Many climate advocates are revolting against Senator Joe Manchin’s permitting deal over its oil and gas industry giveaways. But not all of them. Among the climate wonk set, there’s a growing chorus that supports the bill and says the fossil fuel language is a pill worth swallowing.
The almost-retired West Virginia senator’s bill — which was voted out of committee yesterday with a bipartisan 15-4 vote — would grease the skids for approving new transmission and renewables projects in plenty of ways. It would also strengthen fossil fuel leasing mandates and, in the activists’ view, hinder efforts to wind down permitting for liquified natural gas export terminals.
Little analysis of this specific bill’s climate impacts has been made public, and any modeling would be highly variable. Yet clearly lawmakers have seen at least some research: During the hearing on the permitting bill, Democratic Senator Martin Heinrich claimed the oil and gas provisions would “likely increase emissions on a scale of less than” 160 million tons of CO2, while other parts of the bill would reduce emissions by 2 to 3 billion tons of CO2, he said.
Academics and consultants I spoke with agree with Heinrich’s take: The positive climate impacts of the pieces hastening permits crucial to the energy transition may easily outweigh the carbon dioxide and methane emissions impacts of the fossil fuel language. As I began to unpack the various points of view and the disparity between climate wonks and the many activists opposed to the bill, it became clear to me that the fissures between these two camps speak to a broad challenge facing the energy transition. Bipartisan compromise on climate change through the U.S. government’s system almost by necessity requires capitulation to fossil fuels, which violates the principles of many grassroots activists.
“Truth is, the U.S. is not ready to talk about seriously scaling down oil and gas production,” Noah Gordon, acting co-director for sustainability, climate, and geopolitics at the Carnegie Endowment for World Peace, told me via email. (Gordon said he “supports the bill despite reservations.”)
“The only way to make that conversation possible is to massively boost clean energy and change the balance of political power,” Gordon said. “In 2024, this is feasible only through all-energy-is-welcome bills like Manchin-Barrasso. On a more level playing field, clean energy will prove its superiority.”
How bad can it be?
Take the language on LNG. Yes, it would alter the course of an effort led by youth climate campaigners under the Biden administration to curtail approvals for pending LNG export terminals, which could have clear downsides for the communities surrounding these projects. But on a global scale, as my colleague Matthew Zeitlin has written, the climate impacts of American LNG really depend on where it’s going and what it’s used for. To make matters slightly more opaque, some environmentalists who claim the climate impacts of LNG exports would be catastrophic are referencing science that has yet to be peer-reviewed and is still disputed, as Zeitlin noted.
Or take the bill’s language on coal. If enacted, the legislation would require the government to adhere to strict deadlines on processing applications to lease coal — but it wouldn’t force the government to decide one way or the other on those applications. According to Jenny Harbine, an attorney for Earthjustice (which is opposed to the permitting bill), this language would not impact the Biden administration’s efforts to wind down coal leasing in the Powder River Basin, the nation’s most active coal mining region.
“This bill doesn’t appear to change that decision,” Harbine told me yesterday. “It appears to leave largely discretion in the hands of the Secretary to not lease.”
All of this is not to say that the climate wonks who support the bill enjoy the fossil fuel language — they’re quite sympathetic to the opposition’s rationale. But they also don’t think it’ll be the end of the world; meanwhile, the current permitting regime is just not cutting it. Sources pointed me to a study from the consultancy Evolved Energy Research, which found that about half the potential emissions reductions from the Inflation Reduction Act are essentially dependent on faster deployment and siting of renewables and interregional transmission.
“In terms of overall leverage on climate, the growth of domestic clean sources enabled by transmission really outweighs everything else,” Rob Gramlich, president of Grid Strategies LLC, told me. “All of it is additional, whereas the fossil supply here is displacing fossil supply elsewhere, so a one-for-one deal … is a net carbon benefit because of that dynamic.”
Princeton professor and energy systems expert Jesse Jenkins (who is also a co-host of Heatmap’s Shift Key podcast) told me the same. Curbing oil and gas leasing on federal land would also not necessarily lower supply, as such drilling may just move to non-federal lands or other countries. Without addressing demand, there’s always the risk that leasing restrictions fail to substantially lower CO2 emissions. Jenkins nodded to a Resources for the Future study that quantified emissions from oil and gas leasing and found even a ban on new oil and gas leasing “would not on its own achieve net-zero emissions from oil and gas on federal lands by 2040,” stating much more action would be necessary — such as carbon sequestration, modifications to existing leases, and other measures.
“We can’t choke off the world’s supply for fossil fuels, but we can beat it with cheaper, better clean energy technologies,” he said.
The problem with ‘more of everything’
Ultimately, the Manchin permitting deal — which may or may not become law any time soon — could reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions over time, if the studies and charts are to be believed. That would be a great thing for the planet. But that’s not really why so many climate activists are against the bill. These people see the end of the petroleum sector as the paramount goal and refuse to settle for legislation that enshrines future fossil fuel production into law, even if the benefits to renewable energy deployment may be greater.
There are key differences between the kind of deal renewable energy developers and decarbonization-focused academics would enjoy and legislation that activists will accept, Tony Dutzik, associate director and senior policy analyst with the think tank Frontier Group, explained to me. Dutzik told me he works with environmental non-profits who are against the bill. “I’ve known so many people over the years, and the thing they wanted to do is to be on the front end of the clean energy transition, and dedicate their lives to that for very good reasons … But if you are a trade group or developer that is working on clean energy, that piece of the puzzle is your focus.”
Dutzik compared the IRA and the permitting legislation to longstanding environmental statutes like the Clean Air Act, which acted as a boundary on the market to reduce pollution. “Capitalism mobilizes an incredible amount of resources and can move incredibly quickly when it is given the incentives to do so,” he said, “but the thing that it hasn’t done is to set that boundary or that standard.”
It’s clear to me from my conversations with climate activists that there’s a lingering frustration about the American pro-market approach to climate. The IRA, for example, did very little to penalize fossil fuel production or greenhouse gas emissions at all — it took an all-carrot, no-stick approach to industrial policy. Something resembling a carbon tax is nowhere close to happening, unless you count the nascent bid to enact a carbon border adjustment mechanism. And regulatory efforts to clamp down on greenhouse gasses are getting stymied by courts.
“Essentially, what you wind up with — and this will be the core of the disagreement,” Dutzik said, “is you wind up with more of everything. And if you wind up with more of everything, that may get you more clean energy, but it doesn’t necessarily solve the climate problem, and it certainly doesn’t solve the problems that are experienced by people who live near fossil fuel production, transportation and consumption. And it doesn’t necessarily get at the relationship between fossil fuels and the natural world.”
Jenkins noted similar divisions occurred with the IRA, which had its own capitulations to fossil fuel.
“There’s a chunk of the climate campaigning groups [who believes] we win by raising the cost of permitting and transactions, and legal suits, and choking off supplies of fossil fuels. There’s another group of people — the people who helped get the IRA passed — who believe we win by displacing fossil fuels.”
In Jenkins’ view, the old way of curtailing fossil energy by choking off supplies may not really apply to a post-IRA world. Before the IRA, it made more sense to invest in “dirty energy” than clean energy, when now “the opposite is true.” This “tips the calculus of how you view this process from a climate perspective.” And it may be better to compromise and quicken new renewable energy deployment in the hopes it further diminishes interest in fossil fuel leasing.
“This is at the heart of it. I don’t think there’s any way we can create a legal regime that doesn’t apply something like parity across [all] different kinds of energy infrastructure,” Jenkins said. “You’re not going to get that in a bipartisan bill.”
EIA