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An interview with Dave White, a water expert at Arizona State University, about what a breakthrough along the Colorado River really means

Arizona, California, and Nevada announced a deal on Monday to reduce the amount of Colorado River water they use, ahead of a bigger overhaul planned for 2026. The agreement is crucial, likely keeping the river from reaching dangerously low levels that would have put water supplies for major cities and agricultural regions at risk. But Colorado River water policy is often knotty and confusing, and it can be difficult to wrap one’s head around just what kind of impact deals like this can have.
To that end, I called up Dave White, the director of the Global Institute of Sustainability and Innovation at Arizona State University and chair of the City of Phoenix’s Water/Wastewater Rate Advisory Committee. He explained how things work now, what the deal means, and how he’d like to see things change in the future — particularly in 2026, when the current set of water allocation rules expire and are replaced. Our conversation has been edited for length and clarity.
There are more than 100 years of law policy agreements, which we collectively call the law of the river. But the most relevant is an agreement called the 2007 Interim Operating Guidelines for the Coordinated Operations of Lake Powell and Lake Mead. That’s the long name, but we typically call it the 2007 agreement.
That agreement created a set of rules that, as the name indicates, helped to guide the operations of Lake Powell and Lake Mead. And along with subsequent agreements, particularly the drought contingency plans in 2019, it has guided the management of the reservoir system on the Colorado River and set forth the allocations managing the flow to the lower basin states.
Right now we’re in the time period between when the interim guidelines were established in 2007, updated with drought contingency plans in 2019, and when we’ll hit a deadline for a new set of operating guidelines in 2026. And so all of this is trying to manage the risk from the reduced water supply on the Colorado River and to help reestablish a balance in the supply-demand equation of water in an era of megadrought, climate change, and high agricultural demand and increasing municipal demand.
The first thing that’s important for folks to realize is that this is a proposal. What was announced was essentially an agreement among the lower basin states — California, Nevada and Arizona — to propose a plan to reduce demand in those states. It will need to go through additional steps to identify more specifics, and then this proposal ultimately will need to be adopted by the seven affected states and then endorsed by the Bureau of Reclamation.
What the proposal does is lay out a framework to reduce water demand in the lower basin by about 3 million acre feet. And for context, one acre foot is about 325,000 gallons of water, or the amount of water used by two to four homes in the western United States per year. That reduction would be taken across multiple sectors: agriculture, tribal communities, and some municipal or urban users, most notably the Metropolitan Water District of California, which is the Los Angeles area.
The idea is to reduce demand through voluntary conservation. And then part of the package is compensation for some of that voluntary conservation in the form of funding from the federal government through the Inflation Reduction Act to the tune of about $1.2 billion. That is an absolutely critical part of the of the story: the Inflation Reduction Act has really enabled this breakthrough, because of the federal funding for those voluntary conservation measures.
Another critical part of the story was that recently the Bureau of Reclamation released what’s called a draft environmental impact statement, and it presented a couple of alternatives to the states for consideration. Those proposals gave us kind of a federal government’s perspective on the framework moving forward. It was essentially a classic negotiating tactic, where the Bureau of Reclamation said, “look, you states have yet to reach a consensus agreement, so we’re going to lay out a plan,” and, as is often the case, everybody was unhappy with parts of that plan.
That helped to stimulate additional negotiations and bring California, in particular, more to the table. So it’s a very important moment in time because it represents a turning point in multi-year negotiations between the states. Importantly, it lays out a path forward for a consensus agreement that is driven by the states as opposed to being imposed upon them by the federal government. So, we’re talking about a breakthrough in negotiations that led to a three-state proposal.
Well, that’s what we’re waiting to see. We don’t have all of those details yet.
Legally, the Bureau of Reclamation needs to go through this process, weigh the different alternatives, evaluate it, identify what they would call a preferred alternative, and then ultimately make a determination. But the Bureau of Reclamation has certainly indicated there’s initial support for this proposal and that the funding would be made available.
We don’t know who specifically would receive how much of that funding but we do know that it will be agriculturalists (essentially farmers and ranchers), some municipalities such as the Metropolitan Water District of California, and some Native American communities.
We are still engaged in what I would call incremental adaptation. This is adapting to the rapidly changing conditions that are presented by this 22-year-long drought, the so-called megadrought in the region. We are also adapting to the impacts of climate change. If you go back, you know, the 2007 agreement was an incremental update to deal with a very significant risk of shortage on the Colorado River system in 2000 to 2005. We had the drought contingency planning process in 2019 that was another incremental adaptation at that time that was meant to get us to 2026, when the current guidelines expire. Environmental conditions continue to rapidly change, while the demand side continues to stay high. And while we’ve made a number of efficiency gains and voluntary reductions, the river is simply over-allocated for the flow that we have seen, especially since the turn of the millennium.
So we’ve been engaging in a series of incremental adaptations. Now, there’s nothing wrong with that. That’s a very smart strategy as you move along, right? You’re incrementally adapting your policy to reflect the changing environmental and social conditions. This is another important incremental adaptation that will hopefully allow us to keep working towards the 2026 guidelines.
What I and many others argue is that we need a more transformative adaptation, we need a more significant restructuring. Now, it’s difficult to do that right now in the midst of a very short-term risk. But eventually, between now and 2026, we need to address some of the structural imbalance, or deficit, in the river. We have over-allocated the river in this era of increasing drought and climate change.
We’ve got to restructure the demand over the course of the next several years, and that’s going to require more transformational kinds of changes. But I also want to point out that’s not limited to reducing demand, right? You can do that through dramatic increases in efficiency. We can produce the same units of product, whether that be food or microchips or homes or businesses, with significantly less water.
The most effective strategy is efficiency. It’s the cheapest. It does not require significantly new infrastructure or new water augmentation. And there are lots of good stories out there, in creating more efficiencies and creating more flexible policies and more adaptability within the way that we manage water. We’ve got to sort of wring every cool new approach we can out of the system.
One that I think is really important is that the city of Phoenix and several of its regional partners in central Arizona are in the planning stages of moving towards an advanced water-purification process. What that means is it would allow the cities to pool their wastewater resources, their effluent, and then be able to treat that water through advanced water purification so we can reuse that water for municipal use. We call that direct, potable reuse of the water.
Central Arizona is incredibly efficient, we reuse about 90% of all the wastewater that we produce in the central Arizona region for power production, for urban irrigation, for agriculture, etc. But we can actually reuse that water to support households and businesses. We can then use that water again. Some of it is consumed by people, but basically cycling the water through the city as many times as possible reduces the need for new raw water.
So the current proposal that’s in the process of being developed by the City of Phoenix Water Services Department is for advanced water purification that, according to the current estimates, would produce about 60,000 gallons of water a day for City of Phoenix residents from wastewater. And so, that’s one way we can be much more efficient in recycling and reusing our water.
I do think it gets to the need for greater public understanding and then, you know, individual and collective action. In single family residential households, for example, 50% or more, on average, of the water use is outside the home for things like residential landscaping and swimming pools. In the Phoenix area, we’ve seen a really significant trend in reducing water demand inside single family homes, thanks to technologies like low water-use toilets and more efficient washing machines and dishwashers and so on. The next frontier is getting more progressive with the way we manage residential landscaping water. And that's something that every individual household can do.
The Southern Nevada Water Authority, the Las Vegas Regional Authority, has been really at the forefront of these kinds of strategies with turf buyback programs, incentivizing homeowners, and creating all sorts of both incentives and policies to reduce that outdoor residential demand. And that’s something where individual households can be empowered.
No, I really don’t. It’s about a sort of risk management in the short term, and then crafting new policy approaches and new management strategies over the long term. So I don’t think these get in the way of each other. The 2019 agreement essentially bought us some time, and this round of proposals and anticipated agreements will continue to buy us some time.
Do I think we need more adaptation, and more significant changes? Absolutely. But I would never criticize these incremental plans, because they’re absolutely necessary to manage short-term risk.
Without these actions, there was a plausible scenario where levels in the reservoirs could drop below the minimum power pool, meaning we wouldn’t be able to create power out of the Hoover Dam. In [the Bureau of Reclamation’s] 24-month studies, we began to see scenarios in which the lake levels dropped below the intakes, meaning we wouldn’t be able to deliver Colorado River water whatsoever to the states.
When you start to see these highly undesirable scenarios where you lose the ability to produce power, you potentially even lose the ability to deliver any water at all from the Colorado system to Arizona, California, or Nevada, you know you’ve got to act and engage in short-term risk management.
The risk that we’ve always seen is that you get some relief from the kind of very strong winter precipitation in the Rocky Mountains and in California that we had this year. But as a colleague says, we cannot let one good winter take the pressure off. I never want to root against good news, and the winter precipitation and the new proposal and potential agreements are good news. But you got to keep the pressure on and keep the emphasis on the long-term strategies.
[Laughs] Yes.
Well, I think you can look at it both ways. Yes, there was the intention that the 2019 plans would get us to 2026. Turns out the 2019 plans got us through 2022. That’s just the reality we’re in. Do I wish the 2019 plans would have gotten us to 2026? Yes. But without the 2019 plans, we would have been at risk of minimum power pool levels even earlier.
I was hopeful the 2007 plans would get us to 2026. But the reality is that the climate is changing, the drought has just been incredibly persistent. I mean, we now know from looking at reconstructions of the past climate that this 22-year period is the driest period in our region in the last 800 years for certain, and very likely in the last 1,200 years. That’s an exceptional period of drought. And so, by some measures, you know, it’s pretty remarkable what the water management community has done to manage the risk without significant disruption to the region. So in some ways, it’s a success story.
The single most important thing everyone recognizes is that we really need to chart a new path forward for agriculture. Particularly for agriculture in the lower basin, and even more specifically for non-food forage crops in the lower basin.
We still use two-thirds or more of our water in the lower basin for agriculture, and most of that is used for forage crops, like alfalfa, which feed livestock. So we very much need to restructure the agricultural sector in the lower basin and think about prioritization of certain types of agriculture in certain locations. And importantly, we need to work with agricultural communities, with landowners and businesses, to help them transition to a future that recognizes there’s less water available. And, you know, this is the challenge that we face: How do we make an intentional, thoughtful, supportive transition to a new, more efficient, and more appropriate type of agriculture in the West?
This region is in an amazing region to grow alfalfa if you have water. And so, there’s lots of rational choices that were made along the way. But in an era of significantly reduced water availability, it is simply not sustainable for us to continue to use that much of our available water for agriculture, and in particular for forage crops mostly to support cattle. And so this has to change.
I fully recognize, though, that these are private property rights, and there needs to be a process for this. We can’t just simply have a situation like what we saw in the Midwest where we just move all of our manufacturing overseas and abandon entire swaths of the country. We have to think about how we can help, whether it’s through compensation, community planning, capacity building, job transitions, etc. But that’s the biggest part of the solution. We need to be very thoughtful about that.
I think one of the key things we really need to get into the planning process [for 2026] is greater adaptability and greater flexibility so we’re able to respond to changing conditions. Under the current guidelines there is a priority rights process where we would have [hypothetically] seen the reduction of essentially all — 100% — of Arizona’s allocation of the Colorado River, before any of California’s rights were reduced. But it seems implausible to eliminate the Colorado River water supply to Phoenix, which is the fifth largest city in the country. These are the third rails of water politics. We have to rethink the way that these water allocation decisions are made, and we’ve got to be much more flexible, much more adaptable, and really think about how we can respond to climate and water conditions.
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A trio of powerful climate hawks are throwing their weight against the SPEED Act.
Key Senate Democrats are opposing a GOP-led permitting deal to overhaul federal environmental reviews without assurances that clean energy projects will be able to reap the benefits. Winning these lawmakers’ support will require major concessions to build new transmission infrastructure and greater permitting assistance for renewable energy projects.
In an exclusive joint statement provided Tuesday to Heatmap News, Senate Energy and Natural Resources ranking member Martin Heinrich, Environment and Public Works ranking member Sheldon Whitehouse, and Hawaii senator Brian Schatz came out against passing the SPEED Act, a bill that would change the National Environmental Policy Act, citing concerns about how it would apply to renewable energy and transmission development priorities.
“We are committed to streamlining the permitting process — but only if it ensures we can build out transmission and cheap, clean energy. While the SPEED Act does not meet that standard, we will continue working to pass comprehensive permitting reform that takes real steps to bring down electricity costs,” the statement read.
As I wrote weeks ago, there’s very little chance the SPEED Act could become law without addressing Senate climate hawks’ longstanding policy preferences. Although the SPEED Act was voted out of committee in the House two weeks ago with support from a handful of Democratic lawmakers, it has yet to win support from even moderate energy wonks in that legislative body, including Representative Scott Peters, one of the Democratic House negotiators in bipartisan permitting talks. Peters told me he would need to see more assurances dealing with the renewables permitting freeze, for example, in order for him to support the bill.
Observers had initially expected a full House vote on the SPEED Act as soon as this week, but an additional hurdle arose in recent days in the form of opposition from House conservative Republicans, led by Representative Chip Roy. The congressman from Texas had requested additional federal actions targeting renewables projects in exchange for passage of the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, which effectively repealed the Inflation Reduction Act. What followed was a set of directives from the Interior Department that all but halted federal solar and wind permitting. Roy’s frustration with the SPEED Act concerns a relatively milquetoast nod to renewables permitting problems that would block presidents from rescinding already issued permits. This upset appears to have delayed a vote on the bill in the House.
There’s an eerie familiarity to this moment: Almost exactly one year ago, the last major attempt at a permitting deal, authored by Senators Joe Manchin and John Barrasso, died when then-Majority Leader Chuck Schumer declined to bring it up for a vote in the face of opposition from the House. Unlike the SPEED Act, that bill offered changes to transmission siting policy that even conservative estimates said would’ve hastened the pace of national decarbonization.
Having Schatz, Heinrich, and Whitehouse — the three most powerful climate hawks in Congress — throw their weight against the SPEED Act casts serious doubt on the prospects for that legislation becoming the permitting deal this Congress. It also exposes an intra-energy world conflict, as it appears to position these lawmakers in opposition to American Clean Power, an energy trade group that represents a swath of diversified energy companies and utilities, as well as solar, wind, and battery storage developers.
Last week, ACP joined with the American Petroleum Institute and gas pipeline advocacy organizations to urge Congress to pass the SPEED Act. In a letter to House Speaker Mike Johnson and Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries, ACP and the fossil fuel industry trade groups said that the legislation “directly addresses” the challenges facing their interests and “represents meaningful bipartisan progress toward a more stable and dependable permitting framework.” The only reference to potential additions came in a single, vague line: “While the SPEED Act makes important progress, there are additional ways Congress can facilitate the development of reliable and affordable energy infrastructure as part of a broader permitting package.”
This letter was taken by some backers of the renewable energy industry to be an endorsement without concessions. It was also a surprise because just days earlier, American Clean Power responded to the bill’s passage with a vaguely supportive statement that declared “additional efforts” were needed for “transmission infrastructure,” without which “energy prices will spike and system reliability will be threatened.” (It’s worth noting that the committee behind the SPEED Act, House Natural Resources, has no authority over transmission siting. No other proposal has yet emerged from Republicans in that chamber for Republicans to address the issue, either.)
One of the renewables backers taken aback was Schatz, who took to X to sound off against the organization. “Congratulations to ‘American Clean Power’ for cutting a deal with the American Petroleum Institute, but to enact a law both the house and the Senate have to agree, and Senators are finding out about this for the first time,” Schatz wrote in a post, which Whitehouse retweeted from one of his official X accounts.
In a subsequent post, Schatz said: “I am not finding out about the bill’s existence for the first time, I am tracking it all very closely. I am finding out that ACP endorsed it as is without anything on transmission, for the first time.”
By contrast, the statement from the three senators aligns them with the Solar Energy Industries Association, which sent a letter from more than 140 solar companies to top congressional leaders requesting direct action to fix a bureaucratic freeze on permit-related activity that has already helped kill large projects, including Esmeralda 7, which was the largest solar mega-farm in the United States.
In its message to Congress, the trade association made plain that while the SPEED Act was a welcome form of permitting changes, it was nowhere close to dealing with Trumpian chicanery on the group’s priority list.
We’ll have more on this unfolding drama in the days to come.
One longtime analyst has an idea to keep prices predictable for U.S. businesses.
What if we treated lithium like oil? A commodity so valuable to the functioning of the American economy that the U.S. government has to step in not only to make it available, but also to make sure its price stays in a “sweet spot” for production and consumption?
That was what industry stalwart Howard Klein, founder and chief executive of the advisory firm RK Equities, had in mind when he came up with his idea for a strategic lithium reserve, modeled on the existing Strategic Petroleum Reserve.
Klein published a 10-page white paper on the idea Monday, outlining an expansive way to leverage private companies and capital markets to develop a non-Chinese lithium industry without the risk and concentrated expense of selecting specific projects and companies.
The lithium challenge, Klein and other industry analysts and executives have long said, is that China’s whip hand over the industry allows it to manipulate prices up and down in order to throttle non-Chinese production. When investment in lithium ramps up outside of China, Chinese production ramps up too, choking off future investment by crashing prices.
Recognizing the dangers stemming from dysfunction in the global lithium market constitutes a rare area of agreement between both parties in Washington and across the Biden and Trump administrations. Last year, a Biden State Department official told reporters that China “engage[s] in predatory pricing” and will “lower the price until competition disappears.”
A bipartisan investigation released last month by the House of Representatives’ Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party found that “the PRC engaged in a whole‐of‐government effort to dominate global lithium production,” and that “starting in 2021, the PRC government engaged in a coordinated effort to artificially depress global lithium prices that had the effect of preventing the emergence of an America‐focused supply chain.”
Klein thinks he’s figured out a way to deal with this problem
“They manipulated and they crushed prices through oversupply to prevent us from having our own supply chains,” he told me.
It’s not just that China can keep prices low through overproduction, it’s also that the country’s enormous market power can make prices volatile, Klein said, which scares off private sector investment in mining and processing. “You have two years, up two years down, two years up, two years down,” he told me. “That’s the problem we’re trying to solve.
His proposal is to establish “a large, rules-based buffer of lithium carbonate — purchased when prices are depressed due to Chinese oversupply, and released during price spikes, shortages, or export restrictions.”
This reserve, he said, would be more than just a stockpile from which lithium could be released as needed. It would also help to shape the market for lithium, keeping prices roughly in the range of $20,000 per ton (when prices fall below that, the reserve would buy) and $40,000 to $50,000 per ton, when the reserve would sell. The idea is to keep the price of lithium carbonate — which can be processed as a material for batteries with a wide range of defense (e.g. drones) and transportation (e.g. electric vehicles) applications — within a range that’s reasonable for investors and businesses to plan around.
“Lithium has swung from like $6,000 [per ton] to $80,000, back down to $9,000, and now it’s at $11,000 or $12,000,” Klein told me. “But $11,000 or $12,000 is not a high enough price for a company to build a plan that’s going to take three to five years. They need $20,000 to $25,000 now as a minimum for them to make a $2 billion dollar investment.” When prices for lithium get up to “$50,000, $60,000, or $70,000, then it becomes a problem because battery makers can’t make money.”
Both the Biden and Trump administrations have taken more active steps to secure a U.S. or allied supply chain for valuable inputs, including rare earth metals. But Klein’s proposed reserve looks to balance government intervention with a diverse, private-sector led industry.
The reserve would be more broad-based than price floor schemes, where a major buyer like the Defense Department guarantees a minimum price for the output from a mine or refining facility. This is what the federal government did in its deal with MP Materials, the rare earths miner and refiner, which secured a multifaceted deal with the federal government earlier this year.
Klein estimates that the cost in the first year of the strategic lithium reserve could be a few billion dollars — on the scale of the nearly $2.3 billion loan provided by the Department of Energy for the Thacker Pass mine in Nevada, which also saw the federal government take an equity stake in the miner, Lithium Americas.
Ideally, Klein told me, “there’s a competition of projects that are being presented to prospective funders of those projects, and I want private market actors to decide, should we build more Thacker Passes or should we do the Smackover?” referring to a geologic formation centered in Arkansas with potentially millions of tons of lithium reserves.
Klein told me that he’s trying to circulate the proposal among industry and policy officials. His hoped is that as the government attempts to come up with a solution to Chinese dominance of the lithium industry, “people are talking about this idea and they’re saying, Oh, that’s actually a pretty good idea.”
Current conditions: After a two-inch dusting over the weekend, Virginia is bracing for up to 8 inches of snow • The Bulahdelah bushfire in New South Wales that killed a firefighter on Sunday is flaring up again • The death toll from South and Southeast Asia’s recent floods has crossed 1,750.

President Donald Trump’s Day One executive order directing agencies to stop approving permitting for wind energy projects is illegal, a federal judge ruled Monday evening. In a 47-page ruling against the president in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, Judge Patti B. Saris found that the states led by New York who sued the White House had “produced ample evidence demonstrating that they face ongoing or imminent injuries due to the Wind Order,” including project delays that “reduce or defer tax revenue and returns on the State Plaintiffs’ investments in wind energy developments.” The judge vacated the order entirely.
Trump’s “total war on wind” may have shocked the industry with its fury, but the ruling is a sign that momentum may be shifting. Wind developers have gathered unusual allies. As I wrote here in October, big oil companies balked at Trump’s treatment of the wind industry, warning the precedents Republican leaders set would be used by Democrats against fossil fuels in the future. Just last week, as I reported here, the National Petroleum Council advised the Department of Energy to back a national permitting reform proposal that would strip the White House of the power to rescind already-granted licenses.
Back in October, I told you about how the head of the world’s biggest metal trading house warned that the West was getting the critical mineral problem wrong, focusing too much on mining and not enough on refining. Now the Energy Department is making $134 million available to projects that demonstrate commercially viable ways of recovering and refining rare earths from mining waste, old electronics, and other discarded materials, Utility Dive reported. “We have these resources here at home, but years of complacency ceded America’s mining and industrial base to other nations,” Secretary of Energy Chris Wright said in a statement.
If you read yesterday’s newsletter, you may recall that the move comes as the Trump administration signals its plans to take more equity stakes in mining companies, following on the quasi-nationalization spree started over the summer when the U.S. military became the largest shareholder in MP Materials, the country’s only active rare earths miner, in a move Heatmap's Matthew Zeitlin noted made Biden-era officials jealous.
NextEra Energy is planning to develop data centers across the U.S. for Google-owner Alphabet as the utility giant pivots from its status as the nation’s biggest renewable power developer to the natural gas preferred by the Trump administration. The Florida-based company already had a deal to provide 2.5 gigawatts of clean energy capacity to Facebook-owner Meta Platforms, and also plans gas plants for oil giant Exxon Mobil Corp. and gas producer Comstock Resources. Still, NextEra’s stock dropped by more than 3% as investors questioned whether the company’s skills with solar and wind can be translated to gas. “They’ve been top-notch, best-in-class renewable developers,” Morningstar analyst Andy Bischof told Bloomberg. “Now investors have to get their head around whether that can translate to best-in-class gas developer.”
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In October, Google backed construction of the first U.S. commercial installation of a gas plant built from the ground up with carbon capture. The project, which Matthew wrote about here, had the trappings to work where other experiments in carbon capture failed. The location selected for the plant already had an ethanol facility with carbon capture, and access to wells to store the sequestered gas. Now the U.S. could have another plant. In a press release Monday, the industrial giant Babcock and Wilcox announced a deal with an unnamed company to supply carbon capture equipment to an existing U.S. power station. More details are due out in March 2026.
Executives from at least 14 fusion energy startups met with the Energy Department on Monday as the agency looks to spur construction of what could be the world’s first power plants to harness the reaction that powers the sun. The Trump administration has made fusion a priority, issuing a roadmap for commercialization and devoting a new office to the energy source, as I wrote in a breakdown of the agency’s internal reorganization last month. It is, as Heatmap’s Katie Brigham has written, “finally, possibly, almost time for fusion” as billions of dollars flow into startups promising to make the so-called energy source of tomorrow a reality in the near future. “It is now time to make an investment in resources to match the nation’s ambition,” the Fusion Industry Association, the trade group representing the nascent industry, wrote in a press release. “China and other strategic competitors are mobilizing billions to develop the technology and capture the fusion future. The United States has invested in fusion R&D for decades; now is the time to complete the final step to commercialize the technology.” Indeed, as I wrote last month, China has forged an alliance with roughly a dozen countries to work together on fusion, and it’s spending orders of magnitude more cash on the energy source than the U.S.
Founded by a former Google worker, the startup Quilt set out to design chic-looking heat pumps sexy enough to serve as decor. Investors like the pitch. The company closed a $20 million Series B round on Monday, bringing its total fundraising to $64 million. “Our growth demonstrates that when you solve for comfort, design, and efficiency simultaneously, adoption accelerates,” Paul Lambert, chief executive and co-founder of Quilt, said in a statement. “This funding enables us to bring that experience to millions more North American homes.”