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As bad as previous drafts of the reconciliation bill have been, this one is worse.

Senate Republicans are in the final stages of passing their budget reconciliation megabill — which suddenly includes a new tax on solar and wind projects that has sent many in the industry into full-blown crisis mode.
The proposed tax was tucked inside the latest text of the Senate reconciliation bill, released late Friday night, and would levy a first-of-its-kind penalty on all solar and wind projects tied to the quantity of materials they source from companies with ties to China or other countries designated as adversaries by the U.S. government. Industry representatives are still processing the legislative language, but some fear it would kick in for certain developers as soon as the date of its enactment. Taken together with other factors both in the bill and not, including permitting timelines and Trump’s tariffs, this tax could indefinitely undermine renewables development in America.
On Saturday, as legislators began to digest the new text, Senator Brian Schatz declared on X not once, not twice, but three times that with the new penalty, this bill would on its own “kill” the U.S. solar energy industry, leading to energy shortages and raising costs across the board. "I promise you,” he wrote, “this bill is worse than you think.”
Senator Sheldon Whitehouse of Rhode Island, a staunch advocate for climate policy, said in a statement to Heatmap that the tax will help China and hurt American families, “all so Republican oil and gas donors can make even bigger profits. This isn’t policy; it’s pay-off.”
Without this new tax, energy companies might’ve quietly swallowed the bitter pill of losing the incentives established in the Inflation Reduction Act. In the weeks since the first version of this legislation was introduced in the House, I’ve interviewed numerous renewables developers, tax attorneys, and cleantech investors, who have emphasized the resilience of the industry given rising energy demand and explained that there would still be many ways for projects currently under development to qualify for the credits before they’d be phased out. The history of renewable energy tax credits in the U.S. is full of of phase-outs and restarts. The industry’s been at least somewhere like this before.
But the withdrawal of incentives is one thing. A targeted federal tax that could increase development costs by up to 20% that is levied over longstanding supply chain relationships that will take not years but rather decades to rebuild is another.
The American Council on Renewable Energy said in a statement that the latest iteration of the bill “effectively takes both wind and solar electric supply off the table, at a time when there is $300 billion of investments underway, and this generation is among the only source of electricity that will help to reduce costs and keep the lights on through the early 2030s.” The North America’s Building Trades Unions issued a statement after the text’s release calling it the “biggest job-killing bill in the history of this county” and adding that that “simply put, it is the equivalent of terminating more than 1,000 Keystone XL pipeline projects.”
“I think it’s impossible to overstate how this new version of the bill makes the House bill look moderate by comparison,” Andrew Reagan, president of Clean Energy 4 America, told me in an exasperated tone over the phone Saturday afternoon. “The hope as I see it is that as the full impact of how devastating this proposal would be for every state in the country comes into play, as this comes to the floor, Senate Republicans who claim to care about this issue come to [Majority Leader John] Thune and ask to amend this.”
The tax would apply to new solar and wind construction and be calculated based on the degree to which a project exceeds statutory limits for materials sourced from “foreign entities of concern,” i.e. Russia, North Korea, Iran, and most especially China. Solar projects would have to pay a 50% tax on the value of the overage, and wind projects would pay 30%.
Here’s a simplified example to illustrate how it would work: Say you are developing a solar project that will begin operating in 2028, and the total cost of all of your material inputs is $100,000. The new law would require that at least 50% of the value of all of your materials come from entities disconnected from Chinese companies and investment (the statutory limit for 2028), but your project is only able to achieve 40%. The extra $10,000 dollars you paid to companies with ties to China would be subject to the 50% solar tax, adding $5,000 to the total cost of your project. And this doesn’t even touch the new expense of capturing and reporting all of this supply chain data for the federal government.
The rules for how developers would actually calculate the value of their various material inputs will be subject to the Treasury’s interpretation and guidance, so it is impossible to determine how harshly this tax would fall on any individual solar or wind energy facility. Even so, Rhodium Group has estimated that it would increase project costs overall by 10% to 20% — a whopping total to eat on top of losing key tax credits.
This penalty for sourcing linked to China dates back to the IRA’s consumer electric vehicle tax credit. As I was first to report years ago for E&E News, Senator Joe Manchin successfully limited the credit’s scope by requiring qualifying cars to be made with an increasing percentage of materials from the U.S. or a country with a free trade agreement and mandating that materials could not come from a foreign entity of concern. This tactic mostly failed to reshore mineral supply chains as quickly Manchin had hoped it would, but it did ensure that relatively few vehicles qualified.
This anti-foreigner approach to energy policy has now been taken up by Republicans in Congress to erode the IRA overall. As my colleagues Emily Pontecorvo and Matthew Zeitlin have explained, the Senate legislation would deny tax credits to companies that have supply chains with any ties to China, which many say would effectively stop them from qualifying for the credits.
This specific policy approach is something I’ve previously dubbed the GOP’s “anti-China trap” for renewable energy. Now, on top of cutting off companies from tax credits, this trap will catch them for failing to reinvent their supply chains overnight with little if any warning. Of course, reshoring these supply chains will also be more difficult because of other provisions in the bill that would erode and eliminate advanced manufacturing tax incentives originally designed to encourage companies to make more of these components at home.
The only silver lining here is that the fight isn’t over. It wouldn’t surprise me to see a senator try to get rid of this tax as the bill moves through the amendment process on the Senate floor.
I expect some sort of intervention here because there appears to be momentum from powerful entities outside of Congress to get rid of this tax. Reviews of this piece of the bill are so bad, it has put the American Clean Power and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce on the same side as pro-fossil “philosopher” Alex Epstein, who is also calling on senators to oppose the tax.
“I just learned about the excise tax and it’s definitely not something I would support,” he posted to X yesterday, adding he’d rather they focus on removing the tax credits instead of creating a new cost. “I stand for energy freedom, always, in every situation,” he added in a separate post defending his opposition.
Elsewhere on X yesterday, Elon Musk spent hours (on his birthday, no less) going after the Senate bill, reposting energy wonks’ rants about the bill and its tax on renewables, including from Jesse Jenkins, the host of Heatmap’s very own Shift Key podcast.
So, okay, but will Musk, Epstein or any of these other critics convince at least one senator to force a successful vote on getting rid of the tax? That’s really the only way it can go away, because it’s very likely the Senate will force the House to pass whatever it passes.
I talked to Jenkins hours after Musk reposted him and filled up his replies. Like the iconoclastic billionaire, he told me he thinks this legislation is worse than anything congressional Republicans had released before it. A big reason for that is indeed the excise tax, a completely new idea that hadn’t been in any other previous draft of the bill or debated in committee, which he sees as a “obviously, deliberatively punitive attack on the wind and solar industry for what appears to be purely ideological reasons.”
“It’s going to kill hundreds of billions of dollars in investment and hundreds of gigawatts of new supply that would otherwise help us meet rapidly growing electricity demand. So, yeah, higher energy prices, less jobs, less investment in American energy production, and less confidence in the American business environment,” Jenkins said. “No one is asking for this.”
Debate on the bill is expected to begin later today, and the amendment process will stretch into Monday morning at least.
Additional reporting by Emily Pontecorvo
Editor’s note: This story has been updated to include a statement from Senator Sheldon Whitehouse.
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The data center boom is everywhere you look in U.S. economic and emissions data.
This is an edition of Heatmap Daily, an evening review of the day’s news written by our executive editor. Sign up for it here.
It isn’t exactly a new thought, but I’ve been struck recently by how many trends in America’s economic and environmental data are fundamentally about the data center boom and the return of electricity demand:
First, the Energy Information Administration reported this week that U.S. emissions grew by more than 2% last year, driven by surging electricity demand and an increase in coal-fired generation. What caused that higher power demand? New factories and data centers — as well as record summertime cooling demand.
Second, many of the new factories driving that higher power demand are themselves producing goods that are … let’s say … data center-adjacent. There are the enormous new semiconductor fabs, of course. But Ford and General Motors have also set up new production lines (or repurposed old ones) to manufacture grid-scale batteries to meet power demand.
Third, take a look at the recent U.S. spending on private non-residential construction — in other words, everything American companies are building that is not houses, condos, or apartments.
The construction industry’s spent almost $60 billion on data centers over the past year, which is more than it spent on all other office buildings combined (and more than it spent building warehouses, too). Just a handful of categories — data centers, power plants, electricity infrastructure, and certain kinds of electronics manufacturing — now make up a third of all U.S. private non-residential construction investment. They’ve never made up such a large share of construction spending since data collection began in 2014.
As The New York Times recently noted, the American economy is unusually dependent on the American stock market right now — and the stock market is unusually dependent on artificial intelligence. This week, investors started to balk at the enormous spending hyperscalers are planning to keep building out the AI boom; Alphabet’s shares dropped 8% this week after it boosted its planned 2026 capital expenditure and signaled 2027 will be even bigger. If the data center boom started to slow down in earnest, then more than just that budget will change.
Speaking of which, my colleague Emily Pontecorvo wrote earlier this week about how many businesses are struggling to even estimate their carbon emissions from artificial intelligence. The carbon accounting startup Watershed recently unveiled a new formula to help companies get a sense of their AI-related emissions.
But even that formula is still limited by the amount of data hyperscalers publish — and they don’t publish that much. Google, for instance, is the only AI company that has (laudably) provided estimates of its emissions on a per-prompt basis. Yet no company has published its per-token emissions, or how emissions sync up with particular models or regions.
So Emily asked Google: Why aren’t you — or any other model provider — disclosing this kind of data yet?
The tech company didn’t get back to us until after we’d published Emily’s story. But its response was interesting enough that I wanted to quote some of it here.
The problem is “industry consensus,” Cooper Elsworth, a Google spokesperson, told us. “There is currently very little consensus on how to comprehensively and fairly measure the serving environmental impact of generative AI (such as text generation),” he wrote. “Without standardized, ‘apples-to-apples’ frameworks, it is difficult to compare different providers accurately.”
That’s partly because energy use — and emissions data — can vary from site to site and depend on “custom-built hardware, software compilers, and advanced inference techniques.” And he claimed Google doesn’t always have the measurement hardware in place to provide such specific estimates: “Providing precise, repeatable data requires highly advanced measurement infrastructure,” he said. “For example, software-based energy monitoring tools often suffer from sampling biases. For our study, we had to step away from top-down averages and directly measure actual energy at the physical power supply unit (PSU) level across our deployed fleet. Not all providers have the telemetry or data sets required to benchmark their operations at this level of granularity.”
Read Emily’s story to understand the other reasons why estimating — or even “guesstimating” — AI-related carbon emissions is so challenging.
A conversation with Emma Uridge of the Kansas Health Institute.
This week’s conversation is with Emma Uridge, analyst with the Kansas Health Institute. Uridge spent copious hours analyzing state and local laws on data center development to best understand how policymakers are responding to the potential environmental public health impacts of large AI infrastructure, including power and water. The report, which came out this week, also goes in depth into those health impacts. I reached out to her to discuss what she sees as must-watch territory for our readers on this emerging policy arena.
Our conversation was lightly edited for clarity.
What is actually being done on policy when it comes to data centers — beyond moratoria of course?
So first I’d like to just talk about the point of moratoria. It’s helpful to talk about how these policies emerge in the first place. One area where moratoria are helpful is when a data center is proposed but the county has no approach for how they’d like to potentially regulate them. That’s temporary, most of the time. It lets local governments conduct research on the various impacts and also negotiate community benefits, ones that can mitigate any potential negative impacts — like Lancaster Pennsylvania, which instituted a community benefit agreement that maximized the potential benefits of development while mitigating what large data centers can do. That agreement looked at capping municipal water use at 20,000 gallons per day and requiring 100% clean energy. It had financial penalties for non-compliance. The company also committed $20 million to their local economic development and clean energy fund. There are ways to negotiate with developers.
We also see amendments to existing zoning. Data center proposals are increasingly popping up in rural areas, many of which are unzoned, so there’s no way a county can negotiate unless there’s a moratorium in place.
Other policy solutions include different performance standards or requiring on-site renewable energy, like what Jefferson County, Missouri, looked at. Also setback requirements, mandatory noise buffers, ending by-right zoning.
Where are local governments getting ideas for regulating data centers?
A lot of the technical information comes from developers. That can in cases be seen as a biased source of information. I wouldn’t say there’s a dedicated group providing assistance to local governments when a project is proposed — which is a similar story to wind industry development, where we have only a handful of consultants who provide technical advice. It can be really helpful to get a multi-disciplinary approach to hearing information. It can be helpful to have the utility commission, public health folks, those in academia, as well as the developer.
As of right now, especially in rural areas, local governments have a hard task of balancing pushback while getting the most accurate, evidence-based, neutral information to make decisions. That balance can be contentious.
What is the federal government doing on data center policy? How is the Trump administration approaching it?
A few things there. In the early days, the drive was for AI expansion and to be competitive with foreign adversaries. Now due to the amount of public pushback in red and blue localities and a more cautious approach.
I’m not seeing a lot of actual policy movement at this time.
I know the EPA is looking at the chemicals used in cooling data centers because when that water is cycled through the system, some of it is discharged into the water system, so they’re looking at the Toxic Substances and Control Act for monitoring that.
How much of an impact does this minimal federal role have on industry behavior?
Y’know, this isn’t specific to data centers. This is true for all kinds of large-scale development: there’s a need to require some sort of federal monitoring and regulation.
That’s where I see an emerging role for public health. At the federal level, there could be policy movement towards requiring some sort of environmental monitoring at data centers to make sure they’re operating responsibility. Looking at specific water use relative to water availability and what happens when there’s a time of severe, persistent drought. With air quality too — we’ve seen areas where the grid isn’t as reliable so their diesel generators are kicking on more and affecting air quality for residents.
We’re just not seeing all of that right now. We need corporate disclosure.
What do you see as the most important public health impacts from data center development?
It varies by localities. The most discussed obviously is water usage. One thing I’d note about my conversations with folks enthusiastic around emerging tech is, there are still questions that need to be asked about the capacity of localities to support a data center. Like a small town in Kansas may only be using 40% of their water for their utility needs. If a data center came online, how much of that water goes to the data center?
One area underexplored within the public health discipline is energy poverty and energy security. The ability of a household to meet the needs of everything energy provides in our lives. It’s known we have an aging electric grid but we’re not talking enough about large-scale blackouts when the grid is not sufficient to support some of these new data centers.
Plus more of the week’s big development fights.
1. Laramie County, Wyoming — Meta is fighting the fine it received in the Cheyenne data center water pollution controversy, and the conflict between the tech giant and the city’s small board of public utilities is continuing to spill out into the public.
2. Niagara County, New York — This county just rejected a solar project’s highway work permits in a show of retaliation against the state’s Office of Renewable Energy Siting.
3. Barron County, Wisconsin — The anti-solar protest is the new campaign stop in deep red Wisconsin.
4. Chesapeake, Virginia — A large battery storage project on the Virginia coastline is on the rocks amidst rampant local opposition.
5. Lewis County, West Virginia — West Virginia is now a key battleground in the fight over transmission, as a line spanning all of West Virginia and Maryland — and cutting through Data Center Alley in Virginia — causes compounding consternation.