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It’s not early phase-out. These 3 changes could overhaul the law’s clean electricity supports.

On Monday, the Republican-led House Ways and Means Committee released the first draft of its rewrite of America’s clean energy tax credits.
The proposal might look, at first, like a cautious paring back of the tax credits. But the proposal amounts to a backdoor repeal of the policies, according to energy system and tax analysts.
“The bill is written to come across as reasonable, but the devil is in the details,” Robbie Orvis, a senior analyst at Energy Innovation, a nonpartisan energy and climate think tank, told me. “It may not be literally the worst text we envisioned seeing, but it’s probably close.”
The proposal would strangle new energy development so quickly that it could raise power costs by as much as 7% over the next decade, according to the Rhodium Group, an energy and policy analysis firm.
Senate Republicans have already indicated that the proposal is unworkable. But to understand why, it’s worth diving into the specific requirements that render the proposal so destructive.
The clean energy tax credits are one of the centerpieces of American energy policy. They’re meant to spur companies to deploy new forms of energy technology, such as nuclear fusion or advanced geothermal wells, and simultaneously to cut carbon pollution from the American power grid.
The U.S. government has long used the tax code to encourage the build-out of wind turbines or solar panels. But when Democrats passed the Inflation Reduction Act in 2022, they rewrote a pair of key tax credits so that any technology that generates clean electricity would receive financial support.
Under the law as enacted, these clean electricity tax credits provide 10 years of support to any electricity project — no matter how it generates power — for the foreseeable future. But the new Republican proposal would begin phasing down the value of the credit starting in 2029, and end the program entirely in 2032.
That might sound like a slow and even reasonable phase-out. But a series of smaller changes to the law’s text introduce significant uncertainty about which projects would continue to qualify for the tax credit in the interim. Taken together, these new requirements would kill most, if not all, of the tax credits’ value.
Here are three reasons why the Republican proposal would prove so devastating to the American clean electricity industry.
The new Ways and Means proposal begins to phase out the clean energy tax credits immediately. The proposal cuts the value of the tax credit by 20% per year starting in 2029, and ends the credit entirely in 2032.
But the GOP proposal changes a key phrase that helps financiers invest confidently in a given project.
Under the law as it stands today, developers can’t claim a tax credit until a project is “placed in service” — meaning that it is generating electricity and selling it to the grid. But a project qualifies for a tax credit in the year that construction on that project begins.
For example, imagine a utility that begins building a new geothermal power plant this year, but doesn’t finish construction and connect it to the grid until 2029. Under current law, that company could qualify for the value of the credit as it stands today, but it wouldn’t begin to get money back on its taxes until 2029.
But the GOP proposal would change this language. Under the House Republican text, projects only qualify for a tax credit when they are “placed in service,” regardless of when construction begins. This means that the new geothermal power plant in the earlier example could only get tax credits as set at the 2029 value — regardless of when construction begins.
What’s more, if work on the project were delayed, say by a natural disaster or unexpected equipment shortage, and the power plant’s completion date was pushed into the following year, then the project would only qualify for credits as set at the 2030 value.
In other words, companies and utilities would have no certainty about a tax credit’s value until a project is completed and placed in service. Any postponement or slowdown at any part of the process — even if for a reason totally outside of a developer’s control — could reduce a tax credit’s value.
This makes the tax credits far less dependable than they are today. Generally, companies have more ability to plan around when construction on a power plant begins than they do over when it is placed in service.
This change will significantly raise financing costs for new energy projects of all types because it means that companies won’t be able to finalize their capital stack until a project is completed and turned on. The most complicated and adventurous projects — such as new geothermal, nuclear, or fusion power plants — could face the highest cost inflation.
The Inflation Reduction Act as it stands today attaches a “foreign entity of concern” rule to its $7,500 tax credit for electric vehicle buyers.
In order to qualify for that EV tax credit, automakers had to cut the percentage of Chinese-processed minerals and battery components that appear in their electric models every year. This phased in gradually over time — the idea being that while China dominates the EV and battery supply chain today, the requirement would provide a consistent spur to reshore production.
Somewhat ironically, the GOP proposal ditches the EV tax credit and its accompanying foreign sourcing rules. But it applies a strict version of the foreign entity of concern rule to every other tax credit in the law, including the clean electricity tax credits.
Under the House proposal, no project can qualify for the tax credits unless it receives no “material support” from a Chinese-linked entity. The language defines “material support” aggressively and expansively — it means any “any component, subcomponent, or applicable critical mineral” that is “extracted, processed, recycled, manufactured, or assembled.”
This provision, in other words, would essentially disqualify the use of any Chinese-made part, subcomponent, or metal in the construction of a clean electricity project, although the rule includes a partial and narrow carve-out for some components that are bought from a third-party. Even a mistakenly Chinese-sourced bolt could result in a project losing millions of dollars of tax credits.
Technically, the law also disqualifies the use of goods from other “foreign entities of concern” as defined under U.S. law, which include Russia, Iran, and North Korea. But China is the United States’ third largest trading partner, and it is the only manufacturer of the type of goods that matter to the law.
Solar projects would face immediate challenges under the new rule. China and its domestic companies command more than 80% of the market share for all stages of the solar panel manufacturing process, according to the International Energy Agency.
But then again, the proposal would be an issue for virtually all energy projects. Copper wiring, steel frames, grams of key metals — even geothermal plants rely on individual Chinese-made industrial components, according to Seaver Wang, an analyst at the Breakthrough Institute. These parts also intermingle on the global market, meaning that companies can’t be certain where a given part was made or where it comes from.
These new and stricter rules would kick in two years after the reconciliation bill passes, which likely means 2027.
This provision by itself would be unworkable. But it is made even worse by being coupled to the tax credit’s change to a “placed in service” standard. That’s because projects that are already under construction today might not meet these new foreign entity rules, essentially stripping them of tax credits that companies had already been banking on.
These projects have assumed that they will qualify for the tax credits’ full value, no matter when their power plant is completed, because they have already begun construction. But the GOP proposal would change this retroactively, possibly threatening the financial viability of energy projects that grid managers have been assuming will come online in the next few years.
In some ways, these two changes taken together are “worse than repeal,” Mike O’Boyle, an Energy Innovation analyst, told me. “A number of projects under construction now will lose eligibility."
It is also made worse by the House GOP plan to phase out the tax credits. If companies could plan on the tax credits remaining on the books long-term then the foreign entity rules might spur the creation of a larger domestic — or at least non-Chinese — supply chain for some clean energy inputs. But because the credits will phase out by 2032 regardless, fewer projects will qualify, and it won’t be worth it for companies to invest in alternative supply chains.
Finally, the House Republican proposal would end companies’ ability to sell the value of tax credits to other firms. The IRA had made it easier for utilities and developers to transfer the value of tax credits to other companies — essentially allowing companies with a lot of tax liability, such as banks, to acquire the rights to renewable developers’ credits.
The GOP proposal ends that right for every tax credit, even those that Republicans have historically looked on more favorably, such as the tax credit that rewards companies for capturing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.
This change — coupled with the foreign entity and placed-in-service rules — will have an impact today on power markets by further gumming up the pipeline of new energy projects planned across the country, according to Advait Arun, an analyst at the Center for Public Enterprise.
The end to transferability “functionally imposes higher marginal tax rates on all of these projects,” Arun told me. “The prices that developers will get for their tax credits on the tax equity market today will be a lot lower than normal.”
That could significantly raise the cost of any new energy projects that get planned. And that will lead in the medium term to a further slowdown in the growth of electricity supply, just as turbine shortages have made it more difficult than ever to build a new natural gas power plant.
While many of these changes may seem academic, they will hit energy consumers faster than legislators might realize. Natural gas prices in the U.S. have been unusually high in 2025. A slowdown in the growth of non-fossil energy will further stress natural gas supplies, raising power prices.
Taken together, Orvis told me, these changes to the IRA “will increase the price of the vast majority of new capacity coming online next year,” Orvis said. “It’s an immediate price hike for new energy, and you can’t replace that with new gas.”
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A letter from Day 2 of New York Climate Week.
Utilities sit at an uneasy intersection between private company and public service. Typically, it’s quite a profitable place to be: Investor-owned utilities get to be monopolies in order to provide electric service in a particular geography and then charge government-approved rates. But that also places them on the front lines of the consumer and political backlash to rising electricity prices.
Those prices are likely to continue to rise. The energy advocacy group PowerLines estimates that in 2025, electric and gas utilities requested some $31 billion worth of rate hikes. Spending on that scale translates into higher rates for consumers as utilities pass along their development costs to their rate base. S&P Global projects that electric and gas utilities will undertake $1.3 trillion in capital expenditures through 2030.
Utility executives are as much politicians as they are operators, as their entire corporate existence depends on a government relationship. So it was no surprise that Calvin Butler, chief executive of Exelon, the utility holding company with around 11 million customers spanning from the Chicago area to the Atlantic Seaboard, was speaking at an event on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly hosted by the foreign policy think tank the Atlantic Council on the same agenda as the foreign ministers of Spain and Romania and the prime minister of Syria.
As all this was going on, the White House and Congress appeared to be in the end stages (or at least the beginning of the end stages) of hashing out a deal on permitting reform. While the investor-owned utility trade group the Edison Electric Institute has been publicly supportive of a permitting deal since last year, several industry and policy insiders tracking the deal have told me this week that utilities’ relative political weakness is one reason why a deal might pass.
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That’s because an effective reform to transmission and permitting — especially to interregional transmission planning — could threaten utilities’ spending on serving their own individual territories.
“They are gonna get smoked in the Senate permitting deal,” one energy industry figure following the negotiations told me. When I asked why utilities aren’t opposing a deal, the insider told me, “They need too much from [the Department of Energy] the next few years. They can’t oppose this.”
(I sent a request for comment to EEI, which didn’t respond by press time.)
Butler didn’t weigh in permitting reform — I submitted a question at the event, but alas, it went ignored — but he was straightforward about the importance of maintaining good community and political relationships in the face of rising prices.
“We have to be connected to talk about siting of transmission, distribution lines, or substations. It’s what we do. I always say this: All politics is local,” Butler said. When it comes to local politics, Butler said that Exelon is at the “forefront of advocating responsible growth, responsible build-out, and community benefits agreements that benefit those communities.”
Butler also assigned some blame for the electricity price backlash to data centers and the technology industry, pointing to “people’s concern with AI, people’s concern that they’re going to lose jobs.” The tech industry, he said, “lost the narrative up front, and it’s tough to get it back.”
In the minds of the public and local government figures, however, utilities are very much a part of that story. Several governors or utility regulators in territories served by Exelon have opposed their rate increase requests, especially Pennsylvania Governor Josh Shapiro, who demanded that Exelon subsidiary PECO withdraw a rate case, in a move he claimed saved ratepayers $510 million. North Carolina regulators also rejected a more than $500 million gas project proposed by Duke Energy, calling its price “staggering.”
When it came to how utilities affect everyone in their territory through the prices they charge, Butler was more direct and less cheery than his talk about community benefits. When asked if Exelon could “strengthen the grid” without raising prices, Butler plainly said, “No, you can’t.”
“We’re investing $41.7 billion,” he added. “I’m a part of that increase.”
An investor argues that climate tech should learn to stop worrying and love the robots.
For three years the entire conversation about artificial intelligence in the climate tech and clean energy communities has been about demand. This, of course, is reasonable. The scale of what the world is building right now has no precedent. Amazon, Google, Meta, and Microsoft together spent more than $420 billion on data center infrastructure in 2025, a number dwarfed by the $745 billion they’re expected to spend in 2026. The McKinsey Global Institute puts the global data center buildout through 2030 at $7 trillion — more than the New Deal, the Marshall Plan, and the Apollo program combined.
About 15% to 20% of that unfathomable spending is going exclusively to power the data center scale-up. By 2030, data centers will consume between 3% and 5% of all electricity generated on Earth.
The carbon cost is worse than the financial cost. Google's total greenhouse gas emissions rose by more than 50% in 2024 compared to five years earlier, even as the company worked harder than any of its peers to source clean power. In Armstrong County, Texas, the company is working with developer Crusoe Energy on a nearly gigawatt-scale natural gas plant to power its Goodnight data center campus.
But here is something else to consider: In 2024, Google ran a 17-week trial on 2,400 transatlantic American Airlines flights using a system designed to predict and avoid the formation of contrails. Contrails are the ice crystal trails left by jet engines that account for roughly a third of aviation's total warming impact — more than the impact of the fuel burning. The AI model rerouted flights slightly to avoid the atmospheric conditions that produce persistent contrails, and in doing so, cut contrail formation by 62% without any meaningful increase in fuel burn.
Around the same time, Microsoft used its Azure Quantum Elements platform to sift through 32 million possible chemical candidates for new battery chemistries, and in 80 hours narrowed the field to a handful of promising compounds that could reduce the amount of lithium required by as much as 70%. Meta, working with Georgia Tech, built one of the largest open-source datasets for discovering better sorbent materials for direct air capture, the process of pulling carbon dioxide directly from the atmosphere. Researchers ran nearly 40 million quantum mechanics calculations across 8,400 candidate materials, looking for those that could grab CO2 efficiently without also absorbing water from the air.
All of these things happened in the past two years. They were largely invisible to consumers. Yet they produced meaningful, even transformative climate benefits. Crucially, they cost almost nothing compared to the AI infrastructure buildout. They were side projects, pursued by teams whose quarterly numbers did not depend on their product’s success.
I argued two years ago in an interview with Heatmap that the steep financial and carbon costs of the AI buildout are worth it, and that if we stick with it, the power of AI will quickly yield innovative solutions to address climate change. But the opposition to data centers and AI deployment has created a frustrating paradox. A sector that has spent years describing a technology primarily as a threat — to the grid, to society, to humanity itself — will not, at the end of that time, be in a strong position to invest in what that technology can build. The sector wrote itself into the role of the regulator and critic at precisely the moment it should have been adopting the role of the main customer.
In the first half of 2026 alone, investors put $407 billion into AI startups, Pitchbook calculated. Climate tech, over the same stretch, did fine: $26.1 billion, according to CTVC’s insights report, up 55% year-over-year, the strongest first-half investment numbers since 2022. But low-carbon data centers alone took 34% of it, and two of the sector’s biggest deals were both for data center infrastructure. We essentially took an historic year of climate tech investment and used it to become AI's electricity supplier.
This is definitely a net positive, and critical to a clean hyperscale movement. But there’s more to be done.
Roughly one climate venture dollar in five went to something AI-enabled in 2025, which is a real increase from previous years. But out of $40 billion total climate tech investment last year, that amounts to only about $8 billion. Set that against the $242 billion that went into AI startups in a single quarter — the world's entire annual investment in AI for climate is roughly what AI startups raised every three days at the start of this year.
The three breakthroughs I mentioned at the beginning of this article are just the beginning of what AI can do for the climate — in many cases they’re the easy breakthroughs. They’re prediction, search, and optimization problems where the AI is essentially a faster pair of eyes.
The larger prize is what my colleagues at Obvious Ventures and I have come to call “generative science.” These are models trained in chemistry, physics, and biology that can propose genuinely novel arrangements of atoms rather than merely sorting through existing ones. This is where we unlock nuclear fusion, carbon-free cement and steel, and grid systems that balance themselves. We can make cancer vaccines and drugs optimized with a single patient’s DNA. If we ever make it to another planet, it will be because of AI. The same is true if we ever learn to sustainably feed 10 billion people.
This is not a speculative category anymore. A series of startups are making meaningful breakthroughs in these kinds of technologies. In Cambridge, England, a materials science company called CuspAI is building foundation models for chemistry to find materials for direct air capture of carbon dioxide. In California, Periodic Labs, founded by the researcher who led materials and chemistry at Google DeepMind, raised a $300 million seed round at a $1 billion valuation to run autonomous synthesis labs hunting for superconductors that work at higher temperatures (its valuation has since risen dramatically). And Zanskar, a company Obvious Ventures has backed, trained its models on subsurface data and a century of drilling and satellite records to find geothermal resources the industry had already written off. Last year, it identified a blind site in western Nevada with no geysers or surface expression that has the potential to generate over 100 megawatts.
Zanskar, however, is an exception. None of these other technologies were backed by climate funders. CuspAI and Periodic Labs have received financing from sovereign wealth funds, chipmakers, generalist growth firms, and individual investors who made their fortunes in software.
I’ll be the first to acknowledge that building a climate tech company isn’t easy. Investors often have to make two bets at once: that the science will work and that, if it does, there will be a viable business on the other side. Unlike chatbots from the frontier AI labs that have grown to $1 trillion valuations in less than five years, meaningful climate tech breakthroughs take longer to deploy, and even longer for their impact to put a meaningful dent in climate change.
But companies like CuspAI, Periodic, and Zanskar are proof of what’s possible when we point AI and climate tech in the same direction.
There are three main things we can do differently to continue that progress, and we can start each of them today.
As with any economic shift, aligning the incentives gets us much further than any fleeting policy commitment. When alignment happens, it creates a flywheel where AI powers research in climate tech, whose breakthroughs get fed back into AI to run models more cleanly and efficiently.
Jakob Uszkoreit, the former Google engineer who co-authored the transformer architecture that powers today’s leading large language models, described to me the paradox this way: AI needs carbon to get off the ground, but once airborne, it becomes the mechanism that solves the carbon problem. The question is whether we achieve liftoff before the end of the runway.
New research finds that Europe’s 2025 heat wave was made measurably worse by greenhouse gas emissions since the Paris Agreement.
Europe’s record-breaking heat wave in 2025 would have been a third of a degree Celsius cooler if not for emissions released just since the Paris Climate Agreement was signed in 2015, researchers found in a new study published Tuesday by the American Geophysical Union’s Geophysical Research Letters.
The research marks a step forward for attribution science, which has traditionally worked to tie extreme events such as heat waves and floods to climate change writ large. Now, using artificial intelligence trained on climate models, researchers have managed to link extreme weather to a specific subset of emissions.
“Not only does every little bit of emissions count, but the amount of emissions released since 2015 significantly increased the temperature of [the 2025 European] heat wave,” Jared Trok, the study’s lead author and a PhD student at the Stanford Doerr School of Sustainability, told me. “Before this paper” — which found 99-in-100 odds that human-caused emissions since 2015 increased the severity of the 2025 heat wave — “we couldn’t really make a claim to that extent.”
Though the record-breaking 2026 heat wave fell outside the scope of the study, the 2025 heat wave was no joke either — temperatures crested 115 degrees Fahrenheit in Spain and Portugal, and more than 16,000 died across the continent. Trok’s findings about a relationship between the past decade of emissions and intensified heat also held true for Europe’s hottest week in every year since at least 2021.
While a third of a degree Celsius might not sound like a lot — “it’s smaller than our ability to actually sense,” Trok acknowledged — there’s a growing body of scientific literature that suggests even incremental increases in temperature can be deadly. “It’s nonlinear,” Trok added. “For every additional increment of temperature, the impacts on heat-related mortality are even larger than the previous increment.” Though Trok and his colleagues did not look at mortality specifically, the reasoning indicates dozens if not hundreds of people could have died due to that fraction of a degree.
The study highlights the advances in the specificity and speed of attribution science, which a quarter of a century ago struggled to distinguish the influence of all historical emissions on any individual event. But it also suggests something grim: The past decade also overlaps with the biggest global efforts toward decarbonization. “Even if the decarbonization goals are achieved, these results as well as others suggest near certainty that the extremes, particularly extreme heat, will continue to intensify,” Noah Suresh Diffenbaugh, a Stanford climate scientist and the paper’s senior author, told me.
Paired with a separate commentary also published today by the U.S. Climate Collection, a joint project of AGU and the American Meteorological Society, the research adds an urgent underline to the need for research like Trok’s to be incorporated into state and local policymaking. Many of the institutions that existed to do so in the U.S., however, have collapsed or been actively dismantled by the second Trump administration.
The Climate Collection formed in the void that followed the forced breakup of the sixth National Climate Assessment (and is made up of many of its authors), and argues that the NCA did more than just good rigorous science — it also helped translate that research into a reliable springboard for policymakers.
The U.S. Climate Collection aims to compile an open-access collection of research papers that “lays the groundwork for future national and subnational assessments of climate risks and solutions in the United States.”
The group’s first paper serves as “a call to our colleagues to meet that need and the charge that has been given to us by society to produce the science” necessary for policymakers and other groups to “make better decisions,” Melissa Kenney, one of the commentary’s lead authors and director of research and knowledge initiatives at the University of Minnesota’s Institute on the Environment, told me.
In the past, the formal NCAs have helped inform everything from New Hampshire flood risk management plans to city- and state-level climate policies, the Climate Collection writes in their commentary. (They also set expectations: The last NCA required the involvement of 500 authors, 250 technical contributors, and synthesized more than 8,200 studies, meaning the Collective likely couldn’t replicate the rigor and scope even if it wanted to.) The Climate Collection specifically singles out attribution as an area of priority.
“Compounding extremes and cascading climate risks are increasingly overwhelming our legacy policies and infrastructure,” Kenney said, adding that “being able to understand the impact of these compounding extremes is really critical in a number of communities to be able to make smart, multi-decadal decisions like infrastructure choices.”
But as Trok’s research shows, even assumptions about the climate of 2015 are out of date. Investments in adaptation are a small fraction of the total dollars spent addressing climate change, and as Diffenbaugh stressed, the new paper is just the latest “of a number of studies that highlight that we can expect further acceleration of impacts from extreme events.”
The U.S. Climate Collection doesn’t intend to fill the gap left by the collapse of NCA6 (nor could it, its authors point out, given that it’s a self-organized volunteer group). But its call for synthesis papers of smaller scopes could give policymakers grounds to make decisions pulled from rigorous, peer-reviewed research as the world changes all around us. “These types of assessment reports are one of our greatest professional obligations as scientists,” Kenney said. “Most people will not go and read hundreds of scientific papers to be able to understand what we know and what we still need to know.”
“But,” she added, “there’s a real need for us to be able to provide the information” — before it becomes old news, too.