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In second grade, I dressed up as Rachel Carson for a school project on heroes. My mom, a flight attendant, had petitioned me to be Amelia Earhart, but as an aspiring veterinarian/zookeeper, all it took was learning that Carson had saved the bald eagles!!! for me to make up my mind.
In truth, Amelia Earhart never stood a chance. Environmentalism was everywhere in the 1990s and early 2000s when I was growing up. I became obsessed with endangered animals after learning about them on the back of Welch jam jars; I stuffed a World Wildlife Fund-branded leopard plushie during a birthday party at Build-a-Bear and adopted an Orca for Christmas; and during a fifth-grade unit on the tropical rainforest, I was outraged to learn that bad guys were cutting it down.
Concerns about nature and conservation were my primary entry points into the climate movement when I got older, though at a certain point, I stopped openly calling myself “an environmentalist.” It wasn’t really a conscious choice.
But in setting out this week to write about how the original Earth Day movement — which, at its inception in 1970, involved one in 10 Americans — dwindled into what it is today, a corporate greenwashing bonanza, I now believe my abandonment of the “environmentalist” label is indicative of something more significant, a shift in the movement’s public identity. Earth Day and by extension, environmentalism, used to be cool, as Liza Featherstone reminded readers in The New Republic last year; the movement, for a time, occupied a sweet spot of being both “radical and mainstream.” But somewhere along the line, environmentalism lost its edge.
Many autopsies have been conducted on the modern environmental movement, some more literal than others. It’s easy to forget now, though, that environmentalism was once very much alive. Silent Spring, published in 1962, helped heighten Americans’ awareness of environmental issues (in addition to work by other oft-overlooked grassroots activists); an oil spill off Santa Barbara, California, in 1969, subsequently helped galvanize them. In the aftermath, Wisconsin Democratic Senator Gaylord Nelson organized nationwide “teach-ins” about environmental issues, picking the date of April 22, 1970, when college students would be on spring break. By the time the first Earth Day arrived, though, some 20 million Americans showed up for events and marches around the country, helping make it the biggest single-day protest in human history.
What followed was the golden age of environmentalism. “In May 1971, fully a quarter of the public thought that protecting the environment was important,” up from a mere 1% two years earlier, the Environmental Protection Agency’s website recounts. The EPA itself was created out of that momentum; Congress also passed the Clean Water Act, the Endangered Species Act, and the lesser-known Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act — a Carson throwback that regulated pesticides. Sierra Club and Greenpeace memberships skyrocketed.
The momentum carried into the 1980s: victims of industrial pollution successfully lobbied Congress to pass the Superfund law to clean up toxic sites; the “Save the Whales” campaign achieved a global moratorium on commercial whaling; and in 1988, NASA scientist Dr. James Hansen warned Congress that it was “99% certain that the [planet’s] warming trend was not a natural variation but was caused by a buildup of carbon dioxide and other artificial gases in the atmosphere.”
By then, though, industry, business, and conservative politicians had begun to mobilize a quiet counterattack. In the provocative 2004 essay “The Death of Environmentalism,” Breakthrough Institute founders Michael Shellenberger and Ted Nordhaus cite a market research survey that found the number of Americans who agreed with the statement “we must accept higher levels of pollution in the future [in order to preserve jobs]” increased from 17% in 1996 to 26% in 2000, while the number of Americans who believed “most of the people actively involved in environmental groups are extremists, not reasonable people,” increased from 32% to 41% over the same years.
Meanwhile, the environmental movement was undertaking a long overdue self-examination. “When the Sierra Club polled its members, in 1972, on whether the club should ‘concern itself with the conservation problems of such special groups as the urban poor and ethnic minorities,’ 40% of respondents were strongly opposed, and only 15% were supportive,” The New Yorker writes in a history of the racist roots of the environmental movement (which, it should be noted, go back further and deeper than the original Earth Day). By the 1990s, activists were calling out the fact that minorities made up less than 2% of the combined employees at the top environmental groups in the country. Modern environmentalism has never managed to fully shake the ensuing criticism that it is a white person’s cause.
The narrowness of the environmental movement’s vision also hindered its ability to adapt to the new political landscape. Adam Werbach, an ex-president of the Sierra Club, wrote in his own 2004 postmortem of the movement that while it was perhaps necessary to “package seal pups, redwoods, clean air, Yosemite, clean water, and toxic waste under the brand of ‘environmentalism’ in order to pass a raft of environmental laws in the 1970s,” for “at least 20 years and maybe longer, the basic categorical assumptions that underlie environmentalism have inhibited the environmental movement’s ability to consider opportunities outside environmental boundaries.” Jenny Price, the author of Stop Saving the Planet: An Environmentalist Manifesto, expressed a similar sentiment more recently to Grist: “The environment is not just ‘out there,’” she explained, even though environmentalism has often treated the natural world as a separate “thing” that needs to be saved. Environmentalism is also, though, “our food, the wood in our houses, and the metals in our computers.”
But the real reason environmentalism lost its edge might be that it actually became too mainstream. In the late 1960s, almost no one thought protecting the environment was important; today, nearly three-quarters of Americans say they worry about the environment and four in 10 say they are environmentalists. Businesses jostle to be labeled the “greenest” and “most sustainable”; oil companies brazenly attempt to brand themselves as good for the Earth. Even former President Donald Trump has nonsensically insisted on the 2024 campaign trail that he is an environmentalist.
At the same time, environmentalism is no longer centralized enough to notch policy wins, and professed commitment to the cause flags when it becomes inconvenient or costly; it is human consumption, after all, that is “the primary driver of environmental problems,” as Magali A. Delmas and David Colgan write in The Green Bundle: Pairing the Market with the Planet. Many environmentalists are fair-weather fans; concern about the environment tends to go up when concerns about the economy go down, and vice versa; support wanes once Americans are asked to burden the cost. Still, environmentalism’s core ideas — that our surroundings matter and need protection — have become entrenched cultural values, even if only in spirit.
At the same time, a breakaway wing of the environmental movement has begun pushing back on the more traditional and conservationist faction. In an essay that begins with the words “I’m an environmentalist,” Bill McKibben recently argued in Mother Jones for building out “lots of solar panels and wind farms and battery arrays,” even if and when it requires “aesthetic” intrusions into the natural world. Longtime Sierra Club member and author Rebecca Solnit has also made a surprising, and similar, argument in favor of mining lithium and cobalt, which “will be an inevitable part of building renewables.” Yes, mining will have an environmental cost, but it’s one that realistically “needs to be weighed against the far more devastating impact of mining for and burning fossil fuel.”
This is not yet a mainstream viewpoint, though. Four in every five Americans say conserving local land and wildlife is more important than building new sources of renewable electricity, even if that means slowing down the world’s response to climate change, a Heatmap Climate Poll found.
It’s ironic that the environmental movement might have been so successful that it sometimes blocks the action required to save the places it professes to love. Admittedly, the new branch isn’t likely to inspire first graders to dress up as wind turbines for class projects, and solar farms aren’t likely to have branded partnerships with teddy-bear-making workshops.
But it’s new. It’s bold. It’s exciting. You might even call it edgy.
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Here’s what stood out to former agency staffers.
The Department of Energy unveiled a long-awaited internal reorganization of the agency on Thursday, implementing sweeping changes that Secretary of Energy Chris Wright pitched as “aligning its operations to restore commonsense to energy policy, lower costs for American families and businesses.”
The two-paragraph press release, which linked to a PDF of the new organizational chart, offered little insight into what the changes mean. Indeed, two sources familiar with the rollout told me the agency hadn’t even held a town hall to explain the overhaul to staffers until sometime Friday. (Both sources spoke on condition of anonymity out of fear of reprisals.)
After conversations with multiple former agency staffers, including a senior political appointee who helped lead the Biden-era reorganization in 2022, here’s what stood out to me:
The spring 2022 overhaul Jennifer Granholm, former President Joe Biden’s secretary of energy, oversaw came with a detailed legal memo and extensive explanations about what the changes would mean.
“Overall, this seems sloppy,” the former senior staffer who led that process told me this morning. “If you’re trying to carry out a very coherent energy dominance strategy, you’d at least explain which boxes are moving where and what’s sitting under those boxes.”
Announcing the changes with so little detail, the former official said, “seems like a fundamental lack of leadership.”
“This, to me, just seems reckless,” the appointee continued. “People who are sitting within these offices don’t know where they’re going to work virtually on Monday.”
That, of course, may change by the end of today once the Energy Department holds its town hall meeting.
It’s unusual for an office at the agency to report directly to the secretary. Those that do typically straddle multiple types of responsibilities within the agency. For example, the Office of Technology Transitions reported directly to Granholm under the Biden administration because its purview fell under both research and deployment. The Office of Policy functions similarly. But the newly-created Office of Critical Minerals and Energy Innovation absorbed not only various mining-related sections of the agency, but also the now-defunct Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy. That puts a lot of money and grant-making powers under the new office.
Leading the Office of Critical Minerals and Energy Innovation will be Audrey Robertson, who was confirmed last month as the assistant secretary for the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy. A former investment banker and oil executive, Robertson served on the board of directors of Wright’s former company, the fracking giant Liberty Energy, until earlier this year. Another agency source familiar with the organization said “it makes no sense for this office not to answer to an undersecretary of energy.”
“Audrey is Wright’s person,” the source told me.
That, the other former agency official told me, creates some political liabilities for Wright.
“For departmental oversight reasons, that’s a lot of grant-making money and authorities that typically you’d want to layer under additional oversight before it goes to the secretary,” the ex-official said. “This is the thing that sticks out like a sore thumb.”
All that said about the new Office of Critical Minerals and Energy Innovation, no one can blame Wright for wanting to consolidate some of the bureaucracy. One way to read the decision to eliminate certain offices, such as the Office of Manufacturing and Energy Supply Chains or the Office of State and Community Energy Programs, is that the new administration wanted to undo the changes made under its predecessor in 2022. While manufacturing work included a lot of what the U.S. is doing with batteries, funding for that work fell under the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy in the 2021 Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act.
“A lot of the moves that they’re doing to re-consolidate offices aligns with what was technically under the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, which directed battery work to go through EERE,” one of the sources told me. “So some of this is realignment back to the original congressional direction.”
The stop-gap funding bill that reopened the government after the longest shutdown in history included a measure to prevent any dismissals until January 30.
But it’s unclear whether the agency plans to terminate workers as part of the reorganization starting in February.
In a sign that the Trump administration is taking efforts to commercialize fusion energy technology more seriously, the reorganization gives fusion its own office, moving the work out of the Office of Science.
“Overall this is a win for the private-fusion sector, and further cements a move from a discovery-based research model to milestone-driven, commercialization-focused policy,” Stuart Allen, the chief executive of the investment company FusionX Group, wrote in a post on LinkedIn. “All signs point to a federal strategy increasingly aligned and enmeshed with the rapid advancement of fusion energy.”
Under the new structure, geothermal and fossil fuels will live together under the new Hydrocarbons and Geothermal Energy Office.
There are some obvious synergies. The new generation of geothermal startups racing toward commercialization rely on drilling techniques such as fracking to tap into hot rocks in places that conventional companies couldn’t. Oil and gas companies are excited about the industry; Sage Geosystems, one of the big players, is led by the former head of Shell’s fracking division. And notably, most of the big companies, including Sage, Fervo Energy, and XGS Energy (whom I have written about twice recently in these pages) are all headquartered in Big Oil’s capital of Houston, Texas.
Nuclear power has long had its own office at the Energy Department, and that won’t change. But you’d think that the other source of clean baseload power that the Trump administration has anointed as one of its preferred generating sources might get slotted in with geothermal. Instead, however, hydropower is in Robertson’s mega-office.
Unsurprisingly, the bulk of the Energy Department’s work that deals with the nation’s nuclear arsenal was largely left untouched by the changes. Perhaps the agency had enough drama from the Department of Government Efficiency’s dismissals of critical workers in the early days of the administration, which led to an embarrassing effort to reverse the firings.
As was widely expected, the reorg killed the Biden-era Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations, which the new administration had already gutted. What becomes of key programs that office managed is still a mystery. Chief among them: the hydrogen hubs.
The Energy Department yanked funding for the two regional hubs on the West Coast last month, as Heatmap’s Emily Pontecorovo reported at the time. A leaked list that the administration has yet to confirm as real proposed defunding all seven of the hubs. It’s unclear whether that may happen. If it doesn’t, it’s unclear where those billions of dollars may go. The most obvious place is under Robertson’s portfolio, ballooning the budget under her control by billions.
When Wright announced the first totally new loan issued under the agency’s in-house lender earlier this week, he trumpeted his new approach the Loan Programs Office. He wanted to refashion the entity with its lending authority of nearly $400 billion as a source of funding primarily for the nuclear industry. The first big loan issued Tuesday afternoon went to utility giant Constellation to finance the restart of the functional reactor at the Three Mile Island nuclear station. But at a press conference last month, Wright hinted at the new branding, as Emily called in this piece. It’s now the Office of Energy Dominance Financing.
The new office isn’t just the LPO, however. The $2.5 billion Transmission Facility Financing Program will also fall under the new so-called EDF — an acronym it will aptly share with France’s biggest utility, which came under state control recently as part of Paris’ efforts to refurbish and expand the country’s vast nuclear fleet.
I’ll leave it to my source to level a critique at my colleagues in this industry:
“Even in The New York Times today there’s an article that says all these offices are eliminated,” one of the sources told me. “Their names were eliminated, but a lot of the projects for whatever remains that they haven’t terminated are just being reassigned.” The Wall Street Journal had a similar angle.
The actual thing to watch for, the source said, was how job descriptions change.
“What’s going to be more telling is when they have a new, updated mission of the Office of Electricity or a new, updated mission of the Office of Critical Minerals and Energy Innovation.”
The United Nations climate conference wants you to think it’s getting real. It’s not total B.S.
How to transition away from fossil fuels. How to measure adaptation. How to confront the gap between national climate plans and the Paris Agreement goals. How to mine critical minerals sustainably and fairly.
How to get things done — not just whether they should get done — was front and center at this year’s United Nations climate conference, a marked shift from the annual event’s proclivity for making broad promises to wrestling with some of the tougher realities of keeping global warming in check.
Friday is the last official day of the two-week gathering known as COP30, taking place on the edge of the Amazon rainforest in Belém, Brazil, although probably not the actual end of it. Despite early assurances from the Brazilian government that this year’s conference would finish on time, delegates are still hashing out a final decision text and are likely to keep at it until at least Saturday.
The Brazilian leadership and other COP veterans have framed this as an “implementation COP,” where parties to the Paris Agreement “move from pledges to action” and similar clichès. It’s certainly not the first time these words have been used at COP. The Paris Agreement itself was billed as “enhancing the implementation” of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the foundational treaty underlying these annual negotiations.
“Action” may be a stretch to describe what ultimately happened this year. As is the case at every COP, the provision of finance, or lack thereof, from developed to developing countries dominated the discussion, preventing progress on other agenda items. “Climate finance just remains this ongoing obstacle,” Rachel Cleetus, a senior policy director for the Union of Concerned Scientists, told me. Global south countries and small island states argue they simply cannot increase their ambition, or work on adaptation, without finance. The conference’s repeated failure to come to terms with that is probably the biggest counterpoint to the idea that these meetings have become more grounded in reality.
It remains to be seen which, if any, of the efforts to work out the details of the transition will make it into the final agreement, but the success of these annual gatherings should not only be measured by what’s in the text.
Here are three key ways Belém has already pushed the conversation forward.
During a speech at the start of the conference, Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva proclaimed that it is “impossible to discuss the energy transition without talking about critical minerals, essential to make batteries, solar panels, and energy systems.”
Never before had the negotiations broached the subject of all of the industrial earth-moving implicit in the fight against climate change. By the end of the first week, however, one of the working groups had released a draft text that acknowledged “the social and environmental risks associated with” extracting and processing critical minerals.
A later revision of the document added a note about “enabling fair access to opportunities and fair distribution of benefits of value addition,” a reference to breaking the pattern of rich countries extracting minerals cheaply from the Global South while keeping the more profitable processing and manufacturing of those minerals at home. (As of Friday morning, however, references to “critical minerals” were erased from the text.)
The text was released by the Just Transition Work Program, a newer workstream at the conference that was established at COP27 in Egypt. Outside of the critical minerals note, there was a larger push to get Just Transition program as a whole more grounded in reality. This area of the negotiations focuses on ensuring the goals of the Paris Agreement are achieved fairly and equitably, with recognition that the transition will happen at a different pace in different countries, with different implications for each one’s economy. It was primarily established as a forum for countries to exchange ideas and information, with biannual meetings.
At COP30, however, the G77, China, and many global south countries began pushing to turn it into more of an action-oriented group that guides the global transition and tracks progress using agreed-upon metrics.
The Just Transition mechanism is not to be confused with the much-talked-about roadmap to transition away from fossil fuels, although the two are closely tied.
Two years ago, the final agreement at COP28 in Dubai made history with the first-ever call for “transitioning away from fossil fuels in energy systems, in a just, orderly and equitable manner.” Last year, however, that edict was dropped, as negotiations over a new climate finance target took precedence. Now it’s been revived, with robust support from countries to build on the statement with a more fleshed-out plan. Phasing out fossil fuels has vastly different implications for different countries, some of whose economies are deeply dependent on revenue from their fossil resources. The roadmap would start to work through what it would really mean to coordinate the effort.
Once again, the message came from the top. “We need roadmaps that will enable humankind, in a fair and planned manner, to overcome its dependence on fossil fuels, halt and reverse deforestation, and mobilize resources to achieve these goals,” Brazil’s Silva said in a speech at the opening of the conference.
This past Tuesday, a coalition of a whopping 82 countries came out in support of this planning effort, pressing for it to be included in the final decision text. “This is a global coalition, with global north and global south countries coming together and saying with one voice: this is an issue which cannot be swept under the carpet,” Ed Miliband, the UK’s energy secretary, said during a press conference that day.
Several more countries have joined since, bringing the count to 88 — nearly half of the 195 parties to the Paris Agreement. The biggest fossil fuel emitters, such as China, India, and Saudi Arabia, are not on board, however. As of Friday morning, all mentions of fossil fuels, let alone a roadmap, have been scrubbed from the draft decision text. Still, the huge coalition backing the roadmap is a sign of a growing and potentially powerful consensus.
One of the big questions looming over this year’s conference was whether and how countries would address their utter failure to live up to the Paris Agreement’s goal to keep warming “well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels,” let alone the more ambitious target of 1.5 degrees.
A report issued by the United Nations Environment Program just before the talks began concluded that countries’ latest climate pledges, known as their “nationally determined contributions,” or NDCs, would put the planet on a path to warm at least 2.3 degrees by the end of the century. It also stated definitively that global average temperatures would exceed 1.5 degrees of warming.
This wasn’t news — scientists have previously concluded that exceeding 1.5 degrees is basically guaranteed. “But this is the first time we saw it so bluntly in the UN report,” Cleetus told me. “So that was a pretty sobering backdrop coming into this COP.”
All countries were supposed to submit updated NDCs this year that contained targets for 2035, but more than 70 have failed to do so, including India, one of the world’s biggest emitters.
Island states, backed by Latin American nations and the EU, wanted the conference to make some kind of declaration that countries’ current pledges are not sufficient and should be revised. The draft text issued this morning, while acknowledging the insufficiencies of NDCs, does not spell out the implications or required response as bluntly as many want to see.
It does, however, introduce an important new concept that could become a key part of the negotiations in the future. For the first time, the text references a resolve to “limit both the magnitude and duration of any temperature overshoot.” This not only acknowledges that it’s possible to bring temperatures back down after warming surpasses 1.5 degrees, but that the level at which temperatures peak, and the length of time we remain at that peak before the world begins to cool, are just as important. The statement implies the need for a much larger conversation about carbon removal that has been nearly absent from the annual COPs, but which scientists say that countries must have if they are serious about the Paris Agreement goals.
"If countries (or the UNFCCC) want to keep talking about reaching 1.5C, they need to embrace net-negative emissions, moving even beyond net-zero,” Oliver Geden, a senior fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, and an IPCC report author, told me. “If they don't want to do this, then talking about reaching 1.5°C is not credible anymore.”
Things in Sulphur Springs are getting weird.
Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton is trying to pressure a company into breaking a legal agreement for land conservation so a giant data center can be built on the property.
The Lone Star town of Sulphur Springs really wants to welcome data center developer MSB Global, striking a deal this year to bring several data centers with on-site power to the community. The influx of money to the community would be massive: the town would get at least $100 million in annual tax revenue, nearly three times its annual budget. Except there’s a big problem: The project site is on land gifted by a former coal mining company to Sulphur Springs expressly on the condition that it not be used for future energy generation. Part of the reason for this was that the lands were contaminated as a former mine site, and it was expected this property would turn into something like a housing development or public works project.
The mining company, Luminant, went bankrupt, resurfaced as a diversified energy company, and was acquired by power giant Vistra, which is refusing to budge on the terms of the land agreement. After sitting on Luminant’s land for years expecting it to be used for its intended purposes, the data center project’s sudden arrival appears to have really bothered Vistra, and with construction already underway, the company has gone as far as to send the town and the company a cease and desist.
This led Sulphur Springs to sue Vistra. According to a bevy of legal documents posted online by Jamie Mitchell, an activist fighting the data center, Sulphur Springs alleges that the terms of the agreement are void “for public policy,” claiming that land restrictions interfering with a municipality’s ability to provide “essential services” are invalid under prior court precedent in Texas. The lawsuit also claims that by holding the land for its own use, Vistra is violating state antitrust law by creating an “energy monopoly.” The energy company filed its own counterclaims, explicitly saying in a filing that Sulphur Springs was part of crafting this agreement and that “a deal is a deal.”
That’s where things get weird, because now Texas is investigating Luminant over the “energy monopoly” claim raised by the town. It’s hard not to see this as a pressure tactic to get the data center constructed.
In an amicus brief filed to the state court and posted online, Paxton’s office backs up the town’s claim that the land agreement against energy development violates the state’s antitrust law, the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act, contesting that the “at-issue restriction appears to be perpetual” and therefore illegally anti-competitive. The brief also urges the court not to dismiss the case before the state completes its investigation, which will undoubtedly lead to the release of numerous internal corporate documents.
“Sulphur Springs has alleged a pattern of restricting land with the potential for energy generation, with the effect of harming competition for energy generation generally, which would necessarily have the impact of increasing costs for both Sulphur Springs and Texas consumers generally,” the filing states. “Evaluating the competitive effects of Luminant’s deed restrictions as well as the harm to Texans generally is a fact-intensive matter that will require extensive discovery.”
The Texas attorney general’s office did not respond to multiple requests for comment on the matter. It’s worth noting that Paxton has officially entered the Republican Senate primary, challenging sitting U.S. Senator John Cornyn. Contrary to his position in this case, Paxton has positioned himself as a Big Tech antagonist and fought the state public utilities commission in pursuit of releasing data on the crypto mining industry’s energy use.