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A U.S. firm led by former Israeli government physicists, Stardust seeks to patent its proprietary sunlight-scattering particle — but it won’t deploy its technology until global governments authorize such a move, its CEO says.

The era of the geoengineering startup has seemingly arrived.
Stardust Solutions, a company led by a team of Israeli physicists, announced on Friday that it has raised $60 million in venture capital to develop technological building blocks that it says will make solar geoengineering possible by the beginning of next decade.
It is betting that it can be the first to develop solar geoengineering technology, a hypothetical approach that uses aerosols to reflect sunlight away from Earth’s surface to balance out the effects of greenhouse gases. Yanai Yedvab, Stardust’s CEO, says that the company’s technology will be ready to deploy by the end of the decade.
The funding announcement represents a coming out of sorts for Stardust, which has been one of the biggest open secrets in the small world of solar geoengineering researchers. The company is — depending on how you look at it — either setting out a new way to research solar radiation management, or SRM, or violating a set of informal global norms that have built up to govern climate-intervention research over time.
Chief among these: While universities, nonprofits, and government labs have traditionally led SRM studies, Stardust is a for-profit company. It is seeking a patent for aspects of its geoengineering system, including protections for the reflective particles that it hopes governments will eventually disperse in the atmosphere.
The company has sought the advice of former United Nations diplomats, federal scientists, and Silicon Valley investors in its pursuit of geoengineering technology. Lowercarbon Capital, one of the most respected climate tech venture capital firms, led the funding round. Stardust previously raised a seed round of $15 million from Canadian and Israeli investors. It has not disclosed a valuation.
Yedvab assured me that once Stardust’s geoengineering system is ready to deploy, governments will decide whether and when to do so.
But even if it is successful, Stardust’s technology will not remove climate risk entirely. “There will still be extreme weather events. We’re not preventing them altogether,” Yedvab said. Rather, tinkering with the Earth’s atmosphere on a planetary scale could help preserve something like normal life — “like the life that all of us, you, us, our children have been experiencing over the last few decades.” The new round of funding, he says, will put that dream within reach.
Yedvab, 54, has salt and pepper hair and a weary demeanor. When I met him earlier this month, he and his cofounder, Stardust Chief Product Officer Amyad Spector, had just flown into New York from Tel Aviv, before continuing on to Washington, D.C., that afternoon. Yedvab worked for many years at the center of the Israeli scientific and defense establishment. From 2011 to 2015, he was the deputy chief research scientist at the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission. He was also previously the head of the physics division at the highly classified Israeli nuclear research site in Negev, according to his LinkedIn.
Spector, 42, has also spent much of his career working for the Israeli government. He was a physics researcher at the Negev Nuclear Research Center before working on unspecified R&D projects for the government for nearly a decade, as well as on its Covid response. He left the government in December 2022.
Stardust’s story, in their telling, began in the wake of the pandemic, when they and their third cofounder — Eli Waxman, a particle physics professor at the Weizmann Institute of Science — became curious about climate change. “We started [with a] first principles approach,” Yedvab told me. What were countries’ plans to deal with warming? What did the data say? It was a heady moment in global climate politics: The United States and Europe had recently passed major climate spending laws, and clean energy companies were finally competing on cost with oil and gas companies.
Yet Yedvab was struck by how far away the world seemed to be from meeting any serious climate goal. “I think the thing that became very clear early on is that we’re definitely not winning here, right?” he told me. “These extreme weather events essentially destroy communities, drain ecosystems, and also may have major implications in terms of national security,” he said. “To continue doing what we’re doing over the next few decades and expecting materially different results will not get us where we want to be. And the implications can be quite horrific.”
Then they came across two documents that changed their thinking. The first was a 2021 report from the National Academies of Sciences in the United States, which argued that the federal government should establish “a transdisciplinary, solar geoengineering research program” — although it added that this must only be a “minor part” of the country’s overall climate studies and could not substitute for emissions reductions. Its authors seemed to treat solar geoengineering as a technology that could be developed in the near term, akin to artificial intelligence or self-driving cars.
They also found a much older article by the physicist Edward Teller — the same Teller who had battled with J. Robert Oppenheimer during the Manhattan Project. Teller had warned the oil industry about climate change as early as 1959, but in his final years he sought ways to avoid cutting fossil fuels at all. Writing in The Wall Street Journal weeks before the Kyoto Protocol meetings in 1997, an 89-year-old Teller argued that “contemporary technology offers considerably more realistic options for addressing any global warming effect” than politicians or activists were considering.
“One particularly attractive approach,” he wrote, was solar geoengineering. Blocking just 1% of sunlight could reduce temperatures while costing $100 million to $1 billion a year, he said, a fraction of the estimated societal cost of paring fossil fuels to their 1990 levels. A few years later, he wrote a longer report for the Energy Department arguing for the “active technical management” of the atmosphere rather than “administrative management” of fossil fuel consumption. He died in 2003.
The documents captivated the two scientists. What began to appeal to Yedvab and Spector was the economy of scale unlocked by the stratosphere — the way that just a few million tons of material could change the global climate. “It's very easy to understand why, if this works, the benefit could be enormous,” Yedvab said. “You can actually stop global warming. You can cool the planet and avoid a large part of the suffering. But then again, it was a very theoretical concept.” They incorporated Stardust in early 2023.
Economists had long anticipated the appeal of such an approach to climate management. Nearly two decades ago, the Columbia economist Scott Barrett observed that solar geoengineering’s economics are almost the exact opposite of climate change’s: While global warming is a “free rider” problem, where countries must collaborate to avoid burning cheap fossil fuels, solar geoengineering is a “free driver” problem, where one country could theoretically do it alone. Solar geonengineering’s risks lay in how easy it would be to do — and how hard it would be to govern.
Experts knew how you would do it, too: You would use sulfate aerosols — the tiny airborne chemicals formed when sulfur from volcanoes or fossil fuels reacts with water vapor, oxygen, and other substances in the air. In a now classic natural experiment Teller cited in his Journal op-ed, when Mount Pintabuo erupted in 1991 in the Philippines, it hurled a 20 million ton sulfur-dioxide cloud into the stratosphere, cooling the world by up to 1.3 degrees Fahrenheit before the sulfates rained out.
But to Yedvab, “sulfates look like a poor option,” he told me. Sulfates and sulfur oxides are nasty pollutants in their own right — they can cause asthma attacks, form acid rain, and may damage the ozone layer when in the stratosphere. For this reason, the International Maritime Organization adopted new rules restricting the amount of sulfur in cargo shipping fuels; these rules — in yet another natural experiment — seem to have accidentally accelerated global warming since 2020.
Yedvab and Spector anticipated another problem with sulfates: The atmosphere already contains tens of millions of tons of them. There is already so much sulfate in the sky from natural and industrial processes, they argue, that scientists would struggle to monitor whatever was released by geoengineers; Spector estimates that the smallest potential geoengineering experiment would require emitting 1 million tons of it. The chemical seemed to present an impossible trade-off to policymakers: How could a politician balance asthma attacks and acid rain against a cooler planet? “This is not something that decisionmakers can make a decision about,” Yedvab concluded.

Instead, the three founders tried starting at the end of the process, as they put it. What would an ideal geoengineering system look like? “Let’s say that we are successful in developing a system,” Yedvab said. “What will be the questions that people like you — that policymakers, the general public — will ask us?”
Any completed geoengineering system, they concluded, would need to meet a few constraints. It would need, first, a particle that could reflect a small amount of sunlight away from Earth while allowing infrared radiation from the planet’s surface to bounce back into space. That particle would need to be tested iteratively and manufactured easily in the millions of tons, which means it would also have to be low-cost.
“This needs to be a scalable or realistic particle that we know from the start how to produce at scale in the millions of tons, and at the relevant target price of a few dollars per kilo,” Yedvab said. “So not diamonds or something that we've done at the lab but have no idea how to scale it up,” Yedvab said.
It would need to be completely safe for people and the biosphere. Stardust hopes to run its particle through a safety process like the ones that the U.S. and EU subject food or other materials to, Yedvab said. “This needs to be as safe as, say, flour or some food ingredient,” Yedvab said. The particle would also need to be robust and inert in the stratosphere, and you would need some way to manage and identify it, perhaps even to track it, once it got there.
Second, the system would need some way to “loft” that particle into the stratosphere — some machine that could disperse the particle at altitude. Finally, it would need some way to make the particles observable and controllable, to make sure they are acting as intended. “For visibility, for control, for, I would say, geopolitical implications — you want to make sure you actually know where, how these particles move around, Yedvab said.
Stardust received $15 million in seed funding from the venture firm AWZ and Solar Edge, an Israeli energy company, in early 2024. Soon after, the founders got to work.
The world has come close to solving a global environmental crisis at least once before. In 1987, countries adopted the Montreal Protocol, which set out rules to eliminate and replace the chlorofluorocarbons that were destroying the stratospheric ozone hole. Nearly 40 years later, the ozone hole is showing signs of significant recovery. And more to the point, almost nobody talks about the ozone hole anymore, because someone else is dealing with it.
“I would say it was the biggest triumph of environmental diplomacy ever,” Yedvab said. “In three years, beginning to end, the U.S. government was able to secure the support of essentially all the major powers in solving a global problem.” The story is not quite that simple — the Reagan administration initially resisted addressing the ozone hole until American companies like DuPont stood to benefit by selling non-ozone-depleting chemicals — but it captures the kind of triumphant U.S.-led process that Stardust wouldn’t mind seeing repeated.
In 2024, soon after Stardust raised its seed round, Yedvab approached the Swiss-Hungarian diplomat Janos Pasztor and invited him to join the company to advise on the thicket of issues usually simplified as “governance.” These can include technical-seeming questions about how companies should test their technology and who they should seek input from, but they all, at their heart, get to the fundamentally undemocratic nature of solar geoengineering. Given that the atmosphere is a global public good, who on Earth has the right to decide what happens to it?
Pasztor is the former UN assistant secretary-general for climate change, but he was also the longtime leader of the Carnegie Climate Governance Initiative, a nonprofit effort to hammer out consensus answers to some of those questions.
Pasztor hesitated to accept the request. “It was a quadruple challenge,” he told me, speaking from his study in Switzerland. He and his wife frequently attend pro-Palestine demonstrations, he said, and he was reluctant to work with anyone from Israel as long as the country continued to occupy Gaza and the West Bank. Stardust’s status as a private, for-profit enterprise also gave him pause: Pasztor has long advocated for SRM research to be conducted by governments or academics, so that the science can happen out in the open. Stardust broke with all of that.
Despite his reservations, he concluded that the issue was too important — and the lack of any regulation or governance in the space too glaring — for him to turn the company away. “This is an issue that does require some movement,” he said. “We need some governance for the research and development of stratospheric aerosol injection … We don’t have any.”
He agreed to advise Stardust as a contractor, provided that he could publish his report on the company independently and donate his fee to charity. (He ultimately gave $27,000 to UNRWA, the UN agency for Palestinian refugees.)
That summer, Pasztor completed his recommendations, advising Stardust — which remained in stealth mode — to pursue a strategy of “maximum transparency” and publish a website with a code of conduct and some way to have two-way conversations with stakeholders. He also encouraged the company to support a de facto moratorium on geoengineering deployment, and to eventually consider making its intellectual property available to the public in much the same way that Volvo once opened its design for the three-point seatbelt.
His report gestured at Stardust’s strangeness: Here was a company that said it hoped to abide by global research norms, but was, by its very existence, flouting them. “It has generally been considered that private ownership of the means to manage the global atmosphere is not appropriate,” he wrote. “Yet the world is currently faced with a situation of de facto private finance funding [stratospheric aerosol injection] activities.”
Pasztor had initially hoped to publish his report and Stardust’s code of conduct together, he told me. But the company did not immediately establish a website, and eventually Pasztor simply released his report on LinkedIn. Stardust did not put up a website until earlier this year, during the reporting process for a longer feature about the company by the MIT-affiliated science magazine Undark. That website now features Pasztor’s report and a set of “principles,” though not the code of conduct Pasztor envisioned. They are “dragging their feet on that,” he said.
As news of the company trickled out, Stardust’s leaders grew more confident in their methods. In September 2024, Yedvab presented on Stardust’s approach to stratospheric researchers at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s chemical sciences laboratory in Boulder, Colorado. The lab’s director, David Fahey, downplayed the importance of the talk. “There’s a stratospheric community in the world and we know all the long-term members. We’re an open shop,” he said. “We’ll talk to anyone who comes.” Stardust is the only company of its size and seriousness that has shown up, he said.
Stardust is the only company of its size and seriousness working on geoengineering, period, he added. “Stardust really stands out for the investment that they’re trying to make into how you might achieve climate intervention,” he said. “They’re realizing there’s a number of questions the world will need answered if we are going to put the scale of material in the stratosphere that they think we may need to.” (At least one other U.S. company, Make Sunsets, has claimed to release sulfates in the atmosphere and has even sold “cooling credits” to fund its work. But it has raised a fraction of Stardust’s capital, and its unsanctioned outdoor experiments set off such a backlash that Mexico banned all solar geoengineering experiments in response.)
Pasztor continued to work with Stardust throughout this year despite the company’s foot-dragging. He left this summer when he felt like he was becoming a spokesperson for a business that he merely advised. Stardust has more recently worked with Matthew Waxman, a Columbia law professor, on governance issues through the company WestExec Advisors.
Today, Stardust employs a roughly 25-person team that includes physicists, chemists, mechanical engineers, material engineers, and climate experts. Many of them are drawn from Yedvab and Spector’s previous work on Israeli R&D projects.
The company is getting closer to its goals. Yedvab told me that it has developed a proprietary particle that meets its safety and reflectivity requirements. Stardust is now seeking a patent for the material, and it will not disclose the chemical makeup until it receives intellectual property protection. The company claims to be working with a handful of academics around the world on peer-reviewed studies about the particle and broader system, although it declined to provide a list of these researchers on the record.
As Yedvab sees it, the system itself is the true innovation. Stardust has engineered every part of its approach to work in conjunction with every other part — a type of systems thinking that Yedvab and Spector presumably brought from their previous career in government R&D.
Spector described one representative problem: Tiny particles tend to attract each other and clump together when floating in the air, which would decrease the amount of time they spend in the atmosphere, he said. Stardust has built custom machinery to “deagglomerate” the particles, and it has made sure that this dispersion technology is small and light enough to sit on an aircraft flying at or near the stratosphere. (The stratosphere begins at about 26,000 feet over the poles, but 52,000 feet above the equator.)
This integrated approach is part of why Stardust believes it is much further along than any other research effort. “Whatever group that would try to do this, you would need all those types of [people] working together, because otherwise you might have the best chemist, or make the best particle, but it would not fly,” Spector said.
With the new funding, the company believes that its technology could be ready to deploy as soon as the end of this decade. By then, the company hopes to have a particle fabrication facility, a mid-size fleet of aircraft (perhaps a fraction of the size of FedEx’s), and an array of monitoring technology and software ready to deploy.
Even then, its needs would be modest. That infrastructure — and roughly 2 million tons of the unspecified particle — would be all that was required to stop the climate from warming further, Spector said. Each additional million tons a year would reduce Earth’s temperature about half of a degree.
Yet having the technology does not mean that Stardust will deploy it, Yedvab said. The company maintains that it won’t move forward until governments invite it to. “We will only participate in deployment which will be done under adequate governance led by governments,” Yedvab told me. “When you're dealing with such an issue, you should have very clear guiding principles … There are certain ground rules that — I would say in the lack of regulation and governance — we impose upon ourselves.”
He said the company has spoken to American policy makers “on both sides of the aisle” to encourage near-term regulation of the technology. “Policymakers and regulators should get into this game now, because in our view, it's only a matter of time until someone will say, Okay, I'm going and trying to do it,” Yedvab said. “And this could be very dangerous.”
There is a small and active community of academics, scientists, and experts who have been thinking and studying geoengineering for a long time. Stardust is not what almost any of them would have wished a solar geoengineering company to look like.
Researchers had assumed that the first workable SRM system would come from a government, emerging at the end of a long and deliberative public research process. Stardust, meanwhile, is a for-profit company run by Israeli ex-nuclear physicists that spent years in stealth mode, is seeking patent protections for its proprietary particle, and eventually hopes — with the help of the world’s governments — to disperse that particle through the atmosphere indefinitely.
For these reasons, even experts who in other contexts support aggressive research into deploying SRM are quite critical of Stardust.
“The people involved seem like really serious, thoughtful people,” David Keith, a professor and the founding faculty director of the Climate Systems Engineering Initiative at the University of Chicago, told me. “I think their claims about making an inert particle — and their implicit assumption that you can make a particle that is better than sulfates” are “almost certain to be wrong.”
Keith, who is on the scientific advisory board of Reflective, a San Francisco-based nonprofit that aims to accelerate SRM research and technology development, has frank doubts about Stardust’s scientific rationale. Sulfates are almost certainly a better choice than whatever Stardust has cooked up, he said, because we have already spent decades studying how sulfates act. “There’s no such particle that’s inert in the stratosphere,” he told me. “Now maybe they’ve invented something they’ll get a Nobel Prize for that violates that — but I don’t think so.”
He also rejects the premise that for-profit companies should work on SRM. Keith, to be clear, does not hate capitalism: In 2009, he founded the company Carbon Engineering, which developed carbon capture technology before the oil giant Occidental Petroleum bought it for $1.1 billion in 2023. But he has argued since 2018 that while carbon capture is properly the domain of for-profit firms, solar engineering research should never be commercialized.
“Companies always, by definition, have to sell their product,” he told me. “It’s just axiomatic that people tend to overstate the benefits and undersell the risk.” Capitalistic firms excel at driving down the cost of new technologies and producing them at scale, he said. But “for stratospheric aerosol injection, we don’t need it to be cheaper — it’s already cheap,” he continued. “We need better confidence and trust and better bounding of the unknown unknowns.”
Shuchi Talati, who founded and leads the Alliance for Just Deliberation on Solar Geoengineering, is also skeptical. She still believes that countries could find a way to do solar geoengineering for the public good, she told me, but it will almost certainly not look like Stardust. The company is in violation of virtually every norm that has driven the field so far: It is not open about its research or its particle, it is a for-profit company, and it is pursuing intellectual property protections for its technology.
“I think transparency is in every single set of SRM principles” developed since the technology was first conceived, she said. “They obviously have flouted that in their entirety.”
She doubted, too, that Stardust could actually develop a new and totally biosafe chemical, given the amount of mass that would have to be released in the stratosphere to counteract climate change. “Nothing is biosafe” when you disperse it at sufficient scale, she said. “Water in certain quantities is not biosafe.”
The context in which the company operates suggests some other concerns. Although SRM would likely make a poor weapon, at least on short time scales, it is a powerful and world-shaping technology nonetheless. In that way, it’s not so far from nuclear weapons. And while the world has found at least one way to govern that technology — the nonproliferation regime — Israel has bucked it. It is one of only four countries in the world to have never signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. (The others are India, Pakistan, and South Sudan.) Three years ago, the UN voted 152 to 5 that Israel must give up its weapons and sign the treaty.
These concerns are not immaterial to Stardust, given Yedvab and Spector’s careers working as physicists for the government. In our interview, Yedvab stressed the company’s American connections. “We are a company registered in the U.S., working on a global problem,” he told me. “We come from Israel, we cannot hide it, and we do not want to hide it.” But the firm itself has “no ties with the Israeli government — not with respect to funding, not with respect to any other aspect of our work,” he said. “It’s the second chapter in our life,” Spector said.
Stardust may not be connected to the Israeli government, but some of its funders are. The venture capital firm AWZ, which participated in its $15 million seed round, touts its partnership with the Israeli Ministry of Defense’s directorate of defense R&D, and the fund’s strategic advisors include Tamir Pardo, the former director of the Israeli intelligence agency Mossad. “We have no connection to the Israeli government or defense establishment beyond standard regulatory or financial obligations applicable to any company operating in Israel,” a spokesperson for Stardust reiterated in a statement when I asked about the connection. “We are proud that AWZ, along with all of our investors, agrees with our mission and believes deeply in the need to address this crisis.”
One of Stardust’s stated principles is that deployment should be done under “established governance, guided by governments and authorized bodies.” But its documentation provides no detail about who those governments might be or how many governments amount to a quorum.
“The optimal case, in my view, is some kind of a multilateral coalition,” Yedvab said. “We definitely believe that the U.S. has a role there, and we expect and hope also the other governments will take part in building this governance structure.”
Speaking with Pasztor, I observed that the United States and Israel’s actions often deviate sharply from what the rest of the world might want or inscribe in law. What if they decided to conduct geoengineering themselves? “This gets into a pretty hairy geopolitical discussion, but it has to be had,” Pasztor told me. He had discussed similar issues with the company, he said, adding that “at just about every meeting he had” with the team, Stardust’s leaders hoped to “disassociate and distance themselves” from the current Israeli government. “Even when there were suggestions in my recommendations that the first step is to work through ‘your government’ — their thinking was, Okay, we will do it with the Americans,” he said.
He also discussed with the team the risks of the United States going it alone and pursuing stratospheric aerosol injection by itself. That would produce an enormous backlash, Pasztor warned, especially when the Trump administration “is doing everything contrary to what one should do” to fight climate change. “And then doing the U.S. and Israel together — given the current double geopolitical context — that would be even worse,” he said. (“Of course, they could get away with it,” he added. “Who can stop the U.S. from doing it?”)
And that hints at perhaps the greatest risk of Stardust’s existence: that it prevents progress on climate change simply because it will discourage countries from cutting their fossil fuel use. Solar geoengineering’s biggest risk has long seemed to be this moral hazard — that as soon as you can dampen the atmospheric effects of climate change, countries will stop caring about greenhouse gas emissions. It’s certainly something you can imagine the Trump administration doing, I posed to Yedvab.
Yedvab acknowledged that it is a “valid argument.” But the world is so off-track in meeting its goals, he said, that it needs to prepare a Plan B. He asked me to imagine two different scenarios, one where the world diligently develops the technology and governance needed to deploy solar geoengineering over the next 10 years, and another where it wakes up in a decade and decides to crash toward solar geoengineering. “Now think which scenario you prefer,” he said.
Perhaps Stardust will not achieve its goals. Its proprietary particle may not work, or it could prove less effective than sulfates. The company claims that it will disclose its particle once it receives its patent — which could happen as soon as next year, Yedvab and Spector said — and perhaps that process will reveal some defect or other factor that means it is not truly biosafe. The UN may also try to place a blanket ban on geoengineering research, as some groups hope.
Yet Stardust’s mere existence — and the “free driver” problem articulated by Barrett nearly two decades ago — suggests that it will not be the last to try to develop geoengineering technology. There is a great deal of interest in SRM in San Francisco’s technology circles; Pastzor told me that he saw Reflective as “not really different” from Stardust outside of its nonprofit status. “They’re getting all the money from similar types of funders,” he said. “There is stuff happening and we need to deal with it.” (A Reflective representative disputed this characterization, saying that the nonprofit publishes its funders and has no financial incentive to support geoengineering deployment.)
For those who have fretted about climate change, the continued development of SRM technology poses something of a “put up or shut up” moment. One of the ideas embedded in the concept of “climate change” is that humanity has touched everywhere on Earth, that nowhere is safe from human influence. But subsequent environmental science has clarified that, in fact, the Earth has not been free of human influence for millennia. Definitely not since 1492, when the flora and fauna of the Americas encountered those of Afro-Eurasia for the first time — and probably not since human hunters wiped out the Ice Age’s great mammal species roughly 10,000 years ago. The world has over and over again been remade by human hands.
Stardust may not play the Prometheus here and bring this particular capability into humanity’s hands. But I have never been so certain that someone will try in our lifetimes. We find ourselves, once again, in the middle of things.
Editor’s note: This story has been updated to include a response from the Reflective team.
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My colleague Emily Pontecorvo has a fascinating story today about Net Power, an energy and power development company whose technology once seemed key to decarbonizing the country’s electricity grid.
When Net Power went public in 2023, it was working on a natural gas-burning power plant that would generate little to no emissions in part by using carbon capture and storage. Its invention seemed to have big implications, and not just for the company’s bottom line: Back then, the Environmental Protection Agency was drafting climate rules that would have required new natural gas plants built in the 2030s to capture their carbon dioxide emissions. Net Power’s technology seemed like one of the best available ways to meet that standard.
Cut to 2026, and the world looks different. Thanks to the artificial intelligence boom, electricity demand is surging. But Net Power hasn’t successfully commercialized its proprietary power plant technology. Even if it had, few companies are willing to pay the high premium required by Net Power’s technology, especially when cheaper options are available. And the government certainly isn’t going to require it. Emily’s story reveals what happened next.
When I helped start Heatmap more than three years ago, I never thought I would write this much about data centers. I believed that electricity demand growth was inevitable, sure, and I thought the U.S. power grid had to expand for the country to decarbonize. But I didn’t foresee such a staggering near-term surge in electricity demand. (To be fair, even long-time students of the computing industry’s energy use didn’t see the coming increase, either.)
What I didn’t anticipate — or understand — were two fast-moving trends. The first was that the AI models were responding to scale: the more text or images they consumed, or training they received, or (crucially) computational power they had access to, the better they got. The second was that Wall Street was happy to pay to continue that speedy scale-up. As long as models kept getting better, investors were willing to keep lending or investing more money to the companies making them. Through the power of those two scaling functions, the data center boom became one of the biggest infrastructure buildouts in American history.
In recent days, the second of those trends has started to falter. After a surprisingly hot inflation report last week, and a disclosure on Wednesday evening that Meta has gone free cash flow negative to finance its ongoing AI buildout, stocks with any proximity to AI or data centers stumbled on Wall Street today. The data center developers Coreweave and Vistra were each down about 10%, while Microsoft, Alphabet, and Nvidia all fell in daily trading. Meta’s stock lost almost 7% of its value; GE Vernova, which produces gas turbines, was down 10%.
These declines look more significant when you zoom out. Since late June, a good chunk of the AI portfolio has sagged into the red. Coreweave’s stock is down 54% over the past six months. Alphabet and GE Vernova have also posted declines since the summer. (The trend isn’t uniform: Nvidia and Microsoft are still very much in the green.)
None of this, to be sure, guarantees that the AI boom is ending or even slowing down. But this finance-applied friction is what such a slowdown could look like. Investors aren’t (yet) saying that AI is a business dud, to be clear, just that companies perhaps don’t need to go and construct all this stuff so fast. And given what the data center buildout has meant for energy construction — not to mention greenhouse gas emissions — that’s a trend nobody in climate or energy can ignore.
The zero-emission pioneer is doing the dirty work for the AI boom.
All kinds of companies have refashioned themselves to exploit the AI boom. A bitcoin miner became a data center developer, a shoemaker is building GPUs, and an electric vehicle company is integrating its powertrains into server racks.
Now, a company that once aspired to build one of the lowest-emitting power plants has pivoted to building one of the dirtiest in order to meet data centers’ requirement for speed to power above all. Net Power was founded to pioneer a new form of natural gas power plant with zero emissions, but it has given up on that technology and recently acquired 10 natural gas reciprocating engines that it plans to co-locate with a data center on the site intended for its first commercial plant.
“We believe the clean piece is important,” Net Power CEO Danny Rice said during an August earnings call when he announced the company’s pivot to building unabated natural gas plants. “But just as it’s always been, it will only come at scale once society’s basic energy pillars of reliable, affordable power are fully in place. Power demand is outstripping supply today.”
Net Power’s pivot is a sign not only that the AI boom has eroded market appetite for clean power, but that U.S. policies supporting carbon capture — primarily the 45Q tax credit that President Trump’s One Big Beautiful Bill Act recently expanded — are still not enough to support the technology’s deployment in the power sector.
“The long history of doing CCS in the United States is there isn’t enough public funding to get companies to deploy it at scale,” Jack Andreasen Cavanaugh, a senior research associate at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, told me.
This is actually the second major pivot the company has made in less than a year. Last November, Net Power was still testing its proprietary oxy-combustion technology at its demonstration site in La Porte, Texas. The tech was designed to burn natural gas in a chamber with pure oxygen, producing a purer stream of CO2 than when natural gas is burned in regular air. Net Power’s system could recycle some of that CO2 for power generation and capture the rest more efficiently than a conventional gas plant could. The company had not yet demonstrated that the system could generate more energy than it used, however.
By that point, Net Power had determined that its oxy-combustion plants, if they ever even did generate net power, would not be economically competitive anytime soon. In its 2025 Q3 financial report, the company said it had “decided to broaden the scope of its business” and develop more conventional natural gas plants with carbon capture equipment tacked on. It signed a letter of intent with Entropy, a Canadian company building “post-combustion” carbon capture equipment, to bring the tech to the United States, and ordered two 30-megawatt Siemens natural gas turbines for 2028 delivery.
“For us and everyone else in the power and data center space these days, speed is everything,” Rice said at the time. “We believe gas turbines with [post-combustion capture] can and should be the fastest-to-market and most cost-competitive clean, firm solution for our prospective customers.”
He told investors that rising costs were one of the setbacks Net Power faced in building its first-of-a-kind oxy-combustion plant. It was highly unlikely the company could finance and build a $1.7 billion, 200-megawatt plant before completing all its testing, he said. The best-case scenario for the plant to come online was 2030 or 2031, and costs might keep rising with inflation. The company could either bet on that prospect and keep bleeding cash, or “slow down that spending in order to free up some of our resources for near-term accretive opportunities.” As a public company with shareholders to answer to, there was really only one choice.
By the end of 2025, Net Power decided to suspend its oxy-combustion development and testing activities altogether, according to its year-end SEC filing.
Six months later, the company’s thesis changed again. Gas turbines with post-combustion capture, it turned out, were not the “fastest-to-market and most cost-competitive” solutions that the company had hoped they’d be. Whereas once upon a time, electricity buyers considered a range of factors when shopping around for power, including carbon emissions, the reality was that they were now only looking for three qualities: speed, reliability, and scale. “Natural gas power generation, co-located with customer load, and deployable on a fast timeline, is how we expect to meet that demand today,” Rice told investors, adding that the company hoped to add carbon capture to its projects in the future.
To date, only one proposed U.S. natural gas plant with carbon capture has announced a deal to sell its prospective power. In October 2025, Google signed a power purchase agreement with the Broadwing Energy Center, an Illinois plant under development by a company called Low Carbon Infrastructure.
“There is a massive demand for unabated gas right now, and there is much less of a demand for carbon capture,” Cavanaugh said. He told me there are still lots of conversations happening between hyperscalers and carbon capture companies, but the physical realities and costs of capturing, transporting, and storing carbon from natural gas plants remain obstacles.
The Global CCS Institute published its annual Global Status of CCS report this week, which found more than 266 carbon capture, transport, or storage projects are under development in the U.S., but permitting delays and policy uncertainty are stalling their progress. “Inflation and rising capital costs have weakened project economics, reducing the effectiveness of existing policies, such as tax and investment credits,” the report said.
That doesn’t mean there aren’t still companies trying. Net Power may have given up on oxy-combustion power plants for now, but Arbor Energy, a startup founded by former SpaceX engineers, is just ramping up. Arbor announced a milestone in the development of its own oxy-combustion power generator last week, running a key piece of its system — a supercritical CO2 turbocompressor — for more than two hours at high speeds.
Arbor differentiates itself by using 3D-printed turbines and developing smaller, more modular plants. It’s scaling more incrementally than Net Power tried to, starting with a 1-megawatt demonstration plant in California that is “weeks away” from operating, the company’s Chief Operating Officer Alicia Harmon told me — although the project won’t include carbon storage. It plans to build a 25-megawatt demonstration plant by 2028, also sans storage, before manufacturing commercial-scale systems.
Arbor actually went through a pivot of its own due to the data center boom. The founders originally planned to focus on bioenergy with carbon removal, using the oxy-combustion technology to generate power from biomass and storing the resulting CO2 underground. Over time, though, it became clear that demand for power outpaced demand for carbon removal, and natural gas was more abundant than biomass.
I asked Harmon whether the company thought there was market demand for carbon-capture gas plants. Is anyone willing to pay that green premium right now? “Honestly, my answer is no,” she said, but the company sees a path to erasing the green premium by the early 2030s. She added that Arbor’s technology is already “very close” to parity with combined-cycle natural gas plants when the 45Q tax credit is taken into account.
Last month, Net Power announced it had acquired 123 megawatts’ worth of Wärtsilä reciprocating engines, in addition to the Siemens turbines it had already ordered. Reciprocating engines are among the dirtiest natural gas power-generation technologies. A recent report from Earthjustice estimated that a 1-gigawatt plant powered by reciprocating engines would emit 1.5 times as much CO2 per year as one powered by the “combined cycle” technology most modern plants use, and twice as much nitrogen oxides and fine particulate matter. It has not yet disclosed any data center partners to sell the power to.
Net Power declined to comment on this story.
Ben Allen wants to reform the existing market. Jane Kim wants a revolution.
From Crescent City to Coronado, California voters are facing decisions on a down-ballot strewn with over a dozen propositions and a series of statewide Democrat-versus-Republican races with mostly foregone conclusions.
And then there’s the insurance commissioner.
In the race to oversee California’s insurance market, a $452 billion-in-premium-volume monster imperiled by insurer defections and disaster risks, Democratic State Senator Ben Allen, whose district includes Pacific Palisades, is facing off against Jane Kim, a progressive former San Francisco supervisor.
Kim has the support of Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders — it’s the first thing you see about her when you Google her campaign. She previously served as his California political director during the 2020 presidential race, and she appeared earlier this month at an event with the senator in support of the state’s proposed billionaire wealth tax.
Allen, by contrast, won the endorsement of the state’s Democratic Party and its two incumbent senators.
There has been little public polling of the race, but one September survey showed Kim leading Allen 25% to 18%, with more than half the electorate undecided.
“My opponent and I are not even running for the same office,” Kim told me. “He’s running for what this office used to be, and I’m running for what this office could be.”
Allen wasn’t worried about Kim’s characterization in my interview with him, telling me, “I want to fix the market that we have and make it work. My opponent wants to build a new state insurer that nobody has priced.”
Nowhere are the stakes of insurance regulation higher than in California. On its own, the state’s insurance market would be the third largest in the world, according to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. Homeowner insurance premiums have risen 84% from the end of 2020 to March 2026, according to research from Stanford’s Climate and Energy Policy Program. Several large insurers have either left the market entirely or stopped writing new policies.
California’s creaky and complex regulatory environment for insurers has combined with its famously flammable environment (all beset by a warming climate) to put regular policyholders at risk of losing their policies or bailing out those who can’t get covered. “Climate risks grow, and our mechanisms for dealing with it lag behind,” Matt Weiner, the chief executive of the wildfire policy group Megafire Action, told me. (Weiner said he was supporting Allen in his personal capacity).
Rates for homes insured by the FAIR Plan, the barebones insurer of last resort, have more than doubled from about 2% to 5% over that same period, with FAIR Plan coverage spreading from just high-risk areas to even areas with low and moderate wildfire risk. The plan required a $1 billion assessment from the state’s insurers in 2025 following major Southern California fires. “This trend is a symptom of many homeowners’ inability to secure insurance in the conventional market,” according to the Stanford researchers.
Allen seeks to make the insurance market work better, building on reforms implemented by current Insurance Commissioner Ricardo Lara. Allen described the reforms, which encourage insurers to write policies in high-risk areas and allow them to use forward-looking projections, as a “bit of a band-aid” that doesn’t “actually get to the core of the problem, which is making these communities less risky.”
Allen’s plan for the California insurance market involves both reviewing rate proposals more quickly, incorporating more data into those rates (which may push rates up, but also keep insurers in the market), and mobilizing the whole of government to invest in home hardening and resilience to lower risk and bring premiums down. Allen wants to, well, insure “that risk reduction is actually incentivized and rewarded by the insurance market,” he told me.
This would mean that “there will continue to be certain properties that are going to be so high risk that they really will and ought to be paying significantly more than everybody else,” he added.
When I asked him to elaborate on his vision for California’s insurance future, he told me, “My hope is that when a family and a neighborhood commit to hardening defensible space and community-scale mitigation, that should show up on the bill.”
Jane Kim, on the other hand, is interested in an insurance revolution, which would require — as her most famous supporter might put it — a political revolution as well. Her centerpiece proposal will be familiar from anyone who has followed Sanders’ career: a single-payer disaster insurer.
The plan, which she told me was a “concept and a proposal,” would be funded by a levy placed on insurers, and then a public insurer would invest in the market, buy reinsurance, and pay out claims. (Her opponents have criticized her for not being forthcoming enough with details). She says her plan would not be able to cover a Palisades- or Altadena-level fire in its first year, “but no insurance company can cover a catastrophe of that level.”
The nonprofit nature of the program, she adds, would let the state fund mitigation work directly. While such a program would require legislative action, “the great thing about campaigns is that this is trying to debate big ideas with voters,” Kim said.
In response, Allen cited a report from the California Earthquake Authority, which modeled a state disaster insurer (albeit not Kim’s plan specifically) could require $25 billion in capitalization. A more thinly capitalized insurer could mean $2,000 assessments on every policyholder in the state to cover an extreme wildfire disaster, the report said. “That’s the honest price of what she’s proposing,” Allen said.
“I also have a plan that’s actually grounded in reality and fixing the problems right now. It's not based on some pie-in-the-sky set of ideas that have no precedent, that have no real meat on the bones,” Allen told me.
One of Allen and Kim’s former opponents, Patrick Wolff, who fell short in the top-two primary election in June, told me that “the charitable interpretation of Kim’s platform is she does not think the current system can be made to work, and so she essentially wants to redesign and reimagine the entire system.” (Wolff has endorsed Allen). But, he added, “she’s coming at it from a set of solutions that were baked-in before she started, and then she's fitting [those] into her campaign.”
Moira Birss, a senior fellow at the Climate and Community Institute who said she had “provided input” to Kim’s campaign, but wasn’t speaking on its behalf, told me she “really recognizes that we are yet again in a situation where the private insurance market is not responding to a need that we as communities and as society have for this financial safety net of disaster insurance, and that we need a public approach.” She said the plan would build on lessons learned from New Zealand, which has public natural disaster insurance funded through a levy on fire insurance, and from the National Flood Insurance Program and the FAIR Plan.
Kim is happy to embrace the more ideologically charged vision of her campaign, telling me, “I am talking about transforming this office to be a place where we are leading on, and taking on, economic inequity, a wealth gap, and the climate crisis.
“I don’t even view my opponent as Ben Allen — I’m not running against Ben Allen,” she went on. “I’m running against the status quo.”