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Life cycle analysis has some problems.

About six months ago, a climate scientist from Arizona State University, Stephanie Arcusa, emailed me a provocative new paper she had published that warned against our growing reliance on life cycle analysis. This practice of measuring all of the emissions related to a given product or service throughout every phase of its life — from the time raw materials are extracted to eventual disposal — was going to hinder our ability to achieve net-zero emissions, she wrote. It was a busy time, and I let the message drift to the bottom of my inbox. But I couldn’t stop thinking about it.
Life cycle analysis permeates the climate economy. Businesses rely on it to understand their emissions so they can work toward reducing them. The Securities and Exchange Commission’s climate risk disclosure rule, which requires companies to report their emissions to investors, hinges on it. The clean hydrogen tax credit requires hydrogen producers to do a version of life cycle analysis to prove their eligibility. It is central to carbon markets, and carbon removal companies are now developing standards based on life cycle analysis to “certify” their services as carbon offset developers did before them.
At the same time, many of the fiercest debates in climate change are really debates about life cycle analysis. Should companies be held responsible for the emissions that are indirectly related to their businesses, and if so then which ones? Are carbon offsets a sham? Does using corn ethanol as a gasoline substitute reduce emissions or increase them? Scientists have repeatedly reached opposite conclusions on that one depending on how they accounted for the land required to grow corn and what it might have been used for had ethanol not been an option. Though the debate plays out in calculations, it’s really a philosophical brawl.
Everybody, for the most part, knows that life cycle analysis is difficult and thorny and imprecise. But over and over, experts and critics alike assert that it can be improved. Arcusa disagrees. Life cycle analysis, she says, is fundamentally broken. “It’s a problematic and uncomfortable conclusion to arrive at,” Arcusa wrote in her email. “On the one hand, it has been the only tool we have had to make any progress on climate. On the other, carbon accounting is captured by academia and vested interests and will jeopardize global climate goals.”
When I recently revisited the paper, I learned that Arcusa and her co-authors didn’t just critique life cycle analysis, they proposed a bold alternative. Their idea is not economically or politically easy, but it also doesn’t suffer from the problems of trying to track carbon throughout the supply chain. I recently called her up to talk through it. Our conversation has been edited for clarity.
Can you walk me through what the biggest issues with life cycle analysis are?
So, life cycle analysis is a qualitative tool —
It seems kind of counterintuitive or even controversial to call it a qualitative tool because it’s specifically trying to quantify something.
I think the best analogy for LCA is that it’s a back-of-the-envelope tool. If you really could measure everything, then sure, LCA is this wonderful idea. The problem is in the practicality of being able to collect all of that data. We can’t, and that leads us to use emissions factors and average numbers, and we model this and we model that, and we get so far away from reality that we actually can’t tell if something is positive or negative in the end.
The other problem is that it’s almost entirely subjective, which makes one LCA incomparable to another LCA depending on the context, depending on the technology. And yes, there are some standardization efforts that have been going on for decades. But if you have a ruler, no matter how much you try, it’s not going to become a screwdriver. We’re trying to use this tool to quantify things and make them the same for comparison, and we can’t because of that subjectivity.
In this space where there is a lot of money to be made, it’s very easy to manipulate things one way or another to make it look a little bit better because the method is not robust. That’s really the gist of the problems here.
One of the things you talk about in the paper is the way life cycle analysis is subject to different worldviews. Can you explain that?
It’s mostly seen in what to include or exclude in the LCA — it can have enormous impacts on the results. I think corn ethanol is the perfect example of how tedious this can be because we still don’t have an answer, precisely for that reason. The uncertainty range of the results has shrunk and gotten bigger and shrunk and gotten bigger, and it’s like, well, we still don’t know. And now, this exact same worldview debate is playing into what should be included and not included in certification for things [like carbon removal] that are going to be sold under the guise of climate action, and that just can’t be. We’ll be forever debating whether something is true.
Is this one of those things that scientists have been debating for ever, or is this argument that we should stop using life cycle analysis more of a fringe idea?
I guess I would call it a fringe idea today. There’s been plenty of criticism throughout the years, even from the very beginning when it was first created. What I have seen is that there is criticism, and then there is, “But here’s how we can solve it and continue using LCA!” I’ve only come across one other publication that specifically said, “This is not working. This is not the right tool,” and that’s from Michael Gillenwater. He’s at the Greenhouse Gas Management Institute. He was like, “What are we doing?” There might be other folks, I just haven’t come across them.
Okay, so what is the alternative to LCA that you’ve proposed in this paper?
LCA targets the middle of the supply chain, and tries to attribute responsibility there. But if you think about where on the supply chain the carbon is the most well-known, it is actually at the source, at the point of origin, before it becomes an emission. At the point where it is created out of the ground is where we know how much carbon there is. If we focus on that source through a policy that requires mandatory sequestration — for every ton of carbon that is now produced, there is a ton of carbon that’s been put away through carbon removal, and the accounting happens there, before it is sold to anybody — anybody who’s now downstream of that supply chain is already carbon neutral. There is no need to track carbon all the way down to the consumer.
We know this is accurate because that is where governments already collect royalties and taxes — they want to know exactly how much is being sold. So we already do this. The big difference is that the policy would be required there instead of taxing everybody downstream.
You’re saying that fossil fuel producers should be required to remove a ton of carbon from the atmosphere for every ton of carbon in the fuels they sell?
Yeah, and maybe I should be more specific. They should pay for an equal amount of carbon to be removed from the atmosphere. In no way are we implying that a fossil carbon producer needs to also be doing the sequestration themselves.
What would be the biggest challenges of implementing something like this?
The ultimate challenge is convincing people that we need to be managing carbon and that this is a waste management type of system. Nobody really wants to pay for waste management, and so it needs to be regulated and demanded by some authority.
What about the fact that we don’t really have the ability to remove carbon or store carbon at scale today, and may not for some time?
Yes, we need to build capacity so that eventually we can match the carbon production to the carbon removal, which is why we also proposed that the liability needs to start today, not in the future. That liability is as good as a credit card debt — you actually have to pay it. It can be paid little by little every year, but the liability is here now, and not in the future.
The risk in the system that I’m describing, or even the system that is currently being deployed, is that you have counterproductive technologies that are being developed. And by counterproductive, I mean [carbon removal] technologies that are producing more emissions than they are storing, and so they’re net-positive. You can create a technology that has no intention of removing more carbon than its sequesters. The intention is just to earn money.
Do you mean, like, the things that are supposed to be removing carbon from the atmosphere and sequestering it, they are using fossil fuels to do that, and end up releasing more carbon in the process?
Yeah, so basically, what we show in the paper is that when we get to full carbon neutrality, the market forces alone will eliminate those kinds of technologies that are counterproductive. The problem is during the transition, these technologies can be economically viable because they are cheaper than they would be if 100% of the fossil fuel they used was carbon neutral through carbon removal. And so in order to prevent those technologies from gaming the system, we need a way to artificially make the price of fossil carbon as expensive as it would be if 100% of that fossil carbon was covered by carbon removal.
That’s where the idea of permits comes in. For every amount that I produce, I now have an instant liability, which is a permit. Each of those permits has to be matched by carbon removal. And since we don’t have enough carbon removal, we have futures and these futures represent the promise of actually doing carbon removal.
What if we burn through the remaining carbon budget and we still don’t have the capacity to sequester enough carbon?
Well, then we’re going into very unchartered territory. Right now we’re just mindlessly going through this thinking that if we just reduce emissions it will be good. It won’t be good.
In the paper, you also argue against mitigating greenhouse gases other than carbon, and that seems pretty controversial to me. Why is that?
We’re not arguing against mitigating, per se. We’re arguing against lumping everything under the same carbon accounting framework because lumping hides the difficulty in actually doing something about it. It’s not that we shouldn’t mitigate other greenhouse gases — we must. It’s just that if we separate the problem of carbon away from the problem of methane, away from the problem of nitrous oxide, or CFCs, we can tackle them more effectively. Because right now, we’re trying to do everything under the same umbrella, and that doesn’t work. We don’t tackle drinking and driving by sponsoring better tires. That’s just silly, right? We wouldn’t do that. We would tackle drinking and driving on its own, and then we would tackle better tires in a different policy.
So the argument is: Most of climate change is caused by carbon; let’s tackle that separately from the others and leave tackling methane and nitrous oxide to purposefully created programs to tackle those things. Let’s not lump the calculations altogether, hiding all the differences and hiding meaningful action.
Is there still a role for life cycle analysis?
You don’t want to be regulating carbon using life cycle analysis. So you can use the life cycle analysis for qualitative purposes, but we’re pretending that it is a tool that can deliver accurate results, and it just doesn’t.
What has the response been like to this paper? What kind of feedback have you gotten?
Stunned silence!
Nobody has said anything?
In private, they have. Not in public. In private, it’s been a little bit like, “I’ve always thought this, but it seemed like there was no other way.” But then in public, think about it. Everything is built on LCA. It’s now in every single climate bill out there. Every single standard. Every single consulting company is doing LCA and doing carbon footprinting for companies. It’s a huge industry, so I guess I shouldn’t have been surprised to hear nothing publicly.
Yeah, I was gonna ask — I’ve been writing about the SEC rules and this idea that companies should start reporting their emissions to their investors, and that would all be based on LCA. There’s a lot of buy-in for that idea across the climate movement.
Yeah, but there’s definitely a fine line with make-believe. I think in many instances, we kid ourselves thinking that we’re going to have numbers that we can hang our hats on. In many instances we will not, and they will be challenged. And so at that point, what’s the point?
One thing I hear when I talk to people about this is, well, having an estimate is better than not having anything, or, don’t let the perfect be the enemy of the good, or, we can just keep working to make them better and better. Why not?
I mean, I wouldn’t say don’t try. But when it comes to actually enforcing anything, it’s going to be extremely hard to prove a number. You could just be stuck in litigation for a long time and still not have an answer.
I don’t know, to me it just seems like an endless debate while time is ticking and we will just feel good because we’ll have thought we measured everything. But we’re still not doing anything.
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Giving up on hourly matching by 2030 doesn’t mean giving up on climate ambition — necessarily.
Microsoft celebrated a “milestone achievement” earlier this year, when it announced that it had successfully matched 100% of its 2025 electricity usage with renewable energy. This past week, however, Bloomberg reported that the company was considering delaying or abandoning its next clean energy target set for 2030.
What comes after achieving 100% renewable energy, you might ask? What Microsoft did in 2025 was tally its annual energy consumption and purchase an equal amount of solar and wind power. By 2030, the company aspired to match every kilowatt it consumes with carbon-free electricity hour by hour. That means finding clean power for all the hours when the sun isn’t shining and the wind isn’t blowing.
The news that Microsoft is revisiting this goal could be read as the beginning of the end of corporate climate ambition. Microsoft has long been a pioneer on that front, setting increasingly difficult goals and then doing the groundwork to help others follow in its footsteps. Now it appears to be accepting defeat. The news comes just weeks after my colleague Robinson Meyer broke the news that the company is also pausing its industry-leading carbon removal purchasing program.
Delaying or abandoning the clean energy target — the two options presented in the Bloomberg story — represent quite different scenarios, however.
“There’s going to be a big difference between them saying, We’re going to keep trying as hard as we can to go as far as we can, but acknowledge we may not hit it, versus saying, Well, we can’t hit this extremely ambitious goal we set for ourselves, therefore we’re just giving up on the overall mission,” Wilson Ricks, a manager in Clean Air Task Force’s electricity program, told me.
The goal was always going to be difficult, if not impossible, for Microsoft to hit, Ricks said. Yes, it’s gotten tougher as Microsoft’s electricity usage has surged with the rise of artificial intelligence, and because Congress killed subsidies for clean energy as the Trump administration has done its best to stall wind and solar development. But some of the technologies likely needed to achieve the goal, such as advanced nuclear and geothermal power plants, have yet to achieve commercial deployment, let alone reach meaningful scale, and probably won’t by 2030 — especially not across all the regions that Microsoft operates in.
Nonetheless, some clean energy advocates (including Ricks) argue that keeping hourly matching as a north star is paramount because it helps put the world on the path to fully decarbonized electric grids.
Google was the first to introduce a 24/7 carbon-free energy strategy in 2020, and for a moment, it seemed that the rest of the corporate world would follow. A handful of companies joined a coalition to support the goal, but to date, I’m aware of just two — Microsoft and the data storage company Iron Mountain — that have followed Google in committing to achieving it.
Most companies approach their clean energy claims with considerably less precision. The norm is to purchase “unbundled” renewable energy certificates, tradeable vouchers that say a certain amount of renewable energy has been generated somewhere, at some point, and that the certificate owner can lay claim to it. Many simply buy enough of these RECs to cover their annual electricity usage and call themselves “powered by 100% renewable energy.”
There’s a spectrum of quality in the RECs available for purchase, but the market is flooded with cheap, relatively meaningless certificates. A company that operates in a coal-heavy region like Indiana can buy RECs from a wind farm in Texas that was built a decade ago, which won’t do anything to change the makeup of the grid in either place.
Today, the gold standard for companies with capital to throw around is instead to seek out long-term contracts directly with wind and solar developers known as power purchase agreements. That doesn’t mean the wind and solar farms send power to the companies directly. But these types of contracts are more likely to bring new projects onto the grid by providing guaranteed future revenues, helping developers secure the financing they need to build.
Microsoft started buying unbundled RECs more than a decade ago, and in 2014, it reported it had matched all of its global electricity usage. In 2016, the company began setting goals for direct procurement of renewable energy. In 2020, it pledged to achieve 100% renewable this way by 2025 — but it wasn’t going to sign just any wind or solar agreements. It aimed to pursue contracts with projects that were in the same regions as the company’s operations and that wouldn’t have been built without the company’s support. “Where and how you buy matters,” it wrote in its 2020 sustainability report. “The closer the new wind or solar farm is to your data center, the more likely it is those zero carbon electrons are powering it.”
In 2021, Microsoft upped the ante again by establishing its 2030 hourly matching target, which it referred to as “100/100/0” — 100% of electrons, 100% of the time, zero-carbon energy.
Microsoft has never publicly reported its progress toward the 2030 goal. The company’s enthusiasm for the target has also appeared to wane. In 2020, before Microsoft even made the 100/100/0 commitment, it touted a solution it developed to track and match renewable energy generation and consumption on an hourly basis. In the years since, it has led its peers in investments in round-the-clock nuclear power, even signing a 20-year power purchase agreement with Constellation Energy to bring the shuttered Three Mile Island nuclear plant in Pennsylvania back online.
But Microsoft has stopped publicizing the goal in blog posts and press releases. It went unmentioned in the recent announcement about the 2025 renewable energy achievement, for instance. And a section in the company’s annual sustainability report listing its climate targets that had previously advertised the 2030 goal as “Replacing with 100/100/0 carbon-free energy” was re-written in 2025 as “Expanding carbon-free electricity,” fuzzier rhetoric that now reads as a harbinger of a softer approach.
Microsoft did not respond to questions about its progress toward the 2030 target. In an emailed statement, a spokesperson emphasized the company’s commitment to maintaining its annual matching goal — the one achieved in 2025. No doubt that will take a lot more investment in the years to come now that the company is gobbling up a lot more electricity for data centers — some of it directly from natural gas plants.
Microsoft also shared a statement from Melanie Nakagawa, Microsoft’s chief sustainability officer, emphasizing the company’s commitment to become carbon negative. “At times we may make adjustments to our approach toward our sustainability goals,” she said. “Any adjustments we make are part of our disciplined approach—not a change in our long-term ambition.”
Even if Microsoft axes its hourly matching target, the company might have to start reporting its clean electricity usage on an hourly basis anyway. The Greenhouse Gas Protocol, a nonprofit that sets standards for how companies should calculate their emissions, is currently considering adopting an hourly accounting requirement. While the protocol’s standards are voluntary, companies almost uniformly follow them, and they will soon become mandatory in much of the world, as governments in California and Europe plan to integrate them into corporate disclosure rules.
The accounting rule change is highly controversial, with many companies arguing that it will deter them from investing in clean energy altogether, since their purchases won’t look as good on paper. “I don’t think anybody is debating having rules and guidelines around how you do more narrow matching, we should have that,” Michael Leggett, the co-founder and chief product officer for Ever.Green, a company that sells high-impact RECs, told me. “I think the debate has largely been around, is that required?”
Leggett said he could see how Microsoft’s pullback could be twisted to support either side. Proponents of the hourly accounting method will say, “Aha! See? This is why we have to require it.” Opponents will say, “See, even Microsoft can’t do it, so how are you going to require all these other companies to do it?”
I spoke to Alex Piper, the head of U.S. policy and markets at EnergyTag, a nonprofit that advocates for reforms to enable 24/7 clean energy, who saw the news as vindicating.
“What we’re seeing right now is many of the hyperscale technology companies look to the fastest path to power, and whether it is or not, some of them are turning to gas as that solution,” he told me. Piper argued that companies are choosing natural gas in part because they can get away with clean energy claims under the protocol’s existing rules. “The proposed rules for the greenhouse gas protocol would require those companies to at least be transparent.”
But Microsoft walking back its hourly matching goal does not have to mean that it’s walking back its climate ambition. It’s possible for companies to achieve significant emissions reductions by focusing their clean energy purchases on the places where wind and solar will do the most to displace fossil fuels, rather than worrying about matching every hour. For a company that operates in California, for example, supporting the addition of solar power to a coal-heavy grid — even if it’s in a different part of the country or the world — will do more, faster, than helping to build solar locally or waiting for around-the-clock resources such as geothermal power to come online.
Critics of hourly accounting argue that it doesn’t give companies credit for this kind of approach. “What I would love to have happen is anything to incentivize, recognize, and reward companies signing 20-year contracts that enable new projects coming online,” Leggett said of the Greenhouse Gas Protocol’s forthcoming rule change.
Ricks, of Clean Air Task Force, rejects the idea that an hourly accounting requirement would deter these kinds of deals. “That doesn’t mean that they can’t report any other set of numbers they want to,” he said. “Many companies do report things that aren’t currently recognized in the Greenhouse Gas Protocol.”
Microsoft is a prime example. The company includes two measures of its renewable energy usage in its annual reports: “percentage of renewable electricity,” which includes the unbundled RECs Microsoft has continued to buy over the years, and “percentage of direct renewable electricity,” which tracks power purchase agreements and the renewable portion of the grid mix where its facilities are located. The former uses the Greenhouse Gas protocol’s current accounting method, under which Microsoft says it has hit 100% every year since 2014. But the latter is the company’s own bespoke calculation.
The company’s 2025 feat was based on this made-up methodology, and it represents the first time Microsoft has announced to the world that it used 100% renewable energy. It never previously made such claims about its REC purchases, as far as I can tell. In other words, Microsoft’s standards for what it publicizes are far more rigorous than what the Greenhouse Gas Protocol requires.
Regardless of what the protocol decides, it will determine only what companies must report. It won’t prevent them from offering up their own, additional metrics of success.
PJM Interconnection has some ideas, as does the state of New Jersey.
We’ve already talked this week about Pennsylvania asking whether the modern “regulatory compact,” which grants utilities monopoly geographical franchises and regulated returns from their capital investments, is still suitable in this era of rising prices and data-center-driven load growth.
Now America’s biggest electricity market and another one of that market’s biggest states are considering far-reaching, fundamental reforms that could alter how electricity infrastructure is planned and paid for over 65 million Americans.
New Jersey Governor Mikie Sherrill anchored her 2025 campaign on electricity prices, and for good reason — in the past four years, electricity prices in the state have gone up 48%, according to Heatmap and MIT’s Electricity Price Hub, while average bills have risen from $83 per month to $130. On her first day in office, Sherrill issued two executive orders acting on that promise, directing the state to make funds available to freeze rates and declaring a state of emergency to ease the way to building more generation.
Included in that first order was a review of utility business models to be carried out by state regulators. What that review will entail is now coming into focus.
On Wednesday, the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities issued a statement announcing that it will look specifically at “whether New Jersey’s century-old utility business model — one that rewards electric distribution companies (EDCs) for capital spending even when cheaper alternatives exist — should be replaced with a framework tied to performance, affordability, and long-term cost stability.” In case anyone was still ambiguous as to what the outcome of said study might be, the board added that it is “expected to drive the most significant restructuring of utility regulation in New Jersey in decades.”
The current system, the board’s president Christine Guhl-Savoy said at a hearing Thursday, “creates a structural incentive to favor capital intensive solutions, even when lower costs, non-wires or demand side alternatives may be available.”
This structure, she said, could help explain why “over the past decade, electric delivery charges in New Jersey have risen steadily.” Within the service territory of PSEG, one of the four major New Jersey utilities, distribution charges alone have risen from $19.24 per month in January 2020 (as far back as the Heatmap-MIT data goes) to $21.84 as of April, while transmission charges have risen from around $20 to just over $29 per month. Many critics of the utility business model point to high levels of local grid spending on distribution as a way that utilities pad their earnings with returns harvested from ratepayers.
In the system regulators explored at the hearing, new projects would get a more skeptical look and ratepayers payouts would be partially determined by utilities hitting pre-defined service goals. NJBPU executive director Bob Brabston also indicated that the review process would take a close look at utilities’ regulated returns on equity — echoing his neighbor across the Delaware River, Pennsylvania Governor Josh Shapiro, who wrote in a letter to his state’s utilities earlier this week that these returns must be “transparent” and “justifiable,” and no longer be based on “educated guesses.”
“We want to make sure that the actual cost of equity and the returns on equity are close,” Brabston said Thursday. “We don’t want there to be a significant gap between the cost of equity that you all experience and the returns that the agencies that the agency awards.”
Meanwhile, in Valley Forge, Pennsylvania, the framework within which New Jersey’s utilities exist is coming in for its own examination.
PJM Interconnection — the nation’s largest electricity market, which covers not just Pennsylvania and New Jersey but also part or all of 11 other states — released an almost 70-page paper Wednesday, in which the organization’s president David Mills wrote that “the current situation is not tenable.”
PJM has been the poster child for a host of issues plaguing the electricity markets across the country, including fast-rising prices, a failure to quickly bring on new generation, and an inability to assure the market’s preferred level of reserve reliability. This set of challenges, Mills said in the paper’s introduction, “reflects something more fundamental than a design that needs recalibration.” Instead, PJM must consider “whether the foundational assumptions of the market remain valid – and if not, what a valid set of assumptions would require.”
The problem with the electricity market, he argued, can be solved by more markets. Right now, when prices shoot up, governments intervene with price caps, suppressing the market signal necessary to bring on sufficient generation that would bring down prices.
To replace that system, the paper proposes three possible models. The first, which it calls “Stabilized Markets,” would allow capacity to be procured for several years at a time outside of the current auction system, so that utilities could make sure their basic needs were covered before they go into the annual auctions. This would provide long term security for new investment.
The second path would be a more fundamental reform. This “Differential Reliability” approach would do away with the “shared reliability compact,” under which all loads must be served by the system at all times. Instead, PJM would “develop the operational and commercial framework to explicitly differentiate reliability,” incentivizing approaches like bring your own generation or curtailing power for new large sources of demand.
The third path is an “Energy Market Transition,” which might also be called the “Texas option.” Following this path, the capacity market would shrink as a portion of revenues earned by generators, and more revenue would come from real-time or near-real-time electricity sales.
While this path isn’t “full Texas” (ERCOT doesn’t have a capacity market at all), it would mean allowing for higher prices for energy in real-time, a.k.a. “scarcity pricing” which is arguably the defining feature of the ERCOT system (though even that was scaled back when prices got too high).
“The choices embedded in these paths involve genuine trade-offs, and those trade-offs affect different stakeholders uniquely,” the paper says.If PJM has learned anything in the past few years, it’s that it doesn’t get to make decisions on its own. Those stakeholders will get their say, one way or another.
Big fundraises for Nyobolt and Skeleton Technologies, plus more of the week’s biggest money moves.
Following a quiet week for new deals, the industry is back at it with a bunch of capital flowing into some of the industry’s most active areas. My colleague Alexander C. Kaufman already told you about one of the more buzzworthy announcements from data center-land in Wednesday’s AM newsletter: Wave energy startup Panthalassa raised $140 million in a round led by Peter Thiel to “perform AI inference computing at sea” using nodes powered by the ocean’s waves.
This week also saw fresh funding for more conventional data center infrastructure, as Nyobolt and Skeleton Technologies both announced later-stage rounds for data center backup power solutions. Meanwhile, it turns out Redwood Materials is not the only company bringing in significant capital for second-life EV battery systems — Moment Energy just raised $40 million to pursue a similar approach. Elsewhere, investors backed an effort to rebuild domestic magnesium production, and, in a glimmer of hope for a sector on the outs, gave a boost to green cement startup Terra CO2.
Cambridge-based startup Nyobolt has become the latest battery company to reach a $1 billion valuation, with its expansion into the data center market helping fuel excitement around its tech. Spun out of University of Cambridge research in 2019, the company develops ultra-fast-charging batteries based on a modified lithium-ion chemistry. Its core innovation is an anode made from niobium tungsten oxide, which Nyobolt says enables its batteries to charge to 80% in less than five minutes, with a cycle life that’s 10 times longer than conventional lithium-ion, all without the risk of fire.
The company has now raised a $60 Series C, following what it describes as a period of “rapid commercial momentum,” with revenue increasing five-fold year-over-year as customers in the robotics and data center industry piled in. Symbotic, an autonomous robotics company and existing customer, led the latest round. While Symbotic previously relied on supercapacitors to power its robots, Nyobolt’s says its batteries provide six times more energy capacity in a lighter package, allowing its warehouse robots to work for retailers like Walgreens, Target, and Kroger around the clock.
Now the startup is targeting data center customers too, positioning its tech as a fast-acting fix for the sudden power surges common to large-scale artificial intelligence workloads, as well as a temporary backup power solution for outages. While it has no confirmed domestic data center customers to date, it does have a nonbinding agreement with the Indian state of Rajasthan to deploy over 100 megawatts of off-grid AI data center and power management infrastructure, part of a broader push to expand its presence across the country.
Notably, the press release made no mention of plans to sell its tech to electric vehicle automakers, though this appears to have been a central focus previously. As recently as last summer, executive vice president Ramesh Narasimhan told the BBC that he hoped Nyobolt’s batteries would “transform the experience of owning an EV.” But while its tech does enable extremely fast charging, its underlying chemistry is not optimized for long-range driving. A sports car built to test the company’s batteries had just a 155 mile range. So like many of its climate tech peers, the company appears to be betting that data centers now represent a more reliable opportunity.
This week brought additional news from another European player aiming to smooth out data center power surges. Estonia-based supercapacitor startup Skeleton Technologies raised $39 million in what it describes as the first close of a pre-IPO funding round, with a U.S. listing planned for next year. Its core tech is built around a “curved graphene” structure, which the company likens to a crumpled sheet of paper with a high surface area. The graphene’s many exposed surfaces and edges allows it to hold more electric charge, which Skeleton says delivers a 72% improvement in energy density.
Like Nyobolt, Skeleton says its tech offers faster response times and longer cycle life. But supercapacitors are a fundamentally different technology than Nyobolt’s modified lithium-ion solution. Though they offer near-instantaneous response times, they store very little energy — just enough to smooth out microsecond power spikes in GPU workloads. Nyobolt’s batteries, by contrast, aim not only to smooth out data center power spikes, but also to deliver about 90 seconds of backup power in the case of an outage, before a generator or other backup source kicks in.
Skeleton is already mass-producing supercapacitors in Germany and delivering to unnamed “major U.S. hyperscalers for AI infrastructure.” It’s also making moves to expand its U.S. footprint ahead of its pending IPO, opening an engineering facility in Houston and aiming to begin domestic manufacturing of AI data center solutions in the first half of this year.
Last year brought a wave of new climate tech coalitions, with one of the most ambitious efforts known as the All Aboard Coalition. This group of venture firms is targeting the investment gap known as the missing middle, which falls between early-stage venture rounds and infrastructure funding. The model is relatively mechanical: When three or more member firms participate in a later-stage round for a company, the coalition automatically coinvests out of its own fund, matching the members’ combined contribution.
The group made its first investment in January, supporting the AI-powered geothermal exploration and development company Zanskar’s Series C round. This week, it announced its second: a $22 million commitment to low-carbon cement startup Terra CO2, bringing the company’s Series B total to $147 million. Cement production accounts for roughly 8% of global emissions, a figure Terra aims to shrink by making so-called "supplementary cementitious materials” — which can partially displace traditional cement in concrete mixes — from abundant silicate rocks. By grinding and thermally processing these rocks into a glassy powder, Terra’s product mimics the properties of conventional cement. The company says it can replace up to 50% of the cement in typical concrete mixes, lowering associated emissions by as much as 70%.
The new funding will help Terra build its first commercial-scale plant in Texas, exactly the type of first-of-a-kind project that the coalition was designed to support. But the scale of this challenge remains clear. As noted in ImpactAlpha’s coverage, the coalition has raised just $100 million toward its goal of a $300 million fund — already a relatively modest goal considering the capital intensity of novel infrastructure projects. Bloomberg previously reported that the group aimed to raise the full amount by the end of October 2025, raising questions about the willingness of LPs to bet on projects at this crucial but capital-intensive juncture.
When I think about repurposing used electric vehicle batteries for stationary storage, I think of battery recycling giant Redwood Materials, which raised a $425 million Series E in January after moving aggressively into this promising market. But while Redwood’s well-established recycling business certainly provides it with the largest pipeline of used batteries, it’s far from the only company pursuing this business model. A smaller player with a largely similar approach underscored that this week, when it announced a $40 million Series B to scale its gigafactory in Texas and expand its facilities in British Columbia.
That’s Moment Energy, which focuses on using second-life EV batteries to power commercial and industrial sites such as data centers, hospitals, and factories. Like Redwood, it relies on proprietary software to aggregate battery packs with myriad chemistries and design specs into coordinated grid-scale systems. What the company sees as its critical differentiator, however, is its safety standards. Moment has achieved UL certification, a key safety benchmark that it says others in the industry have yet to meet.
In a shot at its competitors, the company described itself in a press release as the “only provider proven capable of deploying second-life battery storage systems in the built environment without special dispensations or regulatory loopholes.” While Moment never names names, Redwood’s first commercial-scale system sits on its own private land in an open air setting, where certification is arguably unnecessary. “What most other second life [battery] companies are now trying to say is, let’s just lobby to make second life UL certification easier, because it is impossible to get UL certification, as it stands,” the company’s CEO, Edward Chiang, told TechCrunch. “But at Moment, we say that’s not true. We got it.”
As I wrote last September, it’s a good time to be a critical minerals startup, because as you may have heard, “critical minerals are the new oil.” These materials sit at the center of modern energy infrastructure — batteries, magnets, photovoltaic cells, and electrical wiring, to name just a few uses — plus their supply is concentrated in geopolitically tense regions and subject to extreme price volatility. It also certainly doesn’t hurt that the Trump administration loves them and wants to mine and refine way more of them in the U.S.
The latest beneficiary of this enthusiasm is Magrathea, which this week raised a $24 million Series A to build what it says will be the only new magnesium smelter in the U.S., in Arkansas. The company has now raised over $100 million in total, including a $28 million grant from the Department of Defense. Its approach relies on an electrolysis-based process that’s able to extract pure magnesium from seawater and brines, which it positions as a cleaner, cheaper alternative to the high-heat, emission-intensive method that China uses to produce most of the world’s magnesium today.
The U.S. military has taken note of this potential new domestic supply. Magrathea’s 2022 seed round coincided with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as the military looked to scale domestic defense tech supply chains. Magnesium alloys are often used to help reduce weight in EV components, a benefit equally applicable to military helicopters, drones, and next-generation fighter jets. So while these defense applications represent somewhat of a pivot from the startup’s initial focus, a greener fighter jet is still better than a dirty fighter jet.