You’re out of free articles.
Log in
To continue reading, log in to your account.
Create a Free Account
To unlock more free articles, please create a free account.
Sign In or Create an Account.
By continuing, you agree to the Terms of Service and acknowledge our Privacy Policy
Welcome to Heatmap
Thank you for registering with Heatmap. Climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our lives, a force reshaping our economy, our politics, and our culture. We hope to be your trusted, friendly, and insightful guide to that transformation. Please enjoy your free articles. You can check your profile here .
subscribe to get Unlimited access
Offer for a Heatmap News Unlimited Access subscription; please note that your subscription will renew automatically unless you cancel prior to renewal. Cancellation takes effect at the end of your current billing period. We will let you know in advance of any price changes. Taxes may apply. Offer terms are subject to change.
Subscribe to get unlimited Access
Hey, you are out of free articles but you are only a few clicks away from full access. Subscribe below and take advantage of our introductory offer.
subscribe to get Unlimited access
Offer for a Heatmap News Unlimited Access subscription; please note that your subscription will renew automatically unless you cancel prior to renewal. Cancellation takes effect at the end of your current billing period. We will let you know in advance of any price changes. Taxes may apply. Offer terms are subject to change.
Create Your Account
Please Enter Your Password
Forgot your password?
Please enter the email address you use for your account so we can send you a link to reset your password:
Russ Vought could jeopardize the next decade of climate science. But who is he?

It is my sincere belief that, as with many aspects of governance, thinking about climate policy bores former President Donald Trump. He is not without his hobbyhorses — wind turbines are ugly bird-killers; it’s freezing in New York, so where the hell is global warming? — but on the whole, I tend to agree with the assessment that he basically believes “nothing” on climate change. Trump simply isn’t all that interested. He prefers to let the others do the thinking for him.
This isn’t a knock on Trump, per se; part of leading a bureaucracy as big and as complicated as the United States government is surrounding yourself with people who can offload some of that thinking for you. But the crucial question then becomes: Who is doing that thinking?
The answer, to a large extent, is Russ Vought.
The name might not immediately ring a bell. Biographical details of the 48-year-old career bureaucrat can be hard to find (“a native of Trumbull, Connecticut,” “the youngest of seven children,” “a die-hard Yankees fan”), giving the impression that Vought came out of nowhere. In a sense, he did: For years, Vought dealt mainly with spreadsheets as he worked first as a budget staffer for Texas Republican Sen. Phil Gramm and Rep. Jeb Hensarling, then later for then-Rep. Mike Pence, and eventually the Heritage Foundation. It was Gramm, though, who gave Vought his outlook on the world: “If you do budget, you do everything.”
After a stint with the Trump transition team, Vought became deputy director of the Office of Management and Budget in 2018, and took over entirely in 2019. At OMB, he famously held up military aid to Ukraine in what became the subject of Trump’s first impeachment. Described as “ideological in the extreme,” “adversarial” with his colleagues, and having an “aggressive personal style” — incongruous, perhaps, with his somewhat nerdy, bespectacled appearance — Vought would reportedly go too far in proposed budget cuts sometimes even for his boss.
After Biden’s win in 2020, Vought launched the Center for American Restoration, a pro-Trump think tank with the mission of renewing “a consensus of America as a nation under God,” and has otherwise kept busy with appearances on conservative-friendly talk shows on One America News Network and Fox News. Steve Bannon has approvingly dubbed him “MAGA’s bulldog,” though he rarely speaks to the mainstream press. (I received a failed delivery message in response to an email to the address listed on the website for the Center for American Restoration; other attempts to contact Vought went unanswered.)
Vought is all but assured to take up a powerful position in a potential incoming Trump cabinet. He “trained up during the first Trump administration, and he is looking to apply those skills that he learned in a second,” said Alex Witt, the senior advisor for oil and gas at Climate Power, a strategic communications group that shared its research on Vought with me.
Vought may not be the most obvious architect for the project of dismantling climate progress, however. In Project 2025, the Heritage Foundation’s roadmap for the next Republican president, Vought authored the chapter on the Office of the President of the United States — hardly the most climate-y section, given that there are also chapters on reforming the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Energy, and the Department of the Interior. A flurry of new articles about Vought describe him as a Christian nationalist crusader preoccupied with fending off big government and orchestrating an expansion of presidential powers.
But just as Trump advisor Stephen Miller shaped far-right immigration policies from behind the scenes, Vought would be a hidden hand in a future administration dismantling climate progress. In his chapter in Project 2025, for example, Vought proposes moving the National Defense Strategy from under the purview of the Defense Department to the White House and its National Security Council — normal “expansion of presidential powers” stuff. But Vought goes even further, directing the NSC then to “rigorously review” the staff with an eye for “climate change … and other polarizing policies that weaken our armed force.”
Erin Sikorsky, the director of the Center for Climate and Security, told me that such a proposal indicates “a misunderstanding of how connected climate hazards are to the core duties of what the military is focused on.” It could also put the U.S. armed forces on the back foot in conflicts around the world if it’s followed through. As just one example, if the military isn’t engaging with its Indo-Pacific partners “and helping those countries build resilience to climate change, then China is more than happy to step in and address that,” Sikorsky warned. At home, NSC analyses of the domestic impacts of climate change will likely come to a halt, scuttling future coordination between the military and local governments after disasters and hampering mitigation efforts around the country.
The most significant blow on the climate front, however, would come from Vought’s proposal to reinstate Schedule F, a job classification that aims to convert at least 50,000 career civil servants to “at-will” political employees. (Trump used an executive order to implement Schedule F at the very end of his term; President Biden unimplemented it soon after taking office.) The employment classification ostensibly aims to make it easier to replace “rogue” or “woke” civil servants and would-be whistleblowers, a.k.a. “the deep state,” with party-line faithful. But in the words of Vought himself, Schedule F is also necessary because Biden’s “climate fanaticism will need a whole-of-government unwinding.”
The effects of such a decision, experts told me, could range from very bad to disastrous self-sabotage. Schedule F is “designed to be a tool to purge federal agencies of nonpartisan experts” and replace them with “partisan loyalists who would willingly follow any order without question, regardless of whether it was legal, constitutional, or the right thing to do for the people,” Joe Spielberger, the policy counsel at the Project on Government Oversight, an independent and nonpartisan watchdog group, told me. In practice, that might mean firing longtime civil servants perceived as not loyal enough, or even just “creating and perpetuating a climate of fear and intimidation where people are not able or willing to speak out when they see abuse of power and other corruption happening.”
Such a scenario is concerning for employees at agencies like the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration who work on climate modeling. But the expertise of the U.S. civil service is broad and deep; Schedule F could impact everyone from the economists, lawyers, and engineers who work on something like the Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards to the people who sit on the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee.
“Civil service positions are not classified as political appointees for a reason, which is so that staff, especially scientists, can do work that spans administrations because it is so fundamental to public health and welfare,” Chitra Kumar, the Union of Concerned Scientists’ managing director for climate and energy, told me in an email. The people made fireable under Schedule F, in other words, are the ones who actually know what is going on, whereas “elected officials come and go, often taking a year or more to understand the latest underlying science.”
Reimplementing and expanding Schedule F, however, is apparently one of Vought’s greatest ambitions. Earlier this year, the National Treasury Employees Union obtained documents via a Freedom of Information Act request that showed Vought’s intent to apply the status to much of OMB’s workforce in 2020. As justification for taking an implicit machete to his staff, Vought writes in Project 2025 that “it is the president’s agenda that should matter to the departments and agencies that operate under his constitutional authority,” but that instead, the U.S. civil service is “all too often … carrying out its own policy plans and preferences — or, worse yet, the policy plans and preferences of a radical, supposedly ‘woke’ faction of the country.”
Ann Carlson, the former acting administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and a professor of environmental law at UCLA, strongly refutes Vought’s claim. For one thing, she told me that the great irony of the Schedule F proposal is that it would make it more difficult for the Trump administration to carry out its goals in the long run.
“Part of the problem for a conservative administration is, if you want to roll back policies that are in place, you need people who know how to do that,” Carlson pointed out. She also bristled at the suggestion that civil servants are unable to check their biases at the door: Carlson’s team at NHTSA helped put together the Biden administration’s rules to strengthen fuel economy standards, but it also worked to roll back the Obama administration’s regulations and replaced them with the SAFE standards under Trump. “I don’t actually know, for most of them, which one they preferred,” Carlson said.
Carlson wasn’t the only former political appointee I spoke with who fiercely defended the integrity of her staff. Ron Sanders, a three-year Trump appointee, so vehemently opposed Schedule F when it was briefly implemented in 2020 that he resigned as chairman of the Federal Salary Council. Today, he represents a group of Republican former national security officials who are imploring Congress to find a middle ground between the current status quo and the extreme political loyalty demanded by Schedule F.
When I read Sanders the part of Vought’s Project 2025 chapter that calls for weeding out the “radical, supposedly ‘woke’ faction of the country,” he told me that such thinking is “myopic.” “This is potentially a Republican administration coming in and finding ‘Democrats’ in place,” Sanders said. “You could say the same thing about the Biden administration, but they knew better — they knew that senior career officials appointed in the Trump administration are still politically neutral. It just happened to be a matter of timing.”
It likewise struck me as curious that Vought would push so hard for a policy that would not only hamstring the Trump administration but might also allow future Democratic presidents to carry out purges of perceived conservative government operatives.
The Biden administration has made moves to prevent Schedule F from potentially returning under a different president. Still, Spielberger from the Project on Government Oversight told me that short of a legislative fix by Congress, such actions will only delay reimplementation of the policy by “a matter of months” should Trump be reelected. The damage to climate science from four years of Schedule F, however, could be drastic.
“What we’re going to end up with is an executive branch that’s just uninformed,” Daniel Farber, the director of the Center for Law, Energy, and the Environment at the University of California, Berkeley, stressed to me. Farber’s fear is not just that “a bunch of uninformed ideologues” would be running the show, but also that once government experts are kicked out, it will be difficult to replace them or entice them to return.
“Even after we go back to a Democratic president, you can’t wave a wand and get all those people back,” Farber said. In the first nine months of the Trump administration, for example, the EPA lost more than 700 employees — and that was due to poor morale and high turnover even without the threat of Schedule F.
Schedule F doesn’t just chase out climate-related experts from the government. It also accelerates the revolving door that allows anti-climate zealots actors in. Both the Heritage Foundation and Vought’s think tank, the Center for American Restoration, have taken money from Big Oil groups and executives. Trump has already made his own transactional assurances to the industry if it funds his return to the White House. Schedule F, meanwhile, would open up hundreds if not thousands of positions for unqualified political operatives — essentially creating a “spoils system” where the lines between government and private industry would blur more than they already do.
“Russ Vought is not the problem,” Witt, of Climate Power, told me. “The problem is Donald Trump: Donald and the GOP are bought out by Big Oil, and Vought and other bad actors are a cog in that machine.”
It’s a metaphor that works well for the federal government, too: What happens when you have 50,000 cogs, but the person you’ve deferred to run the machine has fired all the mechanics?
“You take out all that expertise, all the people who understand how the system works?” Carlson, the former NHTSA director, said. “Good luck to you.”
Log in
To continue reading, log in to your account.
Create a Free Account
To unlock more free articles, please create a free account.
Today’s top-of-the-line electric vehicles are self-driving computers on wheels built to feel as futuristic and digital as possible. They come with artificial intelligence-powered assistants, enormous touchscreen interfaces, and huge batteries.
The Slate pickup truck’s signature feature? Hand-crank windows.
As Slate Auto has developed its attempt at the bare-bones EV over the past couple of years, its 1990s-nostalgic manual windows became a symbolic choice, one meant to signal just how far it was willing to go in pursuit of affordability. On Wednesday, Slate gave us a fuller picture, revealing the details about its vehicle and providing a glimpse at how the Jeff Bezos-backed startup plans to sell an EV truck at an entry-level price. But while the pickup’s lack of power windows or a built-in stereo system are attention-grabbers, a lot of the savings lie under the skin.
Just how cheap is it? The “Blank Slate,” a version of the truck with zero bells and whistles, starts a hair under $25,000. This is a compact truck in the spirit of decades past, with two seats up front and nothing more. For a Slate that seats more than a couple, choose the SUV or fastback configuration that bumps up the price to about $30,000 or $32,000, respectively.

From there, Slate’s à la carte model takes over. Choosing a wrap to make your whole truck a color other than gray costs $499, though blessedly, Slate provides dozens of color choices as opposed to the handful of neutrals and muted colors offered on a typical new car. The portal to design one’s Slate becomes a rabbit hole of possible choices — custom taillight designs, roof racks, and wheels — all of which add a little or a lot to the price of the truck. These add-ons can quickly propel a Slate deep into the mid- or even high-$30,000s range if you’re not careful. The point, though, is that the $25,000 EV is front and center.
To achieve this starting price required a heavy dose of vintage or simplified tech. Roll-down windows and no built-in stereo speak to drivers who aren’t automotive engineering experts. But as reviewers and online commenters have noted, crank windows aren’t a make-or-break money-saver — they might knock off $20 or $40 per vehicle — and so few companies use them now that Slate had to go out of its way to source them from Brazil.

A bigger cost-cutter was Slate’s embrace of old-school manufacturing and its willingness to consider “yestertech” that’s still perfectly serviceable, but has fallen out of use because better systems have come along. The chassis, for example, is made of ordinary steel — 250 pieces welded together as opposed to the more efficient stamping methods that have taken over automotive manufacturing. While Slate has a familiar, inexpensive MacPherson suspension up front, its rear uses a design called the De Dion that dates back to the late 1800s. (The Autopian has a nice technical write-up about why this choice makes sense.)
We often default to calling EVs smartphones on wheels because of the Tesla approach to making them — the so-called software-defined vehicle that routes its main functions through touchscreen interfaces and gets new features via over-the-air updates. So perhaps a comparison to the phone industry is apt. In the same way budget-conscious buyers were waiting for Apple to make the “affordable iPhone,” drivers have been waiting for the automakers to roll out the entry-level EV. But instead of the cheap Tesla, what we got is the Slate, which is something more like a flip phone on wheels.
That’s not to say it won’t succeed. Flip phones are enjoying a resurgence, after all, powered by their low price and by growing dissatisfaction with life in this age of touchscreens. But Slate’s unusual position in the car industry makes it difficult to predict how American drivers will respond. For those shopping solely on price, Slate may not measure up. The cheapest gas-powered cars in America include the likes of the Toyota Corolla, Hyundai Elantra, and Volkswagen Jetta, and their starting price in the mid-$20,000s includes the basic creature comforts you’d expect from a modern car, not to mention seating for at least four. In a world that still had the $7,500 federal tax credit for buying an EV, the Slate would undercut these gas-burners. In this world, it can’t (though you could add a slew of options to the Slate before it would cost the same as the $35,000 electric truck under development at Ford’s skunkworks operation).

What Slate has going for it, though, is its ability to become the exact car you’d like. Normal cars come with three or four “trim levels,” each of which adds a thousand dollars or two in exchange for more features. In practice, many people are stuck with whatever version they can actually track down at a dealership. Slate follows the Tesla-Rivian model of direct-to-consumer sales, and its trademark customizability means buyers are limited to picking from two or three versions of a car, but can design every single piece of their truck.
To be sure, lots of people don’t want this. Many are presumably happier buying a car off the familiar lot without the mental overload of choosing every single thing about their vehicle. The question is whether a quorum of drivers are ready for a new way to buy a car — or at least, so fed up with fluctuating gas prices and the out-of-control prices of new vehicles that they’re ready to take a chance on rolling their windows again.
Current conditions: France just recorded its hottest day ever, with Wednesday’s temperatures soaring to just under 111 degrees Fahrenheit; nearly 50 people died drowning while seeking respite from the heat • A pair of 7.1-magnitude earthquakes struck Venezuela, collapsing buildings in Caracas • Wind has whipped the Cottonwood Fire, one of six wildfires raging in Utah, into a larger blaze now covering 60,000 acres — and it’s still at 0% containment.
New Jersey Representative Frank Pallone, the ranking Democrat on the House Energy and Commerce committee, joined calls for a national moratorium on data center construction ahead of Wednesday afternoon’s markup of a series of bills related to the buildout of infrastructure to support artificial intelligence software. In a statement, Pallone described the bills as a “useful first step,” but one that, “compared to the challenges the American power grid is facing,” amounts to “not nearly enough.” Rather, he backed a “national AI data center moratorium until we can find a way to ensure they don’t harm our nation’s air, water, and power bills.” Pallone’s new public position makes him one of the highest-ranking Democrats yet to back the idea, championed by the likes of Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, of halting permitting on new data centers in response to the growing blowback from voters.
Pallone’s shift comes in response to the Ratepayer Protection Act, which would enshrine into law the voluntary pledge tech companies signed with the White House to pay for grid costs from their server farms. Heatmap’s Matthew Zeitlin wrote earlier this week that the bill was “not so much an anti-artificial intelligence or anti-data center bill, but rather a move to insulate further data center development from political pressure stemming from rising electricity costs.” When Pallone made his statement a day later, Matthew wrote: “Well, at least one influential lawmaker seems to agree with me.”
The Iran War has cost the average American car owner an extra $156 and the average SUV driver another $232 in gasoline costs, according to new data from the policy shop Third Way. But the newly mapped analysis, shared exclusively with me, shows that Republican-leaning states in the Mountain West and beyond paid some of the highest prices for a conflict. Alaska saw one of the biggest spikes, with gas prices rising by $1.40 per gallon, a 39% increase. Wyoming followed close behind, with prices soaring by $1.37 per gallon, a 50% surge. Prices in Utah, meanwhile, climbed by $1.30, or 47%. That stands in contrast to many big Democratic-leaning states. New York’s gas prices rose by $1.23, or 41%, while California’s prices went up $0.94, or 20%. That, of course, doesn’t reflect where the prices were already high. I just returned this week from a trip to Los Angeles, where gas was nearly twice as expensive as in New York City.
Century Aluminum, America’s largest primary aluminum producer and the developer behind the first new U.S. smelter in 50 years, has inked a deal with a green cement startup to supply a key raw material. Brimstone, known as a major player in the race to commercialize green cement, also generates alumina. On Wednesday, the startup unveiled a memorandum of understanding with Century Aluminum to establish a domestic “mine to metal supply chain” for aluminum made from scratch rather than scrap. “Foreign sources, including China, currently dominate global alumina production. Brimstone is bringing alumina production home and doing it at a globally competitive price,” Brimstone CEO Cody Finke said in a press release. “Brimstone is upending the massive global imbalance by producing alumina from rock quarried here in the United States.”
Sign up to receive Heatmap AM in your inbox every morning:
Until the nation’s flagship reactor project came online and transformed Southern Company’s Alvin W. Vogtle Generating Station in eastern Georgia into America’s most powerful atomic electrical plant, Arizona’s Palo Verde Generating Station was the No.1 nuclear facility by size in the country. The desert state is now looking to reclaim its mantle. The trio of utilities Arizona Public Service, Salt River Project, and Tucson Electric Power said Wednesday they are continuing “to work together to explore adding nuclear generation in Arizona.” The next step, the companies said, is a siting study that’s expected to be completed within the next six months. The Arizona Corporation Commission, the regulator in charge of utilities in the state, is holding an informational workshop today.
Meanwhile, the developer behind Canada’s flagship reactor design — which, because it’s cooled with pressurized heavy water, can run on raw uranium — just submitted initial paperwork to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to start the licensing process to approve what’s known as the CANDU. Pronounced CAN-do and produced by manufacturer AtkinsRéalis, the reactor is the workhorse of the Canadian and Indian fleets and can be built reliably, but requires more maintenance than the light water reactors that run on enriched uranium and make up the entire U.S. fleet. “As the United States enters a new chapter in its civilian nuclear program, AtkinsRéalis is uniquely positioned, as the steward of CANDU technology, to help advance the country’s ambitious energy policy through proven, low-cost reactor technology with a world-class reputation,” Ian L. Edwards, the company’s president and chief executive, said in a statement. As I told you last month, the CANDU is at the heart of Canada’s new nuclear strategy.

The world needs a lot more copper. And while siting and building new mines takes time, two of the planet’s biggest producers are preparing to increase production at existing mines. On Wednesday, London-based Anglo American and the Chilean state-owned Codelco inked a deal to increase production through a joint venture at Los Bronces and Andina copper mines in the South American nation. The joint mining plan is expected to unlock 2.7 million metric tons of additional copper over a 21-year period, delivering an average of 12,000 tons per year. The increase comes with “minimal capital investment” and should bring the new supply online by 2030. “This agreement represents a more efficient and responsible way to develop one of the world’s leading copper districts,” Bernardo Fontaine, Codelco’s chairman, said in a statement. “It allows us to make better use of existing infrastructure, capture greater benefits for Chile, and move forward with a long-term vision based on operational excellence, sustainability, and the responsible use of resources.”
If green hydrogen is the stuff made with clean electricity and water and blue hydrogen is made with natural gas equipped with carbon capture, then the orange stuff is found in underground rock formations where naturally occurring gas forms and then is encouraged to continue forming through artificial means. Heatmap’s Katie Brigham did a good job of explaining the concept here. Well, now a French renewables developer FDE is promising to start producing orange hydrogen “by late 2028 or early 2029” after finding a naturally-occurring underground reservoir in northern France that can be tapped and stimulated to produce additional fuel, Hydrogen Insight reported.
How China saved the world from $200 oil.
Turn your mind back to early March, soon after Iran announced that it was closing the Strait of Hormuz. Energy experts told us to expect calamity.
Roughly 20% of the world’s oil and liquified natural gas supply moved through the narrow waterway, they said, and we would not soon be able to replace it. Oil prices would rocket to $150 or $200 a barrel. The world faced the worst energy supply shock in history.
We braced ourselves. We waited. And then … it didn’t happen.
Sure, the global oil benchmark rose to about $115 a barrel. Energy prices increased everywhere, and Southeast Asia faced a real crunch. But the worst consequences never hit. Europe didn’t run out of jet fuel, we didn’t get $8 gas across the United States, and the global economy did not shut down. Why?
We can now say with confidence: China bailed us out (and itself out, too). Without fanfare, the country slashed its energy imports and conducted a massive release from its strategic stockpiles of crude oil and liquid fuels. It eliminated something like 5 million daily barrels of oil demand, or about 5% of global oil demand.
Although it might seem technical, the implications of that silent intervention are huge for geopolitics, climate policy, and the future of the oil market. That’s why it’s the topic of today’s episode of Shift Key, Heatmap’s podcast. I encourage you to listen to my conversation with oil analyst Rory Johnston as he walks me through the wonky details — how we know China did this (math and satellite imagery), whether it has a modern precedent (it doesn’t), and what it all means (potentially a lot). He calls this public discovery of China’s latent power “the most important thing” we learned from the Iran war.
Anyway, I won’t ruin the conversation. (You can listen to Shift Key for free on any podcast platform, by the way.) But I do want to mull some of the implications here. The most important, to my mind, has to do with market power.
Get Heatmap in your inbox daily.
In oil markets, we often talk about “swing producers.” Saudi Arabia and other OPEC+ countries can shift the global oil price not just because they oversee a large share of the world’s oil production, but also because they can flex domestic production at will. They can increase or decrease their own output to affect the global marginal barrel’s price, stabilizing prices (or hiking them) as needed. (This originates partly from geological luck; Saudi Arabia’s reserves seem particularly well suited to rapid ramp-ups or ramp-downs in drilling and pumping.)
That suggests a mirrored role: a “swing consumer.” What if a country had such large oil stockpiles that it could ramp up or ramp down its imports at will, such that it could move global demand for oil at the margin? Such a thing has never existed in the history of the global oil market, at least to my knowledge. America has experimented with mini-versions of this idea in the past; the Biden administration released oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve in 2022 to depress prices after Russia invaded Ukraine. Outside of oil, China already plays a similar role in many global mineral markets, single-handedly shifting global prices for iron, lithium, copper, and other commodities.
But China's actions over the past few months suggest that its domestic oil stockpiles might now be so big that the country can play a swing role in global liquid fuels markets. After President Trump announced that he had reached a deal with Iran, I reflected in this newsletter on the fact that the world now had two energy systems, at least in the transport sector: a legacy liquid fuels system and a rival electricity system. These systems’ supply is divided among the world’s powers. The U.S. is the largest oil and gas producer in the world, but China is the largest manufacturer of solar panels, EVs, and batteries.
Yet if China is also now the world's swing consumer of oil, it suggests the country now has much more influence over the world’s most critical energy inputs in any form — fossil, electric, or mineral — than we had once thought. That isn’t my only Heatmap-relevant takeaway from the Iran war. But it is one I suspect we will remember for years to come.