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A desire to please the Court may have rendered the EPA’s new power plant rule a little too ineffectual.

If nothing else, give the Environmental Protection Agency credit for this: They seem to understand the assignment.
Last year, the Supreme Court struck down the Clean Power Plan, President Barack Obama’s ambitious attempt to restrict carbon pollution from power plants. That proposal never carried the force of law, and it had been held in suspended animation by the Court — and later the Trump administration — since 2016. But after President Joe Biden took office, Chief Justice John Roberts and the Court’s conservative majority revived it seemingly entirely for the sake of deeming it illegal.
The proposal went far beyond what was allowed by Congress, Roberts ruled. Normally, an EPA standard would require that power plants or factories install some kind of equipment on their smoke stacks to meet a pollution cap. “By contrast, and by design,” the Obama proposal could only be satisfied by burning less coal, the chief justice wrote. It required “generation shifting,” forcing states to get more of their power from renewable, nuclear, or natural-gas plants.
That overreached the EPA’s authority under the Clean Air Act, Roberts declared. If the EPA wanted to regulate greenhouse gases, then it needed to treat them like a normal air pollutant — and it needed to act like a normal technocratic agency. Above all, it had to keep its regulations to those that could be accomplished “inside the fenceline” of each power plant.
So last week, when the Biden administration finally unveiled its own draft attempt at regulating carbon pollution from power plants, it knew it was playing on the Court’s, well, court. And it behaved accordingly. The best thing you can say about the EPA’s new power-plant proposal — which will be one of the Biden era’s most important climate regulations — is that it was meticulously, painstakingly tailored to the Court’s demands. If Chief Justice Roberts asked for a normal rule, then the EPA has delivered one so awkwardly, self-consciously normal that it seems a little like a narc. The worst thing about the new rule is that this desire to please the Court may have rendered the rule a little too ineffectual.
If America wants to fight climate change, it must clean up its power plants. Generating abundant, cheap, zero-carbon electricity is the key to the country’s decarbonization strategy.
“If you clean up the power sector, it enables you to clean up other sectors of the economy too, through electrification,” Leah Stokes, an environmental-science professor at the University of California, Santa Barbara, told me. “Electric cars, heat pumps, induction stoves — all these machines can be fueled with clean power.”
Biden’s climate law, the Inflation Reduction Act, will slash emissions from the sector over the next decade, according to federal and independent modeling efforts. But it won’t get the sector all the way there. That’s where the new proposal is supposed to step in.
As per the Supreme Court’s request, the proposal details how every kind of power plant — even those that burn coal or natural gas — can meet their climate requirements for decades to come. It mandates a buildout of carbon capture and storage infrastructure, or CCS, for most coal and some natural-gas plants that plan to stay open long-term.
“The EPA rule makes sure everyone is on the same level-playing field. If the Inflation Reduction Act is enough to incentivize CCS in some places, the EPA is gonna make sure everyone is gonna do it,” Nick Bryner, a law professor at Louisiana State University, told me. “I think it’s designed very, very well to work in tandem with the IRA tax credits.”
If the IRA is the regulatory-friendly angel on its shoulder, then the Supreme Court’s decision last year — called West Virginia v. EPA — is the devil. The EPA’s desire to stay on the Court’s good side is even visible in the proposal’s name. Previous administrations have tried to give their power-plant rules a memorable name — Obama had the Clean Power Plan, of course, and the Trump administration christened its effort the “Affordable Clean Energy Rule,” or ACE. The Biden administration, by comparison, named the new proposal:
New Source Performance Standards for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New, Modified, and Reconstructed Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units; and Repeal of the Affordable Clean Energy Rule
That’s the NSPSGHGNMRFFFEGU; EGGGEEFFFGU; RACE Rule for short.
I would say that the agency couldn’t have given it a more technocratic name if it tried, except that it obviously tried very hard. “Traditional approach, traditional name,” the EPA’s press office chirped when the Politico reporter Alex Guillén first noted the name. Just what the Supreme Court asked for!, they all but added. The agency is so desperate to look obedient and demure that even its social-media team has been briefed on current federal doctrine.
At the same time, the rule does “a tremendous amount to make the rule as flexible as possible given the constraints they’re working with in West Virginia v. EPA,” Bryner said. Under the proposal, some natural-gas plants can choose between installing carbon-capture equipment or burning low-carbon hydrogen.
But the rules may have erred on the side of too much flexibility, says Charles Harper, a policy analyst at Evergreen, a climate advocacy group and think tank. Evergreen and other environmental groups are worried that the rules might be too generous to fossil fuel companies. They’re focusing their criticism on two elements of the draft: its handling of natural-gas plants and coal retirements.
First, the EPA rule as proposed would not apply to an overwhelming majority of the country’s natural-gas plants.
A large share of carbon emissions from natural-gas plants come from so-called “baseload” plants that generate many hundreds of megawatts of electricity at all hours of the day. The rule focuses on these facilities, and it requires them either to install CCS equipment or to burn hydrogen fuel.
But the rule is not nearly so strict about small or medium-sized natural-gas plants. Natural-gas plants that generate less than 300 megawatts of electricity — or that run less than half the time — are essentially exempt from the rule. This excludes 77% of the country’s natural-gas plants from the new EPA proposal, requiring them to make no changes through 2040.
It is unclear what share of carbon emissions these natural-gas plants represent. The EPA did not provide an estimate of their carbon emissions before the deadline for this story.
As a whole, natural-gas power plants emit 43% of the U.S. electricity sector’s carbon pollution, despite producing nearly twice as much power as coal.
Environmental groups say the proposal’s coal problem is simpler to fix. In the draft, the EPA puts coal-fired power plants in different categories depending on when they’re slated to retire. Plants that have no retirement date — or that will remain open after 2040 — must install equipment to capture 90% of their emissions by the year 2030. Plants shutting down after 2035 must make a cheaper set of changes. And plants due to close by 2032 don’t have to make any changes at all, so long as they don’t increase their emissions over the next decade.
Those deadlines are too long from now, and the EPA should bring them forward in time when it issues a final version of the rule, Harper said. “2040 is pretty far out and would entail a lot of unabated emissions hitting the climate and human health,” he told me.
The EPA still has time to edit this proposal; it will hear public comment over the next few months and probably issue a final version of the rule next year. With the procedural issues resolved, the Supreme Court’s ability to object to that rule is limited to whether carbon capture is feasible and affordable enough to be used under the Clean Air Act.
If there is a bright spot for climate advocates in the new rule, it’s that the Biden administration — and last year’s Democratic majority in Congress — seem to have anticipated that move.
As the House was voting on the IRA last year, Representative Frank Pallone, the chair of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, put a statement in the congressional record saying that the EPA should take the IRA’s generous tax credits into account when proposing power-plant rules. The subsidies should be considered when the agency is deciding whether CCS is feasible and affordable, he said. The EPA cites Pallone’s statement in its new draft.
But ultimately it is Chief Justice John Roberts who will get to decide. Almost a decade ago, a set of conservative states sued the EPA to block it from requiring CCS. That issue has since been held in its own state of suspended animation. It may soon breathe again.
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A new Heatmap Pro poll shows a rapid shift in public opinion since last fall.
Americans have changed their minds about data centers. Decisively.
At least seven in 10 Americans would now oppose a data center being built near their home, according to a new Heatmap Pro poll, a record low that reveals a staggering shift in public opinion against the facilities powering the artificial intelligence boom.
The survey, conducted by Embold Research, finds that an outright majority of Americans are now strongly opposed to data center construction in their area. Young people, Democrats, and rural voters are more hostile to the projects, but they are broadly unpopular with Americans across geographic and political categories.
The new result reflects a rapid and profound shift in public opinion.
When Heatmap first asked Americans how they would feel about a nearby data center project last September, Americans were evenly split: 43% said they would support it, 42% were opposed, and 15% said they weren’t sure.
When asked the same question in February, Americans were more skeptical. Forty-eight percent said they would support a data center project or weren’t sure, while 51% opposed one in their area.
Now, 55% of Americans — an absolute majority — “strongly” oppose a data center project built near where they live, and an additional 16% are “somewhat” opposed. Only 21% of Americans would support a new nearby data center. The public has swung 49 points against data centers in just nine months, underscoring the heightened political salience of the facilities and the AI industry that they embody.
Other statistics suggest that the public’s skepticism of data centers is surging. At least 20 data center projects were canceled after facing significant public backlash in the first quarter of this year, according to Heatmap Pro data released last month. That is more than double the number that were canceled the previous quarter, the data shows.
The canceled projects from the first quarter wiped out more than $41 billion in planned investment and at least 3.5 gigawatts of electricity demand, according to the Heatmap Pro review.
Little wonder: The new polling shows that skepticism of data centers is widespread across all age groups, political parties, and regions of the country. Some 78% of Americans who said they voted for Kamala Harris in the 2024 election would oppose a local data center project; so would 63% of Americans who reported voting for Donald Trump. And no region of the U.S. saw less than 69% data center opposition.
For the past decade, many political issues have polarized along urban and rural lines, with city dwellers lining up on the liberal side of an issue and rural voters trending more conservative. But the new poll suggests data centers may be defying that trend: Data centers are slightly more unpopular among rural voters than among other voters.
Americans in smaller communities were 54 points opposed, on net, to a data center getting built near their home — in other words, 73% opposed a project, while 19% supported it. Suburbanites and urban voters were 48 and 47 points net opposed, respectively.
Young voters are also strongly against data centers. Eighty percent of Americans ages 18 to 34 said they would oppose a new data center near where they live.
Republicans, non-white Americans, and people who did not go to college are slightly more supportive of data centers in their communities than the median, but even that left the developments at least 30 points underwater.
Just 5% of Democrats, by contrast, said they would “strongly” support a data center getting built in their area, with another 10% describing partial support. Sixty-three percent of Democrats would strongly oppose the project and another 15% would somewhat oppose it.
Five percent of independents would strongly support a data center in their area, with 11% somewhat in support. Seventy-two percent of independents would be strongly or somewhat opposed to such a project.
The Heatmap Pro poll of 4,118 American registered voters was conducted by Embold Research via text-to-web responses from May 15 to 28, 2026. The survey included interviews with Americans in all 50 states and Washington, D.C. The margin of sampling error is plus or minus 1.6 percentage points.
Attorney General Letitia James leads a group of states suing the administration’s move to buy back two offshore wind leases.
A group of Northeast attorneys general led by New York’s Letitia James is suing the Trump administration for paying TotalEnergies nearly $1 billion to walk away from its two U.S. offshore wind leases.
The lawsuit, filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on Tuesday, alleges that the government’s settlement agreement with Total violates the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, the statute governing offshore wind, as well as the Judgment Fund Act, which controls the pot of money the federal government uses to pay legal settlements. The other plaintiffs are New Jersey, Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont.
“After repeatedly losing in court, this administration cooked up a sham deal to pay a foreign energy company hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars to abandon offshore wind and invest in oil and gas instead,” James said in a press release. “We are fighting back to stop this illegal agreement that threatens to erase over a thousand union jobs and cheat millions of New Yorkers out of clean, affordable energy.”
On March 23, the Interior Department announced it had reached an agreement with Total to cancel two offshore wind leases in the New York area and refund the $928 million cost back to the company; in exchange, the announcement said, Total would invest an equivalent amount in U.S. oil and gas projects. In a later release, the department said it would pay Total from the Judgment Fund, a permanently appropriated pot of money overseen by the Treasury Department used to settle ongoing or imminent litigation.
According to the signed settlement agreement, the Trump administration said that it would have suspended construction on the lease indefinitely due to national security concerns, after which Total would have claimed breach of contract, but instead, the two parties settled.
James’ lawsuit claims that this does not meet the Judgment Fund’s standard for imminent litigation. “A hypothetical lawsuit to challenge an agency action that had not even been threatened — here, the suspension or cancellation of the Lease — does not constitute actual or imminent litigation under the Judgment Fund Act,” it says.
The lawsuit also contends that there was no actual disagreement between the parties. Both Total and the Trump administration wanted to cancel the leases, it says, citing reporting from Axios in which Total’s CEO asserted that the agreement “came from us — we took the initiative.”
If the parties wanted to cancel the leases, they could have done so legally under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. But the government’s actions violate that statute as well, according to the lawsuit. Proper procedure would have required a hearing to investigate whether continued activity on the lease would cause serious harm to the environment or national security, and whether the advantages of cancelling outweigh those of continuing to honor the lease. The law also requires the administration to notify and coordinate with the governors of affected states, which the Interior Department did not do, the suit argues.
The states that brought the lawsuit allege the terminations will harm their economies, energy grids, and climate goals. New Jersey awarded a contract to one of Total’s offshore wind projects, called Attentive Energy Two, in 2024; the finished development would have provided the state 1.3 gigawatts of power, enough to power about 650,000 homes. On its own, the agreement would have gone a third of the way toward fulfilling a state law passed in 2018 that required New Jersey to procure 3.5 gigawatts of offshore wind energy. In addition to feeding the state’s tight electricity market, in which demand is now outpacing supply, the Attentive Energy Project would have delivered an estimated $3.1 billion in direct, indirect, and induced benefits into New Jersey’s economy.
New York did not have an active contract with any projects under development within the leased areas, but it was anticipating Total bidding into the state’s next round of offshore wind solicitations, according to the lawsuit. The state has many aging power plants nearing retirement, and its grid operator has warned that the New York City area faces a reliability risk without new generation coming online. Total’s project would have provided “critical energy diversity benefits” to the city, the suit says.
The Interior Department disputed the basis for the lawsuit, telling Heatmap that “the only thing blatantly unlawful here was the process by which these offshore wind leases were negotiated and imposed under the Biden administration.” A spokesperson reiterated that “there were serious national security risks that demanded immediate attention,” although did not elaborate on what those risks were. They also emphasized that the settlement agreements were voluntary and were approved by the Department of Justice.
“Attempts to rewrite history now cannot erase the reality of these projects and the damage they could cause,” they said.
Offshore wind advocates, however, applauded the suit. “We commend the Northeast Governors for standing up again against actions that threaten jobs, investment, and the nation's ability to meet growing electricity demand with an affordable and reliable energy source,” Liz Burdock, the president and CEO of the Oceantic Network, said.
A new scientific report on the state of the industry shows a growing gap between what we can do and what we need to do.
The gap between the world’s current capacity to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and the amount we’ll need to remove to materially address climate change is so large, it's hard to fathom crossing it. Now, a new report warns that the chasm is widening.
The third State of Carbon Dioxide Removal report, published on Tuesday, finds that while carbon removal research and deployment has advanced significantly in the past two years, it is still not growing quickly enough to reach the scale required to support the Paris Agreement temperature limits. Carbon emissions, meanwhile, have continued to rise globally, raising the amount of carbon removal required in turn.
“We’re seeing a lot of signs that there’s still growth happening,” Morgan Edwards, an assistant professor of public affairs at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, and one of the authors, told me. “But we need to see a step change in both early indicators like investment and also actual deployments” between now and 2030, in addition to serious emission reductions, she said.
The State of Carbon Dioxide Removal is a project between researchers at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, the University of Maryland, the University of Oxford, the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, and the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. The latest report collates a wide range of indicators to assemble a detailed portrait of progress in the sector, from the number of research papers and patents published, to project deployments, costs, and investment, to voluntary purchases and policies.
The world currently removes approximately 2.2 billion tons of carbon from the atmosphere each year through intentional human activity, the authors found, which is equivalent to about 5% of annual global carbon dioxide emissions. Nearly all of that carbon removal happens through what the authors deem “conventional” methods, which include planting trees, improved forest management, soil sequestration on farms and grasslands, and coastal wetland restoration.
Less than 1% of the 2.2 billion tons comes from “novel” methods such as direct air capture, bioenergy with carbon capture, enhanced weathering, and biochar, the most common method. Novel carbon removal increased from 1.4 million tons in 2023 to 2 million tons in 2025, with biochar responsible for most of that. In total, novel forms of carbon removal have to grow to 70 million by 2030 and 360 million by 2035 for the world to achieve net zero and begin to reverse warming back down to 1.5 degrees Celsius this century, the authors found. And that’s assuming the emissions curve starts to bend dramatically downward.
“The gap will continue to grow if we do not pursue immediate and ambitious emissions reductions today,” Edwards said. Though the Paris Agreement’s 1.5-degree goal looks to be receding further out of reach, she stressed that net-zero emissions implies significant carbon removal, regardless of what temperature target you’re aiming for.
No matter how you look at it, getting to 70 million tons by 2030 would require a major shift. Right now, the most optimistic expectation for how much the carbon removal industry will grow by that point, based on corporate announcements, is about 42 million tons per year by 2030, according to the report. The capacity in the pipeline from projects that are under construction, however, amounts to just 8.4 million by 2030. At the country level, only about a third of national climate strategies even mention novel carbon removal methods, and overall carbon removal ambition among countries would have to double to close the 2030 gap.
This isn’t impossible — other technologies have achieved comparable growth rates. The report’s authors estimate that carbon removal would have to scale at speeds similar to solar power and electric vehicles. Unlike those singular solutions, however, carbon removal consists of many different technologies that intersect with a range of industries — oil and gas drilling, farming, forestry, mining — and therefore may not scale as linearly. Also, unlike EVs and solar, carbon removal isn’t a useful product with an obvious market. It’s a public good, like waste management — and an expensive one, at that.
Carbon removal funding is also highly concentrated, the authors warn, making the industry vulnerable to sudden shifts in policy and investment appetite. For example, Microsoft alone has made more than 80% of carbon removal purchases to date; then in April it confirmed it was pausing procurements, leaving behind major uncertainty over who, if anyone, will fill its role in the market. Similarly, most government funding for pilot projects to date has concentrated in three countries — the U.S., Sweden, and Denmark — but more recently the U.S. has dismantled much of its support.
The industry is also concentrated in terms of deployment. Biochar and bioenergy with carbon capture account for almost all of the 2 million tons of novel removals the authors identified. Direct air capture facilities removed just 1,500 tons in 2025, according to the report. All of that came from Climeworks’ two facilities in Iceland — Orca and Mammoth — and it’s significantly less than the roughly 40,000 tons these facilities were designed to capture each year. (While there are a few other direct air capture plants operating, they have not yet had any removals certified by a third party, and so were not included in the estimate.)
There are some bright spots in the report. Research funding, scientific publications, demonstration projects, public policies, and private investment in carbon removal are all trending up. It’s just that the results of these efforts — in terms of patents, projects under construction, and the amount of carbon being removed — are uneven.
While the report is a valiant effort to assess how far carbon removal has come, the overall picture remains deeply uncertain. That word, “uncertain,” appears over and over, applying to such questions as:
The authors emphasize the need for more research, public policy, and funding to narrow these uncertainties — especially on the demand side of the equation.
“Both demand and supply side policies are important for innovation, but much of the policy we’ve seen for CDR today has been more supply-side focused,” said Edwards. “There’s a need for a strong signal to companies who are developing these technologies and implementing CDR on the ground that the demand will be there.”