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Emissions reporting requirements have gone from mostly mandatory to quasi-discretionary.

The Securities and Exchange Commission approved a highly anticipated rule on Wednesday that will require companies to disclose information about their climate-related risks to investors. But the final rule differs dramatically from the proposal the Commission released two years ago, with significantly weaker provisions that leave it up to companies to decide how much information to share.
Perhaps the most dramatic change: Most of the climate-related disclosures the rule covers are now mandatory only if they’re considered “material.” Under the original rule, all public companies would have been required to calculate and report the greenhouse gas emissions they are directly responsible for, known as scope 1 emissions, and the emissions from the electricity they use, known as scope 2 — no exceptions. But under the final rule, companies only have to report this information if they deem it material — i.e. if there is “a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available,” according to a 1976 Supreme Court decision.
Further, only about 40% of domestic public companies will even be required to consider whether their emissions are material. Smaller companies and emerging growth businesses — generally companies with less than $1.2 billion in annual revenues — are exempt.
Part of the impetus for the rule was to standardize climate disclosures. Though many companies already publicly report information about their emissions and climate-related risks, they do so sporadically, using different methodologies, adopting different formats, and publishing across different forums. Steven Rothstein, a managing director at the nonprofit Ceres, once told me it was like a “climate ‘Tower of Babel.’”
The final rule will still create a more formal, consistent, public reporting system for this information. But the picture it provides to investors will be incomplete. “By shifting to a materiality standard, they are leaving a huge gap in the information available to investors and the public,” Kathy Fallon, the director of land and climate at the Clean Air Task Force told me. “That's going to hurt companies and the climate in the long run.”
This wasn’t entirely unexpected. The original proposal ignited a firestorm from Republican attorneys general and business groups accusing the SEC of trying to pass back-door climate regulations, overstepping its role, and saddling companies with burdensome reporting costs. The Commission received more than 20,000 comments on the proposal, more than any rule in its history. As the pressure grew, reports emerged that the Commission planned to remove a requirement that companies tally up and report a third category of their emissions, known as scope 3, which includes those associated with their supply chains and the use of their products. Then last week, Reuters reported that the SEC would also soften the requirements for disclosing scope 1 and 2 emissions by subjecting them to this materiality test.
Before the vote on Wednesday, Erik Gerding, director of the SEC’s division of corporation finance, emphasized that the final rule struck an “appropriate balance” between investor demand for more consistent, comparable, information about climate-related risks, and “the concerns expressed by many companies and commenters about the potential costs of the proposed rules.”
The Commission voted along party lines, with Democratic chair Gary Gensler and commissioners Caroline Crenshaw and Jaime Lizárraga approving the rule, and Republican commissioners Hester Peirce and Mark Uyeda voting against. But no one appeared satisfied.
Peirce argued that companies were already required to inform investors about material risks and trends, including those related to climate change. She accused the staff of having merely “decorated the final rule with materiality ribbons” while still creating an overly prescriptive rule. “The resulting flood of climate related disclosures will overwhelm investors, not inform them,” she said.
Crenshaw said the rule was a “bare minimum” step forward that would “move a haphazard potpourri of public company disclosures into the Commission's well-developed and standardized filing ecosystem.” But she also worried that it would pass the buck to future commissions to ensure investors are getting the information they actually need. “To be crystal clear, this is not the rule I would have written,” she said. “Today's rule is better for investors than no rule at all, and that's why it has my vote. But while it has my vote, it does not have my unencumbered support.”
There is no specific test to determine whether emissions are considered material. But the climate disclosure rule does discuss some examples of when a company’s scope 1 or scope 2 emissions may be material. One is if there is a transition risk associated with those emissions — for example, if a company anticipates that future regulations would increase their costs. Another is if a company has articulated a climate goal, like an ambition to achieve net-zero emissions, to the public. As with other SEC disclosures subject to a material standard, it will be entirely up to these companies to determine whether their emissions are material, and they will not have to share their analysis with investors.
Experts don’t expect this to lead to a total lack of emissions reporting. If a company fails to disclose its emissions, it could open up the business to fines from the SEC or lawsuits from investors if the information is later determined to be, in fact, material. Many companies, prodded by their lawyers, are likely to play it safe and disclose. “It’s hard to make an argument that scope 1 emissions are not material,” Jameson McLennan, a sustainable finance analyst at BloombergNEF, told me.
But there still may be a spectrum. John Tobin, a professor of practice at Cornell University’s business school and a former managing director of sustainability at Credit Suisse, told me that big, white collar companies like banks and tech companies that don’t directly emit much may not see the need to disclose, whereas manufacturing and industrial companies that directly burn fossil fuels to produce their products, absolutely should. That being said, those white collar businesses should still consider their scope 2 emissions material, Tobin said, as they tend to use a substantial amount of electricity and could be at risk of cost increases if regulations change.
Where Tobin thinks the rule really falls short is in lacking requirements to disclose certain kinds of scope 3 emissions — particularly upstream supply chain emissions. Why would an investor care more about the emissions from the electricity Toyota uses than the emissions from the steel it buys? The latter is more likely to pose a significant risk to the company’s business due to carbon regulations. “A lot of the emissions associated with industrial activity have very little to do with electricity,” he told me.
By telling companies they only have to report emissions that are material, the Commission is essentially saying that a company’s emissions are not inherently material to an investor’s understanding of risk. Allowing companies to opt out of emissions reporting “misses the whole point of climate disclosures,” said Fallon. “The whole point is to make available the information that investors want, not just the information that companies want to give.” Investors want to know how exposed a company may be to changes in climate policies, energy prices, or shifts in consumer sentiments.
At the same time, tying the list of required disclosures to a materiality test could be what ultimately preserves the rule when it inevitably ends up in court. Many groups have already threatened to sue the commission if it exceeds its legal authority. These include the National Association of Manufacturers.
“The NAM has been clear that a failure to bring the rule back within the agency’s statutory authority could invite legal action. On the other hand, a balanced, workable rule could obviate the need for litigation,” said the group’s vice president of domestic policy, Charles Crain.
The rule will still likely surface valuable information for investors and others keen to get their hands on more consistent, comparable data about certain companies’ emissions and vulnerability to climate change. But it will also leave huge reporting gaps that dilute the overall utility of that information.
“The fact that the SEC is providing uniform requirements for reporting is still an improvement upon what we had before,” said Fallon. “But the final rule doesn’t go far enough to give investors the information they need to make informed decisions.”
Editor’s note: This story has been updated to reflect the result of the SEC’s vote.
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Two new reports out this week create a seemingly contradictory portrait of the country’s energy transition progress.
Two clean energy reports out this week offer seemingly contradictory snapshots of domestic solar and battery manufacturing. One, released Wednesday by the Rhodium Group’s Clean Investment Monitor, shows a distinct decline in investment going into U.S. factories to make more of these technologies. The other, released today by the trade group American Clean Power Association, shows staggering recent growth in production capacity.
So which is it? Is U.S. clean energy manufacturing booming or busting?
Maybe both.
The U.S. is suddenly producing more solar and batteries than ever before — enough to meet current domestic demand — so it makes sense that investment in new factories is starting to slow. At the same time, there’s a lot of room for growth in producing the upstream components that go into these technologies, but the U.S. is no longer as attractive a place to set up shop as it was over the past four years.
The U.S. saw 30 new utility-scale solar factories and 30 new battery factories come online last year alone, according to ACP. The country now has the capacity to meet average domestic demand for storage systems through 2030, and can produce enough solar panels to satisfy demand two times over.
In both industries, nearly all of that capacity has been added since 2022, when the Inflation Reduction Act created new subsidies for domestic manufacturing. The advanced manufacturing production tax credit incentivized not just solar and battery factories, but also all the production of components that go into these technologies, including solar and battery cells, polysilicon, wafers, and anodes. On top of these direct subsidies, the IRA generated demand for U.S.-made products by granting bonus tax credits for utility-scale solar and battery projects built with domestically produced parts.
“The policy definitely laid the right foundation for a lot of this investment to take place,” John Hensley, ACP’s senior vice president of markets and policy analysis, told me.
Trump’s One Big Beautiful Bill Act has changed the environment, however. The utility-scale wind and solar tax credits were supposed to apply through at least 2033, but now projects have to start construction by July 4, 2026 — just over a month from now — in order to claim them. Any of those projects that got started this year will also have to adhere to complex new sourcing rules prohibiting Chinese-made materials.
Now, dollars flowing into new U.S. solar factories appears to be on the decline. Investment fell 22% between the fourth quarter of last year and the first of 2026. Battery manufacturing investment dropped by 16%.
The reason investment is declining is not entirely because of OBBBA — it’s partly a function of the fact that a lot of the projects announced immediately after the IRA passed are entering operations, Hannah Hess, director of climate and energy at the Rhodium Group, told me.
Rhodium’s Clean Investment Monitor tracks two metrics, announcements and investment. Announcements are when a company says it’s building a new factory or expanding an existing one, usually with some kind of projected cost. Investments are an estimate of the actual dollars spent during a given quarter on facility construction, calculated based on the total project budget and the expected amount of time it will take to complete after breaking ground.
According to Rhodium’s data, the peak period for new solar manufacturing project announcements was the second half of 2022 through the first quarter of 2025. During that time, announcements averaged more than $2 billion per quarter. New solar factories announced this past quarter, by contrast, fell to about $350 million.
Since it can take a while to get steel in the ground, the peak period for investment was slightly later, with $13.5 billion invested between the second quarter of 2023 and the third quarter of 2025.
“What we were seeing in that post-IRA period was huge, almost unconstrained growth in that sector, and that’s not happening anymore,” Hess said.
Most of this growth occurred all the way downstream, at the final product assembly level — i.e. factories making solar and battery modules that still had to import many of the components that went into them. This was the “lowest hanging fruit” to bring to the U.S., Hensley, of ACP, told me, as the final assembly is the least technologically challenging part of the supply chain.
“These supply chains have momentum as they get going,” he said, “so as you establish those far downstream component manufacturing, you start to recruit all of the upstream manufacturing.” In other words, a solar cell manufacturer is far more likely to build in the U.S. if there’s a robust local market of module factories to buy the cells.
There’s evidence that’s still happening in spite of changes to the tax credit structure. The ACP report says that three solar cell factories came online between 2024 and today — one per year. If all of the additional factories that have been announced are built by 2030, the U.S. will have nearly enough capacity to meet all of its own demand for solar with domestic cells. Battery cell capacity is growing even faster, with three factories as of the end of 2025 and seven more expected to be complete by the end of this year, which will produce more than enough units to meet average annual demand.
It’s the next step up on the supply chain that spells trouble. For solar, that’s ingots and wafers, followed by polysilicon. Today, the only producer of ingots and wafers in the U.S. is a company called Corning. It produces enough to meet about 25% of current domestic solar cell production, but cell production will more than quadruple by the end of this year compared to last year, according to ACP. Similarly, we produce enough polysilicon to meet Corning’s current needs, but not enough to meet anticipated cell demand. The announced projects in the pipeline will not add much on either front.
For batteries, it’s the anodes and cathodes. There’s currently one factory in California producing cathodes and at least one more under construction, but as there is nothing else in the pipeline, the ACP report expects cell manufacturers to rely on imported cathodes for the foreseeable future. Anodes are the one bright spot — there’s one factory producing what’s known as active anode material factory in the U.S., and four more anticipated by the end of this year. Together, they have the potential to meet demand by 2028, according to ACP.
The question now is whether that snowball effect kicked off by the IRA will continue. “A lot has changed about the outlook for future demand after the One Big Beautiful Bill Act passed,” Hess said. “We have seen some more project cancellations and pauses in construction recently.”
Most recently, a company called Maxeon Solar Technologies canceled a $1 billion cell and module factory in New Mexico. The company had been “fighting for its life” since 2024, according to Canary Media. It’s also majority owned by a Chinese state-owned company. The
OBBBA was likely the nail in the coffin, as it penalizes solar developers who source panels from companies with Chinese ownership.
OBBBA also shortened the timeline for the wind and solar tax credits, while the Trump administration’s hostility to wind and solar permitting has made it more difficult for projects to get built before the credits expire. Hensley said the Trump administration’s hostility toward clean energy has added a lot of risk into the system, complicating final investment decisions for manufacturers.
On the flip side, tariffs have the potential to help some domestic producers. Duties on imports from countries such as Cambodia, India, and Vietnam, all major manufacturers of solar panels, “have made their exports to the U.S. almost prohibitive,” Lara Hayim, the head of solar research at BloombergNEF, told me in an email. “This sort of policy framework could continue to provide some protection for domestic manufacturers,” she said, but there are still plenty of countries with low enough tariffs that they will continue to serve the U.S. and compete with domestic manufacturers.
Hensley said that the Trump administration’s tariffs were a double edged sword. They can help domestic manufacturers, but not if they make all of the inputs into the product more expensive.
“That’s a problem with these blanket type of tariffs that aren’t really fine-tuned to target the behavior that you’d like to see,” he told me. “I think we’re seeing a lot of that push and pull and tension in the system at the moment.”
Between Trump’s tariffs and the OBBBA, there’s no doubt that the manufacturing boom sparked by the IRA is slowing. But Hensley is optimistic that the progress will continue. “We haven’t attracted all of the supply chain yet. It’s still a work in progress, but so far the signs are quite good.”
This week’s conversation is with Duncan Campbell of DER Task Force and it’s about a big question: What makes a socially responsible data center? Campbell’s expansive background and recent focus on this issue made me take note when he recently asked that question on X. Instead of popping up in his replies, I asked him to join me here in The Fight. So shall we get started?
Oh, as always, the following conversation was lightly edited for clarity.
Alright let’s start with the big question: What is a socially responsible data center?
So first, there’s water, which I think is pretty solvable.
Part of me thinks water is not even the right thing to be focusing on necessarily, and it’s surprising that it became at least for a while the center of the controversy around data centers.
I think there’s energy, which is mostly a don’t-raise-people’s-bills kind of thing. Or in extreme cases, actually reducing people’s access to energy.”
I think air pollution is another key. This is one of the biggest own-goals our [climate] space is making, because people are installing behind-the-meter power and we can talk about why they’re doing that, the shifting reasons, but the real shame in it is you really shouldn’t have to run those 24/7. If you’re building your own power plant, it should enable you to get a grid connection, because you’re bringing your own capacity and they can provide you firm service, and you should only have to run that gas plant 1% of the year, so air pollution is a non-issue. If only the grid and its institutions could get their act together, this is a no-brainer. But instead people run them 24/7.
There’s noise, which has been very misunderstood and bungled on a handful of well-known projects. That’s just a do-good engineering and site layout type of problem.
And then there’s other. Beyond the very concrete impacts of a data center, what else can it do for the community it's siting itself in? That’s going to be specific for every community.
There’s going to be a perspective that data centers are takers. They get tax incentives. They’re this big new thing. If data centers were to bring something compelling when [they’re] siting in communities, and it is specific to whatever they’re dealing with, maybe they’d be considered socially responsible.
I don’t think I have the master answer here. Everyone’s trying to figure it out.”
What do you hear from other folks in decarb and climate spaces when you ask this question? Do you hear people come up with solutions, or do they knock down the entire premise of the question — that there isn’t such a thing as a socially responsible data center?
You get both. You definitely get both. It depends on who you're talking to.
I can understand both sides of the equation here. There’s definitely solutions, first of all. I do think there’s a group of people whether it is in the energy world or the data center world or tech who would have this incredulous disbelief that anyone could not want what they’re doing. And that then, after being poked and prodded enough, transforms into a very elitist, almost pejorative explanation of everybody’s just NIMBYs.
I think that’s really unproductive. It kind of just throws gas on the fire.
But there’s a lot of people working on solutions, too. The non-firm grid service thing is just a huge opportunity. To be able to connect these sites to the grid in such a manner they either get curtailed some small amount of hours per year or they show up with accredited capacity, absolving them from curtailing. I mean, we can do that. It’s very doable.
The second question becomes, what are the forms of accredited capacity that can be deployed quickly? I think that’s where there’s a lot of cool stuff around VPPs and such. Sure, build a gas power plant, run it once or twice a year. If anything that’s good for a community — back-up power at grid scale.
There’s also other solutions. A really cool effort right now, former Tesla people building a purely solar and battery DC microgrid in New Mexico.
And there’s also a lot of inertia. The folks making decisions about data centers have been doing stuff a certain way for 20 years and it’s hard to change. The inertia within the culture combined with the enormous pressure to deploy just makes it less dynamic than one would hope.
On my end, I’ve been grappling with the issue of tax revenue. We’re seeing a declining amount of money for social services, things that can really help people for both personal and academic reasons. There's quite a bit a lot of people could say on that topic. At the same time, this is another form of industrial development. People are upset at the amount of resources going to this specific thing.
So when it comes to the data center boom in general, where do you stand on social cost-versus-benefit analysis?
That’s a good question. I’m not an expert. I’m mostly just someone who designs energy projects. But I can say where I’m at personally.
Yeah, but isn’t everyone in the energy space talking about data centers? Shouldn’t we all be thinking about this?
Of course. I’m not in a place to proclaim what is right but I’ll tell you where I’m at right now.
With any large-scale industrial build out it is tough relative to other technological changes that were simpler at the infrastructure layer. Like, the smartphone. Massive technological change but pretty straightforward in a lot of ways. But industrial buildout stresses real physical resources, so people have much more of an opinion of whether it’s worth it or not.
I’m pretty optimistic about AI generally. It’s very hand-wave-y. It’s hard to cite data or anything, because we’re talking about something that hasn’t happened yet, but I’m very optimistic about increasing the amount of intelligence we have access to per person on Earth.
A similar thing I think about is when everyone stopped getting lead poisoning all the time, we all jumped five IQ points and killed each other less. Intelligence is good. A lot of our story as a species is about increasing intelligence and learnings-per-person so we can do more. The idea that we would be able to synthesize it, operate it as a machine outside of our own bodies. It feels pretty inevitable.
There’s questions about what that [AI] will do to the economy and jobs, which is what people are really concerned about and is the case with any major technological change.
Are data centers being deployed at a rate and in a way that is responsible? Like, does it need to be this fast? That’s a question people ask and that’s in a way the question being posed by the moratoriums. They’re not saying let’s ban this forever. They’re saying, let’s take a breather. And I do understand that.
There’s a lot of good solutions that could just be pursued and it’s hard for me to separate my feelings about the current path data centers are taking from what I think is objectively right. We could just be doing way better.
On the energy front, what do you make of the way our energy mix — carbon versus renewables, our resilience — is headed? And where do you think we’re heading in five years?
For the energy and climate world, this is the real question. Data centers are a complicated thing but at the end of the day, for us, they’re a source of electricity demand.
From an electricity perspective, there’s been no growth for 20 years. So the theory of addressing climate change was, as the old stuff breaks we’ll replace it with new clean stuff. That was what we were doing, while saying, a lot of the old stuff we’ll keep around. We’ll layer on the new clean stuff.
It was always the case though that we could enter a new phase of electricity growth. Actually, five years ago, when the phrase “electrify everything” was coined, it explicitly became our goal! We were going to massively and rapidly grow the electricity system in order to switch industry, heating, and transport off of fossil fuels. That’s the right prescription, the right way to do it.
My understanding of it is that while this feels really big, because we haven’t grown in so long, compared to the challenge we were all talking about doing is not big at all. It increases the challenge by 15% or 20%. That’s meaningful. But it just seems like we should be able to do this.
From a climate perspective, as someone who’s been trying to do everything I can on it for a while now, I can’t help but feel a little dismayed that today the growth we’re experiencing is some tiny, tiny percentage of what we actually set out to do. And it’s causing chaos. We’re institutionally falling apart from a single percent of what our goals should be.
This is the time for the electrification case. We can all demonstrate this is possible over the next few years. I think confidence in the electricity system as our energy path can remain high. Or this utterly fails, where it’s really hard to imagine governments and businesses making any sincere attempt at a high electrification pathway.
Plus the week’s biggest development fights.
1. LaPorte County, Indiana — If you’re wondering where data centers are still being embraced in the U.S., look no further than the northwest Indiana city of LaPorte.
2. Cumberland County, New Jersey — A broader splashback against AI infrastructure is building in South Jersey.
3. Washington County, Oregon — Hillsboro, a data center hub in Oregon, is turning to a moratorium.
4. Champaign County, Ohio — We’re still watching the slow downfall of solar in Ohio and there’s no sign of it getting any better.
5. Essex County, New York — Man oh man, what’s going on with battery storage in rural pockets of the Empire State?