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Trade is the next big thing in climate policy.
One of the year’s most interesting climate policies was just proposed … by a Republican.
Two, actually.
On Thursday, Senators Bill Cassidy and Lindsey Graham released a bill that would establish a “foreign pollution fee,” a new type of tariff that would raise the cost of products imported from countries with substantially higher emissions than the United States.
If that sounds suspiciously like a carbon price, you’re not wrong: Both policies aim to make dirtier products more expensive. But unlike a carbon price, the foreign pollution fee would apply only to imported products, not to anything made within the United States. In essence, it would be a carbon tax imposed only at the border.
That would theoretically penalize China, the world’s largest emitter of climate pollution — and that’s the point. “It makes absolutely no sense that we allow China to pollute freely and export their products to the U.S. — displacing U.S jobs, manufacturing, and excellence,” Cassidy, who represents Louisiana, said in a statement.
The bill takes advantage of the fact that American heavy industries generally have cleaner processes than their Russian, Chinese, or Indian competition. Chinese plastic makers, for instance, emit perhaps twice as much carbon for every unit of production as American plastic makers.
Under the GOP proposal, the government would set country-by-country tariffs so as to bring the carbon intensity of America’s imports closer to the carbon intensity of American-made products. The tariff would focus first on a few industries, including steel and iron, minerals, plastics, and solar panels. (The Biden administration has continued Trump-era tariffs on Chinese exports of some of those products.)
The bill would set up a new council, composed of federal scientists, officials, and private sector CEOs, to advise on the right tariff level. It would also let federal trade officials negotiate exemptions for countries.
Could the bill, or a policy like it, pass? Probably not in the next 12 months: The House of Representatives is a mess and, in any case, lawmakers rarely pass major policy in a presidential election year. But beyond that, advocates are surprisingly optimistic.
That’s because Democrats in Congress have released their own versions of a carbon tariff, and although they favor different designs than the GOP proposal, they are congealing around shared goals. Earlier this year, Senator Chris Coons of Delaware and Representative Scott Peters of California advanced a carbon tariff that would impose the cost of meeting American environmental regulations on imported goods. In essence, it says that if American manufacturers have to pay to meet the Environmental Protection Agency’s rules, then foreign manufacturers should have to pay, too.
Another proposal from Senate Democrats would charge importers for the social cost of the carbon pollution emitted to make their products. That bill would set the tariff at $55 per ton of carbon and steadily increase it every year.
Even if they look different, these policies share the same objectives, Greg Bertelsen, the CEO of the Climate Leadership Council, a center-right advocacy group that supports carbon border fees, told me.
“The interesting thing about this approach is that it appeals to interests on both sides of the aisle,” he said. “The members that have introduced these policies all have an interest in lowering global emissions, improving U.S. competitiveness, and benefiting our geopolitical interests.”
How they prioritize those policies may vary — Republicans tend to focus more on competing with China, while Democrats on lowering global emissions — but virtually all the members favor the same general tools, he said. “If we’re looking to where we might be able to find common ground on these issues, this approach is the most promising one out there.”
Trade — the fact that goods move around the world — has historically been one of climate policy’s hardest problems. Because climate change is caused by the global stock of atmospheric carbon dioxide, cutting pollution in one country matters only if it ultimately reduces global pollution. Yet if a country imposes a high carbon tax, then its companies will likely respond by importing certain products from abroad.
Because of this problem, economists have historically been fonder of a carbon border fee than they are of more conventional types of tariff. In 2015, the Yale economist and Nobel laureate William Nordhaus argued for the creation of “climate clubs,” groups of countries that agree to abide by the same domestic carbon price, trade freely among themselves, and penalize nonparticipants by imposing a fee on imports.
That approach underpins the European Union’s new carbon border adjustment mechanism, or CBAM, which launched last month but which will fully go into effect in 2026. It essentially imposes Europe’s carbon price — which is set by a shared continental market — on imports into the 27-country bloc.
Cassidy and Graham, the Republican senators, are at pains to distinguish their proposed “foreign pollution fee” from that Euro-coded approach. The CBAM rewards companies that adopt greener production methods, for instance, but theirs does not: It judges countries by the carbon intensity of their industry as a whole. “China can game the CBAM easily by shifting cleaner exports to the E.U. and dirty products elsewhere,” the senators explain in an FAQ released with their bill.
Of course, what’s even more distinctive about these new American proposals is that the United States does not have a domestic carbon price at all. Instead, it has chosen to subsidize its zero-carbon industries through the grants and tax credits in the Inflation Reduction Act. But harmonizing that subsidy-driven scheme with Europe’s fee-based approach has been difficult so far; initial talks to create a shared “arrangement” for steel exports — a kind of transatlantic climate alliance — have broken down due to a lack of E.U. support.
Now, European imports probably wouldn’t face high tariffs under any of the American proposals, because E.U.-made goods are generally lower carbon than those made in the United States. But the path that America is moving toward — passing a carbon border fee without a domestic carbon price — is highly eccentric (a phrase that I mean in a non-derogatory way). A carbon tariff makes perfect political sense domestically, but it may perplex the rest of the world, and Europe especially. And the rest of the world has options: Even though China’s industry is very dirty, its government also already imposes a low carbon price on some industries and in some places.
Yet that all lies in the future. For now, I’d take this Cassidy and Graham proposal seriously: It is possible to imagine some version of this idea passing, perhaps even in a bipartisan way. And more importantly, it reveals how inseparable geopolitics is becoming from the climate challenge. On issue after issue, China and America’s rivalry over security and technology is spilling into the rest of the economy.
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On Alaskan oil, CCS, and ‘zombie plants’
Current conditions: Flights have resumed to and from Sicily after Mt. Etna’s most powerful eruption in four years on Monday • There have already been almost half as many wildfire ignitions in the U.S. in 2025 as there were in all of 2024 • More than 700 people are feared dead in central Nigeria after heavy rains and flash floods.
USGS
The Department of the Interior announced Monday that it plans to rescind President Biden’s 2024 ban on drilling in more than half of the 23 million-acre National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska. The reserve holds an estimated 8.7 billion barrels of recoverable oil, but it is also some of the “last remaining pristine wilderness in the country,” The New York Times writes.
“Congress was clear: the National Petroleum Reserve in Alaska was set aside to support America’s energy security through responsible development,” Secretary Doug Burgum said in a statement announcing the proposed rule, further arguing that Biden’s ban had “ignored that mandate, prioritizing obstruction over production and undermining our ability to harness domestic resources at a time when American energy independence has never been more critical.” While the department’s announcement — which Burgum shared on Sunday at a heritage center in Utqiagvik, the largest city of the North Slope — was greeted with applause by attendees, Alaska’s senior manager for the Wilderness Society, Matt Jackson, said, “Everyone who cares about public lands and is concerned about the climate crisis should be outraged by this move to exploit America’s public lands for the benefit of corporations and the president’s wealthy donors.”
Applications for carbon capture and storage projects fell by 50% in the first quarter of the year as compared to last year, with no new permits having been approved since President Trump took office, the Financial Times reports. Industry experts blamed the uncertainty over the fate of federal grants and tax credits for the lowest application submissions since 2022 — a concern that isn’t likely to go away anytime soon, since the Energy Department canceled nearly $4 billion in clean energy grants last week, including carbon capture and sequestration projects proposed by Heidelberg Materials and Calpine, as my colleague Emily Pontecorvo has reported. By BloombergNEF’s projections, an estimated 35% of the 152 million metric tons of announced carbon capture capacity expected to come online by 2035 will be canceled before then.
The Department of Energy has ordered Constellation Energy to continue operating its Eddystone power plant through the end of the summer to prevent potential electricity shortfalls on the mid-Atlantic grid, the Associated Press reports. The oil and gas plant, located south of Philadelphia, had been scheduled to shut down its last remaining units this weekend, before Constellation received the DOE’s emergency order.
Late last month, the DOE similarly ordered a coal-fired plant in Michigan to continue operating past its planned May 31 shutdown date, although the chair of the Michigan Public Service Commission said at the time that no energy emergency existed, Bloomberg reports. By contrast, the decision to order Eddystone’s continued operation followed PJM Interconnection expressing concerns about summer grid reliability; the operator has since voiced support for the DOE’s order. But the move also has its critics: “The Department of Energy’s move to keep these zombie plants online will have significant public health impacts and increase electricity costs for people in Michigan and Pennsylvania,” argued Kit Kennedy, a managing director at the Natural Resources Defense Council.
The European Union’s climate science advisers have warned the bloc against softening its 2040 emission goals, arguing that such a move could “undermine domestic value creation by diverting resources from the necessary transformation of the EU’s economy.” The European Commission is set to propose a binding target for member nations to cut emissions by 90% by 2040 from 1990 levels, but it is also considering allowing countries to set lower targets for their domestic industries and make up the gap using carbon credits, Reuters reports. The European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change, which issued its warning against the carbon credit loophole on Monday, described the original 90% emission reduction goal as achievable and necessary for both the health of Europeans as well as improving security by limiting the bloc’s reliance on foreign fossil fuel sources.
Oregon-based battery energy storage system integrator Powin has filed a notice with the state warning that it could lay off 250 employees and shut down operations by the end of July. Per the notification, the layoffs would include the company’s chief executives, and “it is presently contemplated that the affected employees will be permanently terminated.”
Powin has the third most gigawatt-hours of batteries installed in the U.S. and the fourth most worldwide. Still, turbulence due to tariffs and the Inflation Reduction Act incentives has reverberated through the industry, Latitude notes. In a statement provided to the publication, Powin described “navigating a period of significant financial challenge, reflective of ongoing headwinds in the broader energy storage industry.”
The partial shading of Colorado grasslands by solar arrays could decrease water stress and increase plant growth during dry years by 20% or more, a new study in Environmental Research Letters has found.
Or, why developers may be loading up on solar panels and transformers.
As the Senate gets to work on the budget reconciliation bill, renewables developers are staring down the extremely real possibility that the tax credits they’ve planned around may disappear sooner than expected. In the version of the bill that passed the House, most renewables projects would have to begin construction within 60 days of the bill’s passage and be “placed in service” — i.e. be up and running — by the end of 2028 to qualify for investment and production tax credits.
But that’s tax law language. The reconciliation bill will almost certainly mean grim tidings for the renewable industry, but it will be Christmas for the tax attorneys tasked with figuring out what it all means. They may be the only ones involved in the energy transition to come out ahead, David Burton, a partner at Norton Rose Fulbright — “other than the lobbyists, of course,” he added with a laugh.
If the timeline restrictions on the investment and production tax credits make it to the final law, within 60 days after it’s enacted, developers will likely have to demonstrate that they’ve done some kind of physical work on a project — or spent a serious amount of money to advance it — in order to qualify for the tax credits.
The IRS has a couple of existing tests and guidelines: the 5% safe harbor and the physical work test.
The 5% harbor rule is the most common way to demonstrate a construction start, Burton told me. But it’s not cheap. That 5% refers to the total cost of a project, meaning that a company would have to shell out a lot of money very quickly to keep hold on those tax credits. For example, a 100-megawatt solar project that costs $1.25 per watt — about the average cost for a utility-scale project according to the National Renewable Energy Laboratory — would cost a developer $6.25 million in initial outlays just to prove they’ve started construction to the satisfaction of the IRS.
There are any number of things to spend that money on. “For solar, the most common thing is modules. But it could be inverters, it could be racking,” Burton said.
Right now there’s a particular rush to get transformers, the electrical equipment used to step up voltage for the transmission of electricity from a generator, Burton added. That’s because transformers also fall under the second construction guideline, the “physical work test.” Developers can say they’ve started construction “when physical work of a significant nature begins, provided that the taxpayer maintains a continuous program of construction,” according to the law firm Leo Berwick.
This “significant physical work” can be split into onsite and offsite work. The former is what one might logically think of as “construction” — something along the lines of pouring foundations for wind turbines or building a road to bring in equipment.
Then there’s offsite. Ordering equipment qualifies as offsite work, Burton explained. But it has to be something that’s not held in inventory — this is why modules for a solar project don’t qualify, Burton said — the equipment must be built to order. Transformers are custom designed for the specific project, and can run into the millions of dollars.
“The guidance says expressly that step-up transformers qualify for this,” Burton told me. “It’s the only thing that guidance expressly states qualifies.”
This all adds up to a likely rush for transformer orders, adding more pressure onto a sector that’s been chronically under-supplied.
“The transformer manufacturers’ phones are ringing off the hook,” Burton said. “If I were the CFO of a transformer manufacturer, I would be raising my prices.”
While these tax rules may seem bewildering to anyone not a lawyer, they’re hardly obscure to the industry, which is well aware of how developers might react and is positioning itself to take advantage of this likely rush to start projects.
PV Hardware, which makes a type of solar equipment called a tracker that allows solar panels to track the movement of the sun, sent out a press release last week letting the world know that “it has the capacity to immediately Safe Harbor 5GW of tracker product, offering solar developers a critical opportunity to preserve eligibility for current clean energy tax credits amid legislative uncertainty.” Its trackers, the release said, would help developers meet the “thresholds quickly, mitigating risk and preserving the long-term viability of their project.”
The prospect of tariffs has also been an impetus to get construction work started quickly, Mike Hall, chief executive of the solar and storage data company Anza, told Heatmap. “There’s a slug of projects that would get accelerated, and in fact just having this bill come out of the House is already going to accelerate a number of projects,” Hall said.
But for projects that haven’t started, complying with the rules may be more tricky.
“For projects that are less far along in the pipeline and haven’t had any outlays or expenditures yet, those developers right now are scrambling,” Heather Cooper, a tax attorney at McDermott Will and Emery, told Heatmap. “I’ve gotten probably about 100 emails from my clients today asking me questions about what they can do to establish construction has begun on their project.”
And while developers of larger projects will literally have to do — or spend — more to qualify for tax credits under the new rule, they may still have an advantage.
“It’s increasingly clear to us that large-scale developers with the balance sheet and a pre-existing safe harbor program in place,” Jefferies analyst Julien Dumoulin-Smith wrote to clients last week, “are easily best positioned to keep playing the game.”
Additional reporting by Jael Holzman
In defense of “everything bagel” policymaking.
Writers have likely spilled more ink on the word “abundance” in the past couple months than at any other point in the word’s history.
Beneath the hubbub, fed by Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson’s bestselling new book, lies a pressing question: What would it take to build things faster? Few climate advocates would deny the salience of the question, given the incontrovertible need to fix the sluggish pace of many clean energy projects.
A critical question demands an actionable answer. To date, many takes on various sides of the debate have focused more on high-level narrative than precise policy prescriptions. If we zoom in to look at the actual sources of delay in clean energy projects, what sorts of solutions would we come up with? What would a data-backed agenda for clean energy abundance look like?
The most glaring threat to clean energy deployment is, of course, the Republican Party’s plan to gut the Inflation Reduction Act. But “abundance” proponents posit that Democrats have imposed their own hurdles, in the form of well-intentioned policies that get in the way of government-backed building projects. According to some broad-brush recommendations, Democrats should adopt an abundance agenda focused on rolling back such policies.
But the reality for clean energy is more nuanced. At least as often, expediting clean energy projects will require more, not less, government intervention. So too will the task of ensuring those projects benefit workers and communities.
To craft a grounded agenda for clean energy abundance, we can start by taking stock of successes and gaps in implementing the IRA. The law’s core strategy was to unite climate, jobs, and justice goals. The IRA aims to use incentives to channel a wave of clean energy investments towards good union jobs and communities that have endured decades of divestment.
Klein and Thompson are wary that such “everything bagel” strategies try to do too much. Other “abundance” advocates explicitly support sidelining the IRA’s labor objectives to expedite clean energy buildout.
But here’s the thing about everything bagels: They taste good.
They taste good because they combine ingredients that go well together. The question — whether for bagels or policies — is, are we using congruent ingredients?
The data suggests that clean energy growth, union jobs, and equitable investments — like garlic, onion, and sesame seeds — can indeed pair well together. While we have a long way to go, early indicators show significant post-IRA progress on all three fronts: a nearly 100-gigawatt boom in clean energy installations, an historic high in clean energy union density, and outsized clean investments flowing to fossil fuel communities. If we can design policy to yield such a win-win-win, why would we choose otherwise?
Klein and Thompson are of course right that to realize the potential of the IRA, we must reduce the long lag time in building clean energy projects. That lag time does not stem from incentives for clean energy companies to provide quality jobs, negotiate Community Benefits Agreements, or invest in low-income communities. Such incentives did not deter clean energy companies from applying for IRA funding in droves. Programs that included all such incentives were typically oversubscribed, with companies applying for up to 10 times the amount of available funding.
If labor and equity incentives are not holding up clean energy deployment, what is? And what are the remedies?
Some of the biggest delays point not to an excess of policymaking — the concern of many “abundance” proponents — but an absence. Such gaps call for more market-shaping policies to expedite the clean energy transition.
Take, for example, the years-long queues for clean energy projects to connect to the electrical grid, which developers rank as one of the largest sources of delay. That wait stems from a piecemeal approach to transmission buildout — the result not of overregulation by progressive lawmakers, but rather the opposite: a hands-off mode of governance that has created vast inefficiencies. For years, grid operators have built transmission lines not according to a strategic plan, but in response to the requests of individual projects to connect to the grid. This reactive, haphazard approach requires a laborious battery of studies to determine the incremental transmission upgrades (and the associated costs) needed to connect each project. As a result, project developers face high cost uncertainty and a nearly five-year median wait time to finish the process, contributing to the withdrawal of about three of every four proposed projects.
The solution, according to clean energy developers, buyers, and analysts alike, is to fill the regulatory void that has enabled such a fragmentary system. Transmission experts have called for rules that require grid operators to proactively plan new transmission lines in anticipation of new clean energy generation and then charge a preestablished fee for projects to connect, yielding more strategic grid expansion, greater cost certainty for developers, fewer studies, and reduced wait times to connect to the grid. Last year, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission took a step in this direction by requiring grid operators to adopt regional transmission planning. Many energy analysts applauded the move and highlighted the need for additional policies to expedite transmission buildout.
Another source of delay that underscores policy gaps is the 137-week lag time to obtain a large power transformer, due to supply chain shortages. The United States imports four of every five large power transformers used on our electric grid. Amid the post-pandemic snarling of global supply chains, such high import dependency has created another bottleneck for building out the new transmission lines that clean energy projects demand. To stimulate domestic transformer production, the National Infrastructure Advisory Council — including representatives from major utilities — has proposed that the federal government establish new transformer manufacturing investments and create a public stockpiling system that stabilizes demand. That is, a clean energy abundance agenda also requires new industrial policies.
While such clean energy delays call for additional policymaking, “abundance” advocates are correct that other delays call for ending problematic policies. Rising local restrictions on clean energy development, for example, pose a major hurdle. However, the map of those restrictions, as tracked in an authoritative Columbia University report, does not support the notion that they stem primarily from Democrats’ penchant for overregulation. Of the 11 states with more than 10 such restrictions, six are red, three are purple, and two are blue — New York and Texas, Virginia and Kansas, Maine and Indiana, etc. To take on such restrictions, we shouldn’t let concern with progressive wish lists eclipse a focused challenge to old-fashioned, transpartisan NIMBYism.
“Abundance” proponents also focus their ire on permitting processes like those required by the National Environmental Policy Act, which the Supreme Court curtailed last week. Permitting needs mending, but with a chisel, not a Musk-esque chainsaw. The Biden administration produced a chisel last year: a NEPA reform to expedite clean energy projectsand support environmental justice. In February, the Trump administration tossed out that reform and nearly five decades of NEPA rules without offering a replacement — a chainsaw maneuver that has created more, not less, uncertainty for project developers. When the wreckage of this administration ends, we’ll need to fill the void with targeted permitting policies that streamline clean energy while protecting communities.
Finally, a clean energy abundance agenda should also welcome pro-worker, pro-equity incentives like those in the IRA “everything bagel.” Despite claims to the contrary, such policies can help to overcome additional sources of delay and facilitatebuildout.
For example, Community Benefits Agreements, which IRA programs encouraged, offer a distinct, pro-building advantage: a way to avoid the community opposition that has become a top-tier reason for delays and cancellations of wind and solar projects. CBAs give community and labor groups a tool to secure locally-defined economic, health, and environmental benefits from clean energy projects. For clean energy firms, they offer an opportunity to obtain explicit project support from community organizations. Three out of four wind and solar developers agree that increased community engagement reduces project cancellations, and more than 80% see it as at least somewhat “feasible” to offer benefits via CBAs. Indeed, developers and communities are increasingly using CBAs, from a wind farm off the coast of Rhode Island to a solar park in California’s central valley, to deliver tangible benefits and completed projects — the ingredients of abundance.
A similar win-win can come from incentives for clean energy companies to pay construction workers decent wages, which the IRA included. Most peer-reviewed studies find that the impact of such standards on infrastructure construction costs is approximately zero. By contrast, wage standards can help to address a key constraint on clean energy buildout: companies’ struggle to recruit a skilled and stable workforce in a tight labor market. More than 80% of solar firms, for example, report difficulties in finding qualified workers. Wage standards offer a proven solution, helping companies attract and retain the workforce needed for on-time project completion.
In addition to labor standards and support for CBAs, a clean energy abundance agenda also should expand on the IRA’s incentives to invest in low-income communities. Such policies spur clean energy deployment in neighborhoods the market would otherwise deem unprofitable. Indeed, since enactment of the IRA, 75% of announced clean energy investments have been in low-income counties. That buildout is a deliberate outcome of the “everything bagel” approach. If we want clean energy abundance for all, not just the wealthy, we need to wield — not withdraw — such incentives.
Crafting an agenda for clean energy abundance requires precision, not abstraction. We need to add industrial policies that offer a foundation for clean energy growth. We need to end parochial policies that deter buildout on behalf of private interests. And we need to build on labor and equity policies that enable workers and communities to reap material rewards from clean energy expansion. Differentiating between those needs will be essential for Democrats to build a clean energy plan that actually delivers abundance.