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The U.S. is burning through forests, and replanting them is expensive.
Wildfires are razing U.S. forests faster than either natural regrowth or active replanting can restore them. There’s a nearly 4 million-acre backlog in the western U.S. of forests that have burned and not been re-seeded. That’s slightly larger than the size of Connecticut. And unless we pick up the pace, the shortfall could increase two to three times over by 2050 as wildfires get worse under a warming climate.
These are the findings of a study published last week on the yawning gap between reforestation needs and reforestation capacity in the western U.S. Trees are still the country’s most important resource to counteract climate change, offsetting more than 12% of annual greenhouse gas emissions as of 2021. But in some areas like in the fire-ravaged Rocky Mountain region, forests have become a net source of carbon to the atmosphere, releasing more than they draw down. To prevent the reforestation gap from widening, the new study warns, we have to fix the “reforestation pipeline” — our capacity to collect seeds, grow seedlings, and plant them.
It also highlights solutions. The research was primarily funded by a company that finances tree-planting efforts by selling credits to carbon-emitting businesses based on the amount of carbon the trees suck up, allowing those businesses to offset their own emissions. To rebuild the country’s reforestation capacity, the study recommends — surprise, surprise — expanding the role of forest carbon offsets, among other ideas.
Some might look at this paper and dismiss it as biased science, but it got me thinking about the long-running debate in the climate community over trees. Should companies be allowed to offset their emissions from burning fossil fuel by planting carbon-sucking forests? It’s easy to say no. Too many forest-related carbon offset projects have come under fire for using faulty accounting methods or for “protecting” forests that were at no risk of being felled. Plus, there’s the larger risk that offsets provide a license to emit.
But when you contemplate the chasm between the funding and infrastructure required to restore forests and current capacity and incentives — not just in the U.S., but also globally — it’s easy to see why so many people ignore these realities and say we must finance reforestation through carbon markets. The new study spells out the predicament quite clearly.
Solomon Dobrowski, the lead author and a professor of landscape ecology at the University of Montana, was quick to tell me that these numbers were a rough estimate. “I'm not so hung up on the absolute number,” he said. “We can increase the precision of that number. But the take-home message here is that the needs are rapidly outstripping our capacity to fill them.”
Dobrowski studies how forests grow back after a disturbance like a wildfire, and he’s been documenting a concerning trend. Larger, more severe fires are “punching these big holes into landscapes,” he told me. A severe burn might leave a mile-long stretch between nearest living trees, making it impossible for the forest to regenerate through natural seed dispersal.
At the same time, the government is struggling to pick up the slack. Due to funding shortfalls, the U.S. Forest Service has managed to address “just 6% of post-wildfire replanting needs” per year over the last decade.
The average area burned in the U.S. more than doubled from 2000 to 2017 compared to the preceding 17-year period. But the uptick in severe fires is not the only reason we’ve fallen so far behind on reforestation. At the same time fires have increased, both public and private forestry shops have collapsed. Ironically, the decline of an ecologically destructive industry — logging — also gutted the potential for an ecologically regenerative forestry industry to thrive.
Previously, most of the Forest Service’s reforestation work was funded by the agency’s timber sales. But beginning in the 1990s, logging on public lands sharply declined due to a confluence of factors, including over-harvesting in previous decades and the listing of the northern spotted owl as protected under the Endangered Species Act. The agency’s non-fire workforce has decreased by 40% over the past two decades. It also shut down more than half its nurseries, leaving just six remaining. Many state-owned nurseries have also closed due to budget cuts and reduced demand for seedlings.
Today, the reforestation supply chain is mostly sustained by private companies serving what’s left of the wood product and fiber industry. State and local regulations require companies to replant in the areas they harvest. But since the industry is concentrated on the west coast, so is the supply chain — 95% of seedling production in the western U.S. occurs in Washington, Oregon, and California. That means interior states like Montana, Colorado, Arizona, and New Mexico, which are seeing increasingly large fires, have no mature supply chain to support reforestation.
The New Mexico Natural Resources Department, for example, estimates it needs 150 million to 390 million seedlings to replant the acres burned in the past 20 years. But the only big nursery in the state, a research center at New Mexico State University, can supply just 300,000 seedlings per year. The nearest U.S. Forest Service nursery serving the region is in Boise, Idaho, more than 700 miles away. Matthew Hurteau, a forest ecologist at the University of New Mexico who is a co-author on the reforestation study, told me he has been working with the state to develop a new nursery capable of producing 5 million seedlings a year. The project has received some funding from the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the state government, but still needs to raise roughly $60 million more, Hurteau said.
Nurseries aren’t the only bottleneck. Hurteau has also been working to build the state’s seedbank, a time-consuming process that requires going out into the field and collecting seeds one by one. Another piece of the puzzle is workforce development. Dowbrowski pointed out that the majority of tree planting today is not done by government workers but rather by private contractors that hire H2B guest workers. Due to federal limits on immigration, reforestation contractors haven’t even been able to hire enough to meet current planting demand.
The new paper is far from the first to highlight these issues, and policymakers are beginning to address the problem. In 2021, the Forest Service got a major infusion of cash from the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, which lifted the cap on its annual budget for reforestation from $30 million to at least $140 million with the directive to clear its backlog.
But Dobrowski said this is a far cry from all that’s needed. In the study, he and his co-authors estimated that clearing the existing backlog in the West alone could cost at least $3.6 billion. And that’s a conservative estimate — it doesn’t include the cost of building more greenhouses or expanding the workforce. “The reality is that the feds don’t have the infrastructure and workforce to address this at scale,” he told me. The Forest Service budget also won’t address reforestation needs on private lands, which account for about 30% of forested land in the western U.S.
After establishing the scale of the problem, the paper raises a followup question: How can we scale the reforestation supply chain? There, it pivots to argue that “new economic drivers” — like carbon markets — “can modernize the reforestation pipeline and align tree planting efforts with broader ecosystem resilience and climate mitigation goals.”
This is precisely what Mast Reforestation, the company that funded the research, is trying to do. Mast is vertically integrated — it collects seeds, grows seedlings, and plants them. The company has developed software to improve the efficiency of each of these steps and increase the chances of success, i.e. to minimize tree deaths. To fund its tree-planting efforts, Mast sells carbon credits based on the amount of CO2 the trees will remove from the atmosphere over their lifetimes. It only plants on privately owned, previously burned land that wouldn’t have otherwise been replanted (because the owner couldn’t afford it) or regenerated (because the burn was so severe). The idea is to create a more stable source of financing for reforestation not subject to the whims of congressional appropriations.
Matthew Aghai, an ecologist who works as the chief science officer at Mast and another of the study’s co-authors, told me there’s a misunderstanding among policymakers and the general public that when forests burn, the government is ready to step in, and all that’s needed is more funding for seedling production. Aghai hopes the new paper illuminates the truth, and how risky it is to wait for state backing that may never arrive. He told me that he sought out Dobrowski to work with him because he knew, as a former academic himself, that if he had written the paper on his own, there would have been a stigma attached to it. “I think the best way for me to get those ideas out was actually something that needs to happen in our broader market, which is a lot more collaboration,” he said.
There are many climate advocates who believe the problems with carbon offsets can be fixed, that the markets can be reformed, and that “high quality” nature-based credits are possible. Indeed, many consider restoring trust in nature-based carbon credits an imperative if we are to fund reforestation at the level that tackling climate change requires. A few weeks ago, Google, Meta, Microsoft, and Salesforce announced a new coalition called Symbiosis that will purchase up to 20 million tons of carbon removal credits from nature-based projects that “meet the highest quality bar” and “reflect the latest and greatest science.” Then, last Tuesday, the Biden administration followed up with a show of support for fixing the voluntary carbon market, because it can “deliver steady, reliable revenue streams to a range of decarbonization projects, programs, and practices, including nature-based solutions.”
But there is one fundamental problem with selling carbon credits based on trees, which no amount of reform or commitment to high integrity can solve. Fossil fuel CO2 emissions are essentially permanent — they stay in the atmosphere for upward of a thousand years. The CO2 sequestered by forests is not. Trees die. In a warming world, with worsening pest outbreaks, drought, and wildfires, the chances of a tree making it to a thousand years without releasing at least some of its stored carbon are slimmer than ever.
Hurteau, despite contributing to the paper, is deeply skeptical of financing reforestation through the sale of carbon credits. “We need to be making monster investments in maintaining forest cover globally, and I understand why people look at carbon finance to do this,” he said. “But you can't fly in an airplane and pay somebody to plant trees and have it zero out. From an energy balance perspective, for the Earth’s system, that's not real.”
When I raised this with Dobrowski, who endorsed the paper’s conclusions about the potential for carbon markets, he said it’s something he struggles with. He agreed that a ton of fossil fuel emissions is not the same as a ton of carbon sequestered in trees, but comes back to the fact that we need new incentive structures for people to do reforestation and be better stewards of our forests. It’s something I’ve heard echoed many times over in my reporting — the unspoken subtext essentially being, do you have any better ideas to raise the billions of dollars needed to do this?
Aghai had a slightly different take. To him, the one-to-one math isn’t so important “as long as the trajectory is moving forward, we're accumulating carbon, we're protecting watersheds, we're increasing the biodiversity index.” That may sound a bit hand-wavy — and it still gives a pass to polluters. But then he raised an interesting point, one that I don’t think I’ve heard before. The environmental damage caused by fossil fuels is not just the carbon they spew into the atmosphere. And the value forests provide is not just the carbon they sequester.
“Carbon’s our currency right now. It’s the thing that everyone is measuring around,” he said. “But what about all the other destruction that comes with the energy sector? There's cascading effects that impact water, soils, methane. Forests tend to stabilize everything by moving us toward homeostasis at a landscape level. For me, these markets will work when we catalyze them at a regional, dare I say global scale.”
Are these benefits enough to dismiss the incongruity inherent to forest carbon offsets? To say, for example, that trees might not actually offset the full amount of carbon that Google is putting in the atmosphere, but the funding Google is providing to get these trees in the ground makes some greater, unquantifiable progress toward our climate goals?
Some scientists have proposed alternative solutions. Myles Allen, a professor of geosystem science at the University of Oxford, has advocated for “like for like” offsetting, in which companies only buy nature-based carbon credits to offset their emissions from nature-based sources, such as land cleared to grow food. To offset fossil fuel emissions, the logic goes, they could buy other kinds of credits, like those based on carbon captured from the air and sequestered deep underground for millenia. The European Union is currently considering a rule that would require companies adhere to this principle. Others have suggested companies could make “contributions” to climate mitigation through investments in forests, rather than buying offsets.
Both would be significant departures from the way corporate sustainability managers have used carbon markets in the past. But the current system is in crisis. The volume of carbon credits traded declined precipitously in the last two years as buyers were spooked off buying offsets. Forestry-related credits, in particular, contracted from $1.1 billion in sales in 2022 to just $351 million in sales in 2023, a 69% drop. Within that, the vast majority of the credits traded during both years came from forestry projects that reduced emissions, not reforestation projects like Mast’s that remove carbon from the atmosphere.
Even if you agree with Aghai that carbon markets are our best hope at addressing the reforestation gap, gaining the trust of buyers is a prerequisite. That means that scientists, companies, and governance groups like the Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market first have to converge on what these credits actually mean and how they can be used.
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Paradise, California, is snatching up high-risk properties to create a defensive perimeter and prevent the town from burning again.
The 2018 Camp Fire was the deadliest wildfire in California’s history, wiping out 90% of the structures in the mountain town of Paradise and killing at least 85 people in a matter of hours. Investigations afterward found that Paradise’s town planners had ignored warnings of the fire risk to its residents and forgone common-sense preparations that would have saved lives. In the years since, the Camp Fire has consequently become a cautionary tale for similar communities in high-risk wildfire areas — places like Chinese Camp, a small historic landmark in the Sierra Nevada foothills that dramatically burned to the ground last week as part of the nearly 14,000-acre TCU September Lightning Complex.
More recently, Paradise has also become a model for how a town can rebuild wisely after a wildfire. At least some of that is due to the work of Dan Efseaff, the director of the Paradise Recreation and Park District, who has launched a program to identify and acquire some of the highest-risk, hardest-to-access properties in the Camp Fire burn scar. Though he has a limited total operating budget of around $5.5 million and relies heavily on the charity of local property owners (he’s currently in the process of applying for a $15 million grant with a $5 million match for the program) Efseaff has nevertheless managed to build the beginning of a defensible buffer of managed parkland around Paradise that could potentially buy the town time in the case of a future wildfire.
In order to better understand how communities can build back smarter after — or, ideally, before — a catastrophic fire, I spoke with Efseaff about his work in Paradise and how other communities might be able to replicate it. Our conversation has been lightly edited and condensed for clarity.
Do you live in Paradise? Were you there during the Camp Fire?
I actually live in Chico. We’ve lived here since the mid-‘90s, but I have a long connection to Paradise; I’ve worked for the district since 2017. I’m also a sea kayak instructor and during the Camp Fire, I was in South Carolina for a training. I was away from the phone until I got back at the end of the day and saw it blowing up with everything.
I have triplet daughters who were attending Butte College at the time, and they needed to be evacuated. There was a lot of uncertainty that day. But it gave me some perspective, because I couldn’t get back for two days. It gave me a chance to think, “Okay, what’s our response going to be?” Looking two days out, it was like: That would have been payroll, let’s get people together, and then let’s figure out what we’re going to do two weeks and two months from now.
It also got my mind thinking about what we would have done going backwards. If you’d had two weeks to prepare, you would have gotten your go-bag together, you’d have come up with your evacuation route — that type of thing. But when you run the movie backwards on what you would have done differently if you had two years or two decades, it would include prepping the landscape, making some safer community defensible space. That’s what got me started.
Was it your idea to buy up the high-risk properties in the burn scar?
I would say I adapted it. Everyone wants to say it was their idea, but I’ll tell you where it came from: Pre-fire, the thinking was that it would make sense for the town to have a perimeter trail from a recreation standpoint. But I was also trying to pitch it as a good idea from a fuel standpoint, so that if there was a wildfire, you could respond to it. Certainly, the idea took on a whole other dimension after the Camp Fire.
I’m a restoration ecologist, so I’ve done a lot of river floodplain work. There are a lot of analogies there. The trend has been to give nature a little bit more room: You’re not going to stop a flood, but you can minimize damage to human infrastructure. Putting levees too close to the river makes them more prone to failing and puts people at risk — but if you can set the levee back a little bit, it gives the flood waters room to go through. That’s why I thought we need a little bit of a buffer in Paradise and some protection around the community. We need a transition between an area that is going to burn, and that we can let burn, but not in a way that is catastrophic.
How hard has it been to find willing sellers? Do most people in the area want to rebuild — or need to because of their mortgages?
Ironically, the biggest challenge for us is finding adequate funding. A lot of the property we have so far has been donated to us. It’s probably upwards of — oh, let’s see, at least half a dozen properties have been donated, probably close to 200 acres at this point.
We are applying for some federal grants right now, and we’ll see how that goes. What’s evolved quite a bit on this in recent years, though, is that — because we’ve done some modeling — instead of thinking of the buffer as areas that are managed uniformly around the community, we’re much more strategic. These fire events are wind-driven, and there are only a couple of directions where the wind blows sufficiently long enough and powerful enough for the other conditions to fall into play. That’s not to say other events couldn’t happen, but we’re going after the most likely events that would cause catastrophic fires, and that would be from the Diablo winds, or north winds, that come through our area. That was what happened in the Camp Fire scenario, and another one our models caught what sure looked a lot like the [2024] Park Fire.
One thing that I want to make clear is that some people think, “Oh, this is a fire break. It’s devoid of vegetation.” No, what we’re talking about is a well-managed habitat. These are shaded fuel breaks. You maintain the big trees, you get rid of the ladder fuels, and you get rid of the dead wood that’s on the ground. We have good examples with our partners, like the Butte Fire Safe Council, on how this works, and it looks like it helped protect the community of Cohasset during the Park Fire. They did some work on some strips there, and the fire essentially dropped to the ground before it came to Paradise Lake. You didn’t have an aerial tanker dropping retardant, you didn’t have a $2-million-per-day fire crew out there doing work. It was modest work done early and in the right place that actually changed the behavior of the fire.
Tell me a little more about the modeling you’ve been doing.
We looked at fire pathways with a group called XyloPlan out of the Bay Area. The concept is that you simulate a series of ignitions with certain wind conditions, terrain, and vegetation. The model looked very much like a Camp Fire scenario; it followed the same pathway, going towards the community in a little gulch that channeled high winds. You need to interrupt that pathway — and that doesn’t necessarily mean creating an area devoid of vegetation, but if you have these areas where the fire behavior changes and drops down to the ground, then it slows the travel. I found this hard to believe, but in the modeling results, in a scenario like the Camp Fire, it could buy you up to eight hours. With modern California firefighting, you could empty out the community in a systematic way in that time. You could have a vigorous fire response. You could have aircraft potentially ready. It’s a game-changing situation, rather than the 30 minutes Paradise had when the Camp Fire started.
How does this work when you’re dealing with private property owners, though? How do you convince them to move or donate their land?
We’re a Park and Recreation District so we don’t have regulatory authority. We are just trying to run with a good idea with the properties that we have so far — those from willing donors mostly, but there have been a couple of sales. If we’re unable to get federal funding or state support, though, I ultimately think this idea will still have to be here — whether it’s five, 10, 15, or 50 years from now. We have to manage this area in a comprehensive way.
Private property rights are very important, and we don’t want to impinge on that. And yet, what a person does on their property has a huge impact on the 30,000 people who may be downwind of them. It’s an unusual situation: In a hurricane, if you have a hurricane-rated roof and your neighbor doesn’t, and theirs blows off, you feel sorry for your neighbor but it’s probably not going to harm your property much. In a wildfire, what your neighbor has done with the wood, or how they treat vegetation, has a significant impact on your home and whether your family is going to survive. It’s a fundamentally different kind of event than some of the other disasters we look at.
Do you have any advice for community leaders who might want to consider creating buffer zones or something similar to what you’re doing in Paradise?
Start today. You have to think about these things with some urgency, but they’re not something people think about until it happens. Paradise, for many decades, did not have a single escaped wildfire make it into the community. Then, overnight, the community is essentially wiped out. But in so many places, these events are foreseeable; we’re just not wired to think about them or prepare for them.
Buffers around communities make a lot of sense, even from a road network standpoint. Even from a trash pickup standpoint. You don’t think about this, but if your community is really strung out, making it a little more thoughtfully laid out also makes it more economically viable to provide services to people. Some things we look for now are long roads that don’t have any connections — that were one-way in and no way out. I don’t think [the traffic jams and deaths in] Paradise would have happened with what we know now, but I kind of think [authorities] did know better beforehand. It just wasn’t economically viable at the time; they didn’t think it was a big deal, but they built the roads anyway. We can be doing a lot of things smarter.
A war of attrition is now turning in opponents’ favor.
A solar developer’s defeat in Massachusetts last week reveals just how much stronger project opponents are on the battlefield after the de facto repeal of the Inflation Reduction Act.
Last week, solar developer PureSky pulled five projects under development around the western Massachusetts town of Shutesbury. PureSky’s facilities had been in the works for years and would together represent what the developer has claimed would be one of the state’s largest solar projects thus far. In a statement, the company laid blame on “broader policy and regulatory headwinds,” including the state’s existing renewables incentives not keeping pace with rising costs and “federal policy updates,” which PureSky said were “making it harder to finance projects like those proposed near Shutesbury.”
But tucked in its press release was an admission from the company’s vice president of development Derek Moretz: this was also about the town, which had enacted a bylaw significantly restricting solar development that the company was until recently fighting vigorously in court.
“There are very few areas in the Commonwealth that are feasible to reach its clean energy goals,” Moretz stated. “We respect the Town’s conservation go als, but it is clear that systemic reforms are needed for Massachusetts to source its own energy.”
This stems from a story that probably sounds familiar: after proposing the projects, PureSky began reckoning with a burgeoning opposition campaign centered around nature conservation. Led by a fresh opposition group, Smart Solar Shutesbury, activists successfully pushed the town to drastically curtail development in 2023, pointing to the amount of forest acreage that would potentially be cleared in order to construct the projects. The town had previously not permitted facilities larger than 15 acres, but the fresh change went further, essentially banning battery storage and solar projects in most areas.
When this first happened, the state Attorney General’s office actually had PureSky’s back, challenging the legality of the bylaw that would block construction. And PureSky filed a lawsuit that was, until recently, ongoing with no signs of stopping. But last week, shortly after the Treasury Department unveiled its rules for implementing Trump’s new tax and spending law, which basically repealed the Inflation Reduction Act, PureSky settled with the town and dropped the lawsuit – and the projects went away along with the court fight.
What does this tell us? Well, things out in the country must be getting quite bleak for solar developers in areas with strident and locked-in opposition that could be costly to fight. Where before project developers might have been able to stomach the struggle, money talks – and the dollars are starting to tell executives to lay down their arms.
The picture gets worse on the macro level: On Monday, the Solar Energy Industries Association released a report declaring that federal policy changes brought about by phasing out federal tax incentives would put the U.S. at risk of losing upwards of 55 gigawatts of solar project development by 2030, representing a loss of more than 20 percent of the project pipeline.
But the trade group said most of that total – 44 gigawatts – was linked specifically to the Trump administration’s decision to halt federal permitting for renewable energy facilities, a decision that may impact generation out west but has little-to-know bearing on most large solar projects because those are almost always on private land.
Heatmap Pro can tell us how much is at stake here. To give you a sense of perspective, across the U.S., over 81 gigawatts worth of renewable energy projects are being contested right now, with non-Western states – the Northeast, South and Midwest – making up almost 60% of that potential capacity.
If historical trends hold, you’d expect a staggering 49% of those projects to be canceled. That would be on top of the totals SEIA suggests could be at risk from new Trump permitting policies.
I suspect the rate of cancellations in the face of project opposition will increase. And if this policy landscape is helping activists kill projects in blue states in desperate need of power, like Massachusetts, then the future may be more difficult to swallow than we can imagine at the moment.
And more on the week’s most important conflicts around renewables.
1. Wells County, Indiana – One of the nation’s most at-risk solar projects may now be prompting a full on moratorium.
2. Clark County, Ohio – Another Ohio county has significantly restricted renewable energy development, this time with big political implications.
3. Daviess County, Kentucky – NextEra’s having some problems getting past this county’s setbacks.
4. Columbia County, Georgia – Sometimes the wealthy will just say no to a solar farm.
5. Ottawa County, Michigan – A proposed battery storage facility in the Mitten State looks like it is about to test the state’s new permitting primacy law.