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A conversation about perovskite, scale, and “soft costs” with Tandem PV CEO Scott Wharton.
What happens after solar modules get cheap? The relentless cost declines for solar technology driven by mass production and steady innovation — largely in China — has resulted in a commercial ecosystem where pricing is dominated by everything but the solar panels themselves.
In this world, a more efficient panel is not necessarily one that costs less to buy from a supplier, but rather one that can optimize on these “soft costs,” getting more energy out of the given time and money spent on installing the panel. This will come to matter more and more as solar costs inevitably plateau — and especially if Congress decides to eliminate clean energy incentives under the Inflation Reduction Act, which, combined with high tariffs on solar imports from Asia, could take away solar’s cost advantage over new natural gas-fired power.
At least that’s the thesis of Tandem PV, which uses so-called perovskite technology to build solar panels that, the company says, are already more efficient than existing silicon panels, and could become almost twice as efficient as existing panels as the technology improves. Perovskite refers to a group of minerals that share a similar structure and which, when stacked with silicon, can absorb a broad range of light, maximizing the efficiency of converting light to electricity.
I spoke with Tandem PV chief executive Scott Wharton about why he thinks that even in this era of rock bottom costs, greater performance will still win the day. Our conversation has been edited for length and clarity.
Why does it not matter so much that your solar panels are a little more expensive than other ones?
Well, I would say, for the whole history of solar panels, the cost of it was really high. There was this move to get the cost down, reduce the green premium, etc. We’re now in a world where that view is, I would say, antiquated.
And by cost, you mean the cost of the physical module.
The cost of the panel itself, yeah. The reason why is that for utility scale, which is where we’re focused on, only 20% of the cost is the panel. So 80% of the actual cost of a solar deployment — which is what matters, right? The cost of deploying it — labor, land, the balance of systems, the construction loans. It’s typical, I would say, of engineers — everything’s about the commodity. Whereas from my experience, it depends on the total cost. What we’re doing is, we’re saving the cost where it matters: on the labor.
So I guess the argument you’re trying to make is that even if the upfront cost of the panel is higher, the higher efficiency actually does make the kind of physical cost over time go down — and then all the soft costs, I imagine, are basically the same. Or is there any argument why the soft costs would be different, too?
First of all, I’m not sure that we will charge a premium. We want to be the same or cheaper. But even if we did, the point is that most of the cost is in those other things: labor, land, and installation. So if our panel has 30% more power in a single panel — a 28% [efficient] panel is about [third] more [efficient] than a 21% panel — then you need 30% fewer panels.
The other thing I learned recently is that people think that, oh, you just have this huge parcel of land and everything is equal. But a lot of times, when you’re deploying solar, you can’t actually fit everything on one parcel. So there’s a savings from having more density.
There’s also an issue where a lot of the best solar locations are taken, or you don’t have a ton of choice, necessarily, about where you put your panels because co-location matters so much. So it’s even more important to have efficiency in how you use that land.
Where is Tandem PV on the trajectory from lab to mass deployment?
We just announced a $50 million [Series A funding round], and we’re building out the first significant commercial perovskite factory in the United States. Conventional wisdom for manufacturing is, you put it as far away as possible. I think when you’re trying to do something really new, it’s probably the same story: It seems cheaper, but it’s not. Because if it takes you six more months because you’re flying back and forth and people don’t understand each other, then that actually costs you money and time and delay. We’re going to emphasize quality and speed over cost.
If we do this right, then the theory is, we’ve become the next, First Solar — that’s our intention. We want to take back solar leadership from China, which is a bold statement, but I think we’re on the journey. I tell the team, it’s like a bicycle race, where you go slowly, slowly, slowly, and then there’s a point where you need to break out. Well, I think we’ve broken out. Whether we fall flat on our face because we’re exhausted or we jump out ahead, we’ll see what history writes.
Obviously a big story in the solar industry is cost declining so much, and that’s tied to, a very specific technological stack. What do you guys have to do besides demonstrating results to tell the story that a different technology might be necessary?
So number one, there’s a reason why people are interested in perovskites. It’s 200 times thinner than traditional silicon panels — no rare earth minerals or metals, no mining.
What people don’t know about silicon solar is, you’ve got to heat this up to, like, 2,000 degrees Celsius to purify it, and it’s very, very expensive. We’re using the same glass and basically putting on a 1 micron-thick layer of ink. So we’re adding a little bit of cost, but you get a lot more energy for it than what you add.
The second thing is, we’re not actually competing with silicon so much as we’re building on top of it. As silicon technology gets better and cheaper, our product gets better and cheaper. And then the third thing is, see point number one, where we started. If you have a 28% or 30% [efficient] panel — by the way, silicon hits its physics limits at 26%. It can never get better than that. So we’re already better than where silicon is. And as labor and land become more expensive in the United States and around the world, it actually is cheaper to make something that focuses on where all the costs are.
I know you’re not in mass production yet, but are you going out to utility scale developers? Do they want a more efficient panel, or are they just comfortable working with the stuff they normally work with?
It’s both. They like what they have, but their feedback is — especially given all the supply chain risks that are going on around the world — if you can build it, we’ll buy it. We’re basically building something that is the same thing they already have, for a market that we already know. And is there a market for electricity? Yeah, there’s going to be a huge shortage of it with the AI boom. So we feel pretty confident that if we can build this, they will come.
Putting aside public policy issues, what’s to stop one of the big Chinese solar manufacturers from using this technology? People have been talking about it for decades.
It’s like any hard thing. It’s not a secret that people want to have rockets and go to space, it’s just a very, very hard technology. It’s the same thing as, why did Google and Apple win back the mobile phone war from the Japanese and the Germans and others? It’s a leapfrogging thing. I think the market’s up for grabs.
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The nation’s largest public power provider just applied to build a small modular reactor.
Can the nuclear renaissance be publicly owned? And will the Trump administration let it?
That’s the question facing the Tennessee Valley Authority as it continues its long-gestating project to build a small modular nuclear reactor, or SMR, to complement its already sizable nuclear fleet. On Tuesday, the project reached another milestone when the public power company applied for a construction permit from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to build a facility for GE Vernova Hitachi’s BWRX-300 reactor at a site on Tennessee’s Clinch River.
Because of the long lead times for nuclear projects and the promise (for now, at least) of government support, how developers talk about them tends to change along with the partisan revolutions of power.
TVA has been considering the Clinch River site for new nuclear since 2010, applied for an early site permit from the NRC in 2016, and received it in 2019. When TVA announced in 2022 that it wouldspend another $150 million on the project, in addition to the $200 million that had already been authorized, the public utility’s then-CEO Jeff Lyash justified the investment as part of an overall effort to convert America to clean energy. “We believe advanced nuclear technologies will play a critical role in our region and nation’s drive toward a clean energy future,” he said. The following year, when then-Secretary of Energy Jennifer Granholmvisited the Clinch River site, the TVA touted how new nuclear generation would reduce the system’s overall carbon emissions.
As the project marches on under Donald Trump, however, the emissions talk is gone.
In Tuesday’s announcement, “carbon,” “emissions,” and even “clean” go unmentioned. Instead the construction application is “TVA’s next step in … establishing America’s energy dominance to power artificial intelligence, quantum computing and advanced manufacturing.”
American energy — and nuclear — policy is in flux, but rhetoric aside, TVA’s nuclear ambitions appear to be an area of continuity between the Trump and Biden administrations. The TrumpWhite House is reportedly working on a series of executive actions to speed up regulatory approvals for nuclear projects and remove some of the NRC’s power and independence.
At the same time,energy policy experts have lambasted Republicans in Congress for theirproposed cuts to the Loans Program Office andphase-out of tax credits for nuclear power. Contra the legislative winds, Secretary of Energy Chris Wright said Tuesday that he supports “every incentive” for nuclear power, and that he favorsextending tax credits for nuclear and geothermal for another 15 years while more quickly phasing out wind and solar credits.
While this is not the first construction permit application for a SMR, it is the first for a utility that seeks to connect the planned reactor to the grid. Both the Bill Gates-backedTerraPower and the partnership of X-Energy and Dow have applied for construction permits for reactors.
The TVA application is another step in a long journey towards new nuclear for the power authority, which is one of two organizations to actually turn on a nuclear plant in the United States this century. It’s also a big step for Ontario Power Generation, TVA’s Canadian counterpart, which recently received a construction permit from Canadian regulators to build a BWRX-300. By building the same design multiple times in sequence — first in Ontario, then in Oak Ridge, and then hopefully in Ontario again — the projects’ developers hope to be able to apply lessons learned from one reactor to the next, as well as shuttle specialized workers back and forth between construction sites.
“If you flip flop sites, they can transition from one site that’s ready to another site that’s ready for the stage that needs that speciality. That’s better utilization of workforce and supply chain,” Adam Stein, director of the nuclear energy innovation program of the Breakthrough Institute, told me.
GE-Hitachi, meanwhile, applied to the NRC for a license for its SMR design in 2019. Despite all the excitement and investment around SMRs, there is onlyone licensed design, NuScale’s US600 — and no current plans for anyone to build it.
The fastest the Clinch River project could actually go into operation is about five years, Stein told me. “A construction permit is part of a two-step licensing process. You get a construction permit, and then you’re allowed to start building the plant. Then you need to get an operating license,” he explained.
The environmental review should go quickly, Stein said, because TVAalready has its site permit. “They should be able to do less intensive environmental review to make sure that nothing changed in the application versus what it’s already approved,” Stein added.
While TVA is a government entity, it funds itself and operates independently, albeit with a presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed board. The board currently does not have a quorum thanks to the Trump administration firing two Biden-appointed members, and would not be able to make a final investment decision on the project until it adds new members. The firings came after Tennessee’s two Republican senators, Bill Hagerty and Marsha Blackburn,wrote an op-ed criticizing the TVA for moving too slowly on its SMR work. TVA also has a new chief executive, Dan Moul, who took over in March, after Lyash announced in January that he intended to resign and looked forward to “spending more time with family.”
Nuclear already comprises over 40% of TVA’s generation capacity. The utility has asked for assistance from the Department of Energy to increase that,including an $800 million grant to help speed up construction at Clinch River and an $8 million grant to specifically defray licensing costs for the SMR.
The Trump administration has shown some friendliness to Biden-era nuclear initiatives, including honoring aloan guarantee to restart the Palisades nuclear plant in Michigan.
Considering the long and uncertain time frame for building any nuclear reactor, it’s almost certain that, if TVA’s application is approved, the project will be completed under a different president than Trump. By then, it might be a carbon-free and emissions-reducing one again.
Energy Innovation has some bad news for House Republicans.
House Republicans are racing to overcome intraparty disagreements and deliver their “one big, beautiful” budget bill to the Senate before the Memorial Day weekend. As currently written, the bill would render the nation’s clean energy tax credits largely inaccessible, severely impairing clean energy development.
We now have a more detailed picture of what’s at stake if this bill or something like it makes it all the way to the president’s desk. The research firm Energy Innovation modeled all of the energy and environment provisions in the version of the bill that passed the House Budget Committee on Sunday night. It found that the proposed changes to oil and gas leasing, greenhouse gas emissions standards, and tax credits, could cost the United States more than $1 trillion in GDP over the next decade compared to a world where these policies remain untouched.
That number is a reflection of the narrow subset of policies the group modeled and does not take into account Trump’s tax cuts. In theory, those could have a positive effect on GDP that offsets some of the loss. But the effects on energy costs and jobs on their own tell a grim story.
By 2030, the average American would spend $120 more per year on transportation and home energy costs than they otherwise would. By 2035, the increase would climb to more than $230. Lower demand for clean technologies like electric vehicles and solar panels would kill more than 700,000 potential jobs across the economy in 2035.
Energy Innovation isn’t the only group warning of dire consequences. The bill “represents a crisis for America’s ability to build the energy infrastructure we need to meet surging demand,” Abigail Ross Hopper, the CEO and president of the Solar Energy Industries Association said in a statement yesterday. The group estimates that the bill would put 287 factories that serve the solar industry at risk of closing or never opening in the first place. Most of those are in red states.
The forecasts stem from key changes the GOP is proposing to make to tax credits that incentivize wind and solar development, domestic manufacturing, and consumer adoption of electric vehicles and energy efficiency upgrades. The bill would end these subsidies earlier than currently planned (though how much earlier is currently in flux), and impose stricter materials sourcing requirements, tighter development timelines, and more rigid project finance rules for the years they remain in effect, making it nearly impossible to use them.
As a result, fewer wind, solar, and energy storage projects would get built. Those that did get built would cost more, meaning that natural gas would set the price in energy markets more frequently. Natural gas would also be more expensive because of higher demand. The Energy Information Administration already expects natural gas costs to rise this year and next, even without changes to tax incentives. Altogether, generating electricity would cost about 50% more in 2035 than it otherwise would, according to Energy Innovation, which would translate to roughly 17% higher bills for consumers.
Budget hawks in the House are now pushing for an even more aggressive phase-out of the green tax credits before they agree to send their legislation to the Senate, and the Republican leadership can afford to lose just three votes on the floor, giving them a narrow window to please everyone. But the earlier phase-out would have little impact on Energy Innovation’s findings, Robbie Orvis, the senior director for modeling and analysis for the group, told me. The existing provisions in the bill that prevent companies from sourcing materials from China would be so difficult to meet that the model assumes the affected credits would be unclaimable beginning next year.
The modeling shows a similar effect in transportation costs. Terminating the tax credit for electric vehicles would lower demand for EVs and increase demand for gasoline, causing prices at the pump to go up. Less demand for EVs would also mean fewer domestic jobs producing them, and fewer jobs producing the components that go into them. Then there’s the overall tightening of purse strings that would come as a result of higher energy costs, which could reduce hiring still further.
Orvis said the estimates for job loss are likely conservative, as the model looks at changes in demand for EVs and other clean technologies but doesn’t do a good job accounting for the changes in supply that would result from early repeal of 45X, the clean manufacturing tax credit.
Notably, energy costs go up in the model despite provisions in the bill that are designed to lower the cost of oil and gas. Those include more frequent lease sales and lower royalty rates for companies that pay to drill on federal lands and waters. But Energy Innovation found that demand-driven price increases more than offset any price declines resulting from these measures.
The tax credit termination also isn’t the only factor here. Energy Innovation included the House’s proposed repeal of the Environmental Protection Agency’s emissions standards for cars and trucks, which amplified the effects. This provision may not make it into the final text, however, as the special rules governing the budget reconciliation process in the Senate prohibit policies that aren’t budgetary in nature. As the nonprofit Environmental Defense Fund put it in a memo to reporters, the regulations were issued to protect public health, and while they do result in costs and benefits for Americans and companies, they do not change the federal budget. “Even if Republican leadership tries to claim any budgetary impacts here, they would be clearly incidental to the main purpose of the proposed legislation,” the group said.
Of course, at least seven Senate Republicans have been vocal about their disapproval of the House’s treatment of the tax credits, so the whole thing may still be subject to change.
“This is what you’d expect from China,” a veteran mining industry lobbyist told Heatmap.
President Donald Trump is chasing a new American mining boom. In the process, he’s making quick bets on projects that haven’t completed routine financial analyses or would be situated in environmentally sensitive areas with significant legal risk — and occasionally both at the same time.
In March, Trump issued an executive order that changed the landscape of American mining for the foreseeable future, commanding agencies to approve permits for individual mines as quickly as possible and requesting government funds go toward domestic mining. The Interior Department has also taken strides to hasten the environmental review process for mining on federal lands, asserting that it will complete comprehensive analyses in less than 30 days, a truncated time-table the likes of which mining industry lobbyists have long sought.
So far in his second term as president, Trump’s administration has claimed to have approved, expedited, or publicly endorsed at least 28 different mines and mineral exploration projects, according to a review of Bureau of Land Management notices and federal permitting databases, with more likely in the offing. Many of these projects may very well produce minerals required for key energy or defense purposes, and some of them are guaranteed to do so. But at least a few have not yet been proven to be economically viable in the way investors typically expect from mining companies.
Conservationists have decried these actions as an unnecessary risk to sensitive landscapes, which could be irrevocably changed without a guarantee of improved energy security. And even some in the mining industry are quietly noting these examples, saying they could represent a paradigm shift in how America treats the mining industry.
“This is what you’d expect from China,” a former veteran mining industry lobbyist told me, requesting anonymity to protect their current business from retribution. “The U.S. prides itself on mines that are good neighbors. The U.S. doesn’t have a perfect record, but those are things that it values.”
“I’m not saying the companies are going to do something wrong here,” the source continued, “but we don’t know that.”
The most headline-grabbing example of this rush to permit came last week, when the Interior Department said it would for the permitting of a large uranium mine in Utah known as Velvet-Wood. The department said it would complete Velvet-Wood’s environmental review within two weeks — a process that has historically taken years.
On first blush, abbreviating the approval process for a mine that will produce energy fuel for nuclear power plants resembles the sort of permitting reform that climate hawks and centrist policy wonks have craved for years. Velvet-Wood’s developer, Anfield Energy, claims the site will also produce vanadium, a strategic mineral used in defense-grade steel.
A deeper examination, however, exposes signs of haste that go beyond all deliberate speed.
Ordinarily, mines take years to develop for reasons wholly unrelated to the federal permitting process. Usually a project requires years of exploration and study to verify that the area where digging will happen holds proven “resources” and then “reserves.” Think of resources vs. reserves as the difference between lukewarm and high levels of confidence that minerals are not only present but also economic to mine and process. It is unusual for any mine to be built without proven resources, let alone reserves, and feasibility studies are the way companies usually communicate that level of proof to investors. These studies have also been a primary mode of conveying a project’s value and design to the government.
Until our present policy moment, the permitting process was so lengthy that it made little sense to pursue it without first giving investors the certainty brought by a feasibility study. Anfield and other companies appear to have found a work-around to demonstrate that certainty, however, at least to the government: Asking to dig in places where mines used to be decades ago.
Anfield has not yet completed a feasibility study for Velvet-Wood, which would include the site of a former underground uranium mine. The most recent study of the project was a 2023 “preliminary economic assessment” that documented some of the old mining infrastructure and otherwise largely referenced historical data about mineralization. The company stated in the report that the study was “too speculative geologically to have economic considerations applied to them,” and that “there is no certainty that the preliminary economic assessment will be realized.”
In Anfield’s own press release announcing the Trump administration’s decision to quickly permit the project, the company states that it “has not done sufficient work to classify these historic estimates” for uranium and vanadium at the site. Anfield did not respond to requests for comment on why the company requested government permits before finishing a feasibility study.
Under the Velvet-Wood deposit’s previous owner, Russian mining company Uranium One, a draft feasibility study did find economically viable uranium. But that study is more than a decade old and was not made public, according to press materials at the time.
In order to become operational, Anfield expected to have to update the decades-old plan of operations for Velvet-Wood, according to the 2023 economic assessment, which also said BLM would need to take into account the impacts of restarting a formerly operational mine, as well as mining in areas that have not previously been mined before. That’s quite a lot of work to complete in only two weeks. While it’s possible that staff at Interior got a head start on their review when Anfield submitted its mine plan last year, they have not confirmed anything to that effect since the department’s announcement about permitting the project.
Aaron Mintzes, senior policy counsel for the mining reform advocacy group Earthworks, told me the practice of approving a mine before feasibility studies have been done carries the risk of painting a misleading portrait to investors about a project’s viability.
“Every mining company does this. All of them. If you’re a publicly traded mining company and you want investors to give your mine money, you must provide a feasibility study. That’s how you know they’re telling the truth,” Mintzes said of this approach. “Investors should be upset about this.”
In an email, BLM press secretary Brian Hires told me that “feasibility studies are not legally required by BLM for mining projects.”
“The BLM continues to ensure appropriate environmental oversight including coordination with other agencies, balancing mineral development rights and responsible public lands management,” Hires stated.
On Velvet-Wood, Hires said the agency acted under “recently established emergency procedures” created under the Trump administration to quickly approve new resource projects. “The expedited review is expected to significantly contribute to meeting urgent energy demands and addressing key threats to national energy security.”
Velvet-Wood is not the first mine Trump’s Interior Department has expedited so early in the approval process.
On April 8, the Trump administration gave Dateline Resources, an Australian company, a green light to build a large mine inside of the Mojave National Preserve. Like Velvet-Wood, the project, known as Colosseum, got this approval without a feasibility study. Colosseum would be a gold mine, according to Dateline’s website, which also states that the project is “prospective” for producing rare earth elements as a byproduct. The company cites previous radiomagnetic reviews by the U.S. Geological Survey and the project’s proximity of roughly 8 kilometers — or about 6 miles — from an operating rare earths mine, Mountain Pass. The company also cites decades-old information about the site from when it used to be an operating gold mine in the 1970s and 1980s.
Are there rare earths at the Colosseum dig site? There may be — but how much and how commercially useful they’d be are normally determined through a feasibility study process.
BLM approved Colosseum without any new environmental review, or at least nothing that was public at the time it made the decision known. Instead, it said in a five-sentence press statement that Dateline could rely entirely on a construction and operations plan from the previous mine, which shut down in the 1990s.
BLM’s press release also referred to Colosseum as a rare earths mine, with no mention of gold.
“For too long, the United States has depended on foreign adversaries like China for rare earth elements for technologies that are vital to our national security,” the release stated. “By recognizing the mine’s continued right to extract and explore rare earth elements, Interior continues to support industries that boost the nation’s economy and protect national security.”
Hires, the BLM press secretary, told me that the agency made this claim to highlight “the project’s potential to produce rare earth elements, which are required for economic and national security.”
On April 21, investors were informed that a “bankable feasibility study” was now “underway.” But that didn’t stop Trump from jumping far ahead of the usual process a few days later, publicly calling the project “America’s second rare earths mine” on Truth Social.
There’s a big reason this area stopped being mined, by the way: According to the National Park Conservation Association, the area is heavily restricted from mineral development under a law Congress passed in the early 1990s, the California Desert Protection Act.
There is a separate law that provides companies the ability to mine in national preserves and parks under very specific and limited conditions, and with the approval of the National Park Service, the association told me. Kelly Shapiro, an attorney representing Dateline, told E&E News in a story published last week that Interior told the company its mine plan of operations was “valid.” Shapiro also told the news outlet that “rare earths have been found at the Colosseum mine site.”
Dateline has now begun work at the mine site and conservation activists are sounding public alarms. The company did not respond to requests for comment.
Asked why BLM gave Colosseum the right to construct a new operating mine, Hires said the project site, which has not been active for decades, “is not a new mine.” He said the facility was granted the “right” to “continue mining operations” under the plan from when the site was active in the 1980s, which the agency said “includes exploration for rare earth minerals.”
Before I came to Heatmap, I spent years writing about the mining industry. One of the stories I’m proudest of was an investigation into the amount of mining needed to build the vastly different energy and transportation systems we’ll need to fully decarbonize. So I can safely say this: We truly will need more minerals like lithium, copper, nickel, graphite and cobalt to decarbonize, and we might need to open more mines to get them, although recycling and technological innovation could easily reduce the tonnage required over time.
The Trump team has a different argument for mining this much. It says our country needs to wean off foreign sources of metals because relying on imports is a weakness in the eyes of hawkish security experts.
For the past decade, U.S. policymakers of both parties have rallied behind the basic notion that the country should stop relying as much on minerals from nations considered to be adversaries by the national defense apparatus, including China and Russia, as well as companies perceived to be substantially controlled by those nations. The idea first gained traction under Trump 1.0, leading to the creation of a list of so-called “critical minerals” that the military and domestically essential businesses rely on but are generally mined or refined in other countries.
Under Joe Biden, the “critical mineral” concept was magnified by multiple signature laws, including the 2021 infrastructure law and the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act, which together established large grant and tax credit programs intended to stimulate a new American mining economy.
Trump has sped up the federal permitting process for some copper, nickel, and lithium mining and exploration projects. These commodities markets are ones in which China genuinely has an outsized influence, per national security experts, through market share and existing business relationships held by Chinese state-owned mining and refining companies.
Some of these U.S. mining projects likely would’ve been permitted no matter the outcome of last year’s election, either because their environmental impacts would be relatively limited or because they’d produce metals crucial for the energy transition that a Democrat-led government would have supported as a trade-off. Take South32’s Hermosa copper mine in Arizona, which the Biden administration fast-tracked and Trump 2.0 has signaled it will approve. A handful of these mines would supply a meaningful amount of defense minerals for which we currently rely on China, such as the Stibnite gold mine in Idaho, which would yield antimony for military-grade ammo as a byproduct.
Then there are special cases like the Resolution copper mine in Arizona, where the government’s hands are essentially tied under federal legal requirements to approve the conveyance of land to a mining company.
Other “transition metal” mining projects fast-tracked or endorsed by Trump 2.0, however, likely would not have been given priority — or even a second look — under a more neutral federal regulator. That’s because they are located in areas that officials under previous administrations fretted would produce outsized pollution risk and potentially run afoul of environmental laws.
Take for example the NewRange copper mine in Minnesota, which the company says would be the state’s only active copper mine if approved and constructed. NewRange is better known in the mining industry as PolyMet, which was its moniker for most of the nearly two decades it has been in the works. NewRange/PolyMet has struggled to get requisite permits, to the point of being referred to by its opponents as a “zombie” project, because it’s situated in an especially porous area of northern Minnesota covered in protected wetlands.
In 2022, the Environmental Protection Agency under Biden said the Army Corps of Engineers should rescind a water permit issued under Trump 1.0 because the project would violate the pollution standards of the Fond du Lac Tribe, which relies on the wet ecosystem to cultivate wild rice for subsistence and cultural practices.
At the beginning of May, the Trump administration added NewRange/PolyMet to a federal “transparency” dashboard that it says will soon have a timetable for approving the project under the same authority it fast-tracked Resolution. Representative Pete Stauber of Minnesota, whose congressional district includes the mining project, reacted in a statement that said the designation shows Trump “understands the vital importance of this project,” and that he looks forward to “seeing NewRange meet and exceed every permitting standard in a timely manner.”
This is an example of mine that, if approved hastily, would probably create new litigation just as fast.
At the risk of repeating myself, it’s not the only example of such a case, and there are more examples where the Trump administration has opened the door to new, legally risky directions on a mine.
Most notable in that pile is the Pebble mine in Alaska, which Trump halted during his first term but may be given what appears to be a last shot at survival under his new government. Decades of battle between a would-be gold mine and the denizens of Bristol Bay have dominated conversations around American mining. Opponents across the political spectrum have tried to stop the project because they fear construction would pollute the bay and its world-class fishing grounds.
The first Trump administration actually opposed Pebble after a private lobbying campaign by Donald Trump, Jr. and other conservative conservation advocates. Under Biden, the EPA issued a rare veto of the project area under a provision of the Clean Water Act. This was a step beyond simply rejecting the permit as it would, in the view of advocates, be a permanent restriction against development.
In February, the Trump 2.0 Justice Department requested a stay on the federal lawsuit filed against the veto by Pebble’s developer, Northern Dynasty Minerals, alongside top political leaders in the state of Alaska, who have argued that the agency overstepped its authority. On Wednesday, Justice Department attorneys filed a status report asking that the stay be extended for at least another month because while officials had been briefed on the subject, they “require additional time to determine how they wish to proceed.”
This indicates the government is still not ready to state its position, and leaves open a door for the Justice Department to flip sides. Northern Dynasty Minerals hopes a flip will happen. “This is an important position in any negotiation between a project proponent and a regulator, and for a process that could, hopefully, remove the veto and re-start the permitting process,” the company’s CEO Ron Thiessen said in a public statement made after the stay extension request.
It may be that even Pebble Mine is a bridge too far for Trump 2.0. But after all these other projects have gotten the skids greased, we must all wait with bated breath for the next shoe — er, pebble — to drop.