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It’s time to deliver pumpkin spiced lattes to the picket lines, because Hot Labor Summer is raging into the fall.
The United Auto Workers Union’s contract with General Motors, Ford Motor Company and Stellantis expired at midnight on Thursday, and the union has made the unprecedented decision to strike all three companies at once.
The transition to electric vehicles is a defining issue of the fight. The Big Three say they aspire for 40% to 50% of their U.S. sales to be electric vehicles by the end of this decade. But they argue that ceding to workers’ demands for higher wages would jeopardize their ability to invest in EVs and their competitiveness against Tesla and foreign automakers that operate nonunion plants.
Meanwhile, the automakers are opening new joint venture battery plants that are not covered under the union’s national agreement, and paying workers there less. That trend, plus the fear that electric vehicles will require fewer workers to assemble than gas-powered vehicles, call into question the Biden administration’s key selling point of tackling climate change — that switching to EVs and other clean technologies is an opportunity “to create millions of good-paying, union jobs.”
When it comes to what UAW is trying to do about all of this, it's not entirely clear. Fain has taken a different stance than his predecessors by embracing the transition to EVs. But when you look at the union’s key demands, electric vehicles aren’t mentioned anywhere.
So how is the union actually tackling the transition? The negotiations are largely confidential, and the UAW has only shared the loose outlines of its proposals to the Big Three. But here’s what we know.
Electric vehicles aren’t named directly on the union’s list, but the transition away from gas-powered cars is implicated in multiple proposals.
1. Wages. The union’s top priority is higher pay. Fain went into negotiations asking for a 40% increase in wages over the next four years, equivalent to the raises that Big Three CEOs received over the last four, and cost of living increases to match inflation. This would boost the pay of all its members, including those working on EVs.
2. Ending Tiers. Fain also aims to end the “tier” system which created different pay classes and benefits between workers. Currently, new hires start at $16 to $18 and have to pay their dues for eight years before earning senior-level wages that top out at $32. Temporary workers make even less, and temp workers at Stellantis have no clear path to permanent positions. It’s not entirely clear what the tier system will mean as the automakers ramp up EV production.
3. Right to strike plant closures. One fear is that automakers will shut down existing plants and build new ones elsewhere, forcing workers to relocate and disrupt their lives if they want to keep their jobs. For example, earlier this year, Stellantis idled a plant in Illinois, laying off a workforce of 1,350. The company said it made the decision due to the escalating costs to shift to electric vehicle production. Some of the plant’s workers transferred to other plants in other states. Workers also fear the companies will end up building new EV plants in right-to-work states, and doing so under new ownership structures, like the joint-venture battery plants, enabling them to keep the UAW out entirely.
The union contracts typically contain a “no strike, no lockout” clause that bars workers from protesting. So if one of the automakers decides not to “allocate” any new vehicle models to a particular plant, signaling potential closure, workers have no way to fight the decision. This provision would change that. While it’s unclear how effective a strike at a plant slated for closure would be, it could provide a path for them to open negotiations with the company to try and keep it open, or move one of its planned EV models into the plant.
4. Paid community service. Fain has also proposed a “Working Family Protection Program.” This seems more like a veiled threat than a real protection plan for workers. The details are vague, but the union said it's asking that in the event of a plant closure, companies have to pay UAW members to do community service work. In a speech to UAW members this week, Fain described it as a way to “disincentivize the Big Three from killing jobs.”
This one’s a bit murky. UAW leadership has made it clear it wants jobs at the Big Three’s joint venture battery plants to be union positions. But the UAW leadership hasn’t said publicly whether rolling joint-venture plant workers into the master contract is one of its demands in the negotiations. And it’s not even clear the union can use a joint venture as a bargaining chip in its current talks, as The American Prospect reports.
The automakers have already tried to quash the notion earlier this summer in negotiations between UAW and the Ultium Cells plant in Lordstown, Ohio, which is owned by GM and LG Energy Solutions, a South Korean company. In August, the union reached an interim agreement with Ultium, winning $3 to $4 raises and thousands more in backpay for workers. But the company has resisted the union’s calls to roll plant workers into the national GM contract, insisting it “is a separate legal entity and independent employer from GM or LGES.”
Art Wheaton, director of Labor Studies at Cornell University, told me one thing the automakers could do is agree to a non-compete clause, or pledge neutrality at the joint-venture plants, so that workers could more easily organize and vote to join UAW.
We don’t know what other transition-related provisions the union may have proposed, like job training guarantees. Ultimately, its EV wins could look more like new plant investment announcements than broader protections for workers in the transition.
For example, going into the last UAW strike in 2019, GM had four “unallocated” plants that were likely to close. But the union negotiated with GM to save one of the plants — the Detroit-Hamtramck assembly factory. The final contract contained a promise from GM to invest $3 billion to retool it for electric truck and van assembly. In 2021, the plant reopened as Factory ZERO, the company’s first dedicated EV assembly plant, and began producing the 2022 GMC Hummer EV Pickup.
It should be noted that the Big Three are not Fain’s only target. The union boss has also withheld his support for Biden’s re-election, putting pressure on the administration to do more to support organized labor.
We’re unlikely to see a big spending package like the Inflation Reduction Act that could premise subsidies on union labor anytime soon. But Ian Greer, another professor at Cornell’s School of Industrial and Labor Relations, told me there’s a lot more policymakers can do to protect workers. He pointed to a federal program called Trade Adjustment Assistance, which provided aid to workers who lost their jobs, including training opportunities. The program expired in 2022.
“Congress could just reauthorize that, and that would release a lot of resources to support these workers who are going to lose their jobs,” said Greer. “Our institutions create so few tools and levers that unions can use to manage this transition and protect their members. I think this is a really important bit of context about why there's a strike that very few Americans are talking about.”
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The data center boom is everywhere you look in U.S. economic and emissions data.
This is an edition of Heatmap Daily, an evening review of the day’s news written by our executive editor. Sign up for it here.
It isn’t exactly a new thought, but I’ve been struck recently by how many trends in America’s economic and environmental data are fundamentally about the data center boom and the return of electricity demand:
First, the Energy Information Administration reported this week that U.S. emissions grew by more than 2% last year, driven by surging electricity demand and an increase in coal-fired generation. What caused that higher power demand? New factories and data centers — as well as record summertime cooling demand.
Second, many of the new factories driving that higher power demand are themselves producing goods that are … let’s say … data center-adjacent. There are the enormous new semiconductor fabs, of course. But Ford and General Motors have also set up new production lines (or repurposed old ones) to manufacture grid-scale batteries to meet power demand.
Third, take a look at the recent U.S. spending on private non-residential construction — in other words, everything American companies are building that is not houses, condos, or apartments.
The construction industry’s spent almost $60 billion on data centers over the past year, which is more than it spent on all other office buildings combined (and more than it spent building warehouses, too). Just a handful of categories — data centers, power plants, electricity infrastructure, and certain kinds of electronics manufacturing — now make up a third of all U.S. private non-residential construction investment. They’ve never made up such a large share of construction spending since data collection began in 2014.
As The New York Times recently noted, the American economy is unusually dependent on the American stock market right now — and the stock market is unusually dependent on artificial intelligence. This week, investors started to balk at the enormous spending hyperscalers are planning to keep building out the AI boom; Alphabet’s shares dropped 8% this week after it boosted its planned 2026 capital expenditure and signaled 2027 will be even bigger. If the data center boom started to slow down in earnest, then more than just that budget will change.
Speaking of which, my colleague Emily Pontecorvo wrote earlier this week about how many businesses are struggling to even estimate their carbon emissions from artificial intelligence. The carbon accounting startup Watershed recently unveiled a new formula to help companies get a sense of their AI-related emissions.
But even that formula is still limited by the amount of data hyperscalers publish — and they don’t publish that much. Google, for instance, is the only AI company that has (laudably) provided estimates of its emissions on a per-prompt basis. Yet no company has published its per-token emissions, or how emissions sync up with particular models or regions.
So Emily asked Google: Why aren’t you — or any other model provider — disclosing this kind of data yet?
The tech company didn’t get back to us until after we’d published Emily’s story. But its response was interesting enough that I wanted to quote some of it here.
The problem is “industry consensus,” Cooper Elsworth, a Google spokesperson, told us. “There is currently very little consensus on how to comprehensively and fairly measure the serving environmental impact of generative AI (such as text generation),” he wrote. “Without standardized, ‘apples-to-apples’ frameworks, it is difficult to compare different providers accurately.”
That’s partly because energy use — and emissions data — can vary from site to site and depend on “custom-built hardware, software compilers, and advanced inference techniques.” And he claimed Google doesn’t always have the measurement hardware in place to provide such specific estimates: “Providing precise, repeatable data requires highly advanced measurement infrastructure,” he said. “For example, software-based energy monitoring tools often suffer from sampling biases. For our study, we had to step away from top-down averages and directly measure actual energy at the physical power supply unit (PSU) level across our deployed fleet. Not all providers have the telemetry or data sets required to benchmark their operations at this level of granularity.”
Read Emily’s story to understand the other reasons why estimating — or even “guesstimating” — AI-related carbon emissions is so challenging.
A conversation with Emma Uridge of the Kansas Health Institute.
This week’s conversation is with Emma Uridge, analyst with the Kansas Health Institute. Uridge spent copious hours analyzing state and local laws on data center development to best understand how policymakers are responding to the potential environmental public health impacts of large AI infrastructure, including power and water. The report, which came out this week, also goes in depth into those health impacts. I reached out to her to discuss what she sees as must-watch territory for our readers on this emerging policy arena.
Our conversation was lightly edited for clarity.
What is actually being done on policy when it comes to data centers — beyond moratoria of course?
So first I’d like to just talk about the point of moratoria. It’s helpful to talk about how these policies emerge in the first place. One area where moratoria are helpful is when a data center is proposed but the county has no approach for how they’d like to potentially regulate them. That’s temporary, most of the time. It lets local governments conduct research on the various impacts and also negotiate community benefits, ones that can mitigate any potential negative impacts — like Lancaster Pennsylvania, which instituted a community benefit agreement that maximized the potential benefits of development while mitigating what large data centers can do. That agreement looked at capping municipal water use at 20,000 gallons per day and requiring 100% clean energy. It had financial penalties for non-compliance. The company also committed $20 million to their local economic development and clean energy fund. There are ways to negotiate with developers.
We also see amendments to existing zoning. Data center proposals are increasingly popping up in rural areas, many of which are unzoned, so there’s no way a county can negotiate unless there’s a moratorium in place.
Other policy solutions include different performance standards or requiring on-site renewable energy, like what Jefferson County, Missouri, looked at. Also setback requirements, mandatory noise buffers, ending by-right zoning.
Where are local governments getting ideas for regulating data centers?
A lot of the technical information comes from developers. That can in cases be seen as a biased source of information. I wouldn’t say there’s a dedicated group providing assistance to local governments when a project is proposed — which is a similar story to wind industry development, where we have only a handful of consultants who provide technical advice. It can be really helpful to get a multi-disciplinary approach to hearing information. It can be helpful to have the utility commission, public health folks, those in academia, as well as the developer.
As of right now, especially in rural areas, local governments have a hard task of balancing pushback while getting the most accurate, evidence-based, neutral information to make decisions. That balance can be contentious.
What is the federal government doing on data center policy? How is the Trump administration approaching it?
A few things there. In the early days, the drive was for AI expansion and to be competitive with foreign adversaries. Now due to the amount of public pushback in red and blue localities and a more cautious approach.
I’m not seeing a lot of actual policy movement at this time.
I know the EPA is looking at the chemicals used in cooling data centers because when that water is cycled through the system, some of it is discharged into the water system, so they’re looking at the Toxic Substances and Control Act for monitoring that.
How much of an impact does this minimal federal role have on industry behavior?
Y’know, this isn’t specific to data centers. This is true for all kinds of large-scale development: there’s a need to require some sort of federal monitoring and regulation.
That’s where I see an emerging role for public health. At the federal level, there could be policy movement towards requiring some sort of environmental monitoring at data centers to make sure they’re operating responsibility. Looking at specific water use relative to water availability and what happens when there’s a time of severe, persistent drought. With air quality too — we’ve seen areas where the grid isn’t as reliable so their diesel generators are kicking on more and affecting air quality for residents.
We’re just not seeing all of that right now. We need corporate disclosure.
What do you see as the most important public health impacts from data center development?
It varies by localities. The most discussed obviously is water usage. One thing I’d note about my conversations with folks enthusiastic around emerging tech is, there are still questions that need to be asked about the capacity of localities to support a data center. Like a small town in Kansas may only be using 40% of their water for their utility needs. If a data center came online, how much of that water goes to the data center?
One area underexplored within the public health discipline is energy poverty and energy security. The ability of a household to meet the needs of everything energy provides in our lives. It’s known we have an aging electric grid but we’re not talking enough about large-scale blackouts when the grid is not sufficient to support some of these new data centers.
Plus more of the week’s big development fights.
1. Laramie County, Wyoming — Meta is fighting the fine it received in the Cheyenne data center water pollution controversy, and the conflict between the tech giant and the city’s small board of public utilities is continuing to spill out into the public.
2. Niagara County, New York — This county just rejected a solar project’s highway work permits in a show of retaliation against the state’s Office of Renewable Energy Siting.
3. Barron County, Wisconsin — The anti-solar protest is the new campaign stop in deep red Wisconsin.
4. Chesapeake, Virginia — A large battery storage project on the Virginia coastline is on the rocks amidst rampant local opposition.
5. Lewis County, West Virginia — West Virginia is now a key battleground in the fight over transmission, as a line spanning all of West Virginia and Maryland — and cutting through Data Center Alley in Virginia — causes compounding consternation.