You’re out of free articles.
This Halloween, get 20% off using code ADVANCED
Log in
To continue reading, log in to your account.
Create a Free Account
To unlock more free articles, please create a free account.
Sign In or Create an Account.
By continuing, you agree to the Terms of Service and acknowledge our Privacy Policy
Welcome to Heatmap
Thank you for registering with Heatmap. Climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our lives, a force reshaping our economy, our politics, and our culture. We hope to be your trusted, friendly, and insightful guide to that transformation. Please enjoy your free articles. You can check your profile here .
subscribe to get Unlimited access
Offer for a Heatmap News Unlimited Access subscription; please note that your subscription will renew automatically unless you cancel prior to renewal. Cancellation takes effect at the end of your current billing period. We will let you know in advance of any price changes. Taxes may apply. Offer terms are subject to change.
Subscribe to get unlimited Access
Hey, you are out of free articles but you are only a few clicks away from full access. Subscribe below and take advantage of our introductory offer.
subscribe to get Unlimited access
Offer for a Heatmap News Unlimited Access subscription; please note that your subscription will renew automatically unless you cancel prior to renewal. Cancellation takes effect at the end of your current billing period. We will let you know in advance of any price changes. Taxes may apply. Offer terms are subject to change.
Create Your Account
Please Enter Your Password
Forgot your password?
Please enter the email address you use for your account so we can send you a link to reset your password:
A new Brown University report argues powering down a misaligned artificial intelligence would be tougher — and take longer — than many experts assume.

This is Heatmap Daily, a weekday digest written by our executive editor. Subscribe here.
It’s one of the most popular what-ifs about rogue artificial intelligence: Suppose an AI agent really were to get out of control and start threatening hospitals, flights, critical infrastructure, or even humanity as a whole. Why wouldn’t we just pull the plug on it?
A new report argues: We might not be able to. And the reason has to do with the energy system.
A new white paper from the Climate Solutions Lab at Brown University finds that U.S. electricity law offers essentially no way to rapidly power down a data center where a rogue AI agent is operating.
The problem is primarily legal, although technical issues could interfere as well. The rules and laws governing the power grid simply don’t countenance a scenario whereby an industrial facility might need to be suddenly disconnected from the grid in an urgent way, the report says. They also aren’t built for a world where something happening autonomously in a computing facility could affect people thousands of miles away — and require an immediate emergency response.
“If the United States concluded tomorrow that an AI system had escaped its deployer’s control and had to be stopped by cutting electrical power, neither federal nor state officials could swiftly do so within the law,” the paper warns.
While authorities might eventually be able to get a court order to disconnect a data center under existing law, that disconnection process could take long enough that a rogue agent might still be able to copy itself to another computer. And it would likely require a technician to go into the facility itself and cut backup power generation — which could itself be controlled by the misaligned agent.
Jeff Colgan, a political science and international affairs professor at Brown University and the report’s author, told me that he was inspired to write the report after studying the Hugging Face hack over the summer, in which a swarm of rogue ChatGPT models escaped OpenAI’s systems and infiltrated a French technology platform.
Colgan normally studies oil and gas companies, the power grid, and international political systems. (He put together the Iran War cost tracker earlier this year.) But after looking at loss-of-control research, he realized AI scientists had not always thought about how state and federal power law might interfere with their disaster planning.
“The folks who are focused on artificial intelligence may not realize that how the grid is managed is a complicated story,” he told me on Wednesday.
The paper focuses on what it calls a “middle-range scenario” in which an AI agent goes rogue. It imagines not a case in which a super-intelligent agent is hellbent on human extinction or civilizational destruction — Colgan assumes the army wouldn’t stand on legal ceremony in that scenario — but one in which an AI system, running on identifiable hardware, hacks into companies and hospitals, steals information, and begins to tamper with key software or demand ransom payments.
In such a scenario, leaders would face three core risks, he said — presuming that they even figured out what was happening in the first place. First, it might not be clear what data center to shut down or even where the agent “lives” in a facility, or even if it resides on a single server at all. The data center operator may also not want to assist in an investigation during that phase for fear of incurring liability. Second, even if the data center could be identified and disconnected, then it might have access to on-site backup power, which would require some kind of in-person intervention. Finally, no command structure exists today through which a public official’s order to disconnect a data center would lead to a technician, either on-site or remotely, pulling the plug.
Existing laws are a poor fit for these problems, Colgan told me. During crisis situations today, the FBI can disconnect a building from the power grid in order to avoid immediate harm to life or property. But it can’t do anything about backup generation inside a property’s fence line.
Nor are today’s federal and state laws built for a situation in which a grid connection needs to be be severed because of what a third-party is computing inside a facility, the report finds. Instead, today’s laws “provide emergency authority over the electrical grid only to address a supply problem or a physical attack on the system itself,” the report says.
In fact, in virtually any scenario now imagined by the law, authorities would need to go to the courts to disconnect a data center from the power grid. That could potentially take “valuable time” because it could give a rogue agent time to distribute copies of itself to other servers, the report says. Existing laws would likely treat any urgent disconnection as the state’s prerogative — and not the federal government’s — because states wield most legal authority over the power grid.
Even if authorities could quickly sever a data center’s hookup, there’s also almost no way to do so without causing collateral damage to every other tenant inside a data center, Colgan said. That risk could further delay a utility shut-off or make leaders skittish about pulling the plug. And since some data center tenants keep backup power capacity in the same “cage” where they run their servers, a worker would likely need to go to the specific racks where an agent “resides” inside a facility to power it down.
The report doesn’t make policy recommendations, in part because frontier AI models are developing so rapidly — and the subject is so “deeply technical” — that it exceeds Colgan’s ability to advise legislative changes, he said. But he does recommend that AI experts and developers begin involving local grid authorities in their emergency scenario planning.
“You need someone from Anthropic to sit down with their utility, with someone from their [public utility commission], with someone from FERC,” he told me, referencing the federal agency that oversees the power grid. Those meetings should arguably happen in every state where an AI company is computing, and they should include discussion of how to locate an AI agent on a computing property and what to do if operators lose control.
Colgan offered another recommendation by phone on Wednesday. Given data centers’ deep unpopularity, many tech companies and data center developers are now willing to strike community benefits agreements with state or local governments in exchange for the right to build a new facility. Those contracts should recognize these AI alignment and electricity problems, he argued.
“There is this real political window to say, ‘If you want to build a data center, you must show that you could — if necessary — shut down specific server racks without doing massive collateral damage to everyone else,” he said. “This is the moment to do this, because there is some political leverage and because there is such demand for these data centers.”
This Halloween, get 20% off using code ADVANCED
Log in
To continue reading, log in to your account.
Create a Free Account
To unlock more free articles, please create a free account.
‘When China wants to do something, boy, they move fast.’
The electrolyzer has come a long way in the nearly 250 years since a pair of Dutch scientists first used electricity to split water into hydrogen and oxygen. Over the decades, European and American scientists refined and commercialized this technology, yet it is China that now accounts for nearly 70% of global electrolyzer manufacturing capacity, churning out the machines that make clean hydrogen from water at a fraction of Western costs. Its factories are building far more equipment than its domestic hydrogen market can absorb, and exports are climbing. On paper, China looks poised to dominate the global electrolyzer and green hydrogen markets, much as it already has solar panels and batteries.
“It stands to reason that the Chinese would want to capture the market just like they did everything else,” Rinaldo Brutoco, a hydrogen investor and founder of the think tank World Business Academy, told me. Beijing’s latest Five-Year Plan certainly lends credence to that ambition, repeatedly calling for the development of green hydrogen, hydrogen-derived fuels, and electrolyzers, even as other nations lag behind their once-ambitious clean hydrogen targets.
But it’s not actually obvious that the technology will go the way of solar. For one, Western governments are increasingly wary of dependence on Chinese energy technologies and are trying to bolster domestic manufacturing and limit foreign competition through measures like tariffs, domestic-content bonuses, and subsidy eligibility restrictions. The West also specializes in its own electrolyzer tech, which relies on proton exchange membranes. Though more expensive than China’s typical alkaline electrolyzers, PEM systems pair better with intermittent renewable power.
China’s tech is improving, though, and its electrolyzer stacks — the pile of cells where water splits into hydrogen and oxygen — cost about 60% less than Western alternatives. But the stack only accounts for about 6% to 9% of the total levelised cost of clean hydrogen production; most of the expense comes from electrical and process equipment, labor, and, most importantly, clean electricity. That single-digit cost advantage may not be enough to sway foreign buyers, especially since some cheaper designs come with trade-offs in efficiency, lifecycle, and warranty coverage.
“When the project as a whole is considered, there’s a lot less deviation between the Chinese technology and the rest of the world’s,” Thomas Koller, regional hydrogen lead at the Norwegian energy and maritime consultancy DNV, told me. But China is working on that, he added. “They’re very competitive already on the stack. But now they know that they also want to be competitive on how that stack can integrate with the wider electrolyzer system.”
Cracking that system-level cost issue could bring China much closer to achieving global market dominance. DNV calculates that to meet the Paris Agreement’s targets, clean hydrogen would need to supply around 15% of global energy demand by 2050 — and the production equipment and resultant clean molecules would have to come from somewhere.
In the meantime, however, the analysts I spoke with agreed that China’s domestic green hydrogen market is positioned for a near-term boom, as the government pushes adoption across fertilizer, chemicals, oil refining, steel, and transportation. “Demand is really the key takeaway that I see from this new Five-Year Plan — shifting from production to thinking about demand,” Koller told me.
And while the plan was pretty much complete before the Iran war broke out, the ongoing disruption in the Strait of Hormuz has underscored the logic behind China’s hydrogen push, as the country previously relied on the Strait for up to half of its crude oil imports. “It’s placed them in a pretty good position — in respect of hydrogen at least — to try and strengthen one of these areas that can reduce dependence on imported oil,” Koller said of the Five-Year Plan.
China is already the world’s largest hydrogen producer and consumer by a wide margin, using the gas as a key industrial feedstock for its vast chemicals and heavy industry sectors. But today, the industry makes nearly all of that hydrogen with fossil fuels.
Beijing made clear in its latest Five-Year Plan, released in March, that it wants to change that. According to an unofficial translation, the state promised to “expand applications of hydrogen energy in transportation, electricity, industrial, and other domains,” while improving “renewable energy hydrogen production equipment” and advancing “the hydrogen energy industry chain toward green ammonia, methanol, and sustainable aviation fuels.” (China has not published an official English translation of the plan.)
The country certainly has the manufacturing capacity to support these ambitions. After hundreds of manufacturers poured into the electrolyzer industry earlier this decade, China now produces about 35 gigawatts worth of this equipment annually, compared with less than 2 gigawatts of domestic demand. The resulting glut has even led some producers to sell their equipment below cost, echoing the dynamics of the solar industry in the early 2010s. Now, Beijing is trying to build a green hydrogen market to soak up the surplus, elevating production of the fuel — and derivatives like ammonia, methanol, and SAF — to a national priority.
“They’re talking about nationwide pipelines for hydrogen. They’re talking about a regionalized cluster strategy; they have very hard targets for green hydrogen sales,” Brutoco told me.
China is targeting 2 million metric tons of renewable hydrogen production annually by 2030, an eightfold increase from roughly 0.25 million metric tons today. The government has also designated five city clusters as green hydrogen demonstration zones, each eligible for up to about $240 million over four years to scale up the fuel’s use across sectors including transportation, metallurgy, and green ammonia and methanol production — and to build the pipelines required to move it.
“Hydrogen has clearly moved up in political visibility,” Qi Qin, a China analyst at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, told me back in March.
All of this stands in stark contrast to Western markets, where low-carbon hydrogen projects continue to be delayed or scrapped amid weak demand and waning political support. Clean hydrogen is still far more expensive than its fossil fuel-based counterpart; buyers remain reluctant to pay a green premium, and policy uncertainty over the past few years has clouded the industry outlook. In the U.S., the rollback of Inflation Reduction Act incentives has weakened the economic case for green hydrogen, while in Europe, delays to regulatory decisions and missed deadlines for implementing hydrogen mandates have added to the uncertainty.
“Many companies were really thinking that the hydrogen economy was going to take off, and in the end, this has not been the case,” Anne-Sophie Corbeau, a researcher at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, told me. “The cost of the whole electrolyzer system is actually much higher than what we thought at the beginning.” That, combined with advances in batteries and other electrification technologies like industrial heat pumps, has arguably narrowed the range of applications where green hydrogen makes sense.
But perhaps the problem is simply a failure of imagination. After all, no country has yet demonstrated what a scaled-up clean hydrogen industry could look like, either physically or economically. The next few years, however, could offer a decent preview.
“When China wants to do something, boy, they move fast,” Brutoco told me. And there’s no doubt Beijing wants to capitalize on its burgeoning hydrogen economy. “They need more export markets because their housing boom — which busted — ain’t coming back in the near future,” he argued, explaining that new export opportunities could help revive Beijing’s sluggish economy. He sees electrolyzers and hydrogen as “low-hanging fruit,” given the country’s existing domestic buildout.
As for the argument that cheap Chinese electrolyzer stacks do comparably little to reduce the overall installed cost of a clean hydrogen project, Brutoco doesn’t buy it. He doubts developers would forgo potential savings — and the additional revenue that could generate — simply to align themselves with their administration’s protectionist preferences. “Did you ever know a business person that would like to shave 5% to 10%?” he asked.
Then there’s the question of performance. China’s alkaline electrolyzers have historically been slower to ramp up and down in tandem with variable renewable power compared with PEM systems. But Brutoco argues that today’s improving alkaline tech is more than capable of serving utility-scale renewable projects in areas with relatively consistent sun or wind. Koller likewise sees Chinese alkaline manufacturers as credible contenders for a range of overseas projects.
“I would expect that all of the European projects that are electrolyzer-driven, they will be considering Chinese electrolyzers, among others,” he told me. The case could prove even stronger elsewhere in the APAC region, including India, Japan, South Korea, and Australia. “All of the projects that I can recall having seen for Asia Pacific [...] at least some Chinese technology has been considered.”
But since Amy Ouyang, a senior hydrogen associate at the Clean Air Task Force, has been tracking the industry, she told me that “the narrative has shifted.” Just three years ago, many analysts expected Chinese electrolyzers to follow the trajectory of solar panels, with rock-bottom prices eventually squeezing Western manufacturers out of the market. But today’s more protectionist trade environment has made her reconsider that assumption.
“Maybe in the 2010s, the European countries and the U.S. were not really prepared to say, ‘We’re going to turn away Chinese solar panels just because they’re made in China,’” she told me. But Washington in particular has soured on its earlier laissez-faire approach to trade, perhaps regretting that while the U.S. and allied nations pioneered technologies such as solar cells and lithium-ion batteries, China ultimately scaled them — capturing millions of manufacturing jobs in the process.
Energy shocks from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to the Iran war have further pushed Western policymakers toward a focus on domestic manufacturing, energy security, and even food security, Corbeau, the Columbia researcher, told me, given that about a third of globally traded fertilizer passes through the Strait of Hormuz. Now, she said, more countries are likely thinking, “What if we use our hydro, geothermal, maybe cheap renewables, in order to produce hydrogen domestically and produce ammonia domestically and produce fertilizer domestically?”
It all adds up to an environment where Ouyang sees “a lot more willingness to protect their own domestic industries from the low price of the Chinese electrolyzers,” she said.
The problem is, there simply isn’t much of a Western clean hydrogen industry to actually protect right now. Spurring demand will require political will and economic incentives to persuade hydrogen end users to make deals and help the nascent industry move down the cost curve. But with wholesale electricity prices rising and the Trump administration dismantling renewable energy legislation, the U.S. in particular looks unlikely to invest in much manufacturing capacity anytime soon.
But if the West does decide to double down, it might be better off conceding the price war from the outset. “A Western electrolyzer stack would probably struggle to match China’s lowest bid on an electrolyzer stack,” Koller explained, advising against trying to replicate China’s commodity-scale manufacturing model. “I would see their stronger position being if they can demonstrate different performance, different integration, offer a different type of service, an improved lifecycle emissions statement.”
That is, the answer probably isn’t to beat China at its own game. The U.S. and Europe might never win on cost, but that doesn’t mean they can’t build and scale a superior technology before yet another industry slips out of their reach.
Only upgrades for pre-existing wind projects have been approved.
In September, the Trump administration told a reporter that the president directed the Pentagon to finally process wind projects through routine airspace approvals as required under a court order. By doing this, it created the appearance of real headway and good faith in talks with Democrats in Congress on energy permitting legislation before the November midterm elections.
But the White House’s assurances are not what they seem.
All of the projects the administration has reportedly advanced over the past week are repowerings, meaning they’re only upgrades of existing projects, and two of the “projects” they’ve advanced were just two individual turbines, the American Clean Power Association on Tuesday told members involved in litigation with the administration.
Over the course of his presidency, the president’s team has turned what was once a sleepy bureaucratic check for radar or flight interference into a weapon against wind energy in the United States. You need Federal Aviation Administration clearance for any structure above 200 feet in the air and that process includes a Pentagon review. By claiming wind projects suddenly needed new scrutiny for national security reasons, the Pentagon held up FAA airspace approvals for apparently hundreds of projects.
This has been a key part of bipartisan energy legislation talks back in D.C., as Democrats in Congress have demanded at least some semblance of regular order be returned to renewable energy in federal permitting. The permitting bill ostensibly has ways to strengthen wind companies’ hand in dealing with a hostile Trump administration but negotiators, including Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse, have also previously called attacks on wind projects during negotiations harmful to a final deal becoming law.
In September, Politico reported Trump told his aides he would agree to direct the Defense Department to “start clearing its queue of long-delayed onshore wind projects to strike a deal” citing “two people familiar with the talks and granted anonymity.” Among the commitments Politico reported were made: to approve about 30 projects awaiting a countersignature from the Pentagon on a mitigation agreement related to airspace impacts.
In federal court, the renewable energy trade groups who brought the lawsuit clearly don’t think the Trump administration actually followed through with that promise.
On Oct. 20, after updates from the Justice Department showed little signs of progress (which I wrote about), the trade groups filed a motion to enforce the judge’s stay on their air clearance freeze, saying that very little had advanced since the ruling in early August, and that none of the 30 projects awaiting countersignature on their mitigation agreements actually had advanced from Pentagon review. In addition, they said the government was now asking project developers to sign onto a litany of new requirements in exchange for a sign-off on mitigation agreements. They submitted a joint declaration from subject matter experts, including from former military personnel, who described these requirements as a vast departure from precedent with little basis in security rationale that they said also had terms that could violate state or local laws, like a blanket prohibition on aircraft detection light systems. (You can read the declaration here.)
Two days later, on Oct. 22, it started to look like we were getting somewhere when news outlets reported the Trump administration was "advancing" two “wind projects” in South Dakota and Maine, citing statements from the White House and the Pentagon.
Bob Ditchey, a spokesperson for the Pentagon, told us in an email that the two “wind projects” were Crowned Ridge, which he said consisted of 87 turbines in “Grant, SD,” and “Blue Sky/Hill,” which he said was made up of 19 turbines in “Hancock, ME.” Ditchey described them both as “proposed” wind energy “developments.”
“Following rigorous evaluation of potential impacts on military readiness, radar installations, and airspace operations, the DoW has cleared both projects to proceed to the next phase of federal evaluation,” Ditchey said in an email. “The projects have been formally referred to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for final aeronautical study and determination.”
The South Dakota wind project Trump officials are referencing is likely NextEra’s Crowned Ridge wind farm, which has 87 turbines and has been operational since 2019. On Oct. 5 a NextEra project consultant submitted a litany of height clearance requests for a “repowering project” on behalf of Crowned Ridge Energy Center, LLC, according to the Federal Aviation Administration’s public database. The requests are for turbines in Grant County.
There is no Maine wind project with the name “Blue Sky/Hill,” as far as we can tell, but there is a project in Hancock County that was completed in 2012 called “Bull Hill” that consists of 19 turbines, and which also has pending applications for repowering in the FAA’s database.
Neither NextEra nor Bull Hill’s developer, TerraForm Power, responded to our requests for comment. The Pentagon also did not respond to questions about these projects or the additional ones it said it had advanced.
In addition, as of this story’s publication, all of the air clearance requests for these two projects are all listed as “pending” online.
If you’re wondering why operational wind farms might need air clearances for construction, all of the wind farms’ requests describe the projects as “repowering,” an industry term that applies to upgrading, modifying, altering or restarting pre-existing wind farms. A repowering can mean anything from fixing turbine blades to changing turbine height, or moving a turbine, or commissioning new turbines entirely. Crucially though it’s not really considered a “new wind farm” in the colloquial sense. As my colleague Matthew Zeitlin has explained, repowerings are seen by the energy sector as a simple pathway to the most juice for the squeeze from what has already been permitted and built.
On Tuesday, Punchbowl News reported that the White House was advancing three more wind projects in Illinois and Iowa. After this story ran, American Clean Power told members involved in the airspace litigation clarifying that all of the projects thus far are “repowerings” and that the two Illinois “projects” each were only individual wind turbines. None of the projects were new utility scale projects.
On Wednesday, just before this story went to press, Punchbowl News reported another two wind projects were advancing, calling it “more permitting goodwill from the White House.” We have not yet been able to confirm what these projects are or whether they are also repowering projects.
American Clean Power endorsed the bipartisan Senate permitting bill and called for its passage. The group provided a comment from Frank Macchiarola, their chief advocacy officer: “To date, the administration has moved forward only a handful of the total number of projects they agreed to approve. In order to pass BAAJA and bring down costs for Americans, the Administration needs to get serious about building clean power.”
The White House did not respond to a request for comment.
Current conditions: For the first time, Miami’s king tide — a periodic exceptionally high tide brought by on astronomical alignment — crossed the threshold for “major” flooding without a hurricane, notching the highest level in 11 years • America’s Northern Mariana Islands are hunkering down as Typhoon In-Fa is set to brush past its northern reaches • India has evacuated tens of thousands from its eastern coast as Tropical Cyclone Arnab makes landfall.

Israelis voted in record numbers Tuesday in the first election held since the October 2023 attacks by Hamas, which ignited the ongoing multifront conflict been Israel and militias in Gaza and southern Lebanon. While Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s conservative Likud party looked projected to win the most seats in the Knesset, the opposition coalition led by centrist former military chief of staff Gadi Eisenkot appeared positioned as of Wednesday morning New York time to form an alliance that holds at least 61 of the parliament’s 120 seats — if anyone can broker a governing bloc at all. What that means for energy and climate policy in the Jewish State remains even less clear than what kind of government may form out of the election results. Eisenkot ran on cost of living, democracy, and holding Netanyahu accountable for the October 7 disaster. In 2021, he became chairman of StorageDrop, a long-duration energy storage startup based just south of Tel Aviv. At the time, he said dealing with climate change and creating green alternatives to fossil fuels was “of great importance,” and that Israel should “be at the forefront of the global effort in this field.”
Netanyahu has also supported renewables, which grew to 16% of Israel’s electricity share last year. In May, his government set a target of a more than threefold increase in renewables in the next decade. Just last week, as you may recall, the Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure put out a new plan to invest more into fusion. But his signature policy has been brokering an historic $35 million deal to drill gas offshore in the Mediterranean to sell the fuel to Egypt. While Israel has pledged to cut its economy-wide emissions 27% below 2015 levels, the State Comptroller, an independent watchdog within the government, warned in June that the country’s failure to pass a law enforcing the reductions meant it had, according to The Jerusalem Post, “still not built a functioning national system to prepare for climate change.”
President Donald Trump plans to loosen a Biden-era regulation requiring oil and gas drillers to cut emissions of methane. Speaking at a campaign rally for Texas Republican Senate hopeful Ken Paxton, Trump said he’s “officially terminating Biden’s expensive and unnecessary methane regulations to save consumers and energy producers $45 billion in costs.” The move aims to spur more gas production at a moment when, as we saw from the megamerger this week set to create the nation’s biggest gas producer, the industry is consolidating. But it comes as methane emissions in the U.S. oil and gas sector are actually flattening, despite growing production. Earlier this month, as I reported, a study by Johns Hopkins University found that “companies have built more infrastructure needed to better capture methane” and “transport it for sale as a fuel, providing a financial incentive to limit the amount escaping into the atmosphere.” But the researchers cautioned that “oil and gas production is still a large percentage of U.S. methane emissions, and we do not find any evidence that a flurry of federal legislation had an impact on emissions.”
Meanwhile, the former Biden senior climate advisor, John Podesta, has warned that passing the permitting reform bill as is could hand Trump “a loaded Howitzer,” my colleague Jael Holzman reported yesterday.
If you can’t buy an as-yet-unbuilt small modular reactor, you go for an existing large-scale technology like the Westinghouse AP1000 or the Canadian CANDU. If you can’t line up the financing for a whole new nuclear megaproject, you squeeze a little more juice out of the reactors you already have. That’s why Amazon and Google inked deals earlier this month with Constellation, the nation’s largest operator of nuclear plants, which estimates it can generate nearly 1.1 gigawatts of new power simply from “uprating” its existing plants. At the time, I called it “big tech’s nuclear hedge.” The Department of Energy is backing the bet. On Tuesday, the Office of Energy Dominance Financing announced a $5 billion loan to support the uprates. “These investments will add more reliable baseload power to the grid, help lower electricity costs, strengthen our nation’s energy security, and fuel long-term American prosperity,” EDF Director Gregory Beard said in a statement.
The U.S. is on track to rise from about 101 gigawatts of nuclear today to 111 gigawatts in 2040 and 132 gigawatts in 2050, according to Wood Mackenzie forecasts. Behind-the-meter plants, particularly for data centers, could add another 11 gigawatts in 2040 and 19 gigawatts in 2050. “If the US government, under the current administration or another pro-nuclear administration in the future, wants to accelerate the pace of that growth, building capacity in the workforce and supply chain should be an urgent priority,” Ed Crooks, Wood Mackenize’s vice chair of the Americas, wrote in a blog post.
Sign up to receive Heatmap AM in your inbox every morning:
Trump’s deal to import Russian diesel has largely been discussed for its for its potential to ease prices on the global market. But 140,000 metric tons of Russian fuel is now headed for the U.S. market. The fuel will arrive in three tankers, including one blacklisted by U.S. authorities and another by the European Union, according to the Financial Times. The shipments are the first licensed by the U.S. since Trump’s recent deal with President Vladimir Putin to exempt Russian diesel from sanctions. The goal is to achieve a perceptible reduction in costs ahead of next week’s midterm election, in which energy prices have been a major factor.
Insurance is often described as the canary in the coal mine for climate change as the industry is expected to raise prices on assets increasingly under threat from extreme weather. But the analysts tasked with assessing risk are facing pressure to downplay climate dangers in their models to help cut the price of coverage and make it easier for brokers and underwriters to sell more policies. That’s according to five whistleblowers’ testimony to the Financial Times. The United Kingdom’s Financial Conduct Authority told the newspaper the allegations were “exceptionally serious” and could amount to significant breaches of financial and prudential regulation. “Every single person I work with all say the same thing — that we shouldn’t be altering the numbers for these accounts in the way we do,” one whistleblower said.
The deadliest conflict of the 21st century is restarting in Ethiopia’s war-torn north. But in the country’s fast-industrialized capital, business is booming. Addis Ababa’s “Made in Ethiopia” initiative has spurred a manufacturing boom of 1,115 factories. As of last year, TOYO, a major U.S.-Japanese solar manufacturer, has capacity to produce 2 gigawatts of solar cells at its Ethiopian factory. Officially inaugurated last year, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam added more than 5 gigawatts of power to the grid. A new International Energy Agency report highlights how far the country has come — and how far it has yet to go. Just 12% of the country had electricity access in the early 2000s. By 2024, that figure hit 35%. But around 85 million Ethiopians remain without steady access to power. The country has a target of 75% access by 2030 and universal access by 2035. That, the IEA said, “will require continued grid expansion, greater deployment of off-grid solutions, and measures to make connections more affordable.”