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Life cycle analysis has some problems.

About six months ago, a climate scientist from Arizona State University, Stephanie Arcusa, emailed me a provocative new paper she had published that warned against our growing reliance on life cycle analysis. This practice of measuring all of the emissions related to a given product or service throughout every phase of its life — from the time raw materials are extracted to eventual disposal — was going to hinder our ability to achieve net-zero emissions, she wrote. It was a busy time, and I let the message drift to the bottom of my inbox. But I couldn’t stop thinking about it.
Life cycle analysis permeates the climate economy. Businesses rely on it to understand their emissions so they can work toward reducing them. The Securities and Exchange Commission’s climate risk disclosure rule, which requires companies to report their emissions to investors, hinges on it. The clean hydrogen tax credit requires hydrogen producers to do a version of life cycle analysis to prove their eligibility. It is central to carbon markets, and carbon removal companies are now developing standards based on life cycle analysis to “certify” their services as carbon offset developers did before them.
At the same time, many of the fiercest debates in climate change are really debates about life cycle analysis. Should companies be held responsible for the emissions that are indirectly related to their businesses, and if so then which ones? Are carbon offsets a sham? Does using corn ethanol as a gasoline substitute reduce emissions or increase them? Scientists have repeatedly reached opposite conclusions on that one depending on how they accounted for the land required to grow corn and what it might have been used for had ethanol not been an option. Though the debate plays out in calculations, it’s really a philosophical brawl.
Everybody, for the most part, knows that life cycle analysis is difficult and thorny and imprecise. But over and over, experts and critics alike assert that it can be improved. Arcusa disagrees. Life cycle analysis, she says, is fundamentally broken. “It’s a problematic and uncomfortable conclusion to arrive at,” Arcusa wrote in her email. “On the one hand, it has been the only tool we have had to make any progress on climate. On the other, carbon accounting is captured by academia and vested interests and will jeopardize global climate goals.”
When I recently revisited the paper, I learned that Arcusa and her co-authors didn’t just critique life cycle analysis, they proposed a bold alternative. Their idea is not economically or politically easy, but it also doesn’t suffer from the problems of trying to track carbon throughout the supply chain. I recently called her up to talk through it. Our conversation has been edited for clarity.
Can you walk me through what the biggest issues with life cycle analysis are?
So, life cycle analysis is a qualitative tool —
It seems kind of counterintuitive or even controversial to call it a qualitative tool because it’s specifically trying to quantify something.
I think the best analogy for LCA is that it’s a back-of-the-envelope tool. If you really could measure everything, then sure, LCA is this wonderful idea. The problem is in the practicality of being able to collect all of that data. We can’t, and that leads us to use emissions factors and average numbers, and we model this and we model that, and we get so far away from reality that we actually can’t tell if something is positive or negative in the end.
The other problem is that it’s almost entirely subjective, which makes one LCA incomparable to another LCA depending on the context, depending on the technology. And yes, there are some standardization efforts that have been going on for decades. But if you have a ruler, no matter how much you try, it’s not going to become a screwdriver. We’re trying to use this tool to quantify things and make them the same for comparison, and we can’t because of that subjectivity.
In this space where there is a lot of money to be made, it’s very easy to manipulate things one way or another to make it look a little bit better because the method is not robust. That’s really the gist of the problems here.
One of the things you talk about in the paper is the way life cycle analysis is subject to different worldviews. Can you explain that?
It’s mostly seen in what to include or exclude in the LCA — it can have enormous impacts on the results. I think corn ethanol is the perfect example of how tedious this can be because we still don’t have an answer, precisely for that reason. The uncertainty range of the results has shrunk and gotten bigger and shrunk and gotten bigger, and it’s like, well, we still don’t know. And now, this exact same worldview debate is playing into what should be included and not included in certification for things [like carbon removal] that are going to be sold under the guise of climate action, and that just can’t be. We’ll be forever debating whether something is true.
Is this one of those things that scientists have been debating for ever, or is this argument that we should stop using life cycle analysis more of a fringe idea?
I guess I would call it a fringe idea today. There’s been plenty of criticism throughout the years, even from the very beginning when it was first created. What I have seen is that there is criticism, and then there is, “But here’s how we can solve it and continue using LCA!” I’ve only come across one other publication that specifically said, “This is not working. This is not the right tool,” and that’s from Michael Gillenwater. He’s at the Greenhouse Gas Management Institute. He was like, “What are we doing?” There might be other folks, I just haven’t come across them.
Okay, so what is the alternative to LCA that you’ve proposed in this paper?
LCA targets the middle of the supply chain, and tries to attribute responsibility there. But if you think about where on the supply chain the carbon is the most well-known, it is actually at the source, at the point of origin, before it becomes an emission. At the point where it is created out of the ground is where we know how much carbon there is. If we focus on that source through a policy that requires mandatory sequestration — for every ton of carbon that is now produced, there is a ton of carbon that’s been put away through carbon removal, and the accounting happens there, before it is sold to anybody — anybody who’s now downstream of that supply chain is already carbon neutral. There is no need to track carbon all the way down to the consumer.
We know this is accurate because that is where governments already collect royalties and taxes — they want to know exactly how much is being sold. So we already do this. The big difference is that the policy would be required there instead of taxing everybody downstream.
You’re saying that fossil fuel producers should be required to remove a ton of carbon from the atmosphere for every ton of carbon in the fuels they sell?
Yeah, and maybe I should be more specific. They should pay for an equal amount of carbon to be removed from the atmosphere. In no way are we implying that a fossil carbon producer needs to also be doing the sequestration themselves.
What would be the biggest challenges of implementing something like this?
The ultimate challenge is convincing people that we need to be managing carbon and that this is a waste management type of system. Nobody really wants to pay for waste management, and so it needs to be regulated and demanded by some authority.
What about the fact that we don’t really have the ability to remove carbon or store carbon at scale today, and may not for some time?
Yes, we need to build capacity so that eventually we can match the carbon production to the carbon removal, which is why we also proposed that the liability needs to start today, not in the future. That liability is as good as a credit card debt — you actually have to pay it. It can be paid little by little every year, but the liability is here now, and not in the future.
The risk in the system that I’m describing, or even the system that is currently being deployed, is that you have counterproductive technologies that are being developed. And by counterproductive, I mean [carbon removal] technologies that are producing more emissions than they are storing, and so they’re net-positive. You can create a technology that has no intention of removing more carbon than its sequesters. The intention is just to earn money.
Do you mean, like, the things that are supposed to be removing carbon from the atmosphere and sequestering it, they are using fossil fuels to do that, and end up releasing more carbon in the process?
Yeah, so basically, what we show in the paper is that when we get to full carbon neutrality, the market forces alone will eliminate those kinds of technologies that are counterproductive. The problem is during the transition, these technologies can be economically viable because they are cheaper than they would be if 100% of the fossil fuel they used was carbon neutral through carbon removal. And so in order to prevent those technologies from gaming the system, we need a way to artificially make the price of fossil carbon as expensive as it would be if 100% of that fossil carbon was covered by carbon removal.
That’s where the idea of permits comes in. For every amount that I produce, I now have an instant liability, which is a permit. Each of those permits has to be matched by carbon removal. And since we don’t have enough carbon removal, we have futures and these futures represent the promise of actually doing carbon removal.
What if we burn through the remaining carbon budget and we still don’t have the capacity to sequester enough carbon?
Well, then we’re going into very unchartered territory. Right now we’re just mindlessly going through this thinking that if we just reduce emissions it will be good. It won’t be good.
In the paper, you also argue against mitigating greenhouse gases other than carbon, and that seems pretty controversial to me. Why is that?
We’re not arguing against mitigating, per se. We’re arguing against lumping everything under the same carbon accounting framework because lumping hides the difficulty in actually doing something about it. It’s not that we shouldn’t mitigate other greenhouse gases — we must. It’s just that if we separate the problem of carbon away from the problem of methane, away from the problem of nitrous oxide, or CFCs, we can tackle them more effectively. Because right now, we’re trying to do everything under the same umbrella, and that doesn’t work. We don’t tackle drinking and driving by sponsoring better tires. That’s just silly, right? We wouldn’t do that. We would tackle drinking and driving on its own, and then we would tackle better tires in a different policy.
So the argument is: Most of climate change is caused by carbon; let’s tackle that separately from the others and leave tackling methane and nitrous oxide to purposefully created programs to tackle those things. Let’s not lump the calculations altogether, hiding all the differences and hiding meaningful action.
Is there still a role for life cycle analysis?
You don’t want to be regulating carbon using life cycle analysis. So you can use the life cycle analysis for qualitative purposes, but we’re pretending that it is a tool that can deliver accurate results, and it just doesn’t.
What has the response been like to this paper? What kind of feedback have you gotten?
Stunned silence!
Nobody has said anything?
In private, they have. Not in public. In private, it’s been a little bit like, “I’ve always thought this, but it seemed like there was no other way.” But then in public, think about it. Everything is built on LCA. It’s now in every single climate bill out there. Every single standard. Every single consulting company is doing LCA and doing carbon footprinting for companies. It’s a huge industry, so I guess I shouldn’t have been surprised to hear nothing publicly.
Yeah, I was gonna ask — I’ve been writing about the SEC rules and this idea that companies should start reporting their emissions to their investors, and that would all be based on LCA. There’s a lot of buy-in for that idea across the climate movement.
Yeah, but there’s definitely a fine line with make-believe. I think in many instances, we kid ourselves thinking that we’re going to have numbers that we can hang our hats on. In many instances we will not, and they will be challenged. And so at that point, what’s the point?
One thing I hear when I talk to people about this is, well, having an estimate is better than not having anything, or, don’t let the perfect be the enemy of the good, or, we can just keep working to make them better and better. Why not?
I mean, I wouldn’t say don’t try. But when it comes to actually enforcing anything, it’s going to be extremely hard to prove a number. You could just be stuck in litigation for a long time and still not have an answer.
I don’t know, to me it just seems like an endless debate while time is ticking and we will just feel good because we’ll have thought we measured everything. But we’re still not doing anything.
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Progressive candidate Jane Kim declared victory in the race for California Insurance Commissioner.
Few political wonks outside of California were likely paying much attention to the Golden State on Tuesday night, as Democrats’ anticipated blue wave crested. But the state did have one close, consequential race on the ballot: insurance commissioner. On Friday, Bernie Sanders-endorsed progressive Jane Kim won the race to lead the California Department of Insurance, which oversees the state’s $452 billion insurance market.
Kim declared victory over the more moderate State Senator Ben Allen, who was backed by the California Democratic Party, after reaching a nearly six-point lead on Friday. In a brief speech before supporters, Kim said Allen called to congratulate her that morning. (A spokesman for the Allen campaign confirmed the call to The Orange County Register.) Kim ran on a proposal for a state-run, single-payer insurance program that would cover homeowners against wildfire damage — though the plan would ultimately need approval from both the California legislature and Governor-elect Xavier Becerra.
The idea is that homeowners would automatically receive public coverage for wildfire-related losses, with payouts capped at roughly what it costs to rebuild a typical California home. Policyholders would keep their regular private insurance for other risks such as theft, burst pipes, or an ordinary kitchen fire. Kim says Californians wouldn’t pay more overall, since the money for the program would come from the share of premiums that already goes toward wildfire coverage, though each household’s bill would partly depend on its own wildfire risk.
“It would be nonprofit, and so any excess capital would stay in the state of California and would be used to drive down risk,” Kim told my colleague Matthew Zeitlin a few weeks ago. “That’s the most important piece about this actually, is that it would create another revenue stream for mitigation.”
The insurance commissioner job has taken on an increasing sense of urgency as wildfires — intensified by climate change — continue ripping through communities in California. Mounting losses from hotter, drier conditions combined with decades of new construction in the wildland-urban interface have squeezed insurers’ profits, leading many to drop policyholders in high-risk areas or simply stop writing new policies in the state altogether.
California’s homeowners insurance premiums climbed 84% between December 2020 and March of this year, according to Stanford researchers. Meanwhile, a growing number of residents have been pushed onto the state’s FAIR Plan, which my colleague Matthew described as “the barebones insurer of last resort.” The share of California’s single-family homes covered by the plan has nearly tripled over that same period, from under 2% to about 5%, as homeowners in even low- and moderate-risk wildfire areas increasingly find themselves with few alternatives.
The insurance crunch has become yet another front in California’s broader affordability crisis, alongside persistently high housing, electricity, and gasoline costs. Kim’s victory suggests frustrated voters are increasingly willing to support more radical solutions that once seemed politically out of reach. And while Kim doesn’t have a background in the insurance industry, she’s no stranger to public office. The former civil rights attorney served on the San Francisco Board of Supervisors from 2011 to 2019 before becoming a regional director for Sanders’ 2020 presidential campaign.
But throughout her run for the Insurance office, critics have continually questioned how, exactly, her plan would work. No state has attempted a public disaster insurance program like this before; critics argue there’s no relevant model to work off of, no white paper laying out the details, and no price tag attached to the idea. Kim herself acknowledges that there’s plenty of uncertainty surrounding the plan. “This is a concept and a proposal, and could look quite different by the time it works its way through the process,” she told Matthew. In other words, the program that eventually emerges from negotiations with lawmakers — if one does — could end up looking considerably different from what Kim campaigned on.
Her opponent, Allen, who chairs the state senate’s Energy, Utilities and Communications Committee, argued that creating a public wildfire insurance program would impose a significant financial burden on the state. The California Earthquake Authority, an agency that sells earthquake insurance and administers the state’s Wildfire Fund, examined the potential costs of such a program this spring, estimating it would require roughly $25 billion upfront to have a 75% chance of staying solvent for 20 years. But Kim points out in her policy brief that buying reinsurance — essentially insurance for the insurer — could cut that to about $6 billion.
Allen, on the other hand, pitched a series of reforms to the existing market, including speeding up rate reviews, rewarding homeowners and communities for wildfire mitigation, expanding financing for home-hardening projects, and discouraging development in high-risk areas.
Voters opted instead for the insurance revolution. But Kim argues that her plan isn’t totally without precedent. On the campaign trail, she frequently pointed to New Zealand, where the government’s Natural Hazards Commission provides homeowners with public coverage for disasters including earthquakes, landslides, volcanic eruptions, and tsunamis — though notably not ordinary wildfires. And while France and Spain also operate state-backed disaster insurance programs, these don’t cover wildfires either, a far more common occurrence in California than the comparably rare disasters these programs were built around abroad.
Ultimately, Kim’s ambitious plan will require a champion in the legislature to go anywhere. But in the meantime, there are other issues she could get to work on. On the campaign trail, she said she wants to push insurers to fund a disaster mitigation program run by the Department of Insurance, require companies selling auto policies in a region to also offer homeowners coverage there, and impose minimum loss ratios compelling home insurers to pay at least 65% of premiums in claims and auto insurers at least 70%. It’s unclear, however, whether Kim can implement either of the latter two proposals without new legislation.
Kim will also immediately face the question of what to do with outgoing Insurance Commissioner Ricardo Lara’s Sustainable Insurance Strategy reform package. Designed to entice insurers back to California, these new rules allow companies to set premiums using forward-looking risk models rather than relying on historical losses, and to pass a portion of their rising reinsurance costs onto policyholders. In exchange, insurers are required to write more policies in wildfire-prone areas.
Kim has criticized this approach, arguing that insurers have exploited loopholes to raise premiums on lower-risk customers while continuing to underserve high-risk communities, all without doing enough to address the underlying factors driving wildfire risk.
That leaves Kim in a tricky situation. Until she is able to secure legislative backing for some version of her proposed public insurance program, she’ll have to decide whether to scrap or simply build on the existing reforms. She hasn’t yet laid out any plan for doing so. But whatever direction she takes could ultimately reshape California’s insurance market well before a new state insurer gets off the ground.
They only ticked up by 5% this week.
Beyond the repudiation of Donald Trump, if there was one message voters sent on election night, it was that they really don’t like data centers.
Democrats who ran against rampant data center development won at both the gubernatorial level (Amy Acton in Ohio, Gina Hinojosa in Texas) and the senatorial level (Abdul El-Sayed in Michigan, Annie Andrews in South Carolina). The Wall Street Journal counted 125 Democrats nationwide who “targeted their opponents over data centers.”
“Data centers are the midterms’ other big loser,” according to Politico. “The Results Are In: Voters Hate Data Centers,” from Wired.
Commentators didn’t just notice that many anti-data-center candidates won, but that a number of local data center moratoria passed as well. “In nearly every case, it’'s about 67-80% opposing data centers. True in California, Ohio, everywhere,” Brad Carson, head of the artificial intelligence policy group Americans for Responsible Innovation tweeted. Added Democratic strategist David Shor on X, “Voters sided against data centers in 40 of 41 ballot measures, with basically no correlation to how red a county was.”
But as far as new legislation and ordinances go, November 3 was just another Tuesday in the long-running local campaign against data center development, Heatmap Pro data shows.
“Forty is a lot in one day,” Owen Curtin, a data analyst with our intelligence platform Heatmap Pro, admitted, but “in terms of the rate at which county governments are enacting legislation and the overwhelming public support for them, it’s not new.”
There have been over 830 restrictive measures passed this year, according to analysis from Heatmap Pro, which breaks down to just over 80 per month. The numbers picked up substantially in the summer and fall.

June 15 to 21 was the busiest week of the year for passing data center laws, at 35, and June the month with the most laws passed overall, with 133. Another95 restrictive laws were passed in July, followed by 86 in October.
Of the 40 ballot measures passed this week, only one applied at the county level (Morgan County, Illinois), where a great deal of data center permitting occurs. “While many municipalities permit data centers, a significant portion are permitted by county governments. Not all counties have the legal authority to pursue ballot measures, which is why most November 2 measures were at the municipal level,” Curtin explained.
“While the overwhelming support for local data center ballot measures is indicative of public sentiment (largely anti-data center), it doesn’t necessarily correlate with the regulatory landscape,” he went on. And here’s a fun fact: “There are over 19,000 municipalities in the U.S., so 40 bans are only 0.2% of all municipalities,” Curtain added. “If 40 municipalities banned data centers every day, it would take 475 days to ban data centers across the entire U.S.”
A conversation with Rep. Mike Levin of California
It’s crunch time for the Senate’s bipartisan permitting reform and transmission bill. In three days, the bill’s authors plan to put the Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act to a vote on the Senate floor. That means there’s probably only three days to finish up an amendment to the bill that addresses critics’ concerns without toppling the delicate balance the authors initially struck to foster bipartisan support.
BAAJA has major implications for climate policy, as it would make it much easier and cheaper to build high-voltage transmission lines that connect renewable energy from where it is generated to demand centers. It includes ratepayer protection provisions that require data centers to pay all of the costs of upgrading the grid so that they can hook up to it. The bill would also speed up permitting for energy projects of all stripes, from solar farms and geothermal plants to pipelines and liquified natural gas terminals.
The trade-offs, beyond the benefits for fossil fuels, include making it far more difficult — in some cases, potentially impossible — to revoke permits for a project once the federal government has issued them. While this might help solar and wind under Trump or a Trump-like president, critics are worried it will give Trump carte blanche to approve shoddy oil and gas projects with abandon in his remaining two years. The bill also limits public participation in the environmental review process, makes significant changes to landmark environmental laws like the Clean Water Act and the Endangered Species Act, and weakens tribal consultation under the National Historic Preservation Act.
Several Democratic Senators and House members who had yet to comment on the bill came out of the woodwork in the post-midterms glow to share where they stood. Ruben Gallego, the senator from Arizona and likely 2028 presidential candidate, told a Washington Sun reporter that the White House may not be so willing to negotiate six months from now after a possible impeachment. “Or maybe we get too close to an election and Vance doesn't want to negotiate, right?” he said. “So why not take this win now?”
Senator Mark Kelly, of Arizona, on the other hand, said he wants to wait and see if Democrats can get more of their priorities into the bill in the next Congress, according to Politico. That sentiment seems to be growing among Democrats in the House, where minority leader Hakeem Jeffries of New York has come out against the current iteration of the bill. “Leader Jeffries will not rubber-stamp legislation that emerges from the Senate without more constructive involvement with our Caucus as we fight to make life more affordable for the American people,” Jeffries’ spokesperson told Politico.
The political calculus on the bill is in the eye of the beholder. Proponents are sure this is the best chance Democrats are going to get to clear transmission bottlenecks that will open the door to a clean energy future. Skeptics are worried the risks are too great, or otherwise feel it’s worth attempting a better deal in the next Congress when Democrats have more power.
On Thursday, I spoke to Representative Mike Levin from California as he was coming down from the high of his own reelection win on Tuesday night. Levin told me he was decidedly undecided on the bill, and so we talked through how he’s thinking about it.
Let’s start with the big picture. What is your opinion of the legislation as written?
I think a few things. One, having such a huge democratic victory in the House and the Senate changes the dynamics around the deal and really around the negotiations — not just around permitting reform, but all the things that have been punted to the lame duck. I think there’s a list of like a dozen things.
The question is, do we choose to accept the permitting deal in its current construct with whatever technical changes there are in the manager’s amendment? Do we negotiate much broader changes this Congress with the massive vote we received on Monday? Or do we wait until the 120th Congress when Democrats have the pens?
The next thing we're going to learn, after we get the final numbers in the House and Senate, is what does the manager’s amendment actually look like? There’s risks to any of the options here. There are more conversations that our caucus needs to have on permitting in light of Tuesday. We’ve raised specific concerns to our colleagues in the Senate. I know others have as well, and I’m going to be watching closely to see if Martin [Heinrich] and Sheldon [Whitehouse] can address some of these concerns that we’ve raised.
What are your biggest concerns about the bill?
There’s a big picture test that I have, a three-prong test. First: Is it going to actually lower costs? This whole election has been about lowering costs for consumers. Second: Is it going to protect the environment, and specifically, will it promote clean air and clean water that communities need? And then, third: Will it actually do the job on access to clean energy?
And what I would say is: there are some real problems. I have a lot of good things to say about the transmission provisions. A lot of it mirrors what we’ve been working on in the Energy Bills Relief Act for a long time. But I think there are loopholes around project certainty language. I read my friend John Podesta’s phrase of “loaded Howitzer” in Heatmap. I see these loopholes as ripe for corruption and potentially allowing permits for fossil fuel projects, and that’s very concerning.
You have the historic preservation tribal issues, right? My friends in New Mexico have been very loud about that, and other places as well. They’re very unhappy about the [National Historic Preservation Act] process and tribal sovereignty.
And I worry in the context of the whole data center fight that there aren’t enough steps in here to improve transparency for the public through the permitting process. You can’t have projects that are shrouded in secrecy, and you need community engagement to lead to better and more successful projects. So those are a few things, and those are not small things.
What is your sense of the sentiment around the bill in the House in general? Are there House Republicans that are against it? Do you think it could get the votes in the House?
Mike Johnson obviously came out strongly for it, which may not help get House Democrats on board. I have to tell you, the fact that he was so enthusiastically for it — in my view that wasn’t a great tell.
In my own opinion, any bipartisan permitting bill or any bipartisan bill at all is going to require compromise, and we owe the negotiators the room to try to get to a deal to a certain extent. We shouldn’t let the perfect be the enemy of the good. But until we see the final text, it’s tough to take a stance on the bill, and that includes the managers’ amendment. And we need more assurances and progress from the administration than we’re getting.
Time is running out for that, it seems.
Yeah. They still refuse to implement our current laws in good faith, and that doesn’t give me confidence that they’re going to implement any new law in good faith.
The other thing that I don’t think really gets talked about in this context, but I see it as germane — at least in the behavior of the administration — is what happened on the Lindsey Graham sanctions bill. This bill was negotiated by the White House, and there were a lot of Dems that were for it. It was a close vote for me. I voted against because I could not trust the administration to proceed in good faith. I thought Trump would use the tariff authority and the sanctions waiver authority in an unintended way, and that’s exactly what happened. Lindsey Graham would never, in a million years, have been okay with how Trump waived sanctions on Russia using a bill intended to impose sanctions. Just the same, I could see a scenario where, with the permit-certainty language, it is in fact the loaded Howitzer that John Podesta described. That’s my two cents.
Some proponents of the bill have said the midterms are an argument to pass this bill because they showed how much voters care about affordability, and this bill, by their account, is all about affordability, and if newly elected Democrats want to do more on clean energy down the road, this is a prerequisite. What do you make of those arguments?
They want us to get stuff done. There’s no question about that. But I also think that they want us to get things done that actually are reflective of our priorities and our values. And in this case, the three things that I laid out are reflective of those priorities and values. Again, costs, environmental implications, and access to clean energy — and clearly there are big challenges with unintended environmental repercussions.
I found it interesting that in [the Rhodium Group’s] analysis, they basically omit the certainty provision from their analysis of the GHG impact because there’s really no way to know how the administration will interpret and potentially abuse that provision. There’s great potential for abuse with that provision; I think it needs to be reworked. And it’s naive to think all of a sudden that the Trump administration will behave any differently than they have in the first six years of their opportunity to run afoul of bedrock environmental law, kneecap clean energy, and double down on fossil fuels. I would expect more of the same.
The other thing I think is wrong is the presumption that everyone in the clean energy industry is all on board —you're not talking to enough actual project developers who may not be on board.
Do you see a clear pathway to do something like your Energy Bills Relief Act in the next Congress?
There's a tremendous opportunity to do the Energy Bills Relief Act in the next Congress. We obviously have to discuss with all of our many new and unexpected colleagues to get them on board, and we may have to make amendments to the bill as it was constituted in the 119th Congress. But we got 160 on board. We have lots and lots of new people, and we may, after making changes, find ourselves with a really strong number of people in support. And I’m not giving up on the Republicans that are left in the House, some of whom have claimed to be more pro-clean energy. We’ll get there, and in the meantime, there are things we can do right at the beginning around the war and tariffs — maybe around other ideas as Nikki Budzinski and I presented to Leader [Hakeem] Jeffries that I’ll let him run with as we scope out the first 100 hours, 100 days in the year of the new 120th Congress.
If you do have an opportunity to do something like the Energy Bills Relief Act next Congress, how do you get Trump to sign it? Or another permitting bill if this one doesn’t pass?
Well, I guess two ways. One is if you get the majority in the House and you get 60 votes in the Senate, you send it to the president’s desk. And if you were to get two-thirds in both houses, then it’d obviously be veto-proof. I would have thought veto-proof majorities to be incredibly difficult, but then we saw something on Tuesday I didn’t expect. We got 260, perhaps more, in the House, and you need 290 to get your two-thirds. And then in the Senate, we got 56, if we hold in Mississippi and Alaska, meaning you’d need 11 Senate Republicans. And you have a changed national mood, where I think a lot of those Republican senators who will be up for re-election — I'm pretty confident you probably could get four of them, but maybe you could get more, and you could get all the way to 11.
But if you were to send a bill to the president’s desk that, on balance, is positive. The president could do what he did for the Road to Housing Act — neither sign nor veto. He could go that route. So I think it’s a lot more possible now with the majorities that we have. What I don’t think we need to do is just accept that the only option is the current deal, have that pass into law with the downside that there are still some pretty stark environmental rollbacks, and the risk that we don't have any real indications that this administration will faithfully implement the bill.
There are two other options as well: Given what happened in the election, we can make our Senate colleagues come to the table and pass a bill that is more reflective of those things I mentioned — costs, environment, and clean energy.
Or a third option is my friend Jared Huffman, who says, ‘Wait until we retake the majority in January, try to strike a better deal,’ with the risk that Trump is not willing to work with us at all.
Another idea I've heard floated by proponents of the bill is: pass it as is, and if there are things that turn out to be really bad or that you want to change down the line, Congress can come at it again later on. What do you think about that strategy?
That's true. The challenge is how long would that take, and what damage would be done in the interim? If Trump does take the certainty sections and turns it into a free-for-all for fossil, then I think it’s going to be two years of some really bad stuff happening, two years of unintended consequences, and potentially longer than two years if you have a Republican winning the White House in 2028.
We’ve got to be clear-eyed about the deal as it stands. This is not the last time in human history that we will have Congress and the White House negotiating. It’s a great opportunity to try to get something done that will be very meaningful, particularly around the transmission piece. And again, I don’t believe in perfect being the enemy of the good, but I want to make sure that it’s actually good.
Just to make sure I'm 100% clear on where you stand on this right now, it sounds like you're still relatively undecided, given what the bill says at this moment?
I am waiting to take a stance on the bill until I see the final text. I am closely watching the Senate process, and again, I’m judging the bill by those three factors that I mentioned, and I won’t know where I stand until I see the final text. We also have to have family discussions back in Washington D.C. next week. It doesn’t do any good to negotiate with the press before we discuss amongst ourselves. I have seen a lot of my colleagues that are very, very interested in this. They reach out to me, and I give them the best information that I can. I can also tell you that I have tremendous respect for John Podesta’s opinion.
This interview was edited for length and clarity.