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The Strait of Hormuz disruption is “gravy” to producers of the world’s dirtiest fuel.

2025 was supposed to be the year of peak global coal, or at least close to it. As recently as December, the International Energy Agency forecasted that 2025 coal demand would be similar to 2024, at around 8.8 billion tons, and would begin to decline by 2030.
There were promising signs that this story would pan out — coal demand in China, the world’s largest consumer, may have peaked in 2024 or 2025. Coal-fired power generation was also falling in India, the world’s second largest coal consumer, for the first time since the 1970s.
Then came “the greatest global energy security threat in history,” as IEA chief Fatih Birol put it.
Until February 28, about a fifth of global oil production and a fifth of liquified natural gas flowed through the Strait of Hormuz. Since the United States and Israel struck Iran, however, the strait has been effectively closed. The IEA has projected that, on net, global oil production would fall by 8 million barrels per day in 2026 due to shut-in production as a result of the war. Iranian airstrikes have also knocked out almost a fifth of Qatar’s LNG production, damage that will likely take several years to recover from.
Middle Eastern fossil fuels largely go to Asia, where oil and gas feed the region’s power plants, cars, and petrochemical factories. In their absence, Asian countries are scrambling to keep power generation steady. That often means (re)turning to coal.
“Last year I put my flag in and called peak coal in seaborne markets,” Anthony Knutson, global head of thermal coal markets research at Wood Mackenzie told me. Now that the strait is closed, however, “It’s still plateauing — it’s a longer plateau, and then a drop-off.”
That’s because, he said, “everybody runs back to energy security.”
Rich Asian countries such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan that are unable to get the gas they’ve already contracted for are having to decide between ramping up coal output or paying for gas in the extremely expensive spot market. How much coal generation actually rises “is a function of how much spot gas can be purchased” and “how much pain they’re willing to take on gas prices,” Knutson said.
The more expensive gas becomes, the more these countries will opt for coal.
“If LNG prices stay relatively high due to the impact of the war, we would expect thermal coal to take market share from gas in the seaborne markets,” Jefferies analyst Lloyd Byrne wrote in a note to clients earlier this week. “The most price-sensitive customers in Asia will switch to coal,” a team of Jefferies analysts wrote in a separate note.
In South Korea, the government lifted limits on capacity utilization in the nation’s coal fleet. Thailand restarted coal units after spot LNG prices nearly doubled. Japan’s policy before the crisis was to cap coal utilization at 50% and to eventually phase it out entirely; now it’s planning to lift limits on coal output, Nikkei reported.
China and India, Knutson said, will likely turn to domestic coal production, while the rest of Asia will be looking to increase imports from Australia, South Africa, Russia, and Indonesia.
Evidence of gas-to-coal switching is showing up on the supply side as well as the demand side. Indonesia, the world’s largest coal exporter, was planning to cut production from 790 million tons to 600 million tons because, Knutson said, it was worried the market was oversupplied and prices were depressed. Now the government is allowing coal miners to increase production.
But whether this is a temporary surge in coal use (and emissions) or a permanent reordering of the energy system depends on the duration and intensity of the shock, and markets and analysts still seem to think markets will return to something like normal.
Like other energy commodities, coal prices have been volatile this month as President Trump continues to hint that he would prefer the war to end soon while the strait remains closed. Coal prices have shot up to around $140 per ton Thursday, compared to around $101 at the beginning of the year. While still a sizable increase, it’s nowhere near the dislocations seen in 2022 following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, when coal prices jumped to above $420 per ton. That volatility means that few analysts expect any long term increase in investment or production, which in turn makes the increase in demand almost pure profit for producers.
“You’re not going to open a new pit. You’re not going to buy new mine fleets. This is gravy right now,” Knutson told me.
Though other parts of the world — e.g. Eastern Europe — also depend on coal, the increase in demand will likely be confined to Asia, S&P analyst Wendy Schallom told me in an email. She expects “incremental coal generation in Europe in Q2 to be limited by both the reduced coal generating capacity and the seasonally low power demand,” she said.
That also means the long-term story of coal might not be disturbed if the market views the disturbance to LNG exports as essentially temporary. S&P’s long term forecast hadn’t changed, Schallom told me. While Knutson said that coal production is “going to be marginally higher going forward,” he added, “it’s not a game changer.”
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The data center boom is everywhere you look in U.S. economic and emissions data.
This is an edition of Heatmap Daily, an evening review of the day’s news written by our executive editor. Sign up for it here.
It isn’t exactly a new thought, but I’ve been struck recently by how many trends in America’s economic and environmental data are fundamentally about the data center boom and the return of electricity demand:
First, the Energy Information Administration reported this week that U.S. emissions grew by more than 2% last year, driven by surging electricity demand and an increase in coal-fired generation.What caused that higher power demand? New factories and data centers — as well as record summertime cooling demand.
Second, many of the new factories driving that higher power demand are themselves producing goods that are … let’s say … data center-adjacent. There are the enormous new semiconductor fabs, of course. But Ford and General Motors have also set up new production lines (or repurposed old ones) to manufacture grid-scale batteries to meet power demand.
Third, take a look at the recent U.S. spending on private non-residential construction — in other words, everything American companies are building that is not houses, condos, or apartments.
The construction industry’s spent almost $60 billion on data centers over the past year, which is more than it spent on all other office buildings combined (and more than it spent building warehouses, too). Just a handful of categories — data centers, power plants, electricity infrastructure, and certain kinds of electronics manufacturing — now make up a third of all U.S. private non-residential construction investment. They’ve never made up such a large share of construction spending since data collection began in 2014.
As The New York Times recently noted, the American economy is unusually dependent on the American stock market right now — and the stock market is unusually dependent on artificial intelligence. This week, investors started to balk at the enormous spending hyperscalers are planning to keep building out the AI boom; Alphabet’s shares dropped 8% this week after it boosted its planned 2026 capital expenditure and signaled 2027 will be even bigger. If the data center boom started to slow down in earnest, then more than just that budget will change.
Speaking of which, my colleague Emily Pontecorvo wrote earlier this week about how many businesses are struggling to even estimate their carbon emissions from artificial intelligence. The carbon accounting startup Watershed recently unveiled a new formula to help companies get a sense of their AI-related emissions.
But even that formula is still limited by the amount of data hyperscalers publish — and they don’t publish that much. Google, for instance, is the only AI company that has (laudably) provided estimates of its emissions on a per-prompt basis. Yet no company has published its per-token emissions, or how emissions sync up with particular models or regions.
So Emily asked Google: Why aren’t you — or any other model provider — disclosing this kind of data yet?
The tech company didn’t get back to us until after we’d published Emily’s story. But its response was interesting enough that I wanted to quote some of it here.
The problem is “industry consensus,” Cooper Elsworth, a Google spokesperson, told us. “There is currently very little consensus on how to comprehensively and fairly measure the serving environmental impact of generative AI (such as text generation),” he wrote. “Without standardized, ‘apples-to-apples’ frameworks, it is difficult to compare different providers accurately.”
That’s partly because energy use — and emissions data — can vary from site to site and depend on “custom-built hardware, software compilers, and advanced inference techniques.” And he claimed Google doesn’t always have the measurement hardware in place to provide such specific estimates: “Providing precise, repeatable data requires highly advanced measurement infrastructure,” he said. “For example, software-based energy monitoring tools often suffer from sampling biases. For our study, we had to step away from top-down averages and directly measure actual energy at the physical power supply unit (PSU) level across our deployed fleet. Not all providers have the telemetry or data sets required to benchmark their operations at this level of granularity.”
Read Emily’s story to understand the other reasons why estimating — or even “guesstimating” — AI-related carbon emissions is so challenging.
A conversation with Emma Uridge of the Kansas Health Institute.
This week’s conversation is with Emma Uridge, analyst with the Kansas Health Institute. Uridge spent copious hours analyzing state and local laws on data center development to best understand how policymakers are responding to the potential environmental public health impacts of large AI infrastructure, including power and water. The report, which came out this week, also goes in depth into those health impacts. I reached out to her to discuss what she sees as must-watch territory for our readers on this emerging policy arena.
Our conversation was lightly edited for clarity.
What is actually being done on policy when it comes to data centers — beyond moratoria of course?
So first I’d like to just talk about the point of moratoria. It’s helpful to talk about how these policies emerge in the first place. One area where moratoria are helpful is when a data center is proposed but the county has no approach for how they’d like to potentially regulate them. That’s temporary, most of the time. It lets local governments conduct research on the various impacts and also negotiate community benefits, ones that can mitigate any potential negative impacts — like Lancaster Pennsylvania, which instituted a community benefit agreement that maximized the potential benefits of development while mitigating what large data centers can do. That agreement looked at capping municipal water use at 20,000 gallons per day and requiring 100% clean energy. It had financial penalties for non-compliance. The company also committed $20 million to their local economic development and clean energy fund. There are ways to negotiate with developers.
We also see amendments to existing zoning. Data center proposals are increasingly popping up in rural areas, many of which are unzoned, so there’s no way a county can negotiate unless there’s a moratorium in place.
Other policy solutions include different performance standards or requiring on-site renewable energy, like what Jefferson County, Missouri, looked at. Also setback requirements, mandatory noise buffers, ending by-right zoning.
Where are local governments getting ideas for regulating data centers?
A lot of the technical information comes from developers. That can in cases be seen as a biased source of information. I wouldn’t say there’s a dedicated group providing assistance to local governments when a project is proposed — which is a similar story to wind industry development, where we have only a handful of consultants who provide technical advice. It can be really helpful to get a multi-disciplinary approach to hearing information. It can be helpful to have the utility commission, public health folks, those in academia, as well as the developer.
As of right now, especially in rural areas, local governments have a hard task of balancing pushback while getting the most accurate, evidence-based, neutral information to make decisions. That balance can be contentious.
What is the federal government doing on data center policy? How is the Trump administration approaching it?
A few things there. In the early days, the drive was for AI expansion and to be competitive with foreign adversaries. Now due to the amount of public pushback in red and blue localities and a more cautious approach.
I’m not seeing a lot of actual policy movement at this time.
I know the EPA is looking at the chemicals used in cooling data centers because when that water is cycled through the system, some of it is discharged into the water system, so they’re looking at the Toxic Substances and Control Act for monitoring that.
How much of an impact does this minimal federal role have on industry behavior?
Y’know, this isn’t specific to data centers. This is true for all kinds of large-scale development: there’s a need to require some sort of federal monitoring and regulation.
That’s where I see an emerging role for public health. At the federal level, there could be policy movement towards requiring some sort of environmental monitoring at data centers to make sure they’re operating responsibility. Looking at specific water use relative to water availability and what happens when there’s a time of severe, persistent drought. With air quality too — we’ve seen areas where the grid isn’t as reliable so their diesel generators are kicking on more and affecting air quality for residents.
We’re just not seeing all of that right now. We need corporate disclosure.
What do you see as the most important public health impacts from data center development?
It varies by localities. The most discussed obviously is water usage. One thing I’d note about my conversations with folks enthusiastic around emerging tech is, there are still questions that need to be asked about the capacity of localities to support a data center. Like a small town in Kansas may only be using 40% of their water for their utility needs. If a data center came online, how much of that water goes to the data center?
One area underexplored within the public health discipline is energy poverty and energy security. The ability of a household to meet the needs of everything energy provides in our lives. It’s known we have an aging electric grid but we’re not talking enough about large-scale blackouts when the grid is not sufficient to support some of these new data centers.
Plus more of the week’s big development fights.
1. Laramie County, Wyoming — Meta is fighting the fine it received in the Cheyenne data center water pollution controversy, and the conflict between the tech giant and the city’s small board of public utilities is continuing to spill out into the public.
2. Niagara County, New York — This county just rejected a solar project’s highway work permits in a show of retaliation against the state’s Office of Renewable Energy Siting.
3. Barron County, Wisconsin — The anti-solar protest is the new campaign stop in deep red Wisconsin.
4. Chesapeake, Virginia — A large battery storage project on the Virginia coastline is on the rocks amidst rampant local opposition.
5. Lewis County, West Virginia — West Virginia is now a key battleground in the fight over transmission, as a line spanning all of West Virginia and Maryland — and cutting through Data Center Alley in Virginia — causes compounding consternation.