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Emissions reporting requirements have gone from mostly mandatory to quasi-discretionary.

The Securities and Exchange Commission approved a highly anticipated rule on Wednesday that will require companies to disclose information about their climate-related risks to investors. But the final rule differs dramatically from the proposal the Commission released two years ago, with significantly weaker provisions that leave it up to companies to decide how much information to share.
Perhaps the most dramatic change: Most of the climate-related disclosures the rule covers are now mandatory only if they’re considered “material.” Under the original rule, all public companies would have been required to calculate and report the greenhouse gas emissions they are directly responsible for, known as scope 1 emissions, and the emissions from the electricity they use, known as scope 2 — no exceptions. But under the final rule, companies only have to report this information if they deem it material — i.e. if there is “a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available,” according to a 1976 Supreme Court decision.
Further, only about 40% of domestic public companies will even be required to consider whether their emissions are material. Smaller companies and emerging growth businesses — generally companies with less than $1.2 billion in annual revenues — are exempt.
Part of the impetus for the rule was to standardize climate disclosures. Though many companies already publicly report information about their emissions and climate-related risks, they do so sporadically, using different methodologies, adopting different formats, and publishing across different forums. Steven Rothstein, a managing director at the nonprofit Ceres, once told me it was like a “climate ‘Tower of Babel.’”
The final rule will still create a more formal, consistent, public reporting system for this information. But the picture it provides to investors will be incomplete. “By shifting to a materiality standard, they are leaving a huge gap in the information available to investors and the public,” Kathy Fallon, the director of land and climate at the Clean Air Task Force told me. “That's going to hurt companies and the climate in the long run.”
This wasn’t entirely unexpected. The original proposal ignited a firestorm from Republican attorneys general and business groups accusing the SEC of trying to pass back-door climate regulations, overstepping its role, and saddling companies with burdensome reporting costs. The Commission received more than 20,000 comments on the proposal, more than any rule in its history. As the pressure grew, reports emerged that the Commission planned to remove a requirement that companies tally up and report a third category of their emissions, known as scope 3, which includes those associated with their supply chains and the use of their products. Then last week, Reuters reported that the SEC would also soften the requirements for disclosing scope 1 and 2 emissions by subjecting them to this materiality test.
Before the vote on Wednesday, Erik Gerding, director of the SEC’s division of corporation finance, emphasized that the final rule struck an “appropriate balance” between investor demand for more consistent, comparable, information about climate-related risks, and “the concerns expressed by many companies and commenters about the potential costs of the proposed rules.”
The Commission voted along party lines, with Democratic chair Gary Gensler and commissioners Caroline Crenshaw and Jaime Lizárraga approving the rule, and Republican commissioners Hester Peirce and Mark Uyeda voting against. But no one appeared satisfied.
Peirce argued that companies were already required to inform investors about material risks and trends, including those related to climate change. She accused the staff of having merely “decorated the final rule with materiality ribbons” while still creating an overly prescriptive rule. “The resulting flood of climate related disclosures will overwhelm investors, not inform them,” she said.
Crenshaw said the rule was a “bare minimum” step forward that would “move a haphazard potpourri of public company disclosures into the Commission's well-developed and standardized filing ecosystem.” But she also worried that it would pass the buck to future commissions to ensure investors are getting the information they actually need. “To be crystal clear, this is not the rule I would have written,” she said. “Today's rule is better for investors than no rule at all, and that's why it has my vote. But while it has my vote, it does not have my unencumbered support.”
There is no specific test to determine whether emissions are considered material. But the climate disclosure rule does discuss some examples of when a company’s scope 1 or scope 2 emissions may be material. One is if there is a transition risk associated with those emissions — for example, if a company anticipates that future regulations would increase their costs. Another is if a company has articulated a climate goal, like an ambition to achieve net-zero emissions, to the public. As with other SEC disclosures subject to a material standard, it will be entirely up to these companies to determine whether their emissions are material, and they will not have to share their analysis with investors.
Experts don’t expect this to lead to a total lack of emissions reporting. If a company fails to disclose its emissions, it could open up the business to fines from the SEC or lawsuits from investors if the information is later determined to be, in fact, material. Many companies, prodded by their lawyers, are likely to play it safe and disclose. “It’s hard to make an argument that scope 1 emissions are not material,” Jameson McLennan, a sustainable finance analyst at BloombergNEF, told me.
But there still may be a spectrum. John Tobin, a professor of practice at Cornell University’s business school and a former managing director of sustainability at Credit Suisse, told me that big, white collar companies like banks and tech companies that don’t directly emit much may not see the need to disclose, whereas manufacturing and industrial companies that directly burn fossil fuels to produce their products, absolutely should. That being said, those white collar businesses should still consider their scope 2 emissions material, Tobin said, as they tend to use a substantial amount of electricity and could be at risk of cost increases if regulations change.
Where Tobin thinks the rule really falls short is in lacking requirements to disclose certain kinds of scope 3 emissions — particularly upstream supply chain emissions. Why would an investor care more about the emissions from the electricity Toyota uses than the emissions from the steel it buys? The latter is more likely to pose a significant risk to the company’s business due to carbon regulations. “A lot of the emissions associated with industrial activity have very little to do with electricity,” he told me.
By telling companies they only have to report emissions that are material, the Commission is essentially saying that a company’s emissions are not inherently material to an investor’s understanding of risk. Allowing companies to opt out of emissions reporting “misses the whole point of climate disclosures,” said Fallon. “The whole point is to make available the information that investors want, not just the information that companies want to give.” Investors want to know how exposed a company may be to changes in climate policies, energy prices, or shifts in consumer sentiments.
At the same time, tying the list of required disclosures to a materiality test could be what ultimately preserves the rule when it inevitably ends up in court. Many groups have already threatened to sue the commission if it exceeds its legal authority. These include the National Association of Manufacturers.
“The NAM has been clear that a failure to bring the rule back within the agency’s statutory authority could invite legal action. On the other hand, a balanced, workable rule could obviate the need for litigation,” said the group’s vice president of domestic policy, Charles Crain.
The rule will still likely surface valuable information for investors and others keen to get their hands on more consistent, comparable data about certain companies’ emissions and vulnerability to climate change. But it will also leave huge reporting gaps that dilute the overall utility of that information.
“The fact that the SEC is providing uniform requirements for reporting is still an improvement upon what we had before,” said Fallon. “But the final rule doesn’t go far enough to give investors the information they need to make informed decisions.”
Editor’s note: This story has been updated to reflect the result of the SEC’s vote.
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Uptake of electric vehicles may have slowed, but internal combustion is still fading.
We know it’s going to be a tough year for fully electric vehicles. 2026 brings with it the absence of tax credits that helped to make EVs cost-competitive with combustion cars and cheap oil to demotivate drivers from switching away from gasoline, factors that have cast a gloom over the upcoming year. And according to one of the world’s biggest automotive suppliers, it’s going to be a tough decade.
Bosch, the German industrial colossus, makes components for both gas and electric cars while also selling refrigerators, power drills, and parts for just about every kind of machine in your life. At CES in Las Vegas earlier this month, the company delivered an ugly prognosis for pure EVs. It predicts that by 2035, 70% of the vehicles sold in the United States still will come with a combustion engine of some kind.
A lot of wiggle room lives within that statement. It did not say, for instance, that seven of 10 cars sold in 2035 will still be gas-guzzling SUVs and trucks that barely top 20 miles per gallon on the highway. Instead, the wording allows for a variety of hybrid, plug-in hybrid, and extended-range electric vehicles (EREVs) — the kind whose on-board gas engine is there to recharge the battery that sends power to the electric motors — that are more climate-friendly than traditional internal combustion engines.
Even so, the Bosch declaration turns the electric optimism of the recent past on its head. Not so long ago, 2035 was the date by which both the state of California and the European Union were to ban the sale of gas cars entirely. Both places are reconsidering their stances as the 2030s approach and EVs face political and economic headwinds. Automakers are adjusting to the new reality in turn by scaling back their electrification goals. For America’s enormous market of full-size pickups, for example, EREVs have become the new hot topic as expensive, fully electric trucks failed to make a big dent.
Thus the negative forecast. But there’s reason to believe the future won’t, in fact, be quite so combustion-dependent, and that the reality of 2035 lies somewhere between Bosch’s prediction and the broken dream of complete electrification.
Here in California, that 30/70 split is the stuff of the present, not the future. The state hit a record in the third quarter of 2025, with 29.1% of new car sales being zero emissions vehicles. That number carries some caveats, most importantly that it coincided with America’s rush to buy EVs before the expiration of the federal tax credit, which pushed EV sales to new heights. (EV sales sank, predictably, at the end of last year once the same slate of vehicles effectively cost $7,500 more overnight.)
Still, as America’s biggest automotive market, the car-mad Golden State traditionally has tremendous pull in deciding the direction of the industry in America — one big reason the Trump administration has launched legal attacks against its pollution rules that push carmakers toward more efficient vehicles. And even with the sour narrative for EVs in 2026, the electric market here isn’t going anywhere, not when gas prices remain among the nation’s highest and the pervasiveness of electric cars has long since pushed EVs past the unfamiliarity barrier that makes people distrust a new technology. Thriving markets abroad and in pockets of the U.S. mean the legacy automakers won’t turn away from EVs entirely, not even as Detroit giants GM and Ford anticipate billions of dollars of losses from resetting their business plans to keep up with Trump’s fossil fuels love affair.
In addition, the conditions of today aren’t the conditions of tomorrow (and I’m not just talking about the possibility that a different regime will come to power in America sometime in the next decade). The death of the EV tax credit felt like a huge blow given that electric cars have long struggled with affordability. As we’ve noted, however, this year marks the arrival of many new models in the $30,000 range that come close to competing directly with gas. If battery production costs continue to shrink, dragging EV prices down with them, then those trends will push back against the economic factors that are pushing down EV adoption.
A lot can change with charging in a decade, too. When I bought my Tesla Model 3 seven years ago, it was really the only choice — Tesla’s already-decent Supercharger network made it possible to own its EV as our only vehicle, something I couldn’t say for anything else on the market. In 2026, electric vehicles by a variety of manufacturers come with Tesla’s NACS plug as their native standard, giving them access to a host of Tesla charging stations. Charging depots of all kinds continue to pop up even with the Trump administration's attempts to kill funding for them. The potential anxiety for new drivers continues to drop, and will be even lower by 2035 as the charger map fills in.
Still, there’s little doubt that some drivers who would have or could have chosen a fully electric vehicle in the coming years will settle for some kind of hybrid instead, especially if they perceive the cost math to be easier on the combustion side. That still counts for something, especially if that hybrid purchase displaces a pure fossil fuel-burner. But the advantages of driving electric will become more familiar to millions of Americans as more of their friends and neighbors opt in.
As for EV drivers themselves, more than 90% say they’ll never return to gas-burning cars after experiencing the EV life. Add it all up and there’s every reason to believe that, while EVs won’t take over America by 2035, they won’t quit at a 30% share, either.
Agriculture startups are suddenly some of the hottest bets in climate tech, according to the results of our Insiders Survey.
Innovations in agriculture can seem like the neglected stepchild of the climate tech world. While food and agriculture account for about a quarter of global emissions, there’s not a lot of investment in the space — or splashy breakthroughs to make the industry seem that investible in the first place. In transportation and energy, “there is a Tesla, there is an EnPhase,” Cooper Rinzler, a partner at Breakthrough Energy Ventures, told me. “Whereas in ag tech, tell me when the last IPO that was exciting was?”
That may be changing, however. Multiple participants in Heatmap’s Insiders Survey cited ag tech companies Pivot Bio and Nitricity — both of which are pursuing alternate approaches to conventional ammonia-based fertilizers — as among the most exciting climate tech companies working today.
Studies estimate that fertilizer production and use alone account for roughly 5% of global emissions. That includes emissions from the energy-intensive Haber–Bosch process, which synthesizes ammonia by combining nitrogen from the air with hydrogen at extremely high temperatures, as well as nitrous oxide released from the soil after fertilizer is applied. N2O is about 265 times more potent than carbon dioxide over a 100-year timeframe and accounts for roughly 70% of fertilizer-related emissions, as soil microbes convert excess nitrogen that crops can’t immediately absorb into nitrous oxide.
“If we don’t solve nitrous oxide, it on its own is enough of a radiative force that we can’t meet all of our goals,” Rinzler said, referring to global climate targets at large.
Enter what some consider one of the most promising agricultural innovations, perhaps since the invention of the Haber–Bosch process itself over a century ago — Pivot Bio. This startup, founded 15 years ago, engineers soil microbes to convert about 400 times more atmospheric nitrogen into ammonia than non-engineered microbe strains naturally would. “They are mini Haber–Bosch facilities, for all intents and purposes,” Pivot Bio’s CEO Chris Abbott told me, referring to the engineered microbes themselves.
The startup has now raised over $600 million in total funding and is valued at over $2 billion. And after toiling in the ag tech trenches for a decade and a half, this will be the first full year the company’s biological fertilizers — which are applied to either the soil or seed itself — will undercut the price of traditional fertilizers.
“Farmers pay 20% to 25% less for nitrogen from our product than they do for synthetic nitrogen,” Abbott told me. “Prices [for traditional fertilizers] are going up again this spring, like they did last year. So that gap is actually widening, not shrinking.”
Peer reviewed studies also show that Pivot’s treatments boost yields for corn — its flagship crop — while preliminary data indicates that the same is true forcotton, which Pivot expanded into last year. The company also makes fertilizers for wheat, sorghum, and other small grains.
Pivot is now selling these products in stores where farmers already pick up seeds and crop treatments, rather than solely through its independent network of sales representatives, making the microbes more likely to become the default option for growers. But they won’t completely replace traditional fertilizer anytime soon, as Pivot’s treatments can still meet only about 20% to 25% of a large-scale crop’s nitrogen demand, especially during the early stages of plant growth, though it’s developing products that could push that number to 50% or higher, Abbott told me.
All this could have an astronomical environmental impact if deployed successfully at scale. “From a water perspective, we use about 1/1000th the water to produce the same amount of nitrogen,” Abbott said. From an emissions perspective, replacing a ton of synthetic nitrogen fertilizer with Pivot Bio’s product prevents the equivalent of around 11 tons of carbon dioxide from entering the atmosphere. Given the quantity of Pivot’s fertilizer that has been deployed since 2022, Abbott estimates that scales to approximately 1.5 million tons of cumulative avoided CO2 equivalent.
“It’s one of the very few cases that I’ve ever come across in climate tech where you have this giant existing commodity market that’s worth more than $100 billion and you’ve found a solution that offers a cheaper product that is also higher value,” Rinzler told me. BEV led the company’s Series B round back in 2018, and has participated in its two subsequent rounds as well.
Meanwhile, Nitricity — a startup spun out of Stanford University in 2018 — is also aiming to circumvent the Haber–Bosch process and replace ammonia-based and organic animal-based fertilizers such as manure with a plant-based mixture made from air, water, almond shells, and renewable energy. The company said that its proprietary process converts nitrogen and other essential nutrients derived from combusted almond shells into nitrate — the form of nitrogen that plants can absorb. It then “brews” that into an organic liquid fertilizer that Nitricity’s CEO, Nico Pinkowski, describes as looking like a “rich rooibos tea,” capable of being applied to crops through standard irrigation systems.
For confidentiality reasons, the company was unable to provide more precise technical details regarding how it sources and converts sufficient nitrogen into a usable form via only air, water, and almond shells, given that shells don’t contain much nitrogen, and turning atmospheric nitrogen into a plant-ready form typically involves the dreaded Haber–Bosch process.
But investors have bought in, and the company is currently in the midst of construction on its first commercial-scale fertilizer factory in Central California, which is expected to begin production this year. Funding for the first-of-a-kind plant came from Trellis Climate and Elemental Impact, both of which direct philanthropic capital toward early-stage, capital-intensive climate projects. The facility will operate on 100% renewable power through a utility-run program that allows customers to opt into renewable-only electricity by purchasing renewable energy certificates,
Pinkowski told me the new plant will represent a 100‑fold increase in Nitricity’s production capacity, which currently sits at 80 tons per year from its pilot plant. “In comparison to premium conventional fertilizers, we see about a 10x reduction in emissions,” Pinkowski told me, factoring in greenhouse gases from both production and on-field use. “In comparison to the most standard organic fertilizers, we see about a 5x reduction in emissions.”
The company says trial data indicates that its fertilizer allows for more efficient nitrogen uptake, thus lowering nitrous oxide emissions and allowing farmers to cut costs by simply applying less product. According to Pinkowski, Nitricity’s current prices are at parity or slightly lower than most liquid organic fertilizers on the market. And that has farmers really excited — the new plant’s entire output is already sold through 2028.
“Being able to mitigate emissions certainly helps, but it’s not what closes the deal,” he told me. “It’s kind of like the icing on the cake.”
Initially, the startup is targeting the premium organic and sustainable agriculture market, setting it apart from Pivot Bio’s focus on large commodity staple crops. “You saw with the electrification of vehicles, there was a high value beachhead product, which was a sports car,” Pinkowski told me. “In the ag space, that opportunity is organics.”
But while big-name backers have lined up behind Pivot and Nitricity, the broader ag tech sector hasn’t been as fortunate in its friends, with funding and successful scale-up slowing for many companies working in areas such as automation, indoor farming, agricultural methane mitigation, and lab-grown meat.
Everyone’s got their theories for why this could be, with Lara Pierpoint of Trellis telling me that part of the issue is “the way the federal government is structured around this work.” The Department of Agriculture allocates relatively few resources to technological innovation compared to the Department of Energy, which in turn does little to support agricultural work outside of its energy-specific mandate. That ends up meaning that, as Pierpoint put it, ”this set of activities sort of falls through the cracks” of the government funding options, leaving agricultural communities and companies alike struggling to find federal programs and grant opportunities.
“There’s also a mismatch between farmers and the culture of farming and agriculture in the United States, and just even geographically where the innovation ecosystems are,” Emily Lewis O’Brien, a principal at Trellis who led the team’s investment in Nitricity, told me of the social and regional divides between entrepreneurs, tech investors and rural growers. “Bridging that gap has been a little bit tricky.”
Still, investors remain optimistic that one big win will help kick the money machines into motion, and with Pivot Bio and Nitricity, there are finally some real contenders poised to transform the sector. “We’re going to wake up one day and someone’s going to go, holy shit, that was fast,” Abbott told me. “And it’s like, well you should have been here for the decade of hard work before. It’s always fast at the end.”
The most popular scope 3 models assume an entirely American supply chain. That doesn’t square with reality.
“You can’t manage what you don’t measure,” the adage goes. But despite valiant efforts by companies to measure their supply chain emissions, the majority are missing a big part of the picture.
Widely used models for estimating supply chain emissions simplify the process by assuming that companies source all of their goods from a single country or region. This is obviously not how the world works, and manufacturing in the United States is often cleaner than in countries with coal-heavy grids, like China, where many of the world’s manufactured goods actually come from. A study published in the journal Nature Communications this week found that companies using a U.S.-centric model may be undercounting their emissions by as much as 10%.
“We find very large differences in not only the magnitude of the upstream carbon footprint for a given business, but the hot spots, like where there are more or less emissions happening, and thus where a company would want to gather better data and focus on reducing,” said Steven Davis, a professor of Earth system science in the Stanford Doerr School of Sustainability and lead author of the paper.
Several of the authors of the paper, including Davis, are affiliated with the software startup Watershed, which helps companies measure and reduce their emissions. Watershed already encourages its clients to use its own proprietary multi-region model, but the company is now working with Stanford and the consulting firm ERG to build a new and improved tool called Cornerstone that will be freely available for anyone to use.
“Our hope is that with the release of scientific papers like this one and with the launch of Cornerstone, we can help the ecosystem transition to higher quality open access datasets,” Yohanna Maldonado, Watershed’s Head of Climate Data told me in an email.
The study arrives as the Greenhouse Gas Protocol, a nonprofit that publishes carbon accounting standards that most companies voluntarily abide by, is in the process of revising its guidance for calculating “scope 3” emissions. Scope 3 encompasses the carbon that a company is indirectly responsible for, such as from its supply chain and from the use of its products by customers. Watershed is advocating that the new standard recommend companies use a multi-region modeling approach, whether Watershed’s or someone else’s.
Davis walked me through a hypothetical example to illustrate how these models work in practice. Imagine a company that manufactures exercise bikes — it assembles the final product in a factory in the U.S., but sources screws and other components from China. The typical way this company would estimate the carbon footprint of its supply chain would be to use a dataset published by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency that estimates the average emissions per dollar of output for about 400 sectors of the U.S. economy. The EPA data doesn’t get down to the level of detail of a specific screw, but it does provide an estimate of emissions per dollar of output for, say, hardware manufacturing. The company would then multiply the amount of money it spent on screws by that emissions factor.
Companies take this approach because real measurements of supply chain emissions are rare. It’s not yet common practice for suppliers to provide this information, and supply chains are so complex that a product might pass through several different hands before reaching the company trying to do the calculation. There are emerging efforts to use remote sensing and other digital data collection and monitoring systems to create more accurate, granular datasets, Alexia Kelly, a veteran corporate sustainability executive and current director at the High Tide Foundation, told me. In the meantime, even though sector-level emissions estimates are rough approximations, they can at least give a company an indication of which parts of their supply chain are most problematic.
When those estimates don’t take into account country of origin, however, they don’t give companies an accurate picture of which parts of their supply chains need the most attention.
The new study used Watershed’s multi-region model to look at how different types of companies’ emissions would change if they used supply chain data that better reflected the global nature of supply chains. Davis is the first to admit that the study’s findings of higher emissions are not surprising. The carbon accounting field has long been aware of the shortcomings of single-region models. There hasn’t been a big push to change that, however, because the exercise is already voluntary and taking into account global supply chains is significantly more difficult. Many countries don’t publish emissions and economic data, and those that do use a variety of methods to report it. Reconciling those differences adds to the challenge.
While the overall conclusion isn’t surprising, the study may be the first to show the magnitude of the problem and illustrate how more accurate modeling could redirect corporate sustainability efforts. “As far as I know, there is no similar analysis like this focused on corporate value chain emissions,” Derik Broekhoff, a senior scientist at the Stockholm Environment Institute, told me in an email. “The research is an important reminder for companies (and standard setters like the Greenhouse Gas Protocol), who in practice appear to be overlooking foreign supply chain emissions in large numbers.”
Broekhoff said Watershed’s upcoming open-source model “could provide a really useful solution.” At the same time, he said, it’s worth noting that this whole approach of calculating emissions based on dollars spent is subject to significant uncertainty. “Using spending data to estimate supply chain emissions provides only a first-order approximation at best!”