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The self-described “ecosocialist” ran an ultra-disciplined campaign for New York City mayor. Once he’s in office, the climate issue could become unavoidable.

Zohran Mamdani, the New York state assemblyman, democratic socialist, and Democratic nominee, was elected mayor of New York City on Tuesday night.
Many factors fueled his longshot rise to Gracie Mansion — a congested primary field, a gleam-in-his-eyes approach to new media, and an optimistic left-wing worldview rendered newly credible by global tumult — but perhaps above all was a nonstop, months-long performance of bravura message discipline. Since the Democratic primary began in earnest earlier this year, Mamdani has harped in virtually every public appearance on what he has described as New York’s “affordability crisis,” promising to lower the city’s cost of living for working-class residents.
He hammered that message even as the election required him to play a shifting set of roles. During the primary, he set himself apart from a field overflowing with progressives by showcasing his differences with the Democratic Party. During the general election, he became the consummate Democrat, earning the votes of the party’s most loyal voters even as the former governor and one-time old-guard Democrat Andrew Cuomo ran an independent bid. Fittingly, Mamdani’s victory speech Tuesday night alluded to and remixed lines from socialists and liberal Democrats alike — including Cuomo’s father, New York’s former governor Mario Cuomo.
“A great New Yorker once said that while you campaign in poetry, you govern in prose,” Mamdani said, paraphrasing the elder Cuomo. “If that must be true, let the prose we write still rhyme, and let us build a shining city for all.”
So given all the notes he struck during the campaign, it is revealing to consider those Mamdani left unplayed. One in particular stands out: Throughout the long mayoral campaign, Mamdani rarely spoke about climate change — often doing so only when directly asked.
This might not seem meaningful on its face. Mamdani had a lot of issues he could focus on, after all. (He also spoke intermittently about, say, K-12 education, even though as mayor he will oversee the nation’s largest school district.)
But in light of his biography, Mamdani’s relative reticence on climate change stands out. During his early career in the state legislature, Mamdani defined himself in part through his climate activism, and by his view that New York should be “leading the country in our fight against the climate crisis,” as he said in a 2022 press release. He helmed some of the most aggressive recent activist efforts to shut down, block, and replace fossil fuel infrastructure in Gotham. They provide a window into where his mayoralty could go — and also illustrate the fraught politics of climate change in Year 1 of Trump 2.0.
From his first days in the New York State Assembly in 2021, Mamdani placed himself at the forefront of the debate over the future of fossil fuels in New York’s energy system. “When I ran for this office, it was on a platform of housing, justice, and energy for all,” he said in a statement soon after his election.
Many of his biggest policy proposals as a legislator focused on climate change. He backed the Build Public Renewables Act, a bill that empowers New York’s state power agency to develop wind and solar projects in order to meet the state’s climate goals. He resisted NRG Energy’s push to replace an aging natural gas peaker plant in Astoria, Queens, with a newer power plant that would still burn gas. And he opposed the expansion of natural gas pipelines into the state while cosponsoring the Clean Futures Act, which would, he said, ban all new natural gas power plants across New York.
Climate change was the issue, he said, at the very heart of his political identity. In July 2022, after the state assembly expired without a vote on the Build Public Renewables Act and amid a heat wave in New York, he called for a special session to pass the bill, deeming climate change a “human catastrophe.”
“There are a number of bills that I would love to pass tomorrow. I’m not calling for a special session for all of them,” he told Spectrum News. “The reason we have to call for this one is because climate change is not waiting.”
In its fight against the Queens power plant, his legislative office — working alongside the Stop NRG Coalition, an alliance of local residents, the Democratic Socialists of America, and traditional environmentalists such as Earthjustice and the Sierra Club — called 36,000 households and sent more than 7,800 postcards asking residents to reject the plant, Mamdani later said. Ultimately, locals filed more than 6,000 comments to oppose the proposed plant; when the New York Department of Environmental Conservation ultimately denied a key permit in October 2022, Mamdani claimed victory.
He was also clear about who had lost that fight: big corporations and fossil fuel-aligned capitalism. “This shows when we organize against corporations that put capital over the collective, we can win a world where we all live with dignity,” he said. “Stopping the Astoria power plant is an amazing victory towards a habitable planet and the clean future we all deserve.”
Many of Mamdani’s other climate efforts were ultimately successful. The Build Public Renewables Act passed in April 2023 as part of the state budget and was signed into law by Governor Kathy Hochul. The state has not passed the Clean Futures Act, although regulators have rejected other proposed fossil-fuel power plants across the state, citing its 2019 climate leadership law.
In a little-watched May 2021 video that gives a concentrated dose of Mamdani’s political vision at the time, he described himself not as a socialist, but as a “proud ecosocialist” who believed that electricity should be treated as a “public good.”
“Did you ever wonder why New York state only gets 5% of its energy from wind and solar?” he asked in the video. “It’s because of one word: capitalism.” The way to fight that capitalistic hold on energy production, he said, was with public power — government ownership and development of zero-carbon generation.
Even after those victories, Mamdani remained a proud champion of climate issues. As recently as a year ago, he suggested that activism and agitation around climate change was a key way that progressives could differentiate themselves from Trump in the eyes of the working class. At a rally in late November last year, shortly after a drought resulted in a rare brush fire that consumed 2 acres of the city’s beloved Prospect Park, he exhorted the New York Power Authority, or NYPA, to move faster to develop its pipeline of renewables projects — and framed credible climate action as essential to countering Trump’s rise.
“The climate crisis does not care about any of the reasons that are usually given so much weight in Albany. It doesn’t care if you want to blame the supply chain. It doesn’t care if a private company says it has reduced profitability. It cares only if you build out renewable infrastructure,” he said.
“If you want to know how to defeat the Donald Trump far-right movement, it’s by showing we actually have a workable alternative,” he continued. “Because if working class people can’t breathe the air, if they can’t afford to live in the city they call home because they can’t find a union job, and if they look around at their favorite parks being on fire, why would they trust us?”
“It is time to show them why,” he concluded. “It’s time for the Build Public Renewables Act.”
Mamdani has continued to push for NYPA to accelerate its renewables construction — he posted a video of the same rally to his Instagram feed in September, encouraging his followers to file public comments with New York state.
As recently as February 2025, he described New York City as facing an “existential moment of our climate crisis” at a candidate forum, and said that enforcing the city’s climate laws would require “taking on the real-estate industry.”
But in the months since, his earlier bold rhetoric — casting practical concerns as no object when it comes to climate action — has faded, and he has evinced more sympathy for landlords and homeowners who may bear decarbonization’s costs. He still describes climate change in existential terms, but has become far less likely to bring it up unbidden in his own speeches and media appearances.
As a major party mayoral candidate, too, Mamdani largely avoided framing climate action as a necessary antidote to Trumpism. When seeking to contrast himself with the president, he focused almost entirely on cost of living issues. In a Fox News appearance in October, Mamdani addressed Trump directly and said that he would work with him to address New Yorkers’ cost of living.
His campaign website’s only stated climate proposal is a “Green Schools” plan to renovate 500 public schools, turn 500 asphalt schoolyards into green spaces, and construct “resilience hubs” at 50 schools. Speaking with The Nation in April — in one of his few recent long-form interviews on climate policy — Mamdani set that plan within his broader campaign, saying “climate and quality of life are not two separate concerns. They are, in fact, one and the same.” Schools, he said, offer “an opportunity for comprehensive climate action.”
But his website has few other details about what climate actions he might like to pursue once he takes office as mayor. Indeed, the candidate who once blamed capitalism for New York’s failure to build renewables is now promising to establish a “Mom-and-Pop Czar” to cut fines on small businesses and speed up permitting. It also gives few clues about how Mamdani would handle decarbonization’s inevitable trade-offs. If achieving a faster renewables buildout led to higher energy prices for consumers and small businesses, what would he do?
Even in situations where his slogans could reasonably connect to some climate benefit, Mamdani did not complete the handshake. His website does not mention the pollution benefits of fast and free bus service, for instance, even though free transit in other campaigns has been described as a climate policy. His 25-minute victory speech, delivered to a jubilant crowd on Tuesday night, did not mention climate change at all.
Regardless of what he’s said, Mamdani will be required to take big actions on climate policy as mayor. The most significant will likely arise from an ordinance called Local Law 97, which requires New York City’s large buildings to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. That law’s strict new set of pollution caps and penalties will start in 2029, and many landlords are set to pay big fines. During the second mayoral debate, Mamdani repeated that the “climate crisis is one of the most pressing issues facing this city,” and said he wants the law’s fines to be enforced. But he also added that “the city should make it easier for buildings to comply.”
Mamdani has also argued that the city and state should renew a set of tax breaks to make it cheaper for large residential buildings, like condos and co-ops, to meet the law’s targets, and has proposed creating a “one-stop shop” for Local Law 97 compliance in the city governance, according to his debate remarks and a memo about homeowner policy released by his campaign.
In replacing climate change with cost of living, Mamdani has moved closer to what appears to be an emerging consensus among his party. Recent autopsies of the 2024 election have argued that voters believed Democrats were too focused on issues like climate change and not enough on affordability or inflation. Mamdani’s relentless focus on near-term costs — and his embrace of clear, actionable, and frankly non-climate-related slogans — suggests that one young ecosocialist might now agree with them. His ultimate victory suggests that it wasn’t a bad gamble.
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In practice, direct lithium extraction doesn’t quite make sense, but 2026 could its critical year.
Lithium isn’t like most minerals.
Unlike other battery metals such as nickel, cobalt, and manganese, which are mined from hard-rock ores using drills and explosives, the majority of the world’s lithium resources are found in underground reservoirs of extremely salty water, known as brine. And while hard-rock mining does play a major role in lithium extraction — the majority of the world’s actual production still comes from rocks — brine mining is usually significantly cheaper, and is thus highly attractive wherever it’s geographically feasible.
Reaching that brine and extracting that lithium — so integral to grid-scale energy storage and electric vehicles alike — is typically slow, inefficient, and environmentally taxing. This year, however, could represent a critical juncture for a novel process known as Direct Lithium Extraction, or DLE, which promises to be faster, cleaner, and capable of unlocking lithium across a wider range of geographies.
The traditional method of separating lithium from brine is straightforward but time-consuming. Essentially, the liquid is pumped through a series of vast, vividly colored solar evaporation ponds that gradually concentrate the mineral over the course of more than a year.
It works, but by the time the lithium is extracted, refined, and ready for market, both the demand and the price may have shifted significantly, as evidenced by the dramatic rise and collapse of lithium prices over the past five years. And while evaporation ponds are well-suited to the arid deserts of Chile and Argentina where they’re most common, the geology, brine chemistry, and climate of the U.S. regions with the best reserves are generally not amenable to this approach. Not to mention the ponds require a humongous land footprint, raising questions about land use and ecological degradation.
DLE forgoes these expansive pools, instead pulling lithium-rich brine into a processing unit, where some combination of chemicals, sorbents, or membranes isolate and extricate the lithium before the remaining brine gets injected back underground. This process can produce battery-grade lithium in a matter of hours or days, without the need to transport concentrated brine to separate processing facilities.
This tech has been studied for decades, but aside from a few Chinese producers using it in combination with evaporation ponds, it’s largely remained stuck in the research and development stage. Now, several DLE companies are looking to build their first commercial plants in 2026, aiming to prove that their methods can work at scale, no evaporation ponds needed.
“I do think this is the year where DLE starts getting more and more relevant,” Federico Gay, a principal lithium analyst at Benchmark Mineral Intelligence, told me.
Standard Lithium, in partnership with oil and gas major Equinor, aims to break ground this year on its first commercial facility in Arkansas’s lithium-rich Smackover Formation, while the startup Lilac Solution also plans to commence construction on a commercial plant at Utah’s Great Salt Lake. Mining giant Rio Tinto is progressing with plans to build a commercial DLE facility in Argentina, which is already home to one commercial DLE plant — the first outside of China. That facility is run by the French mining company Eramet, which plans to ramp production to full capacity this year.
If “prices are positive” for lithium, Gay said, he expects that the industry will also start to see mergers and acquisitions this year among technology providers and larger corporations such as mining giants or oil and gas majors, as “some of the big players will try locking in or buying technology to potentially produce from the resources they own.” Indeed, ExxonMobil and Occidental Petroleum are already developing DLE projects, while major automakers have invested, too.
But that looming question of lithium prices — and what it means for DLE’s viability — is no small thing. When EV and battery storage demand boomed at the start of the decade, lithium prices climbed roughly 10-fold through 2022 before plunging as producers aggressively ramped output, flooding the market just as EV demand cooled. And while prices have lately started to tick upward again, there’s no telling whether the trend will continue.
“Everyone seems to have settled on a consensus view that $20,000 a tonne is where the market’s really going to be unleashed,” Joe Arencibia, president of the DLE startup Summit Nanotech, told me, referring to the lithium extraction market in all of its forms — hard rock mining, traditional brine, and DLE. “As far as we’re concerned, a market with $14,000, $15,000 a tonne is fine and dandy for us.”
Lilac Solutions, the most prominent startup in the DLE space, expects that its initial Utah project — which will produce a relatively humble 5,000 metric tons of lithium per year — will be profitable even if lithium prices hit last year’s low of $8,300 per metric ton. That’s according to the company’s CEO Raef Sully, who also told me that because Utah’s reserves are much lower grade than South America’s, Lilac could produce lithium for a mere $3,000 to $3,500 in Chile if it scaled production to 15,000 or 20,000 metric tons per year.
What sets Lilac apart from other DLE projects is its approach to separating lithium from brine. Most companies are pursuing adsorption-based processes, in which lithium ions bind to an aluminum-based sorbent, which removes them from surrounding impurities. But stripping the lithium from the sorbent generally requires a good deal of freshwater, which is not ideal given that many lithium-rich regions are parched deserts.
Lilac’s tech relies on an ion-exchange process in which small ceramic beads selectively capture lithium ions from the brine in their crystalline structure, swapping them for hydrogen ions. “The crystal structure seems to have a really strong attraction to lithium and nothing else,” Sully told me. Acid then releases the concentrated lithium. When compared with adsorption-based tech, he explained, this method demands far fewer materials and is “much more selective for lithium ions versus other ions,” making the result purer and thus cheaper to process into a battery-grade material.
Because adsorption-based DLE is already operating commercially and ion-exchange isn’t, Lilac has much to prove with its first commercial facility, which is expected to finalize funding and begin construction by the middle of this year.
Sully estimates that Lilac will need to raise around $250 million to build its first commercial facility, which has already been delayed due to the price slump. The company’s former CEO and current CTO Dave Snydacker told me in 2023 that he expected to commence commercial operations by the end of 2024, whereas now the company plans to bring its Utah plant online at the end of 2027 or early 2028.
“Two years ago, with where the market was, nobody was going to look at that investment,” Sully explained, referring to its commercial plant. Investors, he said, were waiting to see what remained after the market bottomed out, which it now seems to have done. Lilac is still standing, and while there haven’t yet been any public announcements regarding project funding, Sully told me he’s confident that the money will come together in time to break ground in mid-2026.
It also doesn’t hurt that lithium prices have been on the rise for a few months, currently hovering around $20,000 per tonne. Gay thinks prices are likely to stabilize somewhere in this range, as stakeholders who have weathered the volatility now have a better understanding of the market.
At that price, hard rock mining would be a feasible option, though still more expensive than traditional evaporation ponds and far above what DLE producers are forecasting. And while some mines operated at a loss or mothballed their operations during the past few years, Gay thinks that even if prices stabilize, hard-rock mines will continue to be the dominant source of lithium for the foreseeable future due to sustained global investment across Africa, Brazil, Australia, and parts of Asia. The price may be steeper, but the infrastructure is also well-established and the economics are well-understood.
“I’m optimistic and bullish about DLE, but probably it won’t have the impact that it was thought about two or three years ago,” Gay told me, as the hype has died down and prices have cooled from their record high of around $80,000 per tonne. By 2040, Benchmark forecasts that DLE will make up 15% to 20% of the lithium market, with evaporation ponds continuing to be a larger contributor for the next decade or so, primarily due to the high upfront costs of DLE projects and the time required for them to reach economies of scale.
On average, Benchmark predicts that this tech will wind up in “the high end of the second quartile” of the cost curve, making DLE projects a lower mid-cost option. “So it’s good — not great, good. But we’ll have some DLE projects in the first quartile as well, so competing with very good evaporation assets,” Gay told me.
Unsurprisingly, the technology companies themselves are more bullish on their approach. Even though Arencibia predicts that evaporation ponds will continue to be about 25% cheaper, he thinks that “the majority of future brine projects will be DLE,” and that DLE will represent 25% or more of the future lithium market.
That forecast comes in large part because Chile — the world’s largest producer of lithium from brine — has stated in its National Lithium Strategy that all new projects should have an “obligatory requirement” to use novel, less ecologically disruptive production methods. Other nations with significant but yet-to-be exploited lithium brine resources, such as Bolivia, could follow suit.
Sully is even more optimistic, predicting that as lithium demand grows from about 1.5 million metric tons per year to around 3.5 million metric tons by 2035, the majority of that growth will come from DLE. “I honestly believe that there will be no more hard rock mines built in Australia or the U.S.,” he said, telling me that in ten years time, half of our lithium supply could “easily” come from DLE.
As a number of major projects break ground this year and the big players start consolidating, we’ll begin to get a sense of whose projections are most realistic. But it won’t be until some of these projects ramp up commercial production in the 2028 to 2030 timeframe that DLE’s market potential will really crystalize.
“If you’re not a very large player at the moment, I think it’s very difficult for you to proceed,” Sully told me, reflecting on how lithium’s price shocks have rocked the industry. Even with lithium prices ticking precariously upwards now, the industry is preparing for at least some level of continued volatility and uncertainty.
“Long term, who knows what [prices are] going to be,” Sully said. “I’ve given up trying to predict.”
A chat with CleanCapital founder Jon Powers.
This week’s conversation is with Jon Powers, founder of the investment firm CleanCapital. I reached out to Powers because I wanted to get a better understanding of how renewable energy investments were shifting one year into the Trump administration. What followed was a candid, detailed look inside the thinking of how the big money in cleantech actually views Trump’s war on renewable energy permitting.
The following conversation was lightly edited for clarity.
Alright, so let’s start off with a big question: How do investors in clean energy view Trump’s permitting freeze?
So, let’s take a step back. Look at the trend over the last decade. The industry’s boomed, manufacturing jobs are happening, the labor force has grown, investments are coming.
We [Clean Capital] are backed by infrastructure life insurance money. It’s money that wasn’t in this market 10 years ago. It’s there because these are long-term infrastructure assets. They see the opportunity. What are they looking for? Certainty. If somebody takes your life insurance money, and they invest it, they want to know it’s going to be there in 20 years in case they need to pay it out. These are really great assets – they’re paying for electricity, the panels hold up, etcetera.
With investors, the more you can manage that risk, the more capital there is out there and the better cost of capital there is for the project. If I was taking high cost private equity money to fund a project, you have to pay for the equipment and the cost of the financing. The more you can bring down the cost of financing – which has happened over the last decade – the cheaper the power can be on the back-end. You can use cheaper money to build.
Once you get that type of capital, you need certainty. That certainty had developed. The election of President Trump threw that into a little bit of disarray. We’re seeing that being implemented today, and they’re doing everything they can to throw wrenches into the growth of what we’ve been doing. They passed the bill affecting the tax credits, and the work they’re doing on permitting to slow roll projects, all of that uncertainty is damaging the projects and more importantly costs everyone down the road by raising the cost of electricity, in turn making projects more expensive in the first place. It’s not a nice recipe for people buying electricity.
But in September, I went to the RE+ conference in California – I thought that was going to be a funeral march but it wasn’t. People were saying, Now we have to shift and adjust. This is a huge industry. How do we get those adjustments and move forward?
Investors looked at it the same way. Yes, how will things like permitting affect the timeline of getting to build? But the fundamentals of supply and demand haven’t changed and in fact are working more in favor of us than before, so we’re figuring out where to invest on that potential. Also, yes federal is key, but state permitting is crucial. When you’re talking about distributed generation going out of a facility next to a data center, or a Wal-Mart, or an Amazon warehouse, that demand very much still exists and projects are being built in that middle market today.
What you’re seeing is a recalibration of risk among investors to understand where we put our money today. And we’re seeing some international money pulling back, and it all comes back to that concept of certainty.
To what extent does the international money moving out of the U.S. have to do with what Trump has done to offshore wind? Is that trade policy? Help us understand why that is happening.
I think it’s not trade policy, per se. Maybe that’s happening on the technology side. But what I’m talking about is money going into infrastructure and assets – for a couple of years, we were one of the hottest places to invest.
Think about a European pension fund who is taking money from a country in Europe and wanting to invest it somewhere they’ll get their money back. That type of capital has definitely been re-evaluating where they’ll put their money, and parallel, some of the larger utility players are starting to re-evaluate or even back out of projects because they’re concerned about questions around large-scale utility solar development, specifically.
Taking a step back to something else you said about federal permitting not being as crucial as state permitting–
That’s about the size of the project. Huge utility projects may still need federal approvals for transmission.
Okay. But when it comes to the trendline on community relations and social conflict, are we seeing renewable energy permitting risk increase in the U.S.? Decrease? Stay the same?
That has less to do with the administration but more of a well-structured fossil fuel campaign. Anti-climate, very dark money. I am not an expert on where the money comes from, but folks have tried to map that out. Now you’re even seeing local communities pass stuff like no energy storage [ordinances].
What’s interesting is that in those communities, we as an industry are not really present providing facts to counter this. That’s very frustrating for folks. We’re seeing these pass and honestly asking, Who was there?
Is the federal permitting freeze impacting investment too?
Definitely.
It’s not like you put money into a project all at once, right? It happens in these chunks. Let’s say there’s 10 steps for investing in a project. A little bit of money at step one, more money at step two, and it gradually gets more until you build the project. The middle area – permitting, getting approval from utilities – is really critical to the investments. So you’re seeing a little bit of a pause in when and how we make investments, because we sometimes don’t know if we’ll make it to, say, step six.
I actually think we’ll see the most impact from this in data center costs.
Can you explain that a bit more for me?
Look at northern Virginia for a second. There wasn’t a lot of new electricity added to that market but you all of the sudden upped demand for electricity by 20 percent. We’re literally seeing today all these utilities putting in rate hikes for consumers because it is literally a supply-demand question. If you can’t build new supply, it's going to be consumers paying for it, and even if you could build a new natural gas plant – at minimum that will happen four-to-six years from now. So over the next four years, we’ll see costs go up.
We’re building projects today that we invested in two years ago. That policy landscape we invested in two years ago hasn’t changed from what we invested into. But the policy landscape then changed dramatically.
If you wipe out half of what was coming in, there’s nothing backfilling that.
Plus more on the week’s biggest renewables fights.
Shelby County, Indiana – A large data center was rejected late Wednesday southeast of Indianapolis, as the takedown of a major Google campus last year continues to reverberate in the area.
Dane County, Wisconsin – Heading northwest, the QTS data center in DeForest we’ve been tracking is broiling into a major conflict, after activists uncovered controversial emails between the village’s president and the company.
White Pine County, Nevada – The Trump administration is finally moving a little bit of renewable energy infrastructure through the permitting process. Or at least, that’s what it looks like.
Mineral County, Nevada – Meanwhile, the BLM actually did approve a solar project on federal lands while we were gone: the Libra energy facility in southwest Nevada.
Hancock County, Ohio – Ohio’s legal system appears friendly for solar development right now, as another utility-scale project’s permits were upheld by the state Supreme Court.