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The Environmental Protection Agency is feeling a calendar crunch.
Since President Joe Biden took office more than two years ago, the Environmental Protection Agency has been something of a sleeping giant.
Once central to President Barack Obama’s climate policy, the EPA seemed to take a backseat under Biden. As the Department of Treasury wrote rules for a dizzying number of new tax credits, and the Department of Energy became a de facto industrial-planning organization, the EPA seemed to wallow.
Then a few weeks ago, the agency came alive.
Last week, it proposed requiring that most new cars sold in the United States — and one quarter of all heavy-duty trucks — be powered solely by electricity. A week before, it tightened limits on the amount of brain-damaging mercury that coal-burning power plants can release. In March, it instructed nearly two dozen states to clean up pollution from their factories and power plants, and it slashed the amount of toxic air pollution that buses, vans, and heavy-duty trucks can legally produce.
This sudden burst of activity is in some ways just the appetizer. Within the next few weeks, the EPA is expected to propose restricting climate-warming pollution from new and existing power plants. This set of draft rules will aim to rapidly eliminate greenhouse-gas pollution from the power sector, one of the most carbon-intensive parts of the economy, in order to meet Biden’s goal of producing 100% zero-carbon electricity by 2035.
It will also face an immediate challenge in the Supreme Court, which has blocked a similar effort in the past even as it has preserved the EPA’s broad power to issue rules about the power sector.
This sudden flurry of productivity may seem to have come out of nowhere.
So why is the EPA publishing so many of these rules now?
The same reason that any of us suddenly become productive: It’s under deadline pressure. For the EPA, and for every other executive agency, the effective beginning of the end of Biden’s first term is as little as a few weeks away. Here’s why.
Under a law called the Congressional Review Act, Congress can overturn new federal rules by a simple majority vote and with the president’s signature. Most of the time, that power doesn’t matter, because presidents rarely want to repeal rules that their own administration has issued. (Last month, Biden vetoed a CRA resolution for this reason.)
But it becomes important when a new White House and Congress take over from a president of the opposite party. In 2017, a newly elected President Donald Trump and a Republican Congress repealed 16 Obama-era rules. In 2021, the new Democratic trifecta overturned three of Trump’s rules.
Biden would like to avoid the same fate befalling his own administration’s climate rules, so he’s moving fast. The key is that Congress can only activate the CRA for new rules — which, under the law, means rules that were finalized during the past 60 “legislative days,” or days when the House or Senate was in session. Because Congress isn’t in session every day, that’s a much longer period of time than it may seem — it can stretch four or five months into the past. When Biden took office in early January 2021, for instance, Congress could use the CRA on any rules that the Trump administration finalized after August 21, 2020.
“It is difficult to know with any specificity what the ‘lookback window’ will look like in 2024,” because it depends on what “the actual session of Congress looks like,” Dan Goldbeck, the director of regulatory policy at the American Action Forum, a center-right think tank, told me. In recent years, the deadline has tended to fall sometime in the late summer, but there’s no guarantee this pattern will hold next year, he said.
Let’s figure it does, though, and that the administration must finalize rules before about August 1, 2024, in order to protect them from the CRA.
We can backfill the calendar from there. As of today, the EPA has only started to circulate drafts of its most important rules, such as the clean-cars mandate. It has yet to publish these drafts in the Federal Register, the government’s official journal of rules and regulations. When they are published, the agency will open a 60-day comment period when the public can respond to any facet of the rules; it will probably extend this to 90 days as a show of good faith.
So if the EPA publishes its draft rule in the Federal Register soon — on May 1, say — then the public comment period will end three months later, on August 1. Then the agency must go over its draft again, double check its math, and respond to every public comment that it has received. This process of finalizing the rule can take about a year. Assuming it does, then suddenly it’s August 1, 2024 — and we’re at the (approximate) deadline.
In other words, the EPA must publish as many rules as possible now in order to protect them from quick repeal if, say, Ron DeSantis is inaugurated in 2025. This is part of why the EPA is moving with such haste now — and why the Biden administration’s climate policy has entered a new and more aggressive phase.
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Rob and Jesse take stock of all the trends threatening to push up power bills.
In the next few years, the United States is going to see the fastest growth in electricity demand since the 1970s. And that’s only the beginning of the challenges that our power grid will face. When you step back, virtually every trend facing the power system — such as the coming surge in liquified natural gas exports or President Trump’s repeal of wind and solar tax credits — threatens to constrain the supply of new electricity.
On this week’s episode of Shift Key, Rob and Jesse talk about why they’re increasingly worried about a surge in electricity prices. What’s setting us up for an electricity shortfall? What does the recent auction in the country’s largest electricity market tell us about what’s coming? And what would a power shock mean for utility customers, the economy, and decarbonization?
Shift Key is hosted by Jesse Jenkins, a professor of energy systems engineering at Princeton University, and Robinson Meyer, Heatmap’s executive editor.
Subscribe to “Shift Key” and find this episode on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Amazon, YouTube, or wherever you get your podcasts.
You can also add the show’s RSS feed to your podcast app to follow us directly.
Here is an excerpt from our conversation:
Robinson Meyer: None of these trends guarantee that electricity prices will go up, but suffice it to say, by the end of President Trump’s term, we could be exporting one fifth, right? 20%, 25%. And so that is a huge increase, and going to increase demand for U.S. natural gas supplies. How the supply side of U.S. natural gas responds is still an open question.
But even that isn’t the only trend. At the same time, the president’s tariffs, specifically on inputs to production — so copper, steel — have gone into effect. They’ve remained in effect. And what we’ve seen is that for these key ingredients and components to build more grid infrastructure, prices have gone up. I think steel prices have doubled, copper prices have increased. It doesn’t seem like those prices are coming down anytime soon.
And so just the raw ingredients that are required to produce, to expand the grid, and to increase electricity supply and electricity capacity are going to be more expensive in the world we’re living in than in the counterfactual world.
Jesse Jenkins: Yeah, I think if you go further upstream, too, there’s some — partly because of the tariffs, partly because of the uncertain trade environment, the uncertain macroeconomic environment, we’re not exactly seeing the oil and gas industry pouring capital into expanding natural gas supplies.
So, you could argue, and I’ve heard the folks from the American Gas Association argue this, that there’s no problem with expanding LNG exports as long as we expand supply to match that. And there’s some truth to that — except that we expect supply curves to be increasing, meaning the more we produce of something, in order to get incremental production up, we have to spend a little bit more per unit of energy we produce. That’s sort of characteristic of most markets.
So sure, we could increase our supply by 10% or 20%, but that would also require paying a higher cost per trillion cubic feet, or million cubic meters, or whatever unit you want of natural gas we get out of the ground in the U.S. And that alone would put upward pressure on prices. But if the U.S. is also not expanding supply at the same time that we’re expanding exports, then that just straight-up drives prices up.
We would see, basically, a delayed response from the market, from the supply side of the market, to those prices. This is partly why natural gas prices are so volatile. Prices spike — that sends a signal to add supply, but you can’t turn on the spigot overnight. You’ve got to drill new wells, identify them, get drill rigs out there, and open up production, and in some cases even expand pipelines to get that supply to market. All that takes several years. And so there’s a lag time there that often leads to these spikes in gas prices going quite a bit above what you would expect, the kind of marginal supply curve picture alone to reveal.
And I think if you look at the rig counts, declining rig counts, stagnating production, and sort of the secular decline of our conventional gas resources and oil resources, which are all on decline curves. As we pump more oil and gas out of the ground, the pressure falls and we get less and less from those wells. All that points to the potential for a relatively constrained supply of natural gas in the near term exactly at the same time that we’re ramping up LNG exports.
Mentioned:
Jesse on The Ezra Klein Show
From Rob: The Electricity Affordability Crisis Is Coming
U.S. power use to reach record highs in 2025 and 2026, per EIA
Why the EIA expects natural gas prices to rise
The Messy Truth of America’s Natural Gas Exports
Governor Josh Shapiro’s legal action to constrain power prices
Jesse’s upshift; Rob’s downshift.
This episode of Shift Key is sponsored by …
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Music for Shift Key is by Adam Kromelow.
A conversation with Harvard Law School’s Jody Freeman about life after the endangerment finding.
The Environmental Protection Agency unveiled a proposal on Tuesday to reverse its own conclusion that greenhouse gases are a threat to public health and welfare. Known as the “endangerment finding,” this 2009 determination initially compelled the agency to regulate carbon emissions from vehicles under the Clean Air Act. But the agency has since used it as the basis for many of its efforts to tackle climate change, including emissions limits on power plants, oil and gas operations, and aviation.
If the reversal is finalized as written — and survives court challenges — the EPA will no longer have the legal authority to regulate carbon dioxide from the tailpipes of cars or trucks, invalidating the vehicle standards issued by the Biden administration last year.
While other greenhouse gas regulations wouldn’t automatically disappear, the agency could easily use the same arguments to repeal them. Indeed, the agency said that it has already initiated or intends to initiate “separate rulemakings that will address any overlapping issues” related to other sources of greenhouse gas emissions, such as power plants.
EPA’s primary justification for reversing course, detailed in a 302-page document, is that the Clean Air Act is designed to target air pollution that endangers public health “through local or regional exposure,” and therefore that it cannot be used to rein in greenhouse gases “based on global climate change concerns.” Richard Revesz, a professor of law at New York University and former Biden official, told me this was “breathtakingly broad,” and said that it was “inconsistent with 55 years of regulation under the Clean Air Act. That limitation was never understood to be there.”
The EPA also put forth a host of other legal and scientific arguments, “basically throwing the kitchen sink at this issue,” Revesz said. The proposal asserts that the EPA should have considered the downstream costs of making the finding, as well as weighed the potential benefits of a warmer climate. In a section entitled “Alternative Rationale for Proposed Rescission,” the agency attempts to poke holes in the scientific evidence that climate change is a threat to public health, concluding that the research is uncertain. It cites a report from the Department of Energy, also released Tuesday, that says the warming caused by greenhouse gases is not as bad for the economy as people once thought, and that regulating such emissions will have “undetectably small direct impacts on the global climate.”
The proposal cherry-picks data and misinterprets scientific findings. For example, it says that recent evidence suggests that the temperature projections EPA used to make the endangerment finding were “unduly pessimistic,” citing a 2020 paper by climate scientist Zeke Hausfather. But Hausfather has already posted on social media that this is wrong — his paper supported the EPA’s 2009 temperature projections.
My inbox is currently full of statements from legal experts, scientists, and activists adamant that the administration’s arguments are baseless. The agency will be taking public comments on the proposal through September 21, and hold at least two public hearings on August 19 and 20. To get a sense of what to expect over the coming months and years as a result of this move, I called up Jody Freeman, the director of the Environmental and Energy Law Program at Harvard and a former White House counsel for the Obama administration. Our conversation has been lightly edited for clarity.
What will EPA have to do in order to finalize this proposal?
What they do is put it out for public comment. There’ll be a huge reaction to this, and so they’ll have a very big set of comments that they’re going to have to go through, which then will take them several months at a minimum. And they’re not necessarily going to be in a rush, right? At a minimum, we’re going to be getting into 2026 before we’d see a final rule. And then the lawsuits would start.
Other than just responding to the public comments, are there certain things that they would have to demonstrate to finalize this determination?
The normal process is you have to respond to the most serious and relevant comments. So if the comment says, The claims you’re making about the science are wrong, they’d have to respond to that. The normal course is they come back with a final rule that explains why they’re doing what they’re doing, and why they either didn’t agree with the comments, or they do agree with some of them, and they’ve adapted the proposal.
And as you said, then the lawsuits would start.
It doesn’t take effect for 30 days after it’s final. But yes, at that point, they get sued. These rules go to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals because that’s what the Clean Air Act says, and usually it would take about a year or so for a D.C. Circuit decision to happen. So now you’re in 2027. You can see the timeline on this stretching out. And if you ultimately think this could go to the Supreme Court, you can imagine that’s another year away. So basically, for the rest of President Trump’s term, you really shouldn’t expect to see enforcement or action on federal climate rules.
Even if the EPA hadn’t taken this step, wouldn’t that still have been the case, since the Trump administration is fighting the power plant rules and the vehicle emissions rules?
Well, you could see them dragging their feet enforcing these standards. Of course, they would get sued if they weren’t enforcing vehicle emission standards against the auto industry. There would be efforts to force them to enforce. But it’s more serious and more long term damage for them to try to rescind the underlying endangerment finding because depending on what the Supreme Court does with that, it could knock out a future administration from trying to bring it back. Now that would be the nuclear option. That would be their best case scenario. I don’t think that’s likely, but it’s possible.
At a minimum, let’s say they don’t win everything, but the court says they can do this for now — they have the discretion, the flexibility not to make this finding. Another administration can come back and make it and restore the rules. But that would take, again, several years. So even if they lose, they win.
If they do finalize this, would the other lawsuits that are going on around the power plant rules and the vehicle emissions rules automatically be dropped?
There are a few lawsuits that were challenging the Biden-era rules, but the Trump administration asked the courts to hold them in abeyance because they said, We’re going to go revisit all those rules and replace them. So those lawsuits aren’t moving forward anyway at the moment. It would probably be true that the administration, in taking this action, wants to set up a situation where it can go back into court and say, Well, now all these challenges are moot. We don’t have any authority to regulate anyway. But for now, they’re all on hold.
Are there other regulations this will affect besides those for vehicles and power plants?
The methane rule for oil and gas facilities is more of a question mark because they don’t seem to be announcing they’ll eliminate it. It’s possible they push off compliance. It’s possible they make the rule weaker. But there are a couple reasons why they might not rescind that.
One is that there’s a very complicated history of this rule. Congress disapproved of a weaker methane rule the first time around in the Trump administration, and because of that congressional action, there’s a barrier there. They can’t easily just rescind that methane rule. They’ve got more legal hurdles to jump through.
The other reason is there are some good reasons to regulate methane that have to do with ozone pollution and pollution that isn’t just about climate change. And the third reason is the oil and gas industry might actually want a methane rule. They might want a weak one, but they might want one federally. So that’s a bit separate, and you have to be on the lookout for them handling methane differently.
Could a future EPA just develop stronger pollution standards for other pollutants that would indirectly reduce greenhouse gas emissions?
It’s true that when you set toxics standards, for example, for power plants to control their toxic pollution, a side benefit is those power plants become more efficient, and that means they control their carbon pollution, too. But this is more around the margins. This is not taking big bites out of power plant greenhouse gas emissions or big bites out of car and truck emissions. It would be a much, much, much weaker version of what you can do with the endangerment finding.
So if the endangerment finding is reversed, is the only path for future regulation for Congress to explicitly tell EPA that it must regulate greenhouse gases?
That’s one option, but it may not necessarily be the only one. It depends on where this lands after it moves through the courts. If the Supreme Court said, You, Trump EPA, you can rescind this finding, but another administration could bring it back, then another administration can say, Well, we think the science is clear, and we’re going to make the finding again and issue these rules. So it all depends on how far the court goes. If it’s going to agree with EPA, how much will it agree? But if the court were to essentially say, this agency has no authority now and forever to make this finding, well then yes, you need new law.
Will the overturning of the Chevron doctrine also play into this?
That’s another interesting one. So what they have to do now is argue that greenhouse gases might be pollutants, but we don’t have to regulate them. And when they argue that we don’t have to regulate them, they’re going to be asking for a lot of deference. And so in that sense, they’re kind of asking for what Chevron used to give you — deference. But they don’t have Chevron anymore, so they’re going to have to say to the court, You should agree with our reading of this law. This is the best reading of this law, that we don’t have to regulate. They no longer can just say, you ought to defer to us under Chevron.
In that scenario, is it left to the court to decide?
It’s left to the court to say, your reading of the law is right. You have flexibility here, and you can decide you don’t need to regulate. The court would have to agree with their reading of the Clean Air Act.
Isn’t the endangerment finding more of a scientific question than a legal one?
Well, in making that scientific decision about what constitutes a danger to human health, there’s a lot of judgment in there. How do we interpret the science? Is it okay for us to say, well, there are a lot of good things that happen because of climate change? This is what they might do, right? They might say, The EPA, long ago, they ignored all the good stuff about climate change, and we think that’s really important. They might say some ludicrous stuff that leading scientists would think is completely wrong. But there’s some discretion in there about how you count the science and what you weigh, and they’re going to try to get the court to agree that they have a lot of flexibility in what method they use. That means the court will have to agree with them on how they read the law.
So they might say, We have flexibility to interpret the science, and the court might say, No, you don’t, the science is really clear. Then they might say, Okay, well even so, the U.S. contribution is so infinitesimally small that we don’t consider it a contribution to the problem. Now there, the court might say, Okay, you have discretion there. So it’s a little bit of a moving target, where at every opportunity they’re going to say, We have flexibility, don’t you agree?, and hope the court bites on one of those.
More than $30 billion of clean energy investments are now on ice since Trump took office, according to new data from Wellesley College’s Big Green Machine.
America’s EV factory building boom is beginning to falter.
Since President Donald Trump took office, at least 34 factories or mineral refineries — totaling more than $30 billion in investment — have been paused, delayed, or canceled, according to a new report from researchers at Wellesley College who track the country’s clean energy manufacturing base.
“When you look at the projects that are slowing down, it’s all up and down the supply chain,” Jay Turner, an environmental studies professor who leads the database, told me.
Electric vehicle manufacturing projects are now being delayed or canceled at six times the rate that they were during the same period last year, he said.
The database, called the Big Green Machine, has data on EV and mineral factory activity going back to 2010, and has been actively tracking investment in the EV supply chain since 2022.
The news is not entirely bleak for the EV buildout, however. Another 68 projects have progressed in the past six months, according to Turner’s data. Those projects represent $24 billion in investment and more than 33,000 jobs.
At the same time, more than two dozen new projects have been announced in the past six months, but they are of a much smaller scale, the report finds. Taken together, the projects in this new wave add up to only $3 billion in investment — one-tenth of the $30 billion in projects that have been paused, delayed, or cancelled.
The Big Green Machine
The new data likely does not capture recent setbacks for the EV industry. Earlier this month, President Trump signed Republicans’ budget reconciliation bill, which will terminate all tax credits for buying or leasing an electric vehicle on September 30.
Turner told me that the slowdown was the predictable outcome of the Trump administration’s turn away from electric cars.
“In some ways, it’s exactly what we expected,” he said. “As concerns about the Inflation Reduction Act and bipartisan infrastructure law began last fall, we started to see projects slowing down. Since Trump was elected, those closures, cancellations, and delays have just ballooned.”
Particularly hard hit are projects located in distressed or fossil-fuel-dependent communities, as defined by the terms set out in the Inflation Reduction Act, he added. Facilities that depended on some kind of federal support or loan guarantee have also been especially likely to pause, he added.
The slowdowns have struck across the EV supply chain. Some battery factories have switched from producing lithium ion cells for vehicles to making large-scale batteries for the power grid. The new budget law, called the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, maintained tax incentives for installing grid-scale battery storage.
Mineral producers have also been affected. Li-Cycle paused work on mineral recycling plants in April, Turner said. A Canadian rare earth processing facility — one of the few such factories in North America — scaled back its ambitions this month. (“The data in our report is just the U.S., but when you add in Canada it’s more shocking how sharp the downturn has been,” Turner said.)
That follows other delays from last year. The Chicago-based company Anovion has continued to pause work on an $800 million facility in southwest Georgia that was slated to make synthetic graphite, which is essential for lithium ion battery anodes.
Last year, the chemicals company Albemarle delayed $1.3 billion in plans to build the country’s largest lithium refinery in South Carolina. “The economics just aren't there to build that plant,” Kent Masters, Albemarle’s CEO, told Reuters in May. China controls roughly three-quarters of the world’s lithium and synthetic graphite supply chains.
Despite its antagonism toward electric cars, the Trump administration has sought to prioritize some mineral projects. Earlier this month, the Pentagon announced a complex deal to invest in — and guarantee a buyer for the output of — a rare earths mine and processing facility on the California-Nevada border.
Whatever the cause of the slowdown, it isn’t limited to just electric cars. Total private manufacturing investment in the United States has leveled off and slightly fallen since October 2024.