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Rob talks with Daniel Palken, the director of infrastructure for energy and permitting at Arnold Ventures, about the policies that would probably make up a grand bargain.

There’s really one one good thing that could happen this year in Congress for clean energy: permitting reform. If lawmakers reached a bipartisan deal on the country’s permitting system, they could make it easier to build solar, wind, and transmission lines — as well as every other kind of infrastructure.
But will it happen? What are the obstacles to a deal? What would be in a deal? On this episode of Shift Key, Rob is joined by Daniel Palken, the director of infrastructure for energy and permitting at Arnold Ventures. They discuss the recent history of permitting reform, the policies that would probably make up a deal, and why it might be now or never for reforming the permitting system.
Shift Key is hosted by Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap News.
Subscribe to “Shift Key” and find this episode on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Amazon, or wherever you get your podcasts.
You can also add the show’s RSS feed to your podcast app to follow us directly.
Robinson Meyer:
This episode of ShiftKey is brought to you by Tandem PV, the leader in perovskite technology. Heatmap Labs recently sat down with Jennifer Granholm, the former Secretary of Energy and Governor of Michigan, and a newly minted board member at Tandem PV.
Daniel Palken:
You know, I would love it if people look back and say that this was one of those technologies that changed the economics of clean energy. You know, solar is cheap, and this can really take it to the next level. When we invent and we build and we manufacture, America wins. And if in five years from now, Tandem has helped to prove that advanced solar can be invented here and manufactured here and deployed around the world, I will feel very good about this decision.
Robinson Meyer:
Stay tuned at the end of this week's episode to learn more about Secretary Granholm's decision to join the board of Tandem PV.
Robinson Meyer:
Hello, it's Wednesday, July 29th. If anything in clean energy is going to happen in this Congress, that's the Congress that ends at the end of this year, 2026, it is permitting reform. That is a bipartisan compromise deal to streamline the paperwork and all the procedure that's required when you build any kind of infrastructure in the United States, be it a bridge or a tunnel, a solar farm, a wind farm or a power line, or yes, a natural gas pipeline. The permitting system affects where infrastructure gets built, who can build it, how easy and cheap it is to build, and how much paperwork you have to do along the way. And in many cases, it places much larger burdens on clean energy than on fossil fuels.
I think permitting is really important. I talk about it a lot. When we had Lily Burmel on the show a few weeks ago, she talked about how the biggest obstacles to building more, say, solar or wind in the United States at this point are often as much about permitting as they are about financing or local climate legislation or anything that we have historically thought of as quite important. McKinsey says that roughly one to one and a half trillion dollars of infrastructure projects are currently held up in the federal permitting process somewhere in the country. So that's just a lot of growth and jobs that's currently being constrained by the permitting process. And at Heatmap, we've covered how the Trump administration has aggressively weaponized the existing permitting process to block wind and solar. But there's actually lots of other examples of where I think good environmental policies have been held up by some, I would call it a permitting procedure. So for instance, as you'll hear about on the show today, New York City congestion pricing was delayed for years basically because of a permitting issue.
So on this show, I wanted to talk about this potential permitting reform deal that could come together in this Congress. You know, I wanted to talk about what's in it, why it's important, why it would need to happen soon, who the winners and losers are, and some of the history here. This is our permitting reform omnibus episode, and we have a great guest for it. So Daniel Palkin worked on Capitol Hill for many years. He worked for a lot of Democrats, Senator Whitehouse, Senator Hickenlooper, and Senator Manchin. He's now Director of Infrastructure for Energy and Permitting at Arnold Ventures. We're going to talk about the history, the policy, what a deal could look like, all the good stuff on this episode. I'm very excited. We're just going to cut right to it. I'm Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap News, and you are listening to ShiftKey. Daniel Palkin, welcome to ShiftKey.
Daniel Palken:
Thank you for having me, Rob.
Robinson Meyer:
Okay, so at this point, we've been talking about permitting reform for so long, and I feel like it has a bit of a mythic quality. But my understanding is that if it is ever going to happen, it would happen in the next few months, and that we're entering a critical time for permitting. The possibility of any kind of package coming together here. So let's just start with this conversation. You're like, where do we stand on permitting reform today? And what's your role in the process?
Daniel Palken:
Yeah. So for my part, I work at Arnold Ventures. I know listeners are likely at least somewhat familiar with the organization since you had John Arnold, one of our founders on the show recently. And we're a philanthropy that grants money to organizations that do work to make it easier to build better, faster, and at lower cost in this country. So we're very interested in the permitting reform discussion, and we're interested in getting the details right and also encouraging passage. And so we support a number of groups who we think are doing good work at kind of, you know, building the record and helping inform the people who are actually n the seats of policymaking and their staff.
So, you know, where we are today, you know, permitting reform has been something that has been debated in Washington and acted upon in Washington for decades, primarily through the series of surface transportation bills, which are authorized every five years or so. And for about two decades, those have kind of played around the edges with reforms to NEPA, primarily focused on transportation projects. But then starting in 2015, there were a set of bigger reforms in the FAST Act called the FAST 41 reforms that allowed certain projects to get preferential treatment, including through more favorable judicial review, statutes of limitations. And then that kind of led into the more modern era. And in the kind of modern permitting debate that we're having now, I consider it maybe the fourth incarnation in a series of kind of once a year or every other year discussions. The first one kind of came immediately out of the Inflation Reduction Act. So you'll recall the big bill that was passed near the start of the Biden administration or middle in like 2022.
And Senator Manchin, who I didn't work for at the time, but would come to work for, was a pivotal vote in passing that. And he insisted that as a condition of doing that, if we're going to invest so much money, we need to set the conditions that you can deploy the money cost effectively. And so he and Senator Schumer reached an agreement that they were going to try to move a permitting bill forward. And that was kind of permitting 1.0 in our recent history. And they had a bill that included some reforms to transmission. It included some other things initially around the Clean Water Act that ended up being controversial. It included some things around NEPA, but it wasn't able to quite garner the votes. It deadlocked 47 to 47 in a vote to attach it to NDAA in December of 2022. And the conversation then kind of went dormant only to revive in what I would call the second permitting 2.0 incarnation of the discussion, which happened during the Fiscal Responsibility Act. So phase two was the Fiscal Responsibility Act. This was kind of a really odd way for a permitting debate to happen, in my opinion. But we were heading towards a default on the federal debt and we had to raise the federal debt ceiling as a country.
Robinson Meyer:
This is the Biden era. This is the second half of the administration. So Republicans have won the House. So now it's a split Congress or a Republican controlled Congress. And as has happened during previous Democratic administrations, Republicans, I would say, extremely irresponsibly don't want to raise the debt ceiling without extracting some kind of leverage. And what emerged was this Fiscal Responsibility Act. This is, I believe it's 2023 is when this happened.
Daniel Palken:
May of 2023, yeah, it passed. And there was a negotiation on permitting reform. And there was a threshold question of, is this going to happen at all? And Democrats said, OK, we are game to play ball. And then there was a question of, how big are we going to go? And there were kind of some base level NEPA reforms that are more than symbolic. They matter. But there are page limits and time limits on the National Environmental Policy Act. 75 pages for an environmental assessment, 150 pages for an environmental impact statement. Sounds pretty strict when you consider that sometimes these reviews are 10,000 pages plus.
But in particular, you know, there were some loopholes. You could simply fit everything you wanted in an appendix. And the time limits, which were one year and two year respectively, depending on the stringency of review, the agency could simply extend at its own discretion in consultation with the applicant. And there was a question of, would you go a lot further than those reforms? And Democrats at the time said, we would want to see some transmission policies. And at the time, there was a bill that I had worked on for my then boss, Senator John Hickenlooper of Colorado, called the Big Wires Act, which entered into the discussion. And the Republicans said, we would want to see some real judicial review reforms in exchange for that. And there just wasn't a meeting of the minds. And so they kind of went with the smaller ball NEPA stuff. They also went with a transmission minimum transfer study in lieu of actually enacting a minimum transfer requirement. And then they kind of moved on. And then there was a real question of, well, have we scratched the itch? Is permitting gone? But the answer to that proved to be no. Permitting 3.0, which is the one kind of immediately proceeding where we are, was the effort that really focused on the Senate side last Congress around the Energy Permitting Reform Act, or EPRA. And that was a bill that came out of the Energy and Natural Resources Committee, Chairman Joe Manchin, who I was working for at the time in partnership with then ranking member now whip of the Senate Republicans, John Barrasso. And it was a bill that included a number of provisions that included provisions on planning and siting.
Of interstate transmission. It included provisions to fix a court decision that had made it very hard to do waste disposal associated with hard rock mining. It included provisions to kind of limit the administration's ability to pause the export of liquefied natural gas. It included requirements for onshore and offshore leasing of oil and gas and coal. It included a bunch of different ingredients that were all within the jurisdiction, crucially, of the Energy and Natural Resources Committee. And that was a bill that was negotiated in a divided government. And it was, you know, we kind of knew when we were negotiating it, that the worst case scenarios for the bill politically going into the 2024 election was either side winning a trifecta. The euphoria that a political party experiences when it sees itself coming into control of all three seats of government tends to lead one to forget about pesky things like the filibuster, which mean that you have to have some measure of bipartisan support in order to pass something that has to go through regular order. And so there were a lot of arguments at the time that, oh, you know, Republicans, we can pass things in the next Congress. We can pass whatever we want. And people tried to say, you know, there's still the filibuster. This isn't going to clear through the parliamentarian. And then they tried to, at the start of this Congress, put things in a reconciliation bill, the one big beautiful bill. And sure enough, the parliamentarian said, no, you can't pass those.
So, you know, permitting 3.0 kind of ended with a whimper. It passed the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee 15 to 4, a very strong bipartisan showing, an impressive dynamic range of senators voted for it. But it made it no further than that. The House had been won by a very thin margin. And I think there was nervousness around, are we going to bring something controversial in the lame duck when we're setting up a new Congress and all of that.
So that brings us to the heart of your question of like where we are now. There have been negotiations going on from fairly early in this Congress, in the Senate, and the House has actually done a lot of its part. The House has passed some major pieces of legislation on a mostly but not entirely partisan basis. So they've passed bills.
Like the SPEED Act, which is a big set of sweeping reforms to NEPA and associated judicial review. They've passed bills like the Permit Act, which reformed the Clean Water Act, and they've passed a number of things that have been very bipartisan, like the E-Permit Act, which does digitization of various permitting things. In the Senate side, the negotiations are really unlike the EPR negotiations, which were just the E&R committee until the very end. These are really Four Corners negotiations. So it's on the Environment and Public Works Committee, It's Chair Shelley Moore Capito and Ranking Member Sheldon Whitehouse. And on the Energy and Natural Resources Committee, both chair and ranker have turned over. It's now Chair Mike Lee of Utah and Ranking Member Martin Heinrich of New Mexico. And I would say the defining characteristic of these negotiations is all four parties are really sincerely interested in good faith in getting to a deal. Like I've been really impressed with kind of the tone and tenor from the outset to where we are now. They're facing a lot of challenges, right? There's stuff going on in the background. There's withdrawals of permits that are making it very hard politically, you know, for this and that side. And this hasn't been a historically productive Congress. It's been quite the opposite. But if anything can pass this Congress in the energy space, I think it's certainly permitting reform.
Robinson Meyer:
That was an incredible history, and I want to thank you for it. Let's talk about the current deal for a second, then I want to get into some of that history. But what do you think are the current biggest obstacles to getting a deal through? Because I think one thing you just said is quite important to call out, and actually something I've encountered when I've gone on other podcasts to talk about permitting reform. I mean, I realize your context of putting things diplomatically, but I've encountered some skepticism that I think especially on the Democratic side that Senators Whitehouse and Heinrich are committed to a deal.
But it sounds like you are both convinced that they are. So what are the biggest obstacles to getting to yes on this package?
Daniel Palken:
Yeah. So, I mean, they're committed to a deal as long as the deal, you know, has the has the right elements. I think Capito and Lee and their counterparties would say that, too, and also is occurring in an environment in which they can have, you know, some degree of faith that the bill will be implemented fairly. And so to that point, one of the big obstacles is, you know, this the cancellation and the revocation and the failure to grant permits that under regular order and routine circumstances would normally be granted. So there's, you know, more things than we could list here, but there's been a lot of actions taken by the Trump administration to make it unreasonably hard to apply for permits that even under the first Trump administration would have been viewed as routine. In the most extreme cases, there's, of course, been revocations of permits like the five wind farms off the Atlantic coast that some of them have been, you know, at the time, 80 percent under construction and had their permits pulled. Courts, thankfully, have been very quick to react to those and say, no, you know, these are they've actually used words like this. This appears to be pretextual and said, you can't do that.
And in some instances, the administration has failed to kind of file certain appeals and has made strategic moves to move a few dozen projects forward through its Department of Interior pause on permitting. So there have been some signs of goodwill, but it's been rocky. And I think there was a quote that Josh Siegel had from Sheldon Whitehouse as recently as like this morning or last night where he keeps saying it's going to be really hard to sell my caucus on a deal if we're in an environment where you can't permit things. And, you know, I don't want to paint with a single brush here like the, you know, Donald Trump is certainly the one who is responsible for this. Now, there is a broader history of not just permit revocations. I think it's fair to say that Trump has done a lot more to revoke permits of existing projects. Biden certainly did it with the Keystone XL pipeline. But, you know, the Biden administration had its own list of things that it did that really upset people like Senator Barrasso when he was trying to negotiate a deal. It less took the form of revocations and more took the form of proactive restrictions. So everything from.
You know, leasing pauses of oil and gas and coal offshore and onshore and LNG pauses, of course, which was addressed in the EPRA bill, and a much longer list besides of kind of rules that made it very hard to invest and move forward with, in that case, fossil projects. And so there's been a long history of tit for tat. That is a major headwind. The other big obstacle is time. You know, we're running out of time, this Congress, for reasons we could discuss. Next, Congress is likely to be a less hospitable environment to a bipartisan permitting deal. And then maybe the last barrier is there's always stakeholder politics, like permitting deals impact a lot of stuff.
You know, there was a McKinsey analysis that said there's about $1.1 to $1.5 trillion of infrastructure projects that are currently in some stage of their NEPA review at any given time. The transmission provisions, the provisions that could impact pipelines, you know, there are not no trade-offs to these things. There are different business models in the power sector, all of whom stand to potentially gain or lose from this or that deal. I sincerely believe that a permitting deal can be very positive some, but there are always some people who will feel like they're not getting as much as they could, or they're losing something here or there. And those stakeholders, you know, tend to be pretty concentrated in their focus when coming out and saying, please don't do a deal. And it's easier to play defense against something than to pass something in Washington.
Robinson Meyer:
It's so interesting to hear you talk about kind of the history of, let's say, permit interference. I'm not sure what to call it, because I think it's important to emphasize that as you were doing that, what the Trump administration has done, I think, especially on onshore and offshore wind, but on all clean energy projects is.
As we have described it at Heatmap, kind of this extrajudicial killing of an industry. I mean, it's all these regulatory processes that in normal times would be approved.
On the same day, that were completely pedestrian, quotidian, things that it made sense to route through the federal government. For instance, it makes sense to check in with the Pentagon before you build a wind farm to make sure that you're not going to interfere with local air bases, with national security, with flight paths. That makes sense to have that as a step in an energy permitting process. It's hard to imagine a world where we don't have that as a step. But what happened until the current administration is that the Pentagon got back to you on the same day and was like, yeah, that's fine, whatever, you can build it. Or within days, right? And now that has emerged as a major bottleneck on permitting. In fact, reporting suggests the Defense Department is just holding up all of these permits in order to block wind. At the same time, it is also true that back during the Biden administration, I mean, famously, Biden revoked the permits for the Keystone XL pipeline on the first day of his presidency, a project that was under construction at the time. And I think it is worth, there's a whole other thing to be done about Keystone XL, because I think one interesting story about that project is that there was far more skepticism about it at the beginning of its journey in the climate movement than there was by the time that it was a day one action from the Biden administration and ultimately.
Whether it was a productive use of time given how much oil was able to get exported from the tar sands just on train cars, not on pipelines. But, you know, there were other things the Biden administration did too. Famously, it was hard to get fossil fuel projects permitted in their interior department, for instance. And that was something that even if it was never a specified policy was something we heard.
Daniel Palken:
Yeah, there was a whole of government approach, right? I mean, it was the things you just mentioned. It was also, you know, there were FERC rules on pipeline, you know, reviews. They were trying to make a lot of pipelines go through environmental impact statements rather than EAs. There was an SEC rule that just imposed a lot of strict disclosure requirements on anybody who was investing in fossil industries. There were a lot of things in Alaska, right? You know, talk to Lisa Murkowski about how she felt. To listen to her remarks. Yeah. You know, in those days, there were all the leasing pauses. You know, there were EPA rules. There were effluent rules. There were mercury and air toxics rules. And there were coal ash rules. There were greenhouse gas rules. And there were more expected to be forthcoming had Kamala won. And I think what it felt like to a lot of Republicans was, you know, gee, some of these you could justify. But they felt that in the aggregate, what was clearly happening was a lot what Democrats feel is happening now. Now, It's different mechanisms, right? I don't want to equate the pulling of a lawfully granted permit, which, again, Biden also did in at least that one instance, with kind of proactive rules to stop things. But it really was the same effect. And if you're arguing to a Republican who cares about the energy sector that these are really different, you're going to be landing on deaf ears. And I think there's an important point of empathy there and there's an important kind of critical evaluation and strategic point for Democrats in the future of, you know, does this tit-for-tat strategy, is this advantageous to clean energy resources given some of the backlash it is contributing to?
Robinson Meyer:
There's one more point I want to hit on the history, which is... Back during the Biden administration, the environmental movement made a bet. They made a political calculation about how this permitting reform conversation was going to work out. And I think it has gone terribly because I think when you look, you can say, if people remember back after the IRA passed, Manchin said, OK, if we pass the Inflation Reduction Act, I also want to pass a permitting reform package. And a number of green groups declared that this package, because it included basically mandatory approvals for a pipeline in West Virginia, the Mountain Valley pipeline, was Manchin's dirty deal. This is the term that they used, Manchin's dirty deal. And they said, no, no Democrats should support Manchin's dirty deal.
That was a political calculation. And it was based on the idea that now the IRA is passed, so we don't need Manchin anymore. And we can block this pipeline successfully. And Congress shouldn't be in the habit of approving pipelines. What actually happened, as we were talking on a recent show with Lily Burmel, who worked in the Biden administration, and as I think modeling from Rhodium and Jesse and others has come to show, is that in fact, you did need permitting legislation to unlock the full capacity of the IRA. Because it's still hard to build transmission in the United States, we weren't able to build as much clean energy under the IRA as we had initially forecast that we might. And every year that the IRA has been on the books, obviously now the wind and solar tax credits have a cliff that we've passed or are in the process of passing. We've realized the hard constraints, the legal constraints on clean energy construction are like higher than we previously thought they were. It would have been really nice to get a permitting deal with the IRA. We would have used that law a lot more. At the same time, the Mountain Valley Pipeline ultimately got approved. It got approved.
Daniel Palken:
It's been built. In that permitting 2.0 I talked about, right? That was in the FRA deal was they just copied and pasted the language. And so it kind of happened for free afterwards. So, you know, there is a moral of that story, which is, you know, jump on the deal when you can. Now, to be fair, the environmental groups who opposed that deal, and I remember the dirty deal campaigns and all the posters around DC, you know, 10 Democrats voted against that. About, you know, 40 voted for it. So they weren't very successful in peeling off Democrats. You know, what actually stopped it was only seven Republicans voted for that deal. And many were ones that had a nexus with the Mountain Valley pipeline itself because they were so eager to see it approved for their states. So it was actually that deal was kind of recognized as not having enough of the Republican priorities. And, you know, for that reason, and maybe for also political reasons of not wanting to give the Biden administration a win there. And as far as that would have been perceived as one, there were a number of Republican votes against it more than Democrats.
Robinson Meyer:
So let's talk about what is in this Yes. Package. So one interesting thing about permitting reform is that we call it by this name permitting reform, but actually it's a bit of a grab bag of different changes to different laws, all of which have some nexus in the selection of siting for large-scale infrastructure or energy projects and the paperwork and studies involved in that siting. But let's just walk through what What would be in a permitting reform package, especially the permitting reform package that is potentially close to coming together in this Congress?
Daniel Palken:
Yeah, it falls into several buckets. I'll put it into six buckets is, I think, the most logical way to think of it for this conversation. One is NEPA and judicial review. So that's the one, that one's one of the very high profile ones that's going to get a lot of attention. The Speed Act is kind of the House's offer there. And I would expect to see elements, but not a kind of copy and paste of the whole text in something that the Senate comes out with. I think they'll leave their own mark on NEPA and associated judicial review reforms.
Another very big one that's going to get a lot of attention is reforms to transmission or reforms to the nation's bedrock power law, the Federal Power Act. The third bucket is Clean Water Act, which has a very significant nexus with pipelines, natural gas pipelines in particular, but also,
You know, depending on how it's done, could have implications for hydropower facilities and other things within and outside of the energy sector. The fourth one is not a single law necessarily, but kind of goes under the heading permit certainty, which is these questions we were just talking about. You know, it's one response to Trump is pulling all these permits is for, you know, Congress to say, well, we don't want to do a deal now. But the other response, of course, is to say we're going to try to stop Trump from doing that through legislating some of it and also potentially through reaching an understanding in the lead up to a permitting deal that like, you know, this has to stop. So permit certainty could be stuff that's within the law. It could also manifest as some form of shared understanding between the parties that happens on the side of a law, or it could be both. The fourth bucket, which is a really interesting one, or I guess fifth bucket now, the newest entrant to the permitting discussion is the National Historic Preservation Act. This is one that Senator Lee has made a signature priority of his. It's kind of the major environmental law that's within his committee, the Energy and Natural Resources Committee's jurisdiction. And then the sixth category is everything else. There's a bunch of odds and ends and parochial things. There's some of those mining fixes that I discussed. Every permitting bill seems to, by mandate, have a geothermal title that unites both parties and makes them feel happy. There could be other hydropower stuff. So there's a grab bag of things that I would say are smaller and less kind of focused on any one specific law, but that will probably find their way into any permitting deal. And those, I would say, are the six major buckets of reforms. And we could dig into any or all of them, depending on how much time you have here today.
Robinson Meyer:
Let's dig into a few of them. Let's dig into a few of them. We don't know exactly what's in the deal yet, but what are the kinds of changes you would expect to see in the transmission section?
Daniel Palken:
Yeah. So just to level set up top on transmission, yes, it's very helpful for new energy sources such as wind that are trying to connect to the grid. What transmission really does is, you know, I almost think of it as synonymous with headroom. When you systematically upgrade your transmission system, you are creating an electrical grid that has spare room on it such that when you add something, you're not always running into a hundred, you know, thermal faults and other things that cause
Years of study and tens to hundreds of millions of dollars of upgrades. So I just want to like to kind of frame out the problem that we're trying to solve with transmission. People, I think, have intuitions that don't match the real way that voltages and currents propagate on the electric system. There was an example of a generator that was being connected in northwestern North Dakota like a few years ago. And that generator, it was an SPP, the Great Plains grid operator, and they had to apply to get interconnected like everybody does these days. And what they found, what SPP found, was that they were going to trigger grid upgrades because they were going to change power flows all over the system, right? When you hook something up new to the system, the grid operator doesn't get to say to the physics, hey, make the power flow here, but not there. It just flows down the path of least resistance on the wires, and you solve Kirchhoff's laws, which are not laws that Congress can amend. And it triggered upgrades 1,000 miles away at the furthest. So it triggered grid upgrades that were needed outside of SPP's territory, in the territory of a cooperative utility called Associated in the state of Missouri.
And this was a generator that was coming online in North Dakota. And so with transmission, that's the microcosm of it. You're trying to systematically upgrade your system. Sometimes that means building big new lines to places that don't have the capacity. Sometimes it means doing the boring and dirty work of systematically upgrading transformers and substations and relays to accommodate much greater power flows to anticipate the next 10 or 15 or 20 years of stuff you might add on the system. And it's relevant for generation, but it's also super relevant for demand. Right now, the stuff that's coming online, you know, five years ago, we were only talking about all the wind and solar coming online. Now we have a lot of data centers that are coming online. And if we fail to upgrade the grid, we're going to perpetually find ourselves in a situation where supply is way behind demand. And that leads to high prices.
Robinson Meyer:
I've wondered if the politics of data centers are making the politics of transmission easier, because for a while during the Biden administration, you know, look, what happens is that a lot of new, especially clean generation gets built in rural areas, which are in our current political system, basically red areas and sent to suburbs and cities, which tend to be bluer. And so when you shift the resolution to state level politics, what that meant is that Democrats often wanted to build transmission or they were interested in transmission for a number of reasons, for improving the overall electricity market, for improving the carbon intensity of the electricity system, for lowering energy costs. And red states, which often had cheap electricity, in part because of clean energy, saw that.
As an arbitrage that they were on the wrong side of, because they said, well, if we build better transmission, then suddenly our price equalizes with your price and our prices go up and we're not necessarily compensated for it. And this is why a lot of the arguments over transmission go to kind of how you pay for the price imbalances that are created or who pays for the new infrastructure. But I've wondered if data centers, because they are getting built in rural and exurban areas that have... Very cheap electricity. Because in some ways, as a data center developer, what you're trying to do is go find, the places where land is cheapest, power is cheapest, but abundant, and you can maybe hook up to some water system, have already changed the politics of transmission in that everyone's electricity prices have gone up. This is not a story where we have too much supply in some areas and too much demand in others. Everywhere is seeing screaming demand, basically. And so it's easier to make a case that we need to expand the market and expand the infrastructure overall because basically load growth is now kicking systems across the country into a more congested state.
Daniel Palken:
That's a great synopsis of it, right? You know, data centers, their political ramifications for permitting reform are complicated because they're incredibly unpopular at the local grassroots level. And I think a lot of that is people mapping their fears about the technology onto the siting of the infrastructure. I think some of it has to do with the siting of the infrastructure. But I think if it were any other type of infrastructure that spit off this much local revenue and had this small land footprint, you know, it wouldn't attract quite the same level of attention. At the same time, as you say, data centers at the national level have been a huge priority for the Trump administration because they correctly recognize that it is a big national security vulnerability if we cannot build these things at home. Imagine that Claude Mythos model that was finding 250 zero-day hacks in Firefox alone to say nothing of all the other web browsers and open source software. If China has the next version of that and the U.S. is two years behind because we don't have the energy. We live in a very fragile state relative to our geopolitical peers and rivals. And so in the data centers, if you talk to any of the hyperscalers and say, what is your number one ask in permitting reform? The answer is transmission, because transmission is the headroom on the grid that allows them to have a reasonable path to interconnect on a reasonable timeline and not be hit with five years of wait in a queue. So that has been really important to the politics. And I have seen the politics around transmission change for that and other reasons.
Robinson Meyer:
But I think that actually matters to the emissions intensity of data centers, because when you can't hook up a data center to the grid and can't use whatever the local grid mix is, what you do is you build an onsite gas plant. And so you shift from a local grid.
Daniel Palken:
Or you build a diesel plant, right?
Robinson Meyer:
Or diesel generators. You hook up 100 diesel generators like Elon Musk did, and you pollute your local area, right? When you can't, like, If you can hook up to the local grid and use power from the local grid, you know, it's the United States. We have a gas-heavy grid. But the grid, let's say, is going to be 66% gas or 50% gas. Or, you know, and that creates the opportunity.
Daniel Palken:
Well, actually, it's actually even more than you're thinking, right? Because you're thinking, oh, how much of that grid is going to be renewable? So that's the, you know, discount you get on emissions. But actually, if you look at the data centers that are hooking up off grid, they are using like simple cycle, you know, when they're not using repurposed jet engines, they're using 20% thermally efficient, you know, gas plants. Whereas if you're hooked up to the grid, there's really two types of gas plants that live on the grid. There's like 60% efficient combined cycle gas turbines, which are most of the gas power that's generated. And then there's peakers, which have that low efficiency, but are run at capacity factors of like 5%. So from an emissions perspective, they don't matter all that much. You know, even if solar and wind didn't exist at all, and nuclear didn't exist, and hydro didn't exist, it would still be a much, much cleaner option. Like we're talking factors of three in efficiency to connect your data center to the grid if it was purely powered by gas, which is, I think, an important point to understand.
Robinson Meyer:
So there's been a lot of reporting on NEPA over the past few years. I'm going to give a very capsule summary of it. NEPA was created. It was actually the first environmental law passed by the Nixon administration. It preceded the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act. And it was initially conceived as a way of granting a broad and comprehensive environmental right to the American people. What actually resulted from it was that it requires that basically before the federal government does anything, it conducts an environmental study. And these studies, through pressure from the court system over time, where someone sues the government for not studying some environmental impact, the courts say, oh, actually, you didn't. You got to study it. These studies have become quite long. And this is partially a story of permit weaponization, too. But famously, congestion pricing in New York City, which has been an incredible success, a runaway success, was delayed for years because the, huge NEPA study, like a multi-volume, tens of thousands of pages NEPA study about it. And I would add, by the way, NEPA systematically discourages public investment in the energy system. Because if you're a private company, you want to build something, it requires a much less intensive study than if you are the government who wants to build something. So if you have any idea about building public renewables or building public nuclear or building public hydro. We're building public anything, transmission.
Right now, NEPA is one of the biggest obstacles to it because it systematically helps private investment over public investment because it creates regulatory burdens on public investment on the government that don't exist on private developers. But anyway, I've gone on my little NEPA rant. What would this law do for NEPA?
Daniel Palken:
So there's several major areas of reforms that you can consider within NEPA and the associated, as you correctly indicated, right? NEPA has kind of morphed into the form it has in the 50 plus years since its enactment because of its feedback through the judicial system. The U.S. is a famously litigious society, even by developed country standards. And so there's, you know, from Nader's Raiders onward, there was just a lot of pressure put on the federal government to always be dotting its I's and crossing its T's and then some or else they would lose a case. And then when they lose a case, the next time the agency has to make a decision, they're told to be that much more careful. But, you know, when it comes to what we're looking at here, we're looking at reforms to what remedies are allowed. So that's the first category upon judicial review. If an agency is found to be deficient in its NEPA report, what is a court allowed to do to that? Today, there's mixed standards. The different appellate courts, the different circuits in the nation have different standards they apply. So in some, vacature or just vacating the entire decision is held to be the only, the sole remedy. No matter how small the error, you have to throw out the whole decision and the agency has to kind of go back to square one and go through the process. And if it wants to try to permit it, you know, go from start to finish again. And then in many other circuits, there's this two factor test called the allied signal test, which is like how severe was the error and how costly would it be to, you know, to remedy it or something like that. And those are two very subjective factors.
And so it basically makes things very unpredictable for developers. And so remedy, I think, is the most important area of reform. I think that what we're likely, what the SPEED Act does is it says you just can't vacate and you can't enjoin things. I think what we may be headed towards is some compromise position where Democrats and Republicans agree we're going to meaningfully raise the bar on what it would take in order to vacate a decision.
Daniel Palken:
Other areas of NEPA and judicial review reform are super easy to remember because they all begin with S. So you have scope, standing, statute of limitations, and the standard of review. Standard of review is, you know, what do you evaluate the agency's decision on? This was actually changed recently by the Supreme Court in the seven counties ruling. They set up a substantial deference standard and said that you should afford substantial deference to the agency. This is like a really interesting area of like Democrat-Republican psychology, because six out of seven days of the week, Democrats are the party that want to afford a lot of deference to federal agencies in making decisions. But of course, when it comes to permitting decisions, the valence flips. And Republicans who are cheering the Loper Bright ruling and saying, yay, less discretion for agencies, are now the party that is very happy to say agencies should have a lot of discretion in making decisions around permitting. And Democrats are like, no, no, no.
Robinson Meyer:
That's a whole running story, though, because the Reagan administration initially created... In fact, Neil Gorsuch's mom, as a Reagan official, initially created Chevron deference, and then it turned out that Republicans hated this thing they had done. But We're now in such the legal history weeds that we've alienated all but our five law professor listeners.
Daniel Palken:
For the two listeners left, yeah, the statute of limitations is simple. It's how long you have to bring a lawsuit. Today, it adopts the standard from the Administrative Procedure Act, which is six years, which is a long cloud of legal uncertainty to hang over a project. Standing is who can bring a lawsuit. So Article 3 of the Constitution provides some basic guidance on that. You have to have some particularized harm that's redressable, et cetera, et cetera. But there are some laws that have what's called exhaustion provisions, which say that in order to bring this litigation, you have to have put the agency on notice in the public engagement period that you have this issue. You can't just bring it de novo in a lawsuit for the first time and allege that the agency was missing something you didn't even tell them about. So there's a question of would you put some sort of standing requirement in? And then there's scope, which is what does NEPA apply to in the first place? There's questions of upstream, downstream, right? If you're permitting, you know, some pipeline, but it causes emissions downstream of it or upstream of it. But there's also questions of what types of action, you know, should NEPA apply to decisions that are made by the federal government, like an agency like, you know, the Bonneville Power Administration and on federal lands and waters? And should it also apply to federal spending decisions? Right. There's kind of an irony in the energy space where Democrats, most of the money they gave to clean energy under the Biden administration was given through tax credits, which are exempt from NEPA because it's really a ministerial duty of the IRS to just let the credits be claimed. But when it's the government's own Department of Energy or Department of Commerce making a decision, all of a sudden, here's several years of NEPA review and six years of legal exposure and you might lose the lawsuit and et cetera, et cetera. So do you want to do something about that is one of the questions that comes up.
Robinson Meyer:
I mean, that goes back to one of the big fights between liberals and leftists about the Inflation Reduction Act, a fight I should add, which didn't appear until after the law was passed. Passed, but now I'm being too grumpy, which is that people said that simply doing the amount of clean energy that the build out that the IRA tried to do through the tax credit was de-risking and it should have happened through the federal government instead, instead of just kind of, encouraging the private developers to do it. That is partially because of NEPA. It all comes back to anyway, let's get into two more buckets and then we're going to move the conversation along. So these changes to the Clean Water Act, I think that is going to make a lot of people very nervous because the Clean Water Act, unlike NEPA, creates big substantive protections. It's like the Clean Air Act. This is a substantive environmental law. It creates a lot of substantive environmental protections for the American people. And my understanding is that the mooted changes to the Clean Water Act are primarily around this question about pipelines crossing bodies of water. This has been a Republican goal of permitting reform basically since it became clear this would have to be a bipartisan deal because of the Senate filibuster.
Robinson Meyer:
Tell us a little bit about this passage and then tell us basically, I mean, is this kind of good for pipelines and climate advocates are just going to have to eat it because the rest of the package is so good for clean energy? Or are there other projects here that are as affected by this Clean Water Act title as pipelines are, and there could be some upside for other types of energy projects beyond just oil and gas pipelines, presumably.
Daniel Palken:
Yeah. So the answer is yes to all of that. It is a set of reforms that primarily has pipelines in mind, but that may also have meaningful upside for other forms of energy, including transmission lines and including, depending on how the reforms are done, potentially hydropower could also potentially have implications for wind and solar and other projects that are in wetlands or have have a nexus with federal waters.
But the reforms we're looking at specifically there likely center on two sections of the Clean Water Act. And you're right to point out at the outset that the Clean Water Act, unlike NEPA and unlike the National Historic Preservation Act, by the way, is a substantive, not a procedural law, but it also has procedural elements. And most of the reforms were really all of the reforms that I would imagine we're talking about here are reforms to procedure within the Clean Water Act. So nobody is talking about, to my knowledge, changing the substantive standards for effluent discharge or for water quality within the Clean Water Act, which is a really important distinction. And so the sections we're talking about in primarily Section 401, which is the state certification section, and then also potentially some changes to Section 404, which is where permits are granted for dredge and fill operations. When you're laying a pipeline or sometimes a transmission line, you're going to have to dredge up some sediment on the bottom and the body of water, the wetland, the stream, and that's going to, you know, discharge, you know, potential pollutants downstream of you.
And so there's things called nationwide permits, which grant the ability to do certain categories of activities for periods at a time. And there's talk of extending the duration of those nationwide permits from five to 10 years. So that's one sort of reform. But the more interesting reforms kind of center around Section 401, which that's a section. So if you read the language of it, it says something like it covers any time the federal government grants a permit to conduct any activity that may result in any discharge into the navigable waters. And so all of those words have almost like a Talmudic level of case law.
Robinson Meyer:
And regulatory text. Well, famously, and to introduce those uninitiated readers, the Clean Water Act, large sections of it apply to the waters of the United States. And despite the fact that this is now a 50-year-old law, we've spent 50 years arguing about what falls under the ambit of the waters of the United States, but that's neither here nor there.
Daniel Palken:
What the Clean Water Act does in Section 401 is it basically it's regulating, there's words like discharge and activity. And this is kind of where the crux of it is, is what is meant by those words. Does a discharge mean you're actually putting something out of something? There's phrases like direct discharge, which don't show up in the law, but which sometimes show up in the regulation. Activity is obviously a broader word that shows up in the statute near discharge. And And so a lot of the fights are really around exactly how do you use the words activity discharge? Do you use words like direct in conjunction with them? Do you change the role of the states vis-a-vis the feds? And all of these things, especially kind of the wordplay things, have a lot of implications that probably won't be perfectly understood unless and until you enact a law and kind of see how it plays out. But the more you cabinet to the direct impacts of something on water quality, because some of what is at debate here is that blue states in particular have used the Clean Water Act to deny or consider denying pipelines, gas pipelines in particular, for reasons that don't really have to do with water quality directly. So sometimes you'll see a state like New York say, we have a climate law. And the climate law says you can't emit so much emissions. And we know this pipeline is moving gas and that gas is going to be emitted somewhere. So therefore, we can't certify this pipeline. And pipeline companies have cried foul at that. And so to fix that, you're going to have to play around with some of these words or otherwise change Section 401 of the Clean Water Act to make it so that states can't do that. There's other tactics, too. There's something called like the withdraw and resubmit tactic, where some states there's a statutory deadline in the Clean Water Act. It says you have one year if you're a state to respond to a request for certification from a developer. And so some states got the clever idea that instead of responding within a year, what you could do is at day 364, tell the applicant that their application was incomplete and they needed to submit more information and send it back to them. And then, you know, 364 days later, rinse and repeat. The courts have somewhat tamped down on that, but there's questions of would you want to apply some fix to that statutorily? And then there's a constellation of questions around that. But they all have the focus of making sure that the Clean Water Act really is about water, preserving the substantive protections, because that is something that I just think that Democrats and a lot of Republicans aren't going to want to change, and making it easier to build linear infrastructure in particular. And I think it will apply more in practice to pipelines than to transmission lines for reasons we could get into, but it has definite potential upside for transmission lines as well.
Robinson Meyer:
This recent addition to the process, the NHPA, the National Historic Preservation Act, This was not part of the discussion. So the National Historic Preservation Act, my understanding, is a procedural law. It requires the government to study kind of cultural sites, places of architectural significance, of which the definition can be quite broad, before it conducts a project. It requires various forms of consultation. It was not part of the permitting reform conversation, to my understanding, until Senator Lee introduced it as a topic perhaps six or eight weeks ago. What's kind of on the table with this law?
Daniel Palken:
Yeah, a little more than six or eight weeks ago. So he started with a hearing on it several months ago at this point. And, you know, to understand why this law kind of makes it into the debate, you want to understand a little bit of the inside baseball of congressional politics. A lot of how permitting reform has grown up has been shaped by the peculiar jurisdictions of the different committees as discussed, right? I think that it's a common fiction, but I think it's not correct that like transmission is the democratic ask and NEPA is the Republican ask, you know, and things like that. In reality, I think changes to both of those laws done well have meaningful upsides for both parties' priorities, as we've already discussed at length. But, you know, NEPA is in the Environment and Public Works Committee's jurisdiction and Transmission Federal Power Act is in the Energy and Natural Resource Committee's jurisdiction. So people are always looking for things, you know, when you're the chair of that committee or a member of that committee was to justify a vote, you're not getting to vote on the other part of the deal.
Robinson Meyer:
Crucially, Senator Heinrich, who has been on the show in the past year, is actually going to be on again in the next few weeks, is a big transmission advocate and is on the ranking Democratic member of Energy and Natural Resources. So lots of transmission policy has to flow through that committee kind of on the Democratic side, so to speak.
Daniel Palken:
Yeah. And so Senator Lee said, well, you know, I really, in my state, I've seen a lot of problems throughout the West with siting things due to the National Historic Preservation Act, which, as you know, is kind of this almost sister law to NEPA, but for historic properties rather than just other environmental harms. And the law was enacted around the same era as many of these other statutes. I think it was something like 1966. It's called a stop, look and listen law. So that's kind of the moniker it goes by. And what it requires you to do when you're an agency is if you have some federal nexus, so you're making some decision to permit something on your land or spend federal money, just like under NEPA, you have to first identify, you know, who the stakeholders are. So usually states and tribes, these offices called SHIPOs and TIPOs, state and tribal historic preservation offices. And then you identify the area that your project is going to impact. And then you identify any historic properties within that area. And then you have like a consultation process to see what, if anything, you're going to do about the potential impacts of your infrastructure on that. So sounds simple enough, but like the there's a lot of devil in a lot of details. So like when you build a transmission line, like the Sunzia line was famously held up in Martin Heinrich state of New Mexico.
Robinson Meyer:
A lot of the endgame delays in Sunzia came down to the use of the National Historic Preservation Act.
Daniel Palken:
Yeah, huge NHPA litigation that happened way more than six years after it kind of there was some somewhat novel jurisprudence on, you know, I said earlier, there's a six year statute of limitations that applies to NEPA. And also, you know, we thought to the National Historic Preservation Act. But the appellate court at the time overturned a district court and decided to rule that if the agency was kind of granting these decisions to move forward on specific construction steps, that itself was an independent agency action. And a new six-year clock was started each time an agency did that. So that project was something like 14 years into permitting when it lost an HPA suit. And it's now operational, right? It's supplying a bunch of energy, you know, through that power line. And it's still under litigation. And there's some risk that it could be stopped. They could tell that you have to shut down.
Robinson Meyer:
The organization, let's just put this in climate terms, the organization Archaeology Southwest, which has been leading a lot of that litigation, during the period of litigation, or at least quite recently, a pipeline was built through the same area. And I asked the head of that organization on the record, why are you fighting this clean energy project when a pipeline was built through the same area? And his answer was basically, well, the pipeline isn't like, it doesn't have big towers. And so I don't care about it. Like I care about the transmission line, even though notionally, this was an environmental protest. He was basically like, oh, pipeline, whatever, that's fine. And so there are ways in which, at least in the Sun Zia case, the NHPA wound up actually prioritizing the wrong kind of energy, so to speak.
Daniel Palken:
So there's a huge asymmetry is what you're getting at, which is correct, between objects that are tall and objects that are not tall when it comes to the NHPA. And you can just see this, there was a Ben Shiffman at the Institute for Progress just published a little explorer website like earlier this week in which he maps out what are the visual areas of potential impact. Yeah, the areas of visual impact that are considered for these different transmission lines, pipelines, gas producing projects, you know, what have you. And it turns out that the transmission lines, it's called an area of potential effect. That's how far away radially you look from the line. Pretty typical distance is three to five miles. For Sunzia, they did five miles. So you had to go five miles in either direction from the line in order to see is anything being visually impacted. If you're on the mall in D.C. near the historic buildings there, that's like worrying about the visual impact of something in Fort Tyne. Like that's a very far distance. And so for a line like Sun Zia, which is hundreds of miles long, the area swept out that they had to consider the impacts on anything of was about twice the size of Delaware.
And you would expect to see that pretty much any time you build a transmission line of comparable size, especially in the West where there's a lot of large open landscapes. Some of the lines in Schiffman's database had actually APEs up to 25 miles, and some of the offshore infrastructure had areas of potential effect of 40 miles or more. Some of them were set by the curvature of the Earth. This is a law that I think it's fair to say has, in certain cases, some excesses where you could apply a rule of reason and say maybe we don't need to look that far away in order to determine who is really materially suffering from this. And you're right. It does accrue more to tall infrastructure. So that's wind. But also solar has surprisingly far APEs. A lot of the solar has five miles. Anything that's within five miles can claim that there's some visual impact.
And then there's a whole process. Unlike NEPA, which has been litigated at the Supreme Court almost a dozen times, I don't think there's any major Supreme Court cases for the NHPA, which means the case law is a bit more incoherent and scattershot. One circuit says this, another circuit says it's actually kind of this way.
And so it depends where in the country you are. It's a less litigated law than NEPA. And it is particularly acute out West. Like when I've done kind of my own informal survey of developers where when this kind of came on the scene, I called up a bunch of transmission developers who I know and said, you know, is this law a problem for you? And the ones out east were like, you know, not that much. Sometimes there was one out east that said it had been a big problem. The ones out west, I actually wrote down the phrases. They used phrases like atomic risk and nightmare. There was really a lot of like this law is imposing a lot of burden on us and it's forcing us into these multi-party negotiations with dozens of states and tribes at once. And if any one of them decides that they don't like what we're doing, then there's a big lawsuit and it's potentially years in a Sunzia-like result. And so it's a big deterrent when you're trying to finance a big project and you go to a bank and they say, you know, well, what are the risks? And, you know, the few samples of transmission that have been built you can point to have things like the Sunzia case, which has been a real albatross there.
I think there's a zone of reasonableness on reforms to NHPA. I think, you know, I haven't spoken to the other side of this, but there are real tribal equities. We have not treated tribes well historically in this country. And I would be remiss not to say the NHPA is there for a reason. There's a lot of nexus with tribes. They have a lot of historic resources. Sometimes those resources are not on the reservation they live on because they have been forcibly moved in their history. And so they have a legitimate claim to say, well, we have a burial ground or we have sites that are sacred to us far from us. And that's all fair. And like you want to strike a balance with reforms to this law that make sure you really are capturing the things that are really important to people. But you are also recognizing we don't live in a tradeoff free world. And if we can carve out some of the more egregious cases, we can have a law that really works well enough for everyone.
Robinson Meyer:
I think it's important that the U.S. has made this commitment that basically before there's a big infrastructure project out west, we look to see that it's not going to build across. I mean, this is inspired by decades of cultural and ethnic cleansing, right? I mean, out west that like we write that like before there's a big infrastructure project built, you make sure that there's no major tribal equities there. I think the issue with Sunzia became that actually the developer of Sunzia had documented and found, and I think in some cases rerouted around major tribal equities, the claim that the archaeology Southwest was making was that the entire valley that this project had to cross through, in order to get was a historic resource and therefore, could not be moved through at all. And actually what they wanted to do was send the project into, a very, very low-income community in Tucson. It was a whole mess.
Daniel Palken:
And that's actually a really good microcosm of a lot of permitting, right? Because in permitting debates, you kind of end up of, well, do we build where there's nobody? But there are people who will come out and say, don't do that. That's pristine wilderness. Do we build where there are people? And people will say, don't do that. Those are your low-income neighborhoods in Houston. They have been burdened enough. Or maybe you think you can find some magic sweet spot where there's nobody, but there used to be people, so it's previously disturbed. But in those places, you can be sure somebody's going to make a historic preservation argument. So there's nowhere you can build without upsetting people. Now, that's not to say we should just throw up our hands and say, well, you can build anywhere now. But it really is like every parochial interest has a reason you shouldn't build near them. And what we need to do in this country, what policymakers should do, is say, we're going to make it somewhat easier to build in all of those places without treading on the things that are sacred about any of them.
Robinson Meyer:
I think that's right. And I found this whole episode quite radicalizing because for someone affiliated with the Center for Biological Diversity to tell me on the record that a valley, a massive valley, which was a beautiful place. I mean, I went to it while I was reporting on this story. It's a beautiful landscape. You cannot build a transmission line through a valley because that would hurt the entire valley as a cultural resource. But you could build a natural gas pipeline, Because that was just a little thing. It just went through the valley. If we are now at the place where it's like whole swaths of land are off limits to clean energy development, to transmission, to the clean electricity economy that we allegedly are trying to build to avert, global climate change, but it's fine to build fossil fuels there, then we might as well. I was just like, I can go home. I'm going to switch beats. You know, like if this is an amazing story.
Daniel Palken:
Yeah.
Robinson Meyer:
If this is what advocates are doing, I have to say, I got into this podcast being like, we're going to get talk about the pros and cons of permitting reform. Like we're going to talk about it. And now it has brought back reporting to me so viscerally that I've just been like, and then remember this.
Robinson Meyer:
Back during the Biden administration, during phase two of permitting, Congress passed these page limit and time limit restrictions. I think there's a sense that they didn't work or they haven't worked as well as maybe we had hoped. Why don't page limits, time limits work?
Daniel Palken:
I mean, I think it's a little it's a little premature to say, you know, so they were passed in May of 2023. I think we have seen time improvements. But the simple reason why, you know, there's two reasons why they don't work in a vacuum. One is that there were loopholes, which I mentioned. So the, you know, one year, two year timelines start when the agency determines that they're going to prepare a NEBA report, what's called the notice of intent stage. Well, an agency can simply defer doing that. So an agency can do a bunch of, quote unquote, pre-application stuff for as long as it wants. And then once it's been going two years, say we're starting the NEPA process. So that's a pretty obvious loophole.
The appendix loophole for the page limits you know if you have 10 000 extra pages of stuff you want to write you can put it in the appendix and circumvent the 150 page you know eis limit in that circumstance but the broader the more fundamental reason why time and page limits on their own are not likely to work is the reason nipa takes a long time is because when it doesn't agencies get sued sometimes for very legitimate deficiencies but sometimes for deficiencies that are quite small and probably wouldn't change by any reasonable person's estimation, the outcome of the agency decision. And if you're not changing any of that, if you're not saying that, you know, we're raising the bar on how big an error you have to make in order to have your decision overturned, but you're only saying you have to fit it into a shorter number of pages and do it quicker, you're actually potentially engineering a worse result. You're potentially engineering a result where agencies have to go quick and have to be concise. And by definition, that means missing certain things in the text, which creates all the more opportunities for litigants to come in and say, we're going to sue you. And then a court looking at existing case law in seven counties. Maybe helps with some of this, but it doesn't help with a lot of it because a lot of the things that Seven County appears to do, it does in dicta. It does in things that aren't part of the actual holding so that other courts are not bound to obey it. And different courts have really different feelings about NEPA. So the Ninth Circuit is generally a very progressive circuit and it interprets NEPA like a pretty left-wing organization that is willing to say, we don't want any of these things to go through unless everything is perfect. And the Fifth Circuit is a much more like oil and gas industry friendly circuit, which is willing to say almost anything can move. And you have a whole spectrum between those two. And so I think a lot of the reason those things don't work is because you need to actually change some of the substance of what's under consideration and how it's under consideration in order to get the results you're driving at through the page and time limits.
Robinson Meyer:
Something I've heard about this go at permitting reform is that this might be it. Now, maybe that isn't true. But what I've heard is basically, you know, next Congress, it's unlikely to be as productive for permitting reform as this Congress will be. Of course, something I've also heard is that if Democrats want to set themselves up to do big public investments in the energy system, when the next president takes office, whoever that may be in 2029, then you need to get the statutory changes. And now because the implementation will then take long enough that it won't really start to kick in until 29.
But why is it important that this happens now that this Congress finds a deal as opposed to future Congresses?
Daniel Palken:
This goes back to more inside baseball, but like, you know, the Senator Whitehouse and Senator Heinrich, we mentioned near the top are two Democratic senators who are really eager to find if there's a workable bipartisan space for a deal by all outward indications. You know, it's not a given that every Democrat and every Republican, for that matter, you know, feels exactly that way. So part of it is just we have a cadre of four senators at the top of these committees on both Democratic and Republican side who are really approaching this constructively and in good faith. That doesn't mean success is guaranteed, but there's going to be turnover next Congress. So with Senator Durbin, who's currently the head of the Judiciary Committee retiring, there seems to be a good likelihood that Senator Whitehouse will head over to the Judiciary Committee. And then you'll likely get someone like Senator Merkley atop the Environment and Public Works Committee. Now, Senator Merkley is by some measures on environmental issues, the most progressive senator.
It just may be hard for him to find a bipartisan deal space between someone like Senator Merkley on the one hand and something that like President Trump might sign off on on the other hand. The usual status quo in D.C., the default assumption we should have is that there's a non-overlapping Venn diagram space between Democrats and Republicans on any given issue that like isn't NDAA and doesn't have to pass. And the reason we know that is because most issues don't pass major reforms in their space most years. And so the presumption should be that it's very hard to pass something. And then in the House, you have a situation where, you know, if you go on polymarket, it will tell you that Democrats have a meaningfully better than not chance of taking the House. And I think that the people who will chair the relevant House committees, I think there's some level of interest in exploring permitting reform, but they haven't been at it, you know, for as long in the way that Senator Whitehouse and Heinrich have. And I kind of think that we have been very blessed with some senators atop these committees now that really have a vision on this, right? I haven't said this explicitly, but one of the things that really is the motive force that is enabling permitting to happen is that both sides don't agree on much, but they agree on one crucial fact, which is that their resources are better than the other side's resources. Republicans have an absolute conviction that in a free market that, you know, gas and coal and sometimes nuclear will outcompete, you know, Democrats' resources. And Democrats have an absolute conviction that wind and solar and sometimes nuclear will out-compete Republicans' resources. And, you know, the market is going to determine who is correct on that. But the fact that both sides – and it's good that both sides – we would want – you know, it would be weird if people were supporting resources they had no confidence in. The fact that both sides have confidence in their resources is kind of what is enabling this to happen in the first place. Because if either side, like, firmly believed that the other side's resources were better, they wouldn't want to do something necessarily that enables the other side. So those are kind of the elements of what I think makes this Congress a particularly ripe environment. And also there's one other thing, which is next Congress is a presidential election cycle. And it's harder to do something much harder the closer you get to a presidential election where everybody's distracted versus a congressional midterm election.
Robinson Meyer:
From the deal, as you currently understand it or think it might look like, who are the winners and losers of this deal? Can you answer that?
Daniel Palken:
I think it's a very positive some deal. So I'm going to name for you a lot more winners. And I don't think there are truly any losers of a permitting deal. I'm not just saying that to be diplomatic, but I do think there are some constituencies that get nervous enough that they perceive themselves to be potential losers. And it's the job of government affairs departments for companies, right? We'll get into this in a second. But like if you're in the government affairs department of a company and there's a deal that's moving along and like the median outcome, if you go 10 years down the road, is like there's a more thriving, vibrant economy that's cleaner and that you get more of an opportunity to compete with
Robinson Meyer:
50 other thin margin. That's not your job at all.
Daniel Palken:
You don't care about any of that. You could be fired overnight if it's found out that you let a law pass that, you know, caused your company to have even one project canceled or bid out to somebody else. So there's a huge small C conservative bias within companies, especially in heavily regulated businesses like utilities, where a lot that happens is downstream of what FERC and the federal government's rules are. So, you know, first, let's talk about winners, right? Winners are anybody that's trying to build this infrastructure within the confines of what are still very important substantive and procedural requirements on how to conduct business. But it has just become very hard to build things in the United States. And, you know, another winner, therefore, is all of the kind of demand side industries that depend on cheap, affordable, abundant, available, resilient, reliable electricity. Right. So that's everybody from the very largest data centers and aluminum smelters to you and me. It will be a brighter, better future for you and me and our electric bills, I believe, in the medium to long run if we pass reforms that grow the headroom on our grid so we're not constantly in a situation where supply is short of demand on a very inelastic good, which leads to, of course, very high prices. And then national security is a big winner. You know, I talked earlier about what if we live in a world where You know, China has access to the zero-day hacks of all of the bedrock software of our utility and water and military systems, and we have none of that because we're two years behind them on a technology that, you know, doubles in its quality every six months. And to say nothing of electricity's role in being able to manufacture advanced technologies of the future, you know, warfare for better or worse seems to be largely a contest of drones fighting other drones in foreign theaters and having the energy supply to be able to manufacture these things and keep up with China is no small task that we have ahead of us because they're the most formidable manufacturing power in the world today. So there are a lot of winners when it comes to everybody from individual, you know, residential rate payers to medium to large companies to the nation's security footing as a whole to, you know, workers, both union and non-union go down the list on the side of, you know, are there people that potentially oppose this or view themselves as losers? I don't want to paint with a broad brush here, but there are parts of the environmental constituencies, folks like you were talking about earlier, who litigate these projects, often for some reason indiscriminately litigate the ones that are associated with non-emitting energy sources even more, who will see taking away those litigation hooks and making it so we build more of these things and it's harder to challenge them for sometimes frivolous reasons as a negative. So there's definitely that constituency. Then there's the question of utilities. And, you know, when it comes to utilities, you really can't paint with a super broad brush. Where each one stands depends on where each one sits. But at a high level, it's counterintuitive that utilities would be the stakeholder group of all groups that is like, we don't like transmission. Because the first thing you learn about utilities and utility class is they like building things. They want to build more infrastructure so they can put more stuff into rate base and make a greater regulated return. Transmission is a thing that they build, so why don't they want more transmission built? And the reason is that the types of transmission we're talking about trying to build in a bill or what are called regional and particularly inter-regional transmission. By definition, regional and inter-regional transmission is transmission that goes between utility service territories. So by definition, it is not within any one utility's territory to serve.
And therefore, there is no obvious God-given reason why the home utility would get to build that transmission because there is no one home utility. And in fact, in recognition of the fact that there's no such God-given reason, regulators at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission have created rules where if a line is above a certain size or insignificance, it gets bid out competitively. And utilities would, in the main, rather not have that happen. They would rather have a monopoly on lines, and so they would rather build within the territory. That's the first reason. The second reason is that even worse than being a line that bridges multiple territories and therefore doesn't necessarily get to get built by you, whatever's on the other side of it doesn't get to get built by you. Maybe it's just picking up spare power that's being curtailed in another region. Maybe somebody is building a gas plant or a wind farm or a nuclear plant or a geothermal on the other side of it. But that somebody probably isn't you because that somebody isn't in your territory. So there's a bit of a market failure here where like we try to run an electric sector, but, you know, the electric sector is a mix of kind of market forces. We have these things, you know, these RTOs that really create functional markets and then, you know, old school monopoly vertical integration and transmission is some weird thing that occupies a hinterland between them where it's like, you know, territory on territory competition. It's we're linking up these territories. So they kind of, even if they don't want to, there's a kind of rudimentary form of competition where one is just naturally positioned to sell into the other, which is a good thing for consumers, which is why the hyperscalers down to a lot of just ratepayer advocate groups all support the transmission side. But there are definitely parochial interests. Now, I personally view that as like overstated. I think that a growing pie is good for everybody, including the utilities. And utilities have a much brighter future in a world where the U.S. Is able to structurally grow load, which is synonymous with structurally growing the economy at a healthy clip over the next several decades. And people are falling into this government affairs staffer trap where they're mitigating against the unlikely outcome that could get them fired one day, rather than thinking about the kind of median growth trajectory of the company. But that's kind of my answer to your question of who are the perceived winners and losers.
Robinson Meyer:
Well, there's so much more we could talk about, but we're going to have to leave it there. Daniel Falcon, thank you so much for joining us on Shift Key. This has been a fantastic discussion.
Daniel Palken:
Rob, thank you for the conversation and thank you for having me.
Robinson Meyer:
And that will do it for us this week. We'll be back later this week, I think, with the new episode of Shift Key, but don't hold us to it. It's a it's a funny season here. Stick around for the end of this episode, by the way. We have a whole great conversation between Heatmap Labs and former Energy Secretary Jennifer Granholm, Just join the board of our sponsor, Tandem PV. Stick around for that.
Daniel Palken:
It should be great.
Robinson Meyer:
Until then, ShiftKey is a production of Heatmap News. Our editors are Jillian Goodman and Nico Lauricella. Multimedia editing and audio engineering is by Jacob Lambert and Nick Woodbury. Our music is by Adam Kromelow. Thanks so much for listening. We'll see you soon.
Jennifer Granholm:
Tandem PV has shown over 30% efficient, which means roughly a 20 to 40% more electricity from the same footprint, depending on what you're comparing it to. That is game-changing. And, you know, for people who are listening, why does it matter that it's so much more efficient? Because every additional percentage point of efficiency lowers the amount of land and steel and wiring, and labor, and installation, all of that needed for every megawatt that you build. And that means lower costs, and that means faster deployment.
Mike Munsell:
That was Jennifer Granholm, the former Secretary of Energy, former Governor of Michigan, and newly minted board member of Tandem PV. And I'm Mike Munsell, HeatMaps Vice President of Partnerships. In today's conversation, I sit down with Secretary Granholm and Tandem PV CEO Scott Wharton to discuss why Granholm is so excited about perovskites. Secretary Granholm, Scott Wharton, welcome to Shift Key.
Scott Wharton:
Hi.
Jennifer Granholm:
Thanks so much.
Mike Munsell:
Jennifer, how did Tandem PV and Scott first get on your radar? And what was your first impression of the company?
Jennifer Granholm:
As you can imagine, I've spent the last several years talking with companies across the clean energy ecosystem. And after leaving government, I wanted to stay close to the technologies that I felt could really move the needle. So I happened to be a big fan of perovskite technology. And I met Saritha Peruri, who's part of Scott's team at Tandem at a clean tech event. And she invited me to visit. Plus, they were a DOE-supported company, so I knew they were good because companies don't get DOE support unless their technology has been thoroughly vetted. And people I respect kept mentioning them as one of the most exciting next-generation solar companies. Then I met Scott and the rest of the team. And Scott has such an interesting background because he comes from a tech-to-manufacturing perspective. And so what struck me wasn't just the science, although, of course, the science is remarkable. It was that Tandem was obsessed with manufacturing and commercialization. Former governor of Michigan, I'm obsessed with manufacturing in the United States. I've certainly seen a lot of breakthrough technologies that never make it out of the lab. And Tandem was singularly focused on how you can actually build an American company that can compete globally. That sold me.
Mike Munsell:
And now you're on the board. So I guess, Scott, on your side, why did you think Jennifer was the right person to join Tandem's board?
Scott Wharton:
Well, like a lot of people listening here, I got to know Jennifer from watching her on TV and obviously being our energy secretary. And from that, I had a positive experience. But I really, as I got to know her better, I had an even more positive experience. For example, when Jennifer came on the factory tour with us, a lot of the other people with her stature would come with a big entourage and come with a lot of the answers. But I found that she came by herself and she's incredibly down to earth and asked a lot of thoughtful questions, very respectful for the team. So I just became more impressed with her. And then we actually had a dinner together with Saritha and really just got to know her better as a person than I was sold. And I'm so pleased to have Jennifer as a partner and on the board.
Mike Munsell:
Jennifer, you've seen a lot of clean energy companies over the years through your role as Secretary of Energy, Governor of Michigan. What made you want to go beyond being supportive and actually join the board?
Jennifer Granholm:
Great question. I mean, I've actually been more selective about where I spend my time. And for me, I guess three things have to line up. First, the technology has got to solve a real problem, not just be incrementally better, but really solve a problem. And then second, the leadership's got to be exceptional. And third, there has to be a path to manufacturing at scale. And Tandem checked all three of those boxes. We're entering into an era where obviously electricity demand is growing because of AI and advanced manufacturing and electrification. And we need dramatically more electricity. And of course, the fastest and cheapest source we have today is solar. So making every panel significantly more productive has enormous implications. You know, people sometimes ask whether I'm optimistic about meeting this moment. And I truly am because innovation has always surprised us. And Tandem is definitely one of those innovations I'm really proud to be affiliated with.
Mike Munsell:
Let's dive into that. For listeners who may not follow solar closely, what should they understand about perovskite-silicon tandem solar cells, and why does it matter now?
Jennifer Granholm:
Yeah, I think about it this way. I mean, today's silicon solar panels are already one of the cheapest ways to generate electricity, if not the cheapest. But they are approaching sort of practical limits of how much sunlight they can convert into electricity. And perovskite allows you to capture parts of the solar spectrum that silicon alone doesn't capture efficiently. So by stacking the two materials together, you get substantially more electricity from the same panel footprint. And today's commercial silicon panels are generally in the low 20s for efficiency. The very best maybe are around 25%. Tandem PV has shown over 30% efficient, which, you know, means roughly a 20 to 40% more electricity from the same footprint, depending on what you're comparing it to. That is game-changing. And, you know, for people who are listening, why does it matter that it's so much more efficient? Because every additional percentage point of efficiency lowers the amount of land and steel and wiring and labor and installation. All of that needed for every megawatt that you build, and that means lower costs, and that means faster deployment. And at a time when we're trying to power AI data centers and factories and communities, while affordability is on the tip of everybody's tongue, this is exactly the kind of innovation that we need.
Mike Munsell:
And after your secretary of energy role, you could be spending your time on a lot of different things. When you decided to join Tandem's board, you were making a real bet on the company and on this moment in clean energy.
If we're talking five years from now, what would make you say that was exactly the right bet?
Jennifer Granholm:
I love this question. I'd measure it in a few ways. I'd say first that in five years, Tandem is manufacturing at meaningful scale here in the United States. And they've already started, but really taken this whole technology to scale. I want us making the technologies of the future and not importing all of them. I want us in the United States making those. So that's number one. Second, that utilities and businesses and homeowners are getting more affordable electricity because higher efficiency solar is driving the cross down. That would make me super happy five years from now. And then maybe one other thing, which is, you know, I would love it if people look back and say that this was one of those technologies that changed the economics of clean energy. You know, solar is cheap, and this can really take it to the next level. When we invent and we build and we manufacture, America wins. And if in five years from now, Tandem has helped to prove that advanced solar can be invented here and manufactured here and deployed around the world. I will feel very good about this decision.
Mike Munsell:
And how would you feel about that, Scott?
Scott Wharton:
I think I feel pretty good, too.
Jennifer Granholm:
I would hope so.
Scott Wharton:
It's like we're on a path to do it, a lot more to do, but that's the dream I think we should hear.
Jennifer Granholm:
Yeah, it's exciting, exciting times.
Mike Munsell:
Anything else either you want to touch on?
Scott Wharton:
Just really grateful for having the partnership with Jennifer and look forward to realizing all the things we just talked about.
Jennifer Granholm:
Amen, brother.
Mike Munsell:
Well, thank you so much for taking the time today.
Scott Wharton:
Thank you.
Jennifer Granholm:
Thanks so much, you guys.
Mike Munsell:
That will wrap up our mini-series with Tandem PV. If you missed any conversation, tune in to the previous two episodes of Shift Key. Thanks for listening.
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Robinson Meyer:
Hello, it's October 16, and the Senate is considering a bipartisan permitting bill. Last month, a group of four senators, two Republicans and two Democrats, introduced the Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act. That is “BAAJA” or “bei-ja.” I've been flipping between the two pronunciations.
At the heart of that bill is a compromise.
The bill would make it easier to build, and in some cases mandate, lots of types of new infrastructure that are essential for decarbonization, including long-distance power lines. It would also make it easier in some cases to build natural gas pipelines. So how should Democrats, and climate hawks more broadly, think about such a compromise?
Is there any case in which lawmakers should accept building more fossil-fuel infrastructure in exchange for a lot of climate-friendly or decarbonization or electrification-friendly measures? Well, joining us today is someone who is among the most cited authors on this topic. Peter Erickson is an affiliated researcher at the Stockholm Environment Institute. He's written some of the most important papers on why it's essential to look at fossil fuel infrastructure, and specifically fossil fuel supply infrastructure, when considering climate policy. He wrote a very influential paper, as you'll hear, on the Keystone XL pipeline, arguing that that pipeline would have created way more carbon emissions than the State Department thought at the time.
He's since become an expert witness testifying against fossil fuel infrastructure in court cases, and I'm pretty sure he's been cited in more court cases about fossil fuel infrastructure and fossil fuel supply than any other climate researcher. But in recent years, he has taken a nuanced approach to the question.
He's come to think that some of the claims about fossil fuel infrastructure are perhaps running ahead of the science. He joins me on this episode of Shift Key to discuss the long arc of his work, because I think in tracking his work, you can see the evolution of a very important approach to climate policy and where that approach may go next in years to come.
You'll also get a sense of what all of this could mean for “BAAJA” or “bei-ja” or whatever we're calling it. I'm Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap News, and all that and more, it's all coming up on Shift Key.
Peter Erickson, welcome to Shift Key.
Peter Erickson
Hi, Rob. I think this is gonna be really fun.
Robinson Meyer
Excited you're here.
Could you just describe, like, your distinct role as a fossil fuel and energy systems researcher?
Peter Erickson
So my name is Peter Erickson, and my background is in science, in geology specifically. And for the last couple of decades, my main role in the climate policy space has been to do, as best as I can, objective analysis of how climate policies would affect greenhouse gas emissions. And so that role has led me to various places, but one place that it has led me to is to be an expert witness in court cases about fossil fuel infrastructure.
And the reason that in my mind has fit into my role as a climate policy analyst is that sometimes information is surfaced or brought forward by project proponents into these permitting decisions. Sometimes the information that's brought forward is clearly wrong and/or it seems like the permitting decision is a proxy for the policy decision made by the government.
And because I care more than anything about good analysis being brought to these decisions, that is why I have gotten involved as an expert witness.
Robinson Meyer
Yeah, I wanna talk today about a number of papers you've written and some of your ideas in the space and kind of how they inform thinking about permitting reform, but also I think the state of climate politics in 2026 more broadly. But before we get there, I wanna start in 2014, with this paper you wrote about the Keystone XL Pipeline.
I think a lot of your writing is about the role of fossil fuel supply and how it drives greenhouse gas emissions and how climate policy should think about fossil fuel supply. But what were you doing before you got into that, and how did you get into this world of fossil fuel supply thinking?
Peter Erickson
Yeah, and the Keystone XL Pipeline is a great example because that was my entry point into the fossil fuel stuff. Before that, I was working much more on either city scale or, local scale, or international scale climate policy. So one of my major things before getting into fossil fuel supply was looking at carbon offsets.
For example, I had just been working with the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, who had commissioned me to do a study of whether carbon offsets were or were not reducing emissions under the Kyoto Protocol. So, you know, I really viewed myself, and I still do to some extent, as just, let's just look at the numbers as best we can about this type of policy, right?
And so Keystone XL came along, and I wasn't really all that interested, but I saw the State Department's environmental impact statement about it, and I thought, “This can't be right." Something is wrong if they're concluding that this major pipeline from the oil sands is not going to change emissions at all.
And so that really got me looking at this question in the first place, reading economics textbooks, talking to economists, understanding oil market dynamics.
Robinson Meyer
I realize I should make one observation that I wanna touch on before we get into the actual process here, I suppose. Which is when I read these papers, when I read your research, when I read your written work, I do see what I would describe as an evolution, or at least a change of thinking on your part about... I'm not even sure you've, like, changed your mind per se, but in some ways I, I see an evolution from a world that wasn't taking, you know, your belief that questions of fossil fuel supply were not being taken seriously at all to now maybe a concern...
It might be wrong to say that you're worried that it's gone too far, but a concern that claims being made about the role that fossil fuel supply plays in greenhouse gas emissions are, like, overstated compared to the role that it actually plays. Am I right to detect in your research a broad turn?
Peter Erickson
I think it's fair. I think it's fair to detect an evolution and a change in emphasis, perhaps. But the fundamental math has stayed, and research findings have stayed true throughout, right? I was interested in Keystone XL in the first place because I thought that truth was somewhere between it can't matter at all and it matters absolutely, right?
That is still the position I'm taking based on my research. It's just that I think we have gotten to the point with some of the fossil fuel supply discussions where not only the rhetoric, that's always been the case, but the actual evidence being brought forward in front of very serious policy venues and very serious courts is straying from what I think is defensible in some cases.
And so if you detect a change in my posture, it's because it's the exaggerated claims are no longer just on the fossil fuel side.
Robinson Meyer
Let's start with the Keystone XL Pipeline, because I think to some degree, Keystone, both for you but also for society at large, winds up setting the terms for how we talk about fossil fuel infrastructure in a new way. And this was partly by design; this was part of the point of the Keystone XL Pipeline campaign was to make people aware of the role of fossil fuel infrastructure in perpetuating climate change and worsening climate change.
What's interesting about it is that part of the question with Keystone, and this will come up again with later fossil fuel projects, comes down to this analytical question where President Obama at the time says, "We're only going to approve Keystone if it doesn't significantly worsen greenhouse gas emissions or significantly worsen climate change."
The State Department then comes out with an analysis that says basically, "No, it won't." Keystone XL Pipeline, which for readers who are blissfully younger than you or I, was a big old pipeline that was gonna connect the Albertan tar sands, a particularly carbon-intensive form of oil extraction, to refineries in the Gulf Coast, allowing a broader expansion of refinery activity.
And because of the particular chemistries of Canadian oil and fracking oil, it was going to allow for a big expansion of activity. But the US State Department came out with this analysis, and it said, “Listen, don't worry. It's only going to worsen greenhouse gas emissions by 1 to 27 million tons of CO2.” And you wrote a paper, it was in Nature Climate Change 2014, and you said, “Actually, that’s not right.” And so what did you say?
Peter Erickson
What we said was that 1 to 27 million range that the State Department came out with was only about how much dirtier the oil sands were than whatever they would be replacing out there in the market. And what we said is, that can't be the only thing, right? You have this major oil producer that is Canada. It is capacity constrained in how and whether it can get its oil to market. Keystone XL is changing that, right? That is the fundamental point of the project, is to expand the ability of Canada to get its oil to market. That is going to change oil markets and therefore oil consumption in ways globally that we can use math about.
This is not unknown. It is, as I was criticized for, using Econ 101, but we should at least bring Econ 101 to bear and look at it from that and other perspectives. And so that's why that paper got published. That's why the State Department cited our paper in a footnote, as if to say, "Look, this is the way we think it is, but it could be this other way, too."
Robinson Meyer
And what did their analysis miss? It was this idea that basically every additional barrel you bring to market slightly lowers the global cost of oil and therefore increases the global market's propensity to consume oil, right?
Peter Erickson
That's exactly right. Yeah, each additional barrel slightly lowers the price of oil in the market, and that means that consumers might drive a little more, and car companies might make cars that are slightly less efficient. it means that whole cascading chain of decisions that is affected by price.
Robinson Meyer
This has come up in previous pieces of legislation, previous policy questions as well, which is you have to think about several different systems, and they're all in equilibrium. One of them is that you're opening up this new fossil fuel resource.
You're producing fossil fuel from it. You're producing oil, in this case, from it, and that's going to slightly increase the amount of oil supply on the global market, and that is going to also make it so oil's cheaper and people burn oil. But it also seems like by decreasing the global cost of oil, you're going to keep other fossil fuel reserves off the market. You're going to, by just a little bit, lower the global cost of oil. And that's going to take, you know, potential oil fields or potential oil field upgrades that other countries or, you know, companies elsewhere in the US or North America could make that would open up new sources of oil.
It's gonna make those projects uneconomic, and therefore, they're not gonna make those investments. And that's going to tick the price of oil a little bit up from where it was. And so how do you think about this relationship between new fossil fuel or new oil supply in this case, crowding out other supply, out-competing other supply versus it creating a market for itself?
Peter Erickson
Yes, that's right. And so the way that economists or oil market economists would deal with all that equilibrium is they would look at just how sensitive the producers are and the new producers are to price. They look at how the consumers and the new consumers are sensitive to price, and they essentially, you know, balance out those different factors in a complicated or, as I've done, a really simple model of how to look at this.
And so, you know, those parameters are called elasticities. We don't need to get into them per se, but when you put that kind of basic fundamentals and math together, what you end up finding is that, for each new oil barrel brought online, abou 0.4 barrels of that are newly consumed and 0.6, that adds to 1 by design, right, are, no longer produced elsewhere.
Robinson Meyer
Has our assessment of that number changed? I'm asking only — obviously I'm reading this paper you wrote 12 years ago. Stipulate it; it's a 12-year-old paper. I think your number there is 0.6, and it's funny 'cause I was reporting on this question like a year ago, and the number a year ago was 0.4, and I was like, "Have we knocked this down by two-tenths of a barrel?"
Peter Erickson
You know, maybe by chance during the Keystone XL era, the oil market was really tight, right? An analyst thought we were way up high on the cost curve for oil where it is very steep, and so where each new unit of production costs that much more.
Or, you know, considerably more than the last unit of production. And so in that environment, like, that is the kind of environment where affecting supply really matters. But in the current oil crisis notwithstanding, we are not exactly in that world anymore. And it's reasonable to think, or at least if you believe the energy transition is happening at the speed and scale that some people think, demand goes down.
That brings us further down the supply curve into an area where it's flatter and where supply restrictions matter, or rather would have less effect on prices and emissions. So in, you know, elasticity terms, we're going from a place of low elasticity in 2014 to a place perhaps with higher elasticity going forward.
Robinson Meyer
The way we would see that, if that change was happening, is that there's now alternatives to, say, in the oil market, there's alternatives to liquid-fueled vehicles in a way that there was not alternatives to liquid-fueled vehicles like in 2014.
Peter Erickson
That is completely the biggest change. And, in Econ 101 terms, the demand curve has shifted to the left because these other alternatives are now available, and consumers are choosing for price or other reasons, other options, and they have those options available.
So there is good reason to think that going forward, and I haven't seen this published in rigorous ways yet, but going forward, the elasticity of oil supply may be higher than it was in the past. And therefore, you know, further shifts in the demand curve or shifts in the supply curve are less consequential for price than they were in the past.
Robinson Meyer
That's so interesting. Let's stay on the chronology. All of that lay ahead. So Keystone XL brings infrastructure as this big climate policy question to the forefront, and I do think it's interesting. What wound up happening, I believe, was that in the final days of his presidency, Obama then revoked the permit from the pipeline or didn't grant it.
Peter Erickson
He did. That's correct.
Robinson Meyer
It was ultimately reinstated by Trump and then partially built, and then President Biden later revoked the permit, and now we live in the world we live in. Have we ever gone back and looked? Because I think what you hear now is that a lot of oil was able to leave the tar sands even-- You know, Keystone XL basically, as I was just describing, never opened.
Peter Erickson
So, your analysis was like zero, you know, the, the Keystone XL CO2 impact was gonna be like zero to 110 million tons. Do we have a sense of where in that range we wound up?
Yeah. I don't think we really do. I mean, what I did was, you know, a forward-looking analysis. What you're suggesting is maybe there's a way to go back and look, do a backward analysis to see what actually happened. But, you know, we do know that Canada's oil was capacity constrained at times. And so, you know, they ended up building another pipeline, and you know, if you believe the Canada Energy Regulator, they may be capacity constrained again.
And so, I think there's good evidence to say that it wasn't near the zero end of that range, right? It was at least somewhere in the middle, if not higher.
Robinson Meyer
Why would it have been zero? Sorry, I just wanna — 'cause I feel like the headline of this paper is that the impact of the Keystone XL pipeline may have been way bigger than the State Department said, but the range is actually like, instead of the State Department range, which was zero to 27 million tons, yours was like zero to 110 million tons.
So what is, like, going on at the zero end of that range that would make it—
Peter Erickson
At the zero end of that range, it's just all the oil is getting to market some other way, right? And we know that didn't happen.
Robinson Meyer
Yeah. And for it to be 110, it would've been like, none of…
Peter Erickson
None of that oil was getting out otherwise.
Robinson Meyer
Do we also know that didn't happen?
Peter Erickson
Yeah, we also know that didn't happen because then they went and built, you know, the Trans Mountain Express TMX pipeline and got a lot of that oil out that way. So, you know, these are dynamic systems.
Robinson Meyer
Cool. Okay, so anyway, all of that lay in the future. So then about a decade ago, I think you wrote two papers. One is about this idea of carbon lock-in, and the other is about limiting fossil fuel production as the next big step in climate policy.
Let's talk about carbon lock-in first. So what is this idea of carbon lock-in?
Peter Erickson
Carbon lock-in is this idea that these energy systems, once you build them, especially the fossil fuel energy systems, they are able to maintain their inertia, maintain their dominance through a whole bunch of factors. But that includes economic, that includes institutional, by which I mean, you know, they have all the trade associations and community colleges and pipeline of workers that they need, and political factors, right?
They are able to continue the lobbying and other activities that keep them there as the center provider of energy for an economy.
Robinson Meyer
Is it like mostly a technical and economic story where you have these pipelines, they're expensive to build but cheap to run? I think your example is gas power plants or coal power plants as big capital-intensive projects that then once you have them, they're pretty cheap to just keep running.
So is it that's like a technical economic story? Or is it like a political story where once you have this big investment that was successful that's throwing off cash, you can reinvest a relatively small amount of that cash into your right to continue to operate?
Peter Erickson
That's right. It's both of those things. In that paper assessing carbon lock-in in 2015, we tried to bring all of those dimensions into a single framework for how to look at lock-in. Both, you know, the economic dimensions of how cheap is it to build this thing, but also another economic dimension, which is, well, once you have built it, does it really stick around for its full lifetime? Or how easy it is to unlock that thing again, right? Which is a key thing. So it's not binary.
Once you build this stuff, it's not like it's just going to keep doing its thing for 30 years necessarily, right? There are analysis tools we can bring to that. And then there are the sociopolitical dimensions, which we tried to find ways to quantify, as well in that paper.
Robinson Meyer
I do think one of the examples in that paper is coal power plants, which at the time and even now still are in— I mean, actually less now because they've been given the great gift of load growth. But through the early 2020s, even though they were locked in, were being outcompeted by gas and therefore shutting down with the help of a lot of EPA regulatory assist and legal campaigns as well.
Peter Erickson
That's a great example of why a thing that's built may not keep operating the way it was intended. And, you know, again, it's a special situation in the U.S. for reasons you know. You know, a lot of the coal plants were really old. They were beyond their useful lifetimes anyway.
But, you know, we could apply the same logic to gas plants, for example, going forward, right? Like, lots of those are being built under duress and under pressure by data centers or otherwise because they feel that they need to. But it's not automatic that those things are gonna be operated for 30 years or 40 years.
Robinson Meyer
At the same time as the carbon lock-in paper, you wrote another piece with two co-authors in Nature Climate Change, It's a case study. It looks at California specifically, but I think it builds on the Keystone XL work to say, look, climate policy should be thinking more proactively about limiting fossil fuel production as a centerpiece of climate policy.
So can you just talk about that paper a little bit?
Peter Erickson
Yeah, of course. And the slight modification I would make to what you say is I would say we were saying it could be, it can be. Here are some of the reasons why it might make sense to be, rather than a normative statement of “it should be.” But nonetheless, what we were seeing at the time is that some of the reasons to not look at supply, didn't hold up to us.
And we looked at the California context in particular, where there was a debate and activism focused on Jerry Brown, the then-governor, about stopping production and starting to wind down production in California of oil, and which is among some of the most carbon-intensive oil in the country and the world is in California, right?'Cause it's this old, very thick, dirty oil.
And what we looked at was, you know, limiting oil supply could make sense as part of a standard, just straight up by-the-books climate policy, in the sense that as you are winding down your oil demand, as California was making great plans to do, if you also wound down production at similar rates or in concert, you would be reducing the fact that downward pressure on prices that you are helping to create by reducing demand, that downward pressure in prices then makes it easier for everyone else around the world to consume oil.
And could you not, at the same time, be winding down your own oil supply and perhaps not even affecting, you know, the net import balance, right? It could all be part of a planned transition. I still stand by that concept, right? These two things can go together: energy policy about oil and gas supply, and climate policy about reducing demand for those things.
Robinson Meyer
I can see why at the time, and I would put myself in the same category here, that would be a very attractive argument, not only because you're limiting fossil fuel production, it has these global effects on the global oil market. You know, as always, the question in climate policy that nobody has a completely satisfying answer on is: How do you do climate policy in your state, your subnational or national entity in a way that advances global decarbonization? How do you do global climate policy in your state or country?
Peter Erickson
That's completely right. And just one, one more thing on that is like, I mean, that exact argument, as you just stated, was influential with the Obama White House on the question of Arctic drilling. So I don't know if you remember, but very late in Obama's presidency, he took off-line, by you know, using his presidential determinations, a bunch of oil from the Arctic that could no longer be considered, in theory, you know, for perpetuity for oil drilling.
And the argument that was with John Holdren, as I understand it, there in the White House at the time, was: how can we expect the rest of the world to be getting off oil in the ways that we, the U.S., want them to do if we're then providing them even more oil in the process?
Robinson Meyer
Oil especially is an unusually global fossil fuel market, it's a very distinctive set of global problems. Like coal is obviously in some ways worse for the climate, but coal markets are often national or regional.
But oil is this nice, big, happy global market. We build all the infrastructure so that it effectively settles on a global basis, except in moments of profound supply shock, such as right after the Iran war, and right after the Iran war started. And, because of that, removing barrels of oil from anywhere kind of affects everyone's consumption in a way that is not nearly as satisfying with, say, natural gas or coal.
It also seems like I can see, and in fact I think I, like, remember, there's another reason this argument is, I think, so appealing, or the potential for this policy is so appealing, which is not only does it satisfy, you know, our, Utopian liberal aspirations of economic planning but it also seems to address a big problem of climate policy, which is that the fossil fuel industry or the set of interests that are aligned around fossil fuels, make a lot of money and extract a lot of political power.
I mean, it's this carbon lock-in idea that they become entrenched through revenues from this existing infrastructure. Part of the case that's made for limiting fossil fuel production is also that it addresses, especially at the time, especially in the late 2010s, is also that it addresses the power of the fossil fuel industry and weakens it as a political power and political entity going forward.
Peter Erickson
I have so much to say about this, but let me just start by saying that paper that you're referencing from 2018, Limiting Production is the Next Big Step in Climate Policy, led to the California Air Resources Board holding — I mean, I'm oversimplifying, it wasn't just my paper that led to—
Robinson Meyer
No, no.
Peter Erickson
California Air Resources Board held a workshop, like a public meeting, on this in Sacramento to try to surface some of the arguments and evidence around this set of ideas.
And I was paired opposite Severin Borenstein, who I think has been a guest on your show before, and he was basically there to rebut this paper, you know, from Nature Climate Change. And, you know, we had a lively debate. We sparred, it was a lot of fun. And what he argued is that, you know, maybe Erickson has a point here. His math is basically correct, but there's another thing that he didn't show you from his math, which is that price increase that, you know, the supply-side theory is counting on to help reduce emissions, that is, in effect, a transfer of wealth from global consumers who had no say in this policy in California to the incumbent producers all around the world, the ones that are not in California, and that transfer of wealth is substantial.
And, you know, I thought that was a good point, but I thought it kind of missed this, "Hey, aren't we doing this in tandem?" idea, right? But it stuck with me ever since, just in the back of my head. And so this summer, I went back to it, and I was like, "Let's look back at that math." And I reconstructed from, you know, scratch, this economic model.
I got it to verify the calcs that Severin put forward in 2018, and I looked at, okay, say we leave that barrel of oil in the ground, and prices increase just the way we think, and it helps reduce emissions, the whole storyline that you and I have been talking about, what else happens? And it turned out— and this was what I was kind of afraid to look at in 2018, right? It turned out that the overall transfer of money from the world's consumers to the world's incumbent fossil fuel producers was greater than the amount of money that was denied that company that you no longer let develop their assets, right? And that finding is inseparable from the climate benefits that limiting supply would bring, right?
And so to me, that really complicated this idea that limiting supply is a stick in the eye to the fossil fuel industry, right? Like they are actually on net winning out when you limit supply in many cases. And of course, they know this, right? That's why they have OPEC and OPEC Plus to try to manage and limit supply themselves.
So it just made me think, you know, I don't think this part of the debate should be limited to some notes in a t2018 debate in Sacramento. I think this needs to be out there for climate advocates to wrestle with.
Robinson Meyer
So before we get to this paper you wrote this summer, in 2021 you wrote a paper that looks at U.S. fossil fuel subsidies, and it draws a very interesting conclusion. The paper looks at what you describe as — the U.S. has 16 different policies that could be construed as fossil fuel subsidies. You take a very rigorous look at subsidies. What did you find in this paper? Because when we talk about fossil fuel subsidies in the U.S., people assume when we say the U.S. is subsidizing fossil fuels, that it means the U.S. is producing more fossil fuels than it would if not for the non-existence of these subsidies.
But you find something surprising, What was it?
Peter Erickson
Find something surprising. And of course, this is all dependent on the price of oil and gas and economics and stuff, but that is what we looked at, so I think you should pay attention to what I say here. What we looked at is we gathered data on tens of thousands of oil and gas fields in the United States that were known.
They were discovered, but they had not yet been developed, right? So these are the ones that either are or are not gonna be affected by subsidies and other regulatory exemptions. And what we found is that the existence of those, like you say, 16 subsidies or regulatory exemptions, what those do is they mainly steer more profit to these projects.
They are not, at least at oil and gas prices at the time, which have been somewhat similar since, what those subsidies are not doing is leading to new projects on the ground. The project economics are not changing all that much. And so we found that well over 90% of the value of those subsidies is going directly to the profits of those companies, but that is not necessarily trickling down to new projects on the ground, which also means, you know, the jobs and other economic benefits that the fossil fuel industry claim that they are providing, right?
Robinson Meyer
Why is that?
Peter Erickson
Yeah. The reason that is, is because this is a really mature industry, right? It is sort of a, almost a, you know, classic rentier industry where they're given a huge amount of, by geology, oil and gas in the ground, and they can draw a line around that, and create a moat for themselves and produce it, right?
And so the price of oil is enough higher than the cost of developing those fields that they are able to do that. They are able to get profits, and the subsidies that are still in place are not essential, are not what is driving that investment on the ground, right? They still have enough profit margin, 15%, say, rate of return on their new projects with or without the subsidies, right?
And so, say the subsidies are taking a project that was gonna get 15% return and they're turning it into a 22% return, right? That's bad either way if you're concerned about the climate, right? We don't want this industry to have any more profits than it already has. But what we really care about at the end of the day is, are new fossil fuel projects being developed, and does the fossil fuel industry have the power to block, you know, clean energy?
Robinson Meyer
I mean, first of all, I think it actually points — and maybe we can get back to this at the end of the conversation — but it seems to point to a place you, climate policy advocates could look if they wanted to go after industry profits specifically, which is go look at the subsidies because it is, uh, actually the subsidies that's driving the surplus.
I mean, it's not only the subsidies that are driving the surplus. The surplus is kind of chemical. That's kind of the whole problem. But if you wanna look at where the additional surplus is coming from, so to speak, that these companies are using to help entrench their political power and support political candidates who oppose climate policy and, you know, lobby against climate policy, you could go after the subsidies.
It would be significant.
Peter Erickson
Yeah, and you could go after windfall, windfall profits and, you know, there are campaigns and ideas to try to do that. But, you know, just one other like specific math finding from that study, which is that we found that basically, you know, subsidies were responsible for basically almost none of the new oil projects to be developed this decade and maybe, you know, a quarter of the gas projects that would be developed this decade in the US, you know, would or would not happen without subsidies.
So, you know, essentially none of the new oil projects were dependent on these subsidies or regulatory exemptions. I mean, that tells you how mature this industry is.
Robinson Meyer
One could go after the subsidies, but be sure if you go after the subsidies you don't think you're going after emissions, 'cause you're not. You're only going after a second order input into the ultimate cocktail of political factors that determine emissions. Because as you said, you don't need the subsidies to make these projects make sense.
Peter Erickson
I think that's basically right. I mean, you know, globally there's perhaps different stories in different parts of the world, but in the U.S.…
Robinson Meyer
Is the U.S. context for…
Peter Erickson
Yeah.
Robinson Meyer
In some ways, the paper is one about corporate decision-making, you know, and what drives corporate decision-making is not lots of little tweaks on the margin to see if a project is just gonna eke out profitability or not. For oil companies to make the, you know, multi-billion dollar investments required to open a new field or open a new resource, they have to be so sure that this thing is gonna be enormously profitable going forward that it justifies them risking that capital. This is not an industry that's operating at the tenths of a margin of profit.
Peter Erickson
No, that's right. And I mean, that's why you hear so much about certainty being an issue with regard to all kinds of energy investment and why, for a long time, you know, major international commissions have gone, "Well, we need the renewable industry to be able to have more certainty in its projects to go forward."
Well, you know, there's a reason for that, right? Certainty really does matter.
Robinson Meyer
Okay, so then let's get to this 2026 paper. So if you've been listening to this, you're like, "Why are we talking about all these papers?" First of all, they're all in the, gonna be in the show notes. But second of all, we're gonna get to the future of climate policy, all that.
So this paper, "Rethinking the Case Against New Oil and Gas Fields," it was published this summer in Environmental Research Letters. I think it does complete this turn, or this honing of your thinking from, hey, we're not thinking about the importance of individual fossil fuel projects in the global marketplace in equilibrium, to like, whoa, whoa, whoa, we need better evidence before we turn every additional new fossil fuel project into, like, a fight over the future of climate policy, perhaps would be one way of putting it.
Peter Erickson
Yeah, and so big things changed in the world in that time too, right? We had, like we had COVID, we had the war in Ukraine, we've had the Strait of Hormuz, and the war on Iran really changing supply. So we've had some big real-world tests to see how supply and demand shocks play out that we can draw from.
Robinson Meyer
So first of all, let's just talk about this finding that you've already previewed, which is that when you restrain fossil fuel supply, you might be able to keep those barrels off the market. But what you are doing is engineering a massive shift of wealth to the existing fossil fuel industry. I know you've already described it a little, but just why is that?
Peter Erickson
Yeah, the reason that is, is because when you constrain supply and constrain supply outlooks, you are causing an increase in price, and that is what is needed to bring on the other new projects. And that increase in price and price outlooks is what causes consumers and all of the institutions that surround consumers, the car industries, et cetera, to reduce their oil consumption.
But that increase in price applies to every single producer in the whole world, right? You've penalized one producer or one whole region of the world by saying, "You can't produce oil here," but the price increase applies globally, and all producers see that, right? And all consumers see that. And when those economics balance out, and a new equilibrium is found, the consumers are paying for that price increase and giving the money to the producers.
And you can do straight-ahead math on that to give a first-order estimate of what happens.
Robinson Meyer
And you cite a recent example that everyone just saw, that we've been talking about on this show, which is in early 2026, Iran, following the US-Israeli war starting, closed the Strait of Hormuz. The price for oil and refined products spiked everywhere around the world.
That increased fuel costs for consumers, and it increased profits for producers. It was quite mechanical, and we all saw it happen. And effectively, what you're saying is that when you constrain fossil fuel production in some subnational region, effectively what you're doing is like a mini version of that.
Peter Erickson
That's completely right. And the logic of that has been consistent through all of my papers. But I think Hormuz and other events mean that this dynamic needs to be considered upfront. It needs to be daylighted in climate policy and in the fossil fuel supply-limiting community to grapple with, right? It is price. Price is the mechanism that causes a decrease in supply to lead to a reduction in consumption and a reduction in emissions, and that price has other effects that need to be considered.
Robinson Meyer
You'll see this idea that people will say, which is, "Look, to hit 1.5C, we need to have no new oil and gas fields." In fact, opening any new oil and gas fields or doing any kind of fossil fuel expansion is completely incompatible with a 1.5C world. is that claim supported by the literature?
Peter Erickson
Well, let's just say first, it is appealing, right? I mean, we are at the final moments of a carbon budget that would allow us to stay within 1.5C. And so therefore, it's appealing to have such simple rubrics. You know, no new fossil fuel projects are compatible. But the simplicity of that is also its real weakness, right?
I mean, if the carbon budget is so vanishingly small that no new fossil fuel projects are compatible with it, well, then nothing is compatible with it, right? Any individual ton of emissions could be the one that you point to and say, "Incompatible," right? And so really it puts the question back in my mind as to what is the effectiveness, what is the effect of any given policy that you're going to be looking at, and is that going to actually bring about the transition, help bring about the transition that we want?
And I think the idea that limiting supply or that specifically the new oil and gas fields are incompatible, like I don't think that really stands up very well in the literature. And I mean, there's like one or two papers that sort of claim that, but they don't — they have flaws.
Robinson Meyer
You mention, for instance, that one of the parts of the IPCC report that looks at, okay, how are we gonna meet these climate targets, of the 97 scenarios that preserve 1.5 C that they look at, and these are scenarios for the path of global energy development and the global energy system, fewer than half show declines in oil and gas demand rapid enough that no new oil and gas fields would be needed.
Even fewer of those that show, you know, 2 C, that show us hitting the 2 C target, show declines that are that rapid.
Peter Erickson
Yeah, just given that, to say that new oil and gas fields are incompatible with 1.5C requires a very narrow reading of the literature, meaning the science, meaning the IPCC. Or it requires saying, you know, those scenarios are a few years old now. We actually know more. You know, this newer scenarios would say that no new oil and gas fields are required. But even that requires that those pathways are feasible, right? Like the reason that the IEA, for example, comes to the logic that it does, that no new oil and gas fields are required is that they first say, they first find that oil demand would decline or would be able to decline this fast, and therefore we wouldn't, quote, need these new fields.
But they actually do not go and say that no-- that those new fields should be stopped. And they actually even explicitly say stopping new fields is not a tactic or a strategy that we think makes a lot of sense.
Robinson Meyer
In other words, the IEA wrote a scenario, and they said, "If you were to hit 1.5 C, if you wanted to do it, oil demand would have to decrease so fast that you wouldn't need new oil and gas fields. But by the way, we don't think that you should respond to this by trying to proactively shut down new oil and gas fields. We're just saying if you were to actually hit this target, then you wouldn't need these fields." And then that was kind of like that if-then statement was then, like, reversed to a then-if and said, "If you want to hit 1.5 C, then you should have no new fields.” But actually, the literature doesn't support that.
Peter Erickson
That logic is plainly wrong, you know? And the literature doesn't support it. So you can then go concoct the literature to try to support it, as some have done, but that doesn't make it right.
Robinson Meyer
It seems like you're making another argument in this paper, which is that the current arguments against limiting oil and— no new oil and gas have these analytical errors, but they also have political errors. And can you talk about the political errors, stipulating that we will never be able to analyze political errors as quantitatively and objectively as we can analyze analytical errors and economic errors?
Peter Erickson
I come at this from having experience working with, you know, Governor Jerry Brown's office or the Obama White House, and seeing how they think about this very real question. And I just think it is a really big ask to ask a politician, someone like Joe Manchin, to go against this sort of basic availability of fossil fuels and the basic community needs in their jurisdiction to make this bigger policy that would basically not necessarily be in the immediate near-term interests of their jurisdiction for very good reasons, right?
And so I just think the politics are much more complicated than this idea that we can develop an anti-fossil fuel norm or that we can, you know, shift the social license around fossil fuel companies in the way that leads to actual policy decisions by real people that face trade-offs in their jurisdictions in the United States.
And I think Joe Manchin is a great example of that. I mean, you know, he has been the most debated politician in the U.S. since the Inflation Reduction Act. But the fact that he had shot a gun at, a literal gun, at cap and trade previously in his ads, and that he got to a yes on this, you know, path-breaking legislation, I think was a huge triumph.
And the fact that he got so excoriated by anti-fossil fuel activists over it, and more to the point, not celebrated for what he actually did, I think misreads the politics of what an actual rural decision-maker in a resource-dependent community faces. And you can debate whether Joe Manchin really is that or whether he's more the face of capital, but the incentives are real.
Robinson Meyer
There's various ways I think about kind of the meso-scale of humanity's future. But one of the big ways is climate change. One of the big ways is these baseline assumptions that climate impacts are gonna be getting worse, and that at the same time, I would hope, and I am trying to advocate for policies that decarbonize the energy system over that timescale.
What can be hard is that those are our interests, yours and mine, and voters don't care. Voters don't care at all. That's not how they see the future at all. They care primarily about cheap energy. They care about the environment. They would like to see something done about climate change, but it is not a fundamental part of their worldview in the same way that it's a part of my worldview or your worldview.
And that can make it very hard, I think, for you— for people like us — to reason about it and to make arguments about it, and to say relatively common-sense things like it is a big deal that Joe Manchin, who came from a state whose economy is dominated by fossil fuels, was willing to be the yes vote on so many important parts of climate policy. Because people can point to all the bad things that he was doing that I don't think he should've been doing about climate policy. But guess what? If I was Joe Manchin, then I wouldn't have won that Senate seat because my politics aren't Joe M— You know, someone with my politics would not have won the Senate seat that…
Peter Erickson
You wouldn't have gotten in that position, and Joe Manchin was in that position. And the material interests, regardless of how he was fracturing those through his own holdings or whatever, the material interests led him to be, for very good reasons, led him to be skeptical of climate policy, and yet he got to a deal. And, you know, I don't think that many of the things he said were all that unreasonable. I don't think his advocacy for the Mountain Valley Pipeline was all that unreasonable. And—
Robinson Meyer
Well, this is the crazy thing. If environmental advocates had taken Joe Manchin's permitting reform, we wouldn't be talking about the package we're talking about right now.
Peter Erickson
That's exactly right. I mean, there's a way to look at this where Joe Manchin got massively sold out because he didn't get what he wanted. And this — I'm not saying any of this to excuse the bad parts about Joe Manchin or say that we should have taken his exact deal, but, like, it was a deal, was it not?
And the Mountain Valley Pipeline as a flashpoint for emission... I mean, I have a lot to say about the Mountain Valley Pipeline and the emissions consequences of that, that go behind the scenes in ways maybe we shouldn't get to. But, you know, there was a major group that came out and said, "Our number one climate priority is stopping the Mountain Valley Pipeline." And that same group had a consultant, that was me, who was looking at the emissions consequences of the Mountain Valley Pipeline, which were very, very small. So if you want to talk about the epistemic environment and how climate analysis of emissions connects to, you know, the statements of major environmental organizations, there's a pretty good case study of mine.
Robinson Meyer
I think that there's another piece of this that we've already kind of touched on, but that I think is worth just hitting on one more time as we leave this paper and then talk about permitting reform, talk about future climate policy. The analysis behind no new oil and gas are dubious, and it can lead people to take political stances that they don't need to take and prevent compromises from happening that would ultimately be helpful for decarbonization.
You describe going back and looking at Severin Borenstein's math. and that what he said at the time was true, which is that if you constrain fossil fuel development, you're basically engineering a massive transfer of wealth from fossil fuel consumers to fossil fuel producers. Just not the particular producer whose production you're constraining at that moment. Probably. I mean, if it's Chevron or Exxon, guess what? They have a lot of other assets in the world. And by the way, there's another whole story here, too, which is that throughout most of the history of the oil market, the key question was how would you constrain supply, not how would you increase demand. And for this reason, cartels continually emerge in the history of the global oil market to constrain the global oil market.
What you find in this paper is that if you, say, do withhold production, if you do constrain production, this transfer of wealth from consumers to producers is, like, not small. Not only is it not small, it is bigger than the scale of the barrel you have kept off the market. So you write, "For each $70 barrel of oil," of course, now it would be $90, but setting that aside — "For each $70 barrel of oil left undeveloped as a result of production-limiting policy, between about 60 and $350 are transferred from global oil consumers to producers. The enrichment of oil producers is greater than the revenue denied the company no longer able to develop its oil assets."
And so if you keep oil off the market, you're actually engineering more than the value of that oil going to the global fossil fuel capital stack.
Peter Erickson
Yeah. That's right. And given what we know right now, I mean, I did also point to a few special cases, you know, certain combinations of elasticities where that would not be the case, right? You know, if we really were on a very rapid transition down in energy demand, then we would be at a place where oil producers would be much more competitive, right?
And the increase in price as a result of any additional barrel pulled off the market would be so low that the sign of that would flip. And, you know, some people I've talked to in response to this paper said, "Well, Isn't it plausible that we're on that path? Aren't we winning the war against oil demand?" And they point to, you know, rates of electric vehicle purchases in Brazil or China or wherever. And I say, "I mean, that's fine. That is maybe — maybe we are on that path." But like people have been telling us we're at peak oil demand for a long time now, right? We are probably at more of a plateau in oil demand. And until we see really good signs that oil demand has peaked and is going down, I think economics and the politics of limiting supply are not as strong as many advocates would like.
Robinson Meyer
All of this now brings us to today, where, in a concrete way, there's a bill in Congress that would include some concessions for fossil fuel companies and also include a lot of concessions and incentives and things that clean energy companies want. It would make it easier, much easier to build clean and I wanna talk about that bill.
This is not the first time this has happened since 2020, where there is a piece of legislation or a piece of policy on the table that would make it easier for oil companies in some ways and make it easier for clean energy companies in a lot of other ways. Where does this leave you? How are you thinking about these issues in a broad way today? What are you thinking about climate policy today?
Peter Erickson
It's a tough place for climate policy qua climate policy, right? And I think there is reason to be really hopeful about the pace of renewables, you know, as we've seen costs coming down, et cetera. But there's a difference between a rapidly accelerating industry, a low-carbon energy industry, and one that we know can keep going at the pace that we need it to ultimately displace fossil fuels, right?
Some people talk about this in terms of increasing returns to scale or, you know, S-curve type dynamics, where there's sort of a line out there among climate and energy policy folks that like, "Oh, you know, we've finally gotten somewhere. Renewables are finally up the S-curve. They are winning. They are going fast." And I think while that is true and that is hopeful, that speed and the continuation of that is not guaranteed at all, right? There's a paper that came out this summer from a group of social scientists in Europe that looked at past energy transitions, like in individual countries, and what they found is, like, how far the S-curve goes before it plateaus and flattens out is really also a function of policy. And you need the policies that allow that speed to keep going. You need the grid integration. You need the permitting reform, even, to let that industry keep growing up into something that can really take on fossil fuels.
So, I think this is a bill that comes at a very important time.
Robinson Meyer
I think where this conversation started, right, actually why it started, in some ways why you and I started talking about this topic and about permitting reform was you said in your carbon lock-in paper you wished you had emphasized things a little differently. And that you'd wish you'd emphasized them differently 'cause they're ideas that are as important now as they were then. So what do you wish you had done differently in that paper that to some degree started all of this off, you know…
Peter Erickson
I think that assessing carbon lock-in paper from 2015 was really good, and it's been cited a whole —
Robinson Meyer
It's great. Yes, it's great. I wanna…
Peter Erickson
But it was in a policy environment where carbon lock-in was much on the people's minds, and we framed the analysis as, you know, you need to not keep making carbon lock-in worse.
But all of the math and the analysis that we did and put into that could just as easily have supported a different take, and it still can support a different take. And that take is that the best way to unseat carbon lock-in, based on our same math and our same findings and all of the literature, is to grow what can beat it, grow low-carbon energy as fast as you can and for as long as you can.
And let me try to crystallize that in terms of one of the pieces of analysis that we did then. As I mentioned, we looked at a whole bunch of different ways to look at carbon lock-in, right? What is carbon lock-in, and how do you unseat it? And one of the things we looked at is we developed this ratio that would say you give a unit of help to both the fossil fuel industry and its obvious replacement in clean energy.
We developed this ratio: say you give the same unit of help, who benefits more? And so we looked at, for example, gas power versus either wind or solar. And if you give those two the same unit of help, the renewables are gonna benefit two to three times more from that same benefit of help as would the gas power plant.
And the reason for that is economics in part, but it extends beyond economics too, right? Because we've heard that these renewables can compete on cost, and so that's sort of the price and economics reason. You know, you're moving them up the S-curve of technology deployment.
But there's a whole set of other conditions that go around that, that allow that speed to be maybe accelerated or allow that speed to be maintained, and that is the institutions that sit around these insurgent industries that the incumbents already have and that the insurgents don't really. So these are things like the trade associations that have enough members and are big enough to actually do things on the ground.
These are things like the fact that there are enough people that work in this industry that you know them in your community, and maybe you go to the bar together, and then maybe you have a softball team, and then maybe, you know, the whole community comes and rallies around your softball team. And all of a sudden, you are a going concern culturally and politically.
And those extra factors are really important in how far an industry can go and how quickly it can scale in the long term. And so that is what we were trying to capture with that dynamic, with that ratio of a unit of help to fossil versus clean benefits clean like two to three times more than it does the fossil.
Robinson Meyer
Where does that shake out for permitting reform?
Peter Erickson
Well, where permitting reform shakes out, you know, there are so many provisions in the bill, but on the fundamentals, I think what that means for permitting reform is that the renewable industry really does need this. This is a critical time to help the renewable industry keep its pace of growth.
This is gonna be a cheesy metaphor, right? But when we're talking about the power of the fossil fuel industry, like it's sometimes talked about as David and Goliath, right? And I'm sure that there were all kinds of lawsuits to try to take Goliath's sword away, and I'm sure there were all kinds of comms campaigns to move the Overton window about just how bad Goliath was, right? But like, if some upstart who's been working with their slingshot to throw things really fast, and they've got five smooth stones, and they've practiced on all the lions and the bears out there, let's have that upstart get a shot.
Robinson Meyer
What would you need to see in the permitting ... and you haven't looked at it. I mean, you're not a U.S. senator. It's not your job to say whether it's a good deal or not. But if you were, or just like what would you need to see to make you think the permitting deal or compromises like it are worth it, versus what would make you think that it's not worth it?
Peter Erickson
I care a lot about climate change. I am a climate policy analyst. I look at bills for my whole career and policy from the perspective of, does this thing dramatically reduce emissions or not? You know, is the upside better and substantially better than the downside? So that is the lens that I would look at, that I am looking at it.
I am a quantitative analyst. I like to see the numbers. There's lots of opinions being weighed on this that are hard to weigh without some analysis. So I think those are forthcoming. I have reasonable, you know, confidence that those are forthcoming. So I'm on the sidelines waiting to look at that, and that is the yardstick that I will use.
Robinson Meyer
Well that is great, and when they come out we'll have to talk about them. This has been a great conversation. Peter Erickson, thank you so much for joining us on Shift Key.
Peter Erickson
Thank you, Rob. Was really fun.
Rob talks with Peter Erickson, an affiliated researcher at the Stockholm Environment Institute
No researcher has been more cited in lawsuits against fossil fuel infrastructure than Peter Erickson. As an affiliated researcher at the Stockholm Environment Institute, Peter studies how pipelines and other oil and gas supply expansions can increase global carbon emissions. His work has been critical to the activist fights against the Keystone XL pipeline, the Enbridge pipeline, and others.
But in recent years, he’s taken a more nuanced approach to fossil fuel supply — in part because, as he has shown, it can enrich the oil and gas industry in a surprising but direct way. On this episode of Shift Key, Peter joins Rob to discuss why blocking fossil fuel supply can lower emissions, why it can counterintuitively transfer wealth from energy consumers to fossil fuel firms, and what it all might mean for the future of climate policy.
Shift Key is hosted by Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap News.
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Here is an excerpt from their conversation:
Robinson Meyer: So first of all, let's talk about this finding that you've already previewed, which is that when you restrain fossil fuel supply, you might be able to keep those barrels off the market. But what you are doing is engineering a massive shift of wealth to the existing fossil fuel industry. I know you've already described it a little, but just why is that?
Peter Erickson: Yeah, the reason for that is because when you constrain supply and constrain supply outlooks, you are causing an increase in price, and that is what is needed to bring on the other new projects. And that increase in price and price outlooks is what causes consumers and all of the institutions that surround consumers, the car industries, et cetera, to reduce their oil consumption.
But that increase in price applies to every single producer in the whole world, right? You've penalized one producer or one whole region of the world by saying, "You can't produce oil here," but the price increase applies globally, and all producers see that. And all consumers see that. And when those economics balance out, and a new equilibrium is found, the consumers are paying for that price increase and giving the money to the producers.
And you can do straight-ahead math on that to give a first-order estimate of what happens.
Robinson Meyer: And you cite a recent example that everyone just saw, that we've been talking about on this show, which is in early 2026, Iran, following the US-Israeli war starting, closed the Strait of Hormuz. The price for oil and refined products spiked everywhere around the world. That increased fuel costs for consumers, and it increased profits for producers. It was quite mechanical, and we all saw it happen. And effectively what you're saying is that when you constrain fossil fuel production in some subnational region, effectively what you're doing is like a mini version of that.
Peter Erickson: That's completely right. And the logic of that has been consistent through all of my papers. But I think Hormuz and other events mean that this dynamic needs to be considered upfront. It needs to be daylighted in climate policy and in the fossil-fuel-supply-limiting community to grapple with. Price is the mechanism that causes a decrease in supply to lead to a reduction in consumption and a reduction in emissions, and that price has other effects that need to be considered.
You can find a full transcript of the episode here.
Mentioned:
Peter’s papers:
"Impact of the Keystone XL pipeline on global oil markets and greenhouse gas emissions"
"Limiting fossil fuel production as the next big step in climate policy"
"Rethinking the case against new oil and gas fields"
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On Taiwan’s LNG investment, Chinese solar job cuts, and molten chloride fast reactors
Current conditions: Temperatures in Washington, D.C., are climbing up to the mid 80s Fahrenheit today before taking a double-digit plunge as cold air blows in this weekend • California’s biggest utility has warned of looming blackouts as the southern part of the state braces for a potential wildfire • Tropical Storm Trudy is strengthening in the Pacific off the coast of Mexico into what could become a major hurricane.
The Houthis sent a clear signal this week: We are coming for Saudi Arabia’s oil industry. Days after striking Riyadh and scaring Western oil executives away from an industry summit in the Saudi capital, the Iran-backed rebels hit the headquarters of the kingdom’s state energy behemoth, Aramco. Official reports on Tuesday initially downplayed the impact on the sweeping complex in Dhahran, in Saudi Arabia’s oil-rich east. On Wednesday, however, Reuters reported that the missile attack had caused “extensive damage,” including “with a fire spreading across several floors.” Saudi Arabia has at other points during the conflict after proven resilient. After Houthi missiles pulverized a key node on the East-West Pipeline that serves as the main conduit to get oil from the Persian Gulf coast to the Red Sea shore, crews quickly created a workaround to restore the flow of crude. Following a brief uptick, the prices of Brent crude, the global benchmark, and the U.S.-centric West Texas Intermediate both fell on Wednesday. Maybe not for long: The Houthis vowed yesterday to continue targeting oil facilities.
Since shutting down its nuclear plants, Taiwan has become dependent on natural gas for at least half its electricity generation. But the self-governing island democracy doesn’t drill any of the fuel. It’s dependent on imports at a moment when, thanks to the war in Iran, anyone who isn’t producing their own is looking for a cheap, steady supply of liquified natural gas. Taipei has found a supplier. In a Wednesday post on his Truth Social platform, President Donald Trump said Taiwan agreed to buy 30% of the LNG shipped from the proposed $55 billion megaproject to build a gas pipeline from Alaska’s Arctic coast to an export terminal south of Anchorage. As part of the 20-year deal, Trump said the Taiwanese government would pay $4.4 billion for an equity stake in the project. Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs confirmed the deal and said it would work out the details later.
The pledged investment for the long-delayed project comes days after the Environmental Defense Fund released a new analysis showing that utilities and developers are cooling on clean power and once again pumping money into fossil fuel infrastructure at a rate that could see gas and even coal regain “a market share not seen since the early 2010s.” Amid all this investment, the national average retail price of electricity fell year over year from 20 cents per kilowatt-hour in September 2025 to 19.6 cents per kilowatt-hour last month, according to the freshest data on Heatmap and MIT’s Electricity Price Hub. “Great news, right?” my colleague Matthew Zeitlin wrote yesterday. “Not really.” He explains further: “While this is the first year-over-year decline in average prices since September 2023, it’s mostly due to California moving around its Climate Credit to the late summer months of August and September, historically among the highest-demand periods on the grid. The state previously delivered the credits in April and October. But while this is a nice thing for California ratepayers, it does less to tell us about nationwide electricity price trends.”

China’s top five solar manufacturers cut nearly 41,000 jobs last year as Beijing cracks down on the overcapacity that made exports so cheap Europeans started building fences out of panels. A new Reuters analysis of company filing shows that Longi Green Energy, Trina Solar, Jinko Solar, JA Solar, and Tongwei employed 40,589 fewer people than a year earlier. That 21% drop followed a 31% decline last year. The job cuts represent what the newswire called a “paradox,” in that the solar sales are booming as the world seeks alternatives to Middle Eastern hydrocarbons, yet the biggest manufacturers built too many factories and now no one can make any money.
The shift in China comes as the U.S. scrambles to rebuild its solar manufacturing capacity. Tariffs that Trump implemented, former President Joe Biden maintained, and Trump doubled down on have already set the stage for what my colleague Emily Pontecorvo reported may or may not be a manufacturing resurgence in the U.S. In August, we reported the Department of Commerce’s new trade restrictions were the administration’s lifeline to solar manufacturers that lost a key incentive when federal tax credits went away, taking with them the bonus for buying domestically-produced panels.
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The world has seen experimental reactors that use molten salt as a coolant for a fission reaction fueled by uranium or plutonium. Several startups, including Bill Gates’ TerraPower, are now seeking to commercialize a version of that technology. Recently, the startup partnered with the utility giant Southern Company to examine a whole new possibility: A molten chloride fast reactor that uses liquid salts as both a coolant and a fuel. If that could work, it would be the first in the world. The advantages of the technology, in theory, would be limited enrichment needs, no fuel assemblies of uranium pellets, and a more flexible reactor that can ramp up and down to meet the grid’s needs. On Wednesday, the Department of Energy backed the effort to validate the science behind so-called MCFR reactors. The research will take place at the Idaho National Laboratory and has support from Southern and Core Power, a startup looking to harness fission to power cargo ships.
Is quantum computing a climate technology? Despite overlapping investors, it’s a difficult case to make, my colleague Katie Brigham wrote earlier this year. But the ways in which the technology develops certainly could be a model for other energy breakthroughs. On Wednesday, New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani unveiled a deal with New York University whereby City Hall will support the construction of a quantum computing lab in exchange for 15% of any proceeds from selling intellectual property developed at the facility. “In the first deal of its kind in NYC history, the public is investing $30 million in a quantum lab — in exchange for three board seats and 15% of the revenue generated from technology it creates,” Lina Khan, the chair of the board of the New York City Economic Development Corporation, wrote in a post on X. “And if any firm coming out of the lab merges, gets acquired, or IPOs, the city gets a payout.”
When the solution to Indonesia’s very modern smog problems was invented, the archipelago nation remained under Dutch colonial rule and the planet was about 1 degree Celsius, or 1.8 degrees Fahrenheit, cooler than it is today. To ease the thick haze in Jakarta and other cities from forest fires the country the country is repurposing a weather-modification technique first invented in the 1940s. Per Bloomberg: “Aircraft will disperse pellets of dry ice above South Sumatra province in an experimental approach that authorities hope will reduce the hazardous smoke that’s blanketed the region for weeks, disrupting economic activity and damaging public health.” The first trial run starts today.