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Harmonizing data across federal agencies will go a long, long way toward simplifying environmental reviews.

Comprehensive permitting reform remains elusive.
In spite of numerous promising attempts — the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023, for instance, which delivered only limited improvements, and the failed Manchin-Barrasso bill of last year — the U.S. has repeatedly failed to overhaul its clogged federal infrastructure approval process. Even now there are draft bills and agreements in principle, but the Trump administration’s animus towards renewable energy has undermined Democratic faith in any deal. Less obvious but no less important, key Republicans are quietly disengaged, hesitant to embrace the federal transmission reform that negotiators see as essential to the package.
Despite this grim prognosis, Congress could still improve implementation of a key permitting barrier, the National Environmental Policy Act, by fixing the federal government’s broken systems for managing and sharing NEPA documentation and data. These opaque and incompatible systems frustrate essential interagency coordination, contributing immeasurably to NEPA’s delays and frustrations. But it’s a problem with clear, available, workable solutions — and at low political cost.
Both of us saw these problems firsthand. Marc helped manage NEPA implementation at the Environmental Protection Agency, observing the federal government’s slow and often flailing attempts to use technology to improve internal agency processes. Elizabeth, meanwhile, spent two years overcoming NEPA’s atomized data ecosystem to create a comprehensive picture of NEPA litigation.
Even so, it’s difficult to illustrate the scope of the problem without experiencing it. Some agencies have bespoke systems to house crucial and unique geographic information on project areas. Other agencies lack ready access to that information, even as they examine project impacts another agency may have already studied. Similarly, there is no central database of scientific studies undertaken in support of environmental reviews. Some agencies maintain repositories for their environmental assessments — arduous but less intense environmental reviews than the environmental impact statements NEPA requires when a federal agency action substantially impacts the environment. But there’s still no unified, cross-agency EA database. This leaves agencies unable to efficiently find and leverage work that could inform their own reviews. Indeed, agencies may be duplicating or re-duplicating tedious, time-consuming efforts.
NEPA implementation also relies on interagency cooperation. There, too, agencies’ divergent ways of classifying and communicating about project data throws up impediments. Agencies rely on arcane data formats and often incompatible platforms. (For the tech-savvy, an agency might have a PDF-only repository while another has XML-based data formats.) With few exceptions, it’s difficult for cooperating agencies to even know the status of a given review. And it produces a comedy of errors for agencies trying to recruit and develop younger, tech-savvy staff. Your workplace might use something like Asana or Trello to guide your workflow, a common language all teams use to communicate. The federal government has a bureaucratic Tower of Babel.
Yet another problem, symptomatic of inadequate transparency, is that we have only limited data on the thousands of NEPA court cases. To close the gap, we sought to understand — using data — just how sprawling and unwieldy post-review NEPA litigation had become. We read every available district and appellate opinion that mentioned NEPA from 2013 to 2022 (over 2,000 cases), screened out those without substantive NEPA claims, and catalogued their key characteristics — plaintiffs, court timelines and outcomes, agencies, project types, and so on. Before we did this work, no national NEPA litigation database provided policymakers with actionable, data-driven insights into court outcomes for America’s most-litigated environmental statute. But even our painstaking efforts couldn’t unearth a full dataset that included, for example, decisions taken by administrative judges within agencies.
We can’t manage what we can’t measure. And every study in this space, including ours, struggles with this type of sample bias. Litigated opinions are neither random nor representative; they skew toward high-stakes disputes with uncertain outcomes and underrepresent cases that settle on clear agency error or are dismissed early for weak claims. Our database illuminates litigation patterns and timelines. But like the rest of the literature, it cannot offer firm conclusions about NEPA’s effectiveness. We need a more reliable universe of all NEPA reviews to have any chance — even a flawed one — at assessing the law’s outcomes.
In the meantime, NEPA policy debates often revolve unproductively around assumptions and anecdotes. For example, Democrats can point to instances when early and robust public engagement appeared essential for bringing projects to completion. But in the absence of hard data to support this view, GOP reformers often prefer to limit public participation in the name of speeding the review process. The rebuttal to that approach is persuasive: Failing to engage potential project opponents on their legitimate concerns merely drives them to interfere with the project outside the NEPA process. Yet this rebuttal relies on assumptions, not evidence. Only transparent data can resolve the dispute.
Some of the necessary repair work is already underway at the Council on Environmental Quality, the White House entity that coordinates and guides agencies’ NEPA implementation. In May, CEQ published a “NEPA and Permitting Data and Technology Standard” so that agencies could voluntarily align on how to communicate NEPA information with each other. Then in June, after years using a lumbering Excel file containing agencies’ categorical exclusions — the types of projects that don’t need NEPA review, as determined by law or regulation — CEQ unveiled a searchable database called the Categorical Exclusion Explorer. The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory’s PermitAI has leveraged the EPA’s repository of environmental impact statements and, more recently, environmental review documents from other agencies to create an AI-powered queryable database. The FAST-41 Dashboard has brought transparency and accountability to a limited number of EISs.
But across all these efforts, huge gaps in data, resources, and enforcement authority remain. President Trump has issued directives to agencies to speed environmental reviews, evincing an interest in filling the gaps. But those directives don’t and can’t compel the full scope of necessary technological changes.
Some members of Congress are tuned in and trying to do something about this. Representatives Scott Peters, a Democrat from California, and Dusty Johnson, Republican of South Dakota, deserve credit for introducing the bipartisan ePermit Act to address all of these challenges. They’ve identified key levers to improve interagency communication, track litigation, and create a common and publicly accessible storehouse of NEPA data. Crucially, they recognize the make-or-break role of agency Chief Information Officers who are accountable for information security. Our own attempts to upgrade agency technology taught us that the best way to do so is by working with — not around — CIOs who have a statutory mandate.
The ePermit Act would also lay the groundwork for more extensive and innovative deployment of artificial intelligence in NEPA processes. Despite AI’s continuing challenges around information accuracy and traceability, large language models may eventually be able to draft the majority of an EIS on their own, with humans involved to oversee.
AI can also address hidden pain points in the NEPA process. It can hasten the laborious summarization and incorporation of public comment, reducing the legal and practical risk that agencies miss crucial public feedback. It can also help determine whether sponsor applications are complete, frequently a point of friction between sponsors and agencies. AI can also assess whether projects could be adapted to a categorical exclusion, entirely removing unnecessary reviews. And finally, AI tools are a concession to the rapid turnover of NEPA personnel and depleted institutional knowledge — an acute problem of late.
Comprehensive, multi-agency legislation like the ePermit Act will take time to implement — Congress may want or even need to reform NEPA before we get the full benefit of technology improvements. But that does not diminish the urgency or value of this effort. Even Representative Jared Huffman of California, a key Democrat on the House Natural Resources Committee with impeccable environmental credentials, offered words of support for the ePermit Act, while opposing other NEPA reforms.
Regardless of what NEPA looks like in coming years, this work must begin at some point. Under every flavor of NEPA reform, agencies will need to share data, coordinate across platforms, and process information. That remains true even as court-driven legal reforms and Trump administration regulatory changes wreak havoc with NEPA’s substance and implementation. Indeed, whether or not courts, Congress, or the administration reduce NEPA’s reach, even truncated reviews would still be handicapped by broken systems. Fixing the technology infrastructure now is a way to future-proof NEPA.
The solution won’t be as simple as getting agencies to use Microsoft products. It’s long past time to give agencies the tools they need — an interoperable, government-wide platform for NEPA data and project management, supported by large language models. This is no simple task. To reap the full benefits of these solutions will require an act of Congress that both provides funding for multi-agency software and requires all agencies to act in concert. This mandate is necessary to induce movement from actors within agencies who are slow to respond to non-binding CEQ directives that take time away from statutorily required work, or those who resist discretionary changes to agency software as cybersecurity risks, no matter how benign those changes may be. Without appropriated money or congressional edict, the government’s efforts in this area will lack the resources and enforcement levers to ensure reforms take hold.
Technology improvements won’t cure everything that ails NEPA. This bill won’t fix the deep uncertainty unleashed by the legal chaos of the last year. But addressing these issues is a no-regrets move with bipartisan and potentially even White House support. Let it be done.
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Emails raise questions about who knew what and when leading up to the administration’s agreement with TotalEnergies.
The Trump administration justified its nearly $1 billion settlement agreement with TotalEnergies to effectively buy back the French company’s U.S. offshore wind leases by citing national security concerns raised by the Department of Defense. Emails obtained by House Democrats and viewed by Heatmap, however, seem to conflict with that story.
California Representative Jared Huffman introduced the documents into the congressional record on Wednesday during a hearing held by the House Natural Resources Committee’s Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations.
“The national security justification appears to be totally fabricated, and fabricated after the fact,” Huffman said during the hearing. “DOI committed to paying Total nearly a billion dollars before it had concocted its justification of a national security issue.”
The email exchange Huffman cited took place in mid-November among officials at the Department of the Interior. On November 13, 2025, Christopher Danley, the deputy solicitor for energy and mineral resources, emailed colleagues in the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management and the secretary’s office an attachment with the name “DRAFT_Memorandum_of_Understanding.docx.”
According to Huffman’s office, the file was a document entitled “Draft Memorandum of Understanding Between the Department of the Interior and TotalEnergies Renewables USA, LLC on Offshore Wind Lease OCS-A 0545,” which refers to the company’s Carolina Long Bay lease. (The office said it could not share the document itself due to confidentiality issues.)
While the emails do not discuss the document further, the November date is notable. It suggests that the Interior Department had been negotiating a deal with Total before BOEM officials were briefed on the DOD’s classified national security concerns about offshore wind development.
Two Interior officials, Matthew Giacona, the acting director of BOEM, and Jacob Tyner, the deputy assistant secretary for land and minerals management, have testified in federal court that they reviewed a classified offshore wind assessment produced by the Department of Defense on November 26, 2025, and then were briefed on it again by department officials in early December. They submitted this testimony as part of a separate court case over a stop work order the agency issued to the Coastal Virginia Offshore wind project in December.
“After my review of DOW’s classified material with a secret designation,” Giacona wrote, “I determined that CVOW Project’s activities did not adequately provide for the protection of national security interests,” leading to his decision to suspend ongoing activities on the lease.
Giacona and Tyner are copied on the emails Huffman presented on Wednesday, indicating that the memorandum of understanding between Total and the Interior Department had been drafted and distributed prior to their reviewing the classified assessment.
The final agreement both parties signed on March 23, however, justifies the decision by citing a series of events that it portrays as taking place after officials learned of the DOD’s national security concerns.
The Interior Department paid Total out of the Judgment Fund, a permanently appropriated fund overseen by the Treasury Department with no congressional oversight that’s set aside to settle litigation or impending litigation. The final agreement describes the background for the settlement, beginning by stating that the Interior Department was going to suspend Total’s leases indefinitely based on the DOD’s classified findings, which “would have” led Total to file a legal claim for breach of contract. Rather than fight it out in court, Interior decided to settle this supposedly impending litigation, paying Total nearly $1 billion, in exchange for the company investing an equivalent amount into U.S. oil and gas projects.
But if the agency had been negotiating a deal with Total prior to being briefed on the national security assessment, it suggests that the deal was not predicated on a threat of litigation. During the hearing, Eddie Ahn, an attorney and the executive director of an environmental group called Brightline Defense, told Huffman that this opens the possibility for a legal challenge to the deal.
I should note one hiccup in this line of reasoning. Even though Interior officials testified that they were briefed on the Department of Defense’s assessment on November 26, this is not the first time the agency raised national security concerns about offshore wind. When BOEM issued a stop work order on Revolution Wind in August of last year, it said it was seeking to “address concerns related to the protection of national security interests of the United States.”
During the hearing, Huffman called out additional concerns his office had about the settlement. He said the amount the Interior Department paid Total — a full reimbursement of the company’s original lease payment — has no basis in the law. “Federal law sets a specific formula for the compensation a company can get when the government cancels an offshore lease,” he said, adding that the settlement was for “far more.” He also challenged a clause in the agreement that purports to protect both parties from legal liability.
Huffman and several of his fellow Democrats also highlighted the Trump administration’s latest use of the Judgment Fund — to create a new $1.8 billion legal fund to issue “monetary relief” to citizens who claim they were unfairly targeted by the Biden administration, such as those charged in connection with the January 6 riot.
“Now we know that that was just the beginning,” Maxine Dexter of Oregon said. “This president’s fraudulent use of the judgment fund is the most consequential and damning abuse of taxpayer funds happening right now.”
The effort brings together leaders of four Mountain West states with nonprofit policy expertise to help speed financing and permitting for development.
Geothermal is so hot right now. And bipartisan.
Long regarded as the one form of electricity generation everyone in Washington can agree on (it’s both carbon-free and borrows techniques, equipment, and personnel from the oil and gas industry), the technology got yet another shot in the arm last week when leading next-generation geothermal company Fervo raised almost $2 billion by selling shares in an initial public offering.
Now, a coalition of western states and nonprofits is coming together to work on the policy and economics of fostering more successful geothermal projects.
Governor Jared Polis of Colorado and Governor Spencer Cox of Utah will announce the formation of the Mountain West Geothermal Consortium this afternoon at a press conference in Salt Lake City.
The consortium brings together governors, regulators, and energy policy staffers from those two states and their Mountain West neighbors Arizona and New Mexico, along with staffing and organizational help from two nonprofits, the Center for Public Enterprise and Constructive, both of which employ former Department of Energy staffers.
The consortium will help coordinate permitting, financing, and offtake agreements for geothermal projects. This could include assistance with permitting on state-level issues like water usage, attracting public dollars to geothermal projects, and upgrading geophysical data to guide geothermal development.
Michael O’Connor, a former DOE staffer who worked on the department’s geothermal programs, is the director of the consortium. He told me that the organization has done financial and geotechnical modeling to entice funding for earlier stage geothermal development that traditional project finance investors have seen as too high-risk.
“We think that the public sector should be a part of the capital stack, and so what we’re trying to do is build investment programs that leverage the state’s ability to provide the early concessionary capital and match that with private sector capital,” O’Connor said. “The consortium has done a whole bunch of financial modeling around this, and we’re now working with energy offices to build that into actual programs where they can start funding.”
The consortium is also trying to make it easier for utilities to agree to purchase power from new geothermal developments, O’Connor said. This includes helping utilities model the performance of geothermal resources over time so that they can be included more easily in utilities’ integrated resource plans.
“Most Western utilities either have no data to incorporate geothermal into their IRPs, or the data they’re using is generalized and 15 years old,” O’Connor told me. This type of data is easy to find for, say, natural gas or solar, but has not existed until recently for geothermal.
“Offtakers want the same kind of assurance that infrastructure investors want,” O’Connor said. “Everyone wants a guaranteed asset, and it takes a little bit more time and effort.”
The third area the consortium is working on is permitting. Many geothermal projects are located on land managed by the Bureau of Land Management, and therefore have to go through a federal permitting process. There are also state-specific permitting issues, most notably around water, a perennially contentious and complicated issue in the West.
How water is regulated for drilling projects varies state by state, creating an obstacle course that can be difficult for individual firms to navigate as they expand across the thermally rich intermountain west. “You’re always working with this sort of cross-jurisdictional permitting landscape,” Fervo policy chief Ben Serrurier told me. “Anytime you’re going to introduce a new technology to that picture, it raises questions about how well it fits and what needs to be updated and changed.”
Fervo — which sited its flagship commercial geothermal plant in Cape Station, Utah — has plenty of experience with these issues, and has signed on as an advisor to the consortium. “How do we work with states across the West who are all very eager to have geothermal development but, aren’t really sure about how to go about supporting and embracing, encouraging this new resource?” Serrurier asked. “This is policymakers and regulators in the West, at the state level, working together towards a much broader industry transformation.”
The Center for Public Enterprise, a consortium member think tank that works on public sector capacity-building, released a paper in April sketching out the idea for the group and arguing that coordinated state policy could bring forward projects that have already demonstrated technological feasibility. The paper called for states to “create new tools to support catalytic public investment in and financing for next-generation geothermal.”
Like many geothermal policy efforts, the geothermal consortium is a bipartisan affair that builds on a record of western politicians collaborating across party lines to advance geothermal development.
“There is sort of this idea that the West is an area that we collectively are still building, and there is still this idea of collaboration against challenging elements and solving unique problems,” Serrurier said.
Cox, a Republican, told Heatmap in a statement: “Utah is working to double power production over the next decade and build the energy capacity our state will need for generations. Geothermal energy is a crucial part of that future, and Utah is proud to be a founding member of the Mountain West Geothermal Consortium.”
Polis, a Democrat, said, “Colorado is a national leader in renewable energy, and geothermal can provide always-on, clean, domestic energy to power our future. Colorado is proud to partner on a bipartisan basis with states across the region to found the Mountain West Geothermal Consortium.”
O’Connor concurred with Fervo’s Serrurier. “Western states are better at working together on ’purple issues’ than most states,” he told me.
In this moment, O’Connor said, the issue at hand is largely one of coordinating and harmonizing across states, utilities, and developers. “Several pieces of good timing have fallen upon the industry at this moment, which has led to a positive news cycle,” he told me. “Making sure that gets to scale now means we have to solve thorny or bigger dollar problems — and that’s why we’re here.
“We’re not an R&D organization,” he added, referring to the consortium. “We’re here to get over the hurdles of financing and of offtake and of regulatory reform.”
The founder of one-time sustainable apparel company Zady argues that policy is the only that can push the industry toward more responsible practices.
Everlane’s reported sale to Shein has left many shocked and saddened. How could the millennial “radical transparency” fashion brand be absorbed by the company that has become shorthand for ultra-fast fashion? While I feel for the team within the company that cares about impact reduction, I am not surprised by the news.
Everlane was built around a theory of change that was always too small for the problem it claimed to address — that better brands and more conscientious consumers could redirect a coal-powered, chemically intensive, globally fragmented industry.
The theory had real appeal, but it was wrong. Yes, it created some better products, but it was never going to remake the fashion industry on its own.
This is the tension at the center of sustainable fashion: Consumer demand can create a niche, even a meaningful one, but it cannot reconfigure the economics of global supply chains. What is needed are common sense laws that require all significant players to play by the same basic rules: reduce emissions, ban toxic chemicals, and maintain basic labor standards.
A company I used to run, Zady, was an early competitor to Everlane, and we were part of the same cultural and commercial moment. When we raised money, we told investors that while our Boomer parents may have thought that changing the world meant marching on the streets, we knew better. Change was going to happen through business.
The problem was that, while our market was growing, fast fashion was growing faster. There was a small but passionate group of consumers trying to buy better, but the overall system drove companies to produce more — more units, more emissions, more chemicals, and more waste.
The truth is that brands do not have direct control over the environmental impacts of their products. Most of the emissions and applications of chemicals are not happening at the brand level, but are instead in fiber production, textile mills, dyehouses, finishing facilities, and laundries, all of which the brands do not own. These factories operate on the thinnest of margins, and the open secret is that brands share these suppliers. No one brand wants to pay the cost for their shared factories to make the necessary upgrades to address their impacts. It’s a classic collective action problem.
Everlane’s capital story matters here, too. Unless a founder arrives with substantial personal wealth, outside investment is often the only path to scale. A company can remain small, independent, and slow-growing, but then it will likely be more expensive, more limited in reach, and less able to influence factories.
Everlane chose the other path. It took institutional growth capital from storied venture firms more closely associated with the digital revolution (including some that also fund clean energy technologies) and became a recognizable national brand. This obligated the company to operate inside a financial structure that leads inexorably toward some kind of exit, whether through a sale, an initial public offering, or some other liquidity event. Once that is the operating system, sustainability can remain a real and important goal, but it is not the final governing logic — investor return is.
“Radical transparency” was never enough to solve the fashion industry’s or venture capital model’s structural problems. Naming a factory is not the same as knowing what happens inside it. Publishing a supplier list does not tell us whether the facility runs on coal, whether wastewater is treated before being released back into the ecosystem, or whether restricted substances are present in dyes, finishes, trims, or coatings.
We already have many forms of transparency in American capitalism. Public companies, for example, are required to disclose executive compensation and the average pay of their workers; this transparency has done exactly nothing to close the pay gap. A disclosure is not the same thing as a legal standard.
So what does this mean for all of us? We don’t know exactly how Shein will absorb Everlane. I could guess that this is a Quince play for Shein, a way to access higher-end consumers that would otherwise never go on the Shein site.
What this tragicomedy reveals is that the idea born from Obama-era optimism, that the arc of history naturally bends toward justice and sustainability, was ephemeral.
The work to make this coal-powered industry sustainable will come from regulation. The technology to decarbonize is there, and unlike with aviation, for instance, it would cost the apparel industry a mere 2 cents per cotton t-shirt to get it done. But unlike with aviation, there are no requirements or incentives that these investments be made, so they are not.
The electric vehicle industry got a head start through direct subsidies and fuel efficiency standards. Apparel needs the same.
If you’re disappointed or angry about this turn of events, I ask you to channel those feelings into citizenship. Help pass the New York or California Fashion Acts that would require all large fashion companies that sell into the states to reduce their emissions and ban toxic chemicals. It’s currently legal to have lead on adult clothing, and Shein is consistently found to have it on their products. The industry is pushing back through their trade associations, so people power is needed so that legislators know it needs to be their priority.
But if you want to shop sustainably, you don’t need a brand. What is most helpful is understanding your own style and lifestyle — that’s how we know what we actually need and what we don’t. There are apps to help on that front. (I love Indyx, for instance, but there are others.)
The only way forward is together, and that means political solutions — emissions requirements, chemical requirements, labor requirements — not just consumer ones.