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If you want to decarbonize concrete, it helps to understand the incredible scale of the problem.

To say that concrete poses a decarbonization challenge would be an understatement. Cement production alone is responsible for somewhere between 5 and 10% of global CO2 emissions [0], roughly two to four times more than aviation, a fact that even the construction industry is finally coming to grips with.
And yet the real problem with decarbonizing concrete isn’t the scale of its emissions, it’s the scale of concrete itself. There is simply a preposterous amount of the stuff. Contemplating concrete is like contemplating the universe — awesome, in the old God-fearing definition of the word.
Before we get into the jaw-dropping amount of concrete we produce every year, it’s worth briefly discussing how the stuff is made, and thus where its emissions come from.
Concrete is formed by mixing together cement (mostly calcium silicates), aggregates (such as sand and gravel), and water into a liquid slurry. The cement reacts with the water, forming a paste that binds the mixture into a single solid mass. Beyond concrete’s high strength and low cost, it’s these liquid beginnings that make concrete so useful. It can easily be formed into any shape and leveled with the help of gravity so you can walk on it or park a car 10 stories up on it. Essentially all modern concrete is also reinforced with steel bars, which provide tensile strength and arrest cracks.
So what about the emissions? Roughly 70-90% of the embodied carbon in concrete comes from manufacturing just the cement [1]. Partly this is because making cement is an energy-intensive process — limestone and clay are put into a kiln and heated around 2500 degrees Fahrenheit. But it’s also because the chemical reaction that turns the limestone into cement (known as calcination) releases CO₂ as a byproduct. Roughly 50-60% of cement’s carbon emissions are due to calcination [2], and thus wouldn’t be addressed by moving to less carbon-intensive electricity sources, like green hydrogen.
Now for the good stuff. Again, the most important thing to understand about concrete is the scale of its production. The world produces somewhere around 4.25 billion metric tons of cement annually (though estimates vary) [3], which works out to about 30 billion tons of concrete produced each year [4].
How much are 30 billion tons?
One way of looking at it is we produce around 4 metric tons, or just under 60 cubic feet (roughly a cube 4 feet on a side), of concrete for each person on the planet each year.
Another way of looking at it is to consider the total amount of mass, full stop, that civilization ingests each year. Estimates here vary quite a bit, but it seems to be in the neighborhood of 100 billion tons [5]. So of the total volume of material that gets extracted and used each year — including all mining, all oil drilling, all agriculture and tree harvesting — around 30% of it by mass goes toward making concrete. The amount of concrete produced each year exceeds the weight of all the biomass we use annually, and all the fossil fuels we use annually.
Total civilization annual material extraction, via Krausmann et al 2018. This is up to 2015, and has now exceeded over 90 Gt/year, with another ~8 Gt/year of recycled material.
Another way of looking at it is that the total mass of all plants on Earth is around 900 billion metric tons. So at current rates of production, it would take about 30 years to produce enough concrete to exceed all the Earth’s plant (dry) biomass.
Because humans have been producing concrete for a while, and because concrete tends to last a long time, we seem to be on the cusp of this happening. Elhacham et al 2020 estimate that total human-created mass (roughly half of which is concrete) reached the total weight of all Earth’s biomass sometime in 2020. Eyeballing their graph, concrete alone will exceed the total weight of all biomass sometime around 2040.
Anthropogenic mass vs biomass during the 20th century, via Elhacham et al 2020
In a pure mass-flow sense, human civilization is basically a machine for producing concrete and gravel (and to a lesser extent bricks and asphalt).
So civilization uses a lot of concrete. Where is it all going?
China, mostly. In recent history, China has been responsible for roughly half the world’s cement production, and by implication, concrete use [6]. The U.S., by comparison, only uses 2%, with Europe using another 5%.
Cement production by region, via Sanjuan et al 2020. Since cement production roughly tracks consumption (see here and here), we can also use this as a rough guide toward where concrete is used. Note that this gives yet another value for total global cement production of 4.65 Gt
Here’s another view from around 2010, showing what this has looked like over time (data after 2010 is a projection).
Cement consumption by region, via Altwair 2010
This gets summarized in the oft-repeated statistic that China used more cement in three years than the U.S. did in the entire 20th century.
But since China has a much larger population than the U.S., we can get a more intuitive understanding of this by looking at cement consumption per capita. Here’s per capita consumption sometime around 2015:
Per capita cement consumption by country, via Globbulk
We see that the official numbers from China make it a huge outlier in cement consumption, using around eight times as much per capita as the U.S. However, in per capita terms, some Middle Eastern countries exceed it. Saudi Arabia is higher, and Qatar, which is somewhere over 2,000 kg/capita, is so high it doesn’t even show up on the graph. It’s the combination of China’s huge population and its huge per-capita consumption that make it such an outlier in concrete production.
The official Chinese numbers are so huge, in fact, that some analysts suspect that they’re inflated, either by manipulating the data or by producing construction projects that don’t have actual demand (or both). The graph above also includes a more “realistic” estimate (which is still 3x as high as U.S. per-capita use).
What does all this concrete construction mean in practical terms? Well, China has somewhere around 50-60% of the floor space per capita as the U.S. does, or roughly as much living space per capita as most European countries [7]. This is the result of a massive trend toward urbanization over the last quarter century. Urbanization rates went from around 25% in 1990 to 60% in 2017, a period in which China’s population also increased by 250 million. In other words, in less than 30 years over 550 million moved into Chinese cities, and they all needed somewhere to live. By building enormous numbers of concrete high rises, in under 20 years China quintupled its urban residential floor space and doubled its residential floor space overall.
Residential floor space in China over time, via Pan 2020
Beyond China, we see high per capita rates of cement use in the rest of Southeast Asia, as well as the Middle East [8].
One reason you see this volume of concrete use in lower-income, urbanizing countries is that concrete construction is comparatively labor-intensive to produce. The materials for concrete are extremely cheap, and much of its cost in high-cost labor countries (such as the U.S.) is from the labor to produce it — building and setting up the formwork, laying out the reinforcing, placing the embeds, etc. If you’re a country with a lot of low-cost labor, this is a pretty good trade-off.
In addition to the current largest users of concrete, one trend to keep an eye on long-term is India’s concrete use. If India ever proceeds on a path of mass urbanization similar to China (as some folks speculate it will), we could see a massive uptick in global concrete output — India’s urbanization rate of 34% is around where China was in the late 1990s. A shift in India toward a per capita cement consumption more consistent with the rest of Southeast Asia (say around 600 kg/capita) would increase worldwide cement consumption by about 13%, and it does seem as if India’s cement use is trending upward.
By contrast, one thing clear from this data is that the U.S. actually uses an unusually low amount of concrete. Per capita, it uses as little as any other Western country, and far, far less than some — like, surprisingly, Belgium.
So we’ve seen where it gets used in the world. Can we go deeper and look at specifically what concrete is being used for?
This will vary significantly depending on the region and the local construction tradition. In the U.S., we have roughly the following breakdown (via the Portland Cement Association):
Overall, roughly half of our concrete gets used in buildings — about 26% goes into residential buildings, 2% in public buildings, and 16% into commercial buildings. The other half gets used for infrastructure — streets and highways, water conveyance and treatment tanks, etc. Because most construction in the U.S. is just one- or two-story buildings (mostly wood for residential buildings and steel for commercial ones), concrete in buildings is probably mostly going into foundations, slabs on grade, and concrete over metal deck, though there’s probably a substantial amount going into concrete masonry units as well.
But the U.S. has a somewhat unusual construction tradition, where the vast majority of our residential construction, both single-family homes and multifamily apartments, is built from light-framed wood. In other places, it's much more common to use concrete. For instance, the U.K. uses closer to 80% of its concrete for buildings, with most of that going toward the superstructure, the concrete frame that holds the building up. China, which has urbanized on the back of huge numbers of concrete residential high rises, probably devotes an even larger share of its concrete to residential construction.
Understanding how much concrete the world uses, and where it’s being used, is important if you want to use less of it.
The scale of the industry is particularly important to keep in mind. For instance, you often see enthusiasm for the idea of replacing concrete buildings with mass timber ones. But assuming you could substitute all the world’s concrete for an equal volume of wood [9], you’d need to more than triple the total annual volume of global wood harvested [10], which puts a somewhat different spin on the issue.
Most other materials would have emissions as bad or worse than concrete if they were used on the same scale.
Consider, for instance, railway ties. In the U.S., these are still largely made out of wood, but in many places they have been replaced with concrete ties. And some places are considering changing from concrete ties to plastic composite rail ties instead. It’s hard to know the exact embodied emissions without a lot of specific details about the materials and supply chains used, but can we ballpark how much a plastic tie uses compared to a concrete one?
Per the Inventory of Carbon and Energy database, concrete varies between 150 and 400 kg of embodied CO2 per cubic meter, depending on the properties of the mix, with an “average” value of about 250. Plastics mostly have embodied emissions of about 3-4 kg of CO2 per kg of plastic, or about 3,500 kg per cubic meter (assuming a density of about 1,000 kg per cubic meter). So per unit volume, plastic has somewhere around 10 times the embodied emissions of concrete.
We can also do a more direct comparison. Consider a beam spanning around 20 feet and supporting a vertical load of 21,000 pounds per linear foot. The lightest U.S. standard steel section that will span this distance is a W16x26, which weighs about 236 kg and will have embodied carbon emissions of around 354 kg.
A concrete beam of the same depth, supporting the same load and spanning the same distance, will be 10.5 inches wide by 16 inches deep, with three #10 steel bars running along the bottom. This beam will have about 190 kg of embodied emissions from the concrete, and about another 230 kg of embodied emissions from the steel rebar. This is about 20% more than the steel beam, but in the same ballpark — and over half the “concrete” emissions are actually due to the embedded reinforcing steel.
This is arguably a nonrepresentative example (most concrete, such as in columns or slabs, will have a much lower ratio of steel), but the basic logic holds: Concrete is unusual in its total volume of use, not how emissions-heavy it is as a material. Most material substitutes that aren’t wood, recycled materials, or industrial byproducts that can be had for “free” won’t necessarily be much better when used at the same scale. In some ways, it’s surprising that the carbon emissions from concrete are as low as they are.
Of course, this calculus is likely to change over time — as electricity sources change over to lower carbon ones, you’re likely to see the embodied emissions of materials drop along with it. And since cement releases CO2 as part of the chemical process of producing it, concrete will look increasingly worse compared to other materials over time.
One potential option is to find ways of changing the cement production process to be less carbon-intensive. The easiest option is to just replace manufactured Portland Cement with some other cementitious material. Industrial byproducts such as blast furnace slag, silica fume, and fly ash, often have cementitious properties and don’t have a “carbon penalty” (since they’d be produced regardless.) Materials like these can potentially eliminate large volumes of cement in a concrete mix, and they’re a key part of current low-carbon concrete strategies — even “normal” concrete mixes tend to utilize these to some degree. But the total volume of these materials is limited by the extent of various industrial processes. And for things like fly ash (which is a byproduct from coal plants) and slag (which is a byproduct from CO2-emitting blast furnaces), we can expect production to decline over time.
Another option is to take advantage of the fact that concrete will naturally absorb CO2 over time, a process known as carbonation. Even normal concrete will absorb roughly 30% of the CO2 emitted during the production process over the course of its life. Companies like Carbicrete, Carboncure, Carbonbuilt, and Solida all offer methods of concrete production that allow the concrete to absorb CO₂ during the production process, substantially reducing embodied emissions. Interestingly, these producers mostly claim that their concrete is actually cheaper than conventional concretes, which would obviously be a massive tailwind for the technology’s adoption.
It’s not obvious what the best path forward is for addressing concrete carbon emissions (like with most things, I suspect it’ll end up being a mix of different solutions), but understanding the parameters of the problem is necessary for solving it.
Note: A version of this article originally appeared in the author’s newsletter, Construction Physics, and has been repurposed for Heatmap.
[0] - This figure varies depending on the source. Chatham House provides a frequently cited estimate of 8%. We can also ballpark it — roughly 0.93 pounds of CO₂ gets emitted for each pound of cement produced, around 4.25 billion tons of cement are produced annually, which gets ~3.95 billion tons of CO₂, and total annual CO₂ emissions are in the neighborhood of 46 billion tons, getting us a bit less than 9%.
[1] - Per Circular Ecology, ~70-90% of emissions are from the cement production process, depending on the type of concrete and what the rest of the supply chain looks like.
[2] - This seems to vary depending on where the cement is being made — in Myanmar, for instance, it’s around 46%.
[3] - Another number where the sources often don’t agree with each other, see here, here, and here for estimates on annual cement production.
[4] - Concrete is roughly 10-15% cement by weight, depending on the strength of the mix, what other cementitious materials are being used, etc. An average value of 12.5% yields 34 billion tons, which we’ll knock down to account for other uses of cement (masonry mortar, grout, gypsum overlay, etc.) This roughly tracks with estimates from PCA (“4 tons of concrete produced each year for every person on Earth”), and from the now-defunct Cement Sustainability Initiative, which estimated 25 billion tons of concrete against 3.125 billion tons of cement in 2015.
[5] - See here, here, and here for an estimate of total civilization mass flow. This doesn’t (I believe) include waste byproducts, which can be substantial — for instance, it doesn’t include the ~46 billion tons of CO₂ emitted each year, or the 16 billion tons of mine tailings, or the 140 billion tons of agriculture byproducts (though this last number is difficult to verify and seems high).
[6] - We see something similar with cement as we do with other bulky, low-value materials, in that it's made in lots of distributed manufacturing facilities relatively close to where it’s used. See here for a map of cement plants in the U.S. around 2001, for instance.
[7] - For China’s total floor space, see here (most sources seem to agree with these numbers). For U.S. floor space, see my Every Building In America article. For per-capita living space in Europe, see here.
[8] - The often high rates of cement use by middle-income countries have led some folks to develop a U-shaped cement consumption theory of industrial development — that countries start out using a small amount of cement, use more as they get richer and build up their physical infrastructure, and then eventually transition to using lower volumes of cement again. The Globbulk paper spends considerable time debunking this.
[9] - It’s not actually obvious to me what the substitution ratio would be. In strength-governed cases, you’d need proportionally more timber than concrete, but in other cases (such as replacing concrete walls with light-framed stud walls), you’d probably use less. Obviously, you can’t substitute all concrete for wood, but you can probably switch out more than you think — there’s no reason you couldn’t use wood foundations instead of concrete ones in many cases, for instance.
[10] - 30 billion tons of concrete is roughly 12.5 billion cubic meters, and total annual wood products produced is currently around 5.5 billion cubic meters.
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The fundraise comes on the heels of a $50 million grant from the Department of Energy.
Almost all lithium-ion batteries on the market rely on graphite for their anodes, more than 90% of which is processed in China. That concentration has created a chokepoint in the Pentagon’s supply chain as the military increasingly turns to batteries to help its transportation network operate more quietly and reduce reliance on complex refueling logistics.
So when Congress passed the latest National Defense Authorization Act at the end of 2025, barring Chinese-linked battery materials from military use starting in 2028, Coreshell saw an opening. While the California-based silicon-anode battery startup had previously focused on automakers as its beachhead customers, it’s now shipping its first battery cells to the military for use on Navy ships and Army ground vehicles. On Wednesday, Coreshell announced a $30 million Series B to scale up manufacturing operations to meet the needs of this growing customer base.
“We’re entering a new stage where we’re no longer, I would say, demand limited,” Coreshell’s CEO Jonathan Tan told me. “This year we’ve had to put on second and third shifts, work nights and weekends, just to get the product out the door.”
Coreshell sets itself apart by going a step further than the NDAA requires. The law doesn’t make suppliers trace battery materials all the way back to the mine, which would be exceedingly difficult given China’s dominance across the battery supply chain. But Coreshell has nevertheless eliminated Chinese sourcing from its anodes by replacing graphite with silicon mined and refined in the U.S. by Ferroglobe, one of its Series A investors.
Ferroglobe and global investment firm Access Industries led the latest round, with defense contractor ADS also joining as a new strategic investor. The financing comes on the heels of a $50 million Department of Energy grant that Coreshell secured in August as part of a program to strengthen the domestic battery supply chain. That funding will support the company’s first commercial-scale facility, a 2-gigawatt-hour factory.
That’s about 20 times the size of the 100-ish-megawatt-hour plant the startup had originally envisioned, as the DOE grant has allowed Coreshell to “expand much further than we were originally expecting,” according to Tan. The company is now evaluating several potential U.S. sites and expects to announce its selection early next year. For now, it relies on unnamed contract manufactures, along with its small pilot line in San Leandro, to produce its cells. But once the gigafactory gets up and running, the startup plans to bring electrode production in house by 2028, followed by full cell assembly in 2029.
Building this plant will ultimately require significant additional capital. But Tan believes this latest vote of confidence from the federal government will help Coreshell to diversify its capital stack as it continues to fundraise. “That’s one of the great things about having such a notable DOE award is that it also allows us to attract multiple forms of capital,” he told me.
Silicon has long been recognized as a promising alternative material for battery anodes, as it can store far more energy than graphite. The catch is that it tends to swell during charging, causing it to break down quickly and ultimately leading to a much shorter cycle life. Coreshell says it’s extended its anode’s lifespan by giving it a proprietary coating, which Tan told me back in April essentially means “painting the inside of your battery” with an ultra-thin protective layer.
Other companies, such as Sila Nanotechnologies and Group14 Technologies, are also working to commercialize silicon anodes. But Coreshell says many of its competitors rely on more highly engineered, expensive forms of silicon, such as silane gas. By contrast, Coreshell uses metallurgical silicon, a cheap, raw commodity already widely used in aluminum alloys. That, Tan argues, gives the company a cost advantage not only over its competitors, but potentially Chinese graphite too.
Coreshell hasn’t yet demonstrated that its cells can meet the performance demands of the automotive industry, however. When the company raised its Series A in early 2025, it said it expected its automotive cells to exceed 1,000 charge cycles while retaining 80% of their original capacity. But Tan told me many defense applications don’t require such demanding performance targets, as Navy ships and ground vehicles are “not intending to have as many miles or missions or use cases on that same battery” as a consumer EV would.
That doesn’t mean the company is abandoning its automotive ambitions. As Tan pointed out, electric vehicles remain by far the largest source of global and domestic battery demand. “It’s natural for us to obviously utilize the security supply chain first,” he told me. “That allowed us to really get to commercialization, revenue, and production faster, because automotive qualification is this longer journey. But ultimately, we want to do both of those and more.”
Current conditions: A large storm is roaring across the Northeast that will shower Michigan and Upstate New York with rain and snow by tomorrow • AccuWeather declared an early end to the 2026 Atlantic hurricane season, which saw 10 named storms and only one hurricane in October, breaking a 121-year record for the latest first hurricane • It’s a mild, cloudy day at the Rethondes Clearing in France’s Forest of Compiègne, where the armistice that ended World War I was signed 108 years ago today.
Inflation is ticking up again, and faster than expected. That’s my colleague Matthew Zeitlin’s read on the latest numbers from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Preliminary data from Heatmap and MIT’s Electricity Price Hub shows that electricity prices in particular spiked nearly 8% to 19.9 cents per kilowatt-hour in October from 18.5 cents in the same month last year. But that’s largely due to a change in the timing of a bill credit in California. Without that, the year over year price jump was just under 4%.

Ontario Power Generation, the state-owned utility in Canada’s most populous province, admitted in a public filing Wednesday that its megaproject to build the first small modular reactor in the rich world is costing a lot more than planned. The company is constructing the world’s first BWRX-300, the flagship reactor from GE Vernova Hitachi Nuclear Energy, at its Darlington plant. The project is an attempt to revive construction of atomic power stations in North America, Europe, and Japan by building the inevitably costly first-of-a-kind unit that can then be replicated at what the developers say will be a decreasing price. Using billions in Canadian ratepayers’ money to essentially de-risk an American-Japanese technology ruffled some feathers among the country’s nuclear boosters, who told me last month they want to see Ottawa approve construction of more of the Canucks’ homegrown reactor. In its latest earnings report, OPG said the BWRX-300, known as DNNP Unit 1, “is no longer expected to achieve the previously disclosed commercial operation date target of October 2030 or be completed with the previously disclosed estimated cost of $7.7 billion.”
Amid a flurry of funding cuts in the early days of the current Trump administration, the Department of Energy canceled an $87 million grant to the green cement startup Sublime Systems. In response, the company sued for damages. This week, the Somerville, Massachusetts-based firm filed legal documents accusing the agency of “refusing to comply with its basic discovery obligations and the schedule” for the case.
“The government has repeatedly delayed responding to Sublime’s discovery requests, and now the government is refusing to even meet and confer with Sublime until some indefinite date in the future,” read the joint status report filed with the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. “The upshot is that, as of today, the government has not produced a single document in response to Sublime’s requests for production (served nearly two months ago), it has provided no timeline by which productions will be completed, and it is refusing to search for core documents related to the May 2025 mass termination at the heart of this case.”
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The Energy Department’s Office of Energy Dominance Financing, formerly the Loan Programs Office, closed a $480 million loan for a Texas-based company’s effort to modernize and boost production from 22 offshore oil and gas platforms in the Gulf of Mexico. Arena Energy, the Woodlands, Texas-based company behind the initiative dubbed Project Elkhorn, said that the initiative will add 38,600 barrels of oil per day and up to 77 million cubic feet of natural gas per day to U.S. energy output.
“The United States is the world’s largest producer and exporter of oil and natural gas, and thanks to President Trump, American energy production will continue to grow,” Secretary of Energy Chris Wright said in a statement. “By providing financing for projects like Project Elkhorn, the Energy Department is expanding domestic production and strengthening our energy security to power American prosperity for decades to come.”
QuantumScape emerged years ago as the frontrunner in the race to commercialize solid-state batteries that last longer, charge more quickly, and function better under harsh conditions than liquid-based lithium-ion packs. On Wednesday, the San Jose, California-based startup unveiled what it called in a press release its “next-generation open platform for all-solid-state batteries.” Dubbed Osprey, the cells “deliver the world’s first public data demonstrating a sulfide-based cathode cycling 1,000 times under just one atmosphere of pressure.” In other words: “an unmatched capability that is necessary for automotive solid-state batteries.”
“Osprey is a next-generation platform that is built on our same core technology, the ceramic separator and anode-free design,” Siva Sivaram, QuantumScape’s chief executive, told me in an email last night. “It will allow us to provide the unique benefits of our ceramic separator to developers of all-solid-state batteries using sulfide-based cathodes.” The company plans to start mass producing its cells in 2028, he said.
Bill Gates boasts that he has committed more of his fortune to fighting climate change than virtually any other rich man in the world. But a new investigation by ProPublica found that he’s ramped up his investments in a landfill company, Republic Services, that spews millions of tons of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. “It seems very likely that Bill Gates has the power to influence Republic’s behavior to make it more climate-friendly, even if that costs the company profits,” Ann Lipton, a legal scholar who studies corporate governance at the University of Colorado, Boulder, told the outlet.
One of the bill’s Democratic co-authors speaks about the bill’s outlook in Congress, what it means for clean energy and data centers, and why the president it helps most won’t take office until 2029.
The bipartisan permitting reform bill took a big step toward becoming law last night, when more than 70 senators voted to advance it past a key procedural hurdle.
About 12 hours later, I sat down at a Heatmap breakfast event in Washington, D.C. with one of its Democratic coauthors: Senator Martin Heinrich of New Mexico.
Heinrich and I have spoken about permitting and power lines repeatedly over the past year, but what were once niche issues in the space — such as when and whether a president can revoke an energy project’s permits — have turned into major disagreements within and between environmental groups, the clean energy industry, and liberal lawmakers.
At the same time, Heinrich is on the verge of a major climate policy victory with the bill, which would finally create a one-stop shop for large-scale power line approvals in the federal government. The bill would put transmission lines, which can carry zero-carbon electricity, on a more equal footing with natural gas pipelines, which already enjoy fast-track federal approval.
“My goal here is to take the politics out of permitting,” Heinrich told me at the event. “If you’ve done everything right — and you get your final permit to actually construct — you should be able to take that to the bank.”
We discussed the bill path to passage and his replies to some of critics’ biggest arguments against the bill, including whether it will push data centers to build more behind-the-meter natural gas power plants. We also discussed whether Congress should restore the wind and solar tax credits, how this bill was informed by the Biden administration’s struggles, and why Heinrich believes lawmakers should take this deal, now, even though some of his colleagues have urged waiting until the new Congress starts in January.
This conversation has been edited for readability and concision.
How are you feeling? And how are you feeling about the number last night?
Seventy-three is a great number. It suggests we’re on track to get this done. And I think we just need to be patient and let the process play out.
We were talking in the green room a little bit. I think one of the things that worries me about today’s politics is that we’re having this really substantive discussion here, and with members, with the House and Senate back and forth, which is super healthy, and that hasn’t really happened often enough in recent years. And then there’s the algorithmic, online, like, light-everyone’s-hair-on-fire [conversation]. Those two things are completely divergent streams, and they make me worry about democracy as a whole.
Not to mention the fact that we need to be able to build big things in this country, and that’s what this legislation represents. How do you actually deliver on the affordability question that was central to the election we just had? How do we make sure that our country competes in the world? All of those things. But the gap between those two conversations is something that we have to solve for in the politics of today. And there were people who should have been with us [last night] who weren’t, and I think it’s indicative of that gap.
As someone who’s been reporting on the bill, and knows the policy, and knows, for instance, where the fault lines in the policy are, it has been striking how much the social media discussion of the bill has been focused on creating sufficiently plausible lies that go just viral enough to poison the politics. And make it so you can’t even talk about the bill, because, why would you ever even consider such a horrible thing?
It’s been interesting — I’ve got a 23-year-old who’s in graduate school in New Mexico, and he has a really good sense of who I am and what I care about. For him to see protests on his campus, or protests on the overpass in Albuquerque — and how divergent that is from the goals of this legislation — those conversations have been really interesting. I think if I wasn’t so comfortable in what I actually care about, and what I want to get done in my time in Washington, D.C. — which like, this is not my identity, it’s a path to making a change. I think it would be really hard to do this if I weren’t so comfortable in what we need to do on this issue.
In the run-up to last night’s vote, there were a number of endorsements of the bill or the motion to proceed. What was the biggest whip victory for you or Senator Whitehouse?
When you hit above 70, your caucus is taking your work very seriously, and given the attempts to poison the well early on, I was just very encouraged by the fact that in our caucus — we had a caucus meeting over the weekend on this, and then we obviously had the vote last night — there’s a certain implicit trust in a number over 70.
People want to get to yes. They understand that at the end of the day, the American people really do want us to make life cheaper. Like, this election is not a mandate, it’s a job interview, right? And if we can’t deliver on it, and we can’t do the things that make people’s lives better, we’re gonna — it’s going to be very fleeting.
The outside assessments of the bill report numbers anywhere from power grid cost savings in the hundreds of billions to single-digit percentage reductions of power bills in a decade or so. Do you feel like those estimates capture the benefits of the bill, or are the benefits largely unquantifiable?
No, I think they’re quantifiable. I think the emissions reductions are quantifiable.
I think if all we did in this bill was the data center provision, that says you can’t keep exporting your costs onto customers, you actually have to pay your own freight — and that’s not something that the data center developers are all aghast at, I blame some of the utilities for passing those costs along to customers. That’s outrageous. Just because you can ratebase things doesn’t mean you should ratebase things, and the public is fucking pissed off, and they should be — but if all we did is transfer that $35 billion from data center developers into the pockets of consumers, I would be enthusiastic about this bill.
But we do a whole lot more than that, right? There’s almost no conversation right now about the value of virtual power plants and distributed energy resources, and all the changes in leasing for geothermal. There are things that I’ve been working on my entire career that we couldn’t get — well, we still, I guess, haven’t gotten — the public to focus on. But if we can get them done, it really opens up a future for the power grid that looks so different from the power grid I grew up with. I grew up around the kitchen table with an IBEW dad, and we would talk about the power grid all the time. And it was a one-way deal. You had a dam or a coal-fired power plant, and then [electricity] would go out across the big wires, and then it would get into the little wires, and then people in homes and businesses would consume that power. We’re now talking about a two-way power grid that is so much more complicated and efficient than that, and that’s what’s getting lost in this conversation. But it’s also what I’m really excited about.
Let’s talk about the criticism of the bill. You mentioned the data center ratepayer protection policies, which we’ve covered at Heatmap. They are quite substantive. I have begun to hear a concern that they are so substantive that they’ll push data centers even further away from using the grid — that they’ll push data center developers to be like, Oh, this is raising the cost of power, I’m going to build more offsite gas than I would.
I don’t know a single hyperscaler who’s saying that, and we’ve had all these conversations about off-grid behind-the-meter generation. It is so much more expensive. It is so much more difficult to operate and maintain. It’s insane to build a data center that is not connected to the grid. Like, these people now talking about repurposing airplane engines to run data centers — that’s nuts. If you want to put the cost of maintaining that kind of operation, go for it, because it’s going to fail.
It makes sense to have stuff connected to the grid because you don’t have to pay the full freight of the worst day of the entire year, and spread that over the rest of the year. That’s why we have a grid. I just don’t see that as a viable business plan for anyone.
This bill makes it easier to build federal infrastructure projects. I’ve seen people say, ‘Look, if we do this now, then the president gets two years to build whatever he wants, and that includes ICE detention centers.’
No. We have walked through the legal cases in places like New Jersey to make sure that we’re not facilitating that.
I don’t think this bill will measurably change what this president can accomplish because it’s going to take multiple years … Like right now, it takes two decades to build a really important interregional transmission line. It’s still going to take five years after this bill. This is not some magic wand. It’s way better. It makes us much more competitive against China and our near-peer competitors around the globe. But you’re still going to take multiple years to do an [Environmental Impact Statement]. So this is not going to impact this president measurably one way or the other.
But it is going to measurably impact the next president. And I can tell you, as someone who was around for the Biden administration, we passed incredible legislation. The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law and the [Inflation Reduction Act] were huge lifts in terms of legislation. But the president of the United States could not deliver on those promises because the permitting regime was a 10-year-plus regime. So even though he had all the funding you could imagine, and you had [the Department of Energy] and the Department of Interior all lined up, President Biden could not deliver on those promises in a time frame that the American people could appreciate.
Is that because of procedure or because of staffing? Because some people have responded to this bill by saying, ‘Well, we know we have to staff up these agencies, and this bill doesn’t do that.’ If Biden had been able to staff those agencies, would they have been able to move a lot faster?
They would have been able to move measurably faster, yeah, but it would not be sufficient. I’m all for restaffing those agencies. We authorize a lot more funding for things like Tribal and state historic preservation officers in this legislation, but it wouldn’t have been sufficient. It just wouldn’t have.
And you look at — I mean, the fact on SunZia, which, you’re as educated on that transmission line as anybody I’ve met in the press. It took, what, 17 years [to permit]? That’s one of the best projects that I’ve ever interacted with. It was 3.6 gigawatts of clean power. They did a great job of doing mitigation. They bought property that had enormous environmental value in my state. They engaged with stakeholders as well as any developer I’ve ever seen, like 17 to 18 years [to permit it]? That’s nuts. We can’t iterate on that kind of a timescale. I mean, John Podesta came back into the White House under the Biden administration and was like, ‘Didn’t we do this? I thought we already did this.’ It took two records of decision. That’s just not a recipe for success.
You mentioned [Biden’s former climate adviser] John Podesta. We reported on comments he made saying this bill would not allow a president to reverse a permit that had been granted illegally.
No, that’s not true. If you don’t follow the law, the permit can be overturned. So first and foremost, you have to have fidelity to the actual underlying statute. So if you violate the Mineral Leasing Act, or you violate some other statute that determines how you get that permit, you’re done. That’s real jeopardy.
Second, you can overturn anything up to the final permit. So if there’s a lease along the way, the next administration can overturn that.
But if you’ve done everything right — and you get your final permit to actually construct — you should be able to take that to the bank. In what world can you do everything right and then you get a legal right to proceed, and anybody, for politics, can pull that out? I know that some in the environmental space think that it should be that way, and we should be able to ping-pong back and forth between Trump and Biden. My goal here is to take the politics out of permitting. So if you do everything right — by the book and by the law — at the end of the day, if you get your permit, you can actually take that to the bank.
One of the big arguments for this bill was this permitting certainty provision. Ending the back-and-forth, and making it so a future president couldn’t do what Trump has done to wind energy. It’s been interesting watching the politics of this bill develop, though, because what’s become clear is — as you just hinted — not everyone actually wants permitting certainty.
No, and it cuts both ways. That is both a positive, depending on your perspective … and if your business model is litigating projects, it’s going to be harder. You can still litigate, but you can’t wait six years to do it.
I have heard folks say, ‘Look, it’s a big bill. It’s 400-something pages. It makes changes to NEPA and the National Historic Preservation Act. It makes changes to the Clean Water Act. The Supreme Court is controlled by conservatives at the moment, and they have been willing to improvise with big new doctrines such as the major questions doctrine. How can we be sure — and how can you be sure — that you’re not writing traps into these laws that courts will come along and use in the future?’ Republican judges may not agree with your aims, but they’ll be able to say, ‘Look at this recent and specific law, it lets presidents do X.’
We need to be able to legislate. I think the more we actually assert our political potential and mandate in legislation, the more we take power from the Supreme Court and from the judiciary in general. I think we need to be very careful and specific about our language. But the more you can’t get things done in Congress, the more power just sort of shifts over to the judiciary and to the administration. We need to claw that back, and we need to show that America can do stuff, that we can build big things again.
And to the extent that we’re not willing to do that, that power is going to shift to other places, and I’m not comfortable with that. I don’t think that’s good for democracy. I don’t think it’s good for our country. I don’t think it’s good for building things. We need to get [a project] to yes, or if it’s going to fail, if it’s a bad project, fail fast. Move on and to the right. This is not about greenlighting bad projects. It’s honestly about getting the projects into the right places.
What’s something you’re excited about in the bill that you feel like hasn’t been discovered yet?
Virtual power plants. I mean, I hate the term “virtual power plants” because they’re not virtual; they’re real. If you’ve got a gigawatt that you can you can contract with someone to say, ‘Hey, when I need this power, it’s there,’ and they can produce on that based on whether they like turn off half the lights in in a Walmart, or tap into the batteries in a bunch of electric vehicles, that is real power, and it has enormous value to the grid.
I know how conservative utility culture is, because I grew up in utility culture. I saw it every day in those conversations with my dad around the dinner table — but that is real demonstrable technology that we all know works at this point, and yet most of the utilities in the country have not embraced it. So if we get this done, we’ll be able to respond to the wholesale markets and [they] can’t be blocked, that’s a huge change.
One of the interesting things about this midterm is that almost all the incoming Democrats, I think certainly in the Senate, have pledged to restore the solar and wind tax credits. Have you done any work on what this bill would mean if those tax credits were back on the books?
I think we need to have a really robust discussion around that. I say that from the point of view that, we don’t have the [tax credits] right now, and yet we have tons of viable projects in wind and solar. So what that says to me is, maybe that money is more valuable someplace else.
We’re doing a really good job in this country of decarbonizing the electric generation sector with wind, solar, and batteries. I think we’ve won that battle, and if we have a level playing field, which is what this bill is all about, we’re going to decarbonize the power sector. We have not decarbonized the transportation sector. We have not decarbonized the industrial sector, which is dependent on, in many cases, chemical processes.
The question for me is not, do I want the wind sector, or the solar sector to move faster? I think if we get out of the way, they’ll move faster. The question is, would those dollars be more valuable in another sector of the economy?
Because when I look around back home, we are in the new normal. We’re in the part of climate change that I didn’t think would happen in my lifetime. In New Mexico, we’ve been the driest we’ve ever been in 1,200 years. And then once El Niño kicks in, we’ve had two of the word floods in recorded history in the last month. That’s where we are today. That’s what our grandkids are going to know for their entire lives. We’ve got to solve for that, and limit the worst cases of that, and we’re not going to do it by doing the least effective, least efficient thing. We have to invest in the places that make the biggest differences.
Senator Merkley voted no yesterday, as you know, and in his statement he said that the bill is very interesting, we should pick it up next year in the new Congress.
How many times has that worked?
I think one argument has been —
I’ve seen that over and over again. I’ve been here since 2008. How many years is that? Almost 20 years. When is that a real thing?
We should do a lot more in the next Congress. Let’s do that. Let’s get this as the floor, and then let’s raise the floor everywhere we possibly can.
And you don’t think passing this now will exhaust the president’s willingness to work on permitting reform?
I will take a win with the president wherever I can get one because it is fleeting, and he is what he is. He did not help last night. My phone blew up. The White House was like, you know, ‘Sorry, he just says stuff.’
[laughter in the room]
We have an alignment right now — the House, the Senate, and the White House — that has real value to making energy cheaper and putting more clean energy online. We should just take that because it also creates uncertainty for other folks. When we have that opportunity, don’t kick it to the curb. It is what it is.
Do you think the president needs to approve these projects for the bill to make sense?
No, because I think the greatest value is for the next president. But we are seeing real progress on real projects right now. We have seen dozens of projects approved that were stalled out. We’re having constructive conversations about many additional projects. That has its own value, but the value of this bill, in my view, is for the next president of the United States — whoever they are — and I will do everything in my power to make sure that that’s a Democrat — but if it’s not, they still need to be able to govern and compete with the rest of the world, and so the value is really for the country and the next president.
Give us a sense of what the amendment process will look like.
I don’t know what the amendment process is going to look like because that typically gets negotiated between the majority and the minority leaders. My view is that amendments are helpful. I think we’ve gotten away from amendment processes in the Senate, and that has not served legislation well. So I’m perfectly comfortable. I’ve told a number of members who want amendments that I’m supportive of them getting those amendments, because I think it lets people make their case about what they care about, and that creates buy-in for eventual legislation. And whether we win over those members or not, I think it has value.
The downside is we let things hang out there at a time when much of the conversation is still governed by these social media algorithms. But I still think it’s the right thing to do.
What does the path in the House look like, as you’re thinking about it today?
In the House, it’s the coalition of, one, the White House actually wants this, and they’re communicating with Republicans in the House, many of which won’t be there next year. So, like, go out on a win. Then on the Democratic side, you have the New Dems and the Problem Solvers Caucus and the Blue Dogs, and like, We’re not going to get all of the Democrats, but we’re going to get enough of the Democrats who believe in governing and who want the lessons of this election cycle to actually be manifest in law. I think we very much have a viable path in the House of Representatives.