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The U.S. is burning through forests, and replanting them is expensive.

Wildfires are razing U.S. forests faster than either natural regrowth or active replanting can restore them. There’s a nearly 4 million-acre backlog in the western U.S. of forests that have burned and not been re-seeded. That’s slightly larger than the size of Connecticut. And unless we pick up the pace, the shortfall could increase two to three times over by 2050 as wildfires get worse under a warming climate.
These are the findings of a study published last week on the yawning gap between reforestation needs and reforestation capacity in the western U.S. Trees are still the country’s most important resource to counteract climate change, offsetting more than 12% of annual greenhouse gas emissions as of 2021. But in some areas like in the fire-ravaged Rocky Mountain region, forests have become a net source of carbon to the atmosphere, releasing more than they draw down. To prevent the reforestation gap from widening, the new study warns, we have to fix the “reforestation pipeline” — our capacity to collect seeds, grow seedlings, and plant them.
It also highlights solutions. The research was primarily funded by a company that finances tree-planting efforts by selling credits to carbon-emitting businesses based on the amount of carbon the trees suck up, allowing those businesses to offset their own emissions. To rebuild the country’s reforestation capacity, the study recommends — surprise, surprise — expanding the role of forest carbon offsets, among other ideas.
Some might look at this paper and dismiss it as biased science, but it got me thinking about the long-running debate in the climate community over trees. Should companies be allowed to offset their emissions from burning fossil fuel by planting carbon-sucking forests? It’s easy to say no. Too many forest-related carbon offset projects have come under fire for using faulty accounting methods or for “protecting” forests that were at no risk of being felled. Plus, there’s the larger risk that offsets provide a license to emit.
But when you contemplate the chasm between the funding and infrastructure required to restore forests and current capacity and incentives — not just in the U.S., but also globally — it’s easy to see why so many people ignore these realities and say we must finance reforestation through carbon markets. The new study spells out the predicament quite clearly.
Solomon Dobrowski, the lead author and a professor of landscape ecology at the University of Montana, was quick to tell me that these numbers were a rough estimate. “I'm not so hung up on the absolute number,” he said. “We can increase the precision of that number. But the take-home message here is that the needs are rapidly outstripping our capacity to fill them.”
Dobrowski studies how forests grow back after a disturbance like a wildfire, and he’s been documenting a concerning trend. Larger, more severe fires are “punching these big holes into landscapes,” he told me. A severe burn might leave a mile-long stretch between nearest living trees, making it impossible for the forest to regenerate through natural seed dispersal.
At the same time, the government is struggling to pick up the slack. Due to funding shortfalls, the U.S. Forest Service has managed to address “just 6% of post-wildfire replanting needs” per year over the last decade.
The average area burned in the U.S. more than doubled from 2000 to 2017 compared to the preceding 17-year period. But the uptick in severe fires is not the only reason we’ve fallen so far behind on reforestation. At the same time fires have increased, both public and private forestry shops have collapsed. Ironically, the decline of an ecologically destructive industry — logging — also gutted the potential for an ecologically regenerative forestry industry to thrive.
Previously, most of the Forest Service’s reforestation work was funded by the agency’s timber sales. But beginning in the 1990s, logging on public lands sharply declined due to a confluence of factors, including over-harvesting in previous decades and the listing of the northern spotted owl as protected under the Endangered Species Act. The agency’s non-fire workforce has decreased by 40% over the past two decades. It also shut down more than half its nurseries, leaving just six remaining. Many state-owned nurseries have also closed due to budget cuts and reduced demand for seedlings.
Today, the reforestation supply chain is mostly sustained by private companies serving what’s left of the wood product and fiber industry. State and local regulations require companies to replant in the areas they harvest. But since the industry is concentrated on the west coast, so is the supply chain — 95% of seedling production in the western U.S. occurs in Washington, Oregon, and California. That means interior states like Montana, Colorado, Arizona, and New Mexico, which are seeing increasingly large fires, have no mature supply chain to support reforestation.
The New Mexico Natural Resources Department, for example, estimates it needs 150 million to 390 million seedlings to replant the acres burned in the past 20 years. But the only big nursery in the state, a research center at New Mexico State University, can supply just 300,000 seedlings per year. The nearest U.S. Forest Service nursery serving the region is in Boise, Idaho, more than 700 miles away. Matthew Hurteau, a forest ecologist at the University of New Mexico who is a co-author on the reforestation study, told me he has been working with the state to develop a new nursery capable of producing 5 million seedlings a year. The project has received some funding from the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the state government, but still needs to raise roughly $60 million more, Hurteau said.
Nurseries aren’t the only bottleneck. Hurteau has also been working to build the state’s seedbank, a time-consuming process that requires going out into the field and collecting seeds one by one. Another piece of the puzzle is workforce development. Dowbrowski pointed out that the majority of tree planting today is not done by government workers but rather by private contractors that hire H2B guest workers. Due to federal limits on immigration, reforestation contractors haven’t even been able to hire enough to meet current planting demand.
The new paper is far from the first to highlight these issues, and policymakers are beginning to address the problem. In 2021, the Forest Service got a major infusion of cash from the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, which lifted the cap on its annual budget for reforestation from $30 million to at least $140 million with the directive to clear its backlog.
But Dobrowski said this is a far cry from all that’s needed. In the study, he and his co-authors estimated that clearing the existing backlog in the West alone could cost at least $3.6 billion. And that’s a conservative estimate — it doesn’t include the cost of building more greenhouses or expanding the workforce. “The reality is that the feds don’t have the infrastructure and workforce to address this at scale,” he told me. The Forest Service budget also won’t address reforestation needs on private lands, which account for about 30% of forested land in the western U.S.
After establishing the scale of the problem, the paper raises a followup question: How can we scale the reforestation supply chain? There, it pivots to argue that “new economic drivers” — like carbon markets — “can modernize the reforestation pipeline and align tree planting efforts with broader ecosystem resilience and climate mitigation goals.”
This is precisely what Mast Reforestation, the company that funded the research, is trying to do. Mast is vertically integrated — it collects seeds, grows seedlings, and plants them. The company has developed software to improve the efficiency of each of these steps and increase the chances of success, i.e. to minimize tree deaths. To fund its tree-planting efforts, Mast sells carbon credits based on the amount of CO2 the trees will remove from the atmosphere over their lifetimes. It only plants on privately owned, previously burned land that wouldn’t have otherwise been replanted (because the owner couldn’t afford it) or regenerated (because the burn was so severe). The idea is to create a more stable source of financing for reforestation not subject to the whims of congressional appropriations.
Matthew Aghai, an ecologist who works as the chief science officer at Mast and another of the study’s co-authors, told me there’s a misunderstanding among policymakers and the general public that when forests burn, the government is ready to step in, and all that’s needed is more funding for seedling production. Aghai hopes the new paper illuminates the truth, and how risky it is to wait for state backing that may never arrive. He told me that he sought out Dobrowski to work with him because he knew, as a former academic himself, that if he had written the paper on his own, there would have been a stigma attached to it. “I think the best way for me to get those ideas out was actually something that needs to happen in our broader market, which is a lot more collaboration,” he said.
There are many climate advocates who believe the problems with carbon offsets can be fixed, that the markets can be reformed, and that “high quality” nature-based credits are possible. Indeed, many consider restoring trust in nature-based carbon credits an imperative if we are to fund reforestation at the level that tackling climate change requires. A few weeks ago, Google, Meta, Microsoft, and Salesforce announced a new coalition called Symbiosis that will purchase up to 20 million tons of carbon removal credits from nature-based projects that “meet the highest quality bar” and “reflect the latest and greatest science.” Then, last Tuesday, the Biden administration followed up with a show of support for fixing the voluntary carbon market, because it can “deliver steady, reliable revenue streams to a range of decarbonization projects, programs, and practices, including nature-based solutions.”
But there is one fundamental problem with selling carbon credits based on trees, which no amount of reform or commitment to high integrity can solve. Fossil fuel CO2 emissions are essentially permanent — they stay in the atmosphere for upward of a thousand years. The CO2 sequestered by forests is not. Trees die. In a warming world, with worsening pest outbreaks, drought, and wildfires, the chances of a tree making it to a thousand years without releasing at least some of its stored carbon are slimmer than ever.
Hurteau, despite contributing to the paper, is deeply skeptical of financing reforestation through the sale of carbon credits. “We need to be making monster investments in maintaining forest cover globally, and I understand why people look at carbon finance to do this,” he said. “But you can't fly in an airplane and pay somebody to plant trees and have it zero out. From an energy balance perspective, for the Earth’s system, that's not real.”
When I raised this with Dobrowski, who endorsed the paper’s conclusions about the potential for carbon markets, he said it’s something he struggles with. He agreed that a ton of fossil fuel emissions is not the same as a ton of carbon sequestered in trees, but comes back to the fact that we need new incentive structures for people to do reforestation and be better stewards of our forests. It’s something I’ve heard echoed many times over in my reporting — the unspoken subtext essentially being, do you have any better ideas to raise the billions of dollars needed to do this?
Aghai had a slightly different take. To him, the one-to-one math isn’t so important “as long as the trajectory is moving forward, we're accumulating carbon, we're protecting watersheds, we're increasing the biodiversity index.” That may sound a bit hand-wavy — and it still gives a pass to polluters. But then he raised an interesting point, one that I don’t think I’ve heard before. The environmental damage caused by fossil fuels is not just the carbon they spew into the atmosphere. And the value forests provide is not just the carbon they sequester.
“Carbon’s our currency right now. It’s the thing that everyone is measuring around,” he said. “But what about all the other destruction that comes with the energy sector? There's cascading effects that impact water, soils, methane. Forests tend to stabilize everything by moving us toward homeostasis at a landscape level. For me, these markets will work when we catalyze them at a regional, dare I say global scale.”
Are these benefits enough to dismiss the incongruity inherent to forest carbon offsets? To say, for example, that trees might not actually offset the full amount of carbon that Google is putting in the atmosphere, but the funding Google is providing to get these trees in the ground makes some greater, unquantifiable progress toward our climate goals?
Some scientists have proposed alternative solutions. Myles Allen, a professor of geosystem science at the University of Oxford, has advocated for “like for like” offsetting, in which companies only buy nature-based carbon credits to offset their emissions from nature-based sources, such as land cleared to grow food. To offset fossil fuel emissions, the logic goes, they could buy other kinds of credits, like those based on carbon captured from the air and sequestered deep underground for millenia. The European Union is currently considering a rule that would require companies adhere to this principle. Others have suggested companies could make “contributions” to climate mitigation through investments in forests, rather than buying offsets.
Both would be significant departures from the way corporate sustainability managers have used carbon markets in the past. But the current system is in crisis. The volume of carbon credits traded declined precipitously in the last two years as buyers were spooked off buying offsets. Forestry-related credits, in particular, contracted from $1.1 billion in sales in 2022 to just $351 million in sales in 2023, a 69% drop. Within that, the vast majority of the credits traded during both years came from forestry projects that reduced emissions, not reforestation projects like Mast’s that remove carbon from the atmosphere.
Even if you agree with Aghai that carbon markets are our best hope at addressing the reforestation gap, gaining the trust of buyers is a prerequisite. That means that scientists, companies, and governance groups like the Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market first have to converge on what these credits actually mean and how they can be used.
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Rob takes Jesse through our battery of questions.
Every year, Heatmap asks dozens of climate scientists, officials, and business leaders the same set of questions. It’s an act of temperature-taking we call our Insiders Survey — and our 2026 edition is live now.
In this week’s Shift Key episode, Rob puts Jesse through the survey wringer. What is the most exciting climate tech company? Are data centers slowing down decarbonization? And will a country attempt the global deployment of solar radiation management within the next decade? It’s a fun one! Shift Key is hosted by Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap, and Jesse Jenkins, a professor of energy systems engineering at Princeton University.
Subscribe to “Shift Key” and find this episode on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Amazon, or wherever you get your podcasts.
You can also add the show’s RSS feed to your podcast app to follow us directly.
Here is an excerpt from our conversation:
Robinson Meyer: Next question — you have to pick one, and then you’ll get a free response section. Do you think AI and data centers energy needs are significantly slowing down decarbonization, yes or no?
Jesse Jenkins: Significantly. Yeah, I guess significantly would … yes, I think so. I think in general, the challenge we have with decarbonization is we have to add new, clean supplies of energy faster than demand growth. And so, in order to make progress on existing emissions, you have to exceed the demand growth, meet all of that growth with clean resources, and then start to drive down emissions.
If you look at what we’ve talked about — are China’s emissions peaking, or global emissions peaking? I mean, that really is a game. It’s a race between how fast we can add clean supply and how fast demand for energy’s growing. And so in the power sector in particular, an area where we’ve made the most progress in recent years in cutting emissions, now having a large, and rapid growth in electricity demand for a whole new sector of the economy — and one that doesn’t directly contribute to decarbonization, like, say, in contrast to electric vehicles or electrifying heating —certainly makes things harder. It just makes that you have to run that race even faster.
I would say in the U.S. context in particular, in a combination of the Trump policy environment, we are not keeping pace, right? We are not going to be able to both meet the large demand growth and eat into the substantial remaining emissions that we have from coal and gas in our power sector. And in particular, I think we’re going to see a lot more coal generation over the next decade than we would’ve otherwise without both AI and without the repeal of the Biden-era EPA regulations, which were going to really drive the entire coal fleet into a moment of truth, right? Are they gonna retrofit for carbon capture? Are they going to retire? Was basically their option, by 2035.
And so without that, we still have on the order of 150 gigawatts of coal-fired power plants in the United States, and many of those were on the way out, and I think they’re getting a second lease on life because of the fact that demand for energy and particularly capacity are growing so rapidly that a lot of them are now saying, Hey, you know what, we can actually make quite a bit of money if we stick around for another 5, 10, 15 years. So yeah, I’d say that’s significantly harder.
That isn’t an indictment to say we shouldn’t do AI. It’s happening. It’s valuable, and we need to meet as much, if not all of that growth with clean energy. But then we still have to try to go faster, and that’s the key.
Mentioned:
This year’s Heatmap Insiders Survey
Last year’s Heatmap Insiders Survey
The best PDF Jesse read this year: Flexible Data Centers: A Faster, More Affordable Path to Power
The best PDF Rob read this year: George Marshall’s Guide to Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception
This episode of Shift Key is sponsored by …
Heatmap Pro brings all of our research, reporting, and insights down to the local level. The software platform tracks all local opposition to clean energy and data centers, forecasts community sentiment, and guides data-driven engagement campaigns. Book a demo today to see the premier intelligence platform for project permitting and community engagement.
Music for Shift Key is by Adam Kromelow.
They still want to decarbonize, but they’re over the jargon.
Where does the fight to decarbonize the global economy go from here? The past 12 months, after all, have been bleak. Donald Trump has pulled the United States out of the Paris Agreement (again) and is trying to leave a precursor United Nations climate treaty, as well. He ripped out half the Inflation Reduction Act, sidetracked the Environmental Protection Administration, and rechristened the Energy Department’s in-house bank in the name of “energy dominance.” Even nonpartisan weather research — like that conducted by the National Center for Atmospheric Research — is getting shut down by Trump’s ideologues. And in the days before we went to press, Trump invaded Venezuela with the explicit goal (he claims) of taking its oil.
Abroad, the picture hardly seems rosier. China’s new climate pledge struck many observers as underwhelming. Mark Carney, who once led the effort to decarbonize global finance, won Canada’s premiership after promising to lift parts of that country’s carbon tax — then struck a “grand bargain” with fossiliferous Alberta. Even Europe seems to dither between its climate goals, its economic security, and the need for faster growth.
Now would be a good time, we thought, for an industry-wide check-in. So we called up 55 of the most discerning and often disputatious voices in climate and clean energy — the scientists, researchers, innovators, and reformers who are already shaping our climate future. Some of them led the Biden administration’s climate policy from within the White House; others are harsh or heterodox critics of mainstream environmentalism. And a few more are on the front lines right now, tasked with responding to Trump’s policies from the halls of Congress — or the ivory minarets of academia.
We asked them all the same questions, including: Which key decarbonization technology is not ready for primetime? Who in the Trump administration has been the worst for decarbonization? And how hot is the planet set to get in 2100, really? (Among other queries.) Their answers — as summarized and tabulated by my colleagues — are available in these pages.
You can see whether insiders think data centers are slowing down decarbonization and what folks have learned (or, at least, say they’ve learned) from the repeal of clean energy tax credits in the Inflation Reduction Act.
But from many different respondents, a mood emerged: a kind of exhaustion with “climate” as the right frame through which to understand the fractious mixture of electrification, pollution reduction, clean energy development, and other goals that people who care about climate change actually pursue. When we asked what piece of climate jargon people would most like to ban, we expected most answers to dwell on the various colors of hydrogen (green, blue, orange, chartreuse), perhaps, or the alphabet soup of acronyms around carbon removal (CDR, DAC, CCS, CCUS, MRV). Instead, we got:
“‘Climate.’ Literally the word climate, I would just get rid of it completely,” one venture capitalist told us. “I would love to see people not use 'climate change' as a predominant way to talk to people about a global challenge like this,” seconded a former Washington official. “And who knows what a ‘greenhouse gas emission’ is in the real world?” A lobbyist agreed: “Climate change, unfortunately, has become too politicized … I’d rather talk about decarbonization than climate change.”
Not everyone was as willing to shift to decarbonization, but most welcomed some form of specificity. “I’ve always tried to reframe climate change to be more personal and to recognize it is literally the biggest health challenge of our lives,” the former official said. The VC said we should “get back to the basics of, are you in the energy business? Are you in the agriculture business? Are you in transportation, logistics, manufacturing?”
“You're in a business,” they added, “there is no climate business.”
Not everyone hated “climate” quite as much — but others mentioned a phrase including the word. One think tanker wanted to nix “climate emergency.” Another scholar said: “I think the ‘climate justice’ term — not the idea — but I think the term got spread so widely that it became kind of difficult to understand what it was even referring to.” And one climate scientist didn’t have a problem with climate change, per se, but did say that people should pare back how they discuss it and back off “the notion that climate change will result in human extinction, or the sudden and imminent end to human civilization.”
There were other points of agreement. Four people wanted to ban “net zero” or “carbon neutrality.” One scientist said activists should back off fossil gas — “I know we’re always trying to try convince people of something, but, like, the entire world calls it ’natural gas’” — and another scientist said that they wished people would stop “micromanaging” language: “People continually changing jargon to try and find the magic words that make something different than it is — that annoys me.”
Two more academics added they wish to banish discussion of “overshoot”: “It’s not clear if it's referring to temperatures or emissions — I just don't think it's a helpful frame for thinking about the problem.”
“Unit economics,” “greenwashing,” and — yes — the whole spectrum of hydrogen colors came in for a lashing. But perhaps the most distinctive ban suggestion came from Todd Stern, the former chief U.S. climate diplomat, who negotiated the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement.
“I hate it when people say ’are you going to COP?’” he told me, referring to the United Nations’ annual climate summit, officially known as the Conference of the Parties. His issue wasn’t calling it “COP,” he clarified. It was dropping the definite article.
“The way I see it, no one has the right to suddenly become such intimate pals with ‘COP.’ You go to the ball game or the conference or what have you. And you go to ‘the COP,’” he said. “I am clearly losing this battle, but no one will ever hear me drop the ‘the.’”
Now, since I talked to Stern, the United States has moved to drop the COP entirely — with or without the “the” — because Trump took us out of the climate treaty under whose aegis the COP is held. But precision still counts, even in unfriendly times. And throughout the rest of this package, you’ll find insiders trying to find a path forward in thoughtful, insightful, and precise ways.
You’ll also find them remaining surprisingly upbeat — and even more optimistic, in some ways, than they were last year. Twelve months ago, 30% of our insider panel thought China would peak its emissions in the 2020s; this year, a plurality said the peak would come this decade. Roughly the same share of respondents this year as last year thought the U.S. would hit net zero in the 2060s. Trump might be setting back American climate action in the near term. But some of the most important long-term trends remain unchanged.
OUR PANEL INCLUDED… Gavin Schmidt, director of the NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies | Ken Caldeira, senior scientist emeritus at the Carnegie Institution for Science and visiting scholar at Stanford University | Kate Marvel, research physicist at the NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies | Holly Jean Buck, associate professor of environment and sustainability at the University at Buffalo | Kim Cobb, climate scientist and director of the Institute at Brown for Environment and Society | Jennifer Wilcox, chemical engineering professor at the University of Pennsylvania and former U.S. Assistant Secretary for Fossil Energy and Carbon Management | Michael Greenstone, economist and director of the Energy Policy Institute at the University of Chicago | Solomon Hsiang, professor of global environmental policy at Stanford University | Chris Bataille, global fellow at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy | Danny Cullenward, senior fellow at the Kleinman Center for Energy Policy at the University of Pennsylvania | J. Mijin Cha, environmental studies professor at UC Santa Cruz and fellow at Cornell University’s Climate Jobs Institute | Lynne Kiesling, director of the Institute for Regulatory Law and Economics at Northwestern University | Daniel Swain, climate scientist at the University of California Agriculture and Natural Resources | Emily Grubert, sustainable energy policy professor at the University of Notre Dame | Jon Norman, president of Hydrostor | Chris Creed, managing partner at Galvanize Climate Solutions | Amy Heart, senior vice president of public policy at Sunrun | Kate Brandt, chief sustainability officer at Google | Sophie Purdom, managing partner at Planeteer Capital and co-founder of CTVC | Lara Pierpoint, managing director at Trellis Climate | Andrew Beebe, managing director at Obvious Ventures | Gabriel Kra, managing director and co-founder of Prelude Ventures | Joe Goodman, managing partner and co-founder of VoLo Earth Ventures | Erika Reinhardt, executive director and co-founder of Spark Climate Solutions | Dawn Lippert, founder and CEO of Elemental Impact and general partner at Earthshot Ventures | Rajesh Swaminathan, partner at Khosla Ventures | Rob Davies, CEO of Sublime Systems | John Arnold, philanthropist and co-founder of Arnold Ventures | Gabe Kleinman, operating partner at Emerson Collective | Amy Duffuor, co-founder and general partner at Azolla Ventures | Amy Francetic, managing general partner and founder of Buoyant Ventures | Tom Chi, founding partner at At One Ventures | Francis O’Sullivan, managing director at S2G Investments | Cooper Rinzler, partner at Breakthrough Energy Ventures | Gina McCarthy, former administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency | Neil Chatterjee, former commissioner of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission | Representative Scott Peters, member of the U.S. House of Representatives | Todd Stern, former U.S. special envoy for climate change | Representative Sean Casten, member of the U.S. House of Representatives | Representative Mike Levin, member of the U.S. House of Representatives | Zeke Hausfather, climate research lead at Stripe and research scientist at Berkeley Earth | Shuchi Talati, founder and executive director of the Alliance for Just Deliberation on Solar Geoengineering | Nat Bullard, co-founder of Halcyon | Bill McKibben, environmentalist and founder of 350.org | Ilaria Mazzocco, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies | Leah Stokes, professor of environmental politics at UC Santa Barbara | Noah Kaufman, senior research scholar at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy | Arvind Ravikumar, energy systems professor at the University of Texas at Austin | Jessica Green, political scientist at the University of Toronto | Jonas Nahm, energy policy professor at Johns Hopkins SAIS | Armond Cohen, executive director of the Clean Air Task Force | Costa Samaras, director of the Scott Institute for Energy Innovation at Carnegie Mellon University | John Larsen, partner at Rhodium Group | Alex Trembath, executive director of the Breakthrough Institute | Alex Flint, executive director of the Alliance for Market Solutions
The Heatmap Insiders Survey of 55 invited expert respondents was conducted by Heatmap News reporters during November and December 2025. Responses were collected via phone interviews. All participants were given the opportunity to record responses anonymously. Not all respondents answered all questions.
Plus, which is the best hyperscaler on climate — and which is the worst?
The biggest story in energy right now is data centers.
After decades of slow load growth, forecasters are almost competing with each other to predict the most eye-popping figure for how much new electricity demand data centers will add to the grid. And with the existing electricity system with its backbone of natural gas, more data centers could mean higher emissions.
Hyperscalers with sustainability goals are already reporting higher emissions, and technology companies are telling investors that they plan to invest hundreds of billions, if not trillions of dollars, into new data centers, increasingly at gigawatt scale.
And yet when we asked our Heatmap survey participants “Do you think AI and data centers’ energy needs are significantly slowing down decarbonization?” only about 34% said they would, compared to 66% who said they wouldn’t.
There were some intriguing differences between different types of respondents. Among our “innovator” respondents — venture capitalists, founders, and executives working at climate tech startups — the overwhelming majority said that AI and data centers are not slowing down decarbonization. “I think it’s the inverse — I think we want to launch the next generation of technologies when there’s demand growth and opportunity to sell into a slightly higher priced, non-commoditized market,” Joe Goodman co-founder and managing partner at VoLo Earth Ventures, told us.
Not everyone in Silicon Valley is so optimistic, however. “I think in a different political environment, it may have been a true accelerant,” one VC told us. “But in this political environment, it’s a true albatross because it’s creating so many more emissions. It’s creating so much stress on the grid. We’re not deploying the kinds of solutions that would be effective."
Scientists were least in agreement on the question. While only 47% of scientists thought the growth of data centers would significantly slow down decarbonization, most of the pessimistic camp was in the social sciences. In total, over 62% of the physical scientists we surveyed thought data centers weren’t slowing down decarbonization, compared to a third of social scientists.
Michael Greenstone, a University of Chicago economist, told us he didn’t see data centers and artificial intelligence as any different from any other use of energy. “I also think air conditioning and lighting, computing, and 57,000 other uses of electricity are slowing down decarbonization,” he said. The real answer is the world is not trying to minimize climate change.”
Mijin Cha, an assistant professor of environment studies at the University of California Santa Cruz, was even more gloomy, telling us, “Not only do I think it’s slowing down decarbonization, I think it is permanently extending the life of fossil fuels, especially as it is now unmitigated growth.”
Some took issue with the premise of the question, expressing skepticism of the entire AI industry. “I’m actually of the opinion that most of the AI and data center plans are a massive bubble,” a scientist told us. “And so, are there plans that would be disruptive to emissions? Yes. Are they actually doing anything to emissions yet? Not obvious.”
We also asked respondents to name the “best” and “worst” hyperscalers, large technology companies pursuing the data center buildout. Many of these companies have some kind of renewables or sustainability goal, but there are meaningful differences among them. Google and Microsoft look to match their emissions with non-carbon-power generation in the same geographic area and at the same time. The approach used by Meta and Amazon, on the other hand, is to develop renewable projects that have the biggest “bang for the buck” on global emissions by siting them in areas with high emissions that the renewable generation can be said to displace.
Among our respondents, the 24/7 “time and place” approach is the clear winner.
Google was the “best” pick for 19 respondents, including six who said “Google and Microsoft.” By contrast, Amazon and Meta had just three votes combined.
As for the “worst,” there was no clear consensus, although two respondents from the social sciences picked “everyone besides Microsoft and Google” and “everyone but Google and Microsoft.” Another one told us, “The best is a tie between Microsoft and Google. Everyone else is in the bottom category.”
A third social scientist summed it up even more pungently. “Google is the best, Meta is the worst. Evil corporation” — though with more expletives than that.
The Heatmap Insiders Survey of 55 invited expert respondents was conducted by Heatmap News reporters during November and December 2025. Responses were collected via phone interviews. All participants were given the opportunity to record responses anonymously. Not all respondents answered all questions.