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Trump just quasi-nationalized U.S. Steel. That could help climate policy later.

The government is getting into the steel business. The deal between Japan’s Nippon Steel and U.S. Steel, long held off by the Biden administration due to national security and economic concerns, may finally happen, and the government will have a seat at the table. And some progressives are smarting over the fact that a Republican did it first.
On Friday, Nippon Steel and U.S. Steel announced “that President Trump has approved the Companies’ historic partnership,” which would include $11 billion in new investments and “a Golden Share to be issued to the U.S. Government” as well as “commitments” that include “domestic production” and “trade matters.”
The New York Times reported that this “Golden Share” would give the president, including Trump’s successors, the ability to appoint or veto some of the company’s directors, and require the government to sign off on a wide range of corporate decisions, like moving production overseas or idling or closing plants or the procurement of raw materials.
The Trump administration will likely use its oversight to encourage domestic production of steel, in tandem with its tariffs on steel imports. The unique arrangement “will massively expand access to domestically produced steel,” Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick wrote on X.
While neither the administration nor the two companies involved in the deal have mentioned decarbonizing steel — and in fact existing steel decarbonization programs have floundered in the first months of the Trump’s second term — it is this government oversight of steel production that could, with a different administration, help steer the steel industry into greener pastures.
A future president could wield a golden share to encourage or require the significant capital investments necessary to decarbonize some of U.S. Steel’s production, investments that the Biden administration had trouble catalyzing even with direct government financial support.
And considering that steel makes up for some 7% of global emissions, decarbonization is a necessary — if costly — step to substantially reducing global emissions.
“It’s honestly embarrassing that Republicans beat us to actually implementing a golden share or something like it,” Alex Jacquez, who worked on industrial policy for the National Economic Council in the Biden White House, told me.
When the steel giant Cleveland Cliffs first hinted that it would not go forward with $500 million worth of federal grants to help build a hydrogen-powered mill, it cited “fears that there won’t be buyers for the lower-carbon product,” thanks to a 40% price gap with traditional steel, Ilmi Granoff wrote for Heatmap., This tracked what steel producers and buyers were telling the Biden administration as it tried to convene the industry to see what it needed to go green.
“The largest issue by far in advancing green steel production in the U.S. is demand. It’s still not price competitive and not worth capital investment upgrades, given where the market is right now and without stable demand from customers who are going to pay a premium for the product,” Jacquez said. “There’s no case to make to shareholders for why you’re investing.”
When the Roosevelt Institute looked at barriers to transition to clean steel, specifically a Cleveland-Cliffs project, among familiar community concerns like what it would mean for steel employment, there was “corporate inertia and focus on short-term shareholder value over long-term public value and competitiveness.”
While the Trump administration sees shareholder demands leading to insufficient domestic production of any steel, a future administration could be a counterweight to investors not wanting to make green steel investments.
Shareholder reticence is a “huge obstacle,” one of the report’s authors Isabel Estevez, co-executive director of the industrial policy think tank I3T, told me.
“Of course investors are not going to green light investments that don’t produce the same returns as doing nothing or doing something else would do,” Jacquez said.
And when green steel projects have gotten canceled, in the U.S. and abroad, it’s been dismal shareholder returns that are often the explicit or implicit justification, as well as the high cost of producing green hydrogen necessary to fuel green steel operations. “We are not only pushing the boundaries of what is technologically feasible with this project. We are also currently pushing the boundaries of economic viability. Or, as it stands today: beyond it,” the chief executive of ThyssenKrupp told the North Rhine-Westphalia parliament, according to Hydrogen Insight.
And the resulting Trump administration retrenchment from the Biden administration’s climate policy has made the environment even less friendly for green steel.
Earlier this month Cleveland-Cliffs scrapped the hydrogen-fuel steel project and said instead it would try to extend its existing coal-fueled blast furnace. And the Swedish company SSAB earlier this year withdrew from a prospective project in Mississippi.
Would these outcomes be any different with a “golden share”? When the Roosevelt Institute looked at steel decarbonization even full-on nationalization was considered as one of the “sticks” that could push along decarbonization (many steel companies globally are either state-owned or have some state investment). The golden share, at least as reported, will seem to put the government in the driver’s seat of a major player of the steel industry, while still maintaining its private ownership structure.
“Assuming the nature of the golden share allows the public sector to make certain requirements about the way that profits are used, it could be very valuable for encouraging U.S. Steel to use their profits to make important investments,” Estevez told me.
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A conversation with Rep. Mike Levin of California
It’s crunch time for the Senate’s bipartisan permitting reform and transmission bill. In three days, the bill’s authors plan to put the Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act to a vote on the Senate floor. That means there’s probably only three days to finish up an amendment to the bill that addresses critics’ concerns without toppling the delicate balance the authors initially struck to foster bipartisan support.
BAAJA has major implications for climate policy, as it would make it much easier and cheaper to build high-voltage transmission lines that connect renewable energy from where it is generated to demand centers. It includes ratepayer protection provisions that require data centers to pay all of the costs of upgrading the grid so that they can hook up to it. The bill would also speed up permitting for energy projects of all stripes, from solar farms and geothermal plants to pipelines and liquified natural gas terminals.
The trade-offs, beyond the benefits for fossil fuels, include making it far more difficult — in some cases, potentially impossible — to revoke permits for a project once the federal government has issued them. While this might help solar and wind under Trump or a Trump-like president, critics are worried it will give Trump carte blanche to approve shoddy oil and gas projects with abandon in his remaining two years. The bill also limits public participation in the environmental review process, makes significant changes to landmark environmental laws like the Clean Water Act and the Endangered Species Act, and weakens tribal consultation under the National Historic Preservation Act.
Several Democratic Senators and House members who had yet to comment on the bill came out of the woodwork in the post-midterms glow to share where they stood. Ruben Gallego, the senator from Arizona and likely 2028 presidential candidate, told a Washington Sun reporter that the White House may not be so willing to negotiate six months from now after a possible impeachment. “Or maybe we get too close to an election and Vance doesn't want to negotiate, right?” he said. “So why not take this win now?”
Senator Mark Kelly, of Arizona, on the other hand, said he wants to wait and see if Democrats can get more of their priorities into the bill in the next Congress, according to Politico. That sentiment seems to be growing among Democrats in the House, where minority leader Hakeem Jeffries of New York has come out against the current iteration of the bill. “Leader Jeffries will not rubber-stamp legislation that emerges from the Senate without more constructive involvement with our Caucus as we fight to make life more affordable for the American people,” Jeffries’ spokesperson told Politico.
The political calculus on the bill is in the eye of the beholder. Proponents are sure this is the best chance Democrats are going to get to clear transmission bottlenecks that will open the door to a clean energy future. Skeptics are worried the risks are too great, or otherwise feel it’s worth attempting a better deal in the next Congress when Democrats have more power.
On Thursday, I spoke to Representative Mike Levin from California as he was coming down from the high of his own reelection win on Tuesday night. Levin told me he was decidedly undecided on the bill, and so we talked through how he’s thinking about it.
Let’s start with the big picture. What is your opinion of the legislation as written?
I think a few things. One, having such a huge democratic victory in the House and the Senate changes the dynamics around the deal and really around the negotiations — not just around permitting reform, but all the things that have been punted to the lame duck. I think there’s a list of like a dozen things.
The question is, do we choose to accept the permitting deal in its current construct with whatever technical changes there are in the manager’s amendment? Do we negotiate much broader changes this Congress with the massive vote we received on Monday? Or do we wait until the 120th Congress when Democrats have the pens?
The next thing we're going to learn, after we get the final numbers in the House and Senate, is what does the manager’s amendment actually look like? There’s risks to any of the options here. There are more conversations that our caucus needs to have on permitting in light of Tuesday. We’ve raised specific concerns to our colleagues in the Senate. I know others have as well, and I’m going to be watching closely to see if Martin [Heinrich] and Sheldon [Whitehouse] can address some of these concerns that we’ve raised.
What are your biggest concerns about the bill?
There’s a big picture test that I have, a three-prong test. First: Is it going to actually lower costs? This whole election has been about lowering costs for consumers. Second: Is it going to protect the environment, and specifically, will it promote clean air and clean water that communities need? And then, third: Will it actually do the job on access to clean energy?
And what I would say is: there are some real problems. I have a lot of good things to say about the transmission provisions. A lot of it mirrors what we’ve been working on in the Energy Bills Relief Act for a long time. But I think there are loopholes around project certainty language. I read my friend John Podesta’s phrase of “loaded Howitzer” in Heatmap. I see these loopholes as ripe for corruption and potentially allowing permits for fossil fuel projects, and that’s very concerning.
You have the historic preservation tribal issues, right? My friends in New Mexico have been very loud about that, and other places as well. They’re very unhappy about the [National Historic Preservation Act] process and tribal sovereignty.
And I worry in the context of the whole data center fight that there aren’t enough steps in here to improve transparency for the public through the permitting process. You can’t have projects that are shrouded in secrecy, and you need community engagement to lead to better and more successful projects. So those are a few things, and those are not small things.
What is your sense of the sentiment around the bill in the House in general? Are there House Republicans that are against it? Do you think it could get the votes in the House?
Mike Johnson obviously came out strongly for it, which may not help get House Democrats on board. I have to tell you, the fact that he was so enthusiastically for it — in my view that wasn’t a great tell.
In my own opinion, any bipartisan permitting bill or any bipartisan bill at all is going to require compromise, and we owe the negotiators the room to try to get to a deal to a certain extent. We shouldn’t let the perfect be the enemy of the good. But until we see the final text, it’s tough to take a stance on the bill, and that includes the managers’ amendment. And we need more assurances and progress from the administration than we’re getting.
Time is running out for that, it seems.
Yeah. They still refuse to implement our current laws in good faith, and that doesn’t give me confidence that they’re going to implement any new law in good faith.
The other thing that I don’t think really gets talked about in this context, but I see it as germane — at least in the behavior of the administration — is what happened on the Lindsey Graham sanctions bill. This bill was negotiated by the White House, and there were a lot of Dems that were for it. It was a close vote for me. I voted against because I could not trust the administration to proceed in good faith. I thought Trump would use the tariff authority and the sanctions waiver authority in an unintended way, and that’s exactly what happened. Lindsey Graham would never, in a million years, have been okay with how Trump waived sanctions on Russia using a bill intended to impose sanctions. Just the same, I could see a scenario where, with the permit-certainty language, it is in fact the loaded Howitzer that John Podesta described. That’s my two cents.
Some proponents of the bill have said the midterms are an argument to pass this bill because they showed how much voters care about affordability, and this bill, by their account, is all about affordability, and if newly elected Democrats want to do more on clean energy down the road, this is a prerequisite. What do you make of those arguments?
They want us to get stuff done. There’s no question about that. But I also think that they want us to get things done that actually are reflective of our priorities and our values. And in this case, the three things that I laid out are reflective of those priorities and values. Again, costs, environmental implications, and access to clean energy — and clearly there are big challenges with unintended environmental repercussions.
I found it interesting that in [the Rhodium Group’s] analysis, they basically omit the certainty provision from their analysis of the GHG impact because there’s really no way to know how the administration will interpret and potentially abuse that provision. There’s great potential for abuse with that provision; I think it needs to be reworked. And it’s naive to think all of a sudden that the Trump administration will behave any differently than they have in the first six years of their opportunity to run afoul of bedrock environmental law, kneecap clean energy, and double down on fossil fuels. I would expect more of the same.
The other thing I think is wrong is the presumption that everyone in the clean energy industry is all on board —you're not talking to enough actual project developers who may not be on board.
Do you see a clear pathway to do something like your Energy Bills Relief Act in the next Congress?
There's a tremendous opportunity to do the Energy Bills Relief Act in the next Congress. We obviously have to discuss with all of our many new and unexpected colleagues to get them on board, and we may have to make amendments to the bill as it was constituted in the 119th Congress. But we got 160 on board. We have lots and lots of new people, and we may, after making changes, find ourselves with a really strong number of people in support. And I’m not giving up on the Republicans that are left in the House, some of whom have claimed to be more pro-clean energy. We’ll get there, and in the meantime, there are things we can do right at the beginning around the war and tariffs — maybe around other ideas as Nikki Budzinski and I presented to Leader [Hakeem] Jeffries that I’ll let him run with as we scope out the first 100 hours, 100 days in the year of the new 120th Congress.
If you do have an opportunity to do something like the Energy Bills Relief Act next Congress, how do you get Trump to sign it? Or another permitting bill if this one doesn’t pass?
Well, I guess two ways. One is if you get the majority in the House and you get 60 votes in the Senate, you send it to the president’s desk. And if you were to get two-thirds in both houses, then it’d obviously be veto-proof. I would have thought veto-proof majorities to be incredibly difficult, but then we saw something on Tuesday I didn’t expect. We got 260, perhaps more, in the House, and you need 290 to get your two-thirds. And then in the Senate, we got 56, if we hold in Mississippi and Alaska, meaning you’d need 11 Senate Republicans. And you have a changed national mood, where I think a lot of those Republican senators who will be up for re-election — I'm pretty confident you probably could get four of them, but maybe you could get more, and you could get all the way to 11.
But if you were to send a bill to the president’s desk that, on balance, is positive. The president could do what he did for the Road to Housing Act — neither sign nor veto. He could go that route. So I think it’s a lot more possible now with the majorities that we have. What I don’t think we need to do is just accept that the only option is the current deal, have that pass into law with the downside that there are still some pretty stark environmental rollbacks, and the risk that we don't have any real indications that this administration will faithfully implement the bill.
There are two other options as well: Given what happened in the election, we can make our Senate colleagues come to the table and pass a bill that is more reflective of those things I mentioned — costs, environment, and clean energy.
Or a third option is my friend Jared Huffman, who says, ‘Wait until we retake the majority in January, try to strike a better deal,’ with the risk that Trump is not willing to work with us at all.
Another idea I've heard floated by proponents of the bill is: pass it as is, and if there are things that turn out to be really bad or that you want to change down the line, Congress can come at it again later on. What do you think about that strategy?
That's true. The challenge is how long would that take, and what damage would be done in the interim? If Trump does take the certainty sections and turns it into a free-for-all for fossil, then I think it’s going to be two years of some really bad stuff happening, two years of unintended consequences, and potentially longer than two years if you have a Republican winning the White House in 2028.
We’ve got to be clear-eyed about the deal as it stands. This is not the last time in human history that we will have Congress and the White House negotiating. It’s a great opportunity to try to get something done that will be very meaningful, particularly around the transmission piece. And again, I don’t believe in perfect being the enemy of the good, but I want to make sure that it’s actually good.
Just to make sure I'm 100% clear on where you stand on this right now, it sounds like you're still relatively undecided, given what the bill says at this moment?
I am waiting to take a stance on the bill until I see the final text. I am closely watching the Senate process, and again, I’m judging the bill by those three factors that I mentioned, and I won’t know where I stand until I see the final text. We also have to have family discussions back in Washington D.C. next week. It doesn’t do any good to negotiate with the press before we discuss amongst ourselves. I have seen a lot of my colleagues that are very, very interested in this. They reach out to me, and I give them the best information that I can. I can also tell you that I have tremendous respect for John Podesta’s opinion.
This interview was edited for length and clarity.
Talking with Arnab Pal, the executive director of Deploy Action.
This week’s conversation is with Arnab Pal, executive director of Deploy Action, president of Clean Infrastructure Advisors, and former principal advisor at the Energy Department’s Loan Programs Office under the Biden administration alongside Jigar Shah.
I reached out to Pal for guidance on where he saw state-level policy going around renewables development after the 2026 blue wave election. Simply put, few could’ve provided better guidance. We have no idea what could happen next after an unprecedented election result, but he couldn’t have been more clear-eyed and, as he put it to me, focused on the future. I appreciated our conversation and decided it was worthwhile to provide it to you in full.
The following transcript was lightly edited for clarity.
When it comes to state policy, what opportunities are created by this blue wave election?
I think this opens up a bunch of possibilities but I also think we also need to be very careful in understanding what the election was about in terms of what we focus on in the energy sector. The focus was on affordability. That was the number one message. On electricity, housing, gas.
The problems I see from these wave elections is that somebody wins — a party, an ideology — after campaigning on something and then they govern on something completely different. The message to take away here is, people can’t afford their day-to-day lives. What we’re working on at Deploy Action and other groups focused on electricity and energy, we’re all really focusing on the issue of consumer protection and affordability. We should not try to package in our own individual goals and call it affordability.
One of the starkest results, at least to me, was what happened in states where permitting had been streamlined for renewable energy — Wisconsin, Michigan, New York. The Republicans campaigned against those laws streamlining those permits and lost handily. How do you see these results affecting permitting certainty for renewable energy at the state level in parts of the country?
If it truly addresses affordability, I think permitting is certainly on the table. Especially because governors are going to be judged on what they accomplished and some of these states are going to be having a Democratic governor for the first time in one or two decades. I think they’re going to really hone in on that. And a lot of permitting is state-level. Conversations around federal permitting are often around transmission — a lot of the project-level is at the state level.
But permitting is really only one part of the puzzle. It’s the part everyone likes to focus on because it’s easier to understand. There’s also the market structures of how utilities operate. How they’re incentivized to make money. How they bring on new customers. That’s really going to determine how we bring down bills, or at the very least limit the increases in these bills over the next five or ten years.
Can you give some examples?
So one of the things we focus on [at Deploy Action] is trying to not change the utility business model but alter it to take into account efficiency, especially when it comes to transmission and distribution. Right now utilities’ cap-ex and their ability to earn a return on that is building transmission and distribution lines. In some places it’s generation too. What we’re saying is, we need to create an incentive structure where they’re first incentivized to use existing lines, so as you bring more customers online it reduces the need for new infrastructure per customer which will ultimately bring down costs for everyone.
The perfect example here, and another policy example here, is data centers. It’s completely understandable why they ran against them and why the public is not a fan. But there’s a way to do data centers intelligently in a way to reduce people’s bills. The way to do that is not these monstrosities but smaller data centers that can be coupled with battery storage and renewables instead of gas and diesel. These smaller ones can be used as their own distribution resource which allows you to bring on new paying customers without building more lines. These are things we’ve been working on in Virginia, in California to a lesser extent and in Pennsylvania, and the election opens up the possibility to do more of this work.
How do these state-level data center moratoria affect renewable energy development?
It depends.
I think there’s a very nuanced and smart compromise to be had. These new governors need to consider that instead of an outright ban there needs to be an understanding there are data centers of a certain size that can actually be beneficial to ratepayers and done without using massive amounts of water and renewables. The moratoria needs to turn into policy. The way to get a policy in place that’ll help people every day with their lives and their bills while actually preventing some of the harms people are thinking about with data centers is to set that size limit.
Do these pauses affect transmission development?
It shouldn’t theoretically. I think the argument that would come up though is people would say big data centers would mean more demand for more transmission. And yes, we want more demand growth but you want to build more transmission to bring down costs. You don’t want to build more transmission just to build more transmission.
What do you think is the biggest challenge this election result poses for renewable energy?
Focus.
Here’s the thing: It’s a new election. People will have tons of ideas. The renewables’ best argument is we are the cheapest solution and oftentimes the fastest solution. If what you’re trying to do is bring on new demand, whether it’s for EVs or for certain types of data centers, and then at the least cost supply for that demand.
There’s a lot of things we can focus on with renewables but if we stick to the purpose of this being to bring down people’s bills and create a steady grid for everyone then, well, the opportunities are strong and will be available to us in the industry.
Evidence suggests data center concerns probably didn’t actually flip many votes.
This week’s midterm elections were undeniably horrible for the data center industry. But a closer look indicates dominant media narratives about the impact of AI infrastructure on voting behavior also deserve more scrutiny.
On election night, candidates who railed against data center sprawl during their campaigns won across the country, including statewide races in red areas. The most striking example was Gina Hinojosa, now governor-elect for the data center-centric state of Texas, who ran on instituting a complete pause on projects across the Lone Star State. So striking was her win, it sent AI and data center stocks into freefall. Cleanview, a clean energy news and data site, said Hinojosa’s pause, if put into effect, could affect up to 88.4 gigawatts of “planned” data center development, depending on how it's implemented.
It’s true data centers were this year’s election boogeyman. However, a deeper dive into the results we have thus far tells us crucial nuance is necessary in the discourse about the midterms and the impacts data centers had on voting behavior.
Two important questions must be asked. First, did data centers play a key role in the 2026 midterm elections? Yes — and no.
One can easily make the case that data centers were instrumental to Democrats winning big because, by and large, they chose data centers as a go-to punching bag in attack ads against Republican candidates. Analysis ahead of Election Day by Tech Oversight Project — an outfit run by former Democratic staffers — found 136 federal and gubernatorial races used “tech accountability messaging in paid media,” including 74% of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee’s target seats to flip for House control. Much of this advertising focused on tying GOP lawmakers to data centers, whether by connecting the GOP’s recent tax cuts bill to lower taxes on data centers or alleging Republicans held stocks in, or took donations from, data center developers.
This echoes Heatmap Pro’s most recent polling, which shows that Americans say the tech industry has a uniquely firm hold over the Trump administration. When asked if large technology companies have more influence over the government than other large industries, like finance and oil and gas, 64% of Americans said yes.

It’s certainly true Democrats capitalized on public opinion souring on data centers with ads that sought to tie GOP candidates to the unpopular industry. Some of these ads focused solely on data centers, like this ad against Republican Representative Brad Finstad in Minnesota, whose district included the controversial Google data center project in Pine Island I’ve previously reported on. Finstad’s likely to lose his seat; his Democratic opponent, Jake Johnson, has claimed victory, but the race is likely to go to a recount. Democrats also ran data center-only ads in Wisconsin’s 3rd Congressional District, a community already angry about transmission lines that then voted for Democrat Rebecca Cooke to replace Republican incumbentDerrick Van Orden. And Democrats used this strategy in ads in Montana’s 1st Congressional District, which is now controlled by a Democrat, as well as in South Carolina’s 1st, which is now also blue.
However, there is also evidence that data centers did not decide key statewide races. David Crowley, a Democrat who was perceived as weaker on this issue, won the Wisconsin gubernatorial race by eight points, in keeping with the state’s leftward swing. The same is true for Byron Donalds, a Republican who overcame data center attacks to become Florida’s first Black governor.
This brings us to the second key question: Did data center development in local communities flip any votes? We have no way of knowing for sure, because data centers are unpopular across party lines and there’s evidence at least some voters saw opposing a data center as compatible with voting for their preferred political party because other issues also matter to them.
There is a crucial difference between data centers being unpopular and local data center development affecting how people vote for higher office. We see this in the midterms data, as communities actively fighting data centers in their backyards continued to vote Republican like before. I’d also note this data has significant limitations, as it’s challenging to separate a community getting bluer from the relevance or use of political attacks tied to data centers.
At most, where movement was registered, these sorts of towns, cities, and counties moved in line with the national partisan swing toward Democrats.
We can see this dynamic playing out in Ohio, where voters across the state weighed in on 21 ballot initiatives about data center development. In all cases, these ballot initiatives were either approved or rejected in order to block development — i.e., the data centers lost all of them. However, when you drill down to the precinct-level data, communities simultaneously voted against their local data center while continuing to support the Republican in higher office. Perhaps some folks split their tickets; others decidedly did not.
Take Conneaut, the northernmost city in Ohio, located in Ashtabula County on the rim of Lake Erie, which overwhelmingly voted to institute a moratorium on large data centers within city limits. Some precincts voted for Democrat Amy Acton to be governor, while others went overwhelmingly for Vivek Ramaswamy, the Republican candidate. Two-thirds of them also voted yes on the moratorium. (Precinct-level data here for transparency!)
The state’s 21 ballot initiatives were the project of Conserve Ohio, a new grassroots organization founded explicitly to advocate against data center development from an apolitical perspective. Austin Baurichter, one of the organization’s founders, told me at least 65% of the volunteers with his organization have been “historical Republicans” and “historical Trumpers,” and he acknowledged there is potential this issue has “moved people around politically."
Baurichter said he has no proof yet whether any of the ballot initiatives led communities that were once Republican to turn blue. He was open to the idea that may have happened somewhere in the state. But he also bristled at the suggestion, because what he’s seeing on the ground is what Heatmap polling also shows: Republicans are upset at data centers, and those feelings are apolitical and nonpartisan.
“The fact there was a blue wave indicates that people did something different at the polls, but I frame it less as a switching of parties and more as an abandoning of the two-party system,” he told me. “These efforts to understand are well expended. But I think a lot is up in the air.”