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“I am increasingly becoming irrelevant in the public conversation,” says Kate Marvel, a climate scientist who until recently worked at NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies. “And I love it.”
For years, such an exalted state was denied to Marvel. Every week, it seemed, someone — a high-profile politician, maybe, or a CEO — would say something idiotic about climate science. Journalists would dutifully call her to get a rebuttal: Yes, climate change is real, she would say, yes, we’re really certain. The media would print the story. Rinse, repeat.
A few years ago, she told a panel, half as a joke, that her highest professional ambition was not fame or a Nobel Prize but total irrelevance — a moment when climate scientists would no longer have anything useful to tell the public.
That 2020 dream is now her 2023 reality. “It’s incredible,” she told me last week. “Science is no longer even a dominant part of the climate story anymore, and I think that’s great. I think that represents just shattering progress.”
We were talking about a question, a private heresy, I’ve been musing about for some time. Because it’s not just the scientists who have faded into the background — over the past few years, the role of climate science itself has shifted. Gradually, then suddenly, a field once defined by urgent questions and dire warnings has become practical and specialized. So for the past few weeks, I’ve started to ask researchers my big question: Have we reached the end of climate science?
“Science is never done,” Michael Oppenheimer, a professor of geosciences and international affairs at Princeton, told me. “There’s always things that we thought we knew that we didn’t.”
“Your title is provocative, but not without basis,” Katharine Hayhoe, a climate scientist at Texas Tech University and one of the lead authors of the National Climate Assessment, said.
Not necessarily no, then. My question, I always clarified, had a few layers.
Since it first took shape, climate science has sought to answer a handful of big questions: Why does Earth’s temperature change so much across millennia? What role do specific gases play in regulating that temperature? If we keep burning fossil fuels, how bad could it be — and how hot could it get?
The field has now answered those questions to any useful degree. But what’s more, scientists have advocated and won widespread acceptance of the idea that inevitably follows from those answers, which is that humanity must decarbonize its economy as fast as it reasonably can. Climate science, in other words, didn’t just end. It reached its end — its ultimate state, its Really Big Important Point.
In the past few years, the world has begun to accept that Really Big Important Point. Since 2020, the world’s three largest climate polluters — China, the United States, and the European Union — have adopted more aggressive climate policies. Last year, the global clean-energy market cracked $1 trillion in annual investment for the first time; one of every seven new cars sold worldwide is now an electric vehicle. In other words, serious decarbonization — the end of climate science — has begun.
At the same time, climate science has resolved some of its niggling mysteries. When I became a climate reporter in 2015, questions still lingered about just how bad climate change would be. Researchers struggled to understand how clouds or melting permafrost fed back into the climate system; in 2016, a major paper argued that some Antarctic glaciers could collapse by the end of the century, leading to hyper-accelerated sea-level rise within my lifetime.
Today, not all of those questions have been completely put aside. But scientists now have a better grasp of how clouds work, and some of the most catastrophic Antarctic scenarios have been pushed into the next century. In 2020, researchers even made progress on one of the oldest mysteries in climate science — a variable called “climate sensitivity” — for the first time in 41 years.
Does the field have any mysteries left? “I wouldn’t go quite so far as angels dancing on the head of a pin” to describe them, Hayhoe told me. “But in order to act, we already know what we need.”
“I think at the macro level, what we discover [next] is not necessarily going to change policymakers’ decisions, but you could argue that’s been true since the late 90s,” Zeke Hausfather, a climate scientist at Berkeley Earth, agreed.
“Physics didn’t end when we figured out how to do engineering, and now they are both incredibly important,” Marvel said.
Yet across the discipline, you can see research switching their focus from learning to building — from physics, as it were, to engineering. Marvel herself left NASA last year to join Project Drawdown, a nonprofit that focuses on emissions reduction. Hausfather now works at Frontier, a tech-industry consortium that studies carbon-removal technology. Even Hayhoe — who trained as a climate scientist — joined a political-science department a decade ago. “I concluded that the biggest barriers to action were not more science,” she said this week.
To fully understand whether climate science has ended, it might help to go back to the very beginning of the field.
By the late 19th century, scientists knew that Earth was incredibly ancient. They also knew that over long enough timescales, the weather in one place changed dramatically. (Even the ancient Greeks and Chinese had noticed misplaced seashores or fossilized bamboo and figured out what they meant.) But only slowly did questions from chemistry, physics, and meteorology congeal into a new field of study.
The first climate scientist, we now know, was Eunice Newton Foote, an amateur inventor and feminist. In 1856, she observed that glass jars filled with carbon dioxide or water vapor trapped more of the sun’s heat than a jar containing dry air. “An atmosphere of that gas,” she wrote of CO₂, “would give to our earth a high temperature.”
But due to her gender and nationality, her work was lost. So the field began instead with the contributions of two Europeans: John Tyndall, an Irish physicist who in 1859 first identified which gases cause the greenhouse effect; and Svante Arrhenius, a Swedish chemist who in 1896 first described Earth’s climate sensitivity, perhaps the discipline’s most important number.
Arrhenius asked: If the amount of CO₂ in the atmosphere were to double, how much would the planet warm? Somewhere from five to six degrees Celsius, he concluded. Although he knew that humanity’s coal consumption was causing carbon pollution, his calculation was a purely academic exercise: We would not double atmospheric CO₂ for another 3,000 years.
In fact, it might take only two centuries. Atmospheric carbon-dioxide levels are now 50 percent higher than they were when the Industrial Revolution began — we are halfway to doubling.
Not until after World War II did climate science become an urgent field, as nuclear war, the space race, and the birth of environmentalism forced scientists to think about the whole Earth system for the first time — and computers made such a daring thing possible. In the late 1950s and 1960s, the physicists Syukuro Manabe and Richard Wetherald produced the first computer models of the atmosphere, confirming that climate sensitivity was real. (Last year, Manabe won the Nobel Prize in Physics for that work.) Half a hemisphere away, the oceanographer Charles Keeling used data collected from Hawaii’s Mauna Loa Observatory to show that fossil-fuel use was rapidly increasing the atmosphere’s carbon concentration.
Suddenly, the greenhouse effect — and climate sensitivity — were no longer theoretical. “If the human race survives into the 21st century,” Keeling warned, “the people living then … may also face the threat of climatic change brought about by an uncontrolled increase in atmospheric CO₂ from fossil fuels.”
Faced with a near-term threat, climate science took shape. An ever-growing group of scientists sketched what human-caused climate change might mean for droughts, storms, floods, glaciers, and sea levels. Even oil companies opened climate-research divisions — although they would later hide this fact and fund efforts to discredit the science. In 1979, the MIT meteorologist Jules Charney led a national report concluding that global warming was essentially inevitable. He also estimated climate sensitivity at 1.5 to 4 degrees Celsius, a range that would stand for the next four decades.
“In one sense, we’ve already known enough for over 50 years to do what we have to do,” Hayhoe, the Texas Tech professor, told me. “Some parts of climate science have been simply crossing the T’s and dotting the I’s since then.”
Crossing the T’s and dotting the I’s—such an idea would have made sense to the historian Thomas Kuhn. In his book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, he argued that science doesn’t progress in a dependable and linear way, but through spasmodic “paradigm shifts,” when a new theory supplants an older one and casts everything that scientists once knew in doubt. These revolutions are followed by happy doldrums that he called “normal science,” where researchers work to fit their observations of the world into the moment’s dominant paradigm.
By 1988, climate science had advanced to the degree that James Hansen, the head of NASA’s Goddard Institute, could confidently warn the Senate that global warming had begun. A few months later, the United Nations convened the first Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, an expert body of scientists asked to report on current scientific consensus.
Yet core scientific questions remained. In the 1990s, the federal scientist Ben Santer and his colleagues provided the first evidence of climate change’s “fingerprint” in the atmosphere — key observations that showed the lower atmosphere was warming in such a way as to implicate carbon dioxide.
By this point, any major scientific questions about climate change were effectively resolved. Paul N. Edwards, a Stanford historian and IPCC author, remembers musing in the early 2000s about whether the IPCC’s physical-science team should pack it up: They had done the job and shown that climate change was real.
Yet climate science had not yet won politically. Santer was harassed over his research; fossil-fuel companies continued to seed lies and doubt about the science for years. Across the West, only some politicians acted as if climate change was real; even the new U.S. president, Barack Obama, could not get a climate law through a liberal Congress in 2010.
It took one final slog for climate science to win. Through the 2010s, scientists ironed out remaining questions around clouds, glaciers, and other runaway feedbacks. “It’s become harder in the last decade to make a publicly skeptical case against mainstream climate science,” Hausfather said. “Part of that is climate science advancing one funeral at a time. But it’s also become so clear and self-evident — and so much of the scientific community supports it — that it’s harder to argue against with any credibility.”
Three years ago, a team of more than two dozen researchers — including Hausfather and Marvel — finally made progress on solving climate science’s biggest outstanding mystery, cutting our uncertainty around climate sensitivity in half. Since 1979, Charney’s estimate had remained essentially unchanged; it was quoted nearly verbatim in the 2013 IPCC report. Now, scientists know that if atmospheric CO₂ were to double, Earth’s temperature would rise 2.6 to 3.9 degrees Celsius.
That’s about as much specificity as we’ll ever need, Hayhoe told me. Now, “we know that climate sensitivity is either bad, really bad, or catastrophic.”
So isn’t climate science over, then? It’s resolved the big uncertainties; it’s even cleared up climate sensitivity. Not quite, Marvel said. She and other researchers described a few areas where science is still vital.
The first — and perhaps most important — is the object that covers two-thirds of Earth’s surface area: the ocean, Edwards told me. Since the 1990s, it has absorbed more than 90% of the excess heat caused by greenhouse gases, but we still don’t understand how it formed, much less how it will change over the next century.
Researchers also know some theories need to be revisited. “Antarctica is melting way faster than in the models,” Marvel said, which could change the climate much more quickly than previously imagined. And though the runaway collapse of Antarctica now seems less likely, we could be wrong, Oppenheimer reminded me. “The money that we put into understanding Antarctica is a pittance compared to what you would need to truly understand such a big object,” he said.
And these, mind you, are the known unknowns. There’s still the chance that we discover some huge new climatic process out there — at the bottom of the Mariana Trench, perhaps, or at the base of an Antarctic glacier — that has so far eluded us.
Yet in the wildfires of the old climate science, a new field is being born. The scientists who I spoke with see three big projects.
First, in the past decade, researchers have gotten much better at attributing individual weather events to climate change. They now know that the Lower 48 states are three times more likely to see a warm February than they would without human-caused climate change, for instance, or that Oregon and Washington’s record-breaking 2021 heat wave was “virtually impossible” without warming. This work will keep improving, Marvel said, and it will help us understand where climate models fail to predict the actual experience of climate change.
Second, scientists want to make the tools of climate science more useful to people at the scales where they live, work, and play. “We just don’t yet have the ability to understand in a detailed way and at a small-enough scale” what climate impacts will look like, Oppenheimer told me. Cities should be able to predict how drought or sea-level rise will affect their bridges or infrastructure. Members of Congress should know what a once-in-a-decade heat wave will look like in their district five, 10, or 20 years hence.
“It’s not so much that we don’t need science anymore; it’s that we need science focused on the questions that are going to save lives,” Oppenheimer said. The task before climate science is to steward humanity through the “treacherous next decades where we are likely to warm through the danger zone of 1.5 degrees.”
That brings us to the third project: That climatologists must create a “smoother interface between physical science and social science,” he said. The Yale economist Richard Nordhaus recently won a Nobel Prize for linking climate science with economics, “but other aspects of the human system are still totally undone.” Edwards wanted to get beyond economics altogether: “We need an anthropology and sociology of climate adaptation,” he said. Marvel, meanwhile, wanted to zoom the lens beyond just people. “We don’t really understand ... what the hell plants do,” she told me. Plants and plankton have absorbed half of all carbon pollution, but it’s unclear if they’ll keep doing so or how all that extra carbon has changed how they might respond to warming.
Economics, sociology, botany, politics — you can begin to see a new field taking shape here, a kind of climate post-science. Rooted in climatology’s theories and ideas, it stretches to embrace the breadth of the Earth system. The climate is everything, after all, and in order to survive an era when human desire has altered the planet’s geology, this new field of study must encompass humanity itself — and all the rest of the Earthly mess.
Nearly a century ago, the philosopher Alexander Kojéve concluded it was possible for political philosophy to gain a level of absolute knowledge about the world and, second, that it had done so. In the wake of the French Revolution, some fusion of socialism or capitalism would win the day, he concluded, meaning that much of the remaining “work to do” in society lay not in large-scale philosophizing about human nature, but in essentially bureaucratic questions of economic and social governance. So he became a technocrat, and helped design the market entity that later became the European Union.
Is this climate science’s Kojéve era? It just may be — but it won’t last forever, Oppenheimer reminded me.
“Generations in the future will still be dealing with this problem,” he said. “Even if we get off fossil fuels, some future idiot genius will invent some other climate altering substance. We can never put climate aside — it’s part of the responsibility we inherited when we started being clever enough to invent problems like this in future.”
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Greenhouse gas pollution could drop by half a percent this year, according to a new analysis.
This is an edition of Heatmap Daily, an evening review of the day’s news written by our executive editor. Sign up for it here.
Back in March of last year, I coined the phrase “Degrowth Donald” to describe President Donald Trump’s accidental environmental impact.
Trump might say that climate change was a “hoax” or “scam,” I said. But when you looked at his actions, a different set of beliefs emerged.
He imposed a 10% tax on Canadian oil — a far more effective deterrent on consuming Albertan crude than a decade of protests against Keystone XL. He taxed foreign car imports and levied new tariffs on single-family-home building materials. You could say he had, I don’t know, rhubarb politics — a MAGA red stalk erupting in big green leaves.
Of course, Trump’s actual environmental politics are far more complicated. He has declared war on wind energy and gutted greenhouse gas rules. As you read in Heatmap AM this morning, the Trump administration announced today it would transform the Endangered Species Act to legalize a much broader range of animal killings.
But every so often, Degrowth Donald rides again. And so it is with the Iran war, which has gone on much longer than Trump initially envisioned, changed the global energy economy, and made China’s distinctive approach to energy security — which relies on electrification and large oil and mineral stockpiles — look more popular globally. It has triggered an energy crisis that is, at the moment, getting worse: Even in the United States, gasoline prices are surging again, and diesel is nearing its post-2022 inflation-adjusted record highs, according to Patrick De Haan, the head of petroleum analysis at GasBuddy. Energy prices are even higher in much of Europe.
One upshot of these higher prices, though? Emissions now seem to be going down. According to a new analysis from Carbon Brief, a U.K.-based nonprofit, global emissions from fossil fuels will fall by half a percent this year because of higher oil and natural gas prices caused by the Iran war and Strait of Hormuz closure. What’s interesting is that coal burning will actually increase — by more than 1% — but it will be swamped by declines from oil and gas consumption.
That’s a change from what authorities once expected. Last year, the International Energy Agency projected that global coal use would decline this year because of Chinese policies. But fuel switching will drive it up.
Of course, emissions declines caused by higher prices (or economic downturns) are the worst type of reductions. What we want to see, instead, is countries switching to lower-carbon forms of energy. But energy crises have a way of pushing every country’s energy policy in new directions. This year’s events have convinced Thailand, for instance, to reduce its liquified natural gas consumption and switch to renewables instead; they have caused Canada to open its market up to cheap Chinese electric vehicles and pursue an “associate membership” with the European Union. The 1970s oil crisis ultimately created the global energy regime of the 1980s and 1990s. What else countries might learn from this crisis is not too hard to guess.
The administration told a federal court that it has a “new analytical methodology,” hence the continued delays.
A federal judge ruled in early August that the Trump administration’s freeze on vertical height clearances for wind turbines was likely illegal. More than a month later nearly all of the wind energy projects remain on pause, as federal officials add new red tape that industry representatives say runs afoul of the court’s edict.
Let’s catch-up quickly on the American wind sector’s existential dilemma: the federal government has control over airspace higher than 200 feet from the ground and wind farm turbines essentially always enter that sphere of control. For at least a year and a half, the Trump administration through the Department of Defense and the Federal Aviation Administration has slowly gummed up what industry and former government officials have said was once a rote, benign bureaucratic process for ensuring turbine rotation didn’t interfere with flight patterns or radar at nearby airports.
So, Trump is delaying key approvals even for wind projects on private land, a worst-case scenario for the industry during his presidency. With support from their respective trade groups, many project developers sued and in August won a preliminary injunction against this de-facto national wind energy freeze. The court ruling said federal law laid out clear deadlines for completing these airspace reviews and the administration was willfully missing them.
“[In] light of DoD’s review freeze that started a year ago and still has no end in sight, the wind developers would naturally look to the same deadlines for relief,” U.S. District Judge Karin Immergut wrote, stating the administration’s pause violated the Administrative Procedures Act. Immergut also said the Trump administration potentially violated the law by reviewing projects under a new national security “methodology” that was defined by Congress.
But on Thursday, in its first update to the court since the ruling, the Justice Department laid out how essentially all projects remain at a standstill because they were adopting a new kind of comprehensive review process.
The administration claimed that “as a matter of policy” it had “resumed processing wind energy project applications,” but it only described a single instance where a company had heard from the military about moving forward. In addition, that company as well as all others affected by the freeze would still face a “new analytical methodology” for federal agencies reviewing height clearances for all projects, which appears to fly in the face of the ruling. The Justice Department did not provide any more detail about the methodology in its status update to the court.
Nicole Hughes, executive director of lead plaintiff Renewable Northwest, asserted in an interview Tuesday that the agency isn’t complying with the court order. “It appears to me they’re still stalling,” Hughes told me, adding the federal government’s reluctance to proceed is creating “a pretty high risk” for developers of any new wind projects in the United States. She said if nothing changes in the short term, they’re going to “have to go back to the judge and ask for further clarification as to what it means to comply with this order.”
“The lack of compliance by the administration does put into question the credibility [of the courts] and what pieces hold their feet to the fire? What remedies do we have? There’s never been a time an administration flaunts a judge’s orders the way the administration is.”
The Justice Department status update described a multitude of wind energy projects impacted by the freeze. At least 30 projects apparently already signed deals proposed by the military to mitigate radar impacts and were awaiting a counter-signature from the Department of Defense (which Trump calls the Department of War or DoW). Those previous legal agreements are now at risk of being thrown out, according to the Justice Department filing. The new pathway forward for them apparently is: “DoW will either (i) provide a notice that the project presents an unacceptable risk to national security, (ii) re-engage in negotiations with the developer to attempt to ameliorate any unacceptable risks, or (iii) circulate to the project proponent [a] new model mitigation agreement.”
At least 110 projects were in the middle of discussions with the federal government about mitigating airspace impacts when the injunction came down, according to the DOJ filing, which says none of them have heard from officials since the injunction. “As of this filing, developer re-engagements have yet to begin because such discussions need to be informed by the analytical results. Given the number of projects in this category, DoW has been assessing how to resume review and engagement with the developers.”
The DOJ said another 50 projects awaiting initial meetings with the federal government about airspace risk will begin once the administration “finishes with those” 110 projects that were in the middle of the process. That waiting list will also include another at least 40 projects the Justice Department said received “presumed risk” airspace notices from the federal government.
We’ve seen the Trump administration use extralegal means to delay wind energy before, but never to this extent or after a judge ruled against them. The Interior Department had been freezing wind and solar projects on federal lands under a policy requiring Secretary Doug Burgum sign off on routine approvals, but those typical government processes seem like they’ve resumed after a different federal court ruling enjoining that policy.
American Clean Power, the largest utility-scale solar and wind energy trade group, declined to comment. The Department of Defense did not respond to a request for comment.
CleanCounts is announcing new hourly matching credits, among other “enhancements.”
Renewable energy certificates, or RECS — the credits that companies buy in order to make claims that their operations “run on renewable energy” — are getting more sophisticated.
CleanCounts, a nonprofit that runs one of the biggest registries for RECs in North America, announced on Wednesday that it now has the capability to issue certificates tied to the exact hour the renewable energy was produced, opening the door to more reality-based clean energy claims. For companies that want to match their renewable energy purchases to the hours when their factories and stores are actually consuming power, “that was a critical piece of infrastructure that was missing,” Benjamin Gerber, the CEO of CleanCounts, told me.
The company also announced “additional enhancements” to its registry that will enable a wider range of new REC products, from certificates tied to “pollinator-friendly solar,” to projects owned by indigenous Tribes, to “low-impact hydropower” projects that mitigate harm to fish. Gerber said he thinks having a system to track and verify these benefits will help companies tell a different story about the infrastructure they are building, and in so doing help turn the tide of public support.
Traditionally, a REC represents a megawatt-hour of electricity that has been generated by a renewable energy source such as wind, solar, geothermal, or moving water. The generator records every megawatt-hour it produces with a registry like CleanCounts, which issues certificates; companies then buy these certificates, either in advance under power purchase agreements or after the fact in the spot market. The registry then “retires” the certificates once the REC buyer chooses to “use” it to make a clean energy claim. Registries ensure that nobody is counting the same megawatt-hour more than once.
Today, a lot of corporations simply match their annual energy consumption with certificates. If they anticipate consuming 100 megawatts, they might buy 100 megawatts of solar RECs — even if their factories operate at night — and then claim they “run on 100% renewable energy.” Critics argue these types of claims mislead the public and tip the scales toward the cheapest renewable sources — i.e. solar and wind — rather than those that can generate energy in the off-hours, such as batteries, geothermal, and nuclear. Many clean energy advocates want to see companies move toward making more specific claims about the number of hours they run on renewable energy.
Google got behind this idea several years ago, pledging to match its consumption with clean energy on a 24/7 basis. CleanCounts piloted a method with Google to issue the company hourly RECs, but to do so it had to basically reverse engineer the certificates, embedding data regarding the time the energy was produced after the fact. That made it complicated to true up a company’s energy consumption data with its REC purchases and say, “we covered X number of hours with clean energy.”
Now, CleanCounts will be able to specifically issue a credit for “1 megawatt-hour produced Wednesday, September 16, at 9:00 a.m.,” for example, making it far easier for companies to adopt an hourly matching strategy.
“Instead of breaking it apart, they're basically issuing it as an already granularized tradable certificate,” Alex Piper, the head of policy at EnergyTag, a nonprofit that advocates for hourly matching, told me. “Which is what is new and exciting, and opens the door for more liquid transactions and a broader and more impactful marketplace.”
Hourly matching is not exactly popular in the corporate sustainability world. A lot of companies and sustainability consultants argue that accounting for their energy on an hourly basis will be too complicated, too expensive, and ultimately crater the corporate clean energy market. Corporations are in a showdown with EnergyTag and other proponents of hourly matching to convince the Greenhouse Gas Protocol, a nonprofit that sets standards for corporate carbon accounting, of their case.
The new CleanCounts product solves at least one of those challenges, making hourly clean energy procurement much simpler.
That might also reap benefits in the form of consumer trust. New polling from EnergyTag and YouGov found that Americans tend to agree that companies shouldn’t claim to use solar at night. When asked, “When should a company count as a clean energy user?” 45% of respondents selected “only when their clean energy supply matches the hours they actually use electricity,” while 22% chose “when their clean energy averages out over the year (i.e. daytime solar covering nighttime usage.)” Just under a third of the 1,292 respondents selected “don’t know.”
Even if companies start buying hourly RECs, however, another challenge will be figuring out how to tell their customers, most of whom have no idea what a REC is. For years, companies have simply advertised that they are 100% renewable. What will it take to convince customers that actually, “We use clean energy about half the time we operate” is a more laudable claim?