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Here’s a grim fact: The most destructive fires in recent American history swept over a state with the country’s strictest wildfire-specific building code, including in some of the neighborhoods that are now largely smoldering rubble.
California’s wildfire building code, Chapter 7A, went into effect in 2008, and it mandates fire-resistant siding, tempered glass, vegetation management, and vents for attics and crawlspaces designed to resist embers and flames. The code is the “most robust” in the nation, Lisa Dale, a lecturer at the Columbia Climate School and a former environmental policy advisor for the State of Colorado, told me. It applies to nearly any newly built structure in one of the zones mapped out by state and local officials as especially prone to fire hazard.
The adoption of 7A followed years of code development and mapping of hazardous areas, largely in response to devastating urban wildfires such as the Tunnel Fire, which claimed more than 3,000 structures and 25 lives in Oakland and Berkeley in 1991, and kicked off renewed efforts to harden Californian homes.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s report on the 1991 fire makes for familiar reading as the Palisades and Eaton fires still smolder. The wildland-urban interface, it says, was put at extreme risk by a combination of dry air, little rainfall, hot winds blowing east to west, built-up vegetation that was too close to homes, steep hills, and limited access to municipal water. The report also castigates the “unregulated use of wood shingles as roof and siding material.”
This was not the first time a destructive fire on the wildland-urban interface had been partially attributed to ignitable building materials. The 1961 Bel-Air fire, for instance, which claimed almost 200 homes, including that of Burt Lancaster, and the 1959 Laurel Canyon fire were both, FEMA said, evidence of “the wood roof and separation from natural fuels problems,” as were fires in 1970 and 1980 near where the Tunnel Fire eventually struck in 1970 and 1980.
But it was the sheer scale of the Tunnel Fire that prompted action by California lawmakers.
Throughout the 1990s, fire-resilient roofing requirements were ramped up, designating which materials were allowed in fire hazard areas and throughout the state. By all accounts, the building code works — but only when and where it’s in force. Dale told me that compliant homes were five times as likely to survive a wildfire. Research by economists Judson Boomhower and Patrick Baylis found that the code “reduced average structure loss risk during a wildfire by 16 percentage points, or about a 40% reduction.”
“The challenge from the perspective of wildfire vulnerability is that those codes are relatively recent, and the housing stock turns over really slowly, so we have this enormous stock of already built homes in dangerous places that are going to be out there for decades,” Boomhower told me.
The 7A building code applies only to new buildings, however. In long-settled areas of California like Pacific Palisades, which has little new housing construction or even existing home turnover due to high costs and permitting complications, especially in areas under the jurisdiction of the California Coastal Commission, many houses are not just failing to comply with Chapter 7A, but also with any housing code at all.
Looking at which homes had survived past fires, Steve Quarles, who helped advise the California State Fire Marshal on developing 7A, told me, “What really mattered was if it was built under any building code.” Many homes destroyed by the fires in Los Angeles likely were not. In Pacific Palisades, fire management is a frequent topic of concern and discussion. But as late as 2018, local media in Pacific Palisades noted that the area still had some homes with wood shingle roofs.
While a complete inventory of homes lost in the Palisades and Eaton fires has yet to be taken, the neighborhoods were full of older homes. According to CalFire incident reports, of the almost 47,000 structures in the zone of the Palisades Fire, more than 8,000 were built before 1939, and 44,560 were built before 2009. For the Eaton Fire area, of the around 41,000 structures, almost 14,000 were built before 1939, and only around 1,000 were built since 2010.
A Pacific Palisades home designed by architect Greg Chasen and built in 2024, however, survived the fire and went viral on X after he posted a photo of it still standing after the flames had moved through. The home embodied some of the best practices for fire-safe building, according to Bloomberg, including keeping vegetation away from the building, a metal roof, tempered glass, and fire-resistant siding.
When Michael Wara, the director of Stanford University’s Climate and Energy Policy Program, spoke with firefighters and insurance industry officials in the process of drafting a 2021 report for the Stanford Woods Institute for the Environment on strategies for mitigating wildfire risk, they told him that, from their perspective, wildfires are often a matter of “home ignition,” meaning that while building near forested areas puts any home at risk, the risk of a home itself igniting varies based on how it’s built and the vegetation clearance around it. “Existing homes in high fire threat areas” built before the implementation of California’s wildfire building codes, Wara wrote, “are a massive problem.” At the time he published the paper, there were somewhere between 700,000 and 1.3 million pre-building code homes still standing in “high or very high threat areas.”
The flipside of focusing on “home ignition” and the building code is that the building code works better over time, as more and more homes comply with it thanks to normal turnover, people extensively renovating, or even tearing down old homes — or rebuilding after fires. Homes that are close to homes that don’t ignite in a fire are more likely to survive.
One study that looked at the 2018 Camp Fire, which destroyed more than 18,000 structures and claimed more than 80 lives in the Northern California town of Paradise, sampled homes built before 1997, between 1997 and 2018, and from 2018 onwards, and found that only 11.5% of pre-1997 homes survived, compared to 38.5% from 1997 and after. The researchers also found that building survivability had a kind of magnifying effect, with distance from the nearest destroyed structure and the number structures destroyed in the immediate area among “the strongest predictors of survival.”
“The more homes that comply, the less chance you get those structural ignitions and the less chance you get those huge disasters like this,” Doug Green, who manages Headwaters Economics’ Community Assistance for Wildfire Program, told me. “It takes people doing the right thing to their own home — dealing with vegetation, making sure roofs are clean, having right roofing. It’s really a community-wide strategy to stop fires that happen like this.”
But just as any home hardening — or just building to code — is more effective the more the homes around you do it as well, it’s just as true in reverse. “If your next door neighbors don’t do that work, the effectiveness of your efforts will be less,” Dale said. “Building codes ultimately work best when we get an entire landscape or neighborhood to adopt them.”
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Current conditions: Japan is bracing for two major storms as Typhoon Nolo and the newly formed Typhoon Koguma barrel toward the country • A brief heat wave in Chicago is driving temperatures up past 85 degrees Fahrenheit today • It’s a sunny day in San Salvador Island, where the Genoan explorer Christopher Columbus first set foot in the Americas exactly 534 years ago today, when the indigenous Lucayan people called the smallest inhabited part of the Bahamas “Guanahani.”
In the Gulf of Mexico, Hurricane Isaias plunged thousands along the Alabama and Florida coastlines into darkness and left at least four dead. In the Pacific off Southern California, Tropical Storm Rachel stirred a surf that badly battered Long Beach’s iconic boardwalk. Further south in the eastern Pacific, Hurricane Simon pounded Mexico’s west coast as a Category 4 storm with sustained winds topping 150 miles per hour. Isaias, the only one of the tempête a trois in the Atlantic, forced nearly two-thirds of U.S. oil and gas production in the Gulf offline, as I told you last week.
The storm threatened to put further pressure on the fuel market as refineries went on pause. But in a post on his Truth Social platform Friday, President Donald Trump announced a surprise deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin to lift Moscow’s restrictions on diesel exports and release nearly 2 million tons of the fuel onto the market. “This is a very big and important announcement,” he wrote. On Sunday, the U.S. president posted another update that, “effectively immediate, there is an ENERGY CEASEFIRE” in the war between Russia and Ukraine, insisting “both parties have agreed.” Whether that holds longer than the last so-called energy ceasefire Trump claimed to have brokered between the two sides remains to be seen. Either way, it didn’t stop the Houthis from twice striking the main airport in Riyadh over the weekend, killing at least a dozen and injuring hundreds amid an oil industry summit in the Saudi capital, the Saudi Arabia-based Arab News reported.
Representative Jared Huffman, a progressive climate hawk from California, wants you to know that he sees your breathless defenses of the bipartisan permitting reform bill and considers them a red flag. “It’s going to be very interesting for everyone to take stock after this election and think about what it means,” he told my colleague Jael Holzman in an interview we published this morning. “I was immediately attacked by right-wing Twitter and some of the boosters of this deal for simply saying, let’s see how this election goes. To me, that’s common sense! And no one is going to vote on this until after the election, anyway! The hypersensitivity tells you something.”
When Jael asked what, exactly, it tells him, he responded: “There’s this choreographed attempt to preemptively flood the zone and prevent any kind of serious scrutiny about this. I think it should be a red flag for my colleagues and serious policymakers to have an attempt to shut down serious scrutiny and debate, or pretend there’ll never be another deal and this one can never be improved, and that it’s now or never or nothing. That’s just fishy and not intellectually honest.”
After construction, automakers buy the most steel of any industry. That makes car companies key factors in how eagerly steelmakers decarbonize. In January, research by the climate advocacy group Mighty Earth concluded that roughly 60% of primary steel made in the U.S. went to automakers who had promised to support greener steel but remained top customers for the metal made from coal-fired blast furnaces. Now the group is out with a new analysis on the European Union, shared exclusively with me for this newsletter, that traced purchases of coal from blast furnaces in France, Spain, Germany, and Italy to vehicles made by Ford, General Motors, Honda, Stellantis, Tata Motors, Toyota, and Volkswagen.
“We always talk about how Europe is leading the charge on green steel, which is true,” Matthew Groch, the senior director of decarbonization at Mighty Earth, told me. “But when you are looking at where these auto companies are being ranked, Europe is still falling behind.” The report proved more challenging than the U.S.-based research given that, in the EU, “it’s a little tougher because, with the common market, they don’t track the actual shipments like we were able to do with anything coming into the U.S.” Still, he said, the team was able to track the commercial relationships through things such as awards given out for “supplier of the year.” What the report ultimately suggests is that advocates of greener steel should seek to pressure shareholders in major automakers on both sides of the Atlantic to clean up their supply chains to spur more demand for lower-carbon materials.
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Long one of the world’s top producers of uranium, Kazakhstan faced a choice with major geopolitical implications earlier this year when the Central Asian giant selected bids to build its first nuclear power station. Astana split the difference between its two powerful neighbors, inking a deal for a Chinese nuclear plant in February and another for a Russian atomic power station in March. The shareholders of the state-owned Kazatomprom, Kazakhstan’s state nuclear and uranium company, are proving less diplomatic. The firm’s stockholders voted by nearly 89% to approve a deal to supply uranium to China’s State Nuclear Uranium Resource Development Company, according to an official tally on Kazatomprom’s website. At the same general meeting, which NucNet called “extraordinary,” a deal to supply Russia’s Uranium One died with roughly 88% abstaining.
Kazakhstan has drawn unprecedented distance between itself and Moscow since the start of the Ukraine war, which Astana refused to back even though the Kremlin had helped quell domestic unrest in its Central Asian neighbor just weeks before the 2022 invasion. Beyond increased investment from China, Kazakhstan has attracted more interest from the United States, as critical mineral prospectors such as Cove Capital look to expand across the region.
China ramped up investments in hydrogen and its derivative products, such as green methanol and ammonia, late last year when the central government opened its budget for the first time to directly subsidizing an industry hitherto left to the provinces. The timing proved prescient as the Iran War put the squeeze on China’s crude imports and further accelerated the shift toward more domestic electricity-based resources. Two stories over the weekend show just how swiftly progress is underway. On Friday, Hydrogen Insight reported that the world’s first green ammonia-powered dry bulk vessel had set sail on its maiden voyage from a shipyard in China to Australia. Then, on Sunday, China Hydrogen Bulletin, a newsletter written by analyst Jian Wu, highlighted that China’s first long-distance pipeline dedicated to green hydrogen was approaching its first trial run.

In markets with a lot of wind and solar, there tends to be a lot of gas to serve as backup and keep the lights on when the weather can’t. But batteries are rapidly getting cheaper. Four-hour battery storage is now less expensive than open-cycle gas turbines in all 43 markets where both technologies were modeled, according to a new Wood Mackenzie analysis published last week. “This economic shift is decisive and widening,” Ahmed Jameel Abdullah, principal analyst at Wood Mackenzie, said in a statement. “Gas turbine shortages and rising fuel volatility are driving up peaking costs, while expanding battery manufacturing continues to push storage costs down.” A word of caution: The report is comparing levelized cost of energy, a metric that — while popular — has some real problems, as my colleague Matthew Zeitlin wrote last year.
The California Democrat and current ranking member of the House Natural Resources Committee is suspicious of all the “now or never.”
The most important voice in Congress criticizing the Senate’s bipartisan energy permitting deal is Representative Jared Huffman.
A California Democrat who previously worked in environmental legal advocacy, Huffman has long been among the most impassioned lawmakers on climate issues. Under the first Trump administration, his voice was often the loudest calling for oversight and accountability on energy and climate policy. Under the second Trump administration, he has been a spirited defender of offshore wind.
Should Democrats take control of the U.S. House of Representatives in the coming midterm elections, as expected, then Huffman is first in line to become chair of the lower chamber’s Natural Resources Committee. This makes him one of the few people able to armchair quarterback permitting talks in Congress right now.
The proposed legislation currently on the table, known as the Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act, or BAAJA, would fundamentally reshape how federal project permitting happens. It would constrain National Environmental Policy Act reviews. It would radically alter transmission approvals. It would let companies sue the government for damages if they can show that an agency was unduly discriminating against them based on fuel type. It would limit state and tribal authority to object against projects under the Clean Water Act. And it would make this whole process more transparent by instituting digital reporting requirements.
Huffman thinks it also gives too much benefit to oil and gas interests, and is an unnecessary capitulation to fossil-friendly Republicans who will likely lose power in this November’s midterm elections, anyway. He wants Democratic lawmakers to wait until after election day to consider what they do with the bill.
I reported on Congress for years and often spoke with Huffman in the Capitol hallways; he knew me on a first-name basis. So last week, when a friend pointed me to a tweet of his criticizing the Senate bill by quoting my writing, I took note. His issue concerned the discrimination provision in the bill, which sets a rolling five-year average for approvals as a baseline for what constitutes normal regulatory behavior. Successful lawsuits under this provision would be paid out of the Judgment Fund, a Justice Department account Trump has used for his offshore wind developer buyouts.
This part of the bill, Huffman wrote, “might pay some clean energy developers money from the judgment fund when they are screwed, but nothing to actually approve their projects. This is potentially a replay of the fake settlements that have bought out offshore wind projects,” he added.
I reached out to Huffman’s team and asked to talk about what he meant by that. What followed was a 20-plus-minute back-and-forth about the future of permitting reform in the U.S. and what may happen after a midterm election defined by public anger over a rush to build another type of large-scale infrastructure: data centers.
The following transcript has been lightly edited for clarity.
So let’s start with your tweet. You quoted a portion of our story about BAAJA that I had written about the “permitting certainty” provisions in the bill, and specifically the fact that developers could be awarded damages under the bill for discriminatory treatment. Could you elaborate on your point?
I don’t want to get too deep into the weeds, but this is the big thing being offered as an end to the war on clean energy, which was always the threshold matter before you get to a bipartisan permitting deal.
It is built on this framework, basically, of cutting checks from the judgment fund. And I believe that requires some close scrutiny and consideration because we have seen this gamed already to the tune of $4 billion to buy out offshore wind developers.
Well I know this can get quite technical, but the underlying point you were making was, this may not be as helpful as people think. I guess I was just wondering if you can you walk me through —
It depends what you want.
If you’re a clean energy developer and you’re worried about your shareholders and your balance sheet, this gives you at least some money when you get screwed. And it may come with some strings attached, like you have to turn around and invest it in [liquified natural gas]. That’s been the playbook from the Trump administration.
If you’re a clean energy CEO — some of them, at least — that helps you mitigate risk. That’s probably better than nothing and will be attractive to some people. But if you care about climate policy [and] whether this is a meaningful assurance of permitting certainty to renewables, I think there’s a lot more to question here.
You also said in your tweet that there’s nothing in the bill to get projects approved. Can you speak to that? Because those who negotiated it clearly say otherwise.
Well, there are shot clocks and all sorts of other things that are designed to speed things up. There’s also broad categories of exemptions — categorical exemptions and other things like that, most of which will benefit fossil fuel projects.
I have no doubt there’s going to be permitting acceleration and certainty for fossil fuel projects. You also have this five-year baseline mechanism being codified here that will further cement a high level of fossil fuel projects for many years to come, and will really operate as a ceiling.
Help me understand what you mean by that, because I’m interested in understanding your concern there.
People are going to want to look at this much more closely and think about how it’ll operate in practice, not just some model. Because in practice, Trump is going to keep doing exactly what he’s done for the last two years. He’s going to find ways not to permit renewables, even if some of them go through this new gauntlet of legal theories and challenges and at the end of the day get a check written to them from the judgment fund.
You make this point about models versus reality. I spent last week trying to understand the implications of the bill for the nation’s buildout of AI data centers and associated energy infrastructure. How do you see that data center conversation weighing on your evaluation of the bill?
It’s part of the context, for sure. It’s driving a lot of this — we have to be honest about that. This is about data centers and pipelines and grid improvements necessary to meet all this surging demand that’s mostly coming from data centers.
That’s not to say we don’t need a more functional and robust grid. We do. Whatever you think about AI and data centers, we do need that. I’m not going to hold up a chance to improve our grid just because I have big concerns about data centers. I am concerned about how all this huge demand for energy in the next few years is going to be met. If we are stacking the deck for fossil fuel to meet a lot of this demand, that is deeply non-responsive to the climate crisis.
In terms of “stacking the deck,” passing the bill or not passing the bill — which reality is a cleaner grid and cleaner buildout of these data centers?
I mean, I would love to give you an absolute answer to that, but it depends. It depends how you assume this is going to play out in practice.
Looking at the conversations around the bill and considerations about federal permitting, as well as the politics, I’m struck by this timeline we’ve found ourselves in. Over the next month, voters will be hearing about data centers, which is something they don’t want in their communities, per polling. They also will be hearing about energy prices, which people want to bring down. Faced with those two different signals, I’m wondering how any kind of lame duck conversation about permitting happens after those two signals land in the ballot box.
It’s going to be very interesting for everyone to take stock after this election and think about what it means.
I was immediately attacked by right-wing Twitter and some of the boosters of this deal for simply saying, let’s see how this election goes. To me, that’s common sense! And no one is going to vote on this until after the election, anyway! The hypersensitivity tells you something.
What does it tell you?
There’s this choreographed attempt to preemptively flood the zone and prevent any kind of serious scrutiny about this.
I think it should be a red flag for my colleagues and serious policymakers to have an attempt to shut down serious scrutiny and debate, or pretend there’ll never be another deal and this one can never be improved, and that it’s now or never or nothing. That’s just fishy and not intellectually honest.
I’m not on the Hill as much anymore, which means I don’t see you as often. But in my many years covering Congress, I can’t tell you how many times I’d ask your late colleague from Arizona, former House Natural Resources Chairman Raul Grijalva, about his conversations with former Senate Energy and Natural Resources Chairman Joe Manchin.
I’m not going to sit here and expect you to read the minds of senators any more than I would expect senators to read the minds of House members. But can you, someone known as a climate champion, speak to how things are going with Senators Sheldon Whitehouse and Martin Heinrich, two people also respected in the climate community, when it comes to your reservations about this legislation?
I mean, it pains me to have a different view of some of this than these two friends of mine I respect enormously. But this may be one of those deals where reasonable minds can differ about tactics, details. That’s what this is coming down to.
I am sure negotiating with the hand they had over the past few months that they did pretty good work. Period. But I am sure with a better hand they and the rest of us could probably get a better deal.
A better deal the president will sign?
Yeah, that’s how it works. Let’s just take the logic of that argument you’re posing, which I hope is a devil’s advocate. Let’s say the president said he’ll agree to this and therefore we have to take the deal. By that reasoning, you should just always do what Trump demands. Always. And I find that absurd.
Any time I hear that kind of reductive reasoning … Has no one been watching Trump his entire life? He’s a bluffer. He’s a threatener. And he changes his mind all of the time.
Yeah I mean, to that effect, we asked Energy Secretary Chris Wright on stage at Climate Week if Trump would publicly post that he will sign off on approving more wind projects, and Wright said we shouldn’t count on that.
I’m very suspicious of the whole thing. There’s so much posturing and choreography going down right now.
They’re going to make it look like they won’t release any hostages, and then they will. It’ll be a very partial release of hostages. It’ll be maybe a dozen or so onshore wind projects that already have all their other approvals and [are] just waiting for the Department of Defense national security hold that is specious to be lifted, even though it’s never going to be held up in court. That’ll be shown as this big breakthrough that lets all this move through at lightspeed.
That’s the charade we’re being walked through right now.
To your point, I checked the court filings this morning, and the Justice Department did just tell the federal court hearing the challenge to the Defense Department that they’re now processing about that number of projects.
But if I can ask you, to that point, I’ve known you almost as long as I’ve been a reporter — almost a decade. I also knew your colleague, the late Raul Grijalva, quite well. I don’t remember a single time when Grijalva was chair of the Natural Resources Committee that he ever supported a bipartisan permitting deal. I remember his opposition to the Barrasso-Manchin bill quite vividly, and a lot of other times that was the case —
Well that might be a difference. I was ready to negotiate improvements in Barrasso-Manchin and try to get to something I could support, in part because I was worried what a Republican Congress and a Trump administration would do if we didn’t try in good faith to get to a deal at that time.
I think we missed an opportunity there. But that was largely because the opportunity was shut down by Republicans. I can’t say what Grijalva would’ve done, but I can say what I would’ve done. I would’ve rolled up my sleeves and tried to get a deal.
Well, I just pulled up a quote from you about that bill, in which you said, “We need to find a way to kill the zombie one more time.”
There was also an opportunity to fix the problematic parts of it.
I guess what I’m asking is, what would you say to people who claim there’s no bipartisan deal in the offing like this bill that you would support? Because any deal like that would obviously have to provide some things to industries like fossil fuels that you don’t want to sign off on.
That’s the problem. If the “deal” has to always get worse, then yeah, that’s a zombie deal we’ve seen time and again, where it’s just the wishlist of the fossil fuel industry or nothing. That is the downward race to the bottom we’ve been on when we talk about permitting reform. But if you want grid improvements, if you want some of the other good provisions in this package — look at the fact I cosponsor Sean Casten and Mike Levin’s bill, [the Energy Bills Relief Act,] to do a lot of these things.
Would you rather that bill is the starting point in the new Congress?
Of course I would. That’s a good transmission bill that doesn’t come with all the other baggage. I’m pointing that out to say I’m not just against things but I’m for things, and you can see that from a longstanding record.
My last question — and I want to ask it because people are raising it — if this bill doesn’t get passed, there are going to be at least some people who point fingers after it fails at the people who stopped it. Those people will say those who stopped it don’t want anything. I know you’re pointing at Levin-Casten and —
No, I know your question, Jael, and I have to run here in just a minute.
If we get to that point and you hear all this whining and recrimination, you know what I will say to those people? Shut up and get in the room and let’s work on a deal. [laughs] I mean honestly it’s just so absurd. If you want permitting reform, you’ve got to be willing to work in a more thoughtful way instead of all these absolutes. This or nothing. Now or never.
I mean, you’ll see. What I can tell you is that you’ll see if we get to that scenario.
Talking with Dan Hartinger, the land conservation group’s senior policy director.
This week’s Q&A is with Dan Hartinger, senior policy director for The Wilderness Society, a prominent land conservation organization in D.C. that this week called for a moratorium on data center development on public land. The public statement was relatively scant on details about the group’s stance, and a decade of reporting on policy in Washington has taught me that its positions are quite influential, especially in more traditional outdoor recreation and conservationist circles that are also often bipartisan. So I reached out and asked if someone could further explain the society’s position, and Dan obliged.
The following chat was lightly edited for clarity.
Let’s start at the beginning. What brought The Wilderness Society to make a call for a moratorium against data centers on public lands?
Like many others, we were concerned about news reporting on industrial-scale data centers being proposed on public lands. When we saw the scale of what was proposed – covering tens of thousands of acres of public lands, being pushed through without public input about whether this was an acceptable use of this land – it became clear we needed to hit the brakes and give the public a chance to evaluate this.
Our mission and vision for The Wilderness Society is not on the broader debate about AI data centers. It’s on public lands. Those are a shared resource we need to manage for the benefit of all Americans. We need to be careful not to sacrifice those for poorly understood impacts from the data center boom.
You called for Congress to do this during the lame duck session. Why call for this now?
We think this is urgently needed now. If we allow public lands to be sacrificed for a data center boom, we could very well never get them back, so we think it’s urgently necessary a moratorium is enacted. We’d love to see the administration institute a moratorium, and we’re rightly skeptical given what boosters they’ve been. It really just kind of leaves it in the hands of Congress.
There’s legislation introduced by Rep. Rashida Tlaib to institute a moratorium on data centers on federal lands, including Interior, Department of Defense, and Energy property. Do you support that bill?
We don’t have any expertise on Department of Energy or Department of Defense lands. I know Sen. Ron Wyden introduced a bill recently to ban data centers on public land managed by the Agriculture and Interior Departments. Our focus right now is on calling for a moratorium. When you’re contemplating a novel industrial use, the public needs time to understand.
Your call doesn’t include the Department of Energy or Defense lands?
We’re not national security experts. We haven’t waded in on whether there are some limited use cases where maybe there’s national security reasons, I guess.
So you want this to happen in a lame duck, when right now the likeliest thing Congress debates is instead building things faster through permitting reform. Does your organization have any stance on the impacts that the permitting reform effort underway in Congress could have regarding data centers on public lands?
We’re still wading through our stance on the [Senate] bill. I don’t know I have much to share on that. We’re concerned about some of the impacts that bill could have on public lands, but there’s also a whole lot of other factors from that bill to weigh.
Talking to folks who are more public about their stances on the bill, and looking at the set of projects even preliminarily underway on federal lands, it’s hard to imagine that changing NEPA and other environmental laws makes things on public lands go slower. I understand you’re still figuring out where you as an organization stand on the bill, but can you speak to the current state of infrastructure development on federal land and changes the administration has made to permitting?
I think through the lens of data centers, narrowly, all of the project reviews and approvals – which is a limited number – have been attempted without additional NEPA analysis. We saw with the Townsite project in Nevada, they tried to claim a solar farm was essentially the same as a data center. There have been authorizations for data centers’ geotechnical surveys approved through categorical exclusions under NEPA.
Certainly, we’re seeing the administration in every single possible opportunity eliminate or shortcut public input and review, and the permitting bill certainly seems to be pointing further in that direction.
The whole rush for speed-to-power over the next few years makes the rest of the Trump administration, should the permitting reform bill become law, feel more important. How does that timing weigh on your organization as you approach the lame duck session? You’re calling for a moratorium on data centers on public lands as we approach a conversation about whether to make it easier to build on federal lands.
That’s why we’re calling for a moratorium eyes open. It’s an uphill push. But if you look at the backlash happening, a lot of it is because the public is concerned these are being pushed forward with very little transparency, or regardless of whether the public supports them, and often done through mechanisms that hide the scale and scope of their impacts. That’s one of the big motivators behind seeking a moratorium. Because this is proceeding so fast, it’s even more essential we pump the brakes and give the public a chance for input.
What do you want to see come after a moratorium? What are the appropriate safeguards? Or do you just not want to see these projects on Interior land?
There are fundamental questions we need answered, including whether the BLM has clear authority to permit and authorize these large projects on public lands. They haven’t answered sufficient questions about that. There’s also the question of the public’s view on this. We don’t want to pre-suppose what the future post moratorium will look like.
There’s just this huge, novel use case, and the public needs to weigh in. If they’re ever given a chance to actually say something, all the polling we’ve seen says the public doesn’t want these on public lands at all. And so, we hope this is also a conversation about what we want for our public lands generally.