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Canada’s carbon tax was supposed to be different. Unlike the proposed cap-and-trade scheme in the United States or the European Union’s carbon trading system, Canada’s program was not a kitty for green energy subsidies. The tax would be split into two pieces: a charge on large industrial emitters, largely raised through provincial systems where more intensive emitters buy credits from those that emit less, and a tax on consumers that took the form of a charge on fuels, including gasoline. And the best part: The bulk of the revenue raised by the tax would be returned to provinces and individual taxpayers.
Five years after it was put in place, however, Canada’s new Liberal prime minister, Mark Carney, scrapped the consumer half of the tax as one of his first acts in office. In doing so, he was trying to cut off a potent line of attack from the opposition Conservative party, whose leader, Pierre Poilievre, has tried to center upcoming national elections on the issue. Polling from earlier this year showed that overall support had fallen from 56% in 2021 to 45% today, while Liberal support for the tax had fallen even further, from 83% to 70%.
This was despite reams of outside and official data showing that most Canadians benefited from the tax, at least in terms of (Canadian) dollars paid compared to those received in rebates. Per Canada’s Parliamentary Budget Officer, Ontario households in the median quintile (i.e. between the 40th and 60th percentile) came out $117 ahead on average this year. And although the tax did have a slight negative effect on economic growth of 0.6%, according to PBO estimates, that study didn’t take into account the value of lower greenhouse gas emissions.
If a carbon tax and dividend can’t work even in Canada, it appears to confirm a distressing truth for climate activists — that even if people are concerned about climate change, they don’t want to pay very much to fix it.
Popular discontent with the tax — especially among Conservative voters — picked up dramatically in 2022, alongside rising gas prices. The thinking goes, “if the price of gas goes up, it’s the carbon tax,” Kathryn Harrison, a professor of political science at the University of British Columbia, told me. But while it’s true that the carbon tax makes gas more expensive, the tax is a fixed charge, meaning that any big jump in gas prices cannot possibly be its fault. Then again, when gas prices are already high, anything extra can feel especially noxious.
“People hate the idea of a tax,” Harrison said. “When they know there’s a tax, they perceive the impact as much greater than it has been.”
There’s also a strong political element to how people feel about a carbon tax. Along with fellow researchers Matto Mildenberger, Erick Lachapelle, and Isabelle Stadelmann-Steffen, Harrison examined rebate programs in Switzerland and Canada for a 2022 paper published in Nature Climate Change, and found that the simple matter of dollars (or francs) and cents could not overcome the carbon tax’s well-established political identity. In Canada, Conservative voters tended to underestimate the rebate’s size more than Liberals did.
Carney is in some sense an odd figure to ditch carbon pricing. Before his leadership campaign, he was a prominent figure in climate finance, heading up climate transition investing at Brookfield Asset Management, a huge renewable investor and developer, and was the co-chair of the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero, a financial institution decarbonization group. Ideally Carney told a BBC interviewer at the 2021 COP26 Summit in Glasgow, “we would have a global carbon price.” And though that would have to vary depending on a company’s relative economic position, “everyone should try to have a price on carbon,” he said.
In canceling the tax on Friday, however, Carney said that it had become “too divisive” and was “not working,” echoing language from his leadership campaign.
The cancellation comes as the federal fuel charge was set to rise 3.3 cents per liter, from 14.3 cents to 17.6 cents. During his party leadership campaign, Carney proposed that the fuel charge be replaced with “a system of incentives to reward Canadians for making greener choices, such as purchasing an energy efficient appliance, electric vehicle, or improved home insulation.” Sound familiar?
So where does this leave carbon tax proponents? If one can’t survive in Canada, where can it?
Catherine Wolfram, an economist at MIT and former Biden Treasury official, is, like many economists, a supporter of carbon pricing. She told me that “too many people are dancing on the grave of carbon taxing writ large,” noting that the industrial side of Canada’s carbon tax is still active. And so If someone came to her for advice on a carbon tax, she would tell them to “start with something very far upstream. Start with industry. Don’t touch retail gasoline until more substitutes are available to consumers.”
She also pointed out that the industrial side of the tax was still alive in Canada, and Carney’s decarbonize your life-style proposal could address individual carbon emissions. But wouldn’t this just be the Inflation Reduction Act all over again, I asked her?
No, she said, because Canada still, for now at least, has a tax on industrial emitters.
“If we could get the U.S. to where Canada is now, I would be delighted,” she said.
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Third Way’s latest memo argues that climate politics must accept a harsh reality: natural gas isn’t going away anytime soon.
It wasn’t that long ago that Democratic politicians would brag about growing oil and natural gas production. In 2014, President Obama boasted to Northwestern University students that “our 100-year supply of natural gas is a big factor in drawing jobs back to our shores;” two years earlier, Montana Governor Brian Schweitzer devoted a portion of his speech at the Democratic National Convention to explaining that “manufacturing jobs are coming back — not just because we’re producing a record amount of natural gas that’s lowering electricity prices, but because we have the best-trained, hardest-working labor force in the history of the world.”
Third Way, the long tenured center-left group, would like to go back to those days.
Affordability, energy prices, and fossil fuel production are all linked and can be balanced with greenhouse gas-abatement, its policy analysts and public opinion experts have argued in a series of memos since the 2024 presidential election. Its latest report, shared exclusively with Heatmap, goes further, encouraging Democrats to get behind exports of liquified natural gas.
For many progressive Democrats and climate activists, LNG is the ultimate bogeyman. It sits at the Venn diagram overlap of high greenhouse gas emissions, the risk of wasteful investment and “stranded” assets, and inflationary effects from siphoning off American gas that could be used by domestic households and businesses.
These activists won a decisive victory in the Biden years when the president put a pause on approvals for new LNG export terminal approvals — a move that was quickly reversed by the Trump White House, which now regularly talks about increases in U.S. LNG export capacity.
“I think people are starting to finally come to terms with the reality that oil and gas — and especially natural gas— really aren’t going anywhere,” John Hebert, a senior policy advisor at Third Way, told me. To pick just one data point: The International Energy Agency’s latest World Energy Outlook included a “current policies scenario,” which is more conservative about policy and technological change, for the first time since 2019. That saw the LNG market almost doubling by 2050.
“The world is going to keep needing natural gas at least until 2050, and likely well beyond that,” Hebert said. “The focus, in our view, should be much more on how we reduce emissions from the oil and gas value chain and less on actually trying to phase out these fuels entirely.”
The memo calls for a variety of technocratic fixes to America’s LNG policy, largely to meet demand for “cleaner” LNG — i.e. LNG produced with less methane leakage — from American allies in Europe and East Asia. That “will require significant efforts beyond just voluntary industry engagement,” according to the Third Way memo.
These efforts include federal programs to track methane emissions, which the Trump administration has sought to defund (or simply not fund); setting emissions standards with Europe, Japan, and South Korea; and more funding for methane tracking and mitigation programs.
But the memo goes beyond just a few policy suggestions. Third Way sees it as part of an effort to reorient how the Democratic Party approaches fossil fuel policy while still supporting new clean energy projects and technology. (Third Way is also an active supporter of nuclear power and renewables.)
“We don’t want to see Democrats continuing to slow down oil and gas infrastructure and reinforce this narrative that Democrats are just a party of red tape when these projects inevitably go forward anyway, just several years delayed,” Hebert told me. “That’s what we saw during the Biden administration. We saw that pause of approvals of new LNG export terminals and we didn’t really get anything for it.”
Whether the Democratic Party has any interest in going along remains to be seen.
When center-left commentator Matthew Yglesias wrote a New York Times op-ed calling for Democrats to work productively with the domestic oil and gas industry, influential Democratic officeholders such as Illinois Representative Sean Casten harshly rebuked him.
Concern over high electricity prices has made some Democrats a little less focused on pursuing the largest possible reductions in emissions and more focused on price stability, however. New York Governor Kathy Hochul, for instance, embraced an oft-rejected natural gas pipeline in her state (possibly as part of a deal with the Trump administration to keep the Empire Wind 1 project up and running), for which she was rewarded with the Times headline, “New York Was a Leader on Climate Issues. Under Hochul, Things Changed.”
Pennsylvania Governor Josh Shapiro (also a Democrat) was willing to cut a deal with Republicans in the Pennsylvania state legislature to get out of the Northeast’s carbon emissions cap and trade program, which opponents on the right argued could threaten energy production and raise prices in a state rich with fossil fuels. He also made a point of working with the White House to pressure the region’s electricity market, PJM Interconnection, to come up with a new auction mechanism to bring new data centers and generation online without raising prices for consumers.
Ruben Gallego, a Democratic Senator from Arizona (who’s also doing totally normal Senate things like having town halls in the Philadelphia suburbs), put out an energy policy proposal that called for “ensur[ing] affordable gasoline by encouraging consistent supply chains and providing funding for pipeline fortification.”
Several influential Congressional Democrats have also expressed openness to permitting reform bills that would protect oil and gas — as well as wind and solar — projects from presidential cancellation or extended litigation.
As Democrats gear up for the midterms and then the presidential election, Third Way is encouraging them to be realistic about what voters care about when it comes to energy, jobs, and climate change.
“If you look at how the Biden administration approached it, they leaned so heavily into the climate message,” Hebert said. “And a lot of voters, even if they care about climate, it’s just not top of mind for them.”
Current conditions: A foot of snow piled up on Hawaii's mountaintops • Fresh snow in parts of the Northeast’s highlands, from the New York Adirondacks to Vermont’s Green Mountains, could top 10 inches • The seismic swarm that rattled Iceland with more than 600 relatively low-level earthquakes over the course of two days has finally subsided.
Say what you will about President Donald Trump’s cuts to electric vehicles, renewables, and carbon capture, the administration has given the nuclear industry red-carpet treatment. The Department of Energy refashioned its in-house lender into a financing hub for novel nuclear projects. After saving the Biden-era nuclear funding from the One Big Beautiful Bill Act’s cleaver, the agency distributed hundreds of millions of dollars to specific small modular reactors and rolled out testing programs to speed up deployment of cutting-edge microreactors. The Department of Commerce brokered a deal with the Japanese government to provide the Westinghouse Electric Company with $80 billion to fund construction of up to 10 large-scale AP1000 reactors. But still, in private, I’m hearing from industry sources that utilities and developers want more financial protection against bankruptcy if something goes wrong. My sources tell me the Trump administration is resistant to providing companies with a blanket bailout if nuclear construction goes awry. But legislation in the Senate could step in to provide billions of dollars in federal backing for over-budget nuclear reactors. Senator Jim Risch, an Idaho Republican, previously introduced the Accelerating Reliable Capacity Act in 2024 to backstop nuclear developers still reeling from the bankruptcies associated with the last AP1000 buildout. This time, as E&E News noted, “he has a prominent Democrat as a partner.” Senator Ruben Gallego, an Arizona Democrat who stood out in 2024 by focusing his campaign’s energy platform on atomic energy and just recently put out an energy strategy document, co-sponsored the bill, which authorizes up to $3.6 billion to help offset cost overruns at three or more next-generation nuclear projects.
Nuclear generation set a new global record in 2025, the International Energy Agency said in its latest electricity outlook published last Friday. That’s largely thanks to Japan restarting reactors idled after Fukushima, France ramping up generation at its fleet, and China and India opening new plants. By 2030, however, China will account for 40% of the global increase in nuclear generation. You can see the difference in the growth rate already. Nuclear power worldwide is on track to grow by an average of 2.8% per year, more than double the 1.3% pace of the previous four years. China’s nuclear capacity, by contrast, will grow by an average of 6% per year through the end of the decade.

Roughly 22% of light-duty vehicles sold last year in the U.S. were hybrid and battery electric, up from 20% in 2024. While sales of battery-powered vehicles have fallen, demand for hybrids has only increased, according to estimates from the research firm Omdia that the U.S. Energy Information Administration highlighted in a new analysis. Electric vehicles accounted for just 2% of all registered light-duty vehicles on U.S. roads in 2024, the most recent year for which annual data is available. Sales for 2025 will show a spike, especially around September when Americans rushed to cash in on electric vehicle tax credits before Trump’s phaseout took effect.
The Department of Transportation, meanwhile, proposed boosting the domestic content requirements for federally funded electric vehicle charging stations from 55% to 100%. The Biden administration had waived some “Buy American” requirements for the $5 billion federal program to fund the infrastructure buildout. The proposal would set steep hurdles for projects, likely slowing the rollout of chargers. The agency, Reuters reported, said it believes it must “protect Americans from foreign-made EV charger components that use technology with cybersecurity vulnerabilities.”
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Equinor is scaling back its near-term investments in carbon capture and sequestration projects as prices go up and customer demand stagnates. Despite its reputation as what the Carbon Herald called “one of the global standard-bearers for carbon capture and storage,” the Norwegian energy giant said the commercial conditions needed to justify more large-scale investments in carbon pipelines and wells were not yet there. CEO Anders Opedal said during the company’s latest earnings call that, because CCS markets were growing more slowly than previously thought, Equinor would hold off on committing more capital to new projects.
CCS had something of a moment last fall when Google agreed to finance construction of a gas plant equipped with carbon capture technology, as Heatmap’s Matthew Zeitlin wrote. But Trump’s plan to go for the climate killshot, repealing the legal underpinning of all federal regulations on planet-heating emissions, would really dampen demand for CCS in the U.S.
The new U.S.-India trade deal that will lower tariffs on Indian goods to 18% from 25% is set to bolster the country’s booming solar manufacturing industry. The pact represents what Prashant Mathur, chief executive of the solar manufacturer Saatvik Green Energy, described to PV-Tech as a “strategic turning point.” Cutting tariffs by seven percentage points “materially improves cost competitiveness, making U.S. projects more profitable and creating new demand for high-efficiency, Made-in-India products.” Gyanesh Chaudhary, the managing director of Vikram Solar, called the deal a “structural inflection point.” But the trade agreement won’t fix all the problems for Indian solar exporters. New restrictions known as Section 232 tariffs, which raise prices on imports that threaten national security by undercutting domestic manufacturers, are expected to come into effect on India’s exports of polysilicon. A separate antidumping and countervailing duty investigation into whether India is unfairly flooding the U.S. market with cheap crystalline silicon solar cells called for a duty of 123.04%, though nothing has yet been imposed.
The Trump administration, meanwhile, is setting the stage for more coal in the U.S. On Wednesday, according to Bloomberg, Trump plans to sign an executive order directing the military to buy more power from coal-fired plants in a bid to prop up the sector.
Despite Trump’s best attempts to stop it, Orsted is finishing its offshore wind farms in New England and, after that, is expected to save its money for new projects overseas. In its native Europe, the energy giant is preparing for a big multinational buildout in the North Sea. Now the Danish developer is charging ahead in a new market. Australia does not have any operating offshore wind farms. But Orsted just submitted an application for an environmental review of a 2.8 gigawatt project proposed off the coast of Gippsland, Victoria. Together with a second site Orsted started lining up in 2024, the area could host a combined 4.8 gigawatts of turbine capacity, according to Renewables Now.
Yet another fusion energy startup has officially entered the race. Inertia Enterprises, a fusion startup aimed at mimicking the technology that managed for the first time in history to generate more energy than it took to start the reaction, has raised $450 million in a Series A round. The venture firm Bessemer Venture Partners led the round, with backing from Google Ventures, Modern Capital, and Threshold Ventures. “Inertia is building on decades of science and billions of dollars invested to reach the ignition milestone that proved the science,” Jeff Lawson, the co-founder and chief executive of Inertia, said in a statement.
CarbonPlan has a new tool to measure climate risk that comes with full transparency.
On a warming planet, knowing whether the home you’re about to invest your life savings in is at risk of being wiped out by a wildfire or drowned in a flood becomes paramount. And yet public data is almost nonexistent. While private companies offer property-level climate risk assessments — usually for a fee — it’s hard to know which to trust or how they should be used. Companies feed different datasets into their models and make different assumptions, and often don’t share all the details. The models have been shown to predict disparate outcomes for the same locations.
For a measure of the gap between where climate risk models are and where consumers want them to be, look no further than Zillow. The real estate website added a “climate risk” section to its property listings in 2024 in response to customer demand — only to axe the feature a year later at the behest of an industry group that questioned the accuracy of its risk ratings.
Now, however, a new tool that assesses wildfire risk for every building in the United States aims to advance the field through total transparency. The nonprofit research group CarbonPlan launched the free, user-friendly app called Open Climate Risk on Tuesday. It allows anyone to enter an address and view a wildfire risk score, on a scale of zero to 10, along with an explanation of how it was calculated. The underlying methodology, data, and code are all public. It’s the first fully open platform of its kind, according to CarbonPlan.
“Right now, the way science works in the climate risk space is that every model is independently developed at different companies, and we essentially have no idea what’s happening in them. We have no idea if they’re any good,” Oriana Chegwidden, a research scientist at CarbonPlan who led the creation of the tool, told me. “Our hope is that by opening this up, people will be able to start contributing, to help us learn how we can do it better.” That might mean critiquing CarbonPlan’s methods or code, for example, or re-running the model with additional data.
The score itself doesn’t tell you much other than the relative risk between one building and another. But the platform also breaks out the two inputs behind it: burn probability, or the likelihood a building will catch fire in a given year, and “conditional risk,” an estimate of how much of the building’s value would be lost if it does burn, based on projected fire intensity.
The projections are largely based on a U.S. Forest Service dataset that models fire frequency on wildlands throughout the country. CarbonPlan uses additional data on wind speed and direction to predict how a given fire might spread into an urban area.
Users can toggle between risk under the “current” climate and a “future” climate, which jumps about 20 years out. They can also see the distribution of buildings across the spectrum of risk scores at various geographic scales — by state, county, census tract, or census block.
One of CarbonPlan’s hopes is to help people become more informed consumers of climate risk data by helping them understand how it’s put together and what questions they might want to ask. While its model is more crude than others on the market, the tool is explicit about the factors that are not accounted for in the results. The loss estimates are based on a generic building, for example, and do not recognize specific traits like fire-resistant construction materials or landscaping that could make a home more fire resistant. They also don’t consider building-to-building spread. The underlying U.S. Forest Service data is also limited in that it maps vegetation across the country as it existed at the end of 2020 — any changes since then that could have reduced fire-igniting fuels, such as prescribed burns, are not incorporated.
Right now, there’s no industry standard for calculating or communicating climate risk. The Global Association of Risk Professionals recently asked 13 climate risk companies for data on floods, tropical storms, wildfires, and heat at 100 addresses to compare the outputs. The authors found there were “significant disparities,” between estimates of vulnerability and damages at the same locations. When it came to wildfires, specifically, they were unable to even compare the data, because the companies all conveyed the risk using different benchmarks.
The implications of having so many diverging methods and results extend beyond individual homebuying decisions. Insurance companies use climate risk data to set rates; publicly-traded companies use it to make disclosures to investors; policymakers use it to guide community planning and investments in adaptation. Some products might be better suited to one task or another.
Katherine Mach, an environmental science and policy professor at the University of Miami, told me the next step for the field is to have more systematic reporting requirements that help people understand how accurate the data are and what types of decisions they can be used for.
“It’s almost like we need the equivalent of industry standards,” she said. “You’re going to release a climate product? Here’s what you need to clearly communicate.”
CarbonPlan collected feedback from various likely users of the tool throughout the development process, including municipal planners, climate scientists, and consumer advocates. The group also hopes to foster an “iterative cycle of community-driven model development,” spurring other researchers to inspect the data, critique it, add to it, and spin out new versions. This is common practice in other areas of climate science, like Earth system modeling and economic modeling, and has been instrumental in advancing those fields. “There’s nothing like that for climate risk right now,” Chegwidden said.
The first step will be raising more money to support further work, but the goal is to partner with outside researchers on comparative analyses and case studies. Tracy Aquino Anderson, CarbonPlan’s interim executive director, told me they have already heard from one researcher who has a fire risk dataset that could be added to the platform. The group has also been invited to present the platform to two academic climate research groups later this spring.
The problem of black box models exists not just because the field is full of private companies that don’t want to share their code. A study published earlier this month found that only 4% of the most-cited peer-reviewed climate risk studies have made their data and code public, despite journal standards that require transparency.
“When you’re working with climate data, you’re dealing with all of these uncertainties,” Adam Pollack, an assistant professor at the University of Iowa who researches flood risk and the lead author of the paper, told me. “Researchers don’t always understand all of the assumptions that are implicit in choices that they make. That’s fine — we have methods for dealing with that. We do model intercomparisons, we do these synthesis studies as a field. The foundation of that is openness and reusability.”
Though he was not involved in the CarbonPlan project, he said it was exactly what his paper was calling for. For example, CarbonPlan’s “future” calculations are based on an extreme warming scenario that has become controversial among climate scientists. CarbonPlan didn’t choose this scenario — it’s what the Forest Service’s dataset used, and that was the only off-the-shelf data available for the entire United States. But because the underlying code is open-source, critics are free to swap it out for other data they may have access to.
“That’s what’s so great about this,” Pollack said. “People who have different values, assumptions, and expertise, can get new estimates and build a shared understanding.”