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Life cycle analysis has some problems.

About six months ago, a climate scientist from Arizona State University, Stephanie Arcusa, emailed me a provocative new paper she had published that warned against our growing reliance on life cycle analysis. This practice of measuring all of the emissions related to a given product or service throughout every phase of its life — from the time raw materials are extracted to eventual disposal — was going to hinder our ability to achieve net-zero emissions, she wrote. It was a busy time, and I let the message drift to the bottom of my inbox. But I couldn’t stop thinking about it.
Life cycle analysis permeates the climate economy. Businesses rely on it to understand their emissions so they can work toward reducing them. The Securities and Exchange Commission’s climate risk disclosure rule, which requires companies to report their emissions to investors, hinges on it. The clean hydrogen tax credit requires hydrogen producers to do a version of life cycle analysis to prove their eligibility. It is central to carbon markets, and carbon removal companies are now developing standards based on life cycle analysis to “certify” their services as carbon offset developers did before them.
At the same time, many of the fiercest debates in climate change are really debates about life cycle analysis. Should companies be held responsible for the emissions that are indirectly related to their businesses, and if so then which ones? Are carbon offsets a sham? Does using corn ethanol as a gasoline substitute reduce emissions or increase them? Scientists have repeatedly reached opposite conclusions on that one depending on how they accounted for the land required to grow corn and what it might have been used for had ethanol not been an option. Though the debate plays out in calculations, it’s really a philosophical brawl.
Everybody, for the most part, knows that life cycle analysis is difficult and thorny and imprecise. But over and over, experts and critics alike assert that it can be improved. Arcusa disagrees. Life cycle analysis, she says, is fundamentally broken. “It’s a problematic and uncomfortable conclusion to arrive at,” Arcusa wrote in her email. “On the one hand, it has been the only tool we have had to make any progress on climate. On the other, carbon accounting is captured by academia and vested interests and will jeopardize global climate goals.”
When I recently revisited the paper, I learned that Arcusa and her co-authors didn’t just critique life cycle analysis, they proposed a bold alternative. Their idea is not economically or politically easy, but it also doesn’t suffer from the problems of trying to track carbon throughout the supply chain. I recently called her up to talk through it. Our conversation has been edited for clarity.
Can you walk me through what the biggest issues with life cycle analysis are?
So, life cycle analysis is a qualitative tool —
It seems kind of counterintuitive or even controversial to call it a qualitative tool because it’s specifically trying to quantify something.
I think the best analogy for LCA is that it’s a back-of-the-envelope tool. If you really could measure everything, then sure, LCA is this wonderful idea. The problem is in the practicality of being able to collect all of that data. We can’t, and that leads us to use emissions factors and average numbers, and we model this and we model that, and we get so far away from reality that we actually can’t tell if something is positive or negative in the end.
The other problem is that it’s almost entirely subjective, which makes one LCA incomparable to another LCA depending on the context, depending on the technology. And yes, there are some standardization efforts that have been going on for decades. But if you have a ruler, no matter how much you try, it’s not going to become a screwdriver. We’re trying to use this tool to quantify things and make them the same for comparison, and we can’t because of that subjectivity.
In this space where there is a lot of money to be made, it’s very easy to manipulate things one way or another to make it look a little bit better because the method is not robust. That’s really the gist of the problems here.
One of the things you talk about in the paper is the way life cycle analysis is subject to different worldviews. Can you explain that?
It’s mostly seen in what to include or exclude in the LCA — it can have enormous impacts on the results. I think corn ethanol is the perfect example of how tedious this can be because we still don’t have an answer, precisely for that reason. The uncertainty range of the results has shrunk and gotten bigger and shrunk and gotten bigger, and it’s like, well, we still don’t know. And now, this exact same worldview debate is playing into what should be included and not included in certification for things [like carbon removal] that are going to be sold under the guise of climate action, and that just can’t be. We’ll be forever debating whether something is true.
Is this one of those things that scientists have been debating for ever, or is this argument that we should stop using life cycle analysis more of a fringe idea?
I guess I would call it a fringe idea today. There’s been plenty of criticism throughout the years, even from the very beginning when it was first created. What I have seen is that there is criticism, and then there is, “But here’s how we can solve it and continue using LCA!” I’ve only come across one other publication that specifically said, “This is not working. This is not the right tool,” and that’s from Michael Gillenwater. He’s at the Greenhouse Gas Management Institute. He was like, “What are we doing?” There might be other folks, I just haven’t come across them.
Okay, so what is the alternative to LCA that you’ve proposed in this paper?
LCA targets the middle of the supply chain, and tries to attribute responsibility there. But if you think about where on the supply chain the carbon is the most well-known, it is actually at the source, at the point of origin, before it becomes an emission. At the point where it is created out of the ground is where we know how much carbon there is. If we focus on that source through a policy that requires mandatory sequestration — for every ton of carbon that is now produced, there is a ton of carbon that’s been put away through carbon removal, and the accounting happens there, before it is sold to anybody — anybody who’s now downstream of that supply chain is already carbon neutral. There is no need to track carbon all the way down to the consumer.
We know this is accurate because that is where governments already collect royalties and taxes — they want to know exactly how much is being sold. So we already do this. The big difference is that the policy would be required there instead of taxing everybody downstream.
You’re saying that fossil fuel producers should be required to remove a ton of carbon from the atmosphere for every ton of carbon in the fuels they sell?
Yeah, and maybe I should be more specific. They should pay for an equal amount of carbon to be removed from the atmosphere. In no way are we implying that a fossil carbon producer needs to also be doing the sequestration themselves.
What would be the biggest challenges of implementing something like this?
The ultimate challenge is convincing people that we need to be managing carbon and that this is a waste management type of system. Nobody really wants to pay for waste management, and so it needs to be regulated and demanded by some authority.
What about the fact that we don’t really have the ability to remove carbon or store carbon at scale today, and may not for some time?
Yes, we need to build capacity so that eventually we can match the carbon production to the carbon removal, which is why we also proposed that the liability needs to start today, not in the future. That liability is as good as a credit card debt — you actually have to pay it. It can be paid little by little every year, but the liability is here now, and not in the future.
The risk in the system that I’m describing, or even the system that is currently being deployed, is that you have counterproductive technologies that are being developed. And by counterproductive, I mean [carbon removal] technologies that are producing more emissions than they are storing, and so they’re net-positive. You can create a technology that has no intention of removing more carbon than its sequesters. The intention is just to earn money.
Do you mean, like, the things that are supposed to be removing carbon from the atmosphere and sequestering it, they are using fossil fuels to do that, and end up releasing more carbon in the process?
Yeah, so basically, what we show in the paper is that when we get to full carbon neutrality, the market forces alone will eliminate those kinds of technologies that are counterproductive. The problem is during the transition, these technologies can be economically viable because they are cheaper than they would be if 100% of the fossil fuel they used was carbon neutral through carbon removal. And so in order to prevent those technologies from gaming the system, we need a way to artificially make the price of fossil carbon as expensive as it would be if 100% of that fossil carbon was covered by carbon removal.
That’s where the idea of permits comes in. For every amount that I produce, I now have an instant liability, which is a permit. Each of those permits has to be matched by carbon removal. And since we don’t have enough carbon removal, we have futures and these futures represent the promise of actually doing carbon removal.
What if we burn through the remaining carbon budget and we still don’t have the capacity to sequester enough carbon?
Well, then we’re going into very unchartered territory. Right now we’re just mindlessly going through this thinking that if we just reduce emissions it will be good. It won’t be good.
In the paper, you also argue against mitigating greenhouse gases other than carbon, and that seems pretty controversial to me. Why is that?
We’re not arguing against mitigating, per se. We’re arguing against lumping everything under the same carbon accounting framework because lumping hides the difficulty in actually doing something about it. It’s not that we shouldn’t mitigate other greenhouse gases — we must. It’s just that if we separate the problem of carbon away from the problem of methane, away from the problem of nitrous oxide, or CFCs, we can tackle them more effectively. Because right now, we’re trying to do everything under the same umbrella, and that doesn’t work. We don’t tackle drinking and driving by sponsoring better tires. That’s just silly, right? We wouldn’t do that. We would tackle drinking and driving on its own, and then we would tackle better tires in a different policy.
So the argument is: Most of climate change is caused by carbon; let’s tackle that separately from the others and leave tackling methane and nitrous oxide to purposefully created programs to tackle those things. Let’s not lump the calculations altogether, hiding all the differences and hiding meaningful action.
Is there still a role for life cycle analysis?
You don’t want to be regulating carbon using life cycle analysis. So you can use the life cycle analysis for qualitative purposes, but we’re pretending that it is a tool that can deliver accurate results, and it just doesn’t.
What has the response been like to this paper? What kind of feedback have you gotten?
Stunned silence!
Nobody has said anything?
In private, they have. Not in public. In private, it’s been a little bit like, “I’ve always thought this, but it seemed like there was no other way.” But then in public, think about it. Everything is built on LCA. It’s now in every single climate bill out there. Every single standard. Every single consulting company is doing LCA and doing carbon footprinting for companies. It’s a huge industry, so I guess I shouldn’t have been surprised to hear nothing publicly.
Yeah, I was gonna ask — I’ve been writing about the SEC rules and this idea that companies should start reporting their emissions to their investors, and that would all be based on LCA. There’s a lot of buy-in for that idea across the climate movement.
Yeah, but there’s definitely a fine line with make-believe. I think in many instances, we kid ourselves thinking that we’re going to have numbers that we can hang our hats on. In many instances we will not, and they will be challenged. And so at that point, what’s the point?
One thing I hear when I talk to people about this is, well, having an estimate is better than not having anything, or, don’t let the perfect be the enemy of the good, or, we can just keep working to make them better and better. Why not?
I mean, I wouldn’t say don’t try. But when it comes to actually enforcing anything, it’s going to be extremely hard to prove a number. You could just be stuck in litigation for a long time and still not have an answer.
I don’t know, to me it just seems like an endless debate while time is ticking and we will just feel good because we’ll have thought we measured everything. But we’re still not doing anything.
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How senators voted didn’t just come down to party, ideology, or geography.
This is Heatmap Daily, a weekday digest written by our executive editor. Subscribe here.
The Senate will vote tonight on amendments to the permitting reform bill, officially known as the Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act.
It will then vote on the bill itself — which only needs a bare majority to pass. The House of Representatives will then take up the bill.
The permitting bill, in other words, appears to have survived that peculiar phase of Senate process where legislation requires 60 votes to pass. (That magic number isn’t due to anything in the Constitution, but because Senate procedure technically allows unlimited and silent “debate” on a measure, and it takes a three-fifths majority to end that “debate.” Changing this is what people mean when they talk about “ending the filibuster.”)
All of this is to say that the bill’s Senate coalition might be as large now as it has ever been. Senators have now taken a handful of these 60-vote-threshold cloture votes on BAAJA, and we can see who voted for the measure last week at the beginning of the debate and who had peeled off by the end.
As we await final votes on the amendments and the bill itself, here’s some brief game-time analysis:
Almost every Republican voted yes. Since the first cloture vote on November 9, almost everyone in the Senate GOP caucus has voted in favor of the bill. Mike Rounds, the junior senator from South Dakota, is the only Republican to vote no in every roll call. Missouri’s Josh Hawley, who opposes the bill’s transmission provisions, started out voting yes but voted no today.
Democratic support has eroded somewhat. Fourteen Democrats (or those who caucus with them) never voted against the bill, while 25 have voted against it at every opportunity. The latter group includes Senators Bernie Sanders, Elizabeth Warren, Ed Markey, and Ron Wyden.
But some Democrats who started off supporting cloture on the bill peeled off as the politics have developed — or as they jockey to add amendments or shape the bill during its final passage. Senators Jon Ossoff of Georgia, Gary Peters of Michigan, and Jeanne Shaheen of New Hampshire voted yes on the initial cloture vote last week, but no on the final vote today about moving to passage. The bill contains Cathy Cortez Masto’s mining measure, and she voted yes on it for its first cloture vote, but no today. Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut and Andy Kim of New Jersey also voted no today.
There’s a surprising amount of same-state splits. BAAJA’s politics have been quite geographic at times — as Julian NoiseCat observed on Shift Key, Western senators with close tribal ties have clearly approached the law differently than those from the East Coast or Midwest — but it’s also revealed surprising splits in the Democratic caucus that don’t necessarily come down to ideology or location. Senator Raphael Warnock of Georgia voted yes on every cloture vote, for instance, but Senator Jon Ossoff started out yes and then switched to no. Senator Martin Heinrich of New Mexico helped write the bill, but his same-state colleague Senator Ben Ray Lujan voted against cloture. Arizona’s Mark Kelly is a no, but Ruben Gallego is a yes. Cory Booker in New Jersey is a yes, but his colleague Andy Kim started out yes … and then became a no.
Among Democrats, there’s something of a “new school” vs “old school” divide on how to fight climate change. I thought it was notable that Senator Brian Schatz of Hawaii, a self-described climate hawk, has evidently signaled he will vote yes on final passage, according to Josh Siegel of Punchbowl. Schatz is part of the group that once called themselves “the three climateers,” a troika of Democratic senators who worked on climate change and decarbonization through the bad old days of the 2010s. The other two members of that group? Senators Martin Heinrich and Sheldon Whitehouse, who led the Democratic side of the negotiations over this bill.
Whitehouse and Heinrich argue that this bill — because it will speed up permitting, especially for transmission lines, and put clean energy to something closer to an even footing with fossil fuels — is good for the climate. They also argue that it will allow future climate policy to go even faster. But BAAJA is also opposed by a handful of senators who have defined themselves by their support for aggressive climate policy, including Senators Ed Markey of Massachusetts and Bernie Sanders of Vermont. You could see this as a new-school climate hawk vs. old-school environmentalist fight, but the divide isn’t total. I find it interesting that Senator Tina Smith of Minnesota — an aggressive climate and clean energy advocate — says she’s “firmly opposed” to the bill because of what she worries it could mean for mining projects near the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness.
Lots more to say but we’ll leave it there for now.
The company is attempting to commercialize a novel processing method, with the help of a former NRC commissioner.
If you were born the year the United States gave up on finding a place to store its spent nuclear fuel, you’d almost be eligible to vote. Since 2009, when the Obama administration halted work on Yucca Mountain, the Nevada site designated under federal law as the nation’s first nuclear waste repository, the country has had no formal plan in place.
Russia, France, China, and Japan all reprocess highly radioactive spent fuel that comes out of reactors to extract usable materials and recycle them into more fuel. The process still leaves behind some nasty, dangerous radioisotopes that form during fission, but there remains a lot less that needs to be stored for centuries. The U.S. attempted to set up a commercial nuclear recycling industry in the 1970s, before President Jimmy Carter pulled the plug as a sop to the nonproliferation movement. No one has really attempted to invest in the industry since.
Over the past decade, a new slate of startups has promised to revive the dream — or, to some, nightmare — of recycling spent fuel. The Biden administration put up funding. The Trump administration proposed “nuclear lifecycle campuses” where recycling would be just one part of future complexes that process, enrich, and reprocess reactor fuel, and dozens of states stepped up to serve as hosts. In a sign of growing momentum, one such company formed last year in Washington, D.C., with former Nuclear Regulatory Commission Chairman Chris Hanson as its head of implementation.
Now that company, Project Omega, has taken a big step toward actually commercializing its technology, Heatmap can exclusively report. The company submitted its “letter of intent” to the NRC, giving the agency a formal heads up that it plans to submit a full application within the next few years.
“Waste is the biggest challenge in the nuclear industry,” Staff Sheehan, Project Omega’s chief executive, told me. “We exist to take the amount of nuclear waste and the hazard of that nuclear waste and drastically decrease it.”
The NRC has, over the past year, ramped up efforts to streamline and modernize its regulatory process, and has greenlit permits for new reactors in record time. But the most successful applications have largely come from companies that carried out a lot of legwork with the NRC before submitting paperwork, so that the formal documents provide answers to questions the regulators expect to ask.
Since the NRC has never permitted or licensed a commercial nuclear reprocessing facility, companies are lining up to engage with the agency early. Oklo, the Silicon Valley startup seeking to deploy its own small modular reactors and reprocess the fuel its future power stations will run on, held a “pre-application meeting” with the NRC just last month. Curio, another Washington-based company specializing in nuclear waste reprocessing, submitted its letter of intent to the NRC in May.
Reprocessing, as a concept, draws fierce opposition from nonproliferation advocates who say the technology lays the groundwork for greater production of materials for bombs. Plutonium, which is used in some of the most powerful nuclear weapons, does not occur in nature, but forms during fission. The world’s only commercial nuclear recycling facilities, such as La Hague in France or the Mayak Production Association in Russia’s Ural Mountains, rely on a technology called aqueous reprocessing, which involves dissolving spent nuclear fuel in acid, then using a solvent to separate reusable uranium and plutonium from the other waste products. What little remains is then typically put into glass through a process called vitrification, which keeps the radiation from emanating, and stored long term. But the issue for policymakers and advocates seeking to thwart the growth of the world’s nuclear arsenal is that plutonium is among the key extracted materials.
Project Omega, by contrast, is pursuing an approach called pyroprocessing. Under that technology, developed in U.S. national laboratories and pursued by Oklo as well, spent fuel is chopped up and dunked in a bath of molten salt, often heated to temperatures around 930 degrees Fahrenheit. An electrical current then separates out useful materials, such as uranium and various isotopes that can be used for medical purposes.
“You can’t separate out pure plutonium, so you don’t get any streams that are usable for weapons,” Sheehan said. “That’s a big regulatory advantage, I would say.”
The biggest disadvantage, he admitted, is that nobody has tried to do pyroprocessing at scale. La Hague in France “has been operational for 50 years or something like that.”
“The disadvantage going in with a new technology is you have to educate regulators, and you have to get them comfortable with some of the novelties about it. It hasn’t been done before,” Sheehan said. “But the advantage of using a new technology is you can do things way more efficiently, way more safely, and way more economically.
Project Omega emerged from stealth back in February. Sheehan founded the company after leaving his previous startup, Air Company, where he had invented a novel process to convert carbon dioxide into hydrocarbons and alcohols that could be used for sustainable aviation fuel. Among the early hires to the new company was Hanson, whom President Donald Trump fired from the NRC last year in a dramatic show of control over an independent federal agency.
That doesn’t mean the company has faced the Trump administration’s wrath. Since then, Project Omega has won funding from the Department of Energy to carry out work at the Idaho National Laboratory and the U.S. military to conduct research with the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. Last week, Project Omega raised $80 million in a Series A, pitching its reprocessing facilities as “nuclear refineries for the next industrial revolution.”
“I believe Project Omega is addressing one of the most critical gaps in our nuclear industrial base,” Tommy Hendrix, general partner at the venture firm Decisive Point, which invested in the Series A, told me over email. “Omega is taking a fundamentally different approach by transforming used nuclear fuel into valuable resources for advanced reactors and long-duration power systems.”
Asked whether he would pitch his company differently to Democrats, who traditionally opposed nuclear reprocessing and will command sizable majorities in Congress next year, Sheehan swiftly answered, “Not at all.”
“They call me the climate guy in all the circles I have walked in. Whether it was the White House under the Trump administration or D or R offices in Congress,” Sheehan said. “And I have a reputation for sticking to my guns.”
Current conditions: Tropical Cyclone Xavier has strengthened into a Category 5 storm after battering the Cook Islands with winds of up to 184 miles per hour • In the Bay of Bengal, Cyclone Akvan is barreling toward India’s Andhra Pradesh just weeks after the state suffered another deadly cyclone • Today is the last day of any sunlight in Utqiaġvik, Alaska, which enters polar night until January 23.
On Tuesday afternoon, Jensen Huang, Nvidia’s disgraced founder who stepped down from his chief executive role last week amid a ballooning scandal over his extramarital affairs with multiple employees and a Chinese spy, began mounting his comeback. “Nvidia is a once-in-a-generation company,” he wrote in a post on X. “If the Board of Directors decides that my return is in the best interest of our shareholders, our employees, the company, and America, I would be honored to answer these calls and return as CEO.” A new website launched late last week, purportedly built by some of the investors and supporters who have been blowing up Huang’s phone with encouragement in recent days, calls on the board to “stand with Jensen.” When the market closed yesterday evening, Huang’s camp got yet more ammunition to bring to the battle: The company doubled its earnings in the third quarter of this year compared to the same time last year, it reported Tuesday. The chip designer reported revenue of $116 billion for the three months that ended in October, a year-over-year increase of 103%, besting Wall Street’s estimates of $109 billion. The earnings may help quell concerns over the soaring debt hyperscalers are incurring to build out data centers, which, as I wrote last month, investors worry may not pay for itself.
The company also projected that its revenue would reach $130 billion for the fourth quarter, ahead of analysts’ bets, which seemingly puts the company — which the Financial Times described as “a bellwether for the health of the AI industry” — on a solid trajectory.
If the Senate voting overwhelmingly to advance the bipartisan permitting reform bill was supposed to help put an end to the Trump administration’s targeting of the offshore wind industry, it hasn’t yet. On Tuesday, Bloomberg reported that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has started to reassess a permit for EDF REnewables North America’s Atlantic Shores South project, which would total as many as 200 wind turbines sited roughly 9 miles off the coast of Atlantic City. The move fits a pattern. Despite the Trump administration’s promise to ease its blockade on renewables as part of negotiations over the Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act, my colleagues Jael Holzman and Emily Pontecorvo reported last month that the only projects advancing were upgrades to existing wind farms.
Speaking of Trump, on a trip to China for a trilateral summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin, the president waved off the national anxiety piqued by a string of major network outages across the U.S., one of which being the National Security Agency’s highly classified communications channels, according to CNN. “It’s life,” he said. “When you're big and powerful and have all the money, things like that happen — it’s fine.”

General Motors made history in December 2013 when it named Mary Barra, previously the company’s executive in charge of supply chains and human resources, as the first woman to lead one of the automotive industry’s big manufacturers. Now GM has begun the search to succeed its longest-serving leader in modern times. While the company is “eyeing a crop of internal candidates,” The Wall Street Journal reported Tuesday, it’s working with a headhunting firm to identify outside contenders. Barra herself, whose tenure is about twice that of an average chief executive at a S&P 500 company, kicked off the process months ago. Among the internal contenders, named by the Journal are “finance chief Paul Jacobson; Sterling Anderson, a high-profile Silicon Valley hire who serves as Chief Product Officer; and Mark Reuss, a 40-year GM veteran and Barra’s No. 2.”
GM’s next top dog will grapple with the company’s evolving battery business. As Heatmap contributor Andrew Moseman wrote last year, Trump’s elimination of the electric vehicle tax credit cost GM $1.6 billion. But it also gave rise to a new standalone battery business that Kurt Kelty, the former Panasonic executive and current GM battery guru, told my colleague Robinson Meyer on our Shift Key podcast, might just turn GM into an “American battery juggernaut.”
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Researchers at Harvard University on Monday released a landmark study breaking down carbon emissions linked to U.S. data center operations, concluding that grid-connected data center operations were linked to more greenhouse gas pollution from May 2024 to April 2025 than the entire country of Denmark. That would be interesting on its own, and yet it’s also likely that number is a serious lowball. Gianluca Guidi, lead author of the study, told Heatmap that the research only accounted for data centers attached to the power grid, meaning it doesn’t take into account diesel generators or behind-the-meter power plants. “It does show how incomplete our understanding remains because the numbers are quite sizable and policy is quite lagging behind,” Guidi said. “We’re still struggling to imagine the environmental consequences of the infrastructure that’s already been built.” — Jael Holzman
Quaise Energy has locked down the first customer for its futuristic approach to vaporizing stone and drilling deep into hot rocks for geothermal power. Conveniently, it is also one of the deepest-pocketed and most sophisticated energy buyers on the market today. On Tuesday, The Wall Street Journal broke the news that Google has signed a power purchase agreement for 50 megawatts of electricity from Quaise’s Project Obsidian, its flagship first plant in Central Oregon and the world’s first superhot geothermal plant, operating with rocks at temperatures greater than 572 degrees Fahrenheit. The project, expected to come online as early as 2030, is on track to cost about $350 million. “Google is officially our first customer at Quaise Energy,” Kathryn Hite de Sousa, Quaise’s chief operating officer, wrote in a post on LinkedIn. “With our millimeter wave drilling technology, we are bringing superhot geothermal to commercial scale, so we can deliver always-on, zero-carbon power to the grid from anywhere on Earth.”
The market is clearly down with VPPs — in a good way. The capacity of North America’s virtual power plants grew by nearly 26% this year compared to 2025, reaching 47.2 gigawatts of behind-the-meter flexible capacity, according to a new analysis by Wood Mackenzie. “Escalating turbine costs, affordability concerns, and slow supply response to large loads are driving more interest in VPPs,” Elham Akhavan, principal analyst at the consultancy, said in a statement. Residential VPPs alone more than doubled.