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Ice is melting — but what does that mean for climate science?
As is usually the case, one of the most basic questions in climate science has also been one of the most difficult to answer: How much energy is the Earth sending out into space? The pair of shoebox-sized satellites that comprise PREFIRE — Polar Radiant Energy in the Far-InfraRed Experiment — could very well provide the answer.
Principal investigator Tristan L’Ecuyer, a professor in the Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and the director of the Cooperative Institute for Meteorological Satellite Studies, spoke with Heatmap about PREFIRE. Tentatively scheduled to launch in May, the project stands not only to make future climate models more accurate, but could also help shape a new generation of atmospheric exploration.
The interview has been edited for length and clarity.
Could you tell me a little bit about your research and the work that you do?
A lot of our climate information comes from models — where I come in is trying to make sure that those predictions are rooted in actual observations of our planet. But it’s impossible to cover the whole globe with a temperature sensor or water vapor [sensor] or those sorts of things, so I’ve always focused on using satellite observations, and in particular I’ve been focusing on the exchange of energy.
Basically, what drives the climate is the incoming energy from the sun and how that’s balanced by the thermal energy that the Earth emits. One of the big influencers of that balance are clouds — they reflect the sunlight, but they also have a greenhouse effect of their own; they trap the thermal energy emitted. So I’ve spent most of my career trying to understand the effects of clouds on the climate and how that might change if the climate warms.
And what’s the goal of this particular mission?
One of the fastest changing regions on Earth right now is the polar regions — I think a lot of people are aware of that. Normally, the polar regions are very cold — they reflect a lot of sunlight just because of the ice surface. But as the ice surface melts, the ocean is a lot darker than ice, and so [the poles] can actually absorb more of the solar radiation that’s coming in.
A lot of people say, “Well, okay, but that’s the Arctic. I don’t live there.” But the way the climate works is that in order to create an equilibrium between these really, really cold polar caps and the really, really warm tropics. It’s just like heating the end of a rod — the rod is going to transfer some of the heat from the hot end to the cold end to establish an equilibrium between them. The Earth does the same thing, but the way it does that is through our weather systems. So basically, how cold the polar region is versus the equator is what’s going to govern how severe our weather is in the mid-latitudes.
What we’re trying to do is make measurements of, basically, how that thermal energy is distributed. We just have a lack of understanding right now — or it’s more that the understanding comes from isolated, individual field projects, and what we really want to do is map out the whole Arctic and understand all of the different regions and how it’s changing.
How do you expect your findings to influence our climate models? Or how significantly do you expect them to affect the climate models?
This is quite unusual for a satellite project, we actually have climate modelers as part of our team. There’s the people that take, for example, the Greenland ice sheet, and they model things like the melting of the ice, how heat transports into the ice sheet, how the water once it melts percolates through the ice and then runs off at the bottom of the glacier, or even on top of the glacier. And then I have a general climate modeling group that basically uses climate models to project future climate.
There’s two ways that's going to happen. The first is we’ve developed a tool that allows us to kind of simulate what our satellite would see if it was flying in a climate model as opposed to around the real Earth — we can simulate exactly what the climate model is suggesting the satellite should see. And then of course, we’re making the real observations with the satellite. We can compare the two and evaluate, in today’s climate, how well is that climate model reproducing what the satellites see?
The other way is we’re going to generate models of how much heat comes off of various surfaces — ice surfaces, water surfaces, snow surfaces — and that information can be used to create a new module that goes right into the climate model and improves the way it represents the surface.
So what do these satellites look like and how do they work?
Our satellite is called a CubeSat. It’s not very big at all, maybe a foot wide, a foot-and-a-half or so long. There’s a little aperture, a little hole on the end of the satellite that lets the thermal energy from the Earth go in, and then the the rest of the satellite is basically just this big box that has a radio and a transmitter. In total, I think the whole thing weighs about 15 kilograms.
Because it's relatively small and relatively inexpensive, we're actually able to have two of those instead of just having one, and what that lets us do is put them into different orbits. At some point that will cross and see the same spot on the ground — let’s say somewhere in the center of Greenland — but up to eight or nine hours apart. Let’s say it melts in between, we’ll be able to understand how that melting process affected the heat that was emitted from the surface into the atmosphere.
How big of a deal do you think this is? Or how big of a deal do you think it could be?
There’s more than a couple of aspects to this. To really segue from the last question to this one, the reason [the satellites are] inexpensive, it’s not that they’re low-quality. It’s actually because they’re very uniform sizes and shapes. You can mass produce them. And so it’s that fact, coupled with the fact that we can now do real science on this small platform. We’ve been able to miniaturize the technology. If we can keep demonstrating that these missions are viable and producing realistic science data, this could be the future of the field.
Coming back to the polar climate, we absolutely know that the poles are warming at a very alarming rate. We know that the ice sheets are melting. We know that this has implications for the weather in the lower latitudes where we live, and for sea level. But when you try to predict that 100 years from now, there’s quite a range of different answers, from very catastrophic to still pretty bad. Depending on which of those answers is correct, it really dictates what we need to do today. How quickly do we need to adapt to a rising sea level, or to stronger storms or more frequent storms? After this mission, we will be able to improve the climate models in such a way that we’ll have a narrower range of possibilities.
The other thing that’s exciting is also just the unknown. There’s always new things that you learn by measuring something for the first time. We might learn something about the tropics, we might learn something about the upper atmosphere. There are some people in mountainous areas that are quite interested in the measurements — at the top of mountains, it’s actually quite similar in climate to the Arctic. So I’m also really excited about what happens when the science community in general explores that data for the first time.
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Re-meet the once and future director of the Office of Management and Budget, Russell Vought.
President-elect Donald Trump spent the Friday evening before Thanksgiving filling out nearly the rest of his Cabinet. He plans for his Treasury secretary to be a hedge fund manager who’s called the Inflation Reduction Act “the Doomsday machine for the deficit”; he’s named a vaccine safety skeptic to lead the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; and his pick to head the Department of Labor is a Republican congresswoman who may want to ease the enforcement of child labor rules if confirmed.
And — in one of the most consequential moves yet for America’s standing in the fight to mitigate climate change — Trump also named Russ Vought to lead the Office of Management and Budget. The decision comes as no surprise — Vought served as deputy director of the OMB under Trump in 2018 and took over the top job in 2019, serving until the end of Trump’s first presidency. The strategic communications group Climate Power had been sounding the alarm on his potential return to the office since this spring, which included sharing their research on him with me.
Unlike many Trump administration nominees, who tend to be loyalists with limited experience in the offices they’re appointed to oversee, Vought is noteworthy for having thought long and hard about how to “purge federal agencies of nonpartisan experts” and replace them with “partisan loyalists who would willingly follow any order without question, regardless of whether it was legal, constitutional, or the right thing to do for the people,” Joe Spielberger, the policy counsel at the Project on Government Oversight, an independent and nonpartisan watchdog group, told me when I covered Vought’s agenda earlier this year.
Vought plans to do so mainly by reinstating Schedule F, a job classification that would designate at least 50,000 career civil servants as “at-will” political employees, including climate scientists National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and others who sit on committees like the Clean Air Scientific Advisory. In Vought’s words in his chapter of Project 2025, “the Biden Administration’s climate fanaticism will need a whole-of-government unwinding.” (In a recent conversation with Tucker Carlson, the pair speculated about being able to “fire them all.”) Vought already tried this once, at the end of Trump’s first term, and Biden swiftly reversed it upon taking office.
Beyond gutting America’s scientific corps, possibly for generations, if confirmed, Vought will immediately make his presence in the Trump administration felt, having spent the past few years secretly drafting “hundreds of executive orders, regulations, and memos that would lay the groundwork for rapid action on Trump’s plans,” according to reporting by CNN and based on undercover video released by the Centre for Climate Reporting, which recorded a candid conversation with former OMB director about his plans under false pretenses. “Eighty percent of my time is working on the plans of what’s necessary to take control of these bureaucracies,” Vought told his interviewers. “And we are working doggedly on that,” including by “destroying their agencies’ notion of independence.”
Though Trump (and his campaign) tried to deflect the influence of the Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025 roadmap for his presidency, insisting he is an independent thinker not beholden to anyone, the president-elect’s appointment of Vought and other Project 2025 authors such as Brendan Carr, Tom Homan, and John Ratcliffe to powerful posts in his administration renders those denials specious, to say the least. More crucially, it suggests a certain intellectual deferral to Vought, enthroning him as one of the key architects of Trumpism 2.0. Through his Christian nationalist group, Center for Renewing America, Vought has spread his framework for solidifying executive power (and eliminating its checks and obstacles) throughout Washington’s right-wing intellectual circles, giving him a powerful base of support.
All this from the OMB, though — one of the, let’s face it, more boring offices of government? As Vought knows, however: If you control the budget, then you do everything.
Meet Scott Bessent.
Donald Trump ended weeks of Billions-esque drama on Wall Street and Palm Beach by finally settling late Friday on a nominee for Secretary of the Treasury, hedge fund manager Scott Bessent.
In contrast to the quick and instinctive picks for major posts like secretary of defense, secretary of state, and attorney general (albeit, two picks for that job), Trump deliberated on the Treasury pick, according to reports, cycling through candidates including Bessent, long the frontrunner for the job, his transition chief Howard Lutnick, private equity titan Marc Rowan, and former Federal Reserve Governor Kevin Warsh.
Bessent will almost immediately face a challenge that the markets have been putting towards Trump since even before his election: can he deliver what investors crave (tax cuts. deregulation), while smoothing out volatility and possible inflation stemming from the tariffs and mass deportations that Trump has promised to implement? Investors already have slightly cooled on the Trump trade and expect that the interest rate cuts kicked off in September will slow.
Bessent has long advised Trump on the economy and is not unaware of these challenges, but his way around them is to embrace much of Trump’s existing agenda in what the Wall Street Journal has described as a “3-3-3” plan, where deficits are cut in half to 3% of gross domestic product, growth is kicked up to 3%, and oil production rises by three million barrels a day, a goal that Continental Resources chief executive and informal Trump advisor Harold Hamm has cast doubt on due to geologic constraints.
“Scott has long been a strong advocate of the America First Agenda,” Trump wrote on Truth Social announcing the pick. “Scott will support my Policies that will drive U.S. Competitiveness, and stop unfair Trade Imbalances, work to create an Economy that places Growth at the forefront, especially through our coming World Energy Dominance.”
While energy policy will seemingly be handled by the nominee for Secretary of the Interior Doug Burgum and the newly formed National Energy Council, fiscal policy and tariffs will likely play a major role in determining if Trump’s vision of a more productive and less constrained oil and gas sector can be realized, whether it’s by tariffs possibly leading to increases in the price of steel or possible retaliatory duties on American energy exports. Higher interest rates due to tariffs or an overheated economy could deter investment in energy, renewable or not.
One of the Treasury Department’s most important jobs is managing the nation’s debt profile by deciding what kind of debt to sell in order to meet the government’s immense borrowing needs. Bessent criticized the current Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen in a Wall Street Journal essay for having “distorted Treasury markets by borrowing more than $1 trillion in more-expensive shorter-term debt compared with historical norms.” He suggested that selling more longer-term debt “may increase longer-term interest rates and will need to be deftly handled.” Higher long-term rates are more likely to feed through to a higher cost of capital for investors, which will likely hurt renewable energy developers more than their fossil fuel competitors due to how much of the cost of renewables comes up front.
In another ominous signal for the nascent climate economy, Bessent also suggested to the Financial Times that the Inflation Reduction Act could be one area where cuts to the federal budget could be found, telling the newspaper that it was “the Doomsday machine for the deficit.”
This would be the second time the U.S. has exited the climate treaty — and it’ll happen faster than the first time.
As the annual United Nations climate change conference reaches the end of its scheduled programming, this could represent the last time for at least the next four years that the U.S. will bring a strong delegation with substantial negotiating power to the meetings. That’s because Donald Trump has once again promised to pull the United States out of the Paris Agreement, the international treaty adopted at the same climate conference in 2015, which unites nearly every nation on earth in an effort to limit global warming to “well below” 2 degrees Celsius.
Existentially, we know what this means: The loss of climate leadership and legitimacy in the eyes of other nations, as well as delayed progress on emissions reductions. But tangibly, there’s no precedent for exactly what this looks like when it comes to U.S. participation in future UN climate conferences, a.k.a. COPs, the official venue for negotiation and decision-making related to the agreement. That’s because when Trump withdrew the U.S. from Paris the first time, the agreement’s three year post-implementation waiting period and one-year withdrawal process meant that by the time we were officially out, it was November 2020 and Biden was days away from being declared the winner of that year’s presidential election. That year’s conference was delayed by a year due to the Covid pandemic, by which point Biden had fully recommitted the U.S. to the treaty.
Now that the waiting period no longer applies, the U.S. could exit as soon as January 2026, meaning COP31 would be the first where it’s not party to the agreement. The U.S. could still attend the conference as long as it retains membership in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the body that oversees the meetings, and it could even attend Paris Agreement-related meetings, though for these it would be relegated to “observer status,” with no decision-making power. The U.S. would not be required to submit updated emissions targets and progress reports as prescribed by Paris, and would have much weaker financial commitments to developing countries.
Todd Stern, Obama’s former U.S. climate envoy, told me decisions at COP are essentially made by consensus, meaning that “if you're a player like the U.S., or you're a player like any of the big guys, and you say, We can't do this, that's going to push the negotiation one way or another.” Post-pullout, the U.S. won’t be able to throw that kind of weight around. “But that doesn't necessarily mean, when you get down into the nitty gritty of negotiation, that the people from the U.S. will have views that are uninteresting,” Stern told me, indicating that the American delegation could still make suggestions and share the country’s overall perspective.
Stern noted that after the U.S. announced its first withdrawal from Paris, it kept showing up at COP, with lower-ranking government officials continuing to provide input even as most political appointees stayed home. “The U.S. kept attending and speaking and having ideas because the U.S. team is very skilled. They're smart people who’ve done it a lot,” he told me. Though the delegations Trump sent to COP were notably smaller, less influential, and more fossil fuel-forward than Obama’s and Biden’s representatives, the U.S. kept contributing, even helping to finalize the Paris rulebook in 2018, which codifies detailed guidelines that make the high-level agreement actionable.
Of course the natural next question is, why would Trump pull out again if his first administration seemed to feel that a seat at the table was worthwhile? Beyond the obvious political symbolism around deprioritizing decarbonization, this was something Stern couldn’t quite explain, either. The official statements on COP from that time reiterate that “the United States intends to withdraw from the Paris Agreement as soon as it is eligible to do so,” while also stating that the country “is participating in ongoing negotiations, including those related to the Paris Agreement, in order to ensure a level playing field that benefits and protects U.S. interests.”
Nonsensical as these dual goals may be, this time the U.S. simply won’t have the option to prioritize both — it’s one or the other. But hey, maybe ExxonMobil will get its way and Trump will stay in the agreement after all.