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Warren Buffet, the chairman of Berkshire Hathaway and investing folk hero, has long had a rule for picking which companies to invest in.
“The most important thing [is] trying to find a business with a wide and long-lasting moat around it … protecting a terrific economic castle with an honest lord in charge of the castle,” he told a CNBC crowd in 1995. He has embellished the metaphor over the years — in some versions, sharks populate the moat — but the idea is the same. Seek out companies with a natural competitive advantage, even an inherent monopoly, and prosperity will follow.
For decades, investor-owned gas and electricity utilities have struck Buffett as businesses with a good moat. Over the years, Buffett has bought up a handful of utilities, including MidAmerican Energy Company in the Great Plains, NV Energy in Nevada, and PacifiCorp in the Mountain West and Pacific Northwest. Their climate record is mixed: The Berkshire utilities generate more power from renewables than the national average, but still operate several coal plants in Utah and Wyoming. Berkshire Hathaway says its utilities and pipeline companies serve about 12 million end customers in North America and the United Kingdom.
But Buffett’s faith in for-profit utilities as a sound and stable business is failing. In his latest letter to investors — an annual tradition known for its plain writing and folksy anecdotes — Buffett says that the future of for-profit utilities looks more ominous. Climate change and what he sees as higher regulatory standards are making it harder for utilities to make money, he says.
He’s speaking in part from personal experience. Last year, an Oregon jury found PacifiCorp liable for negligence that resulted in the start of four wildfires during Labor Day weekend in 2020. A series of “mini-trials” have since awarded at least $175 million to the fires’ victims, with more trials yet to come. These results didn’t take Berkshire Energy into the red — Berkshire’s utility businesses earned $2.3 billion last year — but it did result in much worse financial performance than 2022.
In his letter, Buffett says that “most” of the company’s utility businesses have done as expected. But he adds:
[T]he regulatory climate in a few states has raised the specter of zero profitability or even bankruptcy (an actual outcome at California’s largest utility and a current threat in Hawaii). In such jurisdictions, it is difficult to project both earnings and asset values in what was once regarded as among the most stable industries in America.
For more than a century, electric utilities raised huge sums to finance their growth through a state-by-state promise of a fixed return on equity (sometimes with a small bonus for superior performance). With this approach, massive investments were made for capacity that would likely be required a few years down the road. That forward-looking regulation reflected the reality that utilities build generating and transmission assets that often take many years to construct. BHE’s extensive multi-state transmission project in the West was initiated in 2006 and remains some years from completion. Eventually, it will serve 10 states comprising 30% of the acreage in the continental United States.
With this model employed by both private and public-power systems, the lights stayed on, even if population growth or industrial demand exceeded expectations. The “margin of safety” approach seemed sensible to regulators, investors and the public. Now, the fixed-but-satisfactory return pact has been broken in a few states, and investors are becoming apprehensive that such ruptures may spread. Climate change adds to their worries. Underground transmission may be required but who, a few decades ago, wanted to pay the staggering costs for such construction?
At Berkshire, we have made a best estimate for the amount of losses that have occurred. These costs arose from forest fires, whose frequency and intensity have increased – and will likely continue to increase – if convective storms become more frequent.
He later continues:
Whatever the case at Berkshire, the final result for the utility industry may be ominous: Certain utilities might no longer attract the savings of American citizens and will be forced to adopt the public-power model. Nebraska made this choice in the 1930s and there are many public-power operations throughout the country. Eventually, voters, taxpayers and users will decide which model they prefer. When the dust settles, America’s power needs and the consequent capital expenditure will be staggering. I did not anticipate or even consider the adverse developments in regulatory returns and, along with Berkshire’s two partners at BHE, I made a costly mistake in not doing so.
As has been noted elsewhere, Buffett is criticizing government regulation in this letter. But even if he has reached his conclusion spitefully, it is not necessarily wrong. In the coming years, America’s utilities will have to overhaul their infrastructure to decarbonize their power plants while also girding themselves against climate change’s effects. Both projects are expensive.
For years, most public officials have more or less assumed that the for-profit model is the best way to ensure such maintenance and upgrading get done in a timely and efficient fashion. But that may no longer be feasible or desirable.
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Re-meet the once and future director of the Office of Management and Budget, Russell Vought.
President-elect Donald Trump spent the Friday evening before Thanksgiving filling out nearly the rest of his Cabinet. He plans for his Treasury secretary to be a hedge fund manager who’s called the Inflation Reduction Act “the Doomsday machine for the deficit”; he’s named a vaccine safety skeptic to lead the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; and his pick to head the Department of Labor is a Republican congresswoman who may want to ease the enforcement of child labor rules if confirmed.
And — in one of the most consequential moves yet for America’s standing in the fight to mitigate climate change — Trump also named Russ Vought to lead the Office of Management and Budget. The decision comes as no surprise — Vought served as deputy director of the OMB under Trump in 2018 and took over the top job in 2019, serving until the end of Trump’s first presidency. The strategic communications group Climate Power had been sounding the alarm on his potential return to the office since this spring, which included sharing their research on him with me.
Unlike many Trump administration nominees, who tend to be loyalists with limited experience in the offices they’re appointed to oversee, Vought is noteworthy for having thought long and hard about how to “purge federal agencies of nonpartisan experts” and replace them with “partisan loyalists who would willingly follow any order without question, regardless of whether it was legal, constitutional, or the right thing to do for the people,” Joe Spielberger, the policy counsel at the Project on Government Oversight, an independent and nonpartisan watchdog group, told me when I covered Vought’s agenda earlier this year.
Vought plans to do so mainly by reinstating Schedule F, a job classification that would designate at least 50,000 career civil servants as “at-will” political employees, including climate scientists National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and others who sit on committees like the Clean Air Scientific Advisory. In Vought’s words in his chapter of Project 2025, “the Biden Administration’s climate fanaticism will need a whole-of-government unwinding.” (In a recent conversation with Tucker Carlson, the pair speculated about being able to “fire them all.”) Vought already tried this once, at the end of Trump’s first term, and Biden swiftly reversed it upon taking office.
Beyond gutting America’s scientific corps, possibly for generations, if confirmed, Vought will immediately make his presence in the Trump administration felt, having spent the past few years secretly drafting “hundreds of executive orders, regulations, and memos that would lay the groundwork for rapid action on Trump’s plans,” according to reporting by CNN and based on undercover video released by the Centre for Climate Reporting, which recorded a candid conversation with former OMB director about his plans under false pretenses. “Eighty percent of my time is working on the plans of what’s necessary to take control of these bureaucracies,” Vought told his interviewers. “And we are working doggedly on that,” including by “destroying their agencies’ notion of independence.”
Though Trump (and his campaign) tried to deflect the influence of the Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025 roadmap for his presidency, insisting he is an independent thinker not beholden to anyone, the president-elect’s appointment of Vought and other Project 2025 authors such as Brendan Carr, Tom Homan, and John Ratcliffe to powerful posts in his administration renders those denials specious, to say the least. More crucially, it suggests a certain intellectual deferral to Vought, enthroning him as one of the key architects of Trumpism 2.0. Through his Christian nationalist group, Center for Renewing America, Vought has spread his framework for solidifying executive power (and eliminating its checks and obstacles) throughout Washington’s right-wing intellectual circles, giving him a powerful base of support.
All this from the OMB, though — one of the, let’s face it, more boring offices of government? As Vought knows, however: If you control the budget, then you do everything.
Meet Scott Bessent.
Donald Trump ended weeks of Billions-esque drama on Wall Street and Palm Beach by finally settling late Friday on a nominee for Secretary of the Treasury, hedge fund manager Scott Bessent.
In contrast to the quick and instinctive picks for major posts like secretary of defense, secretary of state, and attorney general (albeit, two picks for that job), Trump deliberated on the Treasury pick, according to reports, cycling through candidates including Bessent, long the frontrunner for the job, his transition chief Howard Lutnick, private equity titan Marc Rowan, and former Federal Reserve Governor Kevin Warsh.
Bessent will almost immediately face a challenge that the markets have been putting towards Trump since even before his election: can he deliver what investors crave (tax cuts. deregulation), while smoothing out volatility and possible inflation stemming from the tariffs and mass deportations that Trump has promised to implement? Investors already have slightly cooled on the Trump trade and expect that the interest rate cuts kicked off in September will slow.
Bessent has long advised Trump on the economy and is not unaware of these challenges, but his way around them is to embrace much of Trump’s existing agenda in what the Wall Street Journal has described as a “3-3-3” plan, where deficits are cut in half to 3% of gross domestic product, growth is kicked up to 3%, and oil production rises by three million barrels a day, a goal that Continental Resources chief executive and informal Trump advisor Harold Hamm has cast doubt on due to geologic constraints.
“Scott has long been a strong advocate of the America First Agenda,” Trump wrote on Truth Social announcing the pick. “Scott will support my Policies that will drive U.S. Competitiveness, and stop unfair Trade Imbalances, work to create an Economy that places Growth at the forefront, especially through our coming World Energy Dominance.”
While energy policy will seemingly be handled by the nominee for Secretary of the Interior Doug Burgum and the newly formed National Energy Council, fiscal policy and tariffs will likely play a major role in determining if Trump’s vision of a more productive and less constrained oil and gas sector can be realized, whether it’s by tariffs possibly leading to increases in the price of steel or possible retaliatory duties on American energy exports. Higher interest rates due to tariffs or an overheated economy could deter investment in energy, renewable or not.
One of the Treasury Department’s most important jobs is managing the nation’s debt profile by deciding what kind of debt to sell in order to meet the government’s immense borrowing needs. Bessent criticized the current Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen in a Wall Street Journal essay for having “distorted Treasury markets by borrowing more than $1 trillion in more-expensive shorter-term debt compared with historical norms.” He suggested that selling more longer-term debt “may increase longer-term interest rates and will need to be deftly handled.” Higher long-term rates are more likely to feed through to a higher cost of capital for investors, which will likely hurt renewable energy developers more than their fossil fuel competitors due to how much of the cost of renewables comes up front.
In another ominous signal for the nascent climate economy, Bessent also suggested to the Financial Times that the Inflation Reduction Act could be one area where cuts to the federal budget could be found, telling the newspaper that it was “the Doomsday machine for the deficit.”
This would be the second time the U.S. has exited the climate treaty — and it’ll happen faster than the first time.
As the annual United Nations climate change conference reaches the end of its scheduled programming, this could represent the last time for at least the next four years that the U.S. will bring a strong delegation with substantial negotiating power to the meetings. That’s because Donald Trump has once again promised to pull the United States out of the Paris Agreement, the international treaty adopted at the same climate conference in 2015, which unites nearly every nation on earth in an effort to limit global warming to “well below” 2 degrees Celsius.
Existentially, we know what this means: The loss of climate leadership and legitimacy in the eyes of other nations, as well as delayed progress on emissions reductions. But tangibly, there’s no precedent for exactly what this looks like when it comes to U.S. participation in future UN climate conferences, a.k.a. COPs, the official venue for negotiation and decision-making related to the agreement. That’s because when Trump withdrew the U.S. from Paris the first time, the agreement’s three year post-implementation waiting period and one-year withdrawal process meant that by the time we were officially out, it was November 2020 and Biden was days away from being declared the winner of that year’s presidential election. That year’s conference was delayed by a year due to the Covid pandemic, by which point Biden had fully recommitted the U.S. to the treaty.
Now that the waiting period no longer applies, the U.S. could exit as soon as January 2026, meaning COP31 would be the first where it’s not party to the agreement. The U.S. could still attend the conference as long as it retains membership in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the body that oversees the meetings, and it could even attend Paris Agreement-related meetings, though for these it would be relegated to “observer status,” with no decision-making power. The U.S. would not be required to submit updated emissions targets and progress reports as prescribed by Paris, and would have much weaker financial commitments to developing countries.
Todd Stern, Obama’s former U.S. climate envoy, told me decisions at COP are essentially made by consensus, meaning that “if you're a player like the U.S., or you're a player like any of the big guys, and you say, We can't do this, that's going to push the negotiation one way or another.” Post-pullout, the U.S. won’t be able to throw that kind of weight around. “But that doesn't necessarily mean, when you get down into the nitty gritty of negotiation, that the people from the U.S. will have views that are uninteresting,” Stern told me, indicating that the American delegation could still make suggestions and share the country’s overall perspective.
Stern noted that after the U.S. announced its first withdrawal from Paris, it kept showing up at COP, with lower-ranking government officials continuing to provide input even as most political appointees stayed home. “The U.S. kept attending and speaking and having ideas because the U.S. team is very skilled. They're smart people who’ve done it a lot,” he told me. Though the delegations Trump sent to COP were notably smaller, less influential, and more fossil fuel-forward than Obama’s and Biden’s representatives, the U.S. kept contributing, even helping to finalize the Paris rulebook in 2018, which codifies detailed guidelines that make the high-level agreement actionable.
Of course the natural next question is, why would Trump pull out again if his first administration seemed to feel that a seat at the table was worthwhile? Beyond the obvious political symbolism around deprioritizing decarbonization, this was something Stern couldn’t quite explain, either. The official statements on COP from that time reiterate that “the United States intends to withdraw from the Paris Agreement as soon as it is eligible to do so,” while also stating that the country “is participating in ongoing negotiations, including those related to the Paris Agreement, in order to ensure a level playing field that benefits and protects U.S. interests.”
Nonsensical as these dual goals may be, this time the U.S. simply won’t have the option to prioritize both — it’s one or the other. But hey, maybe ExxonMobil will get its way and Trump will stay in the agreement after all.