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“The only common thread is the seeming desire of the court to aggrandize the power of the courts.”

The word “consequential” barely touches the importance of the Supreme Court’s decisions this term, as two cases — Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo and Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors — took a wrecking ball to the stability of the administrative state. Courts will no longer give deference to regulators to interpret statute and will permit new challenges against existing rules. Essentially, depending on whom you ask, anything goes.
So naturally, we had to ask. While the legal universe is still digesting these rulings, climate and environmental law experts had plenty of opinions about them, as lawyers tend to do. Here’s what we heard:
The Supreme Court has been on a campaign to weaken environmental regulation. In 2016, it halted implementation of President Obama’s Clean Power Plan without explanation. In 2022, it issued the devastating opinion in West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency, finding that the EPA couldn’t go very far in using the Clean Air Act to fight climate change because the statute isn’t specific enough. In 2023, the court in Sackett v. EPA greatly reduced the coverage of the Clean Water Act.
That campaign intensified this year. On June 27, 2024, in Ohio v. EPA, it struck down a life-saving Clean Air Act rule based on exceedingly narrow technical grounds that Justice Amy Coney Barrett, in her dissent, found were completely off base. The same day, in SEC v. Jarkesy, the Court said that agencies could not use long-established administrative processes to impose certain kinds of penalties. On June 28, the court reversed the Chevron doctrine in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo. On July 1, in Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors, it said that corporate defendants can challenge federal regulations long past the usual statute of limitations. And this campaign may continue: on June 24 the Supreme Court agreed to hear Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County, which may shrink the coverage of the National Environmental Policy Act.
The next election will determine whether the 6-3 conservative majority may be enlarged and rejuvenated to last another generation, or — depending on the fates — may shrink or be reversed.
For good reason, the last day of the Supreme Court’s term will be known for its decision giving presidents incredibly broad immunity from criminal prosecution. But another decision that will play a major role in restricting the ability of the executive branch to protect the environment should not be neglected. Corner Post effectively eliminated what had been a six-year statute of limitations for challenging federal regulations. The impact of Corner Post will amplify the effect of last week’s opinion overturning the Chevron decision, which had held that the judiciary should defer to reasonable legal interpretations made by the executive branch.
The Court announcing that it will take a much more aggressive role in replacing the judgment of regulatory experts in the executive branch with their own judgments will have particularly dire consequences for environmental regulations. What they see as “excessive” environmental regulation is one of the central reasons why conservative legal activists wanted the Chevron doctrine overruled. It’s not a coincidence that last week, the court also prevented a federal regulation of air pollutants from going into effect, one of a long series of Roberts court rulings undermining environmental regulation. And in a darkly comic illustration of what a bad idea it is to replace the judgment of EPA experts with that of arrogant, power-hungry judges, in his opinion for the court, Justice Gorsuch confused “nitrous oxide” (commonly known as “laughing gas”) and “nitrogen oxides” (the pollutant the EPA sought to regulate.)
People who want to stop environmental regulation will not be laughing when considering the effects of this Supreme Court term. Conservative lawyers will aggressively forum-shop for judges hostile to environmental regulations to bring challenges even to long-settled rules, and the authority of the EPA will be under constant threat as the planet continues to warm.
The combined effect of the Corner Post and Loper decisions may not be immediate, but they will be profound. They will make it harder for agencies to do their work, and easier for challengers (especially very well-funded challengers) to attack and delay actions.
The two opinions are hard to reconcile. In Loper, the opinion cites Chevron as "fostering unwarranted instability" in the law, but in Corner Post, the court has added extreme instability by leaving open-ended the question of when a regulation is ever settled. The only common thread is the seeming desire of the court to aggrandize the power of the courts.
Specific to climate, notwithstanding the statement in the opinion that Loper does not reopen prior holdings that used the Chevron framework, it is hard to imagine that such challenges will not be forthcoming. In particular, opponents of the finding in Massachusetts v. EPA may see Loper and Corner Post as an opportunity to reopen that 2007 case, especially as the court seems quite ready and willing to overturn past precedents.
Finally, we have examples of how pre- Chevron litigation worked under the Clean Air Act — and these examples should give as much pause to conservatives as to progressives. Courts are not likely to function well as regulatory agencies. The original Chevron decision was favored by conservatives at the time; post-Chevron, conservatives may regret that they got what they asked for.
The Supreme Court’s rulings this session jeopardize critical environmental protections and climate progress and are likely to wreak chaos across the regulatory landscape. In Corner Post the Supreme Court upended the statute of limitations for challenging many government regulations, opening the door to hundreds of new corporate challenges to long-established protections we all take for granted. And in Loper Bright, the court displaced the long-standing Chevron doctrine by shifting power to judges and sidelining the expertise of agency staff who live and breathe the science and safety concerns that federal agencies specialize in.
In combination, the cases tip the balance of power away from everyday Americans that depend on commonsense protections to industry groups that believe they will financially benefit without any limitations in place. We’re ready to fight back to make sure this conservative supermajority doesn't leave us with a patchwork of inconsistent rulings and an annihilation of the regulatory structure and critical protections that keep us safe and healthy.
The Supreme Court's decisions, in combination, make it clear that the Court intends to insert itself as, in Justice Kagan's words, the country's “administrative czar.” Those decisions give courts control over a wide array of scientific, technical, and policy choices necessary to effectively implement our laws protecting clean air, clean water, and affordable and reliable energy (and much more). That is likely to prove corrosive to climate policy; judges lack the accountability, expertise, and experience of agencies like the EPA or the Department of Energy.
But the primary drivers of decarbonization — economics and public investments to accelerate the clean energy transition, like the Inflation Reduction Act — remain relatively insulated from judicial interference. So while the court's decisions make the likely pathway to decarbonization less steady, science-driven, and predictable, it should not derail our ongoing progress towards achieving our climate goals over the long term.
Undoubtedly, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Corner Post and Loper Bright will make it easier for plaintiffs to prevail in legal challenges to environmental regulations. But we should be careful to keep things in perspective. The end of Chevron deference means that agency interpretations of statutes will get more judicial scrutiny than they did before, but even under Chevron deference it was limited by such things as the major questions doctrine. Agency interpretations are still likely to prevail in many cases. Similarly, while the changes to when the statute of limitations begins to run will allow additional challenges to be brought, a regulation that has already survived earlier legal challenges is likely to be upheld again if challenged by a new plaintiff later on. Agencies like EPA or the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission do not need to be insulated from judicial review in order to be able to function. If they do, that suggests a deeper problem with the administrative state.
In its regulatory jurisprudence this term, the Supreme Court has fundamentally changed the playing field for environmental regulation, making it much more difficult for agencies to use the flexibility that Congress has attempted to provide to protect the environment. This is likely to be felt especially where agencies are trying to tackle new problems using older statutes. The ball is now in Congress's court to protect the American people by regularly improving the nation's environmental laws, ensuring that federal regulatory programs that prevent pollution and preserve our country's natural resources for future generations are not lost forever over legal technicalities.
Taken together, Corner Post and Loper Bright fire the starting gun for an onslaught of lawsuits challenging long-settled regulatory programs. (They also sound the dinner bell for amoral corporate law firms.)
Judicial conservatives have long proclaimed the need for judicial minimalism and caution. Judges, they say, are not elected, and have no business making policy from the bench. They should decide individual cases and focus on the facts in front of them to avoid ripple effects that they can’t foresee and can’t easily fix.
This conservative supermajority is instead heedlessly pursuing a political agenda. By rewriting settled precedents to pursue a holy war against federal regulations, the court is truly legislating from the bench. And in justifying all this by citing idiosyncratic views of the separation of powers, the court is practically holding a new constitutional convention behind closed doors.
The Supreme Court has made it clear that legal precedents and the plain language of statutes will not slow their crusade to destroy the modern regulatory state at the behest of their wealthy benefactors. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson got it right in her dissent in Corner Post: “At the end of a momentous Term, this much is clear: The tsunami of lawsuits against agencies that the Court's holdings in this case and Loper Bright have authorized has the potential to devastate the functioning of the Federal Government.”
This tsunami of lawsuits will result in less consistent statutory interpretations based on individual courts' views on government regulation generally and on the matter at hand. The court's power grab lays bare the importance of civil society and elected officials finding ways to rebalance the relationships between the three branches of government and supporting the ability of federal agencies to implement federal laws effectively.
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Two international law experts on whether the president can really just yank the U.S. from the United Nations’ overarching climate treaty.
When the Trump administration moved on Wednesday to withdraw the U.S. from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, we were left to wonder — not for the first time — can he really do that?
The UNFCCC is the umbrella organization governing UN-organized climate diplomacy, including the annual climate summit known as the Conference of the Parties and the 2015 Paris Agreement. The U.S. has been in and out and back into the Paris Agreement over the years, and was most recently taken out again by a January 2025 executive order from President Trump. The U.S. has never before attempted to exit the UNFCCC — which, unlike the Paris Agreement, it joined with the advice and consent of the Senate.
Whether or not a president can unilaterally remove the U.S. from a Senate-approved treaty is somewhat uncharted legal territory. As University of Pennsylvania constitutional law professor Jean Galbraith told me, “This is an issue on which the text of the constitution is silent — it tells you how to make a treaty, but it doesn’t tell you anything about how to unmake a treaty.” Even if a president can simply withdraw from a treaty, there’s still the question of what happens next. Could a future president simply rejoin the UFCCC? Or would they again need to seek the advice and consent of the Senate, which would require getting 67 senators to agree that international climate diplomacy is a worthy enterprise? And what does all of this mean for the future of the Paris Agreement? Is the U.S. locked out for good?
In an attempt to wrap my head around these questions, I spoke to both Galbraith and Sue Biniaz, a lecturer at Yale School of the Environment and a former lead climate lawyer at the State Department who worked on both the Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC. Biniaz and Galbraith were part of a 2018 symposium on the question of treaty withdrawal that was prompted, in part, by Trump’s first attempt to remove the U.S. from the Paris Agreement, during his first term in the White House. Those conversations led Galbraith to consider the question of rejoining treaties in a 2020 Virginia Law Review article. Suffice it for now to say that both questions are complicated, but we dig into the answers to both and more in our conversation below.
Interviews have been edited for length and clarity.
At the most basic level, what are the constitutional questions at play in an executive withdrawal from the UNFCCC?
Galbraith: Typically, the U.S. president needs to think about both international law and domestic law. And as a matter of international law, there is a withdrawal provision in the UNFCCC that says you can withdraw after you’ve been in it for a few years, after one year of notice. Assuming they give their notice of withdrawal and wait a year, this is an issue on which the text of the constitution is silent — it tells you how to make a treaty, but it doesn’t tell you anything about how to unmake a treaty.
And we have no definitive answer from the courts. The closest they got to deciding that was in a case called Goldwater v. Carter, which was when President Carter terminated the mutual defense treaty with Taiwan. That was litigated, and the Supreme Court ducked — four justices said this is a political question that we’re not going to resolve, and one justice said this case is not ripe for resolution because I don’t know whether or not Congress likes the withdrawal. There was no majority opinion, and there was no ruling on the merit for the constitutional question.
Presidents have exercised the authority to withdraw the United States from various international agreements. So in practice, it happens. The constitutionality has not been finally settled.
Both Trump administrations have removed the U.S. from the Paris Agreement, but the Paris Agreement was not a Senate-ratified treaty, whereas the UNFCCC is. How does that change things?
Galbraith: The text of the constitution only clearly spells out one way to make an international treaty, in the treaty clause [of Article II]. When you make an Article II treaty, it’s signed by the president and secretary of state. It goes over to the Senate; the Senate provides advice and consent — the U.S. is still not in it. At that point, the president has to take a final act of ratifying the treaty, which means depositing the instrument of ratification with the international depository, and that’s the moment you’re in. And it’s perfectly permissible for a president after the Senate has given advice and consent not to ratify a treaty, or to leave those resolutions of advice and consent for years and then go ahead and ratify.
In practice, you have all these kinds of other ways of making [a treaty]. You have what happened with the Paris Agreement, where the president does it largely on their own authority, but maybe pointing to pre-existing facts of, say, the UNFCCC’s existence. You have some international agreements that have been negotiated, then taken to Congress rather than to the Senate. Sometimes you have Congress pass a law that says, Please make this kind of agreement. So you have a lot of different pathways to making them. And I think there is a story in which the pathway to making them should be significant in thinking about, what is the legitimate, constitutional way for exiting them?
To me, it’s pretty obvious that if you don’t get specific approval for an agreement in the first place, then you should be able to unilaterally withdraw, assuming you’re doing so consistent with international law. I think the concerns around the constitutionality of withdrawal are more significant for the UNFCCC than they are for the Paris Agreements. But there nonetheless is this fairly strong body of practice in which presidents have viewed themselves as authorized to withdraw without needing to go to Congress or the Senate.
Biniaz: The Senate doesn’t ratify. It sounds like a detail, but the Senate basically authorizes the president to ratify — they give their advice and consent. And that’s important because it’s not the Senate that decides whether we join an agreement. They authorize the president, the president does not have to join. And that becomes relevant when we talk about withdrawing and rejoining.
We did not address, when we sent up the framework convention, whether it was legally necessary to send it to the Senate. But we sent it in any event, and it was approved basically unanimously by the full Senate back in 1992. With respect to the Paris Agreement, there are a lot of different considerations when you’re trying to figure out whether something needs to go to the Senate or not, but the fact that we already had a Senate-approved convention changed the legal calculus as to whether this Paris Agreement needed to go to the Senate. And then when the Paris Agreement ended up essentially elaborating the convention and the targets were not legally binding, we decided we could do it as an executive agreement. There was some quibbling in some quarters — more from a political point of view than a legal point of view — but I didn’t hear any objection from a legal point of view.
Now, in terms of withdrawing from an agreement, whether or not an agreement has been approved by the Senate, my view would be: The president can withdraw unilaterally. That is the mainstream view. It’s certainly the view that the president can withdraw unilaterally from an agreement that didn’t even go to Congress, like the Paris Agreement. And in part, that’s for the reasons that I mentioned. The Senate is not deciding to join the agreement — they’re authorizing, but it’s up to the president whether to actually join, and the president does that unilaterally. And then the mirror image of that would be he or she can withdraw unilaterally.
There’s a related legal question that has not been litigated, which is if Congress passes a law that says, Thou shalt not withdraw from a particular agreement, would that law be constitutional? Some would say no, because the president can withdraw, and so the Congress can’t fetter that right. So that’s like uncharted waters, but that’s not a live issue in this case.
Trump took the U.S. out of the Paris Agreement. Biden put the us back into the Paris Agreement. Trump then took us out of the Paris Agreement again, and is now withdrawing the U.S. from the umbrella organization of the Paris Agreement. I assume that would complicate the efforts of a future president to rejoin the Paris Agreement. Would it be possible for them to rejoin the framework convention? What would have to happen?
Galbraith: So first, the framework convention is the gateway to the Paris Agreement. There’s a provision in the Paris Agreement that says, in order to be in the Paris Agreement, you’ve got to be in the framework convention. And so as a matter of international law, in order to rejoin the Paris Agreement — at least unless it were dramatically amended, which is its own unlikely thing — you would need to be a member of the UNFCCC, which does mean that the question of how you rejoin the UNFCCC becomes significant. We have very little practice on any kind of rejoining. I myself think that the president could simply rejoin the UNFCCC by pointing back to the original Senate resolution of advice and consent to it. You could go back to the Senate. You could ask Congress for a resolution.
My own view is that if the president withdraws the U.S., well, they still have on the books this resolution in which the Senate has consented to ratification — they want to go back in, they go back in. I think this is pretty logically clear, but also an important constraint on presidential power. Because it’s a much more concerning increase in presidential power if you have to do all the work of getting two-thirds of the Senate, then any president can, just at the snap of their fingers, take you out, and you have to go all the way back to the beginning.
Biniaz: There are many options. One is a straightforward option: You go back to the Senate, get 67 votes. Another would be you get both houses of Congress to authorize it [on a majority vote basis]. Another would be — and there may be more — but another would be the idea that the original Senate resolution which we used in 1992 to join still exists, and nothing has extinguished it. And there the analogy would be to a regular law.
There’s several laws in the United States that authorized the president to join some kind of international body or institution. There’s a law that authorizes the president to join the International Labor Organization. There’s a law that authorized the president to join UNESCO. In both of those cases, the U.S. has been in and out and back in — and I think in one case, at least, back out. No one has batted an eye because, well, it’s a law. So the question there would be, is there any reason why a Senate resolution would be any different? Professor Galbraith explores in her law review article that exact question, and concludes that, no, there shouldn’t be a difference — I’m simplifying, but that’s the gist. And under that theory, yeah, a future president could rejoin the convention on his or her own, utilizing that authority, and then after having rejoined the convention, rejoin the Paris Agreement.
So you mentioned that there’s a provision in the UNFCCC that says you have to give notice that you’re exiting, and you wait a year, and then you exit. What does not waiting a year look like?
Galbraith: It can happen that an entity will announce its exit and then violate international law by violating the treaty terms during that one-year period. If there are, say, reporting obligations that the United States has, it would be a violation of international law not to meet those during the period while you’re still a party to the treaty.
This is obviously an escalation of Trump’s previous actions to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, in the sense that it cuts off the path to rejoining that. What does this tell us about the way the Trump administration views its position within global climate diplomacy, and also the international community, period?
Galbraith: It adds to the impression that we already see other contexts, which is that the second Trump administration is even less inhibited and climate-aware than the first administration was — which is really saying something, right? This is an escalation of a position that was already an international outlier. Every other country is in these things, and it shows a real, powerful, and deeply upsetting failure to address the crisis of the global commons.
Biniaz: The way I think about it is that, during Trump 1, it was more like there was an absence of a positive — so in other words, the administration continued to participate in negotiations. They were not pressing countries to take climate action, but neither were they pressing countries not to take climate action. This administration, you could think of it as not just the absence of a positive, but the presence of a negative. I don’t mean that in any judgmental sense. I just mean there’s been much more of an active push from the administration for others to sort of follow suit or to vote against climate-related agreements such as at the [International Maritime Organization]. That’s quite a difference between 1 and 2.
Going into this past year’s COP, it seemed like there was already a sense that international climate diplomacy was, if not dead, at least the wind had come out of the sails. Do you agree? And if so, do you think that wind will come back?
Biniaz: You have to think of international climate diplomacy very broadly. It’s not just the UNFCCC Paris Agreement and decisions that are taken by consensus. That was pretty thin gruel that came out of COP30. But if you think of international climate diplomacy more broadly as all kinds of initiatives, coalitions that are operating among subgroups of countries and at all levels of stakeholders, there’s really a lot going on in what people call the real world. I think over the next couple of years, the proportion of action that’s taken officially, by consensus, dips somewhat, and action goes up. And maybe that balance shifts over time. But I think it’s wrong to judge climate diplomacy simply by what was achievable by 197 countries, because that’s always going to be the hardest to achieve, with or without the United States.
I think it’s more difficult without a pro-climate U.S. because of the role the U.S. has historically played, in terms of promoting ambition and brokering compromises and that kind of thing. But I don’t think, if you only look at that, it’s not the right metric for judging all of global climate diplomacy.
On Venezuela’s oil, permitting reform, and New York’s nuclear plans
Current conditions: Cold temperatures continue in Europe, with thousands of flights canceled at Amsterdam Schiphol Airport, while Scotland braces for a winter storm • Northern New Mexico is anticipating up to a foot of snow • Australia continues to swelter in heat wave, with “catastrophic fire risk” in the state of Victoria.
The White House said in a memo released Wednesday that it would withdraw from more than 60 intergovernmental organizations, including the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the international climate community’s governing organization for more than 30 years. After a review by the State Department, the president had determined that “it is contrary to the interests of the United States to remain a member of, participate in, or otherwise provide support” to the organizations listed. The withdrawal “marks a significant escalation of President Trump’s war on environmental diplomacy beyond what he waged in his first term,” Heatmap’s Robinson Meyer wrote Wednesday evening. Though Trump has pulled the United States out of the Paris Agreement (twice), he had so far refused to touch the long-tenured UNFCCC, a Senate-ratified pact from the early 1990s of which the U.S. was a founding member, which “has served as the institutional skeleton for all subsequent international climate diplomacy, including the Paris Agreement,” Meyer wrote.
Among the other organizations named in Trump’s memo was the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which produces periodic assessments on the state of climate science. The IPCC produced the influential 2018 report laying the intellectual foundations for the goal of limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels.
More details are emerging on the Trump administration’s plan to control Venezuela’s oil assets. Trump posted Tuesday evening on Truth Social that the U.S. government would take over almost $3 billion worth of Venezuelan oil. On Wednesday, Secretary of Energy Chris Wright told a Goldman Sachs energy conference that “going forward we will sell the production that comes out of Venezuela into the marketplace.” A Department of Energy fact sheet laid out more information, including that “all proceeds from the sale of Venezuelan crude oil and oil products will first settle in U.S. controlled accounts,” and that “these funds will be disbursed for the benefit of the American people and the Venezuelan people at the discretion of the U.S. government.” The DOE also said the government would selectively lift some sanctions to enable the oil sales and transport and would authorize importation of oil field equipment.
As I wrote for Heatmap on Monday, sanctions are just one barrier to oil development among a handful that would have to be cleared for U.S. oil companies to begin exploiting Venezuela’s vast oil resources.
In a Senate floor speech, Senator Martin Heinrich of New Mexico blasted the Trump administration’s anti-renewables executive actions, saying that the U.S. is “facing an energy crisis of the Trump administration’s own making,” and that “the Trump administration is dismantling the permitting process that we use to build new energy projects and get cheaper electrons on the grid.” Heinrich, a Democrat, is the ranking member of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources and a key player in any possible permitting reform bill. Though he said he supports permitting reform in principle, calling for “a system that can reliably get to a ‘yes’ or a ‘no’ on a permit in two to three years — not 10, not 17,” he said that “any permitting deal is going to have to guarantee that no administration of either party can weaponize the permitting process for cheap political points.” Heinrich called on Trump officials “to follow the law. They need to reverse their illegal stop work orders, and they need to start approving legally compliant energy projects.”
He did offer an olive branch to the Republican senators with whom he would have to negotiate on any permitting legislation, noting that “the challenge to doing permitting reform is not in this building,” specifying that Senators Mike Lee, chair of the ENR Committee, and Shelly Moore-Capito, chair of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, have not been barriers to a deal. Instead, he said, “it is this Administration that is poisoning the well.”

The climate science nonprofit Climate Central released an analysis Thursday morning ranking 2025 “as the third-highest year (after 2023 and 2024) for billion-dollar weather and climate disasters — with 23 such events causing 276 deaths and costing a total of $115 billion in damages,” according to a press release.
Going back to 1980, the average number of disasters costing $1 billion or more to clean up was nine, with an average total bill of $67.9 billion. The U.S. hit that average within the first weeks of last year with the Los Angeles wildfires, which alone were responsible for over $61 billion in damages, the most economically damaging wildfire on record.
The New York Power Authority announced Wednesday that 23 “potential developers or partners,” including heavyweights like NextEra and GE Hitachi and startups like The Nuclear Company and Terra Power, had responded to its requests for information on developing advanced nuclear projects in New York State. Eight upstate communities also responded as potential host sites for the projects.
New York Governor Kathy Hochul said last summer that New York’s state power agency would go to work on developing 1 gigawatt of nuclear capacity upstate. Late last year, Hochul signed an agreement with Ontario Premier Doug Ford to collaborate on nuclear technology. Ontario has been working on a small modular reactor at its existing Darlington nuclear site, across Lake Ontario from New York.
“Sunrise Wind has spent and committed billions of dollars in reliance upon, and has met the requests of, a thorough review process,” Orsted, the developer of the Sunrise Wind project off the coast of New York, said in a statement announcing that it was filing for a preliminary injunction against the suspension of its lease late last year.
The move would mark a significant escalation in Trump’s hostility toward climate diplomacy.
The United States is departing the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the overarching treaty that has organized global climate diplomacy for more than 30 years, according to the Associated Press.
The withdrawal, if confirmed, marks a significant escalation of President Trump’s war on environmental diplomacy beyond what he waged in his first term.
Trump has twice removed the U.S. from the Paris Agreement, a largely nonbinding pact that commits the world’s countries to report their carbon emissions reduction goals on a multi-year basis. He most recently did so in 2025, after President Biden rejoined the treaty.
But Trump has never previously touched the UNFCCC. That older pact was ratified by the Senate, and it has served as the institutional skeleton for all subsequent international climate diplomacy, including the Paris Agreement.
The United States was a founding member of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. It first joined the treaty in 1992, when President George H.W. Bush signed the pact and lawmakers unanimously ratified it.
Every other country in the world belongs to the UNFCCC. By withdrawing from the treaty, the U.S. would likely be locked out of the Conference of the Parties, the annual UN summit on climate change. It could also lose any influence over UN spending to drive climate adaptation in developing countries.
It remains unclear whether another president could rejoin the framework convention without a Senate vote.
As of 6 p.m. Eastern on Wednesday, the AP report cited a U.S. official who spoke on condition of anonymity because the news had not yet been announced.
The Trump administration has yet to confirm the departure. On Wednesday afternoon, the White House posted a notice to its website saying that the U.S. would leave dozens of UN groups, including those that “promote radical climate policies,” without providing specifics. The announcement was taken down from the White House website after a few minutes.
The White House later confirmed the departure from 31 UN entities in a post on the social network X, but did not list the groups in question.