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China and the United States have fired their opening salvos in a critical minerals trade war. Over the past year, China has imposed export controls on gallium, germanium, and graphite — all minerals necessary for energy transition technologies. Then in May, the Biden Administration shot back with tariffs on critical mineral imports, part of a package of trade protection measures to help shield domestic manufacturers in strategic sectors, including the mineral industry. The downstream consequence for energy transition technologies such as electric vehicle batteries, however, is almost certainly higher prices.
In all likelihood, this critical mineral trade war will intensify, with corresponding implications for U.S. industries that use these raw materials. China’s next shot may be even tighter export controls on critical minerals, including minerals for which the United States relies heavily on China. Such export controls pose real — and serious — risks to downstream U.S. industries for five key reasons.
For example, the White House assesses that U.S. consumption of rare earth elements worth $613 million affects about $496 billion in downstream economic activity across core sectors, from petroleum refining to automotive manufacturing. Critically, the United States relies on China for nearly 70% of its rare earth consumption. The United States also depends substantially on China for other minerals — more than on any other country. Of the 50 non-fuel mineral commodities for which the United States relied on imports to meet more than 50% of its consumption from 2019 to 2022, China was the leading import source for 15. Because critical minerals are necessary in applications affecting strategic sectors such as automotive manufacturing and renewable energy, Chinese export controls would be particularly disruptive and costly.
To illustrate, the United States does not produce any arsenic metal, which is used to produce gallium arsenide semiconductors for high-performance electronics. China supplied 97% of America’s arsenic metal imports in 2022. If China were to restrict arsenic metal exports to the United States, American manufacturers — including semiconductor fabricators, which the Biden administration very much wants to support — would likely struggle to find non-Chinese suppliers able to meet their full needs. Multiply this across all of the many, many minerals China supplies to the U.S., and you get a major problem.
For instance, Chinese companies have significant stakes in cobalt reserves and production in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the world’s largest holder of cobalt reserves and producer of cobalt ore. There, the Chinese company CMOC owns the Kisanfu project, which calls itself one of the world’s “largest and highest-grade undeveloped copper-cobalt projects,” and Chinese companies owned or financed 15 of the 19 cobalt-producing mines there as of 2020. Depending on the extent to which the Chinese government requires overseas Chinese companies’ help enforcing mineral export controls, downstream U.S. industries could be prevented from sourcing minerals produced by Chinese companies outside China.
Plenty of new companies entered the rare earth industry after China reduced export quotas and caused record-high rare earth prices in 2010 and 2011. But when prices fell in 2015 due to lower-than-expected demand, many of these rare earth companies went bankrupt. Ultimately, the success rate for rare earth projects entering production between 2011 and 2021 was just 1.5%. Non-Chinese mineral producers may find it attractive to enter the market amid artificially inflated prices from export controls, but whether their business model will hold if and when prices fall again is decidedly less sure. Importantly, China’s commanding production share for many critical minerals enables it to influence global prices in its favor. If a new global industry begins to flourish, a glut of cheap Chinese minerals may not be far behind.
Mines and refineries already operating near their maximum capacity would have to invest millions or billions of dollars to expand production capacity, which can take up to five years from starting feasibility studies to commissioning new production. For mines and refineries with the capacity to ramp up production already available, that excess margin could be due to long-standing technical issues in processes like adjusting the temperature during processing. Thus, non-Chinese mineral supply may take some time — and a lot of money — to come online if China imposes export controls.
The Chinese government has both the will and the capability to impose mineral export controls — as evidenced by its prior and present use of mineral trade restrictions, from banning exports of rare earth elements to Japan in 2010 to imposing a blanket export ban on rare earth processing technology in 2023. As U.S.-China competition intensifies, more Chinese export controls on minerals could well follow, which would cause severe supply chain disruptions given challenges sourcing sufficient non-Chinese mineral supplies.
So, while it remains to be seen how China will retaliate to this new round of U.S. mineral tariffs, the U.S. government should accelerate its mineral stockpiling — including urging certain downstream U.S. industries to stockpile — and its collaboration with partner countries to improve the resilience and robustness of their mineral supply chains. The U.S. government should tread carefully in deploying trade tools in this critical minerals competition, and prepare accordingly for possible Chinese responses.
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Current conditions: A wave of summer heat is headed for the East Coast, with midweek temperatures surpassing 90 degrees Fahrenheit in Washington, D.C. • Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands are bracing for winds of up to 190 miles per hour as Super Typhoon Sinlaku bears down on the U.S. territories • At least 30 people have died in floods in Yemen, which just recorded its highest rainfall in five years.
The Trump administration is holding up some funding for grants at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, The Hill reported. On April 1, the University of Colorado put out a statement saying that a federal pause on funding had put scientists who collect data about the atmosphere “at risk for elimination” after the White House Office of Management and Budget had “not released these funds.” The university’s Cooperative Institute for Research in Environmental Sciences said that roughly 30 days before running out of funds to pay scientists, “we were informed that NOAA has put a pause on all grant actions.”
As I told you back in December, the Trump administration is also working to dismantle the National Center for Atmospheric Research in Colorado, an institution credited with many of the biggest scientific breakthroughs in our understanding of weather and climate over the past 66 years since its founding. In a post on X at the time, Russell Vought, the director of the White House’s Office of Management and Budget, called the institute “one of the largest sources of climate alarmism in the country,” and said the administration would be “breaking up” its operations.
Secretary of Energy Chris Wright is scheduled to testify Wednesday morning before the House Committee on Appropriations to defend the White House’s latest budget request for his agency. He’s not the only chieftain of a federal agency with relevance to Heatmap readers who’s coming before Congress this week.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection plans to launch the first phase of what’s called the Consolidated Administration and Processing of Entries tool in the agency’s automated commercial secure data portal to allow companies to request refunds of Trump administration tariffs the U.S. Supreme Court ruled unlawful earlier this year. Solar companies are among the thousands of American businesses that filed complaints with the U.S. Court of International Trade for refunds prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling. Those, according to Solar Power World, include American Wire Group, Canadian Solar, GameChange Solar, Fluke, Hellerman Tyton, Kinematics, JA Solar, Jinko Solar, Longi, Merlin Solar, Qcells, and Trina Solar.
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Established in early 2021, California Community Power is a quasi-governmental organization formed out of nine power providers across the Golden State. On Monday, the agency inked a series of deals with geothermal power developers to expand what’s widely considered one of the most promising clean-energy sources for California, which has some of the continent’s best hot-rock resources. XGS Energy, the Houston-based startup promising to build next-generation closed-loop geothermal systems, announced a deal to build 115 megawatts of power in the state. Zanskar, the geothermal company using AI to locate untapped conventional geothermal resources, also signed an agreement with the agency.
Zanskar in particular ranked among the most promising climate-tech startups on the U.S. market in Heatmap’s poll of experts earlier this year. The company last year announced its biggest find yet, Heatmap’s Katie Brigham reported last year. XGS, meanwhile, is drawing support from the nuclear industry, as I previously reported for Heatmap.
The developer behind a major Massachusetts offshore wind farm is suing its turbine manufacturer in a bid to keep the company from backing out of the project. By February, the Vineyard Wind project off Cape Cod had installed 60 of the project’s 62 turbines, as I reported at the time. Yet the parent company behind GE Renewables, the maker of the project’s turbines, said “it would be terminating its contracts for turbine services and maintenance at the end of April,” the Associated Press reported. GE Vernova, the parent company, says Vineyard Wind owes it $300 million already.
The war in Iran is taking a toll on Central African minerals. Miners in the Democratic Republic of the Congo are curbing output of copper and cobalt as the war cuts supplies of sulfuric acid needed for leaching minerals out of rock, Reuters reported. Mine managers are reducing cobalt production to conserve chemicals.
The deal represents one of the largest public-private partnerships in the history of the national labs.
I’ll admit, I thought I might be done covering fresh fusion startups for a while. In the U.S., at least, the number of new industry entrants has slowed, and most venture capital now flows towards more established players such as Commonwealth Fusion Systems and Helion. But in February, a startup called Inertia Enterprises made headlines with its $450 million Series A raise. It’s aiming to commercialize fusion using the physics pioneered at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the only place yet to achieve scientific breakeven — the point at which a fusion reaction produces more energy than it took to initiate it.
That achievement first came in 2022 at the lab’s National Ignition Facility in Berkeley, California. On Tuesday, Inertia announced that it’s deepening its partnership with Lawrence Livermore, creating one of the largest private sector-led partnerships in the history of the national lab system. This collaboration involves three separate agreements that allow Inertia to work directly with the lab’s employees on research and development, while also giving the startup access to nearly 200 Lawrence Livermore patents covering fusion technology.
The startup’s team isn’t merely a group of enthusiasts galvanized by the national lab’s fusion milestone. Alongside Twilio’s former CEO Jeff Lawson and fusion power plant designer Mike Dunne, Inertia’s other co-founders is Annie Kritcher, a senior employee at Lawrence Livermore who has led the physics design for NIF’s fusion energy experiments since 2019.
“We’re not starting from zero,” Kritcher told me, putting it mildly. “And that was really, really important to me when I decided to co-found this company.” Or as Lawson told me after the company’s fundraise in February, “the government put 60 years and $30 billion into NIF trying to get that thing to work.”
The technical approach pursued by Lawrence Livermore — and now by Inertia — is called inertial confinement fusion. In this system, high-powered lasers are directed at a millimeter-scale pellet of fusion fuel, typically a mixture of the hydrogen isotopes deuterium and tritium. The laser energy rapidly compresses and heats the pellet to extreme temperatures and pressures, driving the nuclei to fuse and releasing enormous amounts of energy. But NIF didn’t build its system for commercial purposes. Rather, its primary mission is to support the domestic nuclear weapons stockpile by recreating the extreme conditions inside a nuclear detonation, allowing scientists to study how U.S. weapons perform without conducting explosive tests.
To translate the lab’s research into a commercially viable device, Kritcher explained, Inertia must significantly increase the lasers’ efficiency and power output, targeting a system roughly 50 times more powerful than existing lasers of its class. The startup is also working to scale production of its fusion targets to drive down costs and enable mass manufacturing.
Inertia is not the only company attempting to commercialize this general approach, however. Back in 2021, as Lawrence Livermore moved closer to its breakeven moment, the future founders of the startup Xcimer Energy were taking note. Convinced that the fundamental physics of inertial confinement had been proven, they thought, “if we’re going to do this, we have to do it now,” Xcimer's CTO, Alexander Valys, told me a few years ago. He and his co-founder quit their day jobs, and Xcimer went on to raise a $100 million Series A round in 2024. Others joined in on the hype, too — the Fusion Industry Association reports 13 fusion companies that were founded or emerged from stealth between summer 2022 and summer 2023, a record for the sector.
Kritcher told me that none are adhering as closely to NIF’s successful design as Inertia. “There are fundamental technical differences between us and the other laser approaches,” she told me, explaining that while Xcimer and others are using broadly similar methodologies to produce a hot, dense plasma, the underlying physics behind their plan diverges significantly. Xcimer, for instance, is developing a novel laser architecture that hasn’t yet been demonstrated at scale, along with a different fuel capsule design than the one validated by NIF.
Kritcher will be allowed to continue her work at the lab thanks to what the company describes as a “first-of-its-kind agreement” enabled by the 2022 CHIPS and Science Act, which allows scientists at the national labs to participate in commercialization efforts with the goal of accelerating the transfer of knowledge to the private sector.
For the fusion engineer, it’s the ultimate dream come true. She first arrived at Lawrence Livermore as a summer intern in 2004, just before her senior year at the University of Michigan, and “fell in love with the lab and the NIF project,” which was still under construction at the time. She opted to attend the University of California, Berkeley for her masters and PhD in nuclear engineering so that she could continue her work there.
“I was starstruck by the possibility of fusion energy and [it having] such a big impact on humanity, and that really kept me going for a long time,” she told me. But after the NIF facility was finally completed in 2009, it failed to achieve ignition by its initial 2012 target.
By then, Kritcher was a postdoctoral fellow, and attention at NIF began to shift toward supporting the nation’s nuclear stockpile. Fusion energy was “always in the back of my mind, driving me day to day,” she said, “but you sort of forget about it, and you lose a little bit of that excitement and spark.” Under her guidance, NIF ultimately reached that watershed moment, which has since been replicated numerous times. And when it did, "it just reopened all those old inspirational feelings and motivations and excitement and it was like a 180 turning point where we all just go, oh, fusion energy is possible again with this approach.”
Many of the lab’s employees feel similarly, she said, and this close collaboration will allow some of the nation’s foremost experts in inertial confinement to work with the startup across a range of technical capabilities, including “the laser side, the target fabrication side, the simulations team side, the code development side, our physics design side,” Kritcher enumerated.
Inertia is looking to bring its first pilot plant online in the “2030s to 2040s,” she told me. By contrast, Commonwealth Fusion Systems — the most well-capitalized company in the sector — plans to connect its first plant to the grid early next decade, while Xcimer is targeting 2035. Kritcher is unfazed, though. While she acknowledges that other companies might complete their facilities sooner, she argues that Inertia still has an upper hand given that NIF effectively serves as the startup’s demonstration plant, something no other company has built.
Not to mention that all of the sector’s projected timelines remain highly speculative. There are serious technical and economic challenges that would-be fusion energy companies will have to overcome — Inertia not excepted — and the industry’s status 10 years down the line remains anyone’s guess. What’s crystal clear, however, is that a serious new contender has entered the race.
Big questions about naval strategy and the oil economy with Cornell University’s Nicolas Mulder.
After negotiations between the United States and Iran broke down Sunday without a deal, the United States Central Command said it would “begin implementing a blockade of all maritime traffic entering and exiting Iranian ports” Monday morning.
It’s hardly like traffic through the Strait of Hormuz had been unencumbered before that. The strait has been largely closed to through traffic since the beginning of March thanks to the threat of Iranian strikes on ships going in and out of the Persian Gulf. That has remained the case even after the ceasefire deal was supposed to have opened up the waterway last week. Only a few countries have been able to get their tankers out, mostly those with close trade relationships with Iran, including China.
President Trump has been seeking to reverse that state of play and open the strait to non-Iranian traffic (e.g. oil, liquified natural gas, and fertilizer coming in and out of the Gulf states), whether by badgering European allies to help clear the strait and by having U.S. Navy ships traverse the channel to clear mines and demonstrate it’s safe to navigate. He appears to have ultimately settled on blockading the blockaders.
The president said Monday on Truth Social that 34 ships had sailed through the strait on Sunday, a number that has not been confirmed by third party sources. In the run-up to the U.S. blockade, about 10 to 12 ships were sailing through the strait per day, according to marine data service Kpler and The New York Times.
So, is the blockade an escalation of U.S. pressure on Iran? A violation of the ceasefire? A “pacific blockade” designed to pressure Iran without resorting to direct strikes? And how would it work, anyway?
I spoke with Nicolas Mulder, an assistant professor of history at Cornell University and the author of The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War, to try and get some of my questions answered. This interview has been condensed and edited for clarity.
Let’s start from the beginning. What is a naval blockade? And how does it different from typical naval warfare?
A naval blockade is actually interesting because it is a form of warfare that has been quite regulated for quite a long time already under international law. A lot of our modern understanding of the laws of belligerence and neutrality actually comes from blockades because they impose an important stricture on international maritime traffic. As a result, they raise all sorts of questions about who wars are fought between, and what wars mean for the civilian economies of the countries involved, and what they mean for the relationship of the belligerent states and third countries.
For most of U.S. history, the U.S. was not the blockader, but the neutral wanting to bypass blockades. The reason that the United States concretely intervened in the First World War and began to really involve itself with the power politics of Eurasia in 1917 is because it insisted on its neutral rights to trade with Britain when Germany had declared an unrestricted submarine warfare campaign that was effectively a blockade of the British Isles.
Even before that, the Union used it against the Confederacy.
In the 18th century, all the big great power wars — the Seven Years War, the various succession wars, the Napoleonic Wars — all of those involved blockades.
What I find interesting is that we have this ceasefire. We have these negotiations, which are apparently still going on. But then we also have the blockade. You seem to be arguing that blockades are a part of warfare. So, is this implying that the U.S. Navy is still potentially going to be shooting at stuff, even if there’s a so-called ceasefire?
That’s the big uncertain aspect of the current situation. We are not back into the same war that we were in last week before the ceasefire took effect. The way I would interpret this is that it’s a kind of fudge. From the perception of the Trump administration, it needs to do something to not look weak, but at the same time wants to avoid the risks of a full resumption of kinetic warfare and a massive air campaign, which they had pursued for six weeks to very mixed and disappointing effects.
The one historical parallel that I think can help us make sense of what they may be attempting to do now is the practice in the 19th century of “pacific blockade.” There were several conflicts, beginning in the 1820s with the Greek War of Independence and then through a whole bunch of Latin American wars and Asian conflicts, where European great powers would blockade small countries — not to declare war on them, but to prevent any of their ships from entering or leaving to put serious pressure on them.
What they were doing in that situation was to use wartime levels of pressure without initiating the full war because they knew that the target states were basically too weak to retaliate and did not have the naval power to contest that blockade.
How can we see this operation in Iran as part of a continuum of using these strangulation-type strategies against much weaker opponents?
One way to interpret what they’re trying to do now is to apply that Venezuela-Cuba template to Iran, and to wager that if they play this carefully, they might be able to bring real economic pressure to bear without provoking Iran into as full-scale a retaliation as it was undertaking before.
But that Venezuela-Cuba template is difficult to implement in the case of Iran for two simple reasons. One is just that Iran has, of course, shown that it has quite a lot of military capacity to retaliate with drones and missiles, and also mines and small ships and submarines. It also has the ability to widen its own maritime disruption in the region, for example by working with the Houthis to really stem the flow of traffic through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait.
What works in the Western Hemisphere, where the United States has a really unrivaled military dominance, may not be reproducible in this strategic theater.
What does the geography tell you about the ability to impose or contest a blockade like this?
They may be doing it with multiple rings, or multiple screens — a light initial screen, and then bigger barriers of ships a bit further away, so as to not risk most of their force too close to the Iranian coastline. We saw in the early phase of the war that some carrier strike groups began to operate over time further and further away from the Iranian coast, presumably to avoid the risk of being hit with missiles and drones.
In this case, one of the questions is, what kind of resources are needed to keep that going? The U.S. did run a blockade against Iraq for most of the 1990s that was in the Persian Gulf itself, which is very narrow. Iraq’s ports are a tiny sliver of land that ends in the Persian Gulf. So that was a very small stretch of coastline.
Iran should still be manageable, but it will require a wider screen, and potentially one that really crosses the entire Arabian Sea somewhere from the southern coast of Oman, diagonally, northeastwards to Pakistan, or at least the Pakistan-Iranian border, and potentially a bit further out. And if there is also interference in the Red Sea, then the U.S. Navy is going to have to route most of disabled forces all the way around Cape of Good Hope to move that whole force into the Indian Ocean.
I think that the Red Sea contingency is quite important to how this shapes up.
CENTCOM said yesterday that this blockade is on ships going in and out of Iranian ports. I wonder if this is unique historically — both a blockade of Iran and trying to impose freedom of navigation elsewhere?
It’s interesting, right? Because indeed, there is the commitment to freedom of navigation. But then it also has been suggested that the U.S. Navy will stop all ships that have paid any toll or transit fee to the [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps], and that paying that toll ipso facto would make their passage illegal. For that I don’t know any good historical precedent.
The other historical precedent is probably actually the Ottoman Empire and Russia and World War I. The Ottoman Empire was bottling up Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in the Black Sea by its control over the Turkish straits, which actually imposed a really serious, long run cost on the Russian economy. It’s one of the things that really fed us in the Russian Revolution. But at the same time, the Ottoman Empire was itself being blockaded by British and French forces in the Mediterranean.
Iran is blockading [Gulf Cooperation Council] states selectively — though of course, it is allowing through some shipments. But those shipments are then going to be intercepted, presumably by the Americans. So the de facto result of it is that no one is really going to be able to leave the Gulf. And that’s kind of where I see this game theoretically ending up.
So it seems like the result of this won’t be hugely different than what things were a few weeks ago, just with fewer Iranian ships getting out.
Also ships of those countries that negotiated transit with Iran.
If you looked at the news coming out of Asia and the diplomatic communiques of a large number of Asian states that brokered bilateral arrangements with Iran — so Pakistan, India; Bangladesh had done so; China, of course — but also countries that have otherwise fairly good links with the United States — the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam — all of them had essentially accepted that some payment to the IRGC was now the new cost of doing business. They were so desperately in need of energy supplies for the population that they decided to enter negotiations, even if, in principle, they would prefer freedom of navigation.
The likely diplomatic contestation or diplomatic issues coming out of this blockade are also going to be related to Asia, and that’s where I would focus our attention.