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The American oil industry wasn’t built for Canadian tariffs.

Since his re-election, President Trump has repeatedly threatened to impose big tariffs on imports from Canada and Mexico.
And in recent days, he’s made it clear: Yes, he really means all imports.
“We don’t need them to make our cars, we make a lot of them. We don’t need their lumber because we have our own forests,” he told Davos attendees last week. “We don’t need their oil and gas, we have more than anybody.”
The president is mistaken about the American fossil fuel industry — at least in its current structure. Even though the United States is the world’s No. 1 producer of oil and natural gas, the industry really does depend on oil imported from its neighbors, especially Canada. If Trump makes good on his threats to tariff oil imports from Canada and Mexico, then he will cost the American oil and gas industry tens of billions of dollars while causing gasoline prices to rise across much of the country.
That’s because not all petroleum is created equal. The type of crude that oozes out of wells in Alberta and Saskatchewan is not identical to what’s extracted by frackers in Texas and Oklahoma. But the types of petroleum now produced in Canada and in America pair especially well together — meaning that if the price of Canadian oil goes up, then American refineries, as well as American consumers, will pay the price.
That could hurt the president’s ability to fulfill one of his core promises. In his inaugural address, Trump promised to “rapidly bring down costs and prices” in part by fighting “escalating energy costs.” Levying tariffs on Canadian oil imports would likely raise energy prices.
But it could have more complicated environmental effects. Western Canadian petroleum has a higher carbon intensity than other crude oils, and American climate activists fought last decade to keep it from entering the United States. Trump, counterintuitively, could succeed more thoroughly than they did.
To understand why, you have to know a little bit of chemistry — and a bit of history, too.
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We often talk about oil as an homogenous and fungible commodity, but that’s not really true. In reality, oil and natural gas usually come out of the ground as a slurry of hydrocarbons.
A hydrocarbon is a chain of hydrogen and carbon atoms bonded together. Sometimes those chains are relatively short — as in methane, the major component of natural gas — and sometimes they’re longer — as in octane, a liquid and a major component of gasoline. As the number of carbon atoms keeps growing, the substance starts to get waxier until the chains get absolutely enormous and become the kind of molecule you find in coal. Nitrogen, oxygen, and sulfur atoms are sometimes jammed into the hydrocarbon chains too.
In other words, all fossil fuels exist on a spectrum — and crude oil, a melange of hydrocarbons of different lengths and properties, occupies the messy middle. Those properties can vary based on how and why in the past a crude field formed. Petroleum engineers classify it along two axes:
American fracking wells tend to produce light, sweet crude. The oil from Alberta is heavy and sour.
Normally, heavy and sour oil trades at a discount compared to light and sweet oil. That’s because the highest volume products that come out of a refinery — gasoline or jet fuel, for instance — are made of short hydrocarbons, not long ones. Light, sweet crudes are closer to the finished product, and thus require less refining.
Yet heavy, sour crudes are crucial to the U.S. oil industry anyway. American refiners use heavy crudes to bring down their input costs for refined products such as gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel.
Why? That’s where the history comes in.
Nearly two decades ago, as oil prices reached painful highs as global demand outstripped supply, many refineries across the United States began to invest in technologies that would let them break down heavier, sour petroleum into something more commercially viable. They built coking refineries, expensive pieces of equipment that use extreme heat to break down long hydrocarbon chains into shorter ones. The cost of such a refinery can exceed $10 billion. Many were purpose-built for breaking down the sludgy, sour oil coming from Canada.
In the early 2010s, as the fracking revolution turned the United States into an oil-drilling superpower, those coking refineries remained important. They helped stretch the value out of the light, tight crude coming out of fracking wells, Rory Johnston, an oil markets analyst and the author of the Commodity Context newsletter, told me last week.
It does not make sense to use the coking refineries on oil from fracking wells, because that oil is already largely composed of short-chain hydrocarbons. But by breaking down Canadian oil in coking refineries, and blending it with American oil, the industry can make a wider blend of producers at a lower cost.
“Heavy crude’s cheaper, and they want to refine this into valuable end products,” Johnston said in a separate conversation recorded this week on Heatmap’s Shift Key podcast. “And so because of this, to just run light crude through that, you would instantly render economically worthless all of this very, very expensive equipment.”
Many of America’s refineries — especially those in the Midwest — are now tuned specifically to process light fracking oil and heavy Canadian sludge together, he said. What this means in practice is that the United States exports as a finished product much of the crude oil that it imports from Canada. Under the current situation, the U.S. earns more money selling refined products made from Canadian crude than it spends importing raw petroleum from Canada, Johnston added.
Tariffs will collapse the price relationships that allow for that mutually beneficial situation to persist. It will boost the cost of Canadian oil by at least $5 a barrel on each side of the border, raising pump prices by about 13 cents in the Midwest, Johnston told me.
That may not sound so bad for consumers. But it would be terrible for refiners. “The total effect of Trump’s actions so far is to nuke the economics of U.S. coking refineries. It’s truly magnificent,” he said. “You couldn’t create a better scenario to destroy the economics of U.S. coking refineries.”
If U.S. oil companies lose access to cheap Canadian oil, they will struggle to replace it. That’s because the next best place to get heavy, sour crude is Mexico — and Mexican imports, too, would likely face 25% tariffs under most scenarios where Canada is levied. The next places to get heavy, sour crude are Venezuela (where the Trump administration wants to tighten sanctions) and Colombia (where Trump nearly imposed tariffs last weekend).
One reason Canadian oil is so cheap in the United States is that companies have invested billions integrating the two countries’ oil infrastructure. A network of pipelines and storage tanks bring millions of barrels of oil from Canada down to the U.S. Gulf Coast every day. The countries — and especially their fossil fuel industries — are interdependent.
Meanwhile, only one pipeline system — the Trans Mountain pipeline — connects Alberta’s oil fields to the Pacific coast.
If you begin to play out how each country might react to a tariff, Johnston said, “you get into these completely absurd scenario discussions,” Johnston said. “The result is everyone would be poorer in that scenario.”
None other than the U.S. oil industry itself has opposed the tariffs.
“We import a lot of oil from both Mexico and Canada, and we refine it here in the most sophisticated refinery system in the world,” Mike Sommers, the CEO of the American Petroleum Institute, said at an event in Washington last week. “We’re going to continue to work with the Trump administration on this so that they understand how important it is that we continue these trade relationships.”
On Monday, The Wall Street Journal reported that some Trump aides are eager to hit Canada and Mexico with tariffs this weekend, even though the president has yet to reopen talks — or even describe his demands — for a reworked U.S.-Mexico-Canada free trade agreement. Canadian and Mexican officials have said that they are not sure what Trump actually wants in the talks.
One irony of this fracas is that the tariffs would have a more uncertain environmental effect. Western Canadian crude is unusually carbon-intensive to extract and refine. If its price rose — or if Canadian officials responded to tariffs in part by shutting down production — then Trump could accidentally, if marginally, decrease carbon emissions. American refineries might also respond to tariffs by importing heavy, sour crude oil from abroad, essentially just shifting production around the planet.
Still, it remains ridiculous that Trump, who has spent his first days in the White House attacking a “Green New Deal” agenda that never actually passed Congress, might succeed in raising the cost of oil consumption and production in the U.S. where a decade of climate activism has largely failed.
Perhaps that’s why many still doubt it would happen. On Wednesday morning, President Claudia Sheinbaum of Mexico said that she did not think Trump would ultimately impose sanctions on her country. And even within the oil industry, tariffs on Canadian oil seem unthinkable. A 25% tariff would whack the industry hardest, even though it has allied itself closely with Trump. Trump’s likely energy secretary, Chris Wright, is the CEO of Liberty Energy, an oilfield services company.
“A lot of the people I’m hearing on the Canadian side are saying, ‘Maybe we should try to speak with these people around Trump. Maybe Wright or [Trump’s energy czar Doug] Burgum understand what’s happening,’” Johnston said.
But Trump has already made demands that strike the North American oil industry as bizarre. At the same Davos meeting where he said the United States didn’t need Canadian oil, Trump demanded that OPEC and Saudi Arabia cut global oil prices so that global interest rates could fall. Such a move would cut profits in the American oil industry while hampering Trump’s goal of increasing U.S. oil production.
The irony that a Republican president would push off Canadian crude to increase America’s reliance on OPEC is hard to comprehend, Johnston said.
“I don’t know that anyone has a great sense of where Trump’s true philosophical anchor is,” he said, “other than that we are now getting a clear picture that he views any and all trade deficits as a sin unto themselves.”
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And data centers might be collateral damage.
After derailing gigawatts of renewable power with a permitting freeze, the Trump administration is expanding its war on renewable energy, retaining one of country music’s biggest stars in a PR offensive against utility-scale projects on “prime farmland.”
The administration recently onboarded John Rich – one half of the stadium-packing American musical duo Big & Rich – to be Trump’s “special envoy for American landowners.” Rich entered activism around landowner rights last January when he backed opponents fighting a large Tennessee Valley Authority transmission project routed through his home county of Cheatham, Tennessee. This led to him joining the Trump team, where he’s fashioning himself as a go-to guy and cheerleader for anyone who wants Trump to help stop a solar or wind farm they don’t want built.
Rich’s first fight on behalf of the Trump team? Battling solar projects in upstate New York. Over the weekend, Agriculture Secretary Brooke Rollins, EPA Administrator Lee Zeldin, and the freshly-annointed Rich wrote New York Governor Kathy Hochul grilling her on the state’s definition of “prime farmland” and claiming “the absence of a clear plan” for disposing of solar panels after projects are decommissioned. The letter resulted from Rich’s conversations with a prominent anti-solar Substack author in upstate New York, Alexandra Fasulo, and it references a specific Repsol project under development in Glen, New York, that she is fighting in state court.
“Only 8 weeks ago, I decided to start posting my written content from Facebook and Substack to X. It didn’t take long before John Rich and I connected,” Fasulo wrote in a blog on Monday. “John and I spoke on the phone a few times. We texted and I began to share my research with him. Many meetings later… and the US Department of Agriculture, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and John Rich put their heads together.” In her post Fasulo signaled more is coming. “If you read the letter slowly, you’ll get the gist of what the feds are trying to do here. For legal purposes, I am not going to explain that in writing. Read between the lines,” she said. “This lays the foundation for battling destruction at the hands of solar and wind complexes, battery storage, and so much more. Have a little faith and patience. There is A LOT to come.”
Trump is pivoting to farmland fights because there are few battlegrounds left for the federal government to fire upon. He has totally undermined large-scale renewable energy development in the ocean – I mean, look at offshore wind. He’s wrecked progress in the desert, where large solar farms on federal lands remain trapped in bureaucratic permitting delays. Some facilities are now getting through, like Primergy Power’s Purple Sage Energy Center south of Pahrump, Nevada, which got its permits last month. Yet other large projects are petering out; permitting on at least three large solar proposals – Smith Blythe’s Desert Energy Charger Project and Intersect Power’s Perkins Renewable Energy Project in California and Balanced Rock Power’s Samantha Solar effort in Nevada – has been paused or canceled outright since the start of the year.
The president’s turn to fighting projects on farmland also makes sense from a political standpoint. He’s facing an enormous backlash to a buildout of hyperscale data centers he supported, many of which are sited on acreage suitable for agriculture. Republicans running statewide in must-watch midterms battlegrounds – Texas and Iowa, for example – will have to navigate this rocky terrain where something their president supported is deeply unpopular. By bringing Rich aboard and letting him wail on renewable energy in the public square, it’ll be a signal that the Big Man is still listening to rural MAGA voters wary of industrial development.
In media interviews, Rich has claimed Trump created this new, unpaid special envoy position after the country star turned down an offer to sit on the TVA. “I said [to Trump], ‘if I serve with the TVA I cannot disparage the TVA, and I fully intend on keeping my right to disparage them intact.’” He said, ‘You know what, I respect that. So what do you want to do?’ And I said, ‘Man, give me a position where I’ve got some authority and I can work with the highest agencies in the land to protect landowners. Can you create something like that for me?’”
That’s at least the public story for how the president created the “special envoy” role, which Rich has described in ways that are equal parts citizen-government liaison and culture warrior. It’s now clear from his many posts on X that he’ll be heavily involved in messaging against the construction of new renewable energy facilities, carbon pipelines and, potentially, hyperscale data centers.
“[I’ll] go out, find these egregious situations where landowners are being infringed upon and I can go in, work with USDA, EPA, Secretary of the Interior, HUD, the Energy Department, and then all the way of course [to] the Oval Office – to throw up a defense against American landowners,” Rich told Atkisson. He added that data centers will also be a focus of his in government, and there are “two or three” projects out there where he wanted to intervene.
“The president wants to see the data centers built, but he also wants the farm and ranchland to be preserved. We have to have food security for America. We have to.”
Rich and Fasulo then joined Rollins and other administration officials at a press conference Thursday in Washington, D.C. Fasulo spoke at length against New York solar and wind development. Pressed on how data centers square with farmland protection, Rollins spoke about the anxiety in rural America around hyperscalers.
“That debate is raging right now,” she said. “I think that the importance of private property rights, the importance of preserving American farmland, the importance of ensuring we’re going to have another 250 years of freedom is paramount. Does that mean it is completely incompatible with data centers? I don’t think so and I know President Trump doesn’t think so. But what it does mean is that we have to be extremely intentional. There should be plenty of land in this country where data centers can be built that will not be on prime, important farmland. That’s my take on that.”
When Rich joined the federal government is unclear. The Agriculture Department formally announced Rich joined the administration on June 10, but Rich first disclosed Trump “made an offer for a position” in a subscriber-only post made to X on July 24, 2025. He then provided updates in similarly paywalled statements, revealing the Trump appointment to his subscribers in April. Then in May, he told subscribers that he’d completed federal onboarding. “I’m really looking forward to pushing bad guys off of good guys’ land:) You’ll be seeing the official announcement soon, but I wanted you to know 1st!”
What’s clear, however, is that Rich has other targets too. As Rich was brought into federal service, he began routinely sharing a URL – “usda.gov/lawfare” – and directed aggrieved landowners to report potential misdeeds around land seizure. A review of his back-and-forth communications on social media indicate several potential fights he may wade into. Wind energy projects in Kansas. Solar development in rural Virginia. An aluminum smelter in Oklahoma. Carbon capture proposals in Louisiana.
Prior to formally joining the administration, Rich got involved in a conflict over eminent domain and transmission for data centers in Coweta County, Georgia, which had gone viral on right-wing social media. On May 12, Rich said he “just had a great phone call” with Rep. Brian Jack, the GOP congressman who represents the transmission battleground in question. “I will be speaking more on the matter soon,” he tweeted, declaring the power lines threatened “not only homes, but cattle farms and row crops.” Rich also says he facilitated federal engagement between the USDA and Casey Murph, a rancher in Navajo County, Arizona, who claims the state prematurely ended a land lease he held so Orsted can build a solar project.
It’s also apparent Rich will be the first major Trump administration official to publicly root for more counties to indefinitely ban solar and wind development. “The best way for farm and ranch land to be protected from wind/solar projects is for the county to pass a moratorium on those energy sources, disallowing them to ever be built in the county,” Rich told an X follower on May 16.
No one can predict how harmful it’ll be to have one of country music’s most famous artists turning into a spokesperson against renewable energy. But I doubt even paying Katie Miller to say nice things about solar will be able to overcome newly-empowered activism from a Nashville legend.
And more of the week’s top news around project fights.
1. Kansas City, Missouri – Data centers are so toxic that politicians are using them as boogeymen in totally unrelated policy discussions.
2. Ingham County, Michigan – We have our first major anti-data center candidate in a Democratic congressional primary.
3. Nueces County, Texas - The Longhorn State is on a bull run towards data center hostility.
4. Pulaski County, Arkansas - We have yet another municipal employee losing their job over helping a data center.
5. Marathon County, Wisconsin - Yet again rural residents are poised to lose against state permitting primacy laws benefiting renewable energy.
This week’s conversation is with Grant Gutierrez, head of community impacts at carbon management company Carbon Direct. This week Carbon Direct published a white paper Gutierrez authored on opposition around data centers he’s studied. His research reinforces much of what Heatmap Pro has uncovered, but I was particularly intrigued by a topline finding – that transparency is the most common thread in the 46 data center fights he looked into. Was he seeing what I’ve been seeing? So I asked him to hop onto a Zoom call and let me know his thoughts.
The following conversation was lightly edited for clarity.
If you were to explain the findings in your white paper to someone at a bar… how would you put it?
What I would say is that we were really interested in the kinds of concerns communities were articulating as they were opposing or resisting data center development in the U.S. To answer and explore those questions, we developed our own data center cancellation tracker where we looked for cases where we could find a strong correlation between cancelation or withdrawal status and opposition. Then we did high-level analyses of the demographics surrounding those data centers, using standard best practices from environmental justice methodologies and pulling sociodemographic and environmental burden characters from EPA’s EJScreen tool. We were mostly looking at public records. Press materials. City council meeting minutes. Things you wouldn’t have to dig too hard to find.
The kinds of communities we saw successfully resisting data centers tracked across the demographic middle of the United States – slightly more middle income, slightly more white than a majority of the American community, but mostly what you’d consider the average American community.
What is the intended audience of this paper and what are you hoping to communicate?
I think it’s important for data center developers and the capital behind them is that they need to move their engagement to early stage, responsible design. A second audience is regulators, city councils, and local zoning commissions about how to engage with developers and advocate for the right disclosure requirements from industry.
The key topline message is that developers who treat community engagement as a permitting formality instead of a critical early stage input are burdening communities, breaking trust. This is resulting in reputational risk for developers, stranded assets, losing capital – and the loss of future opportunities as developers want to build 21st century infrastructure.
Walk me through what you saw evaluating these projects. What’s the development pattern that leads to such opposition?
We saw five key themes. Some of them you might expect – concerns around natural resources, water impacts, electricity rates, land. The rural character came up quite consistently. And then there was a lack of transparency through the use of NDAs.
The NDA example I was surprised to see was the most consistent in all of our case studies. Communities are largely concerned with the process that unfolds as much as the impacts. That’s a very important signal that transcends political lines. Communities want to be heard, involved in the process. They want large infrastructural development with impacts to listen to their concerns. When those decisions are made behind NDAs or with no transparency or equitable engagement, communities quickly mobilize and organize at a hyperlocal level and are successful in opposing these data centers.
I know there are a number of companies out there – without naming names – that are putting responsible development principles forward. The ones we advocate for across our business, whether we’re working in carbon removal or other things. I see companies leading and saying, if we’re involved in this infrastructure, we are not going to sign an NDA. Those who are pushing forward renewable energy commitments, community benefit agreements, and local public-private partnerships are leading with transparency and equity in their engagements.
How any of this carries in the broader industry is yet to be seen.
In your report you point to various ways opposition can crop up to a project. One of those ways was due to the presence of co-located gas – you note that gas power at a data center engendered environmental opponents, which then strengthened those fighting a data center. Can you elaborate on whether you think a new gas power presence is making it harder to get a data center built?
The case you’re pointing to, that’s the Ballico case where on top of the data center there was a 3,500 megawatt co-located gas plant. That quickly led to major community concerns and a partnership with the Southern Environmental Law Center, which became the legal anchor for thinking through the opposition here and commissioned the technical evidence, and provided the legal [support] there.
You see a broad coalition coalesce around not only the data center concern but the climate concerns that arise. I wouldn’t be surprised if we saw a repeated concern around the expansion of fossil energy and combustion sources going hand in hand with community opposition and organizing on data centers. But that remains to be seen.
What in your research have you seen when you compare opposition to data centers and campaigns against, let’s say, fossil fuels? Or mining? Or renewables?
What I think about with data centers is they’re the highways of the 21st century. As we know through the highway projects in the U.S., there were major disproportionate impacts on communities of color. I think there’s potential for data centers if they follow that playbook to have that same impact.
When it comes to comparing these, that’s something I have not done yet. But I think there’s a few things happening. I think the scale and scope of the buildout is taking the American public by surprise. Articulation around impacts to natural resources and electricity prices in a heightened political climate and a difficult economy. It’s also the existential problem AI introduces, which is the role AI plays in society. This is unique compared to other kinds of extraction, which feed technologies already at play.
How do you feel about the fact that so many of us in energy, environment and climate are now talking about data centers all the time?
Never in my career, working in carbon removal and nature based solutions, I never thought data centers would be a major focus in my career as an environmental justice advocate and social scientist.
Data centers are probably emerging to be one of the biggest environmental justice problems of our time so while it’s not something I planned to work on, I am emboldened to see the response from the nonprofit community and others trying to wrap their heads around this. What is the right kind of information? What does the public need to know? How do we advocate for our communities and build the world we would like to build?
While data centers are moving fast, I’m encouraged to see communities organizing and advocating for their own needs as well. Over the next few years, the story will tell itself.
Last question – what was the last song you listened to?
DtMF by Bad Bunny.