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The American oil industry wasn’t built for Canadian tariffs.

Since his re-election, President Trump has repeatedly threatened to impose big tariffs on imports from Canada and Mexico.
And in recent days, he’s made it clear: Yes, he really means all imports.
“We don’t need them to make our cars, we make a lot of them. We don’t need their lumber because we have our own forests,” he told Davos attendees last week. “We don’t need their oil and gas, we have more than anybody.”
The president is mistaken about the American fossil fuel industry — at least in its current structure. Even though the United States is the world’s No. 1 producer of oil and natural gas, the industry really does depend on oil imported from its neighbors, especially Canada. If Trump makes good on his threats to tariff oil imports from Canada and Mexico, then he will cost the American oil and gas industry tens of billions of dollars while causing gasoline prices to rise across much of the country.
That’s because not all petroleum is created equal. The type of crude that oozes out of wells in Alberta and Saskatchewan is not identical to what’s extracted by frackers in Texas and Oklahoma. But the types of petroleum now produced in Canada and in America pair especially well together — meaning that if the price of Canadian oil goes up, then American refineries, as well as American consumers, will pay the price.
That could hurt the president’s ability to fulfill one of his core promises. In his inaugural address, Trump promised to “rapidly bring down costs and prices” in part by fighting “escalating energy costs.” Levying tariffs on Canadian oil imports would likely raise energy prices.
But it could have more complicated environmental effects. Western Canadian petroleum has a higher carbon intensity than other crude oils, and American climate activists fought last decade to keep it from entering the United States. Trump, counterintuitively, could succeed more thoroughly than they did.
To understand why, you have to know a little bit of chemistry — and a bit of history, too.
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We often talk about oil as an homogenous and fungible commodity, but that’s not really true. In reality, oil and natural gas usually come out of the ground as a slurry of hydrocarbons.
A hydrocarbon is a chain of hydrogen and carbon atoms bonded together. Sometimes those chains are relatively short — as in methane, the major component of natural gas — and sometimes they’re longer — as in octane, a liquid and a major component of gasoline. As the number of carbon atoms keeps growing, the substance starts to get waxier until the chains get absolutely enormous and become the kind of molecule you find in coal. Nitrogen, oxygen, and sulfur atoms are sometimes jammed into the hydrocarbon chains too.
In other words, all fossil fuels exist on a spectrum — and crude oil, a melange of hydrocarbons of different lengths and properties, occupies the messy middle. Those properties can vary based on how and why in the past a crude field formed. Petroleum engineers classify it along two axes:
American fracking wells tend to produce light, sweet crude. The oil from Alberta is heavy and sour.
Normally, heavy and sour oil trades at a discount compared to light and sweet oil. That’s because the highest volume products that come out of a refinery — gasoline or jet fuel, for instance — are made of short hydrocarbons, not long ones. Light, sweet crudes are closer to the finished product, and thus require less refining.
Yet heavy, sour crudes are crucial to the U.S. oil industry anyway. American refiners use heavy crudes to bring down their input costs for refined products such as gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel.
Why? That’s where the history comes in.
Nearly two decades ago, as oil prices reached painful highs as global demand outstripped supply, many refineries across the United States began to invest in technologies that would let them break down heavier, sour petroleum into something more commercially viable. They built coking refineries, expensive pieces of equipment that use extreme heat to break down long hydrocarbon chains into shorter ones. The cost of such a refinery can exceed $10 billion. Many were purpose-built for breaking down the sludgy, sour oil coming from Canada.
In the early 2010s, as the fracking revolution turned the United States into an oil-drilling superpower, those coking refineries remained important. They helped stretch the value out of the light, tight crude coming out of fracking wells, Rory Johnston, an oil markets analyst and the author of the Commodity Context newsletter, told me last week.
It does not make sense to use the coking refineries on oil from fracking wells, because that oil is already largely composed of short-chain hydrocarbons. But by breaking down Canadian oil in coking refineries, and blending it with American oil, the industry can make a wider blend of producers at a lower cost.
“Heavy crude’s cheaper, and they want to refine this into valuable end products,” Johnston said in a separate conversation recorded this week on Heatmap’s Shift Key podcast. “And so because of this, to just run light crude through that, you would instantly render economically worthless all of this very, very expensive equipment.”
Many of America’s refineries — especially those in the Midwest — are now tuned specifically to process light fracking oil and heavy Canadian sludge together, he said. What this means in practice is that the United States exports as a finished product much of the crude oil that it imports from Canada. Under the current situation, the U.S. earns more money selling refined products made from Canadian crude than it spends importing raw petroleum from Canada, Johnston added.
Tariffs will collapse the price relationships that allow for that mutually beneficial situation to persist. It will boost the cost of Canadian oil by at least $5 a barrel on each side of the border, raising pump prices by about 13 cents in the Midwest, Johnston told me.
That may not sound so bad for consumers. But it would be terrible for refiners. “The total effect of Trump’s actions so far is to nuke the economics of U.S. coking refineries. It’s truly magnificent,” he said. “You couldn’t create a better scenario to destroy the economics of U.S. coking refineries.”
If U.S. oil companies lose access to cheap Canadian oil, they will struggle to replace it. That’s because the next best place to get heavy, sour crude is Mexico — and Mexican imports, too, would likely face 25% tariffs under most scenarios where Canada is levied. The next places to get heavy, sour crude are Venezuela (where the Trump administration wants to tighten sanctions) and Colombia (where Trump nearly imposed tariffs last weekend).
One reason Canadian oil is so cheap in the United States is that companies have invested billions integrating the two countries’ oil infrastructure. A network of pipelines and storage tanks bring millions of barrels of oil from Canada down to the U.S. Gulf Coast every day. The countries — and especially their fossil fuel industries — are interdependent.
Meanwhile, only one pipeline system — the Trans Mountain pipeline — connects Alberta’s oil fields to the Pacific coast.
If you begin to play out how each country might react to a tariff, Johnston said, “you get into these completely absurd scenario discussions,” Johnston said. “The result is everyone would be poorer in that scenario.”
None other than the U.S. oil industry itself has opposed the tariffs.
“We import a lot of oil from both Mexico and Canada, and we refine it here in the most sophisticated refinery system in the world,” Mike Sommers, the CEO of the American Petroleum Institute, said at an event in Washington last week. “We’re going to continue to work with the Trump administration on this so that they understand how important it is that we continue these trade relationships.”
On Monday, The Wall Street Journal reported that some Trump aides are eager to hit Canada and Mexico with tariffs this weekend, even though the president has yet to reopen talks — or even describe his demands — for a reworked U.S.-Mexico-Canada free trade agreement. Canadian and Mexican officials have said that they are not sure what Trump actually wants in the talks.
One irony of this fracas is that the tariffs would have a more uncertain environmental effect. Western Canadian crude is unusually carbon-intensive to extract and refine. If its price rose — or if Canadian officials responded to tariffs in part by shutting down production — then Trump could accidentally, if marginally, decrease carbon emissions. American refineries might also respond to tariffs by importing heavy, sour crude oil from abroad, essentially just shifting production around the planet.
Still, it remains ridiculous that Trump, who has spent his first days in the White House attacking a “Green New Deal” agenda that never actually passed Congress, might succeed in raising the cost of oil consumption and production in the U.S. where a decade of climate activism has largely failed.
Perhaps that’s why many still doubt it would happen. On Wednesday morning, President Claudia Sheinbaum of Mexico said that she did not think Trump would ultimately impose sanctions on her country. And even within the oil industry, tariffs on Canadian oil seem unthinkable. A 25% tariff would whack the industry hardest, even though it has allied itself closely with Trump. Trump’s likely energy secretary, Chris Wright, is the CEO of Liberty Energy, an oilfield services company.
“A lot of the people I’m hearing on the Canadian side are saying, ‘Maybe we should try to speak with these people around Trump. Maybe Wright or [Trump’s energy czar Doug] Burgum understand what’s happening,’” Johnston said.
But Trump has already made demands that strike the North American oil industry as bizarre. At the same Davos meeting where he said the United States didn’t need Canadian oil, Trump demanded that OPEC and Saudi Arabia cut global oil prices so that global interest rates could fall. Such a move would cut profits in the American oil industry while hampering Trump’s goal of increasing U.S. oil production.
The irony that a Republican president would push off Canadian crude to increase America’s reliance on OPEC is hard to comprehend, Johnston said.
“I don’t know that anyone has a great sense of where Trump’s true philosophical anchor is,” he said, “other than that we are now getting a clear picture that he views any and all trade deficits as a sin unto themselves.”
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Fossil fuels are the real October surprise.
This is Heatmap Daily, an evening news digest written by our executive editor. Subscribe here.
At this point, the real October surprise may be the lack of one — because little seems set to change in the U.S. energy economy between now and the midterm elections on November 3.
Inflation certainly isn’t budging. Prices rose 3.7% over the past year, and 0.6% in September alone, according to today’s new government inflation report. That reading was hot — a tenth of a percent above what economists expected.
Surging gasoline and especially diesel fuel prices were to blame. Gasoline prices rose 9.1% last month, which pushed up prices above the economy: Transportation services, a category that includes airfare and Uber rides, increased by 0.6%, while food prices rose by 0.6%. (Read my colleague Matthew Zeitlin on how rising diesel costs can jack up food prices.) Staggeringly, fuel oil prices rose 15.3% — an eye-popping reading for a report where figures are usually in the tenth of a percent.
President Trump seems to be running out of time to repair the U.S. energy economy before Americans elect the last Congress of his presidency. His last-minute deal to free up 2.25 millions barrels of oil from Russia this month — with another 11 million or so to come afterward — seems unlikely to lower diesel prices, given that it represents only a few days of U.S. demand. (The deal has already succeeded in undermining Ukraine, however, and led six Republican senators to rebuke him this week.) Meanwhile, Election Day is in 20 days, and Americans are already voting in 20 states.
This is not how the Trump administration was supposed to play out — at least not according to its proponents. Trump in 2024 ran on taming the energy inflation that had plagued President Biden’s last two years in office. He vowed to “drill, baby, drill” and end Biden’s ambitious climate policies, which he called a “Green New Scam.” He even promised to do the bidding of oil company CEOs if they only steered $1 billion to his campaign.
This flagrant offer of quid pro quo may have mortified some in the industry, but it was coherent with the rest of Trump’s pitch: For more than a decade, he has essentially argued that only by surrendering to the fossil fuel industry, by giving oil and gas companies as much regulatory relief as they can stand, can voters finally escape high energy prices. Trump, of course, cemented this pitch in a typically over-the-top and ill-considered proposal, pledging to cut energy prices in half by 2026 or so. That was never going to happen, and its failure to happen has blown up for the president. But the underlying idea was consistent.
The Trump administration has spent the past two years executing this energy agenda. It repealed large swaths of the Inflation Reduction Act, ending incentives to build new solar and wind farms and terminating consumer-side subsidies for electric vehicles. It rolled back fines and rules restricting wasteful methane pollution. It has effectively eliminated fuel efficiency standards for cars and trucks. And it has declared an extralegal war on the wind industry.
And what has happened? Prices have gone up anyway. Gasoline and diesel are more expensive on an inflation-adjusted basis than they were on the day Trump took office. Now, you might argue that this surge is unrelated to the underlying policy, and that gasoline and diesel prices have surged because of the fallout from Trump’s war in Iran — not his domestic energy policy.
But the Iran crisis reveals the problem that Trump would have faced in any event: Oil prices are set on the global market, and neither the domestic oil industry nor the federal government possess the capacity to swing America’s production or consumption enough to affect those prices. Trump’s presidency, in other words, would always have been held hostage by the global energy markets — just as Biden’s was before him.
There is a deeper lesson here: The fossil fuel industry cannot guarantee low prices for consumers in the enduring way that Trump has promised — even if you give it all the regulatory relief that it demands. Nor can the oil, gasoline, and diesel markets deliver the deep energy security or economic stability that American policymakers want — or that voters desire. Trump’s war on Iran has continually been undermined by the American economy’s exposure to crude oil prices; the president is now compromising Ukraine’s defense in order to secure a dubiously small amount of crude. Fossil fuels remain America’s soft underbelly. Policymakers will keep getting poked until the country diversifies its energy system.
Even the smallest wave, tidal, and river-current projects are currently licensed as if they were 1,000-megawatt dams.
Tucked inside the Senate’s ambitious new permitting bill, the Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act, is a major win for an energy technology that often flies under the radar: marine power. Small-scale wave, tidal, and river-current projects could help power everything from remote communities and military installations to ocean sensors and coastal desalination systems — at least in theory.
Drawing largely from the bipartisan FLOWS Act, introduced in the Senate last December but never brought to a floor vote, BAAJA aims to streamline the licensing pathway for so-called micro hydrokinetic projects, which harness moving water without dams or reservoirs and have a capacity of 5 megawatts or less. The bill would give the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission one year to act on commercial license applications for these projects, while exempting them from full review under the National Environmental Policy Act. It would also allow FERC to issue 10- to 20-year licenses, giving projects a pathway to long-term commercial operation, as opposed to relying on pilot licenses designed for temporary testing.
The bill wouldn’t eliminate environmental oversight altogether. Small-scale marine energy projects would still undergo basic environmental screenings as a part of FERC licensing, and would still require state and local permits, which can trigger their own environmental reviews. They’d also remain subject to the Endangered Species Act and the Clean Water Act — though the bill would expedite reviews under both of those laws, too. On the whole, the reforms are intended to give developers and investors alike a quicker, more predictable timeline.
“Taking a 1-megawatt marine energy project and trying to license it like it’s a 1,000-megawatt conventional dam just wasn’t working. It was apples to oranges,” Matthew Allen, senior director of legislative affairs at the National Hydropower Association, told me. “Recognizing that it deserves its own process could be a tremendous market signal for the technology.”
After all, this tech certainly doesn’t look like large-scale hydropower, where colossal dams unleash thousands of tons of water per second that rush through electricity-generating turbines to the river below. Such gargantuan infrastructure projects typically require favorable geography — think big rivers running through steep, mountainous terrain, where a dam can create a sharp drop in elevation. And with most of the best sites in the U.S. already developed, the country is unlikely to build many new greenfield hydro projects anytime soon.
But less-developed marine energy technologies have barely scratched the surface of their potential. Some look like large buoys, bobbing with the ocean swells and converting that motion into electricity. Others use turbines anchored to the seafloor or riverbed, spinning as tides ebb and flow or river currents rush past. While these devices generate essentially zero power for the grid today, in theory the resource is enormous: The National Renewable Energy Laboratory estimates that wave, tidal, and river-current projects have the technical potential to generate a staggering 2,300 terawatt-hours of electricity annually — more than half of the country’s total electricity generation last year. Wave energy alone accounts for about 60% of that number.
Of course, technical potential is a long way from practical reality. Economic constraints, environmental regulations, competing water uses, and public acceptance could limit uptake of these technologies. NREL suggests that we would be lucky to eventually tap even 10% of marine energy’s potential. Meanwhile, most of the tech remains in the pilot or demonstration stage in the U.S. — which is exactly why expediting permitting for small-scale projects stands to have significant impact.
“Marine energy is so new and still so novel that a 5-megawatt device, it doesn’t even exist right now,” Jennifer Garson, former director of the Water Power Technologies Office during the Biden administration, told me. “So you’re still talking about a good amount of headroom for being able to deploy smaller-scale marine energy devices in rivers and nearshore.”
Early deployments have largely served remote or island communities. In the 70-person Alaska Native village of Igiugig, for example, Ocean Renewable Power Company installed two 35-kilowatt turbine systems on a local riverbed, designed to supply nearly half the village’s power and thus reduce reliance on expensive diesel generators. While the project’s pilot license expires in three years, the permitting bill could offer a pathway to continued power generation.
The lack of a commercial licensing pathway has already led to the demise of one promising project, National Hydropower Association senior program manager Kelly Rogers told me. Verdant Power’s tidal energy pilot in New York City’s East River — the first project of its type to receive a license in the U.S. — officially shuttered in 2021 when said pilot license expired. By then, its turbines had delivered over 312 megawatt-hours of total electricity to the grid, harnessing the tides as they flowed in and out of the saltwater channel.
Other companies in this space include wave energy startups Oscilla Power and CalWave, which make surface-floating and submerged wave energy converters, respectively, with the goal of selling to utility customers and remote communities alike. C-Power, another early-stage wave energy company, is focused on powering off-grid equipment like ocean sensors. And while all have received at least some venture backing, a significant portion of their funding comes from Department of Energy grants.
In 2022, all three received DOE funding to trial their tech at PacWave, an Oregon-based facility that’s the first grid-connected wave energy test site in the continental U.S. Backed by the DOE, the facility secured all its necessary state and federal approvals in advance so that companies working there could largely bypass the permitting process and get their tech straight into the water. But getting there, Garson told me, involved an arduous 15 years of negotiations among the DOE, the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, and state and local authorities before the facility could open for testing this August.
The permitting bill can only do so much to accelerate a permitting process like this, Garson explained. Even with a faster FERC licensing process, all projects in federal waters — generally those more than 3 nautical miles from shore — will still need a separate lease from BOEM, a complex process that the bill’s new permitting pathway wouldn’t replace. “One of the complexities of anything that you do with water is you just have so many split jurisdictional challenges and questions,” she told me.
It’s also telling that as of yet, there are no wave energy devices in PacWave’s waters, as the Trump administration’s federal funding freeze has scrambled the plans of some of the marine energy developers who’d originally intended to test there. Oregon startup AquaHarmonics, for example, was on track to deploy its wave energy converter at PacWave but had to shut down last year after the Trump administration withheld its previously allocated grant money.
“A lot of the device deployments, particularly in the United States, have been contingent on or reliant on federal funding,” Garson told me. “You’re dealing with still such early-stage R&D that it really points to a necessity for the federal government to be in this space”
But while the federal budget for emerging marine energy technologies has generally grown year over year, Garson said relatively little of that money is actually reaching developers. When she was still at the DOE, for example, the Water Power Technologies Office launched a funding solicitation offering up to $112.5 million in total for wave energy companies to test their devices at sea, including at PacWave. But while the DOE was supposed to announce the winners last year, Garson said it has yet to do so — and it’s disbursed no funding, either.
“That’s a long time for a lot of these companies to sit and wait for any funding to even be available,” she told me. CalWave, at least, still plans to hook its system up at PacWave, as the startup’s CEO, Marcus Lehmann, told me the company is “now in the construction phase of installing the first grid-connected system” and that it plans to launch at PacWave sometime in 2027 or 2028.
He sees the permitting bill as “really critical” in helping early-stage projects “get online faster, and just to prove it out on a community level or a microgrid level” before scaling up to larger installations and device arrays that would likely exceed the 5-megawatt threshold.
“Regulatory certainty, particularly when you’re dealing with capital-tight startups — great. Anything that makes their lives easier, I am all for,” Garson told me, calling the existing permitting structure for marine energy “byzantine.” But she doesn’t think that if the bill passes we’ll suddenly see a slew of wave, tidal, and river-current projects coming online. “You’re still talking about relatively small outputs of power until we reach more [technological] maturity.”
But it could certainly be a first step toward recognizing the potential of water power technologies beyond conventional hydropower — and giving them a place in the broader clean energy conversation. “This is a meaningful amount of power to a lot of people. We just tend to get so lost in the gigawatt conversation,” Garson told me.
And while developers do measure these projects in kilowatts and megawatts for now, one day they too could help move the needle at the gigawatt level. As Garson put it, “If we can figure out how to unlock the ocean — power for everybody, everywhere.”
On methane emissions, renewables’ costs, and Poland’s atomic ambition
Current conditions: Hurricane Simon is lingering off Mexico’s coast as a new tropical depression that could form into a powerful storm begins gathering strength • Iceland has issued an orange-level warning — the notch just below the most severe — across the whole country ahead of an intense storm that could bring vicious winds and snow • The mountain areas surrounding Los Angeles are on red alert for wildfires throughout the rest of the week.
Over Labor Day weekend, I found myself on the upper deck of the ferry to Block Island, a rustic little vacation enclave between Rhode Island and New York’s Long Island, marveling at a seemingly endless horizon of spinning wind turbines. Revolution Wind, Orsted’s first big chunk of the Northeast’s offshore wind buildout, was, as its name implied, an act of defiance. The Trump administration had tried for months to kill the project, which was nearly finished when President Donald Trump returned to office last year. But the Danish energy giant won one battle after another in court, and ultimately brought the 704-megawatt turbine array online. Its completion, however, isn’t the end of the fight.
On Friday, the Department of Justice asked a federal court to rescind the Department of the Interior’s approval of a construction and operation plan for Revolution Wind. Citing a regulatory filing, Bloomberg broke news yesterday that the Interior Department wants to reconsider whether the permit complies with federal law. In response, my colleague Robinson Meyer asked last night whether Trump was “trying to blow up the permitting deal,” which includes a whole section on project certainty. (See my colleague Jael Holzman’s reporting on the bill for more.) White House energy advisor Jarrod Agen appeared to suggest the legal move was a negotiating tactic, calling on “the media” to “stop their attempts to blow up a GREAT deal for the American people.” In a post on X, he said, “This is an old lawsuit brought by the local community—who had serious concerns about this project—against the Biden Administration! The White House maintains support for PERMITTING REFORM! We look forward to the Senate voting on this historic legislation.” In a joint statement Senators Sheldon Whitehouse of Rhode Island and Martin Heinrich of New Mexico, the chief Democratic negotiators of the permitting deal, said “the administration needs to start showing good faith progress on wind permits.”
Of the 1,583 executive orders presidents have issued since 1993, 22 explicitly mention coal. More than a third of those bore Trump’s signature. That’s according to a new analysis by the Financial Times, whose reporting found that lobbying by the coal industry has significantly increased in Trump’s second term. “When we would meet with the Biden administration they were like, ‘Let’s just keep that coal in the ground,’” Michelle Bloodworth, chief executive at trade association America’s Power, told the newspaper. “It’s been just amazing, unbelievable to have President Trump and the administration talk so publicly about the importance of coal.”
Meanwhile, there’s an optimistic climate case for fossil fuel that has driven the shift away from coal and reducing America’s emissions. The problem with natural gas has always been that, despite producing less carbon when burned, the drilling and transportation of the fuel leaks methane, a powerful greenhouse gas that stays in the atmosphere for less time but traps more heat throughout those decades. But methane emissions from the U.S. oil and gas sector are remaining steady despite surging production, according to new research by Johns Hopkins University. The study, published yesterday in the peer-reviewed journal Communications Earth & Environment, highlights a big reason: “Companies have built more infrastructure needed to better capture methane — a vital component of natural gas — and transport it for sale as a fuel, providing a financial incentive to limit the amount escaping into the atmosphere.” That’s a double-edged sword, the paper’s author said. “The good news is that emissions have not markedly increased, as many scientists feared would happen after an enormous increase in natural gas production in the decades following the hydraulic fracturing boom,” Scot Miller, an associate professor of environmental health and engineering at Johns Hopkins University who studies greenhouse gases, said in a statement. “The bad news is that oil and gas production is still a large percentage of U.S. methane emissions, and we do not find any evidence that a flurry of federal legislation had an impact on emissions.”

Wind and solar is cheap to build, and even cheaper to operate. But data suggests “there is no meaningful relationship between wind and solar deployment” and lower wholesale electricity prices, according to a new analysis from the consultancy BloombergNEF. “This is also the case when considering all renewable generation, and renewable-plus-nuclear power.” That’s because, in many markets, renewables bid at or below zero, and are thus tapped first. As a result, fossil fuels set the marginal price during the hours when they’re in demand as a dispatchable resource when the sun isn’t shining or the wind isn’t blowing. On average, fossil fuels such as gas or coal set the price in Europe roughly 58% of the time in 2021, despite a declining share of generation. In the United Kingdom, it was around 90% in the early 2020s, but has since shrunk to 60%. In PJM Interconnection, the second-largest U.S. grid system, natural gas set the marginal price 60% of hours last year. A big problem is the high rate at which renewable power plants are forced to reduce output below maximum levels to keep from overloading the grid. Across 27 markets worldwide, BNEF found that the average rate at which wind and solar are curtailed was 10.5% last year. “Indeed, more wind and solar deployment may increase other cost inputs for retail prices unless other fundraising mechanisms are used,” the report warned. “For example, renewables integration is a key driver of grid expansion and reinforcement, for which network charges in consumer bills have been a crucial source of funding in many markets.”
So, when will wind and solar actually start reducing bills? It depends on where you’re talking about. Over the next decade, Germany’s prices are set to fall by 20% below the 2025 average. Britain’s offshore wind and solar buildout are expected to reduce prices by 26% over that same period between now and 2035. Spain, on the other hand, is forecast to see steady power prices over the next few years followed by an increase as its nuclear plants come offline. In the U.S., prices in PJM and the Electric Reliability Council of Texas are set to soar “partly due to the phaseout of wind and solar tax credits” and “delays to new gas-fired capacity and transmission build.” The Texas grid in particular could see prices soar by 160% over 2025 levels by 2035. But the Midcontinent Independent System Operator, the nation’s largest grid spanning the Midwest, and New York’s statewide grid are poised for “a gradual decline from 2026 driven by steady renewable additions, lowering the need for thermal generation.”
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The Department of Energy is pumping $581 million into upgrading the Tennessee Valley Authority’s grid system. The agency said Tuesday the funding would support 84 transmission and distribution projects across eight states in the federally owned utility’s territory, adding about 2.5 gigawatts of capacity. While $331 million will go to cost-share programs that require the TVA and local utilities to kick in funding, another $250 million will come as direct federal funding. “America’s electric grid cannot become a roadblock to economic growth,” Katie Jereza, the assistant energy secretary of the Office of Electricity, said in a statement.
When I visited the site where Poland plans to build its first nuclear power station with a trio of America’s flagship reactors, Westinghouse AP1000s, the area was little more than a cleared portion of a rural field on the Baltic Sea, where crews were conducting seismic tests. But as I told you last week, Poland cemented its plans by approving the purchase of long lead-time items. All along, the country had planned to build at least one more atomic power station. At first, the second plant was supposed to be financed with private capital and use South Korean technology. But those plans have largely fallen to the wayside in recent years.
Now the same state-owned firm behind the AP1000 facility has officially committed to building a second plant. The U.S., France, and Canada have all begun bidding to build the No. 2 facility, according to World Nuclear News.
Last month, I told you that the AI energy software provider Verse had tripled that amount of power capacity under its control. Now, I can reveal exclusively for this newsletter, the company is out with a new calculator that shows the potential impact of the data center buildout on Texas ratepayers. Without new power supply, data centers would add $624 per year to the average household’s bills, Verse’s calculations found. But requiring data centers to build their own power would reduce that increase to $35 per year. But data centers that respond to grid demand with flexibility, ramping down when supply when is lower, could actually reduce households' electricity bills by $223 per year. You can play with the calculator here for yourself.