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What began as a dispute over world-leading computer chips is now rocking the auto and clean energy industries.
America and China’s increasingly acrimonious rivalry over national security is now spilling over into clean energy.
On Friday, China imposed export restrictions on three high-purity forms of graphite, a mineral that is essential to making semiconductors, electronics, and — most importantly — electric vehicle batteries. Under the new rules, Chinese companies cannot export any of these especially valuable types of graphite without getting a waiver from the government.
For now, these new restrictions exist in a curious quantum state: They could be a big deal, permanently reshaping the global clean-energy economy, or they could quickly fizzle into a bureaucratic wrinkle.
Yet the potential importance of these new rules to the EV industry is difficult to overstate. Graphite makes up about 20% of the mass of an EV battery, and at least two-thirds of the world’s graphite comes from China.
What’s most ominous might be the fact that the rules exist at all. The new restrictions show that America and China’s growing trade battle over “dual-use technologies” — tools and materials that can be used by both civilians and the military — is proving difficult to contain. What began as a dispute over world-leading computer chips is now rocking the auto and clean energy industries.
As far as critical minerals go, graphite is relatively simple: It is just a crystal of carbon atoms. It can be mined from the Earth or produced synthetically by processing fossil fuels. Humanity goes through hundreds of tons of low-grade graphite every year — it is in pencils and chemicals, for instance — but high-grade graphite is crucial for two uses. First, it is used in the equipment needed to make semiconductors, including those used for AI and other uses. Second, it makes up the anodes — or the negative electrodes — of lithium-ion batteries, the type of batteries that power smartphones, laptops, and electric vehicles.
Right now, China makes most of the world’s graphite. It also processes much of that graphite, grinding it into flakes 1/10th the size of a human hair and rounding them into tiny spheres. Graphite then must be processed to incredible purity — 99.5% or higher — to be used in batteries or semiconductors; only exceptionally pure graphite has the chemical properties needed for these technologies. It is the export of these very pure forms of graphite that China has now restricted.
The new rules follow restrictions on the export of gallium and germanium, which are crucial for electronics and EVs, that China imposed in June.
“In the wider critical minerals space, the talking point is that China dominates. Which is true. But it’s especially true for graphite,” Morgan Bazilian, the director of the Payne Institute for Public Policy at the Colorado School of Mines, told me.
Graphite makes up about 20% of the mass of a lithium-ion battery. There is, in all likelihood, several grams of graphite in the device you are using right now. The odds are high that it originated in a Chinese factory.
The new limits came in the context of a widening United States-China trade war. A few days earlier, the United States had closed loopholes and tightened its restrictions on the kind of semiconductors that can be exported to China. Those American restrictions were first imposed last year; they aimed to preserve America’s technological supremacy by blocking China’s ability to produce the most advanced forms of semiconductors domestically. The restrictions limited what kinds of technology and intellectual property could be shared with China; they also blocked U.S. citizens or green-card holders from working on technology that could be shared with the Chinese.
There is some disagreement about whether these rules are working; China has announced production of a 7-nanometer chip, which puts it close to the state of the art. But in any case, China’s new limits on graphite export don’t seem to be an in-kind response to the American semiconductor restrictions, and it’s unclear whether the graphite restrictions will matter as much for the rest of the world. The restrictions could temporarily spike short-term prices, according to Alex Turnbull, an investor who has proposed, along with the think tank Employ America, that the U.S. maintain a strategic lithium reserve. But in the long-term, graphite producers in the West should be able to increase production and fill the gap.
Bazilian said that these new restrictions have hit at a lucky time. Graphite prices have fallen this year due to an excess of Chinese capacity and softer demand for electric vehicles than expected.
The good news is that unlike with other minerals, a number of American, Indian, and Japanese firms have already begun manufacturing graphite. Many of these firms saw their share prices rise on Monday.
In a way, the restrictions were a blessing for non-Chinese graphite suppliers, Turnbull said. Many companies would have struggled to scale up in the same market as the Chinese firms, which regularly produce more graphite than they need. (It also helps that — unlike semiconductors — graphite does not rely on proprietary or especially advanced technology; its risks are primarily financial, rather than technical.)
That said, there are still reasons why a rapid scale up might not happen, Bazilian said. “This is really a place where China dominates, and the other parties that have, like, 10% market share are places like Mozambique,” he said.
And Mozambique’s mines have suffered from what are sometimes euphemistically referred to as “security issues.” Last year, the Balama mine in the country’s Cabo Delgado was attacked by Islamist terrorists, who beheaded two security guards. The Islamic State has claimed responsibility for the attack.
America’s efforts to develop a rival graphite supply chain depend on that mine. Last year, the Department of Energy issued a $102 million loan to Syrah Vidalia, a new Louisiana facility that will process graphite from the Mozambique mine and manufacture battery anodes.
“The critical minerals discussion is not a homogenous discussion. Each of these supply chains is different — it’s not easy to make big analogies to the oil market or something,” Bazilian said. “People love to say, Rare earths aren’t rare, but that’s not nearly as profound as people think. All of these minerals are abundant on Earth, but it’s not easy to find economically viable deposits of these ores.”
As long as the global graphite market remained constrained, he added, then Chinese firms would continue to have the easiest, cheapest access to it — which means that they will likely continue their dominance of producing anodes, a crucial midstream part of the EV battery supply chain.
Climate advocates have long pointed out that the technologies needed to fight climate change — batteries, renewables, electric vehicles, and more — have profound national-security implications. They are, like semiconductors, the industries of the future. It’s little surprise that battles over the former have been dragged into fights over the latter.
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It was a curious alliance from the start. On the one hand, Donald Trump, who made antipathy toward electric vehicles a core part of his meandering rants. On the other hand, Elon Musk, the man behind the world’s largest EV company, who nonetheless put all his weight, his millions of dollars, and the power of his social network behind the Trump campaign.
With Musk standing by his side on Election Day, Trump has once again secured the presidency. His reascendance sent shock waves through the automotive world, where companies that had been lurching toward electrification with varying levels of enthusiasm were left to wonder what happens now — and what benefits Tesla may reap from having hitched itself to the winning horse.
Certainly the federal government’s stated target of 50% of U.S. new car sales being electric by 2030 is toast, and many of the actions it took in pursuit of that goal are endangered. Although Trump has softened his rhetoric against EVs since becoming buddies with Musk, it’s hard to imagine a Trump administration with any kind of ambitious electrification goal.
During his first go-round as president, Trump attacked the state of California’s ability to set its own ambitious climate-focused rules for cars. No surprise there: Because of the size of the California car market, its regulations helped to drag the entire industry toward lower-emitting vehicles and, almost inevitably, EVs. If Trump changes course and doesn’t do the same thing this time, it’ll be because his new friend at Tesla supports those rules.
The biggest question hanging over electric vehicles, however, is the fate of the Biden administration’s signature achievements in climate and EV policy, particularly the Inflation Reduction Act’s $7,500 federal consumer tax credit for electric vehicles. A Trump administration looks poised to tear down whatever it can of its predecessor’s policy. Some analysts predict it’s unlikely the entire IRA will disappear, but concede Trump would try to kill off the incentives for electric vehicles however he can.
There’s no sugar-coating it: Without the federal incentives, the state of EVs looks somewhat bleak. Knocking $7,500 off the starting price is essential to negate the cost of manufacturing expensive lithium-ion batteries and making EVs cost-competitive with ordinary combustion cars. Consider a crucial model like the new Chevy Equinox EV: Counting the federal incentive, the most basic $35,000 model could come in under the starting price of a gasoline crossover like the Toyota RAV4. Without that benefit, buyers who want to go electric will have to pay a premium to do so — the thing that’s been holding back mass electrification all along.
Musk, during his honeymoon with Trump, boasted that Tesla doesn’t need the tax credits, as if daring the president-elect to kill off the incentives. On the one hand, this is obviously false. Visit Tesla’s website and you’ll see the simplest Model 3 listed for $29,990, but this is a mirage. Take away the $7,500 in incentives and $5,000 in claimed savings versus buying gasoline, and the car actually starts at about $43,000, much further out of reach for non-wealthy buyers.
What Musk really means is that his company doesn’t need the incentives nearly as bad as other automakers do. Ford is hemorrhaging billions of dollars as it struggles to make EVs profitably. GM’s big plan to go entirely electric depended heavily on federal support. As InsideEVsnotes, the likely outcome of a Trump offensive against EVs is that the legacy car brands, faced with an unpredictable electrification roadmap as America oscillates between presidents, scale back their plans and lean back into the easy profitably of big, gas-guzzling SUVs and trucks. Such an about-face could hand Tesla the kind of EV market dominance it enjoyed four or five years ago when it sold around 75% of all electric vehicles in America.
That’s tough news for the climate-conscious Americans who want an electric vehicle built by someone not named Elon Musk. Hundreds of thousands of people, myself included, bought a Tesla during the past five or six years because it was the most practical EV for their lifestyle, only to see the company’s figurehead shift his public persona from goofy troll to Trump acolyte. It’s not uncommon now, as Democrats distance themselves from Tesla, to see Model 3s adorned with bumper stickers like the “Anti-Elon Tesla Club,” as one on a car I followed last month proclaimed. Musk’s newest vehicle, the Cybertruck, is a rolling embodiment of the man’s brand, a vehicle purpose-built to repel anyone not part of his cult of personality.
In a world where this version of Tesla retakes control of the electric car market, it becomes harder to ditch gasoline without indirectly supporting Donald Trump, by either buying a Tesla or topping off at its Superchargers. Blue voters will have some options outside of Tesla — the industry has come too far to simply evaporate because of one election. But it’s also easy to see dispirited progressives throwing up their hands and buying another carbon-spewing Subaru.
Republicans are taking over some of the most powerful institutions for crafting climate policy on Earth.
When Republicans flipped the Senate, they took the keys to three critical energy and climate-focused committees.
These are among the most powerful institutions for crafting climate policy on Earth. The Senate plays the role of gatekeeper for important legislation, as it requires a supermajority to overcome the filibuster. Hence, it’s both where many promising climate bills from the House go to die, as well as where key administrators such as the heads of the Department of Energy and the Environmental Protection Agency are vetted and confirmed.
We’ll have to wait a bit for the Senate’s new committee chairs to be officially confirmed. But Jeff Navin, co-founder at the climate change-focused government affairs firm Boundary Stone Partners, told me that since selections are usually based on seniority, in many cases it’s already clear which Republicans are poised to lead under Trump and which Democrats will assume second-in-command (known as the ranking member). Here’s what we know so far.
This committee has been famously led by Joe Manchin, the former Democrat, now Independent senator from West Virginia, who will retire at the end of this legislative session. Energy and Natural Resources has a history of bipartisan collaboration and was integral in developing many of the key provisions in the Inflation Reduction Act — and could thus play a key role in dismantling them. Overall, the committee oversees the DOE, the Department of the Interior, the U.S. Forest Service, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, so it’s no small deal that its next chairman will likely be Mike Lee, the ultra-conservative Republican from Utah. That’s assuming that the committee's current ranking member, John Barrasso of Wyoming, wins his bid for Republican Senate whip, which seems very likely.
Lee opposes federal ownership of public lands, setting himself up to butt heads with Martin Heinrich, the Democrat from New Mexico and likely the committee’s next ranking member. Lee has also said that solving climate change is simply a matter of having more babies, as “problems of human imagination are not solved by more laws, they’re solved by more humans.” As Navin told me, “We've had this kind of safe space where so-called quiet climate policy could get done in the margins. And it’s not clear that that's going to continue to exist with the new leadership.”
This committee is currently chaired by Democrat Tom Carper of Delaware, who is retiring after this term. Poised to take over is the Republican’s current ranking member, Shelley Moore Capito of West Virginia. She’s been a strong advocate for continued reliance on coal and natural gas power plants, while also carving out areas of bipartisan consensus on issues such as nuclear energy, carbon capture, and infrastructure projects during her tenure on the committee. The job of the Environment and Public Works committee is in the name: It oversees the EPA, writes key pieces of environmental legislation such as the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act, and supervises public infrastructure projects such as highways, bridges, and dams.
Navin told me that many believe the new Democratic ranking member will be Sheldon Whitehouse of Rhode Island, although to do so, he would have to step down from his perch at the Senate Budget Committee, where he is currently chair. A tireless advocate of the climate cause, Whitehouse has worked on the Environment and Public Works committee for over 15 years, and lately seems to have had a relatively productive working relationship with Capito.
This subcommittee falls under the broader Senate Appropriations Committee and is responsible for allocating funding for the DOE, various water development projects, and various other agencies such as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
California’s Dianne Feinstein used to chair this subcommittee until her death last year, when Democrat Patty Murray of Washington took over. Navin told me that the subcommittee’s next leader will depend on how the game of “musical chairs” in the larger Appropriations Committee shakes out. Depending on their subcommittee preferences, the chair could end up being John Kennedy of Louisiana, outgoing Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, or Lisa Murkowski of Alaska. It’s likewise hard to say who the top Democrat will be.
Inside a wild race sparked by a solar farm in Knox County, Ohio.
The most important climate election you’ve never heard of? Your local county commissioner.
County commissioners are usually the most powerful governing individuals in a county government. As officials closer to community-level planning than, say a sitting senator, commissioners wind up on the frontlines of grassroots opposition to renewables. And increasingly, property owners that may be personally impacted by solar or wind farms in their backyards are gunning for county commissioner positions on explicitly anti-development platforms.
Take the case of newly-elected Ohio county commissioner – and Christian social media lifestyle influencer – Drenda Keesee.
In March, Keesee beat fellow Republican Thom Collier in a primary to become a GOP nominee for a commissioner seat in Knox County, Ohio. Knox, a ruby red area with very few Democratic voters, is one of the hottest battlegrounds in the war over solar energy on prime farmland and one of the riskiest counties in the country for developers, according to Heatmap Pro’s database. But Collier had expressed openness to allowing new solar to be built on a case-by-case basis, while Keesee ran on a platform focused almost exclusively on blocking solar development. Collier ultimately placed third in the primary, behind Keesee and another anti-solar candidate placing second.
Fighting solar is a personal issue for Keesee (pronounced keh-see, like “messy”). She has aggressively fought Frasier Solar – a 120 megawatt solar project in the country proposed by Open Road Renewables – getting involved in organizing against the project and regularly attending state regulator hearings. Filings she submitted to the Ohio Power Siting Board state she owns a property at least somewhat adjacent to the proposed solar farm. Based on the sheer volume of those filings this is clearly her passion project – alongside preaching and comparing gay people to Hitler.
Yesterday I spoke to Collier who told me the Frasier Solar project motivated Keesee’s candidacy. He remembered first encountering her at a community meeting – “she verbally accosted me” – and that she “decided she’d run against me because [the solar farm] was going to be next to her house.” In his view, he lost the race because excitement and money combined to produce high anti-solar turnout in a kind of local government primary that ordinarily has low campaign spending and is quite quiet. Some of that funding and activity has been well documented.
“She did it right: tons of ground troops, people from her church, people she’s close with went door-to-door, and they put out lots of propaganda. She got them stirred up that we were going to take all the farmland and turn it into solar,” he said.
Collier’s takeaway from the race was that local commissioner races are particularly vulnerable to the sorts of disinformation, campaign spending and political attacks we’re used to seeing more often in races for higher offices at the state and federal level.
“Unfortunately it has become this,” he bemoaned, “fueled by people who have little to no knowledge of what we do or how we do it. If you stir up enough stuff and you cry out loud enough and put up enough misinformation, people will start to believe it.”
Races like these are happening elsewhere in Ohio and in other states like Georgia, where opposition to a battery plant mobilized Republican primaries. As the climate world digests the federal election results and tries to work backwards from there, perhaps at least some attention will refocus on local campaigns like these.