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Frontier model developers still keep their energy use largely a secret, but Watershed is proposing a new formula that will at least get you close.

With companies now rapidly adding artificial intelligence into their products and using it across their workstreams, it stands to reason that all that extra energy use might show up in their climate accounting. But to any business that wants to get a sense of how big its AI-related emissions footprint is becoming — and, god forbid, maybe even try to reduce it — I say well, good luck. AI providers mostly keep the data required to make such calculations a secret.
Now Watershed, a startup that helps companies track and estimate their carbon emissions, is proposing a workaround. The firm published a white paper on Wednesday laying out a method for companies to produce rough estimates of their carbon impact from AI, while also encouraging them to demand better data from AI developers.
“We’ve heard from companies that they’re already being asked about AI emissions from investors, from auditors, from regulators, and right now most of them are guessing,” John Bistline, Watershed’s head of science, told me. “We wanted to give them something that was more defensible.”
For most frontier AI models, including those developed by OpenAI and Anthropic, there’s very little information to work with. Google is the only proprietary AI developer that has published a transparent estimate of its model’s operational energy use and related emissions. In a paper last August, researchers at the company found that “the median Gemini apps text prompt consumes 0.24 watts,” which is “less energy than watching nine seconds of television,” and released 0.03 grams of CO2-equivalent. These numbers may be out of date by now, however. In the paper, the authors note that this already represented a 33-fold reduction in energy consumption compared to the previous year.
That’s one challenge with estimating AI-related emissions — tech companies are both growing and innovating rapidly, expanding their energy footprints while also finding greater efficiencies, which may be one reason they don’t disclose this information yet.
Another obstacle is that the exercise involves making a number of carbon accounting decisions, and there’s no consensus yet on best practices. For instance, where do you draw the line on which emissions to include? You could just look at the energy required to operate the model, or you could include the energy used to train the model, or even the emissions related to fabricating and manufacturing the hardware it’s running on. Training a model tends to be more energy-intensive than running it to respond to queries, but it only happens once. If you’re going to include training emissions, the next question is, how should responsibility for those be allotted across the lifetime of the model and its use by hundreds of thousands of customers?
Another decision is how to account for differences in user behavior. A model’s energy intensity can vary widely depending on whether the user is asking a simple question, requesting complex research, generating images, or dispatching agents to conduct multiple tasks simultaneously. Models capable of “reasoning” use an estimated 30 times more electricity than those without that ability, according to research by HuggingFace, a company that creates tools for AI developers. A per-prompt emissions average would not capture these differences, and therefore would not give companies actionable information to help them reduce their emissions.
A “per token” average might be more useful in that sense. When AI models process queries, they break the sentence or code down into smaller components called tokens. One token might be just the first few letters of a word. When the model generates a response, it also processes it in terms of tokens. Estimating emissions per token is not a perfect system either, however, since a token’s value can vary across AI providers. Input tokens, i.e. user questions, also tend to be less energy-intensive than output tokens, or user responses, and a single per-token average will conceal that difference.
Then there’s the question of how to get from a model’s energy intensity to an emissions estimate. Should you use the real-world average carbon intensity of the electric grid? What about any clean energy agreements the AI company may have signed? And how should you factor in companies that decide to bypass the grid entirely and build their own on-site generation, which tends to use natural gas?
The Watershed paper proposes some answers to these questions, and also offers guidance for how companies can develop emissions estimates based on the data available to them.
While most of the published research on AI emissions to date has calculated energy intensity on a per-query basis, Watershed advocates for a per-token approach. — i.e. “kilowatt-hours per thousand tokens.” The authors reason that electricity use scales more directly with the number of tokens used than the number of queries submitted. AI application customers are also often billed based on their token usage, so there’s a business case for tracking tokens and trying to use them more efficiently.
For those companies working with essentially zero data — not even the number of tokens they’re using per year — Watershed recommends they approximate their AI emissions using a “spend-based” method. This means simply multiplying the amount they spend per year on AI services by an emissions factor of 0.134 kilograms of carbon dioxide equivalent per U.S. dollar, which is based on U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis numbers for the data processing sector of the economy.
The Watershed paper concedes that whatever number this method spits out will be wrong, noting that it “can misestimate true AI emissions by several times in either direction,” and advising companies to treat this as a “provisional placeholder.” But publishing these numbers, even though they are wrong, could help push AI companies toward more transparency if they want to correct the record.
For companies that do track their token volumes, Watershed has a more rigorous solution. The paper proposes a formula companies can use to calculate their AI emissions, accounting not just for inference energy use, but also training emissions, embodied emissions of the data processing equipment, and a figure known as “power usage effectiveness.” This captures the energy consumed by cooling systems, power conversion, and other data center infrastructure that’s not directly serving AI processing. Since model-specific values for the various inputs to the formula are mostly not available today, Watershed has provided default values gathered from previous studies, including papers by Microsoft and Google. Companies can substitute the actual numbers disclosed by AI providers into the formula as that information becomes available.
I reached out to Google, Microsoft, Anthropic, and OpenAI to ask why they didn’t share token carbon intensity, and whether they planned to in the future. Only Microsoft responded to my inquiry, pointing me to its blog post and peer-reviewed paper estimating general AI energy use across frontier models.
To get the most accurate estimate, companies would also need to know where, geographically, their AI queries are being serviced, since emissions from the electric grid varies by region. In some cases, companies may be able to actually choose where their queries are being processed, offering another lever by which they could potentially reduce their emissions.
The right data, disclosed in sufficient detail, will unlock companies’ ability to reduce their AI-related emissions, Watershed argues. Employees would have more reason to choose the most appropriate model for a given task, for example, like avoiding using energy-intensive reasoning models for basic questions.
“I think about a John von Neumann test here,” Bistline said, referring to the mathematician and proto-computer scientist. “You wouldn’t ask an advanced model like Fable anything that you would be embarrassed to ask John von Neumann, or Marie Curie, right? You wouldn’t want to ask ‘how many R’s are there in Strawberry?’ or ‘which restaurants would you recommend I go to in Miami?’”
Of course, companies can already implement this recommendation today, but there will be no way to account for and prove that they are reducing their emissions as a result until AI providers disclose distinct model-based energy estimates.
As Bistline mentioned, this information isn’t just nice-to know — companies are already being asked for it. Upcoming regulations in California and the European Union will require large companies to disclose their total direct emissions, and will eventually require them to disclose indirect emissions like AI energy use. The EU’s AI Act will also require AI companies to disclose a breakdown of the energy consumption of its general purpose AI models.
“There are customer-side disclosure rules and provider-side ones developing in parallel,” Bistline said, “and right now there’s no agreed methodology connecting the two, which is the gap we’re trying to address with our AI emissions framework.”
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Money is pouring into small modular and microreactor startups. But there can only be so many winners.
Investment in smaller, next-generation nuclear reactor designs is booming, with a flood of capital pouring into scaled-down models known as small modular reactors — or, if they’re extra tiny, microreactors. In just the past few weeks, Valar Atomics announced a $1 billion Series B, while Antares Nuclear closed its $470 million Series C. The two companies are attempting to serve different customers — Valar is targeting hyperscale data centers, while Antares is building for off-grid military applications — but both are betting on the same premise: that smaller, factory-built reactors can deliver reliable, carbon-free power far more quickly, flexibly, and cheaply than traditional large-scale nuclear plants.
Venture capital is eating it up. In addition to Valar and Antares’ raises this year, SMR startup X-Energy went public in April, raising over $1 billion at a $9.1 billion valuation. Last year alone, SMR companies TerraPower, Last Energy, Radiant Industries, Aalo Atomics, Arc Clean Technology, and Stellaria all raised rounds.
It seems like every week brings another announcement about an SMR company hitting a new milestone or a microreactor raising a new round. But some industry experts aren’t buying the hype. One 2024 report by the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis summarizes it neatly with the title, “Small Modular Reactors: Still too expensive, too slow and too risky.” One of the report’s co-authors, Dennis Wamsted, thinks this blunt analysis has held up remarkably well.
“I still think that’s one of the best-titled reports we ever wrote,” he told me, arguing that nothing in the past two years has changed his fundamental analysis of the sector. “I think it’s just as overhyped as it was a few years ago. There is a shiny new object mentality to SMRs. They’re going to work perfectly right out of the box.” Instead, the report argues, borrowing a phrase from NextEra Energy CEO John Ketchum, SMRs are “an opportunity to lose money in smaller batches.”
The report came out about six months after NuScale — still the only SMR company with a design certified by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission — canceled its inaugural project in Idaho before construction even began. It’s been a wild ride ever since: Buoyed by investor excitement over an artificial intelligence-driven nuclear renaissance, NuScale’s stock soared last year before losing most of its value once again as the company posted major losses.
The AI boom has driven much of the surge in SMR interest, as hyperscalers scramble to procure power for a rapidly expanding fleet of new data centers. Google, Amazon, and Meta have signed agreements with SMR developers Kairos Power, X-energy, and TerraPower and Oklo, respectively. At the same time, bipartisan support for nuclear is growing. Recent Gallup polls show that 46% of Americans believe the U.S. should put a greater emphasis on nuclear power and that 61% support the technology overall. Other surveys suggest SMRs in particular enjoy even higher levels of favorability.
The Trump administration has gone all in too, signing executive orders directing the Department of Energy and Department of Defense to prioritize deploying small reactors at domestic military bases and spinning up the Reactor Pilot Program to expedite testing of 11 new advanced reactor designs outside the jurisdiction of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The program aimed to have three reach criticality — the point at which a nuclear reaction becomes self-sustaining — by this July 4th. Four microreactor companies ended up beating the deadline: Antares, Valar, Deployable Energy, and Aalo Atomics, while the Sam Altman-backed SMR company Oklo achieved criticality last week.
“Say I was an advisor to the Department of Energy,” Wamsted’s co-auther David Schlissel, formerly director of resource planning analysis at the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, posited to me. “Even with the risk, the smart way to go is, let’s pick two or three designs and go out and build them. Build one of each. See which ones work and which ones don’t. But what’s happening is the exact opposite of that.”
Whether federal policy is creating a durable new industry or not, there are still plenty of situations where customers need clean, firm power and today’s options fall short. Solar-plus-storage is broadly useful, but matching nuclear’s 24/7 availability can require significant overbuilding. And when it comes to large-scale nuclear, a customer may need power sooner than when a project that big could feasibly come online.
Many customers are also simply unwilling to take on the risk of a multibillion-dollar, decade-long nuclear megaproject, which tend to run over time and budget. The only new reactors built in the U.S. since the Three Mile Island accident in 1979 — two huge Westinghouse AP1000 units capable of generating 1.1 gigawatts of power apiece — have become poster children for this risk. Units 3 and 4 at the Vogtle Electricity Generating Plant in Georgia came online in 2023 and 2024, respectively, roughly seven years late and tens of billions of dollars over budget. Georgia Power customers will be paying off Vogtle well into the 2050s.
This has left many SMR entrepreneurs and industry boosters convinced there simply must be a better way. "The only customers capable of buying a reactor that large are either nation-state governments or essentially state-backed utilities,” Jordan Bramble, Antares’ co-founder and CEO, told me.
In part because of this, Bramble rejects the idea that small reactors are even competing with large-scale nuclear in the first place, explaining that the either/or framing overlooks the fact that these designs attract distinct pools of capital. “What a venture capitalist in private equity is going to invest in versus a municipal bond investor or a utility investor is going to invest in are two totally different things,” he told me.
And while SMRs may eventually seek institutional capital too, Bramble points to recent funding rounds by Anthropic, OpenAI, and Commonwealth Fusion Systems as evidence of just how much money companies can attract in today's private market even before their tech has come down the cost curve. “I think when the upside equation is there, there’s near limitless money in venture and growth equity right now,” he told me.
True? Largely. Indicative of a bubble? Possibly.
One lesson many developers took from NuScale seems to be about customer selection. While NuScale intended to serve a coalition of small, price-sensitive municipal utilities, today’s SMR startups are targeting early adopters with more room in their budgets: AI hyperscalers, of course, but also military and defense customers and industrial companies such as chemicals and metals producers that can put both nuclear’s heat and electricity to use. Modular, factory-based production is central to many of their strategies, along with even smaller reactor designs. While NuScale sought to build 77-megawatt reactors, Valar is targeting 5 megawatts while Antares is building in the 100-kilowatt to 1-gigawatt range.
But utility analyst Bill Tilles argues that scaling down further isn’t the answer. The fundamental issue with SMRs, he told me, is that they suffer from a "reverse economy of scale." That is, shrink the size of the reactor and the cost per watt of electricity produced goes up, not down. Add in a market crowded with dozens of these companies pursuing different reactor designs and fuel types but chasing the same data center, defense, and industrial customers, and it becomes difficult to see how any single one can attract the critical mass of customers needed to scale up a manufacturing line and become relatively cost-effective.
Of course, every SMR company says it’s uniquely positioned to emerge as a winner in what even Bramble acknowledges is an overcrowded field likely to see consolidation in the coming years through either mergers and acquisitions or outright failures. Still, he’s feeling confident in Antares’ decision to pursue the Department of Defense as a beachhead customer: In April, the Air Force selected the company to build a 500-kilowatt microreactor at a military base in San Antonio, set to come online in 2028.
“[Nuclear] actually was always a defense-first technology that eventually became commercial, and that’s how rocket propulsion worked. It’s how GPS worked. It’s how semiconductors worked. It’s even how the internet developed,” he told me. Bramble said he thinks Antares can follow a similar trajectory, riding the cost curve down before eventually bringing a grid-scale product to market.
While SMR skeptics may not be convinced this grid-scale goal is truly feasible, many do acknowledge that remote military bases offer a compelling, if niche, market for SMRs and microreactors. The military has operated nuclear-powered submarines for decades, so the concept of using small reactors in situations where conventional refueling is costly and dangerous is not without precedent. “You have these unique, price insensitive buyers that the government will try to encourage,” Tilles told me of remote deployments. “But one should not confuse that with anything resembling a commercial technology.”
That may be where the real debate lies — whether there are enough price insensitive customers for multiple companies to commercialize small reactors at scale and drive costs down.
There’s also the question of what the market will look like by the time these companies are ready to scale production — a milestone experts peg around the mid-2030s. Ultra-long-duration energy storage company Form Energy and advanced geothermal developer Fervo are already building out and turning on their first commercial projects, while multiple fusion companies are similarly targeting the mid-2030s for commercialization. If any or all of these technologies take off, they could reshape the market for clean, firm power — and thus the options available to SMRs’ potential customers.
But Benton Arnett, senior director at the industry group Nuclear Energy Institute, argues that multi-billion-dollar energy customers would be unwise to put all their eggs in one technological basket, betting that ultra-long duration storage or fusion alone will meet all their future energy needs. “You’ve got to have a diversity of investments and a diversity of plays so you can capture what’s going to be most available over the next 10 years, which can be really hard to predict,” he told me. He’s obviously betting SMRs will be among those technologies of the future. “I think everyone’s building right now not based on hype, but based on real dollars that are changing hands, building out this kind of new data center ecosystem.”
Bramble, for his part, thinks the hype cycle might be real. He just doesn’t see the exuberance as a negative for Antares or the industry at large. “Some of the most generational, economically transformational companies get built during a hype cycle,” he told me. “That was true of Google and Amazon in the dot-com bubble. This was true of the railroads. The best ones emerged during a period of mass overbuilding and overinvestment.”
So the question may not be whether the SMR boom will produce any winners, but how many — and how much capital investors and startups will burn in the process. Because while the Google of small nuclear may still be waiting to emerge, history suggests there will be plenty of nuclear equivalents of Pets.coms, Kozmo.coms, and Webvans along the way.
Current conditions: The devastating 7.4-magnitude earthquake that struck Colombia has left at least 111 dead • Severe thunderstorms once again caused ground stops at New York City’s airports, stranding your correspondent at Chicago O’Hare for the entire afternoon • Tropical Storm Chan-Hom is battering Tokyo.
The United States sweltered through its hottest month in more than 130 years of analysis, breaking records set during the 1930s Dust Bowl. The average temperatures in the lower 48 states in July came out to 76.89 degrees Fahrenheit, 0.12 degrees above the value from July 1936. “Those who deny or dismiss U.S. climate change have hit a Waterloo moment of sorts,” wrote Yale Climate Connections.
The water levels in Lake Mead, meanwhile, have dropped to a record low as drought parches the American West. “This is a significant wake-up call,” J.B. Hamby, chairman of the Colorado River Board of California and the state’s lead negotiator, told The New York Times. “We need to have long-term solutions that are going to get us away from the precipice.”
For years, the world’s great powers have jockeyed for control of the Arctic as climate change thawed sea ice enough to open new shipping routes across the frigid polar region. Now China is poised to launch its first regular container shipping service through the frigid North. On Monday, the Financial Times reported that Sea Legend, a Chinese cargo vessel that delivers to ports in Turkey and North Africa, will begin weekly service through the Arctic with a route following Russia’s northern coastline. Beijing is calling the approach its “Ice Silk Road.”
The Trump administration, meanwhile, told researchers Monday that it would stop funding the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's lead report on how climate change is affecting the Arctic, Politico reported.
The Trump administration won federal approval to reconsider the environmental review for the stalled Atlantic Shores offshore wind project off Atlantic City, New Jersey. Previously a joint venture between the French energy giant EDF and the oil behemoth Shell until the latter company pulled out following Trump’s reelection, the remaining developer had argued in court that the approval process completed under the Biden administration could not be reopened. While the company “points to various ways that it believes that Congress has limited” the Department of the Interior’s authority to reconsider a review, “none speak with the exquisite specificity to undercut” the government’s right to remand the approval, according to court documents Heatmap obtained last night. Acknowledging the potential for the White House to bog down the procedure in bureaucracy, the court said it will require the Trump administration to provide a status report for why a 120-day deadline for revisiting the review would not be possible. My colleague Jael Holzman had put the project on death watch last year.
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If you listened to any of Tesla’s recent earnings calls, you know that Elon Musk has a lot of big plans for the company that don’t involve luxury electric vehicles with large in-dash homescreens. The company wants to mass produce humanoid robots. It’s promised to basically double America’s output of solar panels. And it’s aiming to build a $16.8 billion chip factory to rival Taiwan’s semiconductor industry. Yet that facility won’t be powered by Tesla’s solar. Instead, Musk said that his other company, SpaceX, will set up batteries and natural gas to keep the lights on for the plant. “The plant sits on the site of a former coal-fired power plant, and SpaceX plans to power it with newly built natural gas plants and batteries,” Electrek reporter Fred Lambert wrote. “So the compute future gets built on the same fossil ground as the past. Just swap coal for gas.”
At the start of the Iran War, a four-dimensional chess interpretation of President Donald Trump’s motivations posited that the conflict was actually about asserting control over China’s supply of hydrocarbons. Six months into the war, The Economist has declared China “the world’s great oil power.” Despite relatively limited domestic supplies, the People’s Republic managed to seize control over its energy fate through stockpiling, restricting exports, and curbing domestic demand by, for example, encouraging city dwellers to take mass transit and or cycle over driving. Among the other ways Beijing is limiting demand, as I have written previously: It’s pouring money into green hydrogen, ammonia, and methanol.

Puerto Rico’s blackouts got worse last year without extreme weather bringing on the outages. The latest data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration shows that the island’s beleaguered ratepayers suffered an average of 36 hours of power interrupts that were not caused by major events such as hurricanes. That’s 19% more than in 2024. Between 2021 and 2025, Puerto Ricans experienced a combined average of 29 hours of power loss each year.
The president has paid $4 billion to kill projects that were already dying or dead.
At a certain level, it defies belief: The Trump administration is spending nearly $4 billion … for nothing.
It’s paid something for nothing at least five times now. Last week, the administration reached a $1.2 billion deal with the German energy company RWE to not build three wind farms, including a large installation off the coast of New Jersey. The Chicago-based developer Invenergy signed a separate deal in June. It’s not clear these deals are legal, yet they keep happening.
These agreements mark the formal end of the first American offshore wind boom, which began in the late 2010s and stepped up during the Biden administration. This buildout, alas, never quite found its sea legs. As recently as February 2022, you could squint at the horizon and imagine that 14 gigawatts of turbines might soon spin along the East Coast. Now, we’ll be lucky to get more than six gigawatts by the end of the decade.
That’s a lot of lost generation capacity — and as I’ve repeatedly written, its absence is going to be a problem for the northeastern United States. The Mid-Atlantic and New England, which were set to receive some of the largest offshore facilities, will still need a lot more new electricity in the years to come, especially during winters. (New York City, for instance, now avoids blackouts by relying on two aging barge-mounted power plants parked in the East River.) And while many of the developers who received President Trump’s payouts pointed to fossil fuel investments in their press releases — as if to imply that those other projects were “replacing” the lost wind farms — relatively few of the power plants mentioned will be built in the Northeast.
Yet there’s another weird aspect of these offshore deals that I haven’t focused on as much: Why are they happening in the first place? That’s the subject of a helpful new article published today by James Sallee, an economics professor at UC Berkeley. He observes that many of the offshore wind projects that the Trump administration has now paid to “cancel” were struggling financially long before January 20, 2025. Few of the farms, if any, would have been built under any administration. So why, exactly, is Trump paying off their developers?
Let’s roll the tape. More than four years ago, the Biden administration held the country’s largest offshore auction ever for a set of promising offshore-wind sites along the Atlantic coast. That brought in more than $4 billion; as part of it, a German company named RWE placed a record-shattering bid for a particularly promising area off New Jersey’s coast. The date? February 25, 2022.
As it turned out, that auction was not the most important thing that happened that week in global energy markets — or world history. A day earlier, Russian troops began their full-scale invasion of Ukraine, igniting a geopolitical firestorm that ultimately ushered in an era of tighter energy supplies, rampant inflation, and higher interest rates. Although the offshore developers could not have known it then, those three trends would reshape the economics of their projects. That’s because offshore wind farms — far more than solar, battery, or gas plants — require titanic upfront investment, as Sallee writes:
Offshore wind is extremely capital intensive: enormous costs come up front, while revenue arrives over decades. Inflation raised the cost of steel, turbines, vessels, and labor. Higher interest rates reduced the present value of future revenue and raised financing costs. Where developers signed fixed-price contracts, developers were left holding the capital cost risk when conditions changed.
Unit economics started to deteriorate, and costs ballooned. Projects started to fail as early as October 2023, when Orsted canceled its Ocean Wind 1 and 2 projects slated for the New Jersey coast. I remember talking to an energy expert at the time who mused that for the same per-megawatt cost as an offshore wind farm, the state might as well just build a new Westinghouse nuclear reactor. (Its governor Mikie Sherrill is now exploring doing just that.)
By the time President Trump took office, in other words, many offshore wind projects were already on financial life support, if not deceased. Given the real underlying shift in project economics, that should have decreased the value of developers’ offshore leases — which are, as Sallee writes, more of an option than a permit, because they give a developer the right to study an area but do not authorize construction per se.
Yet over the past year, the Trump administration has reimbursed five developers largely in full, and it hasn’t gotten much in return. Perhaps that’s what the administration needed to do in order to fully kill these projects without risk of future legal sanction. Yet it is … strange. “The deals relate to development rights that look uneconomic today, even before the buyouts,” Sallee says. “The buyouts may limit how quickly offshore wind could rebound in a future economic and policy environment, but as of today it seems as though the government just spent $3.9 billion of taxpayer dollars spent to shoot a corpse.”
I wonder if that description undersells it. In a certain light, the government isn’t really shooting the corpse so much as handing it big wads of cash. Since the first of these deals were announced, I’ve struggled with what to call them — buyouts? payouts? — but Sallee’s post (which you should go read in full) made me wonder if bailout is the best option. After all, imagine if a hypothetical President Kamala Harris had reimbursed this same set of companies for the full value of their failed offshore wind bets — and used the Justice Department’s permanent and technically unlimited Judgement Fund to do it. What would journalists say then? How would Republicans respond?
Or to make the analogy truly work, I suppose, imagine that a President Harris had bailed out oil companies for some overly exuberant bet made during an earlier Republican administration, then claimed (with dubious evidence) that they would use the refunds to build renewables. That would still be an enormous waste of public money, but it would scramble the politics somewhat, perhaps evoking astonished embarrassment from her allies and delighted confusion from her opponents. Which might — to return to our world — mirror some of the response we’re seeing to Trump’s wind payouts.