You’ve reached your free article limit
Log in
To continue reading, log in to your account.
Create a Free Account
To unlock more free articles, please create a free account.
Sign In or Create an Account.
By continuing, you agree to the Terms of Service and acknowledge our Privacy Policy
Welcome to Heatmap
Thank you for registering with Heatmap. Climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our lives, a force reshaping our economy, our politics, and our culture. We hope to be your trusted, friendly, and insightful guide to that transformation. Please enjoy your free articles. You can check your profile here .
subscribe to get Unlimited access
Offer for a Heatmap News Unlimited Access subscription; please note that your subscription will renew automatically unless you cancel prior to renewal. Cancellation takes effect at the end of your current billing period. We will let you know in advance of any price changes. Taxes may apply. Offer terms are subject to change.
Subscribe to get unlimited Access
Hey, you are out of free articles but you are only a few clicks away from full access. Subscribe below and take advantage of our introductory offer.
subscribe to get Unlimited access
Offer for a Heatmap News Unlimited Access subscription; please note that your subscription will renew automatically unless you cancel prior to renewal. Cancellation takes effect at the end of your current billing period. We will let you know in advance of any price changes. Taxes may apply. Offer terms are subject to change.
Create Your Account
Please Enter Your Password
Forgot your password?
Please enter the email address you use for your account so we can send you a link to reset your password:

This transcript has been automatically generated
Subscribe to “Shift Key” and find this episode on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Amazon, or wherever you get your podcasts.
You can also add the show’s RSS feed to your podcast app to follow us directly.
Robinson Meyer:
Hello, it is Monday, July 6, and a year has passed since Republicans in Congress and President Trump passed the One Big Beautiful Bill Act. That pulchritudinous policy repealed many of the provisions in the Inflation Reduction Act, which is, of course, the big climate law passed in 2022 by President Biden and congressional Democrats. It also revealed, crucially, the tax credits for wind and solar energy and the consumer side tax credits for electric cars. I would say this is the biggest event in recent American climate political history. You know, for the first time in 40 years, the U.S. had passed a comprehensive climate law, and then it got repealed by Republicans very quickly. I think it’s driven part of the climate hushing trend, the so-called climate hushing trend, where even Democrats are reluctant to talk about climate change now. And I think it’s seen at least, I don’t know, among progressives, climate advocates, liberals, everyone who cares about the environment and climate change as a partial failure.
Robinson Meyer:
What today’s guest presumes is, what if it wasn’t? A new report out today argues that in the power sector, much of the IRA’s new clean energy construction and emissions reductions remain intact. Even in a world where the Trump administration has passed OB3, the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, and repealed Environmental Protection Agency regulations restricting fossil fuel emissions, the glass remains more than half full. That’s what she says. The IRA really did, she says, helped pull ahead new clean energy construction that would not have happened otherwise. And that success has big implications for policy going forward, including whether Dems should restore the solar and wind tax credits next time, when and if they get a majority, or do something else to fight climate change. Well, joining me today is the author of that new report, Lily Bermel. She’s a visiting fellow at the Columbia Center on Global Energy Policy and a former climate policy advisor at the State Department. She was on John Kerry’s climate diplomacy team during the Biden administration. We talk about what she found in the new report, why she thinks the glass is more than half full, why the IRA might not have produced the benefits that we thought it would at the moment it was passed, and what she changed her mind about as she looked at the reality of climate policy’s landscape today. I’m Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap News, and it’s all coming up on Shift Key. Lily Bermel, welcome to Shift’s Key.
Lily Bermel:
Thanks, Rob. Excited to be here.
Robinson Meyer:
Okay, so let’s get right into it. You write in this report, which we have a story about on Heatmap.news today, I encourage everyone to read. You compare two scenarios in this report. One is the, let’s say, the world of the Biden administration, where the Inflation Reduction Act is law. And the other one is the world we live in, where the One Big Beautiful Bill Act passed, repealing swaths of the Inflation Reduction Act. And you write in this new report that the Oba scenario preserves 74% of new and clean energy capacity, 71% of new clean generation, and 67% of emissions reductions that we would have achieved had the IRA stayed on the books. And so my opening question for you is, why are you so sunny?
Lily Bermel:
Why am I so sunny? Well, great question. That is definitely a part of my personality, but I wanted to get some data to book it up to see if it was really real or not. I think last year, last summer, when the Republicans were doing their reconciliation process, really kind of taking that hatchet to the IRA, it was a distressing time and there were different narratives that emerged and were confusing and dueling even. The IRA was totally dismantled. The clean energy transition is doomed, but you also had that the clean energy itself is unstoppable because it’s the cheapest. And so a couple of things caught my attention. I actually remember Jigar Shah saying that if we had just skipped the IRA and gone straight to, I’ll say OB3, we would be shouting from the rooftops. It preserved the majority of the tax credits, which is where most of the IRA’s decarbonization benefits were coming from. And it was really just wind and solar that got the short end of the stick.
Robinson Meyer:
And electric vehicles.
Lily Bermel:
Totally. Yes. Thank you. In the power sector, specifically.
Robinson Meyer:
Yes. In the power sector, it’s all about wind and solar.
Lily Bermel:
Yes. Exactly. So this report is just on the power sector, the backbone of the energy transition. And it’s really wind and solar that get their tax credits removed in the coming decade. And then there was restrictions placed on the rest. And so in wanting to just myself kind of have a clearer understanding of what’s happening, my curiosity got the best of me. I reached out to the Energy Innovation Team and asked for some data. And they provided me with two scenarios. So the first is what you outlined, say the prior policy environment, which is the full IRA, and also those EPA regulations. So it’s the tax credits and the regulations.
Robinson Meyer:
What exactly is in these two scenarios? Because I think crucially, you’re not comparing worlds that never existed. You’re kind of comparing like the entire regulatory and legal framework created by the Biden administration versus the world we live in now.
Lily Bermel:
That’s exactly right. So the first scenario I call the IRA trajectory, but it’s more than the IRAs. The IRA plus the power plant regulations. And you can imagine that’s the like December 2024 world, that policy frozen in place. The second scenario is with the one big beautiful bill act, OB3, and then all of those regulations taken away. And so that would be maybe the July 2025 policy environment. Models are a camera of a moment in time with a trajectory or projection of what you think is going to happen going forward from that. And so importantly, the model does not include all of the coordinated executive branch actions that the Trump administration has done on wind and solar since then. And that’s really important because these numbers are model numbers really distinct from real world outcomes.
Robinson Meyer:
Your report is titled “Glass Half Full.” And I think the story in the power sector that you tell in this report is a much more upbeat one than maybe people were expecting after OB3 passed.
Lily Bermel:
Yep. So that basic question is what actually survived. And it technically has two different ways. It’s how much of the gain survives. So that’s your clean energy, your emissions reductions, and how much worse is that fossil outcome. And so we see that the glass is half full if you’re within 50% of the benefits preserved or more, or fossil is less than 50% worse. The top line is that more than half of those benefits of the prior policy environment survives across the board. It’s only onshore wind that dips below that 50% line. And so we have about three quarters of clean capacity will still get added over the coming decade, and about two thirds of emissions reductions will still occur as well. And then on the fossil side, the outcomes were less than 50% worse at threshold. We see fossil capacity is only 4% more in the OB3 scenario than the IRA trajectory, and it’s fossil generation that surges 19% more on average over the coming decade compared to the IRA trajectory. So it’s about the same fossil fleet, but doing more.
Robinson Meyer:
So if I’m thinking about these two worlds, and I want to get into the epistemological world of the models in a moment, something that I’m sure quickened all of our listeners’ pulses just to hear. I mean, in some ways, it’s not even as the glass half full or half empty. It’s that the glass is detectably more than half full. In kind of all these three big questions, we’re going to be adding most of the clean energy capacity, the new build, new wind and solar farms and batteries that we anticipated adding in IRA world under Trump world, held constant basically for executive interference that’s very hard to model and changing by the week, but which you can follow on a day-to-day basis at Heatmap.news. We’re going to preserve two-thirds, roughly, of the emissions reductions we expect to see under IRA world. And we’re going to not add that much new fossil. In fact, we’re just going to run the fossil fleet more than we would have under a world where we kept the IRA on the books and maybe built that kind of extra 25% of solar and wind and battery capacity. Is that a fair description?
Lily Bermel:
Yes. Yeah, you said that really well. One detail on that fossil fleet is that while the size of the fossil fleets between the scenarios are relatively similar, the composition is quite different. And so this is where it’s important to remember the scenarios include the impact of the regulations as well. So without these power plant regulations that encourage faster retirement of coal power plants, what we see is that coal still retires, but it retires more slowly today than it would have if the regulations were still on board. So therefore, the fossil fleet itself is just ever so slightly larger, but it’s more coal heavy and therefore more emissions heavy as well.
Robinson Meyer:
I mean, it’s interesting because this is a mechanism we talk about all the time back during the Biden administration that I think has a little bit been lost to time, which is that the IRA, correct me if this is a misunderstanding, but the Inflation Reduction Act, because it discounted the cost of clean and because it discounted various carbon capture technology, made it far easier for the EPA to impose strict air pollution standards on coal plants. And it was actually those standards that would have shifted the composition of the fossil fleet from a coal and gas fleet to a primarily gas fleet. And with the IRA off the books, and of course, with the standards off the books, too, it’s much harder now. We’re going to run these coal plants for much longer than we would have in Biden world. Is that right? Or am I missing something important?
Lily Bermel:
Yeah, I think that’s generally right, that the coal is stickier. It stays around for longer. It’s the gas that fires and runs way more and helps to fill in that clean shortfall. I think the Biden administration viewed the regulations as a nice complement to making clean cheaper. And that kind of allowed them to say, as we build more clean, we can generate less of fossil. But there is a really important distinction between building clean and replacing fossil capacity and the reliability services it adds to the grid. When you build clean energy, you can decarbonize in a shallow or in a deep way. To me, I think about shallow decarbonization as adding clean energy that meets new demand and that helps the economy grow and helps meet demand growth. It kind of offsets emissions that would have happened if that was met by fossil fuels instead. A deeper decarbonization is clean energy that is built that mitigates emissions that have already been happening from fossil plants that are already running. And so just because you’re building clean energy, you’re often doing the former and not the latter there.
Robinson Meyer:
It’s interesting. It’s such a good comparison between the two in the power sector. And I think it also helps to like maybe put it in the context of countries, right? What we see in China so far has generally been shallow decarbonization, where they build this enormous amount of clean energy. It’s extremely impressive. And historically it has allowed them to maybe not run their fossil plants as much as they wanted going forward and i think in like very recent quarters we have seen that clean energy begin to eat away at the existing fossil generation and that’s what a deeper decarbonization looks like that’s what it looks like when you’re not only building enough clean to meet new growth but actually building so much clean that you’re out competing the fossil that already exists
Lily Bermel:
Yeah, I think that’s spot on. And it’s Lauri Myllyvirta is one of my favorite China analysts who has found that like clean energy is what’s driving China’s economic growth. And that’s why their coal fleet is generally still there in the size that it is. I think the other distinction to make on shallow and deep is that different clean energy technologies kind of can do one or the other. And so the services and the gains that wind and solar and storage bring to the grid when you deploy them do not provide the same reliability services that gas, that coal, that nuclear or geothermal will give. And so as you are scaling variable renewable energy penetration on the grid, you actually sometimes need more gas capacity to meet its intermittency and to support it from happening. And so simply deploying wind and solar alone does not achieve you that deep decarbonization. You can’t wind and solar your way out of the fossil fleet. You need that set of clean firm technologies to replace it, to offset it, to eventually retire it. But that’s something far in the future.
Robinson Meyer:
And clean firm here is anything that can run 24-7, is relatively reliable, is independent on the weather or the sun, and is dispatchable too, right? You can basically, as a grid planner, say, hey, we need this power plant to go on and turn it on and it provides power. And it doesn’t need to be like a battery or something where it had to have saved up fuel.
Lily Bermel:
Yeah, I think about firm energy as that always-on, always-available energy generation. And then when it’s clean, it’s low emissions or no emissions. You know, traditional firm powers is that coal and gas. Interestingly, I don’t think of storage as firm power because that’s more about shifting when the energy is generated rather than it always being available. So therefore, it’s interesting to realize that it’s gas is what firms renewables less so than storage. Storage kind of supports a wider time span horizon with which wind and solar can generate energy. But it’s what’s on the books right now is coal and gas and later other clean technologies will be able to firm renewables as well.
Robinson Meyer:
This report only looks at the power sector. And so arguably, some of the worst damage of repealing the IRA happened in the transportation sector. We’re not talking about the transportation sector. But when you look at the power sector, I think we’ve spent a long time mourning the disappearance of the Inflation Reduction Act. And even if its repeal is going to be more for the transportation sector than the power sector, the idea that we’ve only lost, say, 25 percent of the emissions reductions that we expected, I think, will be surprising. So why didn’t repealing the IRA have a bigger effect on U.S. emissions?
Lily Bermel:
I think this comes down to the maturity of wind and solar, the power of market forces to drive the energy transition, and some functionalities about how the grid and deployment basically works. So to take those each in force, or in turn, we know that wind and solar are very mature, are cost competitive. Advocates in industry have been saying that for a while. And so I think removing the tax credits and seeing that still, on average, three quarters is getting built speaks to that and is a testament to their resiliency, their cost effectiveness, the benefits that they have, and the fact that they make up 95% of the interconnection queue. So that’s one reason. I think the other is that because of the safe harboring of the wind and solar tax credits, you do see a bit of near-term deployment locked in. And Rhodium Group actually has similar projections that mirror mine. In their taking stock report, they show that across their projections, their low, medium, and high emission scenarios, that the deployment that’s happening through 2030 is the same. And so I kind of like to think about the grid in terms of light years, how it operates, where what you see today reflects what was decided years ago. So therefore, the things that get deployed today, construction decisions, permitting decisions, were made many years ago, and that kind of flows through. So there’s a lot of momentum, I think, on clean energy’s side and a lot going forward in terms of cost competitiveness.
Robinson Meyer:
And so in that world, I guess, did passing the IRA matter to the grid’s decarbonization at all? Because I’m listening to what you’re saying, And what I’m hearing is, well, wind and solar are really mature. We were building up a lot of them. Did we basically build up a huge bolus of wind and solar projects that are now working their way through the system between, say, 2021 and 2024? And they were all safe harbored and they’re all going to get built or many of them are going to get built. And so in some ways, the IRA already gave its gift to the wind and solar industry and it didn’t need to extend these tax credits forward. And kind of it already essentially did because of how the safe harbor rules work. Or is it just that AI and load growth have driven up power prices so much that developers are going to go out and build wind and solar anyway? The IRA actually turned out to be a little extraneous to this story because it turned out that everyone was going to build wind and solar as much as they could because power prices are shooting through the roof in any deregulated market.
Lily Bermel:
Yeah, I think that’s a great question. And of course, the IRA was enacted before the huge energy boom that we’re seeing right now. And in some ways, the way you phrase that question makes me think about how, as the wind and solar tax credits are phasing down, you have demand growth surging, and that’s acting as the demand pull, kind of in some ways to replace the IRA tax credits. I mean, I think the IRA was hugely beneficial in that when I was working on the Clean Investment Monitor, we just saw investment come off the sidelines and explode through the roof in terms of the amount of projects being stood up and investment flowing through the economy. And that was very tangible and very real. The huge value add of the IRA, too, was that it put down a lot of public investment to down payment in innovating and commercializing the set of other technologies that we need to decarbonize. And so that’s in geothermal, that’s in nuclear restarts, that’s in carbon capture and a whole lot more. And so what’s interesting about this model is that because it comes with its own assumptions about costs and performance, the model itself actually does not pick up on these clean firm technologies deploying at all in the coming decade.
Robinson Meyer:
That’s something so striking here is that we put all this work in. I mean, during the One Big Beautiful Bill Act legislative process, I wrote an op-ed. I wrote tons of pieces for Heatmap, basically saying the Senate and Congress needs to keep these tax credits for clean firm technologies like geothermal and fusion and fission on the books because they really matter. And what your model shows is like that capacity never comes online like it does not come online in 2030 it doesn’t come online in 2035 it is simply not a major player in your model.
Lily Bermel:
That’s an interesting kind of embedded assumption in the energy innovations model where just the projects don’t seem to pencil out. And that’s where we get to really bifurcate between what a model says and what we’re seeing in the real world, because these are two really different things. And I’d argue that commercialization of these technologies is happening faster than we expected, ranging from the progress that we’re seeing on geothermal with Fervo’s IPO, a lot of offtake that they have, construction of a project, to what we’re seeing in nuclear, where two weeks ago, the Office of Energy Dominance Financing announced, I think, $17.5 billion, in loans to restart new nuclear plants. That’s multiple gigawatts that we did not expect at the time that this model was created that will now come online and help do the job. And then we also have the hyperscaler attention and willingness to pay to commercialize these technologies to invest in the grid and to build clean energy fast. That’s tangible. That’s a lot of capital. And that is doing a lot of work to create the environment that these technologies need to come to bear.
Robinson Meyer:
So one of the big findings in the report is that if you look across technologies, you look across different questions that you’re curious about. The clearest bad news is in onshore wind. It is only onshore wind that fails to build 50% of the capacity in a Trump world that it would have built in an IRA world. And I guess maybe there’s a certain argument for this because people would go, well, of course it does. The Trump administration doesn’t want to build any wind at all. They hate wind. For whatever reason, they’ve decided wind should lose the culture war. But wind actually was already struggling by the time we were halfway into the Biden administration. I mean, I think 2020 was the best year for wind construction ever, and it’s kind of been falling off since then. Why is onshore wind so harmed in the IRA repeal scenario or the OBBBA scenario in your model?
Lily Bermel:
Yes, I think you already indicated that it is a technology that just seems to struggle anyways. It has really long development timelines. It needs a lot of transmission to connect to the grid. It has … it’s just very capital intensive. It has high upfront costs, high project finance costs and whatnot. So that helps make it very credit sensitive. So when you remove the tax credits, it’s hurt by that. But it also has other problems that a tax credit won’t fix anyways.
Robinson Meyer:
In other words, it was already struggling. IRA was going to help it because those tax credits were actually meaningful to helping projects pencil out. But without the tax credits penciling out wind, it’s just not getting built.
Lily Bermel:
Yes. And this is onshore wind in particular. Offshore wind is interestingly like less credit sensitive because it’s more connected to state procurement mandates and has kind of other drivers pushing it forward.
Robinson Meyer:
That’s interesting. Does your model account for all the offshore wind skullduggery that’s happened?
Lily Bermel:
The model doesn’t take into account any of those executive branch actions, but the report itself includes kind of a deep discussion of how real world events will change the model’s outcomes. And it looks at three different time horizons. It looks at what the IRA expectations have come to pass. It looks at the near term, like will OB3 projections and outcomes bear? And on a more medium term, What does it look like as well?
Robinson Meyer:
Reading this report and seeing basically that repealing the IRA, at least in the power sector, and again, we’re talking about the power sector, doesn’t have this catastrophic effect on our emissions trajectory. It doesn’t have this catastrophic effect on how much wind and solar we build. Now, of course, I will miss the wind and solar that gets built. I’m sure developers will, the climate will. We’ll all mourn this 25% of emissions that we could have had that we didn’t have. Like reading this report, it doesn’t sound like we’ve lurched from beautiful, verdant, abundant, cheap electricity world into dark, evil, polluter world. It sounds like we’ve taken a wrong turn somewhere and it’ll take us some time to get back onto the right highway, but we’re not locked into an evil world now. And that suggests that the Inflation Reduction Act was maybe not as important as we thought it would be. And so my question to you is like, When the IRA passed, we talked about how it was going to reduce economy-wide emissions by like 40 to 48 percent by 2035. Would it have achieved the huge emissions reductions that we thought it was going to achieve when it passed?
Lily Bermel:
I don’t think it would have achieved the full amount that we would have expected in the power sector. Jesse Jenkins put out a really prescient report when the IRA was enacted that said 80% of the IRA’s emissions benefits hinged on could we build transmission faster. And guess what? We have not built it faster at all. We’ve built less and less of it and more slowly. And so John Bisling, who you had on your podcast recently, put out this really great report with a lot of other people, and they looked at all of the IRA modeling. And what they found was that later IRA models projected less and less benefits that would have come as people kind of realized like, oh, shoot, we have a lot of supply side constraints. And so I think your question is very sharp. Because the IRA would not have fully come to pass, that doesn’t mean that the IRA wasn’t good or wasn’t worth it. It’s that we have other problems. Basically, by solving one problem, by making clean energy a little bit cheaper and by incentivizing the demand of it, we therefore exposed how supply-side constrained we are and how awful and burdensome the permitting barrier process is.
Robinson Meyer:
In other words, because the IRA sort of solved any financial issue you would ever have building wind and solar, we discovered how bad the non-financial issues are or how many supply side constraints create financial issues for projects, regardless of whether the, you know, kind of facial economics are favorable or not.
Lily Bermel:
Yes, I think that’s right. And right, Heatmap does an excellent job of this on the local side, where you guys track on the local ordinance level, like how these restrictions and bans against wind and solar are completely proliferating. And so that makes me think that this issue is only getting worse because you have the federal level, you have all the national laws that really constrain build out. That adds cost. It makes it more expensive to build the longer it takes. That’s an issue. And at the local level, we have it building up as well.
Robinson Meyer:
Given that the IRA, in retrospect, in the power sector, kind of resolved any economic issue you would have making a project pencil out and revealed all these non-economic issues that actually constrain development. We are now looking at a political environment where we’re switching from mourning the IRA to saying, okay, what should happen next? And my colleague, Emily Ponacorvo, recently wrote a story about this question. But I think one of the big questions going forward, especially if Democrats take Congress at the end of this year is, well, should they fight to restore the tax credits? I can even see a world where restoring the tax credits becomes something people insist on to get permitting reform or something. After writing this report, did you come to the conclusion that Democrats should restore the wind and solar tax credits? Is that the most urgent priority for climate policy?
Lily Bermel:
In writing this report, I became quite confident that I don’t think it’s worth the bang for buck in restoring those wind and solar tax credits and instead that the supply side constraints are the real issue that we need to focus on. I did this lag analysis where if you take a given year, say 2031, and you see that the IRA trajectory would have deployed like more than 300 gigawatts of solar, how many years later would the OB3 scenario do that? There’s only a two and a half year lag or gap. And so in restoring the clean energy tax credits, you are only buying back two and a half years worth of deployment, which, at least for me, was a lot smaller than I had thought. Meanwhile, both scenarios have a literal cap in them about how much they can build and how fast they can build it. So even if you buy back that little two-and-a-half-year average annual lag, you’re going to run up to the exact same ceiling. So restoring the tax credits brings you closer to that ceiling, while permitting reform will completely lift the ceiling and be a rising tide that lifts all boats.
Robinson Meyer:
Can I ask, do we know that permitting reform will lift the ceiling? I mean, what you’ve done is create an ingenious modeling device that basically tries to account for real world constraints, which I appreciate because as we’ve been talking about, the awareness that we even need to do this in energy models, I think, was maybe not as there as it has been dawning on the community over the past five years. But do we know that if we pass permitting reform, I mean, we don’t even know what’s in the legislative package. So I guess let me ask you, like, what would need to be in a permitting reform package to raise the cap on what we can build in a meaningful way?
Lily Bermel:
Yeah, I think there’s a suite of laws that need reform to help speed the process of building. And so, of course, that’s the National Environmental Policy Act, Clean Water Act, Section 401, Federal Power Act, the National Historic Preservation Act, you know, rules to make it so that you don’t have like 10 years to litigate a case. And then the concept of permit certainty, which the Freedom Act on the Senate recently introduced to kind of protect against what the Trump administration is doing in revoking permits. So I can imagine a package coming together with components across the board from that. And we do a bills in Congress, both sides of the House or both sides of the chamber that have elements of all of that. So I think it is coming together. I do think there’s two ways that permitting reform does accelerate clean energy and help reduce emissions. The first would be raising that ceiling so that more can get added to the grid, so that the grid itself can grow, so that more transmission can get built. And the second is shortening the amount of time to build and to connect to the grid itself. And then because clean energy, it’s more permitting exposed, it needs more infrastructure from scratch. The queue itself is 95% clean, like it will net benefit clean.
Robinson Meyer:
You write in the report, the American energy transition now operates in a different macroeconomic and political environment than the one that shaped climate policy debates in the late 20 teens and early 2020s. I thought that was such an interesting claim. Can you speak a little bit more about that?
Lily Bermel:
Sure. I think I say the IRA was built and it was sold, and later it was attacked as a pure climate law. It was the product of a democratic trifecta. Interest rates were zero or near zero. Very low deficit anxiety. We were economically choosing to prioritize jobs over costs, and now all of that has changed. We’re living in a cost-of-living politics where affordability is the name of the game. We have huge demand growth that we were not really seeing at the time. Geopolitical competition over supply chains has sharpened and the fiscal space has really become quite exhausted. And then, of course, politically, right, we are now in a Republican trifecta and energy itself is ideologically the ire of both parties. And so I think with that big shift, that for me is one of the biggest telltale signs that you can’t just restore what happened before. That was built for a completely different moment. And to me, the glass half full result should point policymakers towards building beyond what we have.
Lily Bermel:
One other thing I’ll point out is that the wind and solar tax credits have been extended and extended for 30 to 40 years on a bipartisan basis. It was then a one-party vote that expanded the tax credit policy from focusing on wind and solar to supporting a lot of different technologies in the full suite of clean energy. It was then one party that affirmed to keep all of those, but that, explicitly tells us that the wind and solar tax credits are no longer bipartisan, that it will take a one party vote to bring them back and the next party, when given the opportunity, will remove them. And so to me, that’s another tell that it will come with great political capital and cost to try to extend them. And that urges the question if it’s worth the political capital to do that. Do we get the emissions reductions in the build out that we want? Is it worth that bang for buck? And so, right, like I’m not working for the CBO. I don’t know the exact fiscal costs. I’m not one of my friends on the Senate negotiating. And so I’ll leave the political strategy to them. But I trust them greatly. But I think it’s a really important question to ask if it’s worth it.
Robinson Meyer:
How much of all the assumptions here are just dependent on continued high electricity prices? Because I’m a little bit worried about a world where we assume the AI, you know, like, it’s funny in environmental policy land right now, let’s say, because on the one hand, you have a group of people who are convinced the AI is a bubble, or going to pop or not economically useful. And we’re not going to talk about that, but we’re going to just say that’s one point of view. And then we have another point of view that basically, when thinking about the future, assumes high power prices are going to remain the norm now, somewhat indefinitely. But in fact, we know the two things are linked. We know that power prices are high because hyperscalers are bidding up for every electron they can get. If power prices were to fall, would we still like to have winded solar tax credits on the books? Or are there certain insurance policies we should try to pass now that would insure us against a world where power prices fall because the last time power prices were high back in the aughts, we made a lot of bets on different technologies. And then a number of things happened, but fracking was one of them. And what wound up happening with fracking was it crashed power prices. And then it turned out to be okay because we got cheap Chinese solar. But a lot of technological bets didn’t wind up panning out because we anticipated a world of expensive power prices and instead we got cheap power prices. Thank you.
Lily Bermel:
My understanding is that the data is quite mixed on whether large loads are directly raising electricity prices or not. The Lawrence Berkeley National Lab has a really great study that they’ve updated over time that shows the impact of large loads on these prices. And in some areas, prices are tracking with inflation up until only super, super recently. So I think the data is mixed there. What your point implies, though, is that, as we discussed, AI is such a large demand and a demand pull for energy? Like, what if that goes away? What if it’s smaller than we expect? Like, are we screwed from that? I don’t think wind and solar tax credits are a necessary insurance against, like, oh, demand growth is less for several reasons. One is that the demand growth that we’re seeing now from AI is very sizable. It’s actually smaller than the demands that will come from electrification, from EVs, from building, from industry. That comes more next decade. So essentially, AI is front running this high energy demand growth scenario. And that’s good because it’s forcing us to think on our toes and react to this now. And whether or not the AI part of it comes to pass, electrification is definitely coming and it’s a larger amount. So I think while, yes, size of the bubble, all of that is like debated. And thank you, economists who are debating that. The demand growth is coming.
Lily Bermel:
And then third is that, again, I don’t think that the wind and solar tax credits are the number one needed thing here. I think, like, in terms of insurance costs, like, we are so much more screwed if we can’t build in this country and build faster. And so I think the argument there still points to permitting reform over the tax credits.
Robinson Meyer:
What did you change your mind about writing this report?
Lily Bermel:
One thing that I think this report really crystallized for me is the role that gas plays in our power system. We see that it’s what fills the clean energy gap because it’s able to generate more. And we see that even as we build more clean energy, when it’s wind and solar and storage, that does not offset the services that gas provides. And I think like anyone who’s focused on mitigating the power sector needs to keep top of mind. They’re like, you literally need a turbine spinning on the grid as like the on switch to keep it on and to keep it functioning. There are only so many technologies that can do that. Gas is the only cost competitive and available technology to do that right now. And that’s why if we want a clean alternative, it has to be nuclear, it has to be geothermal. And down the line, there’s other options as well. And so to me, that helps us realize that geothermal in particular should be the number one public and private investment priority in the coming decades for decarbonization. And I saw a stat recently that geothermal has only received like one tenth of the amount of public support that solar has received. And so even though we’re seeing some success on that side, like it’s not enough. There is so much more that we can do.
Lily Bermel:
I think something else that this report helped me clarify my thinking about was the value of building versus doing things kind of marginally on the side to make things better. There’s a whole set of actually like really cool, innovative technologies like grid enhancing technologies, reconductoring, virtual power plants, demand response. Like there’s a whole set of things now that’s essentially the equivalent of like finding a $20 bill on the street. Like these should be pursued immediately. But recognizing that in order to meet demand growth, which as we talk about is both from AI, but also electrification and heat pumps and EVs and manufacturing, decarbonizing industry, like doubling the size of our grid is table stakes. In fact, like we might need to triple it. And so while all of those energy things should be pursued with like full steam ahead, it’s probably marginal and just like buys a little bit of time for all of the building that we really need to do. And a through line, like a theme that I put in my report is that building actually, is what will help solve our problems on both sides, right? You have to simply build more renewables to close that clean energy gap. And you have to build a clean firm to be able to close the emissions gap. And so to me, that’s the through line here and the way that we’ll decarbonize our power sector.
Robinson Meyer:
Can you give us how you used to feel about gas versus how you feel now?
Lily Bermel:
Sure. I’ll admit that I was raised in kind of climate academia, where I was very excited to go work at the Paris Agreement. And like everything was all about climate change and net zero and 2050 and direct timelines like that. And I think as I’ve learned more practically about how the energy system works, right, you realize that like, oh, you like things take slower than you expect. And you actually have to like add a whole lot of energy, way more than you want. And there’s a lot of building that’s required. And then maybe in a while, we can get rid of some of that fossil. I’ll see you next time.
Robinson Meyer:
Let’s now preserve some of your climate respectability here, as we’ve praised gas and said we shouldn’t bring back the wind and solar tax credits. And if we aren’t using the money on the wind and solar tax credits, of course, we have constrained fiscal space. The budget deficit, unlike a decade and a half ago when people were concerned about it, now seems to be a real problem, certainly driving up mortgage rates. We could just not spend that money at all. Okay. But if we did want to spend some money on climate change and we didn’t just want to do permitting reform, like what do you think we should spend money to do? What should we do instead of wind and solar tax credits?
Lily Bermel:
Great question. And just to provide a little bit of context, Brendan Duke put out a great report last month that looked at, if Democrats are to undo just a portion of the Trump agenda, it will cost the size of Biden’s original Build Back Better proposal. And that is not Trump’s whole agenda. And that is before any additional Democrat spending priorities.
Robinson Meyer:
Is that like the tax cuts? Like basically, if you were to undo the tax cuts, it’s just extremely expensive.
Lily Bermel:
It’s not even the tax cuts. It is healthcare and the tariffs and one other piece. So it’s not the tax credits. So all to say is, not only has the level of debt gone through the roof, the amount of spending demands will be huge. And so we will have to be really picky about what we do.
Lily Bermel:
So your question is a great one. In the report, I think I propose a premise for thinking about it. The first should be, let’s not subsidize the deployment of mature technologies. And instead let’s focus on building out the grid and focus on commercializing the set of innovative technologies that need to come to scale. So there’s a lot of things you can do to build the grid. You can expand existing tax credits on the books, say the manufacturing one for transformers, advanced conductors, transmission equipment, other power electronics that will really help relieve bottlenecks and supply crunch that we’re facing on that side. Some people support a transmission investment tax credit. That makes sense to look into. And then those technologies that we need really to deploy in the 2030s to have ready. So long-duration energy storage, geothermal, nuclear, carbon capture, you know, fusion maybe one day will happen. And that can be done through procurement that the government does. And then, of course, federal loan authority. And the Department of Energy Dominance Financing obviously plays a huge role here. And so wanting to continue to support that is really key. And it’s been great to see that being done on a bipartisan basis so far.
Robinson Meyer:
Your report says so clearly, build, build, build, how we’re going to achieve decarbonization is developing, you know, this next generation of clean firm technologies, be it nuclear or geothermal or fusion. And only building out more transmission can unlock the degree of renewables that we would need to see in order to really begin shipping away at the huge amount of fossil that’s in the system. When you look at leaders in the environmental policy space, when you look at what organizations are telling their Instagram followers and the people who ostensibly look to them, do you feel like they are communicating the importance of building as much as they should be?
Lily Bermel:
Yeah, I think it’s becoming more of a priority. I think people are realizing how important it is. And again, that Jesse Jenkins report that says we’ll lose 80% of emissions reductions if you don’t build transmission more like that is quite eye opening. So I do hope that my report can be a nudge in that direction, explaining, you know, really at a detail level and a technology level, like why we need to build more and why building more is the answer.
Robinson Meyer:
So you feel like it’s getting better. But do you feel like it’s where it needs to be now?
Lily Bermel:
Probably not. There’s always room for improvement. That’s the counter to glass out full. I’ll say I’ll be optimistic, but there’s a lot more work to do for sure.
Robinson Meyer:
OK, very politic answer. One more question, which is after all that you’ve come to understand about the IRA and looking at these reports, looking at what it would have done, looking at what it didn’t do. I think when the law was first passed, a lot of us thought, wow, what a well-designed law. It’s going to stay on the books. And then after the Beautiful Bill Act passed, a lot of us thought, oh, my gosh, it wasn’t well designed at all. What a disaster. It didn’t survive in the House. It didn’t. There were this group of 14 House Republicans who were lined up to support it. But as soon as President Trump made it clear that he wanted to get rid of this law, they got rid of it.
Robinson Meyer:
Actually, this was a disaster. But looking at your report, I don’t know, I’m of two minds. On the one hand, I look at your report and I go, look at this, three quarters of the clean energy capacity we would have had, two thirds of the emissions reductions we would have seen. Seems like the IRA did a pretty good job. On the other hand, I go like, well, but I look to 2035 or I look to 2030 and those clean firm tax credits don’t seem to be doing a lot. Now, we know that in the real world, it seems like they actually have a better track record that we’re commercializing technology faster than the models think we will. But there’s a reading of events here where like the IRA spent a lot of money to accelerate trajectories that we would have hit within a year or two anyway. Was the IRA a well-designed law? Do you think it did what we thought it was going to do when we passed it? Or does doing this, you know, after analysis report on it make you think, actually, we should have done a lot of other stuff instead of the IRA during this moment?
Lily Bermel:
Yeah, I think about how our understanding of what our best foot forward is with policy changes over time. And after, what, 20 years of trying to tax carbon and make carbon more expensive, we were enlightened to instead make clean energy cheaper. And so that was like the moment that the IRA was riding on. It was novel. It was very cool to design an industrial strategy and policy around clean energy. And that’s where a lot of the IRA came from. Again, by kind of solving for that demand side of the equation, we realized, oh my gosh, the supply side morass is so massive that we are just running and hitting our head against the wall over and over again. Also, right, the rise in energy demand, like our own realization about it came after the IRA was passed. So I think now that we are in a different moment where we have more data to prove that how, mature wind and solar are and how cost competitive they are, and we have a better understanding that there’s a whole other suite of technologies that we need to commercialize and innovate and scale, that then our focus, I think, naturally continues to move on. So I don’t think anything about the IRA was a mistake or not worth doing, right? We learned a lot from it. It did spur a lot of investment. It accelerated things. And now we’re realizing, oh my gosh, like, look how cool it is that these technologies are mature. And now let’s go do that for the rest of the set of clean energy
Lily Bermel:
technologies that we need and that we want to decarbonize the power sector.
Robinson Meyer:
When you look at your the set of technologies that have matured now, one thing we often hear from Democrats, one thing we hear, I have to say, constantly heated map events from elected Democratic representatives is, well, clean is cheap and cheap is clean, right? Right. Clean is the cheapest it can be. Clean, clean. There’s a bit of dissonance, I have to say, in this message that clean is cheap and also that we need to restore the subsidies for the thing that is allegedly cheapest because it was truly cheapest. We wouldn’t need to subsidize it. Do you believe after writing this report that clean is always the cheapest option?
Lily Bermel:
Sure. And I think you are so spot on in saying that. I’ll flag that my report itself didn’t look at costs and was just looking at deployment levels. But it did encourage me to look exactly into that question because I wanted to think through what are the headwinds and the tailwinds that the clean energy sector is facing. So obviously, we’re getting a lot of tailwinds right now from the Trump administration directly, also from persistent high interest rates and other things like that.
Lily Bermel:
A tailwind that people cite over and over again is how cheap clean energy is. And in looking into it, again, to ground truth that, I realized that clean is cheap. It’s comparatively cheap when it’s freshly getting built. So new solar compared to new gas, the solar will be cheaper. But in the really narrow context, when that market or that region has enough reliability already, if it already has the transmission built, and if it has a relatively low amount of solar, so therefore the solar is like value add. And in other moments when those conditions are not met, clean is not necessarily like automatically cheaper. And when you compare new clean to existing fossil, clean doesn’t always win out there either. And so I think that’s really important to know and, of course, argues for doing things to make clean cheap. I think it still supports the fact that clean is very competitive, but I think we really need to dismantle the thinking that says clean is always cheapest because it’s simply not. The study in the data that’s most often cited, which is the Lazard’s levelized cost of energy, it doesn’t take into account the grid costs and the systems costs that it takes to connect renewables to the grid. And it compares apples to oranges and all of these things. So again, clean is relatively cheap. Clean is super competitive. It’s not 100% always the cheapest.
Lily Bermel:
That’s really important to know. And it’s also like, okay, that gas is cheap, too. And that gas is what’s being used, because we want whatever energy is cheapest. And when gas is cheap and getting added to the grid, that will lower the cost of electrification, like that still helps support our goals. That’s still, yeah, lowering the cost of electrification is useful for decarbonization, and gas helps firm solar and wind and storage.
Robinson Meyer:
It’s funny, the Lazard levelized cost of energy, it’s if we did a, you know, levelized cost of calories.
Lily Bermel:
That’s such a good analogy.
Robinson Meyer:
It would tell you basically that what you should be eating at all times is like oatmeal cooked in canola oil. Yeah. You know, and it’s be like, you know, oatmeal cooked in canola oil, man, nothing delivers cheap calories like that. You can go to Costco and walk away with tens, hundreds of thousands of calories for like 10 bucks, you know, tomorrow. But you actually can’t exclusively eat oatmeals cooked in canola oil. You need other nutrients. You need other parts of your diet. Totally.
Lily Bermel:
Yeah. It’s like, how soon would you die if that’s the only thing that you ate? Yeah, exactly. How soon would the grid fail if you just completely only relied on wind and solar and didn’t have firm capacity, which one day will be met with clean energy?
Robinson Meyer:
That’s great. Lily Bermel, thank you so much for joining us on Shift Key. This was great.
Lily Bermel:
Thanks, Rob. So happy to be here.
Robinson Meyer:
And that will do it for us on Shift Key today and on Shift Key this week. We’ll be back next week with a new episode of Shift Key. But if you miss us, remember, you can go to heatmap.news right now. Go to the newsletter button in the tab and subscribe to Heatmap Daily. It’s the new daily on weekdays newsletter that I write with my analysis and thoughts on the day’s biggest climate and energy news on the biggest news and kind of the new electric economy. Me. It’s like getting an email from me to you every evening. It’s fun. I’m enjoying doing it. And you should go sign up right now. Heatmap.news. Click newsletters. Subscribe. Of course, you should subscribe to all of our newsletters at Heatmap, including Heatmap AM written by my colleague, Alexander Kaufman. Until then, Shift Key is a production of Heatmap News. Our editors are Jillian Goodman and Nico Lauricella. Multimedia editing and audio engineering is by Jacob Lambert and by Nick Woodbury. Our music’s by Adam Kromelow. Thanks so much for listening. See you next week.
Log in
To continue reading, log in to your account.
Create a Free Account
To unlock more free articles, please create a free account.
This transcript has been automatically generated.
Subscribe to “Shift Key” and find this episode on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Amazon, YouTube, or wherever you get your podcasts.
You can also add the show’s RSS feed to your podcast app to follow us directly.
Robinson Meyer:
Hello, it's October 16, and the Senate is considering a bipartisan permitting bill. Last month, a group of four senators, two Republicans and two Democrats, introduced the Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act. That is “BAAJA” or “bei-ja.” I've been flipping between the two pronunciations.
At the heart of that bill is a compromise.
The bill would make it easier to build, and in some cases mandate, lots of types of new infrastructure that are essential for decarbonization, including long-distance power lines. It would also make it easier in some cases to build natural gas pipelines. So how should Democrats, and climate hawks more broadly, think about such a compromise?
Is there any case in which lawmakers should accept building more fossil-fuel infrastructure in exchange for a lot of climate-friendly or decarbonization or electrification-friendly measures? Well, joining us today is someone who is among the most cited authors on this topic. Peter Erickson is an affiliated researcher at the Stockholm Environment Institute. He's written some of the most important papers on why it's essential to look at fossil fuel infrastructure, and specifically fossil fuel supply infrastructure, when considering climate policy. He wrote a very influential paper, as you'll hear, on the Keystone XL pipeline, arguing that that pipeline would have created way more carbon emissions than the State Department thought at the time.
He's since become an expert witness testifying against fossil fuel infrastructure in court cases, and I'm pretty sure he's been cited in more court cases about fossil fuel infrastructure and fossil fuel supply than any other climate researcher. But in recent years, he has taken a nuanced approach to the question.
He's come to think that some of the claims about fossil fuel infrastructure are perhaps running ahead of the science. He joins me on this episode of Shift Key to discuss the long arc of his work, because I think in tracking his work, you can see the evolution of a very important approach to climate policy and where that approach may go next in years to come.
You'll also get a sense of what all of this could mean for “BAAJA” or “bei-ja” or whatever we're calling it. I'm Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap News, and all that and more, it's all coming up on Shift Key.
Peter Erickson, welcome to Shift Key.
Peter Erickson
Hi, Rob. I think this is gonna be really fun.
Robinson Meyer
Excited you're here.
Could you just describe, like, your distinct role as a fossil fuel and energy systems researcher?
Peter Erickson
So my name is Peter Erickson, and my background is in science, in geology specifically. And for the last couple of decades, my main role in the climate policy space has been to do, as best as I can, objective analysis of how climate policies would affect greenhouse gas emissions. And so that role has led me to various places, but one place that it has led me to is to be an expert witness in court cases about fossil fuel infrastructure.
And the reason that in my mind has fit into my role as a climate policy analyst is that sometimes information is surfaced or brought forward by project proponents into these permitting decisions. Sometimes the information that's brought forward is clearly wrong and/or it seems like the permitting decision is a proxy for the policy decision made by the government.
And because I care more than anything about good analysis being brought to these decisions, that is why I have gotten involved as an expert witness.
Robinson Meyer
Yeah, I wanna talk today about a number of papers you've written and some of your ideas in the space and kind of how they inform thinking about permitting reform, but also I think the state of climate politics in 2026 more broadly. But before we get there, I wanna start in 2014, with this paper you wrote about the Keystone XL Pipeline.
I think a lot of your writing is about the role of fossil fuel supply and how it drives greenhouse gas emissions and how climate policy should think about fossil fuel supply. But what were you doing before you got into that, and how did you get into this world of fossil fuel supply thinking?
Peter Erickson
Yeah, and the Keystone XL Pipeline is a great example because that was my entry point into the fossil fuel stuff. Before that, I was working much more on either city scale or, local scale, or international scale climate policy. So one of my major things before getting into fossil fuel supply was looking at carbon offsets.
For example, I had just been working with the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, who had commissioned me to do a study of whether carbon offsets were or were not reducing emissions under the Kyoto Protocol. So, you know, I really viewed myself, and I still do to some extent, as just, let's just look at the numbers as best we can about this type of policy, right?
And so Keystone XL came along, and I wasn't really all that interested, but I saw the State Department's environmental impact statement about it, and I thought, “This can't be right." Something is wrong if they're concluding that this major pipeline from the oil sands is not going to change emissions at all.
And so that really got me looking at this question in the first place, reading economics textbooks, talking to economists, understanding oil market dynamics.
Robinson Meyer
I realize I should make one observation that I wanna touch on before we get into the actual process here, I suppose. Which is when I read these papers, when I read your research, when I read your written work, I do see what I would describe as an evolution, or at least a change of thinking on your part about... I'm not even sure you've, like, changed your mind per se, but in some ways I, I see an evolution from a world that wasn't taking, you know, your belief that questions of fossil fuel supply were not being taken seriously at all to now maybe a concern...
It might be wrong to say that you're worried that it's gone too far, but a concern that claims being made about the role that fossil fuel supply plays in greenhouse gas emissions are, like, overstated compared to the role that it actually plays. Am I right to detect in your research a broad turn?
Peter Erickson
I think it's fair. I think it's fair to detect an evolution and a change in emphasis, perhaps. But the fundamental math has stayed, and research findings have stayed true throughout, right? I was interested in Keystone XL in the first place because I thought that truth was somewhere between it can't matter at all and it matters absolutely, right?
That is still the position I'm taking based on my research. It's just that I think we have gotten to the point with some of the fossil fuel supply discussions where not only the rhetoric, that's always been the case, but the actual evidence being brought forward in front of very serious policy venues and very serious courts is straying from what I think is defensible in some cases.
And so if you detect a change in my posture, it's because it's the exaggerated claims are no longer just on the fossil fuel side.
Robinson Meyer
Let's start with the Keystone XL Pipeline, because I think to some degree, Keystone, both for you but also for society at large, winds up setting the terms for how we talk about fossil fuel infrastructure in a new way. And this was partly by design; this was part of the point of the Keystone XL Pipeline campaign was to make people aware of the role of fossil fuel infrastructure in perpetuating climate change and worsening climate change.
What's interesting about it is that part of the question with Keystone, and this will come up again with later fossil fuel projects, comes down to this analytical question where President Obama at the time says, "We're only going to approve Keystone if it doesn't significantly worsen greenhouse gas emissions or significantly worsen climate change."
The State Department then comes out with an analysis that says basically, "No, it won't." Keystone XL Pipeline, which for readers who are blissfully younger than you or I, was a big old pipeline that was gonna connect the Albertan tar sands, a particularly carbon-intensive form of oil extraction, to refineries in the Gulf Coast, allowing a broader expansion of refinery activity.
And because of the particular chemistries of Canadian oil and fracking oil, it was going to allow for a big expansion of activity. But the US State Department came out with this analysis, and it said, “Listen, don't worry. It's only going to worsen greenhouse gas emissions by 1 to 27 million tons of CO2.” And you wrote a paper, it was in Nature Climate Change 2014, and you said, “Actually, that’s not right.” And so what did you say?
Peter Erickson
What we said was that 1 to 27 million range that the State Department came out with was only about how much dirtier the oil sands were than whatever they would be replacing out there in the market. And what we said is, that can't be the only thing, right? You have this major oil producer that is Canada. It is capacity constrained in how and whether it can get its oil to market. Keystone XL is changing that, right? That is the fundamental point of the project, is to expand the ability of Canada to get its oil to market. That is going to change oil markets and therefore oil consumption in ways globally that we can use math about.
This is not unknown. It is, as I was criticized for, using Econ 101, but we should at least bring Econ 101 to bear and look at it from that and other perspectives. And so that's why that paper got published. That's why the State Department cited our paper in a footnote, as if to say, "Look, this is the way we think it is, but it could be this other way, too."
Robinson Meyer
And what did their analysis miss? It was this idea that basically every additional barrel you bring to market slightly lowers the global cost of oil and therefore increases the global market's propensity to consume oil, right?
Peter Erickson
That's exactly right. Yeah, each additional barrel slightly lowers the price of oil in the market, and that means that consumers might drive a little more, and car companies might make cars that are slightly less efficient. it means that whole cascading chain of decisions that is affected by price.
Robinson Meyer
This has come up in previous pieces of legislation, previous policy questions as well, which is you have to think about several different systems, and they're all in equilibrium. One of them is that you're opening up this new fossil fuel resource.
You're producing fossil fuel from it. You're producing oil, in this case, from it, and that's going to slightly increase the amount of oil supply on the global market, and that is going to also make it so oil's cheaper and people burn oil. But it also seems like by decreasing the global cost of oil, you're going to keep other fossil fuel reserves off the market. You're going to, by just a little bit, lower the global cost of oil. And that's going to take, you know, potential oil fields or potential oil field upgrades that other countries or, you know, companies elsewhere in the US or North America could make that would open up new sources of oil.
It's gonna make those projects uneconomic, and therefore, they're not gonna make those investments. And that's going to tick the price of oil a little bit up from where it was. And so how do you think about this relationship between new fossil fuel or new oil supply in this case, crowding out other supply, out-competing other supply versus it creating a market for itself?
Peter Erickson
Yes, that's right. And so the way that economists or oil market economists would deal with all that equilibrium is they would look at just how sensitive the producers are and the new producers are to price. They look at how the consumers and the new consumers are sensitive to price, and they essentially, you know, balance out those different factors in a complicated or, as I've done, a really simple model of how to look at this.
And so, you know, those parameters are called elasticities. We don't need to get into them per se, but when you put that kind of basic fundamentals and math together, what you end up finding is that, for each new oil barrel brought online, abou 0.4 barrels of that are newly consumed and 0.6, that adds to 1 by design, right, are, no longer produced elsewhere.
Robinson Meyer
Has our assessment of that number changed? I'm asking only — obviously I'm reading this paper you wrote 12 years ago. Stipulate it; it's a 12-year-old paper. I think your number there is 0.6, and it's funny 'cause I was reporting on this question like a year ago, and the number a year ago was 0.4, and I was like, "Have we knocked this down by two-tenths of a barrel?"
Peter Erickson
You know, maybe by chance during the Keystone XL era, the oil market was really tight, right? An analyst thought we were way up high on the cost curve for oil where it is very steep, and so where each new unit of production costs that much more.
Or, you know, considerably more than the last unit of production. And so in that environment, like, that is the kind of environment where affecting supply really matters. But in the current oil crisis notwithstanding, we are not exactly in that world anymore. And it's reasonable to think, or at least if you believe the energy transition is happening at the speed and scale that some people think, demand goes down.
That brings us further down the supply curve into an area where it's flatter and where supply restrictions matter, or rather would have less effect on prices and emissions. So in, you know, elasticity terms, we're going from a place of low elasticity in 2014 to a place perhaps with higher elasticity going forward.
Robinson Meyer
The way we would see that, if that change was happening, is that there's now alternatives to, say, in the oil market, there's alternatives to liquid-fueled vehicles in a way that there was not alternatives to liquid-fueled vehicles like in 2014.
Peter Erickson
That is completely the biggest change. And, in Econ 101 terms, the demand curve has shifted to the left because these other alternatives are now available, and consumers are choosing for price or other reasons, other options, and they have those options available.
So there is good reason to think that going forward, and I haven't seen this published in rigorous ways yet, but going forward, the elasticity of oil supply may be higher than it was in the past. And therefore, you know, further shifts in the demand curve or shifts in the supply curve are less consequential for price than they were in the past.
Robinson Meyer
That's so interesting. Let's stay on the chronology. All of that lay ahead. So Keystone XL brings infrastructure as this big climate policy question to the forefront, and I do think it's interesting. What wound up happening, I believe, was that in the final days of his presidency, Obama then revoked the permit from the pipeline or didn't grant it.
Peter Erickson
He did. That's correct.
Robinson Meyer
It was ultimately reinstated by Trump and then partially built, and then President Biden later revoked the permit, and now we live in the world we live in. Have we ever gone back and looked? Because I think what you hear now is that a lot of oil was able to leave the tar sands even-- You know, Keystone XL basically, as I was just describing, never opened.
Peter Erickson
So, your analysis was like zero, you know, the, the Keystone XL CO2 impact was gonna be like zero to 110 million tons. Do we have a sense of where in that range we wound up?
Yeah. I don't think we really do. I mean, what I did was, you know, a forward-looking analysis. What you're suggesting is maybe there's a way to go back and look, do a backward analysis to see what actually happened. But, you know, we do know that Canada's oil was capacity constrained at times. And so, you know, they ended up building another pipeline, and you know, if you believe the Canada Energy Regulator, they may be capacity constrained again.
And so, I think there's good evidence to say that it wasn't near the zero end of that range, right? It was at least somewhere in the middle, if not higher.
Robinson Meyer
Why would it have been zero? Sorry, I just wanna — 'cause I feel like the headline of this paper is that the impact of the Keystone XL pipeline may have been way bigger than the State Department said, but the range is actually like, instead of the State Department range, which was zero to 27 million tons, yours was like zero to 110 million tons.
So what is, like, going on at the zero end of that range that would make it—
Peter Erickson
At the zero end of that range, it's just all the oil is getting to market some other way, right? And we know that didn't happen.
Robinson Meyer
Yeah. And for it to be 110, it would've been like, none of…
Peter Erickson
None of that oil was getting out otherwise.
Robinson Meyer
Do we also know that didn't happen?
Peter Erickson
Yeah, we also know that didn't happen because then they went and built, you know, the Trans Mountain Express TMX pipeline and got a lot of that oil out that way. So, you know, these are dynamic systems.
Robinson Meyer
Cool. Okay, so anyway, all of that lay in the future. So then about a decade ago, I think you wrote two papers. One is about this idea of carbon lock-in, and the other is about limiting fossil fuel production as the next big step in climate policy.
Let's talk about carbon lock-in first. So what is this idea of carbon lock-in?
Peter Erickson
Carbon lock-in is this idea that these energy systems, once you build them, especially the fossil fuel energy systems, they are able to maintain their inertia, maintain their dominance through a whole bunch of factors. But that includes economic, that includes institutional, by which I mean, you know, they have all the trade associations and community colleges and pipeline of workers that they need, and political factors, right?
They are able to continue the lobbying and other activities that keep them there as the center provider of energy for an economy.
Robinson Meyer
Is it like mostly a technical and economic story where you have these pipelines, they're expensive to build but cheap to run? I think your example is gas power plants or coal power plants as big capital-intensive projects that then once you have them, they're pretty cheap to just keep running.
So is it that's like a technical economic story? Or is it like a political story where once you have this big investment that was successful that's throwing off cash, you can reinvest a relatively small amount of that cash into your right to continue to operate?
Peter Erickson
That's right. It's both of those things. In that paper assessing carbon lock-in in 2015, we tried to bring all of those dimensions into a single framework for how to look at lock-in. Both, you know, the economic dimensions of how cheap is it to build this thing, but also another economic dimension, which is, well, once you have built it, does it really stick around for its full lifetime? Or how easy it is to unlock that thing again, right? Which is a key thing. So it's not binary.
Once you build this stuff, it's not like it's just going to keep doing its thing for 30 years necessarily, right? There are analysis tools we can bring to that. And then there are the sociopolitical dimensions, which we tried to find ways to quantify, as well in that paper.
Robinson Meyer
I do think one of the examples in that paper is coal power plants, which at the time and even now still are in— I mean, actually less now because they've been given the great gift of load growth. But through the early 2020s, even though they were locked in, were being outcompeted by gas and therefore shutting down with the help of a lot of EPA regulatory assist and legal campaigns as well.
Peter Erickson
That's a great example of why a thing that's built may not keep operating the way it was intended. And, you know, again, it's a special situation in the U.S. for reasons you know. You know, a lot of the coal plants were really old. They were beyond their useful lifetimes anyway.
But, you know, we could apply the same logic to gas plants, for example, going forward, right? Like, lots of those are being built under duress and under pressure by data centers or otherwise because they feel that they need to. But it's not automatic that those things are gonna be operated for 30 years or 40 years.
Robinson Meyer
At the same time as the carbon lock-in paper, you wrote another piece with two co-authors in Nature Climate Change, It's a case study. It looks at California specifically, but I think it builds on the Keystone XL work to say, look, climate policy should be thinking more proactively about limiting fossil fuel production as a centerpiece of climate policy.
So can you just talk about that paper a little bit?
Peter Erickson
Yeah, of course. And the slight modification I would make to what you say is I would say we were saying it could be, it can be. Here are some of the reasons why it might make sense to be, rather than a normative statement of “it should be.” But nonetheless, what we were seeing at the time is that some of the reasons to not look at supply, didn't hold up to us.
And we looked at the California context in particular, where there was a debate and activism focused on Jerry Brown, the then-governor, about stopping production and starting to wind down production in California of oil, and which is among some of the most carbon-intensive oil in the country and the world is in California, right?'Cause it's this old, very thick, dirty oil.
And what we looked at was, you know, limiting oil supply could make sense as part of a standard, just straight up by-the-books climate policy, in the sense that as you are winding down your oil demand, as California was making great plans to do, if you also wound down production at similar rates or in concert, you would be reducing the fact that downward pressure on prices that you are helping to create by reducing demand, that downward pressure in prices then makes it easier for everyone else around the world to consume oil.
And could you not, at the same time, be winding down your own oil supply and perhaps not even affecting, you know, the net import balance, right? It could all be part of a planned transition. I still stand by that concept, right? These two things can go together: energy policy about oil and gas supply, and climate policy about reducing demand for those things.
Robinson Meyer
I can see why at the time, and I would put myself in the same category here, that would be a very attractive argument, not only because you're limiting fossil fuel production, it has these global effects on the global oil market. You know, as always, the question in climate policy that nobody has a completely satisfying answer on is: How do you do climate policy in your state, your subnational or national entity in a way that advances global decarbonization? How do you do global climate policy in your state or country?
Peter Erickson
That's completely right. And just one, one more thing on that is like, I mean, that exact argument, as you just stated, was influential with the Obama White House on the question of Arctic drilling. So I don't know if you remember, but very late in Obama's presidency, he took off-line, by you know, using his presidential determinations, a bunch of oil from the Arctic that could no longer be considered, in theory, you know, for perpetuity for oil drilling.
And the argument that was with John Holdren, as I understand it, there in the White House at the time, was: how can we expect the rest of the world to be getting off oil in the ways that we, the U.S., want them to do if we're then providing them even more oil in the process?
Robinson Meyer
Oil especially is an unusually global fossil fuel market, it's a very distinctive set of global problems. Like coal is obviously in some ways worse for the climate, but coal markets are often national or regional.
But oil is this nice, big, happy global market. We build all the infrastructure so that it effectively settles on a global basis, except in moments of profound supply shock, such as right after the Iran war, and right after the Iran war started. And, because of that, removing barrels of oil from anywhere kind of affects everyone's consumption in a way that is not nearly as satisfying with, say, natural gas or coal.
It also seems like I can see, and in fact I think I, like, remember, there's another reason this argument is, I think, so appealing, or the potential for this policy is so appealing, which is not only does it satisfy, you know, our, Utopian liberal aspirations of economic planning but it also seems to address a big problem of climate policy, which is that the fossil fuel industry or the set of interests that are aligned around fossil fuels, make a lot of money and extract a lot of political power.
I mean, it's this carbon lock-in idea that they become entrenched through revenues from this existing infrastructure. Part of the case that's made for limiting fossil fuel production is also that it addresses, especially at the time, especially in the late 2010s, is also that it addresses the power of the fossil fuel industry and weakens it as a political power and political entity going forward.
Peter Erickson
I have so much to say about this, but let me just start by saying that paper that you're referencing from 2018, Limiting Production is the Next Big Step in Climate Policy, led to the California Air Resources Board holding — I mean, I'm oversimplifying, it wasn't just my paper that led to—
Robinson Meyer
No, no.
Peter Erickson
California Air Resources Board held a workshop, like a public meeting, on this in Sacramento to try to surface some of the arguments and evidence around this set of ideas.
And I was paired opposite Severin Borenstein, who I think has been a guest on your show before, and he was basically there to rebut this paper, you know, from Nature Climate Change. And, you know, we had a lively debate. We sparred, it was a lot of fun. And what he argued is that, you know, maybe Erickson has a point here. His math is basically correct, but there's another thing that he didn't show you from his math, which is that price increase that, you know, the supply-side theory is counting on to help reduce emissions, that is, in effect, a transfer of wealth from global consumers who had no say in this policy in California to the incumbent producers all around the world, the ones that are not in California, and that transfer of wealth is substantial.
And, you know, I thought that was a good point, but I thought it kind of missed this, "Hey, aren't we doing this in tandem?" idea, right? But it stuck with me ever since, just in the back of my head. And so this summer, I went back to it, and I was like, "Let's look back at that math." And I reconstructed from, you know, scratch, this economic model.
I got it to verify the calcs that Severin put forward in 2018, and I looked at, okay, say we leave that barrel of oil in the ground, and prices increase just the way we think, and it helps reduce emissions, the whole storyline that you and I have been talking about, what else happens? And it turned out— and this was what I was kind of afraid to look at in 2018, right? It turned out that the overall transfer of money from the world's consumers to the world's incumbent fossil fuel producers was greater than the amount of money that was denied that company that you no longer let develop their assets, right? And that finding is inseparable from the climate benefits that limiting supply would bring, right?
And so to me, that really complicated this idea that limiting supply is a stick in the eye to the fossil fuel industry, right? Like they are actually on net winning out when you limit supply in many cases. And of course, they know this, right? That's why they have OPEC and OPEC Plus to try to manage and limit supply themselves.
So it just made me think, you know, I don't think this part of the debate should be limited to some notes in a t2018 debate in Sacramento. I think this needs to be out there for climate advocates to wrestle with.
Robinson Meyer
So before we get to this paper you wrote this summer, in 2021 you wrote a paper that looks at U.S. fossil fuel subsidies, and it draws a very interesting conclusion. The paper looks at what you describe as — the U.S. has 16 different policies that could be construed as fossil fuel subsidies. You take a very rigorous look at subsidies. What did you find in this paper? Because when we talk about fossil fuel subsidies in the U.S., people assume when we say the U.S. is subsidizing fossil fuels, that it means the U.S. is producing more fossil fuels than it would if not for the non-existence of these subsidies.
But you find something surprising, What was it?
Peter Erickson
Find something surprising. And of course, this is all dependent on the price of oil and gas and economics and stuff, but that is what we looked at, so I think you should pay attention to what I say here. What we looked at is we gathered data on tens of thousands of oil and gas fields in the United States that were known.
They were discovered, but they had not yet been developed, right? So these are the ones that either are or are not gonna be affected by subsidies and other regulatory exemptions. And what we found is that the existence of those, like you say, 16 subsidies or regulatory exemptions, what those do is they mainly steer more profit to these projects.
They are not, at least at oil and gas prices at the time, which have been somewhat similar since, what those subsidies are not doing is leading to new projects on the ground. The project economics are not changing all that much. And so we found that well over 90% of the value of those subsidies is going directly to the profits of those companies, but that is not necessarily trickling down to new projects on the ground, which also means, you know, the jobs and other economic benefits that the fossil fuel industry claim that they are providing, right?
Robinson Meyer
Why is that?
Peter Erickson
Yeah. The reason that is, is because this is a really mature industry, right? It is sort of a, almost a, you know, classic rentier industry where they're given a huge amount of, by geology, oil and gas in the ground, and they can draw a line around that, and create a moat for themselves and produce it, right?
And so the price of oil is enough higher than the cost of developing those fields that they are able to do that. They are able to get profits, and the subsidies that are still in place are not essential, are not what is driving that investment on the ground, right? They still have enough profit margin, 15%, say, rate of return on their new projects with or without the subsidies, right?
And so, say the subsidies are taking a project that was gonna get 15% return and they're turning it into a 22% return, right? That's bad either way if you're concerned about the climate, right? We don't want this industry to have any more profits than it already has. But what we really care about at the end of the day is, are new fossil fuel projects being developed, and does the fossil fuel industry have the power to block, you know, clean energy?
Robinson Meyer
I mean, first of all, I think it actually points — and maybe we can get back to this at the end of the conversation — but it seems to point to a place you, climate policy advocates could look if they wanted to go after industry profits specifically, which is go look at the subsidies because it is, uh, actually the subsidies that's driving the surplus.
I mean, it's not only the subsidies that are driving the surplus. The surplus is kind of chemical. That's kind of the whole problem. But if you wanna look at where the additional surplus is coming from, so to speak, that these companies are using to help entrench their political power and support political candidates who oppose climate policy and, you know, lobby against climate policy, you could go after the subsidies.
It would be significant.
Peter Erickson
Yeah, and you could go after windfall, windfall profits and, you know, there are campaigns and ideas to try to do that. But, you know, just one other like specific math finding from that study, which is that we found that basically, you know, subsidies were responsible for basically almost none of the new oil projects to be developed this decade and maybe, you know, a quarter of the gas projects that would be developed this decade in the US, you know, would or would not happen without subsidies.
So, you know, essentially none of the new oil projects were dependent on these subsidies or regulatory exemptions. I mean, that tells you how mature this industry is.
Robinson Meyer
One could go after the subsidies, but be sure if you go after the subsidies you don't think you're going after emissions, 'cause you're not. You're only going after a second order input into the ultimate cocktail of political factors that determine emissions. Because as you said, you don't need the subsidies to make these projects make sense.
Peter Erickson
I think that's basically right. I mean, you know, globally there's perhaps different stories in different parts of the world, but in the U.S.…
Robinson Meyer
Is the U.S. context for…
Peter Erickson
Yeah.
Robinson Meyer
In some ways, the paper is one about corporate decision-making, you know, and what drives corporate decision-making is not lots of little tweaks on the margin to see if a project is just gonna eke out profitability or not. For oil companies to make the, you know, multi-billion dollar investments required to open a new field or open a new resource, they have to be so sure that this thing is gonna be enormously profitable going forward that it justifies them risking that capital. This is not an industry that's operating at the tenths of a margin of profit.
Peter Erickson
No, that's right. And I mean, that's why you hear so much about certainty being an issue with regard to all kinds of energy investment and why, for a long time, you know, major international commissions have gone, "Well, we need the renewable industry to be able to have more certainty in its projects to go forward."
Well, you know, there's a reason for that, right? Certainty really does matter.
Robinson Meyer
Okay, so then let's get to this 2026 paper. So if you've been listening to this, you're like, "Why are we talking about all these papers?" First of all, they're all in the, gonna be in the show notes. But second of all, we're gonna get to the future of climate policy, all that.
So this paper, "Rethinking the Case Against New Oil and Gas Fields," it was published this summer in Environmental Research Letters. I think it does complete this turn, or this honing of your thinking from, hey, we're not thinking about the importance of individual fossil fuel projects in the global marketplace in equilibrium, to like, whoa, whoa, whoa, we need better evidence before we turn every additional new fossil fuel project into, like, a fight over the future of climate policy, perhaps would be one way of putting it.
Peter Erickson
Yeah, and so big things changed in the world in that time too, right? We had, like we had COVID, we had the war in Ukraine, we've had the Strait of Hormuz, and the war on Iran really changing supply. So we've had some big real-world tests to see how supply and demand shocks play out that we can draw from.
Robinson Meyer
So first of all, let's just talk about this finding that you've already previewed, which is that when you restrain fossil fuel supply, you might be able to keep those barrels off the market. But what you are doing is engineering a massive shift of wealth to the existing fossil fuel industry. I know you've already described it a little, but just why is that?
Peter Erickson
Yeah, the reason that is, is because when you constrain supply and constrain supply outlooks, you are causing an increase in price, and that is what is needed to bring on the other new projects. And that increase in price and price outlooks is what causes consumers and all of the institutions that surround consumers, the car industries, et cetera, to reduce their oil consumption.
But that increase in price applies to every single producer in the whole world, right? You've penalized one producer or one whole region of the world by saying, "You can't produce oil here," but the price increase applies globally, and all producers see that, right? And all consumers see that. And when those economics balance out, and a new equilibrium is found, the consumers are paying for that price increase and giving the money to the producers.
And you can do straight-ahead math on that to give a first-order estimate of what happens.
Robinson Meyer
And you cite a recent example that everyone just saw, that we've been talking about on this show, which is in early 2026, Iran, following the US-Israeli war starting, closed the Strait of Hormuz. The price for oil and refined products spiked everywhere around the world.
That increased fuel costs for consumers, and it increased profits for producers. It was quite mechanical, and we all saw it happen. And effectively, what you're saying is that when you constrain fossil fuel production in some subnational region, effectively what you're doing is like a mini version of that.
Peter Erickson
That's completely right. And the logic of that has been consistent through all of my papers. But I think Hormuz and other events mean that this dynamic needs to be considered upfront. It needs to be daylighted in climate policy and in the fossil fuel supply-limiting community to grapple with, right? It is price. Price is the mechanism that causes a decrease in supply to lead to a reduction in consumption and a reduction in emissions, and that price has other effects that need to be considered.
Robinson Meyer
You'll see this idea that people will say, which is, "Look, to hit 1.5C, we need to have no new oil and gas fields." In fact, opening any new oil and gas fields or doing any kind of fossil fuel expansion is completely incompatible with a 1.5C world. is that claim supported by the literature?
Peter Erickson
Well, let's just say first, it is appealing, right? I mean, we are at the final moments of a carbon budget that would allow us to stay within 1.5C. And so therefore, it's appealing to have such simple rubrics. You know, no new fossil fuel projects are compatible. But the simplicity of that is also its real weakness, right?
I mean, if the carbon budget is so vanishingly small that no new fossil fuel projects are compatible with it, well, then nothing is compatible with it, right? Any individual ton of emissions could be the one that you point to and say, "Incompatible," right? And so really it puts the question back in my mind as to what is the effectiveness, what is the effect of any given policy that you're going to be looking at, and is that going to actually bring about the transition, help bring about the transition that we want?
And I think the idea that limiting supply or that specifically the new oil and gas fields are incompatible, like I don't think that really stands up very well in the literature. And I mean, there's like one or two papers that sort of claim that, but they don't — they have flaws.
Robinson Meyer
You mention, for instance, that one of the parts of the IPCC report that looks at, okay, how are we gonna meet these climate targets, of the 97 scenarios that preserve 1.5 C that they look at, and these are scenarios for the path of global energy development and the global energy system, fewer than half show declines in oil and gas demand rapid enough that no new oil and gas fields would be needed.
Even fewer of those that show, you know, 2 C, that show us hitting the 2 C target, show declines that are that rapid.
Peter Erickson
Yeah, just given that, to say that new oil and gas fields are incompatible with 1.5C requires a very narrow reading of the literature, meaning the science, meaning the IPCC. Or it requires saying, you know, those scenarios are a few years old now. We actually know more. You know, this newer scenarios would say that no new oil and gas fields are required. But even that requires that those pathways are feasible, right? Like the reason that the IEA, for example, comes to the logic that it does, that no new oil and gas fields are required is that they first say, they first find that oil demand would decline or would be able to decline this fast, and therefore we wouldn't, quote, need these new fields.
But they actually do not go and say that no-- that those new fields should be stopped. And they actually even explicitly say stopping new fields is not a tactic or a strategy that we think makes a lot of sense.
Robinson Meyer
In other words, the IEA wrote a scenario, and they said, "If you were to hit 1.5 C, if you wanted to do it, oil demand would have to decrease so fast that you wouldn't need new oil and gas fields. But by the way, we don't think that you should respond to this by trying to proactively shut down new oil and gas fields. We're just saying if you were to actually hit this target, then you wouldn't need these fields." And then that was kind of like that if-then statement was then, like, reversed to a then-if and said, "If you want to hit 1.5 C, then you should have no new fields.” But actually, the literature doesn't support that.
Peter Erickson
That logic is plainly wrong, you know? And the literature doesn't support it. So you can then go concoct the literature to try to support it, as some have done, but that doesn't make it right.
Robinson Meyer
It seems like you're making another argument in this paper, which is that the current arguments against limiting oil and— no new oil and gas have these analytical errors, but they also have political errors. And can you talk about the political errors, stipulating that we will never be able to analyze political errors as quantitatively and objectively as we can analyze analytical errors and economic errors?
Peter Erickson
I come at this from having experience working with, you know, Governor Jerry Brown's office or the Obama White House, and seeing how they think about this very real question. And I just think it is a really big ask to ask a politician, someone like Joe Manchin, to go against this sort of basic availability of fossil fuels and the basic community needs in their jurisdiction to make this bigger policy that would basically not necessarily be in the immediate near-term interests of their jurisdiction for very good reasons, right?
And so I just think the politics are much more complicated than this idea that we can develop an anti-fossil fuel norm or that we can, you know, shift the social license around fossil fuel companies in the way that leads to actual policy decisions by real people that face trade-offs in their jurisdictions in the United States.
And I think Joe Manchin is a great example of that. I mean, you know, he has been the most debated politician in the U.S. since the Inflation Reduction Act. But the fact that he had shot a gun at, a literal gun, at cap and trade previously in his ads, and that he got to a yes on this, you know, path-breaking legislation, I think was a huge triumph.
And the fact that he got so excoriated by anti-fossil fuel activists over it, and more to the point, not celebrated for what he actually did, I think misreads the politics of what an actual rural decision-maker in a resource-dependent community faces. And you can debate whether Joe Manchin really is that or whether he's more the face of capital, but the incentives are real.
Robinson Meyer
There's various ways I think about kind of the meso-scale of humanity's future. But one of the big ways is climate change. One of the big ways is these baseline assumptions that climate impacts are gonna be getting worse, and that at the same time, I would hope, and I am trying to advocate for policies that decarbonize the energy system over that timescale.
What can be hard is that those are our interests, yours and mine, and voters don't care. Voters don't care at all. That's not how they see the future at all. They care primarily about cheap energy. They care about the environment. They would like to see something done about climate change, but it is not a fundamental part of their worldview in the same way that it's a part of my worldview or your worldview.
And that can make it very hard, I think, for you— for people like us — to reason about it and to make arguments about it, and to say relatively common-sense things like it is a big deal that Joe Manchin, who came from a state whose economy is dominated by fossil fuels, was willing to be the yes vote on so many important parts of climate policy. Because people can point to all the bad things that he was doing that I don't think he should've been doing about climate policy. But guess what? If I was Joe Manchin, then I wouldn't have won that Senate seat because my politics aren't Joe M— You know, someone with my politics would not have won the Senate seat that…
Peter Erickson
You wouldn't have gotten in that position, and Joe Manchin was in that position. And the material interests, regardless of how he was fracturing those through his own holdings or whatever, the material interests led him to be, for very good reasons, led him to be skeptical of climate policy, and yet he got to a deal. And, you know, I don't think that many of the things he said were all that unreasonable. I don't think his advocacy for the Mountain Valley Pipeline was all that unreasonable. And—
Robinson Meyer
Well, this is the crazy thing. If environmental advocates had taken Joe Manchin's permitting reform, we wouldn't be talking about the package we're talking about right now.
Peter Erickson
That's exactly right. I mean, there's a way to look at this where Joe Manchin got massively sold out because he didn't get what he wanted. And this — I'm not saying any of this to excuse the bad parts about Joe Manchin or say that we should have taken his exact deal, but, like, it was a deal, was it not?
And the Mountain Valley Pipeline as a flashpoint for emission... I mean, I have a lot to say about the Mountain Valley Pipeline and the emissions consequences of that, that go behind the scenes in ways maybe we shouldn't get to. But, you know, there was a major group that came out and said, "Our number one climate priority is stopping the Mountain Valley Pipeline." And that same group had a consultant, that was me, who was looking at the emissions consequences of the Mountain Valley Pipeline, which were very, very small. So if you want to talk about the epistemic environment and how climate analysis of emissions connects to, you know, the statements of major environmental organizations, there's a pretty good case study of mine.
Robinson Meyer
I think that there's another piece of this that we've already kind of touched on, but that I think is worth just hitting on one more time as we leave this paper and then talk about permitting reform, talk about future climate policy. The analysis behind no new oil and gas are dubious, and it can lead people to take political stances that they don't need to take and prevent compromises from happening that would ultimately be helpful for decarbonization.
You describe going back and looking at Severin Borenstein's math. and that what he said at the time was true, which is that if you constrain fossil fuel development, you're basically engineering a massive transfer of wealth from fossil fuel consumers to fossil fuel producers. Just not the particular producer whose production you're constraining at that moment. Probably. I mean, if it's Chevron or Exxon, guess what? They have a lot of other assets in the world. And by the way, there's another whole story here, too, which is that throughout most of the history of the oil market, the key question was how would you constrain supply, not how would you increase demand. And for this reason, cartels continually emerge in the history of the global oil market to constrain the global oil market.
What you find in this paper is that if you, say, do withhold production, if you do constrain production, this transfer of wealth from consumers to producers is, like, not small. Not only is it not small, it is bigger than the scale of the barrel you have kept off the market. So you write, "For each $70 barrel of oil," of course, now it would be $90, but setting that aside — "For each $70 barrel of oil left undeveloped as a result of production-limiting policy, between about 60 and $350 are transferred from global oil consumers to producers. The enrichment of oil producers is greater than the revenue denied the company no longer able to develop its oil assets."
And so if you keep oil off the market, you're actually engineering more than the value of that oil going to the global fossil fuel capital stack.
Peter Erickson
Yeah. That's right. And given what we know right now, I mean, I did also point to a few special cases, you know, certain combinations of elasticities where that would not be the case, right? You know, if we really were on a very rapid transition down in energy demand, then we would be at a place where oil producers would be much more competitive, right?
And the increase in price as a result of any additional barrel pulled off the market would be so low that the sign of that would flip. And, you know, some people I've talked to in response to this paper said, "Well, Isn't it plausible that we're on that path? Aren't we winning the war against oil demand?" And they point to, you know, rates of electric vehicle purchases in Brazil or China or wherever. And I say, "I mean, that's fine. That is maybe — maybe we are on that path." But like people have been telling us we're at peak oil demand for a long time now, right? We are probably at more of a plateau in oil demand. And until we see really good signs that oil demand has peaked and is going down, I think economics and the politics of limiting supply are not as strong as many advocates would like.
Robinson Meyer
All of this now brings us to today, where, in a concrete way, there's a bill in Congress that would include some concessions for fossil fuel companies and also include a lot of concessions and incentives and things that clean energy companies want. It would make it easier, much easier to build clean and I wanna talk about that bill.
This is not the first time this has happened since 2020, where there is a piece of legislation or a piece of policy on the table that would make it easier for oil companies in some ways and make it easier for clean energy companies in a lot of other ways. Where does this leave you? How are you thinking about these issues in a broad way today? What are you thinking about climate policy today?
Peter Erickson
It's a tough place for climate policy qua climate policy, right? And I think there is reason to be really hopeful about the pace of renewables, you know, as we've seen costs coming down, et cetera. But there's a difference between a rapidly accelerating industry, a low-carbon energy industry, and one that we know can keep going at the pace that we need it to ultimately displace fossil fuels, right?
Some people talk about this in terms of increasing returns to scale or, you know, S-curve type dynamics, where there's sort of a line out there among climate and energy policy folks that like, "Oh, you know, we've finally gotten somewhere. Renewables are finally up the S-curve. They are winning. They are going fast." And I think while that is true and that is hopeful, that speed and the continuation of that is not guaranteed at all, right? There's a paper that came out this summer from a group of social scientists in Europe that looked at past energy transitions, like in individual countries, and what they found is, like, how far the S-curve goes before it plateaus and flattens out is really also a function of policy. And you need the policies that allow that speed to keep going. You need the grid integration. You need the permitting reform, even, to let that industry keep growing up into something that can really take on fossil fuels.
So, I think this is a bill that comes at a very important time.
Robinson Meyer
I think where this conversation started, right, actually why it started, in some ways why you and I started talking about this topic and about permitting reform was you said in your carbon lock-in paper you wished you had emphasized things a little differently. And that you'd wish you'd emphasized them differently 'cause they're ideas that are as important now as they were then. So what do you wish you had done differently in that paper that to some degree started all of this off, you know…
Peter Erickson
I think that assessing carbon lock-in paper from 2015 was really good, and it's been cited a whole —
Robinson Meyer
It's great. Yes, it's great. I wanna…
Peter Erickson
But it was in a policy environment where carbon lock-in was much on the people's minds, and we framed the analysis as, you know, you need to not keep making carbon lock-in worse.
But all of the math and the analysis that we did and put into that could just as easily have supported a different take, and it still can support a different take. And that take is that the best way to unseat carbon lock-in, based on our same math and our same findings and all of the literature, is to grow what can beat it, grow low-carbon energy as fast as you can and for as long as you can.
And let me try to crystallize that in terms of one of the pieces of analysis that we did then. As I mentioned, we looked at a whole bunch of different ways to look at carbon lock-in, right? What is carbon lock-in, and how do you unseat it? And one of the things we looked at is we developed this ratio that would say you give a unit of help to both the fossil fuel industry and its obvious replacement in clean energy.
We developed this ratio: say you give the same unit of help, who benefits more? And so we looked at, for example, gas power versus either wind or solar. And if you give those two the same unit of help, the renewables are gonna benefit two to three times more from that same benefit of help as would the gas power plant.
And the reason for that is economics in part, but it extends beyond economics too, right? Because we've heard that these renewables can compete on cost, and so that's sort of the price and economics reason. You know, you're moving them up the S-curve of technology deployment.
But there's a whole set of other conditions that go around that, that allow that speed to be maybe accelerated or allow that speed to be maintained, and that is the institutions that sit around these insurgent industries that the incumbents already have and that the insurgents don't really. So these are things like the trade associations that have enough members and are big enough to actually do things on the ground.
These are things like the fact that there are enough people that work in this industry that you know them in your community, and maybe you go to the bar together, and then maybe you have a softball team, and then maybe, you know, the whole community comes and rallies around your softball team. And all of a sudden, you are a going concern culturally and politically.
And those extra factors are really important in how far an industry can go and how quickly it can scale in the long term. And so that is what we were trying to capture with that dynamic, with that ratio of a unit of help to fossil versus clean benefits clean like two to three times more than it does the fossil.
Robinson Meyer
Where does that shake out for permitting reform?
Peter Erickson
Well, where permitting reform shakes out, you know, there are so many provisions in the bill, but on the fundamentals, I think what that means for permitting reform is that the renewable industry really does need this. This is a critical time to help the renewable industry keep its pace of growth.
This is gonna be a cheesy metaphor, right? But when we're talking about the power of the fossil fuel industry, like it's sometimes talked about as David and Goliath, right? And I'm sure that there were all kinds of lawsuits to try to take Goliath's sword away, and I'm sure there were all kinds of comms campaigns to move the Overton window about just how bad Goliath was, right? But like, if some upstart who's been working with their slingshot to throw things really fast, and they've got five smooth stones, and they've practiced on all the lions and the bears out there, let's have that upstart get a shot.
Robinson Meyer
What would you need to see in the permitting ... and you haven't looked at it. I mean, you're not a U.S. senator. It's not your job to say whether it's a good deal or not. But if you were, or just like what would you need to see to make you think the permitting deal or compromises like it are worth it, versus what would make you think that it's not worth it?
Peter Erickson
I care a lot about climate change. I am a climate policy analyst. I look at bills for my whole career and policy from the perspective of, does this thing dramatically reduce emissions or not? You know, is the upside better and substantially better than the downside? So that is the lens that I would look at, that I am looking at it.
I am a quantitative analyst. I like to see the numbers. There's lots of opinions being weighed on this that are hard to weigh without some analysis. So I think those are forthcoming. I have reasonable, you know, confidence that those are forthcoming. So I'm on the sidelines waiting to look at that, and that is the yardstick that I will use.
Robinson Meyer
Well that is great, and when they come out we'll have to talk about them. This has been a great conversation. Peter Erickson, thank you so much for joining us on Shift Key.
Peter Erickson
Thank you, Rob. Was really fun.
Rob talks with Peter Erickson, an affiliated researcher at the Stockholm Environment Institute
No researcher has been more cited in lawsuits against fossil fuel infrastructure than Peter Erickson. As an affiliated researcher at the Stockholm Environment Institute, Peter studies how pipelines and other oil and gas supply expansions can increase global carbon emissions. His work has been critical to the activist fights against the Keystone XL pipeline, the Enbridge pipeline, and others.
But in recent years, he’s taken a more nuanced approach to fossil fuel supply — in part because, as he has shown, it can enrich the oil and gas industry in a surprising but direct way. On this episode of Shift Key, Peter joins Rob to discuss why blocking fossil fuel supply can lower emissions, why it can counterintuitively transfer wealth from energy consumers to fossil fuel firms, and what it all might mean for the future of climate policy.
Shift Key is hosted by Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap News.
Subscribe to “Shift Key” and find this episode on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Amazon, YouTube, or wherever you get your podcasts.
You can also add the show’s RSS feed to your podcast app to follow us directly.
Here is an excerpt from their conversation:
Robinson Meyer: So first of all, let's talk about this finding that you've already previewed, which is that when you restrain fossil fuel supply, you might be able to keep those barrels off the market. But what you are doing is engineering a massive shift of wealth to the existing fossil fuel industry. I know you've already described it a little, but just why is that?
Peter Erickson: Yeah, the reason for that is because when you constrain supply and constrain supply outlooks, you are causing an increase in price, and that is what is needed to bring on the other new projects. And that increase in price and price outlooks is what causes consumers and all of the institutions that surround consumers, the car industries, et cetera, to reduce their oil consumption.
But that increase in price applies to every single producer in the whole world, right? You've penalized one producer or one whole region of the world by saying, "You can't produce oil here," but the price increase applies globally, and all producers see that. And all consumers see that. And when those economics balance out, and a new equilibrium is found, the consumers are paying for that price increase and giving the money to the producers.
And you can do straight-ahead math on that to give a first-order estimate of what happens.
Robinson Meyer: And you cite a recent example that everyone just saw, that we've been talking about on this show, which is in early 2026, Iran, following the US-Israeli war starting, closed the Strait of Hormuz. The price for oil and refined products spiked everywhere around the world. That increased fuel costs for consumers, and it increased profits for producers. It was quite mechanical, and we all saw it happen. And effectively what you're saying is that when you constrain fossil fuel production in some subnational region, effectively what you're doing is like a mini version of that.
Peter Erickson: That's completely right. And the logic of that has been consistent through all of my papers. But I think Hormuz and other events mean that this dynamic needs to be considered upfront. It needs to be daylighted in climate policy and in the fossil-fuel-supply-limiting community to grapple with. Price is the mechanism that causes a decrease in supply to lead to a reduction in consumption and a reduction in emissions, and that price has other effects that need to be considered.
You can find a full transcript of the episode here.
Mentioned:
Peter’s papers:
"Impact of the Keystone XL pipeline on global oil markets and greenhouse gas emissions"
"Limiting fossil fuel production as the next big step in climate policy"
"Rethinking the case against new oil and gas fields"
This episode of Shift Key is sponsored by ...
Every year Giving Green researches the top climate nonprofits and sends 100% of every dollar donated to its Giving Green Fund straight to them. Make your first gift before the new year, and it will be matched up to $500. Go to GivingGreen.earth/Shift.
Formed through a joint venture between Wärtsilä and RCT Solutions, Valo helps utilities, independent power producers, and developers navigate market and grid complexity without sacrificing system performance. Learn more at valoenergy.com.
RE+ 26 is the largest clean energy event in North America, happening November 16th through 19th at the Las Vegas Convention Center. Register at re-plus.com and use code SHIFTKEY20 to save 20% off a Full Conference pass.
Music for Shift Key is by Adam Kromelow.
On Taiwan’s LNG investment, Chinese solar job cuts, and molten chloride fast reactors
Current conditions: Temperatures in Washington, D.C., are climbing up to the mid 80s Fahrenheit today before taking a double-digit plunge as cold air blows in this weekend • California’s biggest utility has warned of looming blackouts as the southern part of the state braces for a potential wildfire • Tropical Storm Trudy is strengthening in the Pacific off the coast of Mexico into what could become a major hurricane.
The Houthis sent a clear signal this week: We are coming for Saudi Arabia’s oil industry. Days after striking Riyadh and scaring Western oil executives away from an industry summit in the Saudi capital, the Iran-backed rebels hit the headquarters of the kingdom’s state energy behemoth, Aramco. Official reports on Tuesday initially downplayed the impact on the sweeping complex in Dhahran, in Saudi Arabia’s oil-rich east. On Wednesday, however, Reuters reported that the missile attack had caused “extensive damage,” including “with a fire spreading across several floors.” Saudi Arabia has at other points during the conflict after proven resilient. After Houthi missiles pulverized a key node on the East-West Pipeline that serves as the main conduit to get oil from the Persian Gulf coast to the Red Sea shore, crews quickly created a workaround to restore the flow of crude. Following a brief uptick, the prices of Brent crude, the global benchmark, and the U.S.-centric West Texas Intermediate both fell on Wednesday. Maybe not for long: The Houthis vowed yesterday to continue targeting oil facilities.
Since shutting down its nuclear plants, Taiwan has become dependent on natural gas for at least half its electricity generation. But the self-governing island democracy doesn’t drill any of the fuel. It’s dependent on imports at a moment when, thanks to the war in Iran, anyone who isn’t producing their own is looking for a cheap, steady supply of liquified natural gas. Taipei has found a supplier. In a Wednesday post on his Truth Social platform, President Donald Trump said Taiwan agreed to buy 30% of the LNG shipped from the proposed $55 billion megaproject to build a gas pipeline from Alaska’s Arctic coast to an export terminal south of Anchorage. As part of the 20-year deal, Trump said the Taiwanese government would pay $4.4 billion for an equity stake in the project. Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs confirmed the deal and said it would work out the details later.
The pledged investment for the long-delayed project comes days after the Environmental Defense Fund released a new analysis showing that utilities and developers are cooling on clean power and once again pumping money into fossil fuel infrastructure at a rate that could see gas and even coal regain “a market share not seen since the early 2010s.” Amid all this investment, the national average retail price of electricity fell year over year from 20 cents per kilowatt-hour in September 2025 to 19.6 cents per kilowatt-hour last month, according to the freshest data on Heatmap and MIT’s Electricity Price Hub. “Great news, right?” my colleague Matthew Zeitlin wrote yesterday. “Not really.” He explains further: “While this is the first year-over-year decline in average prices since September 2023, it’s mostly due to California moving around its Climate Credit to the late summer months of August and September, historically among the highest-demand periods on the grid. The state previously delivered the credits in April and October. But while this is a nice thing for California ratepayers, it does less to tell us about nationwide electricity price trends.”

China’s top five solar manufacturers cut nearly 41,000 jobs last year as Beijing cracks down on the overcapacity that made exports so cheap Europeans started building fences out of panels. A new Reuters analysis of company filing shows that Longi Green Energy, Trina Solar, Jinko Solar, JA Solar, and Tongwei employed 40,589 fewer people than a year earlier. That 21% drop followed a 31% decline last year. The job cuts represent what the newswire called a “paradox,” in that the solar sales are booming as the world seeks alternatives to Middle Eastern hydrocarbons, yet the biggest manufacturers built too many factories and now no one can make any money.
The shift in China comes as the U.S. scrambles to rebuild its solar manufacturing capacity. Tariffs that Trump implemented, former President Joe Biden maintained, and Trump doubled down on have already set the stage for what my colleague Emily Pontecorvo reported may or may not be a manufacturing resurgence in the U.S. In August, we reported the Department of Commerce’s new trade restrictions were the administration’s lifeline to solar manufacturers that lost a key incentive when federal tax credits went away, taking with them the bonus for buying domestically-produced panels.
Sign up to receive Heatmap AM in your inbox every morning:
The world has seen experimental reactors that use molten salt as a coolant for a fission reaction fueled by uranium or plutonium. Several startups, including Bill Gates’ TerraPower, are now seeking to commercialize a version of that technology. Recently, the startup partnered with the utility giant Southern Company to examine a whole new possibility: A molten chloride fast reactor that uses liquid salts as both a coolant and a fuel. If that could work, it would be the first in the world. The advantages of the technology, in theory, would be limited enrichment needs, no fuel assemblies of uranium pellets, and a more flexible reactor that can ramp up and down to meet the grid’s needs. On Wednesday, the Department of Energy backed the effort to validate the science behind so-called MCFR reactors. The research will take place at the Idaho National Laboratory and has support from Southern and Core Power, a startup looking to harness fission to power cargo ships.
Is quantum computing a climate technology? Despite overlapping investors, it’s a difficult case to make, my colleague Katie Brigham wrote earlier this year. But the ways in which the technology develops certainly could be a model for other energy breakthroughs. On Wednesday, New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani unveiled a deal with New York University whereby City Hall will support the construction of a quantum computing lab in exchange for 15% of any proceeds from selling intellectual property developed at the facility. “In the first deal of its kind in NYC history, the public is investing $30 million in a quantum lab — in exchange for three board seats and 15% of the revenue generated from technology it creates,” Lina Khan, the chair of the board of the New York City Economic Development Corporation, wrote in a post on X. “And if any firm coming out of the lab merges, gets acquired, or IPOs, the city gets a payout.”
When the solution to Indonesia’s very modern smog problems was invented, the archipelago nation remained under Dutch colonial rule and the planet was about 1 degree Celsius, or 1.8 degrees Fahrenheit, cooler than it is today. To ease the thick haze in Jakarta and other cities from forest fires the country the country is repurposing a weather-modification technique first invented in the 1940s. Per Bloomberg: “Aircraft will disperse pellets of dry ice above South Sumatra province in an experimental approach that authorities hope will reduce the hazardous smoke that’s blanketed the region for weeks, disrupting economic activity and damaging public health.” The first trial run starts today.