centers, by and large, are looking for every clean electron they can find. Their commitments to clean energy are huge.
Josh Parker:
World-leading. And so the demand that AI is creating itself is very much focused on clean energy. That’s what Microsoft and Google and Meta, that’s the type of energy they want. And then you factor in the concepts of smart grids, VPPs, which AI can enable, and the demand flexibility of data centers themselves. That makes variable generation like solar and wind, at least incrementally more valuable relative to fossil fuels. So I think it only accelerates and improves the economics of clean energy relative to fossil fuels. So I think if, you know, agreed, AI can, I think, help fossil fuel companies be more efficient in their operations. But I think the overall demand picture is in the economics of clean energy are driving us unavoidably in that direction.
Josh Parker:
And the last thing I’ll say on this is AI is a fantastic complement to policy. It’s not a replacement. AI is technology agnostic. It helps you be more efficient at whatever you’re doing generally. But if we want policies that drive prioritization of clean energy and things like transmission and permitting reform and smart grids will lead us down that road naturally, then the policies, we should focus on the policies that unlock that feature.
Robinson Meyer:
I agree with that. The current set of companies that are using a lot of NVIDIA’s chips, most of NVIDIA’s chips and are applying AI, especially in the United States, are very focused on these clean energy goals. That’s not true of globally, right? I mean, that’s not true of China. It’s not true of the Gulf states, which I think are the next buyer of some of NVIDIA’s chips. Does this mean when we think about how to regulate AI, focus on keeping it at these American tech companies that have these clean energy goals? Yeah.
Josh Parker:
I’m not our political specialist, so I won’t be able to comment on the geopolitics of everything. But I will mention that I think the trend towards net emissions reductions enabled by AI, to me, looks almost unavoidable at this point, because the technology fundamentally helps us take better advantage of the resources that we have. So even if in the near term, we see an increase in emissions globally due to the build out of AI, I think in the medium and long term, we will end up with net reductions for all the reasons that are covered in those papers that I mentioned.
Robinson Meyer:
So Heatmap has been tracking what to us has been a very sudden and shocking rise of local pushback against AI data centers. And of course, this has become a larger meme over the past few months, as it’s gotten more attention. For instance, we think about 50 AI data centers or data centers broadly were canceled last year after facing local pushback. And we think more than 50 have already been canceled this year. Are you seeing that at all at NVIDIA? I mean, it doesn’t look your quarterly results came out yesterday and they were they absolutely blew out expectations. And so evidently it’s not affecting demand yet. But do you hear it from customers? Is this affecting NVIDIA’s business at all? And how do you think about it as a risk going forward?
Josh Parker:
So I’m aware of the sentiment, the paranoia around AI, mostly on a personal level, because I see it on social media like other people do as well. I’m not aware of any direct impact on our sales, so I can’t comment on that. But what I will say is I do think it’s particularly tragic because this technology has the potential to be the most beneficial, both for environmental goals and for social goals. So things like education and health care and kind of across the board, social issues benefit from AI as well. And the concerns about AI, a lot of them are based on either erroneous data or old data. and I worry that some people.
Josh Parker:
Don’t fully understand the net impacts, the positive as well as the negative of AI. Plus, we have the uphill battle of it’s really hard if the data center is being built a few miles down the road to tie that data center, which they don’t always look beautiful and things like that, to the benefits that the whole world is going to get from AI. So if, obviously not promising this, but AI could unlock cancer cures or cures to other diseases. And we’re seeing trends in the direction of cures and treatments and drug discovery and so forth. But it’s really hard for us as humans to draw a line between the infrastructure that we see down the street and especially the speculative, the moonshot benefits, but even the more fundamental ones, like the benefits and productivity that we’re seeing in potential for wage growth and education and so forth, even though it’s hard for us to draw the line between the infrastructure. So it’s understandable, but I do think it’s tragic. And I think it’s our responsibility in the tech industry to help people see the bigger picture and to address people’s concerns head on about environmental impacts and social impacts. Because the data really does demonstrate that, by and large, these data centers are pro-sustainability. They don’t have the impacts that most people are concerned about, and they’re manageable. And most data center operators are trying to operate them in a sustainable way.
Robinson Meyer:
Josh Parker, so much more to talk about, but we’re going to have to leave it there. Thank you so much for joining us here on Shift Key.
Josh Parker:
My pleasure. Thanks, Rob.
Robinson Meyer:
And that will do it for us on Shift Key today. We’ll be back soon with another episode. Until then, Shift Key is a production of Heatmap News. Our editors are Jillian Goodman and Nico Lauricella. Multimedia editing and audio engineering is by Jacob Lambert and by Nick Woodbury. Our music is by Adam Kromelow. Thanks so much for listening. See you next time.
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Rob talks with Columbia’s Lily Bermel about where climate policy should go next.
Wait, is the climate policy landscape … in better shape than it looks?
Just over a year ago, President Trump passed the One Big Beautiful Bill Act. It repealed many of the Biden administration’s most aggressive climate policies, including tax credits for solar and wind energy.
Although those policies are gone, the emissions cuts they achieved remain largely intact — at least in the power sector, according to a new study that we’re covering exclusively at Heatmap. Lily Bermel, the report’s author and a visiting fellow at the Columbia Center on Global Energy Policy, argues that at least where energy generation is concerned, the glass is more than “half full.”
On this episode of Shift Key, Lily joins Rob to discuss what we learned from Biden’s big climate law, why it likely never would have achieved its projected emissions declines (at least not without a tremendous transmission buildout), and how studying its legacy changed her mind about policy going forward.
Shift Key is hosted by Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap News.
Subscribe to “Shift Key” and find this episode on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Amazon, or wherever you get your podcasts.
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Here is an excerpt from their conversation:
Robinson Meyer: Given that the IRA, in retrospect, in the power sector, kind of resolved any economic issue you would have making a project pencil out and revealed all these non-economic issues that actually constrain development, we are now looking at a political environment where we’re switching from mourning the IRA to saying, okay, what should happen next? And my colleague Emily Pontecorvo recently wrote a story about this question. But I think one of the big questions going forward, especially if Democrats take Congress at the end of this year is, well, should they fight to restore the tax credits? I can even see a world where restoring the tax credits becomes something people insist on to get permitting reform or something.
After writing this report, did you come to the conclusion that Democrats should restore the wind and solar tax credits? Is that the most urgent priority for climate policy?
Lily Bermel: In writing this report, I became quite confident that I don’t think it’s worth the bang for buck in restoring those wind and solar tax credits, and instead that the supply side constraints are the real issue that we need to focus on. I did this lag analysis where if you take a given year, say 2031, and you see that the IRA trajectory would have deployed like more than 300 gigawatts of solar, how many years later would the [OBBBA] scenario do that? There’s only a two and a half-year lag, or gap. And so in restoring the clean energy tax credits, you are only buying back two and a half years’ worth of deployment, which, at least for me, was a lot smaller than I had thought.
Meanwhile, both scenarios have a literal cap in them about how much they can build and how fast they can build it. So even if you buy back that little two and a half-year average annual lag, you’re going to run up to the exact same ceiling. So restoring the tax credits brings you closer to that ceiling, while permitting reform will completely lift the ceiling and be a rising tide that lifts all boats.
You can find a full transcript of the episode here.
Mentioned:
The “Glass Half Full” report
More from Rob on Lily’s findings
From Heatmap: The Wind and Solar Tax Credits Are About to Expire. Will They Come Back?
Heatmap’s cheat sheet on how the One Big Beautiful Bill Act changed America’s clean energy law
Previously on Shift Key: What Has All This Back-and-Forth Climate Legislating Bought Us?
Jesse Jenkins’ paper on transmission’s role in achieving the IRA’s goals
Brendan Duke’s policy affordability framework
This episode of Shift Key is sponsored by ...
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Music for Shift Key is by Adam Kromelow.
A just-released MIT paper argues that the energy transition is still largely following the trajectory laid out in the Inflation Reduction Act.
When President Joe Biden signed the Inflation Reduction Act into law in 2022, climate observers — myself included — marked it as a landmark victory in the history of climate policy.
For the first time since global warming arose as a major issue more than three decades earlier, the United States had enacted a comprehensive policy to do something about it. America could boast a generous set of incentives meant to spur new solar farms, electric vehicle factories, and other zero-carbon industries nationwide. The law was projected to bring down U.S. emissions by at least 36% by the mid-2030s, compared to the all-time high they had reached in 2005.
Then Donald Trump declared that the law was in fact a “Green New Scam” and resolved to repeal it. Scarcely half a year into his second term, President Trump and Republicans in Congress terminated many of the climate law’s most important provisions in the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, their tax cuts and spending package passed last summer.
Was the Biden law a false dawn? A new report, released on Monday by MIT’s Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research and entitled “Glass Half Full,” argues that its influence will live on — at least in the electricity system.
Most of the Biden policies’ expected climate benefits in the power sector — including the amount of renewables that will get built nationwide, and the projected declines in greenhouse gas emissions — are still likely to happen by 2035, even under the Trump administration’s policies, the report finds.
“The glass is substantially full,” Lily Bermel, the report’s author and a visiting fellow at the Columbia Center on Global Energy Policy, told me. “It’s not barely half full. It’s like three-quarters full.” Her study compared not only the effects of Biden and Trump’s tax and spending laws, but also the environmental rules that each administration fought for.
Roughly 74% of new clean energy capacity that would have gotten built under Biden’s policies by 2035 will still get built under Trump’s policies by that year, the report estimates. Those new renewables and zero-carbon power plants will generate about 71% of the electricity that would have been expected had Biden’s policies remained law.
About 67% of the decline in climate pollution that would have occurred over the next decade under Biden’s policies will still happen under Trump’s policies, the report estimates.
Coal- and gas-fired power plants are also likely to generate less electricity over time in both the Biden and Trump scenarios. But under Trump that story is not quite as rosy: The coal-powered fleet will retire more slowly than it would have had Biden’s laws stayed on the books, and the natural gas fleet will run more often than it would have needed to.
The report does not analyze what Trump’s climate and energy policies will do to emissions from every sector of the economy. It focuses only on the electricity system and omits, for instance, any discussion of transportation or heavy industry, even though Trump’s tax and spending law repealed incentives for electric vehicle buyers and hydrogen production.
But the power sector drove the largest share of emissions declines that were expected from the IRA, and other estimates of President Trump’s tax law have suggested that repealing the wind and solar incentives would do more harm to the climate than any other provision. In those studies, the law’s termination of the EV tax credits is often the No. 2 driver of higher emissions.
When Bermel began writing her paper, she wasn’t sure the results would be so optimistic. She compared two scenarios produced by a mathematical model prepared by Energy Innovation, a nonpartisan energy and climate policy think tank, which seeks to simulate the country’s energy system.
In the first scenario, the Biden administration’s climate law and other policies — such as Environmental Protection Agency rules restricting carbon emissions from coal and some natural gas power plants — remain on the books through 2035.
The second scenario looks more like the world we live in. In that run, the Trump administration passes the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, repealing the solar and wind tax credits but preserving incentives for other zero-carbon technologies, such as nuclear power plants and batteries. It also withdraws the EPA’s power plant rules and weakens other regulations on pollution.
The models do not simulate everything the White House has done to stymie renewables and climate policy. Simulations cannot capture, for instance, Trump’s bureaucratic and sometimes extralegal war on solar and wind power because the administration has changed tactics — and gotten blocked by courts — too often to model effectively, Bermel said.
But the models do try to estimate some of the real-world constraints that limit the construction of new clean power plants. In both scenarios, the country’s lack of new interregional transmission — and the long queues to connect new energy projects in many power markets — imposes a “speed limit” on new wind and solar construction, regardless of other incentives on the books.
Despite those constraints, the report finds that more than 80% of the utility-scale solar and battery storage that would have been built under the Biden scenario by 2035 will still be deployed under Trump’s policies.
Only one clean electricity technology stands to do much worse than it would have had the IRA remained on the books: onshore wind. The country will build less than half of the new onshore wind capacity that it would have built had the IRA remained on the books.
In the U.S., new onshore wind installation has declined every year since its peak in 2020. The lack of new large-scale power lines — and a deteriorating local permitting environment — has hampered wind energy’s expansion.
Ultimately, policymakers should prioritize easing construction of new transmission lines and other forms of energy infrastructure, Bermel asserts in the report. Amending the country’s permitting system — and raising the de facto speed limit on new clean energy construction — is likely far more important for lowering emissions than restoring the tax credits, she told me in a conversation for Heatmap’s Shift Key podcast.
“By solving one problem — by making clean energy a little bit cheaper and by incentivizing the demand of it — we therefore exposed how supply-side constrained we are and how awful and burdensome the permitting barrier process is,” she said.
Though there is broad agreement among researchers about the need for a smoother permitting process to allow more renewables development, Bermel’s direct comparison of counterfactuals is an unusually direct way of trying to answer policy questions. “In general, I think the findings are reasonably consistent with what we’d say, but this is a bit of a different way of looking at these questions than energy modelers typically take,” Ben King, an energy and climate analyst at the Rhodium Group, which also operates an energy system model, told me.
Energy analysts often try to examine a range of outcomes and assumptions in their models, such as by varying natural gas prices or electricity demand, he said. The new report does not do that, instead comparing the same baseline energy demand assumptions under the two differing policy regimes. That means the results are less likely to capture what will actually happen in the real world, but still “illustrate the economic competitiveness of these technologies no matter what,” King said — as well, for the moment, as the surging hunger for electricity from AI companies.
Noah Kaufman, a Columbia economist and senior research scholar, told me Bermel’s technical analysis made sense. But he differed sharply with her conclusion that the IRA’s most important benefits had been preserved, even in the power sector. The law’s most important benefits, he said, were never measured in gigatons alone.
“I don’t agree at all with the ‘glass half full’ framing of the situation,” he said. “To me, the importance of the Inflation Reduction Act wasn’t the tax credits or how many gigawatts of solar we will deploy. It was that, for the first time, the U.S. was able to go out to the world and say, ‘We have a strategy now.’”
“I don’t think we have 50% of that now, or 70% of that now,” he said. “I think we have basically none of that now.”
Repealing the IRA and the Biden administration’s other policies has returned the country to something closer to its pre-2021 status quo, he said, where the country is slowly reducing its emissions but not using the energy transition to generate new jobs or economic opportunities for fossil-fuel-dependent communities.
“If you’re not decarbonizing in a way that works for big parts of the country, then you’re not going to be able to sustain the strategy over long periods of time,” he said.
The MIT report does not try to examine whether clean energy manufacturing has declined under the Trump scenario, and concedes that “the Glass Half Full reading is limited to … the power sector, not the broader economic-transformation strategy a successful energy transition requires.” The One Big Beautiful Bill Act retained some of the Biden law’s manufacturing tax credits, including subsidies for solar panel and battery component production.
For at least one technology, Bermel believes the report is not optimistic enough.
The Trump tax law preserved tax credits for technologies such as enhanced geothermal and nuclear fusion — “clean firm” power plants that can produce electricity on a 24/7 basis, regardless of the wind or weather. These technologies will be essential to eventually replacing fossil fuel-burning power plants on the grid.
Yet the energy system models on which Bermel’s report depends hold that companies will build essentially no new sources of zero-carbon electricity by 2035. That’s partly because the policies to support those technologies still aren’t generous enough, because in some cases companies developing them are still building first-of-a-kind facilities.
“Tax credits are best for a technology that is mature enough to respond to price signals,” Bermel said. “They’re helpful, but ironically they’re more helpful for a later stage technology.”
Yet in this case, the real world is already diverging from the models. The artificial intelligence boom has driven hyperscalers to invest in clean firm technologies in ways the model does not predict. Even the models Bermel uses in her report, for instance, do not account for the more than 5 gigawatts of new nuclear power that is expected to come online due to new plant openings, canceled plant closures, and planned upgrades.
The models also don’t reflect the gigawatt of enhanced geothermal-produced electricity Google plans to buy from the energy developer Fervo by 2028. That deal could scale to 3 gigawatts in the 2030s.
Despite those additions, she argues that the next stage of federal climate policy should emphasize public investment that helps expand the power grid and commercialize the next generation of clean firm technologies. That could look like expanding the manufacturing tax credit to cover transformers and other grid equipment. It could also entail offering more direct financial support — either through cheap loans, federal guarantees, or even direct government procurement — to clean firm energy developers. Only through building the next generation of zero-carbon of power plants, she told me, will the country begin to retire its fossil fuel fleet in earnest.
This transcript has been automatically generated
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Robinson Meyer:
Hello, it is Monday, July 6, and a year has passed since Republicans in Congress and President Trump passed the One Big Beautiful Bill Act. That pulchritudinous policy repealed many of the provisions in the Inflation Reduction Act, which is, of course, the big climate law passed in 2022 by President Biden and congressional Democrats. It also revealed, crucially, the tax credits for wind and solar energy and the consumer side tax credits for electric cars. I would say this is the biggest event in recent American climate political history. You know, for the first time in 40 years, the U.S. had passed a comprehensive climate law, and then it got repealed by Republicans very quickly. I think it’s driven part of the climate hushing trend, the so-called climate hushing trend, where even Democrats are reluctant to talk about climate change now. And I think it’s seen at least, I don’t know, among progressives, climate advocates, liberals, everyone who cares about the environment and climate change as a partial failure.
Robinson Meyer:
What today’s guest presumes is, what if it wasn’t? A new report out today argues that in the power sector, much of the IRA’s new clean energy construction and emissions reductions remain intact. Even in a world where the Trump administration has passed OB3, the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, and repealed Environmental Protection Agency regulations restricting fossil fuel emissions, the glass remains more than half full. That’s what she says. The IRA really did, she says, helped pull ahead new clean energy construction that would not have happened otherwise. And that success has big implications for policy going forward, including whether Dems should restore the solar and wind tax credits next time, when and if they get a majority, or do something else to fight climate change. Well, joining me today is the author of that new report, Lily Bermel. She’s a visiting fellow at the Columbia Center on Global Energy Policy and a former climate policy advisor at the State Department. She was on John Kerry’s climate diplomacy team during the Biden administration. We talk about what she found in the new report, why she thinks the glass is more than half full, why the IRA might not have produced the benefits that we thought it would at the moment it was passed, and what she changed her mind about as she looked at the reality of climate policy’s landscape today. I’m Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap News, and it’s all coming up on Shift Key. Lily Bermel, welcome to Shift’s Key.
Lily Bermel:
Thanks, Rob. Excited to be here.
Robinson Meyer:
Okay, so let’s get right into it. You write in this report, which we have a story about on Heatmap.news today, I encourage everyone to read. You compare two scenarios in this report. One is the, let’s say, the world of the Biden administration, where the Inflation Reduction Act is law. And the other one is the world we live in, where the One Big Beautiful Bill Act passed, repealing swaths of the Inflation Reduction Act. And you write in this new report that the Oba scenario preserves 74% of new and clean energy capacity, 71% of new clean generation, and 67% of emissions reductions that we would have achieved had the IRA stayed on the books. And so my opening question for you is, why are you so sunny?
Lily Bermel:
Why am I so sunny? Well, great question. That is definitely a part of my personality, but I wanted to get some data to book it up to see if it was really real or not. I think last year, last summer, when the Republicans were doing their reconciliation process, really kind of taking that hatchet to the IRA, it was a distressing time and there were different narratives that emerged and were confusing and dueling even. The IRA was totally dismantled. The clean energy transition is doomed, but you also had that the clean energy itself is unstoppable because it’s the cheapest. And so a couple of things caught my attention. I actually remember Jigar Shah saying that if we had just skipped the IRA and gone straight to, I’ll say OB3, we would be shouting from the rooftops. It preserved the majority of the tax credits, which is where most of the IRA’s decarbonization benefits were coming from. And it was really just wind and solar that got the short end of the stick.
Robinson Meyer:
And electric vehicles.
Lily Bermel:
Totally. Yes. Thank you. In the power sector, specifically.
Robinson Meyer:
Yes. In the power sector, it’s all about wind and solar.
Lily Bermel:
Yes. Exactly. So this report is just on the power sector, the backbone of the energy transition. And it’s really wind and solar that get their tax credits removed in the coming decade. And then there was restrictions placed on the rest. And so in wanting to just myself kind of have a clearer understanding of what’s happening, my curiosity got the best of me. I reached out to the Energy Innovation Team and asked for some data. And they provided me with two scenarios. So the first is what you outlined, say the prior policy environment, which is the full IRA, and also those EPA regulations. So it’s the tax credits and the regulations.
Robinson Meyer:
What exactly is in these two scenarios? Because I think crucially, you’re not comparing worlds that never existed. You’re kind of comparing like the entire regulatory and legal framework created by the Biden administration versus the world we live in now.
Lily Bermel:
That’s exactly right. So the first scenario I call the IRA trajectory, but it’s more than the IRAs. The IRA plus the power plant regulations. And you can imagine that’s the like December 2024 world, that policy frozen in place. The second scenario is with the one big beautiful bill act, OB3, and then all of those regulations taken away. And so that would be maybe the July 2025 policy environment. Models are a camera of a moment in time with a trajectory or projection of what you think is going to happen going forward from that. And so importantly, the model does not include all of the coordinated executive branch actions that the Trump administration has done on wind and solar since then. And that’s really important because these numbers are model numbers really distinct from real world outcomes.
Robinson Meyer:
Your report is titled “Glass Half Full.” And I think the story in the power sector that you tell in this report is a much more upbeat one than maybe people were expecting after OB3 passed.
Lily Bermel:
Yep. So that basic question is what actually survived. And it technically has two different ways. It’s how much of the gain survives. So that’s your clean energy, your emissions reductions, and how much worse is that fossil outcome. And so we see that the glass is half full if you’re within 50% of the benefits preserved or more, or fossil is less than 50% worse. The top line is that more than half of those benefits of the prior policy environment survives across the board. It’s only onshore wind that dips below that 50% line. And so we have about three quarters of clean capacity will still get added over the coming decade, and about two thirds of emissions reductions will still occur as well. And then on the fossil side, the outcomes were less than 50% worse at threshold. We see fossil capacity is only 4% more in the OB3 scenario than the IRA trajectory, and it’s fossil generation that surges 19% more on average over the coming decade compared to the IRA trajectory. So it’s about the same fossil fleet, but doing more.
Robinson Meyer:
So if I’m thinking about these two worlds, and I want to get into the epistemological world of the models in a moment, something that I’m sure quickened all of our listeners’ pulses just to hear. I mean, in some ways, it’s not even as the glass half full or half empty. It’s that the glass is detectably more than half full. In kind of all these three big questions, we’re going to be adding most of the clean energy capacity, the new build, new wind and solar farms and batteries that we anticipated adding in IRA world under Trump world, held constant basically for executive interference that’s very hard to model and changing by the week, but which you can follow on a day-to-day basis at Heatmap.news. We’re going to preserve two-thirds, roughly, of the emissions reductions we expect to see under IRA world. And we’re going to not add that much new fossil. In fact, we’re just going to run the fossil fleet more than we would have under a world where we kept the IRA on the books and maybe built that kind of extra 25% of solar and wind and battery capacity. Is that a fair description?
Lily Bermel:
Yes. Yeah, you said that really well. One detail on that fossil fleet is that while the size of the fossil fleets between the scenarios are relatively similar, the composition is quite different. And so this is where it’s important to remember the scenarios include the impact of the regulations as well. So without these power plant regulations that encourage faster retirement of coal power plants, what we see is that coal still retires, but it retires more slowly today than it would have if the regulations were still on board. So therefore, the fossil fleet itself is just ever so slightly larger, but it’s more coal heavy and therefore more emissions heavy as well.
Robinson Meyer:
I mean, it’s interesting because this is a mechanism we talk about all the time back during the Biden administration that I think has a little bit been lost to time, which is that the IRA, correct me if this is a misunderstanding, but the Inflation Reduction Act, because it discounted the cost of clean and because it discounted various carbon capture technology, made it far easier for the EPA to impose strict air pollution standards on coal plants. And it was actually those standards that would have shifted the composition of the fossil fleet from a coal and gas fleet to a primarily gas fleet. And with the IRA off the books, and of course, with the standards off the books, too, it’s much harder now. We’re going to run these coal plants for much longer than we would have in Biden world. Is that right? Or am I missing something important?
Lily Bermel:
Yeah, I think that’s generally right, that the coal is stickier. It stays around for longer. It’s the gas that fires and runs way more and helps to fill in that clean shortfall. I think the Biden administration viewed the regulations as a nice complement to making clean cheaper. And that kind of allowed them to say, as we build more clean, we can generate less of fossil. But there is a really important distinction between building clean and replacing fossil capacity and the reliability services it adds to the grid. When you build clean energy, you can decarbonize in a shallow or in a deep way. To me, I think about shallow decarbonization as adding clean energy that meets new demand and that helps the economy grow and helps meet demand growth. It kind of offsets emissions that would have happened if that was met by fossil fuels instead. A deeper decarbonization is clean energy that is built that mitigates emissions that have already been happening from fossil plants that are already running. And so just because you’re building clean energy, you’re often doing the former and not the latter there.
Robinson Meyer:
It’s interesting. It’s such a good comparison between the two in the power sector. And I think it also helps to like maybe put it in the context of countries, right? What we see in China so far has generally been shallow decarbonization, where they build this enormous amount of clean energy. It’s extremely impressive. And historically it has allowed them to maybe not run their fossil plants as much as they wanted going forward and i think in like very recent quarters we have seen that clean energy begin to eat away at the existing fossil generation and that’s what a deeper decarbonization looks like that’s what it looks like when you’re not only building enough clean to meet new growth but actually building so much clean that you’re out competing the fossil that already exists
Lily Bermel:
Yeah, I think that’s spot on. And it’s Lauri Myllyvirta is one of my favorite China analysts who has found that like clean energy is what’s driving China’s economic growth. And that’s why their coal fleet is generally still there in the size that it is. I think the other distinction to make on shallow and deep is that different clean energy technologies kind of can do one or the other. And so the services and the gains that wind and solar and storage bring to the grid when you deploy them do not provide the same reliability services that gas, that coal, that nuclear or geothermal will give. And so as you are scaling variable renewable energy penetration on the grid, you actually sometimes need more gas capacity to meet its intermittency and to support it from happening. And so simply deploying wind and solar alone does not achieve you that deep decarbonization. You can’t wind and solar your way out of the fossil fleet. You need that set of clean firm technologies to replace it, to offset it, to eventually retire it. But that’s something far in the future.
Robinson Meyer:
And clean firm here is anything that can run 24-7, is relatively reliable, is independent on the weather or the sun, and is dispatchable too, right? You can basically, as a grid planner, say, hey, we need this power plant to go on and turn it on and it provides power. And it doesn’t need to be like a battery or something where it had to have saved up fuel.
Lily Bermel:
Yeah, I think about firm energy as that always-on, always-available energy generation. And then when it’s clean, it’s low emissions or no emissions. You know, traditional firm powers is that coal and gas. Interestingly, I don’t think of storage as firm power because that’s more about shifting when the energy is generated rather than it always being available. So therefore, it’s interesting to realize that it’s gas is what firms renewables less so than storage. Storage kind of supports a wider time span horizon with which wind and solar can generate energy. But it’s what’s on the books right now is coal and gas and later other clean technologies will be able to firm renewables as well.
Robinson Meyer:
This report only looks at the power sector. And so arguably, some of the worst damage of repealing the IRA happened in the transportation sector. We’re not talking about the transportation sector. But when you look at the power sector, I think we’ve spent a long time mourning the disappearance of the Inflation Reduction Act. And even if its repeal is going to be more for the transportation sector than the power sector, the idea that we’ve only lost, say, 25 percent of the emissions reductions that we expected, I think, will be surprising. So why didn’t repealing the IRA have a bigger effect on U.S. emissions?
Lily Bermel:
I think this comes down to the maturity of wind and solar, the power of market forces to drive the energy transition, and some functionalities about how the grid and deployment basically works. So to take those each in force, or in turn, we know that wind and solar are very mature, are cost competitive. Advocates in industry have been saying that for a while. And so I think removing the tax credits and seeing that still, on average, three quarters is getting built speaks to that and is a testament to their resiliency, their cost effectiveness, the benefits that they have, and the fact that they make up 95% of the interconnection queue. So that’s one reason. I think the other is that because of the safe harboring of the wind and solar tax credits, you do see a bit of near-term deployment locked in. And Rhodium Group actually has similar projections that mirror mine. In their taking stock report, they show that across their projections, their low, medium, and high emission scenarios, that the deployment that’s happening through 2030 is the same. And so I kind of like to think about the grid in terms of light years, how it operates, where what you see today reflects what was decided years ago. So therefore, the things that get deployed today, construction decisions, permitting decisions, were made many years ago, and that kind of flows through. So there’s a lot of momentum, I think, on clean energy’s side and a lot going forward in terms of cost competitiveness.
Robinson Meyer:
And so in that world, I guess, did passing the IRA matter to the grid’s decarbonization at all? Because I’m listening to what you’re saying, And what I’m hearing is, well, wind and solar are really mature. We were building up a lot of them. Did we basically build up a huge bolus of wind and solar projects that are now working their way through the system between, say, 2021 and 2024? And they were all safe harbored and they’re all going to get built or many of them are going to get built. And so in some ways, the IRA already gave its gift to the wind and solar industry and it didn’t need to extend these tax credits forward. And kind of it already essentially did because of how the safe harbor rules work. Or is it just that AI and load growth have driven up power prices so much that developers are going to go out and build wind and solar anyway? The IRA actually turned out to be a little extraneous to this story because it turned out that everyone was going to build wind and solar as much as they could because power prices are shooting through the roof in any deregulated market.
Lily Bermel:
Yeah, I think that’s a great question. And of course, the IRA was enacted before the huge energy boom that we’re seeing right now. And in some ways, the way you phrase that question makes me think about how, as the wind and solar tax credits are phasing down, you have demand growth surging, and that’s acting as the demand pull, kind of in some ways to replace the IRA tax credits. I mean, I think the IRA was hugely beneficial in that when I was working on the Clean Investment Monitor, we just saw investment come off the sidelines and explode through the roof in terms of the amount of projects being stood up and investment flowing through the economy. And that was very tangible and very real. The huge value add of the IRA, too, was that it put down a lot of public investment to down payment in innovating and commercializing the set of other technologies that we need to decarbonize. And so that’s in geothermal, that’s in nuclear restarts, that’s in carbon capture and a whole lot more. And so what’s interesting about this model is that because it comes with its own assumptions about costs and performance, the model itself actually does not pick up on these clean firm technologies deploying at all in the coming decade.
Robinson Meyer:
That’s something so striking here is that we put all this work in. I mean, during the One Big Beautiful Bill Act legislative process, I wrote an op-ed. I wrote tons of pieces for Heatmap, basically saying the Senate and Congress needs to keep these tax credits for clean firm technologies like geothermal and fusion and fission on the books because they really matter. And what your model shows is like that capacity never comes online like it does not come online in 2030 it doesn’t come online in 2035 it is simply not a major player in your model.
Lily Bermel:
That’s an interesting kind of embedded assumption in the energy innovations model where just the projects don’t seem to pencil out. And that’s where we get to really bifurcate between what a model says and what we’re seeing in the real world, because these are two really different things. And I’d argue that commercialization of these technologies is happening faster than we expected, ranging from the progress that we’re seeing on geothermal with Fervo’s IPO, a lot of offtake that they have, construction of a project, to what we’re seeing in nuclear, where two weeks ago, the Office of Energy Dominance Financing announced, I think, $17.5 billion, in loans to restart new nuclear plants. That’s multiple gigawatts that we did not expect at the time that this model was created that will now come online and help do the job. And then we also have the hyperscaler attention and willingness to pay to commercialize these technologies to invest in the grid and to build clean energy fast. That’s tangible. That’s a lot of capital. And that is doing a lot of work to create the environment that these technologies need to come to bear.
Robinson Meyer:
So one of the big findings in the report is that if you look across technologies, you look across different questions that you’re curious about. The clearest bad news is in onshore wind. It is only onshore wind that fails to build 50% of the capacity in a Trump world that it would have built in an IRA world. And I guess maybe there’s a certain argument for this because people would go, well, of course it does. The Trump administration doesn’t want to build any wind at all. They hate wind. For whatever reason, they’ve decided wind should lose the culture war. But wind actually was already struggling by the time we were halfway into the Biden administration. I mean, I think 2020 was the best year for wind construction ever, and it’s kind of been falling off since then. Why is onshore wind so harmed in the IRA repeal scenario or the OBBBA scenario in your model?
Lily Bermel:
Yes, I think you already indicated that it is a technology that just seems to struggle anyways. It has really long development timelines. It needs a lot of transmission to connect to the grid. It has … it’s just very capital intensive. It has high upfront costs, high project finance costs and whatnot. So that helps make it very credit sensitive. So when you remove the tax credits, it’s hurt by that. But it also has other problems that a tax credit won’t fix anyways.
Robinson Meyer:
In other words, it was already struggling. IRA was going to help it because those tax credits were actually meaningful to helping projects pencil out. But without the tax credits penciling out wind, it’s just not getting built.
Lily Bermel:
Yes. And this is onshore wind in particular. Offshore wind is interestingly like less credit sensitive because it’s more connected to state procurement mandates and has kind of other drivers pushing it forward.
Robinson Meyer:
That’s interesting. Does your model account for all the offshore wind skullduggery that’s happened?
Lily Bermel:
The model doesn’t take into account any of those executive branch actions, but the report itself includes kind of a deep discussion of how real world events will change the model’s outcomes. And it looks at three different time horizons. It looks at what the IRA expectations have come to pass. It looks at the near term, like will OB3 projections and outcomes bear? And on a more medium term, What does it look like as well?
Robinson Meyer:
Reading this report and seeing basically that repealing the IRA, at least in the power sector, and again, we’re talking about the power sector, doesn’t have this catastrophic effect on our emissions trajectory. It doesn’t have this catastrophic effect on how much wind and solar we build. Now, of course, I will miss the wind and solar that gets built. I’m sure developers will, the climate will. We’ll all mourn this 25% of emissions that we could have had that we didn’t have. Like reading this report, it doesn’t sound like we’ve lurched from beautiful, verdant, abundant, cheap electricity world into dark, evil, polluter world. It sounds like we’ve taken a wrong turn somewhere and it’ll take us some time to get back onto the right highway, but we’re not locked into an evil world now. And that suggests that the Inflation Reduction Act was maybe not as important as we thought it would be. And so my question to you is like, When the IRA passed, we talked about how it was going to reduce economy-wide emissions by like 40 to 48 percent by 2035. Would it have achieved the huge emissions reductions that we thought it was going to achieve when it passed?
Lily Bermel:
I don’t think it would have achieved the full amount that we would have expected in the power sector. Jesse Jenkins put out a really prescient report when the IRA was enacted that said 80% of the IRA’s emissions benefits hinged on could we build transmission faster. And guess what? We have not built it faster at all. We’ve built less and less of it and more slowly. And so John Bisling, who you had on your podcast recently, put out this really great report with a lot of other people, and they looked at all of the IRA modeling. And what they found was that later IRA models projected less and less benefits that would have come as people kind of realized like, oh, shoot, we have a lot of supply side constraints. And so I think your question is very sharp. Because the IRA would not have fully come to pass, that doesn’t mean that the IRA wasn’t good or wasn’t worth it. It’s that we have other problems. Basically, by solving one problem, by making clean energy a little bit cheaper and by incentivizing the demand of it, we therefore exposed how supply-side constrained we are and how awful and burdensome the permitting barrier process is.
Robinson Meyer:
In other words, because the IRA sort of solved any financial issue you would ever have building wind and solar, we discovered how bad the non-financial issues are or how many supply side constraints create financial issues for projects, regardless of whether the, you know, kind of facial economics are favorable or not.
Lily Bermel:
Yes, I think that’s right. And right, Heatmap does an excellent job of this on the local side, where you guys track on the local ordinance level, like how these restrictions and bans against wind and solar are completely proliferating. And so that makes me think that this issue is only getting worse because you have the federal level, you have all the national laws that really constrain build out. That adds cost. It makes it more expensive to build the longer it takes. That’s an issue. And at the local level, we have it building up as well.
Robinson Meyer:
Given that the IRA, in retrospect, in the power sector, kind of resolved any economic issue you would have making a project pencil out and revealed all these non-economic issues that actually constrain development. We are now looking at a political environment where we’re switching from mourning the IRA to saying, okay, what should happen next? And my colleague, Emily Ponacorvo, recently wrote a story about this question. But I think one of the big questions going forward, especially if Democrats take Congress at the end of this year is, well, should they fight to restore the tax credits? I can even see a world where restoring the tax credits becomes something people insist on to get permitting reform or something. After writing this report, did you come to the conclusion that Democrats should restore the wind and solar tax credits? Is that the most urgent priority for climate policy?
Lily Bermel:
In writing this report, I became quite confident that I don’t think it’s worth the bang for buck in restoring those wind and solar tax credits and instead that the supply side constraints are the real issue that we need to focus on. I did this lag analysis where if you take a given year, say 2031, and you see that the IRA trajectory would have deployed like more than 300 gigawatts of solar, how many years later would the OB3 scenario do that? There’s only a two and a half year lag or gap. And so in restoring the clean energy tax credits, you are only buying back two and a half years worth of deployment, which, at least for me, was a lot smaller than I had thought. Meanwhile, both scenarios have a literal cap in them about how much they can build and how fast they can build it. So even if you buy back that little two-and-a-half-year average annual lag, you’re going to run up to the exact same ceiling. So restoring the tax credits brings you closer to that ceiling, while permitting reform will completely lift the ceiling and be a rising tide that lifts all boats.
Robinson Meyer:
Can I ask, do we know that permitting reform will lift the ceiling? I mean, what you’ve done is create an ingenious modeling device that basically tries to account for real world constraints, which I appreciate because as we’ve been talking about, the awareness that we even need to do this in energy models, I think, was maybe not as there as it has been dawning on the community over the past five years. But do we know that if we pass permitting reform, I mean, we don’t even know what’s in the legislative package. So I guess let me ask you, like, what would need to be in a permitting reform package to raise the cap on what we can build in a meaningful way?
Lily Bermel:
Yeah, I think there’s a suite of laws that need reform to help speed the process of building. And so, of course, that’s the National Environmental Policy Act, Clean Water Act, Section 401, Federal Power Act, the National Historic Preservation Act, you know, rules to make it so that you don’t have like 10 years to litigate a case. And then the concept of permit certainty, which the Freedom Act on the Senate recently introduced to kind of protect against what the Trump administration is doing in revoking permits. So I can imagine a package coming together with components across the board from that. And we do a bills in Congress, both sides of the House or both sides of the chamber that have elements of all of that. So I think it is coming together. I do think there’s two ways that permitting reform does accelerate clean energy and help reduce emissions. The first would be raising that ceiling so that more can get added to the grid, so that the grid itself can grow, so that more transmission can get built. And the second is shortening the amount of time to build and to connect to the grid itself. And then because clean energy, it’s more permitting exposed, it needs more infrastructure from scratch. The queue itself is 95% clean, like it will net benefit clean.
Robinson Meyer:
You write in the report, the American energy transition now operates in a different macroeconomic and political environment than the one that shaped climate policy debates in the late 20 teens and early 2020s. I thought that was such an interesting claim. Can you speak a little bit more about that?
Lily Bermel:
Sure. I think I say the IRA was built and it was sold, and later it was attacked as a pure climate law. It was the product of a democratic trifecta. Interest rates were zero or near zero. Very low deficit anxiety. We were economically choosing to prioritize jobs over costs, and now all of that has changed. We’re living in a cost-of-living politics where affordability is the name of the game. We have huge demand growth that we were not really seeing at the time. Geopolitical competition over supply chains has sharpened and the fiscal space has really become quite exhausted. And then, of course, politically, right, we are now in a Republican trifecta and energy itself is ideologically the ire of both parties. And so I think with that big shift, that for me is one of the biggest telltale signs that you can’t just restore what happened before. That was built for a completely different moment. And to me, the glass half full result should point policymakers towards building beyond what we have.
Lily Bermel:
One other thing I’ll point out is that the wind and solar tax credits have been extended and extended for 30 to 40 years on a bipartisan basis. It was then a one-party vote that expanded the tax credit policy from focusing on wind and solar to supporting a lot of different technologies in the full suite of clean energy. It was then one party that affirmed to keep all of those, but that, explicitly tells us that the wind and solar tax credits are no longer bipartisan, that it will take a one party vote to bring them back and the next party, when given the opportunity, will remove them. And so to me, that’s another tell that it will come with great political capital and cost to try to extend them. And that urges the question if it’s worth the political capital to do that. Do we get the emissions reductions in the build out that we want? Is it worth that bang for buck? And so, right, like I’m not working for the CBO. I don’t know the exact fiscal costs. I’m not one of my friends on the Senate negotiating. And so I’ll leave the political strategy to them. But I trust them greatly. But I think it’s a really important question to ask if it’s worth it.
Robinson Meyer:
How much of all the assumptions here are just dependent on continued high electricity prices? Because I’m a little bit worried about a world where we assume the AI, you know, like, it’s funny in environmental policy land right now, let’s say, because on the one hand, you have a group of people who are convinced the AI is a bubble, or going to pop or not economically useful. And we’re not going to talk about that, but we’re going to just say that’s one point of view. And then we have another point of view that basically, when thinking about the future, assumes high power prices are going to remain the norm now, somewhat indefinitely. But in fact, we know the two things are linked. We know that power prices are high because hyperscalers are bidding up for every electron they can get. If power prices were to fall, would we still like to have winded solar tax credits on the books? Or are there certain insurance policies we should try to pass now that would insure us against a world where power prices fall because the last time power prices were high back in the aughts, we made a lot of bets on different technologies. And then a number of things happened, but fracking was one of them. And what wound up happening with fracking was it crashed power prices. And then it turned out to be okay because we got cheap Chinese solar. But a lot of technological bets didn’t wind up panning out because we anticipated a world of expensive power prices and instead we got cheap power prices. Thank you.
Lily Bermel:
My understanding is that the data is quite mixed on whether large loads are directly raising electricity prices or not. The Lawrence Berkeley National Lab has a really great study that they’ve updated over time that shows the impact of large loads on these prices. And in some areas, prices are tracking with inflation up until only super, super recently. So I think the data is mixed there. What your point implies, though, is that, as we discussed, AI is such a large demand and a demand pull for energy? Like, what if that goes away? What if it’s smaller than we expect? Like, are we screwed from that? I don’t think wind and solar tax credits are a necessary insurance against, like, oh, demand growth is less for several reasons. One is that the demand growth that we’re seeing now from AI is very sizable. It’s actually smaller than the demands that will come from electrification, from EVs, from building, from industry. That comes more next decade. So essentially, AI is front running this high energy demand growth scenario. And that’s good because it’s forcing us to think on our toes and react to this now. And whether or not the AI part of it comes to pass, electrification is definitely coming and it’s a larger amount. So I think while, yes, size of the bubble, all of that is like debated. And thank you, economists who are debating that. The demand growth is coming.
Lily Bermel:
And then third is that, again, I don’t think that the wind and solar tax credits are the number one needed thing here. I think, like, in terms of insurance costs, like, we are so much more screwed if we can’t build in this country and build faster. And so I think the argument there still points to permitting reform over the tax credits.
Robinson Meyer:
What did you change your mind about writing this report?
Lily Bermel:
One thing that I think this report really crystallized for me is the role that gas plays in our power system. We see that it’s what fills the clean energy gap because it’s able to generate more. And we see that even as we build more clean energy, when it’s wind and solar and storage, that does not offset the services that gas provides. And I think like anyone who’s focused on mitigating the power sector needs to keep top of mind. They’re like, you literally need a turbine spinning on the grid as like the on switch to keep it on and to keep it functioning. There are only so many technologies that can do that. Gas is the only cost competitive and available technology to do that right now. And that’s why if we want a clean alternative, it has to be nuclear, it has to be geothermal. And down the line, there’s other options as well. And so to me, that helps us realize that geothermal in particular should be the number one public and private investment priority in the coming decades for decarbonization. And I saw a stat recently that geothermal has only received like one tenth of the amount of public support that solar has received. And so even though we’re seeing some success on that side, like it’s not enough. There is so much more that we can do.
Lily Bermel:
I think something else that this report helped me clarify my thinking about was the value of building versus doing things kind of marginally on the side to make things better. There’s a whole set of actually like really cool, innovative technologies like grid enhancing technologies, reconductoring, virtual power plants, demand response. Like there’s a whole set of things now that’s essentially the equivalent of like finding a $20 bill on the street. Like these should be pursued immediately. But recognizing that in order to meet demand growth, which as we talk about is both from AI, but also electrification and heat pumps and EVs and manufacturing, decarbonizing industry, like doubling the size of our grid is table stakes. In fact, like we might need to triple it. And so while all of those energy things should be pursued with like full steam ahead, it’s probably marginal and just like buys a little bit of time for all of the building that we really need to do. And a through line, like a theme that I put in my report is that building actually, is what will help solve our problems on both sides, right? You have to simply build more renewables to close that clean energy gap. And you have to build a clean firm to be able to close the emissions gap. And so to me, that’s the through line here and the way that we’ll decarbonize our power sector.
Robinson Meyer:
Can you give us how you used to feel about gas versus how you feel now?
Lily Bermel:
Sure. I’ll admit that I was raised in kind of climate academia, where I was very excited to go work at the Paris Agreement. And like everything was all about climate change and net zero and 2050 and direct timelines like that. And I think as I’ve learned more practically about how the energy system works, right, you realize that like, oh, you like things take slower than you expect. And you actually have to like add a whole lot of energy, way more than you want. And there’s a lot of building that’s required. And then maybe in a while, we can get rid of some of that fossil. I’ll see you next time.
Robinson Meyer:
Let’s now preserve some of your climate respectability here, as we’ve praised gas and said we shouldn’t bring back the wind and solar tax credits. And if we aren’t using the money on the wind and solar tax credits, of course, we have constrained fiscal space. The budget deficit, unlike a decade and a half ago when people were concerned about it, now seems to be a real problem, certainly driving up mortgage rates. We could just not spend that money at all. Okay. But if we did want to spend some money on climate change and we didn’t just want to do permitting reform, like what do you think we should spend money to do? What should we do instead of wind and solar tax credits?
Lily Bermel:
Great question. And just to provide a little bit of context, Brendan Duke put out a great report last month that looked at, if Democrats are to undo just a portion of the Trump agenda, it will cost the size of Biden’s original Build Back Better proposal. And that is not Trump’s whole agenda. And that is before any additional Democrat spending priorities.
Robinson Meyer:
Is that like the tax cuts? Like basically, if you were to undo the tax cuts, it’s just extremely expensive.
Lily Bermel:
It’s not even the tax cuts. It is healthcare and the tariffs and one other piece. So it’s not the tax credits. So all to say is, not only has the level of debt gone through the roof, the amount of spending demands will be huge. And so we will have to be really picky about what we do.
Lily Bermel:
So your question is a great one. In the report, I think I propose a premise for thinking about it. The first should be, let’s not subsidize the deployment of mature technologies. And instead let’s focus on building out the grid and focus on commercializing the set of innovative technologies that need to come to scale. So there’s a lot of things you can do to build the grid. You can expand existing tax credits on the books, say the manufacturing one for transformers, advanced conductors, transmission equipment, other power electronics that will really help relieve bottlenecks and supply crunch that we’re facing on that side. Some people support a transmission investment tax credit. That makes sense to look into. And then those technologies that we need really to deploy in the 2030s to have ready. So long-duration energy storage, geothermal, nuclear, carbon capture, you know, fusion maybe one day will happen. And that can be done through procurement that the government does. And then, of course, federal loan authority. And the Department of Energy Dominance Financing obviously plays a huge role here. And so wanting to continue to support that is really key. And it’s been great to see that being done on a bipartisan basis so far.
Robinson Meyer:
Your report says so clearly, build, build, build, how we’re going to achieve decarbonization is developing, you know, this next generation of clean firm technologies, be it nuclear or geothermal or fusion. And only building out more transmission can unlock the degree of renewables that we would need to see in order to really begin shipping away at the huge amount of fossil that’s in the system. When you look at leaders in the environmental policy space, when you look at what organizations are telling their Instagram followers and the people who ostensibly look to them, do you feel like they are communicating the importance of building as much as they should be?
Lily Bermel:
Yeah, I think it’s becoming more of a priority. I think people are realizing how important it is. And again, that Jesse Jenkins report that says we’ll lose 80% of emissions reductions if you don’t build transmission more like that is quite eye opening. So I do hope that my report can be a nudge in that direction, explaining, you know, really at a detail level and a technology level, like why we need to build more and why building more is the answer.
Robinson Meyer:
So you feel like it’s getting better. But do you feel like it’s where it needs to be now?
Lily Bermel:
Probably not. There’s always room for improvement. That’s the counter to glass out full. I’ll say I’ll be optimistic, but there’s a lot more work to do for sure.
Robinson Meyer:
OK, very politic answer. One more question, which is after all that you’ve come to understand about the IRA and looking at these reports, looking at what it would have done, looking at what it didn’t do. I think when the law was first passed, a lot of us thought, wow, what a well-designed law. It’s going to stay on the books. And then after the Beautiful Bill Act passed, a lot of us thought, oh, my gosh, it wasn’t well designed at all. What a disaster. It didn’t survive in the House. It didn’t. There were this group of 14 House Republicans who were lined up to support it. But as soon as President Trump made it clear that he wanted to get rid of this law, they got rid of it.
Robinson Meyer:
Actually, this was a disaster. But looking at your report, I don’t know, I’m of two minds. On the one hand, I look at your report and I go, look at this, three quarters of the clean energy capacity we would have had, two thirds of the emissions reductions we would have seen. Seems like the IRA did a pretty good job. On the other hand, I go like, well, but I look to 2035 or I look to 2030 and those clean firm tax credits don’t seem to be doing a lot. Now, we know that in the real world, it seems like they actually have a better track record that we’re commercializing technology faster than the models think we will. But there’s a reading of events here where like the IRA spent a lot of money to accelerate trajectories that we would have hit within a year or two anyway. Was the IRA a well-designed law? Do you think it did what we thought it was going to do when we passed it? Or does doing this, you know, after analysis report on it make you think, actually, we should have done a lot of other stuff instead of the IRA during this moment?
Lily Bermel:
Yeah, I think about how our understanding of what our best foot forward is with policy changes over time. And after, what, 20 years of trying to tax carbon and make carbon more expensive, we were enlightened to instead make clean energy cheaper. And so that was like the moment that the IRA was riding on. It was novel. It was very cool to design an industrial strategy and policy around clean energy. And that’s where a lot of the IRA came from. Again, by kind of solving for that demand side of the equation, we realized, oh my gosh, the supply side morass is so massive that we are just running and hitting our head against the wall over and over again. Also, right, the rise in energy demand, like our own realization about it came after the IRA was passed. So I think now that we are in a different moment where we have more data to prove that how, mature wind and solar are and how cost competitive they are, and we have a better understanding that there’s a whole other suite of technologies that we need to commercialize and innovate and scale, that then our focus, I think, naturally continues to move on. So I don’t think anything about the IRA was a mistake or not worth doing, right? We learned a lot from it. It did spur a lot of investment. It accelerated things. And now we’re realizing, oh my gosh, like, look how cool it is that these technologies are mature. And now let’s go do that for the rest of the set of clean energy
Lily Bermel:
technologies that we need and that we want to decarbonize the power sector.
Robinson Meyer:
When you look at your the set of technologies that have matured now, one thing we often hear from Democrats, one thing we hear, I have to say, constantly heated map events from elected Democratic representatives is, well, clean is cheap and cheap is clean, right? Right. Clean is the cheapest it can be. Clean, clean. There’s a bit of dissonance, I have to say, in this message that clean is cheap and also that we need to restore the subsidies for the thing that is allegedly cheapest because it was truly cheapest. We wouldn’t need to subsidize it. Do you believe after writing this report that clean is always the cheapest option?
Lily Bermel:
Sure. And I think you are so spot on in saying that. I’ll flag that my report itself didn’t look at costs and was just looking at deployment levels. But it did encourage me to look exactly into that question because I wanted to think through what are the headwinds and the tailwinds that the clean energy sector is facing. So obviously, we’re getting a lot of tailwinds right now from the Trump administration directly, also from persistent high interest rates and other things like that.
Lily Bermel:
A tailwind that people cite over and over again is how cheap clean energy is. And in looking into it, again, to ground truth that, I realized that clean is cheap. It’s comparatively cheap when it’s freshly getting built. So new solar compared to new gas, the solar will be cheaper. But in the really narrow context, when that market or that region has enough reliability already, if it already has the transmission built, and if it has a relatively low amount of solar, so therefore the solar is like value add. And in other moments when those conditions are not met, clean is not necessarily like automatically cheaper. And when you compare new clean to existing fossil, clean doesn’t always win out there either. And so I think that’s really important to know and, of course, argues for doing things to make clean cheap. I think it still supports the fact that clean is very competitive, but I think we really need to dismantle the thinking that says clean is always cheapest because it’s simply not. The study in the data that’s most often cited, which is the Lazard’s levelized cost of energy, it doesn’t take into account the grid costs and the systems costs that it takes to connect renewables to the grid. And it compares apples to oranges and all of these things. So again, clean is relatively cheap. Clean is super competitive. It’s not 100% always the cheapest.
Lily Bermel:
That’s really important to know. And it’s also like, okay, that gas is cheap, too. And that gas is what’s being used, because we want whatever energy is cheapest. And when gas is cheap and getting added to the grid, that will lower the cost of electrification, like that still helps support our goals. That’s still, yeah, lowering the cost of electrification is useful for decarbonization, and gas helps firm solar and wind and storage.
Robinson Meyer:
It’s funny, the Lazard levelized cost of energy, it’s if we did a, you know, levelized cost of calories.
Lily Bermel:
That’s such a good analogy.
Robinson Meyer:
It would tell you basically that what you should be eating at all times is like oatmeal cooked in canola oil. Yeah. You know, and it’s be like, you know, oatmeal cooked in canola oil, man, nothing delivers cheap calories like that. You can go to Costco and walk away with tens, hundreds of thousands of calories for like 10 bucks, you know, tomorrow. But you actually can’t exclusively eat oatmeals cooked in canola oil. You need other nutrients. You need other parts of your diet. Totally.
Lily Bermel:
Yeah. It’s like, how soon would you die if that’s the only thing that you ate? Yeah, exactly. How soon would the grid fail if you just completely only relied on wind and solar and didn’t have firm capacity, which one day will be met with clean energy?
Robinson Meyer:
That’s great. Lily Bermel, thank you so much for joining us on Shift Key. This was great.
Lily Bermel:
Thanks, Rob. So happy to be here.
Robinson Meyer:
And that will do it for us on Shift Key today and on Shift Key this week. We’ll be back next week with a new episode of Shift Key. But if you miss us, remember, you can go to heatmap.news right now. Go to the newsletter button in the tab and subscribe to Heatmap Daily. It’s the new daily on weekdays newsletter that I write with my analysis and thoughts on the day’s biggest climate and energy news on the biggest news and kind of the new electric economy. Me. It’s like getting an email from me to you every evening. It’s fun. I’m enjoying doing it. And you should go sign up right now. Heatmap.news. Click newsletters. Subscribe. Of course, you should subscribe to all of our newsletters at Heatmap, including Heatmap AM written by my colleague, Alexander Kaufman. Until then, Shift Key is a production of Heatmap News. Our editors are Jillian Goodman and Nico Lauricella. Multimedia editing and audio engineering is by Jacob Lambert and by Nick Woodbury. Our music’s by Adam Kromelow. Thanks so much for listening. See you next week.