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A podcast by GBH News reporter Ian Coss gives this notorious project a long-overdue reappraisal. Bonus: The show comes with lessons for climate infrastructure projects of the future.
If you’ve lived in Massachusetts at any point in the last 50 years, you’ve heard of the Big Dig. It’s infamous — a tunnel project that was supposed to bury an elevated highway in Boston to the tune of $2 billion that eventually ballooned in cost to $15 billion and took a quarter of a century to finish.
The Big Dig was more than just a highway project, though. It was a monumental effort that Ian Coss, a reporter at GBH News, calls a “renovation of downtown Boston.” The project built tunnels and bridges, yes, but it also created parks, public spaces, and mass transit options that transformed the city. In a nine-episode podcast series appropriately called The Big Dig, Coss dives into the long, complicated history of the project, making a case for why the Big Dig was so much more than the boondoggle people think it was.
I talked to Coss about how the Big Dig came to be and the lessons we can learn from it as we continue to adapt our built environment to a changing climate. Our interview has been edited for length and clarity.
I moved to Boston for college in 2010, and I remember going to the North End and being struck by how beautiful it was. I didn’t realize how recently that view had changed until I listened to your podcast — I mean, the Big Dig had only wrapped up a few years earlier.
It’s easy to forget how quickly it transformed. I grew up in Massachusetts, so when I would come into the city I would see [the Big Dig] being built — I have vague memories of the elevated artery. And when I moved to Boston Proper in 2013, which was less than a decade after the project wrapped, it was stunning for me to be like, “oh, this is what that project was,” because I definitely didn’t understand it at the time.
What made you decide to create an entire podcast about this “renovation” of Boston?
I think part of it was this disconnect where I grew up hearing about the Big Dig and mostly hearing bad things about it — it was behind schedule, it was a disaster, a boondoggle, etc. — because that really was the reputation of the project, nationally and locally. And then moving to the city and seeing the fruits of it, it was hard to reconcile those things. Like, this “disaster” created a greenway through the middle of the city. Now you can actually get to the airport.
What was driving that narrative of its being a disaster?
The Big Dig went on a very long emotional journey. It started as this kind of visionary, idealistic project championed by activists and supported by politicians of both parties. And then, after navigating the process of funding, permitting, contracting, managing, and designing, by the time it's in construction, it really is not a source of pride.
There are a number of technical things about the Big Dig that could have been done better, and we can learn lessons from it. The way it was contracted could have been done better. The management structure could have been done better. There were flaws in the design, including a fatal flaw that cost the life of a driver in the tunnel.
I think a lot of it is about the storytelling. Just to give one example, so much of the negative narrative around the Big Dig was around the cost. You often hear about how it started with an estimated cost of $2 billion and wound up costing $15 billion. But I think that narrative misses a few things.
One is that it was never going to cost $2 billion. That was not a realistic estimate. But in our country, it is so hard to get approval, political support, funding, and permitting in place that there is a very strong incentive all throughout the process to downplay the costs, downplay the risks, downplay the disruption, make it sound like this is going to be quick and easy and painless and cheap, just to get to the starting line. Because the paradox of it is that if we had known in 1983 or 1987 or 1991 that this was going to be a $15 billion project, it would have never happened. And yet, in hindsight, there are many smart people who told me that this project was a bargain at $15 billion because of what we got in terms of economic benefits, transportation improvements, and environmental improvements.
There’s almost an element of asking for forgiveness rather than permission here, but that forgiveness is inevitably laced with anger because of those expectations.
Right. If only it were just forgiveness.
The Big Dig had its roots in the National Highway Program. Were all those projects going constantly over budget?
There’s a great paper that I cite in episode four where the authors studied the cost of highway building per mile every year from the 1970s through the 1990s, and it’s actually a great sample set because we’ve built so many highways of different sizes in different states. Basically, what they found is that highway costs per mile really ramp up significantly in the 1970s. And that’s, of course, the period when the [Big Dig] was first getting conceived.
So the short answer to your question is, it was cheaper once. But there were other costs, in that those early highways in the ‘50s and ‘60s largely did not consider the impact on communities or on the environment. They did not make a lot of mitigation efforts to minimize the day to day disruption caused by those projects. So I think part of what the Big Dig captures is this really historic change in the way we build things in this country that was ushered in by the anti-highway movements, by citizen activism, and by the National Environmental Policy Act. Over the course of the 1970s we made it much harder to build things, for very good reasons.
I think the Big Dig — which some people describe as the last great project of the interstate era — captures an attempt to do a massive, ambitious infrastructure project that is also loaded with environmental mitigation and also has a robust community process. Part of what we learned through that is that you can have a project that’s cheap and efficient, you can have a project that’s democratic and humane, but it’s tough to have it all. And the Big Dig was trying to have it all, and we did get it all, but at enormous cost. That was the thing that could never be solved.
You make a connection between the Big Dig and climate change right from the first episode. What are the climate lessons we can learn from the Big Dig?
In some ways, it’s ironic to hold up the Big Dig as a case study for climate change because it’s a highway project. My point is not that the Big Dig is, like, the future of infrastructure. But what it offers is a recent case study on a massively ambitious building project. We have some distance, and you can see the whole arc of it, but it very much lives within our era. It’s not the Hoover Dam or the Golden Gate Bridge or any of those other big projects built in a different time under different conditions.
The way I see it is that in order to mitigate or prevent the worst effects of climate change — and you can feel free to disagree with me — we’re going to need to build a lot of stuff. This is not a problem that we’re going to solve by riding bicycles and growing vegetables in the backyard, both of which I do and hope everyone does. And of course, those projects might look different than the Big Dig because building a wind turbine isn’t exactly analogous to building a downtown tunnel. But I think there are relevant analogies, especially things like coastal mitigation in cities, improving mass transit, building high energy transmission lines — these large scale projects that will affect people but also are an important public good.
You talked on the show about the Big Dig as an attempt to make this process more democratic at some level. People on both sides had very strong feelings about it. This reminded me of the NIMBY/YIMBY dichotomy of climate projects. Did anyone mention any best practices that could be applied to future projects of this kind?
I’ve talked with Fred Salvucci [former Massachusetts Secretary of Transportation and driving force of the Big Dig] about this. He mentioned this biblical parable — he’s full of parables — about Jesus walking across the water and then turning to his disciples and telling them to follow. But they step into the water and fall right in, and when they get back out they say it’s impossible. And then Jesus says, “It’s easy to walk across the water. You just have to know where the stones are.”
And Fred said the lesson there is that, in order to navigate this kind of process, you have to know where the flashpoints are, what the issues will be. That way you can anticipate them rather than just going in and saying “this is my project, I’m going to do it this way and you can fight me on it.”
Part of what I think is really interesting about this, which I think speaks to present-day projects like offshore wind, is that in that fight, you have very well-intentioned actors who are trying to make the project better and using the environmental process to do that. And you also have bad actors who are weaponizing and manipulating the environmental process to their own personal ends. And those two things get all mixed up.
You know, I’m an environmentalist. I believe in environmental review. I don’t want to sit here and say that we need to get rid of all environmental permitting because it makes it too hard to build things. But I think it’s also important to recognize that these things can be weaponized.
Scheme Z, which proposed this big spiral loop of ramps and a bridge over the river, is a good example. Politically, that became very messy — they were trying to impose concentrated harm in the name of a public good. And I know, strategically, maybe there are things [Salvucci] could have done to mitigate that or circumvent that, but given the structures in place, the logical outcome is that it spends a decade in lawsuits and review committees and you wind up with something that’s okay, that everyone can live with.
The funny thing about that is that it turned into the Zakim Bridge, which is now a Boston icon.
Right. I mean, that’s part of the communication piece, too.
I was biking under the Zakim bridge the other day, and I biked through where there’s a nice pedestrian and bicycle bridge and this skate park that is always filled with people. Truly, that is maybe the best utilized public space created by the Big Dig.
It’s easy for me to play Monday morning quarterback and say “oh, you should have communicated that better, you should have told the story better.” I mean, he was saying all the right things. But then all you had to say on the other side was “it’s 18 lanes and five ramps,” and that sounded terrible and looked terrible on the page. And I mean, sure, I wish there weren’t all those ramps there, but like you said, ironically, the bridge became an icon of the city.
I think a big part of the lesson for me is how hard it is to build infrastructure democratically because the timescales are all wrong. These things have short-term costs and cause short-term disruption and bring very long-term benefits.
I was constantly struck by this issue of scale, both in terms of time and money. It’s hard to wrap your head around the idea of billions of dollars and projects that span decades. These are just things that are impossible for any regular person to really plan out.
I was talking to someone who said that their dad was in his 70s when the Big Dig was just getting started. And for him, it was like, “my city’s going to be torn up for the rest of my life,” right? That’s what this project meant for him — he would live with this mess of a project and never see the results. And he had to deal with that so that you could move to Boston in 2010 and never know the city another way. The cost of that benefit is borne by another generation.
And it’s the same thing with climate change. It moves on a scale that is so much longer than politics. The Big Dig took almost 40 years from conception to completion. So if you’re thinking about political capital, if you’re thinking about two- and four-year election cycles, it’s very, very hard to conceive, plan, and deliver a project on that kind of time scale.
The benefits and costs are almost inverted in climate change, in a way. We’re talking about future benefits, yes, but we’re also talking about future costs if we don’t do anything. But it’s so hard to make people think in a 40- or 50-year timescale.
If the Big Dig was so hard to make happen politically with what I think was a more genial political environment overall, it feels kind of impossible to think of building anything on that scale right now.
I gave a talk at City Hall a few weeks ago and I was talking with some of the young planners there, people who are in their 30s. Some of them have been listening to the series, and they told me they could not imagine what it would be like to get that kind of federal funding out of Washington, get all the local players on board, get it through the permitting process, and get it contracted. Because right now if they try to take away one parking spot and put in one bike line, they’re bogged down in meetings for a year.
I think climate change is also the inverse of projects like this because with the Big Dig, for example, you can feel the tangible benefits of a quicker commute and a more beautiful city. But with climate change, if the projects work, you’d actually feel nothing.
Exactly. Climate change is way, way harder. A road project or a rail project will have benefits. You get ribbon cuttings and photo ops. But if we make Boston resilient to flooding or something, you know, do some big project that would improve the shoreline or whatever ideally, that historic storm surge may never come, or it’ll come and we’ll be prepared for it and nothing will happen. But yeah, you’re working with long term counterfactuals.
It feels to me like climate change was designed in a laboratory to flummox institutions. It takes all of our cognitive biases, our ingrained social and biological blind spots and weak points and just flicks them all at us at once.
All nine episodes of The Big Dig are out now. You can listen on the WGBH website, Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts.
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On the cobalt conundrum, Madagascar’s mining mess, and Antarctica’s ‘Greenlandification’
Current conditions: Severe storms are sweeping through the central Great Plains states this weekend, whipping up winds of up to 75 miles per hour • Freezing temperatures are settling over Kazakhstan and Mongolia • A record heat wave in Australia is raising temperatures as high as 113 degrees Fahrenheit.
Nearly two dozen states signed onto two lawsuits Thursday to stop the Trump administration from ending the $7 billion grant program that funded solar panels in low-income communities. The first complaint, filed Wednesday, seeks monetary damages over the Environmental Protection Agency’s bid to eliminate the so-called Solar for All program. A second lawsuit, filed Thursday, seeks to reinstate the program. Arizona Attorney General Kris Mayes told Reuters the cancellation affected 900,000 low-income households nationwide, including some 11,000 in Arizona that the state expected to see a 20% spike in bills after losing access to the $156 million in funding from Solar for All. California would lose $250 million in funding. The litigation comes days after Harris County, which encompasses most of Houston, Texas, filed suit against the EPA over its own loss of $250 million due to the program’s termination. Earlier this month, a coalition of solar energy companies, labor unions, nonprofit groups, and homeowners also sued the EPA over the cancellation.
It remains to be seen whether other countries are willing to balk at the Trump administration’s push to gut key carbon-cutting policies. But at least in theory, later today, the drafting group for the International Maritime Organization, the United Nations agency overseeing global shipping, will vote on an emissions pricing mechanism meant to slash greenhouse gas output from an industry that still relies on some of the most heavily polluting fuels. The scheduled vote comes a day after President Donald Trump pressed the international body to reject the proposal, calling it “the Global Green New Scam Tax on Shipping” and vowing to ignore the rules.
The maritime shipping industry accounts for about 3% of global emissions. But the impact of shipping fuels is substantial. As Heatmap’s Robinson Meyer wrote in December, a study found that, when the IMO began enforcing rules to remove a toxic pollutant, sulfur dioxide from shipping fuels, the planet’s temperatures spiked. That’s because, in addition to inflaming the heart and lungs, triggering asthma attacks, and causing acid rain, sulfur dioxide can also reflect heat back into space, artificially cooling the Earth. When that fuel went away, the warming effects of all the carbon in the atmosphere became more apparent.
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A child worker at a cobalt mine in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Michel Lunanga/Getty Images
The Department of Defense canceled a tender to buy cobalt, in what the trade publication Mining.com called “a fresh sign of the challenges facing Western countries trying to bolster domestic supplies of the battery metal.” In mid-August, the Defense Logistics Agency first sought offers for up to 7,500 tons of the bluish metal used in batteries and alloys for jet engines over the next five years, in a contract worth as much as $500 million. It was, according to Bloomberg, the U.S. government’s first attempt to acquire the metal since 1990. When no deals came in by the original due date of August 29, the offer was extended to October 15. But a notice published on a government website Wednesday indicated that the offer had been pulled. The move marks an apparent setback for the Pentagon’s effort to stockpile critical minerals, as I reported in this newsletter earlier this week.
While the funding doesn’t produce raw cobalt from mining, as I reported for Heatmap last month, the DLA has backed an Ohio-based startup called Xerion that’s commercializing a novel approach to processing both that metal and gallium, another mineral over which China has tightened export controls recently. It’s not alone. As Heatmap’s Katie Brigham wrote last month, “everybody wants to invest in critical mineral startups.”
The British rare earths processor Pensana has canceled plans for a refinery in East Yorkshire, England, in favor of investing in an American project instead. The company spent the past seven years developing a $268 million rare earths mine in Angola. One of the largest of its kind in the world, the project is scheduled to begin delivering raw materials in 2027. To turn that ore into industrial-grade materials, Pensana had planned to build a processing facility at the Saltend Chemicals Plant near Hull, England, that would have turned the metals into powerful magnets. The project won about $6.7 million in support from the British government. But Pensana’s founder and chairman, Paul Atherley, told the BBC that was “nowhere near enough.” He compared the deal to the Trump administration’s direct investment of billions of dollars into MP Materials, the country’s only rare earths mine. Pensana instead announced plans to work with the U.S. refiner ReElement to develop a domestic American supply chain, and plans to list its shares on the Nasdaq. As I wrote in Tuesday morning’s newsletter, the world’s top metals trader warned this week that the West’s mineral weakness is a lack of refining capacity, not mining. “Mining is not critical,” Trafigura CEO Richard Holtum said in London on Monday, according to Mining Journal. “True supply chain security comes from processing investment, not just extraction.”
But even the increased supply of ore from overseas projects could be in jeopardy. I have a scoop this morning in Heatmap that highlights the geopolitical challenges U.S. mining projects face overseas. On Sunday, following weeks of youth-led protests over electricity and water outages, Madagascar’s military overthrew its government in a coup. Now the new self-declared leaders have pulled support for Denver-based mining developer Energy Fuels’ plans for a giant mine that would produce rare earths, uranium, and other metals. The so-called Toliara mine, worth an estimated $2 billion, had won approval from the previous government last winter. But a consultant on the ground in Madagascar’s capital of Antananarivo told me the new leaders had “announced the definitive cancellation” of what was previously described as the future “crown jewel” of an economy where 75% of people live on less than $3 per day and less than 40% of the population has access to electricity.
As recently as the 1990s, the Greenland Ice Sheet and the Arctic were melting at a measurable pace thanks to global warming, but Antarctica’s ice cap seemed securely frozen. But, as Inside Climate News reported Thursday, “not anymore.” New satellite data and field observations show the only unpopulated continent is thawing at an alarming rate, leading to what some scientists are now calling the “Greenlandification” of Antarctica, turning it into an environment that’s melting at a rate closer to the Arctic.
There’s little question as to what is causing the meltdown. More than 100 countries now experience at least 10 more “hot days” per year than a decade ago, when the Paris climate accord was first drafted, according to new data analysis from the research groups Climate Central and World Weather Attribution published Thursday in the Financial Times. In 10 countries, the warming over the past decade added roughly a month of additional “hot days.”
The good climate news, reported by Bloomberg: the Bay Area startup Rondo Energy has turned on the world’s largest industrial heat battery, a giant cubic structure that heats clay bricks with electricity from a 20-megawatt solar array to generate steam.
The bad climate news? That steam is used to force more oil out of the ground as part of Holmes Western Oil Corp.’s enhanced oil recovery system.
The mitigating factors to consider: The battery replaced a natural gas-fired boiler at the Kern County, California, facility. And proponents of enhanced oil recovery say the approach meets lasting demand for petroleum by extracting more fuel from existing wells rather than encouraging new drilling.
Denver-based Energy Fuels was poised to move forward on the $2 billion project before the country's leadership upheaval.
As the Trump administration looks abroad for critical minerals deals, the drama threatening a major American mining megaproject in Madagascar may offer a surprising cautionary tale of how growing global instability can thwart Washington’s plans to rewire metal supply chains away from China.
Just days after the African nation’s military toppled the government in a coup following weeks of protests, the country’s new self-declared leaders have canceled Denver-based Energy Fuels’ mine, Heatmap has learned.
The so-called Toliara mine was supposed to be the “crown jewel” of one of the world’s least developed economies, a megaproject designed to patch Madagascar into a new global supply chain meant to reroute trade in metals needed for everything from state-of-the-art weapons to electric vehicle batteries away from China.
Last December, Energy Fuels, the Denver-based rare earths and uranium miner, won approval from the Malagasy government to move forward on its Toliara Project, a critical minerals mine with a value analysts estimated at $2 billion. But on Thursday morning, the new president of Madagascar’s National Assembly “announced the definitive cancellation” of the project, Luke Freeman, a geopolitical consultant with 25 years of experience in Madagascar, told me by email.
Kim Casey, Energy Fuels’ head of investor relations, dismissed the legitimacy of the coup leaders’ decision in an emailed statement. The company is “watching the events in Madagascar closely, and like the rest of the world we are waiting to see how things unfold,” the statement said.
“At this time, governing bodies and areas of responsibility in Madagascar remain unclear,” she went on. “Any statements made by any individual politicians or others amid this crisis have no legal effect, nor should they be taken to represent official Madagascar government policy or the opinions of the majority of local communities.”
Still, Casey left open the possibility that the mine could be postponed. If the coup “results in any delays in our development plans for the Toliara Project,” she said, “Energy Fuels has multiple projects around the world which are advancing at the same time.” Investors seemed less confident. The company’s stock, which had soared by nearly 500% over the past six months, plunged 8% on Wednesday, and another 13% on Thursday afternoon.
Even if the project goes under, it’s unlikely to impact U.S. mineral supplies, Neha Mukherjee, a rare earths analyst the London-based battery-metals consultancy Benchmark Mineral Intelligence, told me. The mine did not have any public offtakers yet, but Energy Fuels announced plans last year to send uranium ore from the project to the White Mesa Mill in Utah for processing.
“Toliara remains at a very early stage and is still working towards a final investment decision, so immediate on-ground impacts are likely to be limited,” she told me in an email. But she warned that “investors and potential offtakers” may “take a more cautious approach until there’s greater clarity on the political environment.”
It is no accident that, despite its unique culture that blends influences from Africa and Asia, Madagascar is a place known to many Americans primarily as the setting of a series of fictional movies about cartoon animals that aren’t even native to the island nation off southeast Africa. More than 75% of the island's 32 million people live on less than $3 per day, and poverty levels have barely declined over the past decade. Less than 40% of its people have access to electricity.
On Sunday, sweeping month-long youth protests over power and water outages, dubbed a “Generation Z revolution,” evolved into a more traditional type of insurrection when an elite arm of Madagascar’s military overthrew the government in what the African Union denounced as a coup.
The upheaval highlights the challenges ahead for U.S. companies as Washington attempts to reduce its dependency on China, which controls most of the world’s mining and processing of key metals such as rare earths and lithium.
The Biden administration sought to get around the issue by making minerals extracted from countries with which the U.S. had free trade agreements eligible for the Inflation Reduction Act’s most generous electric vehicle tax credits. That strategy put a particular focus on allies with vast mining industries, including Australia, Chile, and Canada.
While President Donald Trump has phased out the tax credits, his administration has tried to broker deals across the world with developing countries whose resources China has largely monopolized in recent years. In May, Trump signed a deal with Ukraine to secure revenues from its as-yet largely untapped minerals once the war with Russia ends — a precondition for his administration’s continued assistance in the effort to repel the Kremlin’s invasion. A month later, Trump negotiated a peace deal between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, pausing a bloody conflict and setting the stage for the U.S. to secure new contracts for raw materials in the war-torn but resource-rich part of central Africa.
The administration’s ongoing pressure on Denmark to cede its autonomous territory of Greenland to the U.S. is widely considered a play for the Arctic island’s minerals. Earlier this month, Reuters reported that the administration is considering buying a stake in Critical Metals, a company prospecting for rare earths in Greenland.
Washington’s appetite for critical minerals could even redraw world maps in the next few years.
Under the terms of a peace agreement that ended a decade-long civil war in the 1980s, Bougainville, a breakaway island off Papua New Guinea, is slated to hold a referendum in 2027 over whether to become an independent nation. Polls suggest the overwhelming majority of voters will support secession. In the U.S., a former investment banker turned novelist named John D. Kuhns has taken up the cause of Bougainville’s independence, advocating that Washington support the would-be republic whose biggest economic asset is a shuttered Rio Tinto copper mine that the autonomous government wants to reopen — potentially with U.S. help.
Trump is also weighing recognizing the breakaway region of Somalia’s independence as Somaliland, which has functioned as a sovereign nation with an internationally praised democracy for more than three decades, in a bid to secure deals to mine its mineral riches. Senator Ted Cruz, the Texas Republican, called on Trump to grant Somaliland recognition as recently as August.
But the most promising potential region for critical minerals may be the one sandwiched between America’s two greatest rivals. In September 2013, then-President Joe Biden huddled with the leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York. From that summit came the C5+1, a partnership between the U.S. and the five Central Asian nations to work on critical minerals. Weeks after Trump returned to office, Secretary of State Marco Rubio affirmed the Trump administration’s support for the partnership in a call with his Uzbek counterpart.
After Australia and Canada, the Central Asian republics represent the “lowest-hanging fruit” for developing a U.S. critical mineral supply chain, said Pini Althaus, a veteran mining executive making deals in the region. The countries are relatively stable, have recently enacted business reforms meant to invite U.S. companies to work there, and — as a means of safeguarding their independence from Moscow and Beijing — are eager to make deals with the U.S., he said.
“We are at least a couple of decades away from having a domestic supply chain in the United States that can meet all of our critical mineral needs,” Althaus told me. “Practically speaking, we don’t have enough of these materials in the U.S., so we must partner with allied countries. Central Asia offers a lot of these opportunities.”
These days, however, political instability isn’t unique to developing countries. The Trump administration is supposed to host a meeting of the C5+1 in Washington as early as next month, Althaus said — that is, if the ongoing government shutdown is resolved.
In a press conference about the newly recast program’s first loan guarantee, Energy Secretary Chris Wright teased his project finance philosophy.
Energy Secretary Chris Wright on Thursday announced a $1.6 billion loan guarantee for American Electric Power to replace 5,000 miles of transmission lines with more advanced wires that can carry more electricity. He also hinted at his vision for how the Trump administration could recast the role of the department's Loan Programs Office in the years to come.
The LPO actually announced that it had finalized an agreement, conditionally made in January under the Biden administration, to back AEP’s plan. The loan guarantee will enable AEP to secure lower-cost financing for the project, for an eventual estimated saving to energy consumers of $275 million over the lifetime of the loan.
“These are the kind of projects where we’re going to partner with businesses to make our energy system more efficient, more reliable, ultimately lower cost,” Wright said on a call with reporters.
And yet in the past few months, the department has also canceled loan guarantees and grants for other transmission projects that were expected to provide those same benefits — including the Grain Belt Express, an 800-mile line set to bring low-cost wind power from Kansas to the Chicago metropolitan area in Illinois.
“We don’t care about authorship,” Wright told reporters, acknowledging that the AEP loan was conditionally approved by the Biden administration. “Not all of them were nonsense. The ones that are in the interest of the American taxpayers, in the interest of the American ratepayers, and there’s a helpful role for government capital — we’re happy to support those.”
When asked specifically why AEP’s proposal met his criteria while the Grain Belt Express didn’t, Wright first made an argument about cost. “I have nothing against the Grain Belt Express,” he said. “I suspect it’ll still be developed. But it’s far more expensive on a per mile basis since it’s a brand new transmission line.”
His subsequent comments, however, hinted at a more significant shift in approach. He went on to argue that the project came with an unacceptable amount of risk since the developers didn’t have buyers yet for the power coming down the line. It was trying to “close on arbitrage,” he said, by buying up cheap wind power that was stranded in Kansas and bringing it to a larger market. “It’s a more commercial enterprise,” he said. “That’s done with private entrepreneurs and private capital.”
It’s important to note that the Grain Belt Express loan guarantee would have been issued under an innovation-focused program within the Loan Programs Office that was specifically geared toward higher risk projects that banks won’t otherwise touch. The AEP project is part of a different program focused on more mature technologies, with a goal of reducing the cost of major utility infrastructure upgrades to ratepayers.
When I floated Wright’s comments by Jigar Shah, the former head of the Loan Programs Office under the Biden administration, he was flummoxed. “It’s nonsensical,” he said. To Shah, taking Wright’s risk aversion to its logical conclusion would mean, for instance, that the office should not fund any nuclear energy projects. “If this becomes a new standard, that means nuclear is dead in the United States,” he said.
AEP is the first developer to secure a loan guarantee under the Energy Dominance Financing Program, Congress’ new name a Biden-era program within LPO that offered loan guarantees to utilities to “retool, repower, repurpose, or replace energy infrastructure.” Initially called the Energy Infrastructure Reinvestment Financing Program and created by the Inflation Reduction Act, it focused on projects with climate benefits, like making efficiency upgrades to power plants or installing renewables on the site of a former coal plant.
In the Biden administration’s view, AEP’s project would “contribute to emissions reductions by supporting existing and new clean generation by expanding transmission capacity in the regions in which they operate.”
Trump’s One Big Beautiful Bill Act rebranded the program and removed any requirements that projects reduce emissions. On Thursday’s call, Wright seemed to imply that it wasn’t just the Biden-era loan program that had been renamed. “The Loan Program Office is being rechristened the Energy Dominant Financing — it is the rechristening of the same department,” he said in response to a question about the office’s remaining loan authority. The Department of Energy did not respond to my request for clarification.
None of that means that the potential emissions benefits from AEP’s project won’t materialize. Limited transmission capacity is one of the biggest obstacles for bringing new wind and solar power online, and reconductoring could also reduce line losses, making the overall grid more efficient.
The transmission project — which includes plans to rebuild some power lines and reconductor others — will ultimately increase capacity by more than 100%, a spokesperson for AEP told me. The first phase will involve upgrades to about 100 miles of wires across Ohio and Oklahoma, while future phases will tackle lines in Indiana, Michigan, and West Virginia, with the intent of meeting growing demand from data centers and manufacturing development, according to a press release.
When reporters asked Wright about the other conditional loan guarantees the Biden administration had issued under the Energy Infrastructure Reinvestment program that are still pending, the secretary stressed that he was looking for applicants that had identified a clear set of projects they would implement. “Many were done in a hurry, without really even having the projects that the loans would be associated with identified. You can end up with a grab bag of projects without a lot of say for where the money went,” he said.
Wright accused the Biden administration of failing to ask applicants to detail the impact the projects would have on taxpayers and ratepayers — a key question his colleagues are now asking.
Shah disagreed with that portrayal. The whole point of the program was to reduce interest rates for utilities and require them to pass on the benefit to ratepayers. All of the projects awarded conditional commitments met that bar, he said.
He warned that if the Trump administration didn’t honor the remaining conditional commitments to utilities under the program — all 10 of them — it risked losing the trust of any new companies it attempts to make similar deals with.
“Most of the nuclear projects that they’re looking to chase are not going to get closed until 2028. And so what signal are they sending? That projects that get approved in the last year of an administration are not going to be honored in the next administration?”