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The results of Heatmap’s very first insiders survey.

Most climate insiders don’t expect the Inflation Reduction Act to get repealed. They don’t foresee the world’s temperature rising more than 3 degrees Celsius by 2100, and they are bullish on hot rocks and geothermal.
Those are the findings from our exclusive — and highly unscientific — survey of climate and decarbonization insiders. Over the past few weeks, Heatmap has queried more than 30 climate insiders across policy, science, technology, and economics, including high-profile energy entrepreneurs, high-rolling “climate tech” venture capitalists, and some high-ranking (and very-soon-to-be-former) Biden officials.
We wanted to know what they’re thinking about the era to come — and about how they would handle some of the biggest questions that plagued climate policy during the Biden era: Will Congress pass permitting reform? Is there a trade-off between developing artificial intelligence and decarbonizing the power grid? And how would you balance China’s dominance over certain clean technologies — and the need for the American economy, and the American military, to stay competitive? We got a lot of answers. Here’s what they told us…
Folks were bullish about geothermal, hot rocks, and batteries. Five respondents mentioned Fervo, the advanced geothermal company that borrows techniques (and workers) from the fracking industry. Three said Form Energy, which makes cheap iron-air batteries for the power grid; several mentioned Rondo or Antora, which produce thermal batteries that can store and release huge amounts of heat. “The real answer I can't disclose yet, but there is the one,” said a prominent climate tech investor. Get real, replied a policy researcher: The only “climate tech” company today with a claim to be the most important is Chinese EV juggernaut BYD.
Really good heat pumps, said the most respondents, tied with any way to make chemicals, liquid fuels, or plastics in a low-carbon way. A close second: Virtually anything that could be used to decarbonize apartment or multifamily residential buildings. “From the perspective of an apartment-dweller in a large shared building, it seems almost impossible to get buy-in for building decarbonization,” said one climate scientist. “I know ‘convince a landlord/co-op/condo board to do something’ doesn't have a technological solution, but it's the biggest stumbling block.”
Brown hydrogen, green hydrogen, blue hydrogen — it doesn’t matter, throw them all out. Sixteen percent of respondents, including an energy researcher and a climate tech VC, wanted to ditch “the hydrogen rainbow.” “Tipping points,” said one climate scientist. Another climate scientist told us: “Climate crisis, climate emergency, global heating: anything that implies the primary impediment to cutting emissions is scientists using the wrong word.” “Three pillars,” said a former Biden official. “Levelized cost of energy, or LCOE,” said a climate entrepreneur. “It so oversimplifies the way the grid actually works and how electricity is valued that it does more harm than good.” “Carbon accounting, carbon footprint, and anything else that makes us think our current emissions are the most important thing to our future success,” said another VC.
Nearly two-thirds of respondents, spanning every field we queried, said that AI and data center growth isn’t hindering decarbonization … yet. And among the 35% of insiders who answered yes, most also framed their concerns in future terms. “Perhaps not at present, nor over the last few years, but the trajectory is alarming and I do believe they could derail emissions goals at scale within the next 5 years,” said one climate scientist. “Seems like there are plenty of reports of new gas capacity being added,” agreed another researcher. “On the other hand … we would need so much more capacity for hydrogen, electrification of transport and homes, etc., so I'm not sure why we are so worried about AI in the scheme of all the new and upcoming needs for electricity.” “Hot take: AI isn't worried about energy, but energy is worried about AI,” interjected a climate tech VC.
Exactly half of our insiders said: Nope, this tradeoff almost never actually exists. Among the other half, insiders said policymakers should be pragmatic, and only a few said that they should focus on cutting emissions at all costs. “They should do whatever is required to maintain and accelerate political ambition on climate,” said a climate philanthropist. “They should have prioritized social justice issues less,” said one climate tech CEO. “It is never a fair commercial fight with China since our companies are always up against the Chinese state,” said a former U.S. government official. “But it would be a big mistake to allow China to dominate green tech and supply chains — as they would like to do — since that would create an untenable dependence on a country that never hesitates to weaponize its economic advantage. But the imperative to decarbonize is massively important.”
Forty-five percent of respondents said that yes, we should let the EV imports rip. A few researchers and former Biden officials added a twist: “Yes, but only if they are made in the USA.” Others thought that the U.S. should import the cars, but only with a carbon adjustment tariff and a huge investment in U.S. EV manufacturing. “If there were CBAM and other tariffs meant to reflect the imbalance of environmental and labor regulations, then yes,” said one VC. “But then the cars wouldn’t be that competitive.” Almost everyone else said no.
NOPE, said 68% of the insiders. (About 17% said yes, and 15% weren’t sure or thought a minority of the grants might get clawed back.) “I expect it will go after some provisions, but there is quite a bit in the IRA that will be very difficult to repeal since large-scale clean energy investments have been made, and a majority of those in red states whose politicians will not want to give them up,” said one former U.S. official. “A lot of money has already gone out, so I'm guessing the money for EJ initiatives and communities is most at risk,” said a climate researcher. One Biden official threw down the gauntlet: “None of the measures will get repealed. Even unspent money will largely be safe.”
YES, said 59% of insiders. NO, said 41%. “I hope not. That bill sucked,” said a researcher.
“Europe pushing ahead with nuclear energy. Paradigm shifts are possible,” said one energy researcher. “Trump's picks for Energy and Interior could have been much worse,” said another. A former Biden official said that the American Petroleum Institute’s decision to back the IRA was a good sign — and an economist noted the dozen House Republicans opposing repeal encouraged him, too. “Corporates’ willingness to procure clean electrons at a ‘green premium’ for their AI energy demands,” said a climate tech VC.
“Oh dear,” said one researcher. The average of insiders’ answers were 2.8 degrees Celsius, with the highest guesses going up to 3.5 degrees Celsius. A few respondents said 2 degrees Celsius, but only because they thought humanity will have the ability to modulate temperatures by then. “If we don't do anything, I think 3 to 4 degrees,” said another. “We will be able to control global temperatures before we achieve net zero, so by 2100 if civilization is still healthy we will have settled at some optimal temperature,” said another VC.
Some experts believe that the world’s biggest polluter has already hit peak greenhouse gas emissions. Our panelists weren’t so sure: 30% of respondents each said that China’s pollution would peak in the 2020s, 2030s, and 2040s, respectively. The remainder would look to 2050 or beyond.
Unlike China, America’s emissions have already peaked. (They did that more than a decade ago, around the Great Recession.) So U.S. policy makers now plan for the arrival of net zero, the hypothesized future date when the American economy will emit roughly as much climate pollution as it absorbs. While respondents were split on when that might happen, most see it emerging in the 2050s or 2060s.
It’s time to focus on climate impacts, which are coming regardless of what happens with emissions, said many. “In the age of Trump, we need to think more about resilience. Preparing ourselves to deal with the weather variability we are seeing already (e.g., California fires, Florida hurricanes, Colorado River drought years) will put us in a much better position to deal with climate change,” a climate scientist added. “I think 2025 is a year that we will start to see adaptation technologies/approaches and solar geoengineering start playing much larger roles in the climate response policy portfolio,” one researcher-activist told us.
But the climate tech industry is upbeat: “It's an optimistic time for climate tech,” one climate tech CEO said. “The return of climate-tech funding in the last 5 years has allowed a lot of ideas to be tried, and there is now enough data on what is working and what is not. The good news is that there is more than enough in the ‘working’ column to move full speed ahead.” And a climate VC agreed: “The second Trump administration will see more acceleration for industrial climate tech than the Biden years.” “The United States has better technology than any country in the world,” said a Biden official. “Biden’s policies combined with America First messaging will forever dispel the myth that China has any sort of technology lead by 2028 … emissions will go down faster during the Trump administration than they did in the Biden administration because deployment has been positioned to reach all time highs starting in 2026.”
Yet some saw risks for the world ahead. “The most important stories for climate action in 2025 have less to do with climate and more to do with geoeconomic competition,” said one public policy expert. Trade fragmentation may drive prices up and slow innovation, greatly delaying technology diffusion and deployment. And there is a major risk of continued or worsened conflict — the greatest risk being China's positioning vis a vis the Pacific and Taiwan.”
OUR PANEL INCLUDED… Gavin Schmidt, British climatologist | Jennifer Wilcox, University of Pennsylvania chemical engineering professor and former U.S. Assistant Secretary for Fossil Energy and Carbon Management | Kim Cobb, coral scientist and director of the Institute at Brown for Environment and Society | Tim Latimer, chief executive of Fervo Energy | Clay Dumas, founding partner at Lowercarbon Capital | Holly Jean Buck, environment professor at University at Buffalo | J. Mijin Cha, environmental studies professor at UC Santa Cruz | Zeke Hausfather, climate scientist | Ken Caldeira, senior scientist emeritus at Carnegie Science | Apoorv Bhargava, chief executive at Weavegrid | Todd Stern, former U.S. special envoy for climate change | Jigar Shah, U.S. Loan Programs Office director | Jesse Jenkins, energy systems professor at Princeton | Peter Reinhardt, CEO of Charm Industrial | Amy Francetic, managing general partner at Buoyant Ventures | Jane Flegal, executive director at Blue Horizons Foundation | Shuchi Talati, executive director at the Alliance for Just Deliberation on Solar Geoengineering… and many more …
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Average U.S. gasoline prices have slipped back above $4 a gallon.
A decade ago, the Princeton economists Alan Blinder and Mark Watson published a paper about a fact that they called “not nearly as widely known as it should be”: The U.S. economy has done better under Democratic presidents than Republican presidents.
Blinder was not a completely impartial observer — he served on President Bill Clinton’s Council of Economic Advisers, and Clinton later appointed him vice chair of the Federal Reserve — but he and Watson compiled a lengthy list of statistics to back up their claim. The U.S. economy has grown faster, produced more jobs, had a lower unemployment rate, seen higher corporate profits and investment, and experienced better stock market performance under Democrats than Republicans. While the original paper described this divergence from 1947 to 2013, recent research has shown that it held through the subsequent Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations.
The only metric where the two parties come close is inflation, but Democrats still seem to have a tiny edge there, even after the Biden-era inflation.
Why? Blinder and Watson found that it didn’t entirely come down to timing. (Other observers have disputed this, arguing that Republicans tend to get elected at the peak of economic booms, while Democrats win during or just after recessions.) Instead, Blinder and Watson found that a few factors — oil shocks, productivity growth, a more favorable international growth environment, and perhaps better consumer confidence — could explain much of the divergence.
Of course, these factors can’t be entirely separated from a president’s record in office. Oil shocks, for example, tend to drag down global growth, which in turn slows the U.S. economy. And as Watson and Blinder write, some of those oil shocks “may have been induced by [American] foreign policy.” By that mechanism, presidential bellicosity in the Middle East can translate into poorer economic outcomes. This belligerence may even be, as the writer Matt Yglesias contended earlier this year, Republican presidents’ “worst economic policy.”
Why am I recounting all this? Because average U.S. gasoline prices have slipped back above $4 a gallon, according to AAA. (As I write, they stand at $4.01.) The collapse of the ceasefire with Iran — and President Trump’s inability to figure out how to end a war he started — are once again driving up fossil fuel prices.
The numbers add up. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth told Congress today that the Iran War has cost $37.5 billion so far, but according to a tracker from Brown University researchers, Americans have already paid nearly double that — $71 billion! — on more expensive gasoline and diesel fuel. A billion here, a billion there, and pretty soon you’re talking about real economic underperformance. That estimate suggests the burden of higher energy prices from the Iran War has wiped out the expected $65 billion consumer boost from the One Big Beautiful Bill Act’s expanded tax refunds.
Of course, from a decarbonization perspective, higher gas prices are good, in theory. They encourage people to drive less and to switch to more fuel-efficient — or even fully electrified — vehicles, reducing carbon emissions. (This is part of why I joke about Degrowth Donald, raising fuel prices as he goes.) But short-term oil shocks are the second worst kind of emissions reductions after recessions: They are unlikely to last; they will probably not lead to real decarbonization; and they produce a lot of human misery along the way.
Perhaps this oil spike won’t persist. Perhaps Trump will find a way out of the quagmiring conflict in the Persian Gulf. Perhaps Republican presidential underperformance really does all come down to luck, too. (Or maybe, as a 2020 paper argued, Democratic presidents benefit from a “pre-election growth surge” just before a Republican wins.) But I think it’s worth noting that the recent trickle of news — and the recent and less noticed surge in gas prices — is how an oil interruption results in slower growth overall. If oil shocks really are responsible for GOP presidential underperformance, this is what it would look like.
The irony is that technology finally exists to make the American transportation sector — and the overall economy — less dependent on oil. This technology was developed at the American public’s expense to help manage a scenario much like this one. And the administration has undermined it at almost every opportunity.
The latest forecast from BloombergNEF raises its estimate for AI electricity demand by 83%.
Energy analysts at BloombergNEF predicted last year that U.S. data center electricity demand would reach 106 gigawatts within the next decade. In its latest outlook, released Tuesday, the group increased its forecast by 83%, to 194 gigawatts — enough to light up 150 million homes, or roughly every single household in the country today.
Even that may be a conservative estimate. If data center developers were to max out the total number of the high-powered chips used to train and operate AI models forecast to be delivered by 2035, electricity demand would reach 229 gigawatts.
Over 100 gigawatts of that demand has entered the development pipeline since the beginning of this year, the result of both rising demand for artificial intelligence and shortened construction timelines for data centers. Some developers have oriented their site selection around energy availability, redeveloping brownfield energy generation sites for quick access to electricity and developing relationships with utilities. Others have eschewed grid interconnection entirely and instead relied behind-the-meter power generation.
As Mark Daly, head of technology and innovation at BNEF and a co-author of the report, pointed out to me, a growing share of the project pipeline comes from first-time developers. He and his colleagues project that non-hyperscaler data center capacity will nearly quintuple over the next decade, as hyperscaler capacity almost triples. That could ultimately create pipeline risks, however, as small-scale developers lack the capabilities of more experienced developers to optimize around pre-construction bottlenecks and navigate rapidly growing local opposition. Although local opposition to data centers has become prevalent, historic trends and predictions on how quickly developers are able to navigate hostile environments are built on the proficiency of experienced developers. Because first-time developers may face more challenges, Daly told me that data center projects overall “would see an increase in the number of delays.”
All of this, of course, comes with a big asterisk. The data center sector is rapidly evolving, and therefore highly uncertain. Among leading market research firms, BNEF said, there is a 100-gigawatt spread between the lowest and highest predicted electricity demand from data centers in 2030. Driving this spread are differences in assumptions about the average development timeline for a data center project. Daly told me that BNEF’s “project-based estimate is middle-of-the-road to bearish compared to other outlooks,” but also acknowledged that the fickle nature of local opposition on development timelines may place more constraints on future data center development than currently modeled.
No matter which prediction turns out to be most accurate, hourly U.S. electricity demand will come under intensifying pressure. BNEF predicts that average hourly U.S. electricity demand from AI workloads will grow five-fold over next nine years, reaching 120 gigawatts by 2035. That will put data centers at 12% of total electricity consumption on average by 2030, and 20% in 2035, up from 5% in 2025, according to figures from the International Energy Agency. This will put particular strain on electricity prices in markets like the Mid-Atlantic’s PJM, where data centers already comprise nearly a third of electricity consumption, and Texas’ ERCOT, where data centers currently consume a fifth of the market’s electricity.
Even the most conservative bet on future data center electricity demand is a scenario we’re not prepared for. If the Electric Power Research Institute’s prediction that just 56 gigawatts of new data center capacity will be up and running by 2030 — the lowest estimate BNEF cited — that would still consume the equivalent of Sweden’s total energy supply. Absent investments from utilities into grid resilience and intensive permitting reform to speed up renewable energy siting and development, PJM and ERCOT customers will not be the only ones feeling a serious squeeze in their wallets when their monthly utility bills arrive.
Current conditions: Tropical Depression Two strengthened into Tropical Storm Bertha yesterday, recycling the name of the 1996 Atlantic hurricane season’s first major storm • Floods from the monsoon season killed at least four people in Vietnam and left as many missing • Lightning in Utah sparked the state’s latest wildfire, the Meeks Fire, near the Strawberry Reservoir.
President Donald Trump’s on-again, off-again feud with America’s northern neighbor is, as of Monday, back on again. The White House imposed 50% tariffs on most Canadian goods, accusing the nation’s geographically nearest ally and closest cultural bedfellow of unfairly discriminating against American automotives, alcohol, and dairy products. The move threatens to unleash what the Associated Press called “a new wave of economic chaos, with risks of higher inflation and further fraying of relations between two nations that had been closely woven together before Trump’s return” to office.
In its announcement, the Trump administration said the new tariffs would “apply to all covered goods regardless of whether a good originates under the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement,” referring to the Trump-negotiated North American free trade agreement, which the U.S. opted this month not to renew. This struck my colleague Robinson Meyer as ominous. “If the White House now thinks it can levy taxes despite that pact,” he wrote in yesterday’s Heatmap Daily newsletter, “then the risks for Ford, General Motors, and their suppliers have increased.”
Perhaps the only thing growing faster than voters’ antipathy toward data centers is the market’s desire for more of them. Demand for data centers is ballooning at such a rapid clip that BloombergNEF just raised its total forecast for 2035 by a jaw-dropping 83%. The latest data outlining the best-case scenario from the energy consultancy, released Tuesday morning, shows the total installed capacity of U.S. data centers reaching 194 gigawatts in the next nine years. The surge reflects how quickly new server farms are flowing into the project pipeline. In a bid to hedge against the continued expansion, BNEF created a new scenario based on the implied power demand of forecast shipments of microchips for AI computers up to 2033. This scenario implies an even greater need for power: 229 gigawatts of demand from data centers in just the next seven years. And that doesn’t count the continued growth of demand from data centers carrying out non-AI functions, such as traditional cloud computing workloads. This comes as the latest Heatmap Pro polling shows that seven in 10 Americans now oppose data centers in their backyard, a marked shift from last September, when the same survey showed voters evenly split in support and opposition.
That ballooning demand is already showing up in power markets. Of the $16.4 billion in charges from PJM Interconnection’s most recent capacity auction, $6.3 billion — some 38% — stems from data centers. That’s what Joseph Bowring, president of PJM’s independent market monitor Monitoring Analytics, told Utility Dive last week. In the last four base capacity auctions the nation’s largest grid operator held, 46% of capacity charges were driven by data centers. “PJM is continuing to act like it’s business as usual,” Bowring told the trade publication Friday. “You have to open your eyes and recognize that it is really a paradigm shift, and failing to do that imposes costs on other customers.”

On a logical level, it’s a simple supply and demand problem. The supply of electricity is not growing as quickly as demand, all while the Trump administration eliminates subsidies that once buoyed investments in new supply. As a result, corporate electricity deals look poised to increase in price. But not for every generating source. New estimates from LevelTen, a marketplace for power purchase agreements, found that solar PPAs were 5% cheaper in the second quarter of this year compared to the first quarter. In a piece by my colleague Matthew Zeitlin, LevelTen attributed the decline to an especially steep drop in prices in California’s electricity market. Excluding CAISO, solar PPA prices nationwide dropped slightly less than 2%. While hyperscalers are still buying solar, LevelTen found that commercial and industrial buyers are pulling back, creating a “continued softening in the market’s buy-side.” “We saw a lot less corporate energy buyers in the space in 2025 — 40% less — and that is just due to the increase of hyperscalers and data centers getting projects and snapping them up quickly,” Sarah Wolf, LevelTen’s director of North American transactions, told Matthew.
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Ah, Germany. The land of the Autobahn. Diesel-powered industry. The purring engines of BMWs, Porsches, and Mercedes-Benzes. The nation’s automotive might makes its latest milestone particularly important: Electric vehicles just outsold gas and diesel cars for the first time. New data from the Federal Motor Transport Authority shows that Germans registered 84,057 new electric vehicles in June, a more than 78% year-over-year increase. Traditional hybrids, meanwhile, saw 83,315 registrations, followed by gasoline-powered cars with 60,796, diesel with 33,862, and plug-in hybrids with 32,212. “The automotive history books will need a new page sooner rather than later, after electric cars outsold every other fuel type in Germany for the first time,” InsideEVs reporter Iulian Dnistran wrote. “It’s a huge shift in Europe’s biggest car market, which has traditionally been associated with diesel-powered cars that could travel hundreds of miles at highway speeds without breaking a sweat.” The Tesla Model Y was by far the best-selling EV in Germany, with nearly twice as many registrations as the No. 2 vehicle, the Volkswagen ID.3.
Putting on my Mesopotamian metal merchant hat again: Copper prices are back up. The price of the metal needed for virtually all electrical infrastructure rose 1.3% to just under $14,000 per metric ton, according to Mining.com. The price ultimately hovered at the red metal’s record set in early June. The spike stems from data showing rising tightness in the Chinese market, namely a hike in the premium buyers will pay in Shanghai for shipments of the metal. The price hiked further after a series of storms halted production in Chile for a few days.
While the West dithers on hydrogen, China is making huge strides. It already may be too late to catch up to Beijing on manufacturing the key machinery needed to produce the zero-carbon fuel. The latest data point, via Hydrogen Insight: China just shipped its largest electrolyzer order yet to Europe, via Romania.