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Life cycle analysis has some problems.

About six months ago, a climate scientist from Arizona State University, Stephanie Arcusa, emailed me a provocative new paper she had published that warned against our growing reliance on life cycle analysis. This practice of measuring all of the emissions related to a given product or service throughout every phase of its life — from the time raw materials are extracted to eventual disposal — was going to hinder our ability to achieve net-zero emissions, she wrote. It was a busy time, and I let the message drift to the bottom of my inbox. But I couldn’t stop thinking about it.
Life cycle analysis permeates the climate economy. Businesses rely on it to understand their emissions so they can work toward reducing them. The Securities and Exchange Commission’s climate risk disclosure rule, which requires companies to report their emissions to investors, hinges on it. The clean hydrogen tax credit requires hydrogen producers to do a version of life cycle analysis to prove their eligibility. It is central to carbon markets, and carbon removal companies are now developing standards based on life cycle analysis to “certify” their services as carbon offset developers did before them.
At the same time, many of the fiercest debates in climate change are really debates about life cycle analysis. Should companies be held responsible for the emissions that are indirectly related to their businesses, and if so then which ones? Are carbon offsets a sham? Does using corn ethanol as a gasoline substitute reduce emissions or increase them? Scientists have repeatedly reached opposite conclusions on that one depending on how they accounted for the land required to grow corn and what it might have been used for had ethanol not been an option. Though the debate plays out in calculations, it’s really a philosophical brawl.
Everybody, for the most part, knows that life cycle analysis is difficult and thorny and imprecise. But over and over, experts and critics alike assert that it can be improved. Arcusa disagrees. Life cycle analysis, she says, is fundamentally broken. “It’s a problematic and uncomfortable conclusion to arrive at,” Arcusa wrote in her email. “On the one hand, it has been the only tool we have had to make any progress on climate. On the other, carbon accounting is captured by academia and vested interests and will jeopardize global climate goals.”
When I recently revisited the paper, I learned that Arcusa and her co-authors didn’t just critique life cycle analysis, they proposed a bold alternative. Their idea is not economically or politically easy, but it also doesn’t suffer from the problems of trying to track carbon throughout the supply chain. I recently called her up to talk through it. Our conversation has been edited for clarity.
Can you walk me through what the biggest issues with life cycle analysis are?
So, life cycle analysis is a qualitative tool —
It seems kind of counterintuitive or even controversial to call it a qualitative tool because it’s specifically trying to quantify something.
I think the best analogy for LCA is that it’s a back-of-the-envelope tool. If you really could measure everything, then sure, LCA is this wonderful idea. The problem is in the practicality of being able to collect all of that data. We can’t, and that leads us to use emissions factors and average numbers, and we model this and we model that, and we get so far away from reality that we actually can’t tell if something is positive or negative in the end.
The other problem is that it’s almost entirely subjective, which makes one LCA incomparable to another LCA depending on the context, depending on the technology. And yes, there are some standardization efforts that have been going on for decades. But if you have a ruler, no matter how much you try, it’s not going to become a screwdriver. We’re trying to use this tool to quantify things and make them the same for comparison, and we can’t because of that subjectivity.
In this space where there is a lot of money to be made, it’s very easy to manipulate things one way or another to make it look a little bit better because the method is not robust. That’s really the gist of the problems here.
One of the things you talk about in the paper is the way life cycle analysis is subject to different worldviews. Can you explain that?
It’s mostly seen in what to include or exclude in the LCA — it can have enormous impacts on the results. I think corn ethanol is the perfect example of how tedious this can be because we still don’t have an answer, precisely for that reason. The uncertainty range of the results has shrunk and gotten bigger and shrunk and gotten bigger, and it’s like, well, we still don’t know. And now, this exact same worldview debate is playing into what should be included and not included in certification for things [like carbon removal] that are going to be sold under the guise of climate action, and that just can’t be. We’ll be forever debating whether something is true.
Is this one of those things that scientists have been debating for ever, or is this argument that we should stop using life cycle analysis more of a fringe idea?
I guess I would call it a fringe idea today. There’s been plenty of criticism throughout the years, even from the very beginning when it was first created. What I have seen is that there is criticism, and then there is, “But here’s how we can solve it and continue using LCA!” I’ve only come across one other publication that specifically said, “This is not working. This is not the right tool,” and that’s from Michael Gillenwater. He’s at the Greenhouse Gas Management Institute. He was like, “What are we doing?” There might be other folks, I just haven’t come across them.
Okay, so what is the alternative to LCA that you’ve proposed in this paper?
LCA targets the middle of the supply chain, and tries to attribute responsibility there. But if you think about where on the supply chain the carbon is the most well-known, it is actually at the source, at the point of origin, before it becomes an emission. At the point where it is created out of the ground is where we know how much carbon there is. If we focus on that source through a policy that requires mandatory sequestration — for every ton of carbon that is now produced, there is a ton of carbon that’s been put away through carbon removal, and the accounting happens there, before it is sold to anybody — anybody who’s now downstream of that supply chain is already carbon neutral. There is no need to track carbon all the way down to the consumer.
We know this is accurate because that is where governments already collect royalties and taxes — they want to know exactly how much is being sold. So we already do this. The big difference is that the policy would be required there instead of taxing everybody downstream.
You’re saying that fossil fuel producers should be required to remove a ton of carbon from the atmosphere for every ton of carbon in the fuels they sell?
Yeah, and maybe I should be more specific. They should pay for an equal amount of carbon to be removed from the atmosphere. In no way are we implying that a fossil carbon producer needs to also be doing the sequestration themselves.
What would be the biggest challenges of implementing something like this?
The ultimate challenge is convincing people that we need to be managing carbon and that this is a waste management type of system. Nobody really wants to pay for waste management, and so it needs to be regulated and demanded by some authority.
What about the fact that we don’t really have the ability to remove carbon or store carbon at scale today, and may not for some time?
Yes, we need to build capacity so that eventually we can match the carbon production to the carbon removal, which is why we also proposed that the liability needs to start today, not in the future. That liability is as good as a credit card debt — you actually have to pay it. It can be paid little by little every year, but the liability is here now, and not in the future.
The risk in the system that I’m describing, or even the system that is currently being deployed, is that you have counterproductive technologies that are being developed. And by counterproductive, I mean [carbon removal] technologies that are producing more emissions than they are storing, and so they’re net-positive. You can create a technology that has no intention of removing more carbon than its sequesters. The intention is just to earn money.
Do you mean, like, the things that are supposed to be removing carbon from the atmosphere and sequestering it, they are using fossil fuels to do that, and end up releasing more carbon in the process?
Yeah, so basically, what we show in the paper is that when we get to full carbon neutrality, the market forces alone will eliminate those kinds of technologies that are counterproductive. The problem is during the transition, these technologies can be economically viable because they are cheaper than they would be if 100% of the fossil fuel they used was carbon neutral through carbon removal. And so in order to prevent those technologies from gaming the system, we need a way to artificially make the price of fossil carbon as expensive as it would be if 100% of that fossil carbon was covered by carbon removal.
That’s where the idea of permits comes in. For every amount that I produce, I now have an instant liability, which is a permit. Each of those permits has to be matched by carbon removal. And since we don’t have enough carbon removal, we have futures and these futures represent the promise of actually doing carbon removal.
What if we burn through the remaining carbon budget and we still don’t have the capacity to sequester enough carbon?
Well, then we’re going into very unchartered territory. Right now we’re just mindlessly going through this thinking that if we just reduce emissions it will be good. It won’t be good.
In the paper, you also argue against mitigating greenhouse gases other than carbon, and that seems pretty controversial to me. Why is that?
We’re not arguing against mitigating, per se. We’re arguing against lumping everything under the same carbon accounting framework because lumping hides the difficulty in actually doing something about it. It’s not that we shouldn’t mitigate other greenhouse gases — we must. It’s just that if we separate the problem of carbon away from the problem of methane, away from the problem of nitrous oxide, or CFCs, we can tackle them more effectively. Because right now, we’re trying to do everything under the same umbrella, and that doesn’t work. We don’t tackle drinking and driving by sponsoring better tires. That’s just silly, right? We wouldn’t do that. We would tackle drinking and driving on its own, and then we would tackle better tires in a different policy.
So the argument is: Most of climate change is caused by carbon; let’s tackle that separately from the others and leave tackling methane and nitrous oxide to purposefully created programs to tackle those things. Let’s not lump the calculations altogether, hiding all the differences and hiding meaningful action.
Is there still a role for life cycle analysis?
You don’t want to be regulating carbon using life cycle analysis. So you can use the life cycle analysis for qualitative purposes, but we’re pretending that it is a tool that can deliver accurate results, and it just doesn’t.
What has the response been like to this paper? What kind of feedback have you gotten?
Stunned silence!
Nobody has said anything?
In private, they have. Not in public. In private, it’s been a little bit like, “I’ve always thought this, but it seemed like there was no other way.” But then in public, think about it. Everything is built on LCA. It’s now in every single climate bill out there. Every single standard. Every single consulting company is doing LCA and doing carbon footprinting for companies. It’s a huge industry, so I guess I shouldn’t have been surprised to hear nothing publicly.
Yeah, I was gonna ask — I’ve been writing about the SEC rules and this idea that companies should start reporting their emissions to their investors, and that would all be based on LCA. There’s a lot of buy-in for that idea across the climate movement.
Yeah, but there’s definitely a fine line with make-believe. I think in many instances, we kid ourselves thinking that we’re going to have numbers that we can hang our hats on. In many instances we will not, and they will be challenged. And so at that point, what’s the point?
One thing I hear when I talk to people about this is, well, having an estimate is better than not having anything, or, don’t let the perfect be the enemy of the good, or, we can just keep working to make them better and better. Why not?
I mean, I wouldn’t say don’t try. But when it comes to actually enforcing anything, it’s going to be extremely hard to prove a number. You could just be stuck in litigation for a long time and still not have an answer.
I don’t know, to me it just seems like an endless debate while time is ticking and we will just feel good because we’ll have thought we measured everything. But we’re still not doing anything.
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Two new reports out this week create a seemingly contradictory portrait of the country’s energy transition progress.
Two clean energy reports out this week offer seemingly contradictory snapshots of domestic solar and battery manufacturing. One, released Wednesday by the Rhodium Group’s Clean Investment Monitor, shows a distinct decline in investment going into U.S. factories to make more of these technologies. The other, released today by the trade group American Clean Power Association, shows staggering recent growth in production capacity.
So which is it? Is U.S. clean energy manufacturing booming or busting?
Maybe both.
The U.S. is suddenly producing more solar and batteries than ever before — enough to meet current domestic demand — so it makes sense that investment in new factories is starting to slow. At the same time, there’s a lot of room for growth in producing the upstream components that go into these technologies, but the U.S. is no longer as attractive a place to set up shop as it was over the past four years.
The U.S. saw 30 new utility-scale solar factories and 30 new battery factories come online last year alone, according to ACP. The country now has the capacity to meet average domestic demand for storage systems through 2030, and can produce enough solar panels to satisfy demand two times over.
In both industries, nearly all of that capacity has been added since 2022, when the Inflation Reduction Act created new subsidies for domestic manufacturing. The advanced manufacturing production tax credit incentivized not just solar and battery factories, but also all the production of components that go into these technologies, including solar and battery cells, polysilicon, wafers, and anodes. On top of these direct subsidies, the IRA generated demand for U.S.-made products by granting bonus tax credits for utility-scale solar and battery projects built with domestically produced parts.
“The policy definitely laid the right foundation for a lot of this investment to take place,” John Hensley, ACP’s senior vice president of markets and policy analysis, told me.
Trump’s One Big Beautiful Bill Act has changed the environment, however. The utility-scale wind and solar tax credits were supposed to apply through at least 2033, but now projects have to start construction by July 4, 2026 — just over a month from now — in order to claim them. Any of those projects that got started this year will also have to adhere to complex new sourcing rules prohibiting Chinese-made materials.
Now, dollars flowing into new U.S. solar factories appears to be on the decline. Investment fell 22% between the fourth quarter of last year and the first of 2026. Battery manufacturing investment dropped by 16%.
The reason investment is declining is not entirely because of OBBBA — it’s partly a function of the fact that a lot of the projects announced immediately after the IRA passed are entering operations, Hannah Hess, director of climate and energy at the Rhodium Group, told me.
Rhodium’s Clean Investment Monitor tracks two metrics, announcements and investment. Announcements are when a company says it’s building a new factory or expanding an existing one, usually with some kind of projected cost. Investments are an estimate of the actual dollars spent during a given quarter on facility construction, calculated based on the total project budget and the expected amount of time it will take to complete after breaking ground.
According to Rhodium’s data, the peak period for new solar manufacturing project announcements was the second half of 2022 through the first quarter of 2025. During that time, announcements averaged more than $2 billion per quarter. New solar factories announced this past quarter, by contrast, fell to about $350 million.
Since it can take a while to get steel in the ground, the peak period for investment was slightly later, with $13.5 billion invested between the second quarter of 2023 and the third quarter of 2025.
“What we were seeing in that post-IRA period was huge, almost unconstrained growth in that sector, and that’s not happening anymore,” Hess said.
Most of this growth occurred all the way downstream, at the final product assembly level — i.e. factories making solar and battery modules that still had to import many of the components that went into them. This was the “lowest hanging fruit” to bring to the U.S., Hensley, of ACP, told me, as the final assembly is the least technologically challenging part of the supply chain.
“These supply chains have momentum as they get going,” he said, “so as you establish those far downstream component manufacturing, you start to recruit all of the upstream manufacturing.” In other words, a solar cell manufacturer is far more likely to build in the U.S. if there’s a robust local market of module factories to buy the cells.
There’s evidence that’s still happening in spite of changes to the tax credit structure. The ACP report says that three solar cell factories came online between 2024 and today — one per year. If all of the additional factories that have been announced are built by 2030, the U.S. will have nearly enough capacity to meet all of its own demand for solar with domestic cells. Battery cell capacity is growing even faster, with three factories as of the end of 2025 and seven more expected to be complete by the end of this year, which will produce more than enough units to meet average annual demand.
It’s the next step up on the supply chain that spells trouble. For solar, that’s ingots and wafers, followed by polysilicon. Today, the only producer of ingots and wafers in the U.S. is a company called Corning. It produces enough to meet about 25% of current domestic solar cell production, but cell production will more than quadruple by the end of this year compared to last year, according to ACP. Similarly, we produce enough polysilicon to meet Corning’s current needs, but not enough to meet anticipated cell demand. The announced projects in the pipeline will not add much on either front.
For batteries, it’s the anodes and cathodes. There’s currently one factory in California producing cathodes and at least one more under construction, but as there is nothing else in the pipeline, the ACP report expects cell manufacturers to rely on imported cathodes for the foreseeable future. Anodes are the one bright spot — there’s one factory producing what’s known as active anode material factory in the U.S., and four more anticipated by the end of this year. Together, they have the potential to meet demand by 2028, according to ACP.
The question now is whether that snowball effect kicked off by the IRA will continue. “A lot has changed about the outlook for future demand after the One Big Beautiful Bill Act passed,” Hess said. “We have seen some more project cancellations and pauses in construction recently.”
Most recently, a company called Maxeon Solar Technologies canceled a $1 billion cell and module factory in New Mexico. The company had been “fighting for its life” since 2024, according to Canary Media. It’s also majority owned by a Chinese state-owned company. The
OBBBA was likely the nail in the coffin, as it penalizes solar developers who source panels from companies with Chinese ownership.
OBBBA also shortened the timeline for the wind and solar tax credits, while the Trump administration’s hostility to wind and solar permitting has made it more difficult for projects to get built before the credits expire. Hensley said the Trump administration’s hostility toward clean energy has added a lot of risk into the system, complicating final investment decisions for manufacturers.
On the flip side, tariffs have the potential to help some domestic producers. Duties on imports from countries such as Cambodia, India, and Vietnam, all major manufacturers of solar panels, “have made their exports to the U.S. almost prohibitive,” Lara Hayim, the head of solar research at BloombergNEF, told me in an email. “This sort of policy framework could continue to provide some protection for domestic manufacturers,” she said, but there are still plenty of countries with low enough tariffs that they will continue to serve the U.S. and compete with domestic manufacturers.
Hensley said that the Trump administration’s tariffs were a double edged sword. They can help domestic manufacturers, but not if they make all of the inputs into the product more expensive.
“That’s a problem with these blanket type of tariffs that aren’t really fine-tuned to target the behavior that you’d like to see,” he told me. “I think we’re seeing a lot of that push and pull and tension in the system at the moment.”
Between Trump’s tariffs and the OBBBA, there’s no doubt that the manufacturing boom sparked by the IRA is slowing. But Hensley is optimistic that the progress will continue. “We haven’t attracted all of the supply chain yet. It’s still a work in progress, but so far the signs are quite good.”
This week’s conversation is with Duncan Campbell of DER Task Force and it’s about a big question: What makes a socially responsible data center? Campbell’s expansive background and recent focus on this issue made me take note when he recently asked that question on X. Instead of popping up in his replies, I asked him to join me here in The Fight. So shall we get started?
Oh, as always, the following conversation was lightly edited for clarity.
Alright let’s start with the big question: What is a socially responsible data center?
So first, there’s water, which I think is pretty solvable.
Part of me thinks water is not even the right thing to be focusing on necessarily, and it’s surprising that it became at least for a while the center of the controversy around data centers.
I think there’s energy, which is mostly a don’t-raise-people’s-bills kind of thing. Or in extreme cases, actually reducing people’s access to energy.”
I think air pollution is another key. This is one of the biggest own-goals our [climate] space is making, because people are installing behind-the-meter power and we can talk about why they’re doing that, the shifting reasons, but the real shame in it is you really shouldn’t have to run those 24/7. If you’re building your own power plant, it should enable you to get a grid connection, because you’re bringing your own capacity and they can provide you firm service, and you should only have to run that gas plant 1% of the year, so air pollution is a non-issue. If only the grid and its institutions could get their act together, this is a no-brainer. But instead people run them 24/7.
There’s noise, which has been very misunderstood and bungled on a handful of well-known projects. That’s just a do-good engineering and site layout type of problem.
And then there’s other. Beyond the very concrete impacts of a data center, what else can it do for the community it's siting itself in? That’s going to be specific for every community.
There’s going to be a perspective that data centers are takers. They get tax incentives. They’re this big new thing. If data centers were to bring something compelling when [they’re] siting in communities, and it is specific to whatever they’re dealing with, maybe they’d be considered socially responsible.
I don’t think I have the master answer here. Everyone’s trying to figure it out.”
What do you hear from other folks in decarb and climate spaces when you ask this question? Do you hear people come up with solutions, or do they knock down the entire premise of the question — that there isn’t such a thing as a socially responsible data center?
You get both. You definitely get both. It depends on who you're talking to.
I can understand both sides of the equation here. There’s definitely solutions, first of all. I do think there’s a group of people whether it is in the energy world or the data center world or tech who would have this incredulous disbelief that anyone could not want what they’re doing. And that then, after being poked and prodded enough, transforms into a very elitist, almost pejorative explanation of everybody’s just NIMBYs.
I think that’s really unproductive. It kind of just throws gas on the fire.
But there’s a lot of people working on solutions, too. The non-firm grid service thing is just a huge opportunity. To be able to connect these sites to the grid in such a manner they either get curtailed some small amount of hours per year or they show up with accredited capacity, absolving them from curtailing. I mean, we can do that. It’s very doable.
The second question becomes, what are the forms of accredited capacity that can be deployed quickly? I think that’s where there’s a lot of cool stuff around VPPs and such. Sure, build a gas power plant, run it once or twice a year. If anything that’s good for a community — back-up power at grid scale.
There’s also other solutions. A really cool effort right now, former Tesla people building a purely solar and battery DC microgrid in New Mexico.
And there’s also a lot of inertia. The folks making decisions about data centers have been doing stuff a certain way for 20 years and it’s hard to change. The inertia within the culture combined with the enormous pressure to deploy just makes it less dynamic than one would hope.
On my end, I’ve been grappling with the issue of tax revenue. We’re seeing a declining amount of money for social services, things that can really help people for both personal and academic reasons. There's quite a bit a lot of people could say on that topic. At the same time, this is another form of industrial development. People are upset at the amount of resources going to this specific thing.
So when it comes to the data center boom in general, where do you stand on social cost-versus-benefit analysis?
That’s a good question. I’m not an expert. I’m mostly just someone who designs energy projects. But I can say where I’m at personally.
Yeah, but isn’t everyone in the energy space talking about data centers? Shouldn’t we all be thinking about this?
Of course. I’m not in a place to proclaim what is right but I’ll tell you where I’m at right now.
With any large-scale industrial build out it is tough relative to other technological changes that were simpler at the infrastructure layer. Like, the smartphone. Massive technological change but pretty straightforward in a lot of ways. But industrial buildout stresses real physical resources, so people have much more of an opinion of whether it’s worth it or not.
I’m pretty optimistic about AI generally. It’s very hand-wave-y. It’s hard to cite data or anything, because we’re talking about something that hasn’t happened yet, but I’m very optimistic about increasing the amount of intelligence we have access to per person on Earth.
A similar thing I think about is when everyone stopped getting lead poisoning all the time, we all jumped five IQ points and killed each other less. Intelligence is good. A lot of our story as a species is about increasing intelligence and learnings-per-person so we can do more. The idea that we would be able to synthesize it, operate it as a machine outside of our own bodies. It feels pretty inevitable.
There’s questions about what that [AI] will do to the economy and jobs, which is what people are really concerned about and is the case with any major technological change.
Are data centers being deployed at a rate and in a way that is responsible? Like, does it need to be this fast? That’s a question people ask and that’s in a way the question being posed by the moratoriums. They’re not saying let’s ban this forever. They’re saying, let’s take a breather. And I do understand that.
There’s a lot of good solutions that could just be pursued and it’s hard for me to separate my feelings about the current path data centers are taking from what I think is objectively right. We could just be doing way better.
On the energy front, what do you make of the way our energy mix — carbon versus renewables, our resilience — is headed? And where do you think we’re heading in five years?
For the energy and climate world, this is the real question. Data centers are a complicated thing but at the end of the day, for us, they’re a source of electricity demand.
From an electricity perspective, there’s been no growth for 20 years. So the theory of addressing climate change was, as the old stuff breaks we’ll replace it with new clean stuff. That was what we were doing, while saying, a lot of the old stuff we’ll keep around. We’ll layer on the new clean stuff.
It was always the case though that we could enter a new phase of electricity growth. Actually, five years ago, when the phrase “electrify everything” was coined, it explicitly became our goal! We were going to massively and rapidly grow the electricity system in order to switch industry, heating, and transport off of fossil fuels. That’s the right prescription, the right way to do it.
My understanding of it is that while this feels really big, because we haven’t grown in so long, compared to the challenge we were all talking about doing is not big at all. It increases the challenge by 15% or 20%. That’s meaningful. But it just seems like we should be able to do this.
From a climate perspective, as someone who’s been trying to do everything I can on it for a while now, I can’t help but feel a little dismayed that today the growth we’re experiencing is some tiny, tiny percentage of what we actually set out to do. And it’s causing chaos. We’re institutionally falling apart from a single percent of what our goals should be.
This is the time for the electrification case. We can all demonstrate this is possible over the next few years. I think confidence in the electricity system as our energy path can remain high. Or this utterly fails, where it’s really hard to imagine governments and businesses making any sincere attempt at a high electrification pathway.
Plus the week’s biggest development fights.
1. LaPorte County, Indiana — If you’re wondering where data centers are still being embraced in the U.S., look no further than the northwest Indiana city of LaPorte.
2. Cumberland County, New Jersey — A broader splashback against AI infrastructure is building in South Jersey.
3. Washington County, Oregon — Hillsboro, a data center hub in Oregon, is turning to a moratorium.
4. Champaign County, Ohio — We’re still watching the slow downfall of solar in Ohio and there’s no sign of it getting any better.
5. Essex County, New York — Man oh man, what’s going on with battery storage in rural pockets of the Empire State?