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Life cycle analysis has some problems.

About six months ago, a climate scientist from Arizona State University, Stephanie Arcusa, emailed me a provocative new paper she had published that warned against our growing reliance on life cycle analysis. This practice of measuring all of the emissions related to a given product or service throughout every phase of its life — from the time raw materials are extracted to eventual disposal — was going to hinder our ability to achieve net-zero emissions, she wrote. It was a busy time, and I let the message drift to the bottom of my inbox. But I couldn’t stop thinking about it.
Life cycle analysis permeates the climate economy. Businesses rely on it to understand their emissions so they can work toward reducing them. The Securities and Exchange Commission’s climate risk disclosure rule, which requires companies to report their emissions to investors, hinges on it. The clean hydrogen tax credit requires hydrogen producers to do a version of life cycle analysis to prove their eligibility. It is central to carbon markets, and carbon removal companies are now developing standards based on life cycle analysis to “certify” their services as carbon offset developers did before them.
At the same time, many of the fiercest debates in climate change are really debates about life cycle analysis. Should companies be held responsible for the emissions that are indirectly related to their businesses, and if so then which ones? Are carbon offsets a sham? Does using corn ethanol as a gasoline substitute reduce emissions or increase them? Scientists have repeatedly reached opposite conclusions on that one depending on how they accounted for the land required to grow corn and what it might have been used for had ethanol not been an option. Though the debate plays out in calculations, it’s really a philosophical brawl.
Everybody, for the most part, knows that life cycle analysis is difficult and thorny and imprecise. But over and over, experts and critics alike assert that it can be improved. Arcusa disagrees. Life cycle analysis, she says, is fundamentally broken. “It’s a problematic and uncomfortable conclusion to arrive at,” Arcusa wrote in her email. “On the one hand, it has been the only tool we have had to make any progress on climate. On the other, carbon accounting is captured by academia and vested interests and will jeopardize global climate goals.”
When I recently revisited the paper, I learned that Arcusa and her co-authors didn’t just critique life cycle analysis, they proposed a bold alternative. Their idea is not economically or politically easy, but it also doesn’t suffer from the problems of trying to track carbon throughout the supply chain. I recently called her up to talk through it. Our conversation has been edited for clarity.
Can you walk me through what the biggest issues with life cycle analysis are?
So, life cycle analysis is a qualitative tool —
It seems kind of counterintuitive or even controversial to call it a qualitative tool because it’s specifically trying to quantify something.
I think the best analogy for LCA is that it’s a back-of-the-envelope tool. If you really could measure everything, then sure, LCA is this wonderful idea. The problem is in the practicality of being able to collect all of that data. We can’t, and that leads us to use emissions factors and average numbers, and we model this and we model that, and we get so far away from reality that we actually can’t tell if something is positive or negative in the end.
The other problem is that it’s almost entirely subjective, which makes one LCA incomparable to another LCA depending on the context, depending on the technology. And yes, there are some standardization efforts that have been going on for decades. But if you have a ruler, no matter how much you try, it’s not going to become a screwdriver. We’re trying to use this tool to quantify things and make them the same for comparison, and we can’t because of that subjectivity.
In this space where there is a lot of money to be made, it’s very easy to manipulate things one way or another to make it look a little bit better because the method is not robust. That’s really the gist of the problems here.
One of the things you talk about in the paper is the way life cycle analysis is subject to different worldviews. Can you explain that?
It’s mostly seen in what to include or exclude in the LCA — it can have enormous impacts on the results. I think corn ethanol is the perfect example of how tedious this can be because we still don’t have an answer, precisely for that reason. The uncertainty range of the results has shrunk and gotten bigger and shrunk and gotten bigger, and it’s like, well, we still don’t know. And now, this exact same worldview debate is playing into what should be included and not included in certification for things [like carbon removal] that are going to be sold under the guise of climate action, and that just can’t be. We’ll be forever debating whether something is true.
Is this one of those things that scientists have been debating for ever, or is this argument that we should stop using life cycle analysis more of a fringe idea?
I guess I would call it a fringe idea today. There’s been plenty of criticism throughout the years, even from the very beginning when it was first created. What I have seen is that there is criticism, and then there is, “But here’s how we can solve it and continue using LCA!” I’ve only come across one other publication that specifically said, “This is not working. This is not the right tool,” and that’s from Michael Gillenwater. He’s at the Greenhouse Gas Management Institute. He was like, “What are we doing?” There might be other folks, I just haven’t come across them.
Okay, so what is the alternative to LCA that you’ve proposed in this paper?
LCA targets the middle of the supply chain, and tries to attribute responsibility there. But if you think about where on the supply chain the carbon is the most well-known, it is actually at the source, at the point of origin, before it becomes an emission. At the point where it is created out of the ground is where we know how much carbon there is. If we focus on that source through a policy that requires mandatory sequestration — for every ton of carbon that is now produced, there is a ton of carbon that’s been put away through carbon removal, and the accounting happens there, before it is sold to anybody — anybody who’s now downstream of that supply chain is already carbon neutral. There is no need to track carbon all the way down to the consumer.
We know this is accurate because that is where governments already collect royalties and taxes — they want to know exactly how much is being sold. So we already do this. The big difference is that the policy would be required there instead of taxing everybody downstream.
You’re saying that fossil fuel producers should be required to remove a ton of carbon from the atmosphere for every ton of carbon in the fuels they sell?
Yeah, and maybe I should be more specific. They should pay for an equal amount of carbon to be removed from the atmosphere. In no way are we implying that a fossil carbon producer needs to also be doing the sequestration themselves.
What would be the biggest challenges of implementing something like this?
The ultimate challenge is convincing people that we need to be managing carbon and that this is a waste management type of system. Nobody really wants to pay for waste management, and so it needs to be regulated and demanded by some authority.
What about the fact that we don’t really have the ability to remove carbon or store carbon at scale today, and may not for some time?
Yes, we need to build capacity so that eventually we can match the carbon production to the carbon removal, which is why we also proposed that the liability needs to start today, not in the future. That liability is as good as a credit card debt — you actually have to pay it. It can be paid little by little every year, but the liability is here now, and not in the future.
The risk in the system that I’m describing, or even the system that is currently being deployed, is that you have counterproductive technologies that are being developed. And by counterproductive, I mean [carbon removal] technologies that are producing more emissions than they are storing, and so they’re net-positive. You can create a technology that has no intention of removing more carbon than its sequesters. The intention is just to earn money.
Do you mean, like, the things that are supposed to be removing carbon from the atmosphere and sequestering it, they are using fossil fuels to do that, and end up releasing more carbon in the process?
Yeah, so basically, what we show in the paper is that when we get to full carbon neutrality, the market forces alone will eliminate those kinds of technologies that are counterproductive. The problem is during the transition, these technologies can be economically viable because they are cheaper than they would be if 100% of the fossil fuel they used was carbon neutral through carbon removal. And so in order to prevent those technologies from gaming the system, we need a way to artificially make the price of fossil carbon as expensive as it would be if 100% of that fossil carbon was covered by carbon removal.
That’s where the idea of permits comes in. For every amount that I produce, I now have an instant liability, which is a permit. Each of those permits has to be matched by carbon removal. And since we don’t have enough carbon removal, we have futures and these futures represent the promise of actually doing carbon removal.
What if we burn through the remaining carbon budget and we still don’t have the capacity to sequester enough carbon?
Well, then we’re going into very unchartered territory. Right now we’re just mindlessly going through this thinking that if we just reduce emissions it will be good. It won’t be good.
In the paper, you also argue against mitigating greenhouse gases other than carbon, and that seems pretty controversial to me. Why is that?
We’re not arguing against mitigating, per se. We’re arguing against lumping everything under the same carbon accounting framework because lumping hides the difficulty in actually doing something about it. It’s not that we shouldn’t mitigate other greenhouse gases — we must. It’s just that if we separate the problem of carbon away from the problem of methane, away from the problem of nitrous oxide, or CFCs, we can tackle them more effectively. Because right now, we’re trying to do everything under the same umbrella, and that doesn’t work. We don’t tackle drinking and driving by sponsoring better tires. That’s just silly, right? We wouldn’t do that. We would tackle drinking and driving on its own, and then we would tackle better tires in a different policy.
So the argument is: Most of climate change is caused by carbon; let’s tackle that separately from the others and leave tackling methane and nitrous oxide to purposefully created programs to tackle those things. Let’s not lump the calculations altogether, hiding all the differences and hiding meaningful action.
Is there still a role for life cycle analysis?
You don’t want to be regulating carbon using life cycle analysis. So you can use the life cycle analysis for qualitative purposes, but we’re pretending that it is a tool that can deliver accurate results, and it just doesn’t.
What has the response been like to this paper? What kind of feedback have you gotten?
Stunned silence!
Nobody has said anything?
In private, they have. Not in public. In private, it’s been a little bit like, “I’ve always thought this, but it seemed like there was no other way.” But then in public, think about it. Everything is built on LCA. It’s now in every single climate bill out there. Every single standard. Every single consulting company is doing LCA and doing carbon footprinting for companies. It’s a huge industry, so I guess I shouldn’t have been surprised to hear nothing publicly.
Yeah, I was gonna ask — I’ve been writing about the SEC rules and this idea that companies should start reporting their emissions to their investors, and that would all be based on LCA. There’s a lot of buy-in for that idea across the climate movement.
Yeah, but there’s definitely a fine line with make-believe. I think in many instances, we kid ourselves thinking that we’re going to have numbers that we can hang our hats on. In many instances we will not, and they will be challenged. And so at that point, what’s the point?
One thing I hear when I talk to people about this is, well, having an estimate is better than not having anything, or, don’t let the perfect be the enemy of the good, or, we can just keep working to make them better and better. Why not?
I mean, I wouldn’t say don’t try. But when it comes to actually enforcing anything, it’s going to be extremely hard to prove a number. You could just be stuck in litigation for a long time and still not have an answer.
I don’t know, to me it just seems like an endless debate while time is ticking and we will just feel good because we’ll have thought we measured everything. But we’re still not doing anything.
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A natural gas well in Kansas is not the same as an offshore wind farm in Maine.
It happened again. The Trump administration has struck a deal with an offshore wind developer to cancel another round of projects. My colleague Emily Pontecorvo has the full story: The Chicago-based company Invenergy has accepted $765 million to give up four offshore wind leases off the coast of New York, California, and Maine.
These deals might be legally suspect — Democratic state attorneys general sued to block them a few weeks ago — but the administration says more are coming. “The Department of Justice looks forward to continued cooperation from companies that are reevaluating their energy investments,” the official press release about today’s deal intones. I have to applaud the federal lawyer who chose the phrase “continued cooperation” here; it is suitably menacing while implying that developers who give in to the racket are somehow complicit.
If you read Heatmap, you knew a deal like this might be coming. As Emily writes, she predicted that Trump would target Invenergy for a deal back in April. Eyes now turn to the German developer RWE, which is sitting on two more leases and hasn’t yet taken a bargain.
Most observers have seen these deals as a front in the president’s war on wind power. And, of course, they are. But they should also be viewed as part of Trump’s peculiar attack on the economy of coastal states.
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By Heatmap’s tally, the Trump administration has now terminated the leases for more than 14 gigawatts of planned offshore wind capacity, or roughly enough to power at least 6 million to 7 million homes. More than half of those gigawatts were initially planned to go to New York and New Jersey’s strained power markets (and on from there to New England and the Mid-Atlantic).
Another 3.4 gigawatts were planned for Maine’s power grid. Maine already suffers from some of the highest power bills in the country, according to Heatmap and MIT’s Electricity Price Hub; its rates have risen more than 10% in the past year.
California was slated to get another 4 gigawatts, and the Carolinas were due the last remaining gigawatt.
What’s funny — or perhaps fishy, given the maritime setting — is that administration officials seem to realize that they shouldn’t be taking so much electricity generation off the map. Today’s Invenergy deal includes a new quasi-quid pro quo arrangement: In exchange for giving up its offshore wind leases, Invenergy agreed to develop natural gas or geothermal power plants in Indiana, Wisconsin, Iowa, Kansas, and Missouri. (Previous deals countenanced only fossil fuel development, so I suppose this counts as a “win.”)
But of course, as Hilary Bright, who leads the pro-wind group Turn Forward, argued this afternoon, that doesn’t work. “These buyouts are not one-for-one ‘swaps’ for another kind of energy,” she said in a statement. These wind farms were meant to bring new generation capacity online in some of the country’s most stressed power markets. It doesn’t work to cancel them, then build new power plants in the middle of the country. New York is particularly power-constrained at the moment and faces a risk of summertime blackouts as soon as the end of this decade. Invenergy’s wind leases in the tristate area — or, as FIFA would call it, New York/New Jersey — were closer to operation than any of its other projects.
If and when blackouts arrive in Gotham, will New Yorkers look back and remember this moment? Or — somewhat more importantly to Trump — will voters in Maine and North Carolina, both of which have elections this November that will help determine the balance of the Senate. Whatever happens, we’ll be watching it here at Heatmap.
The deal with developer Invenergy includes a commitment to build geothermal generation in addition to natural gas.
In the third deal of its kind, Trump’s Interior Department has agreed to pay the energy developer Invenergy $765 million to cancel its four offshore wind leases, an amount equal to what Invenergy originally paid the federal government for them.
Like the preceding deals, the administration structured the refund as a legal settlement with Invenergy. That means the government will pay the company out of the Judgment Fund, a reserve of taxpayer dollars overseen by the Department of Justice and the Treasury Department that’s set aside to settle litigation that’s either ongoing or imminent.
The Invenergy agreement follows a similar $928 million arrangement with TotalEnergies announced in March, and an $885 million agreement with several joint ventures in April. That brings the total amount the Trump administration has agreed to pay to cancel offshore wind leases to more than $2.5 billion to date. The agency has not yet posted the settlement publicly, but the previous agreements were predicated on hypothetical lawsuits that the offshore wind developers would have filed if the Trump administration had paused activity on their leases, which it threatened to do based on national security concerns.
The key difference in the Invenergy agreement is in the quid pro quo. The other settlements specified that the companies would only be eligible for payment after investing an equal amount into U.S. oil and gas projects. In exchange for walking away from its offshore wind leases, Invenergy promised not only to develop natural gas-fired power plants, but also geothermal power generation projects — which are emissions-free.
Invenergy is a diversified power developer that builds solar, storage, wind, and natural gas generation. The company currently has more than 30 gigawatts of solar in its development pipeline and 10 gigawatts of natural gas. It has not yet built a geothermal power plant, but it has leased 139,000 acres of federal land to explore geothermal development. It’s also a member of the Mountain West Geothermal Consortium, a group of states, investors, and companies working together to scale the technology.
Invenergy holds one offshore wind lease off the coast of New York and New Jersey that it purchased in 2022 for $645 million, where it was developing its Leading Light project before work stalled last November. It also has a lease off the coast of California that it acquired for $112 million, also in 2022, and two in the Gulf of Maine, for which it paid about $9 million in 2024.
In a blog post published Wednesday, Invenergy said the deal with the Trump administration would “bring more megawatts to the grid and advance projects that can move forward today,” implying that the projects the company will build instead of offshore wind will come online faster.
The problem with Trump’s quid pro quos across all of these deals is that there’s no guarantee the companies wouldn’t have invested the same amount of money into the same projects regardless of whether they were reimbursed for their offshore wind leases. In the case of Total, the settlement is explicit that projects the company had already committed to invest in prior to the deal qualify.
After the administration announced the second round of offshore wind lease buyouts in April, making it clear the strategy was not a one-off settlement with Total but a new strategy to squash the industry, I named Invenergy as one of two developers that could be next. The other one that seems positioned to reach a similar deal is RWE, a German energy company with plans to develop 15 natural gas plants in the U.S. RWE paid $1.1 billion in 2022 to purchase a lease off the coast of New York and New Jersey for a project called Community Offshore — the most any company has paid to date for U.S. offshore wind development rights. It also bought a lease in the Pacific for $121 million, and another in the Gulf of Mexico for about $4 million.
In a press release, the Interior Department signaled its intention to broker more such agreements. “The Department of Justice looks forward to continued cooperation from companies that are reevaluating their energy investments,” it said.
Legal experts I’ve spoken with are skeptical that any of these settlement agreements comply with federal law. The government’s leasing statutes generally do not allow companies to walk away from their agreement and receive a refund.
Earlier this month, a group of seven attorneys general from Northeast states challenged Trump’s deal with TotalEnergies in court. They alleged that there was no actual disagreement between the parties that would legitimize use of the Judgement Fund. They also argued that under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, the statute governing offshore wind, the Interior Department was required to hold a hearing to investigate whether continued activity on the lease would cause serious harm to the environment or national security before cancelling it.
The Trump administration has lost every lawsuit thrown its way so far challenging its actions on offshore wind. Last week, it quietly gave up its own appeal of a federal court’s December decision vacating Trump’s Day One Executive Order to halt wind energy approvals. The Invenergy deal suggests that this was less a sign of surrender in Trump’s wind war than part of a pivot to other strategies.
Editor’s note: This story has been updated to include the press release from the Department of the Interior.
That may be not be the case for long, though, as the AI company poaches energy talent from Google, Meta, the DOE, and others.
To the extent that any $965 billion artificial intelligence company built on pirated model training material can be “good-coded,” Anthropic has somehow managed to earn that reputation, at least relative to its peers. It’s somewhat surprising, then, that the company has been silent on climate change.
Until today. Sort of.
Frontier Climate, a corporate initiative to drive advances in carbon removal, announced a $915 million advance market commitment growth fund on Wednesday, naming Anthropic as one of the participating buyers.
Frontier supports projects that are capable of sucking large amounts of carbon out of the atmosphere, a solution scientists say is a critical supplement to reducing emissions in order to curb climate change. With the new fund, Frontier is shifting its focus from supporting early innovation to taking bigger swings on fewer, larger projects. Anthropic, alongside Google, Stripe, Shopify, and others, has committed to co-sign offtake agreements to buy the resulting carbon removal.
The news throws into relief Anthropic’s nearly complete absence from the clean energy development picture. The company’s primary contribution to climate change is its energy consumption, which is driving up coal and natural gas-fired power generation. According to data shared with Heatmap by the market intelligence company Cleanview, the average carbon intensity of Anthropic’s data centers is among the highest of its competitors, second only to xAI. Yet unlike many of peers, the company has not announced a single clean power purchase agreement to date.
Anthropic’s reputation as the ethical AI company traces back to its origin story, which begins with a guy leaving OpenAI to build a company more committed to AI safety. That guy, Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei, speaks and writes openly about the risks to humanity posed by powerful AI. Anthropic has also donated millions to support the development of AI regulations and prohibited the use of its models for mass surveillance or autonomous weapons, putting it at odds with the Trump administration. The company has focused on text-based products, in part to avoid the risk of users creating child sexual abuse material.
To date, however, the company has not publicized any sustainability strategy, nor has it published an annual sustainability report. It has not made any public commitments to use clean energy or reduce emissions. It is not a member of the Corporate Energy Buyers Association, a trade group representing companies that buy emissions-free energy. The only mention of any of the above themes in the company’s “Transparency Hub” is a note that many of its customers use Claude, Anthropic’s AI model, to “increase public health, education, environmental sustainability, and societal benefits.”
To be fair, it’s not that Anthropic has never discussed clean power. In a July 2025 report titled “Building AI in America,” the company made recommendations for ensuring the U.S. can support a competitive AI industry. It advocated for an “all of the above” approach to power generation to meet AI demand in the near term, which would “maximize opportunities for AI to catalyze emerging energy technologies, such as next-generation geothermal and advanced nuclear” down the line. It endorsed permitting reform to speed up transmission development and called for increased domestic production of electrical grid equipment.
In a section on the use of federal lands, the report also made a subtle dig at the Trump administration’s discriminatory policies against wind and solar. It noted that “solar, batteries, and geothermal may prove the most economically efficient choices before advanced nuclear power comes online,” and that “limiting developers’ opportunities to procure some power sources but not others” could make American AI “less competitive in a period of global competition.”
From one perspective, it makes sense that Anthropic hasn’t gone out of its way to procure clean power. To date, the company has mostly leased data center capacity from other providers that do have clean power commitments, including Amazon and Google. That will soon be the case no longer, however, as it is planning to both build its own data centers and rent capacity from xAI’s Colossus data centers, which rely heavily on power from on-site natural gas turbines. Colossus is currently the subject of a lawsuit filed by the NAACP over its air pollution.
Anthropic also doesn’t need to own and operate its own data centers to assume responsibility on climate change. Jane Flegal, a senior fellow at the think tank the Searchlight Institute, argued in a recent paper that companies should forget trying to minimize their individual carbon footprints and just make the most high-leverage investments they can, whether that’s helping to finance a geothermal power plant or a transmission line or a new transformer for the grid.
Anthropic did not respond to my inquiry for this story, but there’s some evidence to suggest that the company may be starting to take on climate and clean energy beyond the Frontier deal.
In March and April, Anthropic made three new hires to lead its energy strategy who all have a background in clean power. Ariel Horowitz is the company’s new data center energy lead. She previously spent five years at the Massachusetts Clean Energy Center before becoming the deputy director of grid modernization at the federal Department of Energy during the Biden administration. Sana Ouiji, who spent six years at Google working on data center clean energy strategy, is one of Anthropic’s new energy leads. Another new energy lead, Andrew Rudersdorf, came from roles sourcing energy for Meta’s data centers, including renewables.
The company is also currently hiring for a director of infrastructure and energy accounting, and looking for someone with “experience accounting for energy contracts — Power Purchase Agreements, Virtual PPAs, Renewable Energy Credits, or similar commodity arrangements,” according to the job listing.
Anthropic also appears to be preparing for mandatory emissions reporting rules that large companies will soon be subject to in California and the European Union. In April, the company hired Chris Power, who previously worked in sustainability reporting for Amazon and Salesforce, as its new head of non-financial reporting and strategy, according to LinkedIn. In a post announcing his new job, Power said part of his role would be building out the company’s sustainability reporting capabilities.
While funding carbon removal through Frontier is a major step forward for Anthropic on climate, the company is sure to face criticism over its order of operations. Scientists largely agree that carbon removal is an important solution for down the line, but only if the world also dramatically reduces the amount of carbon it emits in the first place — not least because doing so is less expensive and less resource-intensive than removing emissions in the future.
My colleague Robinson Meyer had Hannah Bebbington Valori, the head of Frontier, on his podcast Shift Key this morning, and asked her whether Anthropic is an example of the common concern that the potential to remove carbon from the atmosphere in the future could be used to delay cutting emissions today.
Bebbington Valori didn’t comment on Anthropic specifically. But she did say that most of the companies buying carbon removal with Frontier and otherwise do have broader climate programs. She also noted that buying carbon removal from Frontier is not a “get out jail free card,” since it costs hundreds of dollars per carbon credit, and that in general the world is spending a lot more money on decarbonization than carbon removal.
“And then, you know, the other way to answer this question,” she added, “is we should hold folks’ feet to the fire on this. People who buy carbon removal, people who don’t buy carbon removal, should be thinking about decarbonizing their emissions.”