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What happens when Stanford tackles sustainability.

Backed by a whopping $1.69 billion endowment, Stanford’s Doerr School of Sustainability — its first new school in more than 70 years — opened its doors two years ago, and what else came along with it but a new sustainability-focused accelerator specifically for the Stanford community. Seeking to move research out of the lab and into the real world, the Sustainability Accelerator provides early stage funding and a deep network of university-affiliated support to its grantees.
Now that the accelerator has staffed up, gathered insights from its first funding cohort, and given more structure to what is still a very flexibly organized program, I wanted to know more.
The basic concept sounded very Stanford-y indeed — gobs of money, a hugely valuable network, entrepreneurial vibes out the wazoo. But that’s nothing new. When I was at Stanford as an undergrad over a decade ago, The New Yorker’s Nicholas Thompson, now the CEO of the Atlantic (and a fellow Stanford alumnus), quipped that the school had come to resemble “a giant tech incubator with a football team.” This was in the early days of Snapchat and around the time when over a dozen computer science students dropped out to work on the Venmo-wannabe Clinkle, which went up in smoke soon after. Concerns about the university’s deep ties to Silicon Valley and the preponderance of potentially pointless startups coming out of it coexisted with plaudits poured on alumni founders with started-in-a-garage-now-we’re-here type stories.
I thought it was all a bit much. But now there’s a sustainability accelerator, and man, does that sound like something we could all get behind. So I talked with the accelerator’s faculty director, Yi Cui, and managing director, Jeff Brown, about the accelerator’s goals, what sets it apart from the infinite other funding avenues in Silicon Valley, and how they go about deciding what concepts have the potential for widespread adoption, either in the commercial or the policy space.
Brown himself is a Stanford alum with a deep background as a Silicon Valley engineer and founder — in other words, he can talk the talk as well as he walks the walk. Prior to his current role at the sustainability accelerator, he was founder and CEO of Novvi, which makes plant-based oils for use in the lubricants industry. He told me that one of the primary elements that sets Stanford’s accelerator apart from other incubators or venture capital funds is that it’s not just focused on technical solutions to climate and sustainability problems.
“There’s a lot of challenges beyond technology,” Brown told me. “This is market development, this is frameworks that need to be globally aligned, this is policy that leads to new legislation in a global scenario. And so at the accelerator, we’re thinking about these things at that scale, and working in a very interdisciplinary manner across all those spaces.”
Thirty-one projects were selected to join the accelerator’s initial cohort in the summer of 2022, their teams generally comprised of researchers with deep subject area expertise — mostly professors partnering with other professors, faculty members or postdocs. Topics spanned the gamut from highly technical ideas like electrifying steam cracking reactors for industrial chemical production to policy projects such as reforming California’s approach to wildfire management or partnering with stakeholders to support the energy transition in Southeast Asia.
“We are interested in water, food. We are interested in climate adaptation,” Cui, a Stanford professor in both the Materials Science & Engineering department as well as the Energy Science & Engineering Department, told me. “We are also interested in new approaches that could be highly scalable for sustainability — for example, synthetic biology.” He also cited grid decarbonization and industrial decarbonization as focus areas.
And yet Brown also told me it’s vital that all teams, even policy-focused ones, demonstrate that they have potential backers outside the Stanford bubble. For legislative solutions, “you have to go out into the community and find that people agree and are willing to adopt that and move forward with you.” And for technical solutions, Brown said, “you've got to show that customers are willing to receive it, and there are other funding sources that buy into that, as you're going to need increasing capital to scale.”
For the accelerator’s first cohort, projects were organized into one of three categories based on their level of maturity — planning, mid-range, and large-scale, which dictated the amount of funding they were eligible to receive. Brown didn’t want to disclose how much money Stanford is pouring into these projects (although he did say they have a “large budget” to work with) but a 2022 request for proposals indicates that Level 1 projects could secure up to $100,000, Level 2 up to $400,000, and Level 3 up to $1,000,000. It also noted that project teams can specify their own timelines, ranging from three months up to a year, with the option for follow-on funding based on a project’s progress.
Going forward, cohorts will be organized around particular climate themes, a.k.a. “flagship destinations,” which will include key metrics for scalability and speed. The first focus area for the 2024 group is greenhouse gas removal, for which 16 projects were chosen based on their potential to remove a gigaton (that’s a billion tons, folks) of greenhouse gas from the atmosphere by 2050, either by technical or policy means. Examples include transforming rocks and mining waste into efficient CO2 sponges, and developing a monitoring, reporting, and verification framework for ocean-based carbon removal.
Brown emphasized the importance of MRV particularly, the Achilles’ heel of many well-intentioned carbon removal efforts. Reforestation, for example, “is not a technology problem,” he told me. “It's a framework problem around the MRV challenge, and getting the legislation in place, and getting community alignment around the world on how to execute this properly.”
Some in the Stanford community worry, however, that the choice of greenhouse gas removal as a focus area was influenced by the university’s fossil fuel connections, as big oil and gas companies often tout carbon capture as a solution that would allow them to continue producing fossil fuels. The Doerr School does accept research funding from fossil fuel companies, and three years ago, Stanford’s Precourt Institute for Energy collaborated with Shell, ExxonMobil, and TotalEnergies to host a workshop on carbon management. The Doerr School itself cited the meeting as one of two events that led to the focus on greenhouse gas removal.
Cui, though, has downplayed the meeting’s influence on the accelerator. In an interview with the Stanford Daily, he said that “greenhouse gas removal has always been incredibly important to everybody. It’s not because of the workshop.” It’s one of a few key climate solutions he always brings up in his talks, he added. “So it wasn’t hard at all to get to the point and say this should be the first flagship destination.”
In an effort to build the right internal partnerships, the accelerator is launching a postdoc fellowship program, in which entrepreneurial fellows will team up with faculty members to work on projects that align with flagship destinations. The inaugural class should be announced by the end of July. Cui told me the accelerator staff is also contemplating an entrepreneur-in-residence type of program and finding ways to deepen connections with the Stanford Graduate School of Business, which has already partnered with the Doerr School for its ecopreneurship programs.
The point, of course, is to leverage the full weight of the Stanford network, giving project teams access to the entrepreneurial expertise of Silicon Valley as well as the interdisciplinary skillset among the university’s different schools and departments. It’s a much higher-touch experience than teams would get at other incubators or accelerators, Cui told me.
“We actually build an ecosystem,” he explained. “We provide coaching if it [a project] needs coaching. If it needs outside partners and connections, we build that in, we help the team to do that. And if the team doesn't have an entrepreneur type of person, we might hire a person to work with the team.”
And given the university’s reputation as, well, a tech incubator with a (now bad, I hear) football team, Cui stressed that there’s a surprising amount of promising research that never sees the light of day. “There are many technologies, many solutions actually developed in Stanford faculty’s lab — they don't come out, you're not even aware of them,” he told me. But their potential in the sustainability space could be huge, Cui said. “The accelerator’s function is super important to further grow and amplify the entrepreneurial spirit on Stanford campus, and also orient the faculty into working on scalable ideas.”
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‘When China wants to do something, boy, they move fast.’
The electrolyzer has come a long way in the nearly 250 years since a pair of Dutch scientists first used electricity to split water into hydrogen and oxygen. Over the decades, European and American scientists refined and commercialized this technology, yet it is China that now accounts for nearly 70% of global electrolyzer manufacturing capacity, churning out the machines that make clean hydrogen from water at a fraction of Western costs. Its factories are building far more equipment than its domestic hydrogen market can absorb, and exports are climbing. On paper, China looks poised to dominate the global electrolyzer and green hydrogen markets, much as it already has solar panels and batteries.
“It stands to reason that the Chinese would want to capture the market just like they did everything else,” Rinaldo Brutoco, a hydrogen investor and founder of the think tank World Business Academy, told me. Beijing’s latest Five-Year Plan certainly lends credence to that ambition, repeatedly calling for the development of green hydrogen, hydrogen-derived fuels, and electrolyzers, even as other nations lag behind their once-ambitious clean hydrogen targets.
But it’s not actually obvious that the technology will go the way of solar. For one, Western governments are increasingly wary of dependence on Chinese energy technologies and are trying to bolster domestic manufacturing and limit foreign competition through measures like tariffs, domestic-content bonuses, and subsidy eligibility restrictions. The West also specializes in its own electrolyzer tech, which relies on proton exchange membranes. Though more expensive than China’s typical alkaline electrolyzers, PEM systems pair better with intermittent renewable power.
China’s tech is improving, though, and its electrolyzer stacks — the pile of cells where water splits into hydrogen and oxygen — cost about 60% less than Western alternatives. But the stack only accounts for about 6% to 9% of the total levelised cost of clean hydrogen production; most of the expense comes from electrical and process equipment, labor, and, most importantly, clean electricity. That single-digit cost advantage may not be enough to sway foreign buyers, especially since some cheaper designs come with trade-offs in efficiency, lifecycle, and warranty coverage.
“When the project as a whole is considered, there’s a lot less deviation between the Chinese technology and the rest of the world’s,” Thomas Koller, regional hydrogen lead at the Norwegian energy and maritime consultancy DNV, told me. But China is working on that, he added. “They’re very competitive already on the stack. But now they know that they also want to be competitive on how that stack can integrate with the wider electrolyzer system.”
Cracking that system-level cost issue could bring China much closer to achieving global market dominance. DNV calculates that to meet the Paris Agreement’s targets, clean hydrogen would need to supply around 15% of global energy demand by 2050 — and the production equipment and resultant clean molecules would have to come from somewhere.
In the meantime, however, the analysts I spoke with agreed that China’s domestic green hydrogen market is positioned for a near-term boom, as the government pushes adoption across fertilizer, chemicals, oil refining, steel, and transportation. “Demand is really the key takeaway that I see from this new Five-Year Plan — shifting from production to thinking about demand,” Koller told me.
And while the plan was pretty much complete before the Iran war broke out, the ongoing disruption in the Strait of Hormuz has underscored the logic behind China’s hydrogen push, as the country previously relied on the Strait for up to half of its crude oil imports. “It’s placed them in a pretty good position — in respect of hydrogen at least — to try and strengthen one of these areas that can reduce dependence on imported oil,” Koller said of the Five-Year Plan.
China is already the world’s largest hydrogen producer and consumer by a wide margin, using the gas as a key industrial feedstock for its vast chemicals and heavy industry sectors. But today, the industry makes nearly all of that hydrogen with fossil fuels.
Beijing made clear in its latest Five-Year Plan, released in March, that it wants to change that. According to an unofficial translation, the state promised to “expand applications of hydrogen energy in transportation, electricity, industrial, and other domains,” while improving “renewable energy hydrogen production equipment” and advancing “the hydrogen energy industry chain toward green ammonia, methanol, and sustainable aviation fuels.” (China has not published an official English translation of the plan.)
The country certainly has the manufacturing capacity to support these ambitions. After hundreds of manufacturers poured into the electrolyzer industry earlier this decade, China now produces about 35 gigawatts worth of this equipment annually, compared with less than 2 gigawatts of domestic demand. The resulting glut has even led some producers to sell their equipment below cost, echoing the dynamics of the solar industry in the early 2010s. Now, Beijing is trying to build a green hydrogen market to soak up the surplus, elevating production of the fuel — and derivatives like ammonia, methanol, and SAF — to a national priority.
“They’re talking about nationwide pipelines for hydrogen. They’re talking about a regionalized cluster strategy; they have very hard targets for green hydrogen sales,” Brutoco told me.
China is targeting 2 million metric tons of renewable hydrogen production annually by 2030, an eightfold increase from roughly 0.25 million metric tons today. The government has also designated five city clusters as green hydrogen demonstration zones, each eligible for up to about $240 million over four years to scale up the fuel’s use across sectors including transportation, metallurgy, and green ammonia and methanol production — and to build the pipelines required to move it.
“Hydrogen has clearly moved up in political visibility,” Qi Qin, a China analyst at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, told me back in March.
All of this stands in stark contrast to Western markets, where low-carbon hydrogen projects continue to be delayed or scrapped amid weak demand and waning political support. Clean hydrogen is still far more expensive than its fossil fuel-based counterpart; buyers remain reluctant to pay a green premium, and policy uncertainty over the past few years has clouded the industry outlook. In the U.S., the rollback of Inflation Reduction Act incentives has weakened the economic case for green hydrogen, while in Europe, delays to regulatory decisions and missed deadlines for implementing hydrogen mandates have added to the uncertainty.
“Many companies were really thinking that the hydrogen economy was going to take off, and in the end, this has not been the case,” Anne-Sophie Corbeau, a researcher at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, told me. “The cost of the whole electrolyzer system is actually much higher than what we thought at the beginning.” That, combined with advances in batteries and other electrification technologies like industrial heat pumps, has arguably narrowed the range of applications where green hydrogen makes sense.
But perhaps the problem is simply a failure of imagination. After all, no country has yet demonstrated what a scaled-up clean hydrogen industry could look like, either physically or economically. The next few years, however, could offer a decent preview.
“When China wants to do something, boy, they move fast,” Brutoco told me. And there’s no doubt Beijing wants to capitalize on its burgeoning hydrogen economy. “They need more export markets because their housing boom — which busted — ain’t coming back in the near future,” he argued, explaining that new export opportunities could help revive Beijing’s sluggish economy. He sees electrolyzers and hydrogen as “low-hanging fruit,” given the country’s existing domestic buildout.
As for the argument that cheap Chinese electrolyzer stacks do comparably little to reduce the overall installed cost of a clean hydrogen project, Brutoco doesn’t buy it. He doubts developers would forgo potential savings — and the additional revenue that could generate — simply to align themselves with their administration’s protectionist preferences. “Did you ever know a business person that would like to shave 5% to 10%?” he asked.
Then there’s the question of performance. China’s alkaline electrolyzers have historically been slower to ramp up and down in tandem with variable renewable power compared with PEM systems. But Brutoco argues that today’s improving alkaline tech is more than capable of serving utility-scale renewable projects in areas with relatively consistent sun or wind. Koller likewise sees Chinese alkaline manufacturers as credible contenders for a range of overseas projects.
“I would expect that all of the European projects that are electrolyzer-driven, they will be considering Chinese electrolyzers, among others,” he told me. The case could prove even stronger elsewhere in the APAC region, including India, Japan, South Korea, and Australia. “All of the projects that I can recall having seen for Asia Pacific [...] at least some Chinese technology has been considered.”
But since Amy Ouyang, a senior hydrogen associate at the Clean Air Task Force, has been tracking the industry, she told me that “the narrative has shifted.” Just three years ago, many analysts expected Chinese electrolyzers to follow the trajectory of solar panels, with rock-bottom prices eventually squeezing Western manufacturers out of the market. But today’s more protectionist trade environment has made her reconsider that assumption.
“Maybe in the 2010s, the European countries and the U.S. were not really prepared to say, ‘We’re going to turn away Chinese solar panels just because they’re made in China,’” she told me. But Washington in particular has soured on its earlier laissez-faire approach to trade, perhaps regretting that while the U.S. and allied nations pioneered technologies such as solar cells and lithium-ion batteries, China ultimately scaled them — capturing millions of manufacturing jobs in the process.
Energy shocks from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to the Iran war have further pushed Western policymakers toward a focus on domestic manufacturing, energy security, and even food security, Corbeau, the Columbia researcher, told me, given that about a third of globally traded fertilizer passes through the Strait of Hormuz. Now, she said, more countries are likely thinking, “What if we use our hydro, geothermal, maybe cheap renewables, in order to produce hydrogen domestically and produce ammonia domestically and produce fertilizer domestically?”
It all adds up to an environment where Ouyang sees “a lot more willingness to protect their own domestic industries from the low price of the Chinese electrolyzers,” she said.
The problem is, there simply isn’t much of a Western clean hydrogen industry to actually protect right now. Spurring demand will require political will and economic incentives to persuade hydrogen end users to make deals and help the nascent industry move down the cost curve. But with wholesale electricity prices rising and the Trump administration dismantling renewable energy legislation, the U.S. in particular looks unlikely to invest in much manufacturing capacity anytime soon.
But if the West does decide to double down, it might be better off conceding the price war from the outset. “A Western electrolyzer stack would probably struggle to match China’s lowest bid on an electrolyzer stack,” Koller explained, advising against trying to replicate China’s commodity-scale manufacturing model. “I would see their stronger position being if they can demonstrate different performance, different integration, offer a different type of service, an improved lifecycle emissions statement.”
That is, the answer probably isn’t to beat China at its own game. The U.S. and Europe might never win on cost, but that doesn’t mean they can’t build and scale a superior technology before yet another industry slips out of their reach.
Only upgrades for pre-existing wind projects have been approved.
In September, the Trump administration told a reporter that the president directed the Pentagon to finally process wind projects through routine airspace approvals as required under a court order. By doing this, it created the appearance of real headway and good faith in talks with Democrats in Congress on energy permitting legislation before the November midterm elections.
But the White House’s assurances are not what they seem.
All of the projects the administration has reportedly advanced over the past week are repowerings, meaning they’re only upgrades of existing projects, and two of the “projects” they’ve advanced were just two individual turbines, the American Clean Power Association on Tuesday told members involved in litigation with the administration.
Over the course of his presidency, the president’s team has turned what was once a sleepy bureaucratic check for radar or flight interference into a weapon against wind energy in the United States. You need Federal Aviation Administration clearance for any structure above 200 feet in the air and that process includes a Pentagon review. By claiming wind projects suddenly needed new scrutiny for national security reasons, the Pentagon held up FAA airspace approvals for apparently hundreds of projects.
This has been a key part of bipartisan energy legislation talks back in D.C., as Democrats in Congress have demanded at least some semblance of regular order be returned to renewable energy in federal permitting. The permitting bill ostensibly has ways to strengthen wind companies’ hand in dealing with a hostile Trump administration but negotiators, including Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse, have also previously called attacks on wind projects during negotiations harmful to a final deal becoming law.
In September, Politico reported Trump told his aides he would agree to direct the Defense Department to “start clearing its queue of long-delayed onshore wind projects to strike a deal” citing “two people familiar with the talks and granted anonymity.” Among the commitments Politico reported were made: to approve about 30 projects awaiting a countersignature from the Pentagon on a mitigation agreement related to airspace impacts.
In federal court, the renewable energy trade groups who brought the lawsuit clearly don’t think the Trump administration actually followed through with that promise.
On Oct. 20, after updates from the Justice Department showed little signs of progress (which I wrote about), the trade groups filed a motion to enforce the judge’s stay on their air clearance freeze, saying that very little had advanced since the ruling in early August, and that none of the 30 projects awaiting countersignature on their mitigation agreements actually had advanced from Pentagon review. In addition, they said the government was now asking project developers to sign onto a litany of new requirements in exchange for a sign-off on mitigation agreements. They submitted a joint declaration from subject matter experts, including from former military personnel, who described these requirements as a vast departure from precedent with little basis in security rationale that they said also had terms that could violate state or local laws, like a blanket prohibition on aircraft detection light systems. (You can read the declaration here.)
Two days later, on Oct. 22, it started to look like we were getting somewhere when news outlets reported the Trump administration was "advancing" two “wind projects” in South Dakota and Maine, citing statements from the White House and the Pentagon.
Bob Ditchey, a spokesperson for the Pentagon, told us in an email that the two “wind projects” were Crowned Ridge, which he said consisted of 87 turbines in “Grant, SD,” and “Blue Sky/Hill,” which he said was made up of 19 turbines in “Hancock, ME.” Ditchey described them both as “proposed” wind energy “developments.”
“Following rigorous evaluation of potential impacts on military readiness, radar installations, and airspace operations, the DoW has cleared both projects to proceed to the next phase of federal evaluation,” Ditchey said in an email. “The projects have been formally referred to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for final aeronautical study and determination.”
The South Dakota wind project Trump officials are referencing is likely NextEra’s Crowned Ridge wind farm, which has 87 turbines and has been operational since 2019. On Oct. 5 a NextEra project consultant submitted a litany of height clearance requests for a “repowering project” on behalf of Crowned Ridge Energy Center, LLC, according to the Federal Aviation Administration’s public database. The requests are for turbines in Grant County.
There is no Maine wind project with the name “Blue Sky/Hill,” as far as we can tell, but there is a project in Hancock County that was completed in 2012 called “Bull Hill” that consists of 19 turbines, and which also has pending applications for repowering in the FAA’s database.
Neither NextEra nor Bull Hill’s developer, TerraForm Power, responded to our requests for comment. The Pentagon also did not respond to questions about these projects or the additional ones it said it had advanced.
In addition, as of this story’s publication, all of the air clearance requests for these two projects are all listed as “pending” online.
If you’re wondering why operational wind farms might need air clearances for construction, all of the wind farms’ requests describe the projects as “repowering,” an industry term that applies to upgrading, modifying, altering or restarting pre-existing wind farms. A repowering can mean anything from fixing turbine blades to changing turbine height, or moving a turbine, or commissioning new turbines entirely. Crucially though it’s not really considered a “new wind farm” in the colloquial sense. As my colleague Matthew Zeitlin has explained, repowerings are seen by the energy sector as a simple pathway to the most juice for the squeeze from what has already been permitted and built.
On Tuesday, Punchbowl News reported that the White House was advancing three more wind projects in Illinois and Iowa. After this story ran, American Clean Power told members involved in the airspace litigation clarifying that all of the projects thus far are “repowerings” and that the two Illinois “projects” each were only individual wind turbines. None of the projects were new utility scale projects.
On Wednesday, just before this story went to press, Punchbowl News reported another two wind projects were advancing, calling it “more permitting goodwill from the White House.” We have not yet been able to confirm what these projects are or whether they are also repowering projects.
American Clean Power endorsed the bipartisan Senate permitting bill and called for its passage. The group provided a comment from Frank Macchiarola, their chief advocacy officer: “To date, the administration has moved forward only a handful of the total number of projects they agreed to approve. In order to pass BAAJA and bring down costs for Americans, the Administration needs to get serious about building clean power.”
The White House did not respond to a request for comment.
Current conditions: For the first time, Miami’s king tide — a periodic exceptionally high tide brought by on astronomical alignment — crossed the threshold for “major” flooding without a hurricane, notching the highest level in 11 years • America’s Northern Mariana Islands are hunkering down as Typhoon In-Fa is set to brush past its northern reaches • India has evacuated tens of thousands from its eastern coast as Tropical Cyclone Arnab makes landfall.

Israelis voted in record numbers Tuesday in the first election held since the October 2023 attacks by Hamas, which ignited the ongoing multifront conflict been Israel and militias in Gaza and southern Lebanon. While Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s conservative Likud party looked projected to win the most seats in the Knesset, the opposition coalition led by centrist former military chief of staff Gadi Eisenkot appeared positioned as of Wednesday morning New York time to form an alliance that holds at least 61 of the parliament’s 120 seats — if anyone can broker a governing bloc at all. What that means for energy and climate policy in the Jewish State remains even less clear than what kind of government may form out of the election results. Eisenkot ran on cost of living, democracy, and holding Netanyahu accountable for the October 7 disaster. In 2021, he became chairman of StorageDrop, a long-duration energy storage startup based just south of Tel Aviv. At the time, he said dealing with climate change and creating green alternatives to fossil fuels was “of great importance,” and that Israel should “be at the forefront of the global effort in this field.”
Netanyahu has also supported renewables, which grew to 16% of Israel’s electricity share last year. In May, his government set a target of a more than threefold increase in renewables in the next decade. Just last week, as you may recall, the Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure put out a new plan to invest more into fusion. But his signature policy has been brokering an historic $35 million deal to drill gas offshore in the Mediterranean to sell the fuel to Egypt. While Israel has pledged to cut its economy-wide emissions 27% below 2015 levels, the State Comptroller, an independent watchdog within the government, warned in June that the country’s failure to pass a law enforcing the reductions meant it had, according to The Jerusalem Post, “still not built a functioning national system to prepare for climate change.”
President Donald Trump plans to loosen a Biden-era regulation requiring oil and gas drillers to cut emissions of methane. Speaking at a campaign rally for Texas Republican Senate hopeful Ken Paxton, Trump said he’s “officially terminating Biden’s expensive and unnecessary methane regulations to save consumers and energy producers $45 billion in costs.” The move aims to spur more gas production at a moment when, as we saw from the megamerger this week set to create the nation’s biggest gas producer, the industry is consolidating. But it comes as methane emissions in the U.S. oil and gas sector are actually flattening, despite growing production. Earlier this month, as I reported, a study by Johns Hopkins University found that “companies have built more infrastructure needed to better capture methane” and “transport it for sale as a fuel, providing a financial incentive to limit the amount escaping into the atmosphere.” But the researchers cautioned that “oil and gas production is still a large percentage of U.S. methane emissions, and we do not find any evidence that a flurry of federal legislation had an impact on emissions.”
Meanwhile, the former Biden senior climate advisor, John Podesta, has warned that passing the permitting reform bill as is could hand Trump “a loaded Howitzer,” my colleague Jael Holzman reported yesterday.
If you can’t buy an as-yet-unbuilt small modular reactor, you go for an existing large-scale technology like the Westinghouse AP1000 or the Canadian CANDU. If you can’t line up the financing for a whole new nuclear megaproject, you squeeze a little more juice out of the reactors you already have. That’s why Amazon and Google inked deals earlier this month with Constellation, the nation’s largest operator of nuclear plants, which estimates it can generate nearly 1.1 gigawatts of new power simply from “uprating” its existing plants. At the time, I called it “big tech’s nuclear hedge.” The Department of Energy is backing the bet. On Tuesday, the Office of Energy Dominance Financing announced a $5 billion loan to support the uprates. “These investments will add more reliable baseload power to the grid, help lower electricity costs, strengthen our nation’s energy security, and fuel long-term American prosperity,” EDF Director Gregory Beard said in a statement.
The U.S. is on track to rise from about 101 gigawatts of nuclear today to 111 gigawatts in 2040 and 132 gigawatts in 2050, according to Wood Mackenzie forecasts. Behind-the-meter plants, particularly for data centers, could add another 11 gigawatts in 2040 and 19 gigawatts in 2050. “If the US government, under the current administration or another pro-nuclear administration in the future, wants to accelerate the pace of that growth, building capacity in the workforce and supply chain should be an urgent priority,” Ed Crooks, Wood Mackenize’s vice chair of the Americas, wrote in a blog post.
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Trump’s deal to import Russian diesel has largely been discussed for its for its potential to ease prices on the global market. But 140,000 metric tons of Russian fuel is now headed for the U.S. market. The fuel will arrive in three tankers, including one blacklisted by U.S. authorities and another by the European Union, according to the Financial Times. The shipments are the first licensed by the U.S. since Trump’s recent deal with President Vladimir Putin to exempt Russian diesel from sanctions. The goal is to achieve a perceptible reduction in costs ahead of next week’s midterm election, in which energy prices have been a major factor.
Insurance is often described as the canary in the coal mine for climate change as the industry is expected to raise prices on assets increasingly under threat from extreme weather. But the analysts tasked with assessing risk are facing pressure to downplay climate dangers in their models to help cut the price of coverage and make it easier for brokers and underwriters to sell more policies. That’s according to five whistleblowers’ testimony to the Financial Times. The United Kingdom’s Financial Conduct Authority told the newspaper the allegations were “exceptionally serious” and could amount to significant breaches of financial and prudential regulation. “Every single person I work with all say the same thing — that we shouldn’t be altering the numbers for these accounts in the way we do,” one whistleblower said.
The deadliest conflict of the 21st century is restarting in Ethiopia’s war-torn north. But in the country’s fast-industrialized capital, business is booming. Addis Ababa’s “Made in Ethiopia” initiative has spurred a manufacturing boom of 1,115 factories. As of last year, TOYO, a major U.S.-Japanese solar manufacturer, has capacity to produce 2 gigawatts of solar cells at its Ethiopian factory. Officially inaugurated last year, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam added more than 5 gigawatts of power to the grid. A new International Energy Agency report highlights how far the country has come — and how far it has yet to go. Just 12% of the country had electricity access in the early 2000s. By 2024, that figure hit 35%. But around 85 million Ethiopians remain without steady access to power. The country has a target of 75% access by 2030 and universal access by 2035. That, the IEA said, “will require continued grid expansion, greater deployment of off-grid solutions, and measures to make connections more affordable.”