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At least in the short term, developers looking to build quickly have just a few sites to choose from.

Donald Trump aims to spur the biggest nuclear development boom this side of the 21st century. The big question: Will it work?
Trump signed a fleet of executive orders on Friday seeking to quadruple U.S. nuclear capacity, expanding generation from 100 gigawatts today to 400 gigawatts by 2050. To that end, he also set a near-term goal to start construction on 10 new conventional reactors by 2030 — that is, within the next five years.
The interim goal on its own is, on its face, extremely ambitious. There have only been three reactors completed this century: Watts Bar Unit 2, which had a complicated, multi-decade development timeline and finally entered operation in 2016; and Vogtle Units 3 and 4, which started construction in 2009 and came online in 2023 and 2024, respectively.
Part of the reason those three facilities took so long is the convoluted permitting process nuclear hopefuls must navigate. (Chris Gadomski, lead nuclear analyst at BloombergNEF, called it a “gauntlet.”) It can take almost a decade for a new nuclear project to receive what’s called a “combined operating license” from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the federal body charged with overseeing civilian nuclear technology and power plant operations. The orders seek to simplify and accelerate the NRC’s licensing procedure, giving the body 18 months to issue new rules and guidance designed to shorten the timeline for processing new applications to 18 months at the longest, and to reduce the timeline for considering continuing operations licenses to just a year.
In the even nearer term, however, “If you want to build nuclear fast in this country, you would go to sites that are already licensed or already have infrastructure,” Brett Rampal, senior director of nuclear and power strategy at Veriten, told Heatmap. Many of these sites received NRC approval in the 2000 and 2010s but languished due to poor market conditions (the rise of cheap natural gas), the nuclear industry’s own instability (Westinghouse, a major contractor, went bankrupt in 2017), or some combination of both.
But even then the process is complicated, as Adam Stein, director of the nuclear energy innovation program of the Breakthrough Institute, told Heatmap. “Several of the sites with licenses for AP1000 [reactors] theoretically could start construction fairly quickly without major license changes,” he said. “However, that’s not likely to happen.”
The AP1000 is a 1-gigawatt pressurized water reactor made by Westinghouse, and it’s currently pumping out electrons at the Vogtle site in Georgia. There are hopes that it can become a standard design that is built over and over again at scale.
But even on an already-licensed site, any new project would be starting from scratch with its supply chain and workforce. And just because the site has a license now doesn’t mean its developers are done with the licensing process. “The licenses for those sites were issued for a design that was essentially what Vogtle started out as,” Stein explained. Vogtle subsequently underwent almost 200 license amendments, and it’s probable that a new build would want to incorporate many of these design changes into their license, as well. “That takes time,” Stein said.
Duke Energy, which serves over 8 million customers largely in the Southeast, has an active combined operating license for AP1000s in South Carolina. The company told South Carolina utilities regulators in April that its W.S. Lee site in the state “offers the best opportunity to deploy large light-water reactors in the Carolinas” — but that, at least at the time, “the conceptual deployment timeline from when a definitive “go forward” decision is made is about 13 to 14 years.” (Emphasis mine.)
The spokesperson noted that the combined operating license at the site “gives us optionality in the future to construct and operate two Westinghouse AP1000 units at the site,” and that “we will have an opportunity to update state Commissions in the Carolinas on our progress regarding the potential for future new nuclear investments later this year.” The spokesperson gave no specific indication that the company’s timeline for building a new plant had changed due to the executive orders.
Duke also terminated a combined operating license for a Florida site in 2018. “We currently have no nuclear planned for Duke Energy Florida per our 10-year site plan, although advanced nuclear overall is still a longer-term option,” the spokesperson said.
What about “advanced nuclear”? Several advanced nuclear projects have either applied for or gotten construction permits. Kairos Power received construction permits for demonstration reactors, while X-Energy, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and TerraPower have applied for construction permits for advanced reactors. These companies are pursuing a different pathway than the combined operating license application process and will need to apply for operation licenses as well. Two advanced reactor designs by NuScale have received approval from the NRC to date, including one that’s fresh as of Thursday, but there are no current plans to deploy either anywhere.
That hasn’t dampened excitement about advanced nuclear, including on sites with licenses for larger reactors. Virginia utility Dominion Energy is looking at new nuclear development at its North Anna site, which is licensed for a GE-Hitachi Economic Simplified Boiling Water Reactor, a large reactor which has received an NRC design certification but has not yet been deployed. But instead of conventional reactors, Dominion has a memorandum of understanding with Amazon to explore small modular reactor development.
Duke Energy, meanwhile, told Heatmap that the company “strongly supports the advancement and deployment of new nuclear technologies, including large reactors and small modular reactors, to meet the growing energy needs of our customers.”
There is one nuclear company that greeted the executive orders with fulsome excitement: The Nuclear Company. Unlike other newer entrants in the space, The Nuclear Company — which raised a $51 million Series A in April — aims to build six conventional reactors with “proven, licensed technology.”
“I feel like I’m Jack and Rose from the Titanic and my arms are out. I feel like we're flying finally,” Juliann Edwards, chief development officer at The Nuclear Company, told Heatmap. “I feel like we’ve been unleashed through these executive orders.”
As difficult and costly as it was to bring the new Vogtle reactors online, the process jumpstarted the previously dormant domestic nuclear industry. And The Nuclear Company thinks it would be a shame for this emergent expertise to go to waste.
The Nuclear Company has identified the first site where it plans to build, but it’s not yet public, Edwards told Heatmap, though she pointed to states such as Florida, South Carolina, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Alabama as places where the company could “hit the ground running,” given that they already have the necessary licenses in place.
And yet The Nuclear Company does not, itself, intend to design or operate these reactors. Instead it would run licensing, permitting, and construction, while also potentially serving as the facility’s long-term owner, depending on the regulatory structure of the local utilities and grid operators.
That still leaves the question of whether the market will end up valuing the power produced from all these new reactors at a level that will keep an operator in business. That’s not a given. In the 2010s, nuclear capacity fell in part because the market preferred natural gas to nuclear, since it was cheaper and could respond quickly to varying demand. “Why would you build a nuclear reactor when you got very cheap natural gas?” BNEF’s Gadomski, told Heatmap.
But the prospects of an artificial-intelligence-fueled data center boom, as well as the broader electrification of the economy, has begun to change this calculus, as utilities look to catch up to quickly rising electricity demand for the first time this century.
"I’m hoping that this environment doesn’t create too much uncertainty for folks, and I’m hoping it sends signals to get things going and that things will hopefully work out,” Rampal said. “I love my utilities, but they are 14 times bitten, 97 times shy.”
Editor’s note: This story has been updated to reflect that Duke Energy terminated its Florida license.
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Current conditions: The devastating 7.4-magnitude earthquake that struck Colombia has left at least 111 dead • Severe thunderstorms once again caused ground stops at New York City’s airports, stranding your correspondent at Chicago O’Hare for the entire afternoon • Tropical Storm Chan-Hom is battering Tokyo.
The United States sweltered through its hottest month in more than 130 years of analysis, breaking records set during the 1930s Dust Bowl. The average temperatures in the lower 48 states in July came out to 76.89 degrees Fahrenheit, 0.12 degrees above the value from July 1936. “Those who deny or dismiss U.S. climate change have hit a Waterloo moment of sorts,” wrote Yale Climate Connections.
The water levels in Lake Mead, meanwhile, have dropped to a record low as drought parches the American West. “This is a significant wake-up call,” J.B. Hamby, chairman of the Colorado River Board of California and the state’s lead negotiator, told The New York Times. “We need to have long-term solutions that are going to get us away from the precipice.”
For years, the world’s great powers have jockeyed for control of the Arctic as climate change thawed sea ice enough to open new shipping routes across the frigid polar region. Now China is poised to launch its first regular container shipping service through the frigid North. On Monday, the Financial Times reported that Sea Legend, a Chinese cargo vessel that delivers to ports in Turkey and North Africa, will begin weekly service through the Arctic with a route following Russia’s northern coastline. Beijing is calling the approach its “Ice Silk Road.”
The Trump administration, meanwhile, told researchers Monday that it would stop funding the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's lead report on how climate change is affecting the Arctic, Politico reported.
The Trump administration won federal approval to reconsider the environmental review for the stalled Atlantic Shores offshore wind project off Atlantic City, New Jersey. Previously a joint venture between the French energy giant EDF and the oil behemoth Shell until the latter company pulled out following Trump’s reelection, the remaining developer had argued in court that the approval process completed under the Biden administration could not be reopened. While the company “points to various ways that it believes that Congress has limited” the Department of the Interior’s authority to reconsider a review, “none speak with the exquisite specificity to undercut” the government’s right to remand the approval, according to court documents Heatmap obtained last night. Acknowledging the potential for the White House to bog down the procedure in bureaucracy, the court said it will require the Trump administration to provide a status report for why a 120-day deadline for revisiting the review would not be possible. My colleague Jael Holzman had put the project on death watch last year.
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If you listened to any of Tesla’s recent earnings calls, you know that Elon Musk has a lot of big plans for the company that don’t involve luxury electric vehicles with large in-dash homescreens. The company wants to mass produce humanoid robots. It’s promised to basically double America’s output of solar panels. And it’s aiming to build a $16.8 billion chip factory to rival Taiwan’s semiconductor industry. Yet that facility won’t be powered by Tesla’s solar. Instead, Musk said that his other company, SpaceX, will set up batteries and natural gas to keep the lights on for the plant. “The plant sits on the site of a former coal-fired power plant, and SpaceX plans to power it with newly built natural gas plants and batteries,” Electrek reporter Fred Lambert wrote. “So the compute future gets built on the same fossil ground as the past. Just swap coal for gas.”
At the start of the Iran War, a four-dimensional chess interpretation of President Donald Trump’s motivations posited that the conflict was actually about asserting control over China’s supply of hydrocarbons. Six months into the war, The Economist has declared China “the world’s great oil power.” Despite relatively limited domestic supplies, the People’s Republic managed to seize control over its energy fate through stockpiling, restricting exports, and curbing domestic demand by, for example, encouraging city dwellers to take mass transit and or cycle over driving. Among the other ways Beijing is limiting demand, as I have written previously: It’s pouring money into green hydrogen, ammonia, and methanol.

Puerto Rico’s blackouts got worse last year without extreme weather bringing on the outages. The latest data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration shows that the island’s beleaguered ratepayers suffered an average of 36 hours of power interrupts that were not caused by major events such as hurricanes. That’s 19% more than in 2024. Between 2021 and 2025, Puerto Ricans experienced a combined average of 29 hours of power loss each year.
The president has paid $4 billion to kill projects that were already dying or dead.
At a certain level, it defies belief: The Trump administration is spending nearly $4 billion … for nothing.
It’s paid something for nothing at least five times now. Last week, the administration reached a $1.2 billion deal with the German energy company RWE to not build three wind farms, including a large installation off the coast of New Jersey. The Chicago-based developer Invenergy signed a separate deal in June. It’s not clear these deals are legal, yet they keep happening.
These agreements mark the formal end of the first American offshore wind boom, which began in the late 2010s and stepped up during the Biden administration. This buildout, alas, never quite found its sea legs. As recently as February 2022, you could squint at the horizon and imagine that 14 gigawatts of turbines might soon spin along the East Coast. Now, we’ll be lucky to get more than six gigawatts by the end of the decade.
That’s a lot of lost generation capacity — and as I’ve repeatedly written, its absence is going to be a problem for the northeastern United States. The Mid-Atlantic and New England, which were set to receive some of the largest offshore facilities, will still need a lot more new electricity in the years to come, especially during winters. (New York City, for instance, now avoids blackouts by relying on two aging barge-mounted power plants parked in the East River.) And while many of the developers who received President Trump’s payouts pointed to fossil fuel investments in their press releases — as if to imply that those other projects were “replacing” the lost wind farms — relatively few of the power plants mentioned will be built in the Northeast.
Yet there’s another weird aspect of these offshore deals that I haven’t focused on as much: Why are they happening in the first place? That’s the subject of a helpful new article published today by James Sallee, an economics professor at UC Berkeley. He observes that many of the offshore wind projects that the Trump administration has now paid to “cancel” were struggling financially long before January 20, 2025. Few of the farms, if any, would have been built under any administration. So why, exactly, is Trump paying off their developers?
Let’s roll the tape. More than four years ago, the Biden administration held the country’s largest offshore auction ever for a set of promising offshore-wind sites along the Atlantic coast. That brought in more than $4 billion; as part of it, a German company named RWE placed a record-shattering bid for a particularly promising area off New Jersey’s coast. The date? February 25, 2022.
As it turned out, that auction was not the most important thing that happened that week in global energy markets — or world history. A day earlier, Russian troops began their full-scale invasion of Ukraine, igniting a geopolitical firestorm that ultimately ushered in an era of tighter energy supplies, rampant inflation, and higher interest rates. Although the offshore developers could not have known it then, those three trends would reshape the economics of their projects. That’s because offshore wind farms — far more than solar, battery, or gas plants — require titanic upfront investment, as Sallee writes:
Offshore wind is extremely capital intensive: enormous costs come up front, while revenue arrives over decades. Inflation raised the cost of steel, turbines, vessels, and labor. Higher interest rates reduced the present value of future revenue and raised financing costs. Where developers signed fixed-price contracts, developers were left holding the capital cost risk when conditions changed.
Unit economics started to deteriorate, and costs ballooned. Projects started to fail as early as October 2023, when Orsted canceled its Ocean Wind 1 and 2 projects slated for the New Jersey coast. I remember talking to an energy expert at the time who mused that for the same per-megawatt cost as an offshore wind farm, the state might as well just build a new Westinghouse nuclear reactor. (Its governor Mikie Sherrill is now exploring doing just that.)
By the time President Trump took office, in other words, many offshore wind projects were already on financial life support, if not deceased. Given the real underlying shift in project economics, that should have decreased the value of developers’ offshore leases — which are, as Sallee writes, more of an option than a permit, because they give a developer the right to study an area but do not authorize construction per se.
Yet over the past year, the Trump administration has reimbursed five developers largely in full, and it hasn’t gotten much in return. Perhaps that’s what the administration needed to do in order to fully kill these projects without risk of future legal sanction. Yet it is … strange. “The deals relate to development rights that look uneconomic today, even before the buyouts,” Sallee says. “The buyouts may limit how quickly offshore wind could rebound in a future economic and policy environment, but as of today it seems as though the government just spent $3.9 billion of taxpayer dollars spent to shoot a corpse.”
I wonder if that description undersells it. In a certain light, the government isn’t really shooting the corpse so much as handing it big wads of cash. Since the first of these deals were announced, I’ve struggled with what to call them — buyouts? payouts? — but Sallee’s post (which you should go read in full) made me wonder if bailout is the best option. After all, imagine if a hypothetical President Kamala Harris had reimbursed this same set of companies for the full value of their failed offshore wind bets — and used the Justice Department’s permanent and technically unlimited Judgement Fund to do it. What would journalists say then? How would Republicans respond?
Or to make the analogy truly work, I suppose, imagine that a President Harris had bailed out oil companies for some overly exuberant bet made during an earlier Republican administration, then claimed (with dubious evidence) that they would use the refunds to build renewables. That would still be an enormous waste of public money, but it would scramble the politics somewhat, perhaps evoking astonished embarrassment from her allies and delighted confusion from her opponents. Which might — to return to our world — mirror some of the response we’re seeing to Trump’s wind payouts.
As electricity prices rise, the stakes for the leaders of states like Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Indiana are only getting higher.
Governors are increasingly throwing their weight around in the technocratic and often obscure utility ratemaking process. The latest example is Virginia Governor Abigail Spanberger, who last week published a Washington Post op-ed announcing that she would intervene in the attempted acquisition of the state’s dominant utility, Dominion, by Florida utility and energy development company NextEra Energy.
Spanberger is “deeply skeptical about whether selling our primary state-regulated utility to an out-of-state company is good for the commonwealth,” she wrote. While she didn’t go so far as to oppose the merger, she did insist that NextEra maintain jobs in the state, comply with Virginia’s clean energy goals, and come up with cost savings for Virginians. And while the state’s utility regulators will make the ultimate decision themselves, she said, she wanted to use her leverage as the state’s highest ranking and most visible elected official “to make sure Virginians have a voice in the process.”
It’s not unheard of for a governor to try to influence utility regulators by picking members of state utility commissions — or simply by haranguing them. But as electricity bills rise to their highest level ever, according to Heatmap and MIT’s Electricity Price Hub, governors in particular have started responding to pressure from voters to do something — anything — about it.
In New Jersey, Governor Mikie Sherrill won office in part by promising to freeze electricity rates — then used her influence over the utility regulators to make it happen.
In Indiana, Governor Mike Braun replaced the head of the state utility regulator after his predecessor agreed to a rate increase from the utility AES Indiana.
In North Carolina, Governor Josh Stein publicly called on the state’s dominant utility, Duke Energy, to reduce a rate increase request.
And the whole PJM Interconnection market, which includes Indiana, Virginia, and New Jersey, exists under a capacity price cap worked out in litigation initiated by Pennsylvania Governor Josh Shapiro, who has also led an effort alongside the White House to procure more generation and pressured the utility PECO to withdraw a rate case.
“Governor Shapiro is maybe the pioneer of this,” Eric Miller, the interim vice president of the states program at Evergreen Action and a former climate and energy official under former New Jersey Governor Phil Murphy, told me. “Legislators, they hear from their constituents about utility issues, whether it’s shut-offs or high prices. They go to their elected officials, and those elected officials engage with the governor’s office,” he said.
Utility regulation and ratemaking exists in a netherworld between public policy and private business. Most customers in the U.S. are served by investor-owned electric utilities, but the prices they pay are set by boards whose members are typically appointed by governors after a long, quasi-judicial process.
The process by which rates are set is wonky by design, with thousands of pages of filings and analysis explaining what costs need to be recovered at what rate paid by ratepayers. “Intervening” in a public service commission decision typically involves quietly slipping a document into a large docket, to be seen solely by utility regulators and lawyers (plus a few enterprising reporters.) To the extent the public or elected officials get to weigh in, it’s often through non-governmental advocacy groups or state officials designated as advocates for the public.
That governors are now openly taking responsibility for such a painfully bureaucratic process is “an indication of just how central utility rates are to overall energy affordability concerns that governors are hearing,” Jeff Dennis, executive director of the Electricity Customer Alliance and a former Department of Energy and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission official, told me.
With prices as high as they are, “the stakes are higher, and so the governors feel like in order to fulfill their campaign promises or their job as the top elected official in the state, that they’ve got to be directly heard,” he said. In Virginia, for example, typical bills have grown over 45% in the past five years, and by almost 12% in the past year alone.
When it comes to assigning responsibility for high electricity prices, Americans are most likely to blame their state government and their utility (and, increasingly, data centers), according to Heatmap polling.
Governors, who have a direct mandate from the public, can exert a unique countervailing force in a process that many critics argue is weighted towards utility interests. “Despite a lot of fences to prevent regulatory capture and rent seeking, it happens,” Miller said, “and having an executive weigh in directly can shake that up.”
There are risks, however, to governors getting more directly involved in the ratemaking process. One is that it could encourage short-term thinking, leading to measures that hold down prices at the expense of potentially necessary investments to maintain reliability or building out the infrastructure necessary to bring on new sources of power like wind and solar.
On top of that, “There’s certainly always a risk that the proceedings get more political,” Dennis told me. But he noted that ultimately, it’s utility commissions making the decisions, and they’re obligated to provide a record of filings and data to support their decisions.
Governors getting involved more formally could also have upsides, Dennis said, by shining a spotlight on the process that ultimately affects every resident and business in the state. “It brings a lot more spotlight to how utilities are making decisions about investments and how customers are impacted by those decisions, and I don’t think that that’s necessarily a bad thing.”
Governors also have a different set of mandates and responsibilities than the utilities do. While utilities have a mandate to provide reliable electric service — and thus spend whatever they can convince their regulators is necessary to do so — Miller argued that governors have to balance reliability and affordability for their constituents.
“The regulatory monopoly that utilities have is a political creation made by the elected officials in that jurisdiction.” Miller told me. “It is well within the authority of those same elected officials to decide to take a very hard look at whether that model is delivering the type of outcome that they want.”