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Carbon removal would seem to have a pretty clear definition. It’s the reverse of carbon emissions. It means taking carbon out of the atmosphere and putting it somewhere else — underground, into products, into the ocean — where it won’t warm the planet. But a new kind of carbon removal project shows how this formula can conceal consequential differences between approaches.
A few months ago, Puro.earth, a carbon removal registry, certified a small ethanol refinery in North Dakota to sell carbon removal credits — the first ethanol plant to earn this privilege. Red Trail Energy, which owns the facility, captures the CO2 released from the plant when corn is fermented into ethanol, and injects it into a porous section of rock more than 6,000 feet underground. Since Red Trail started doing this in June of 2022, it’s prevented some 300,000 metric tons of CO2 from entering the atmosphere, according to data published by the North Dakota Department of Mineral Resources.
There are two ways to look at what’s happening here.
If you just follow the carbon, it started in the atmosphere and ended up underground. In between, the corn sucked up carbon through photosynthesis; when it was processed into ethanol, about a third of that carbon went into the fuel, a third was left behind as dried grain, and the remainder was captured as it wafted out of the fermentation tank and stashed underground. “That is, in a broad sense, how that looks like carbon removal,” Daniel Sanchez, an assistant professor at the University of California, Berkeley who studies biomass carbon removal, told me.
But if you zoom out, the picture changes. For the carbon to get from the atmosphere to the ground, a few other things had to happen. The corn had to be grown, harvested, and transported in trucks to the plant. It had to be put through a mill, cooked, and then liquified using heat from a natural gas boiler. And this was all in service, first and foremost, of producing ethanol to be burned, ultimately, in a car engine. If you account for the CO2 emitted during these other steps, the process as a whole is putting more into the atmosphere than it’s taking out.
So, is Red Trail Energy really doing carbon removal?
Puro.earth takes the first view — the registry’s rules essentially draw a box around the carbon capture and storage, or CCS, part of the process. Red Trail has to count the emissions from the energy it took to capture and liquify and inject the carbon, but not from anything else that happened before that. So far, Puro has issued just over 157,000 carbon removal credits for Red Trail to sell.
This is, essentially, industry consensus. Other carbon market registries including Gold Standard, Verra, and Isometric more or less take the same approach for any projects involving biomass, though they haven’t certified any ethanol projects yet. (Isometric’s current rules disqualify ethanol plants because they only allow projects that use waste biomass.)
But the nonprofit CarbonPlan, a watchdog for the carbon removal industry, argues that it’s a mistake to call this carbon removal. In a blog post published in December, program lead Freya Chay wrote that because the carbon storage is “contingent upon the continued production of ethanol,” it’s wrong to separate the two processes. The project reduces the facility’s overall emissions, Chay argued, but it’s not “carbon removal.”
This debate may sound semantic, and to some extent, it is. As long as an action results in less pollution warming the planet, does it matter whether we label it “carbon removal” or “emission reduction”?
The point of carbon credits is that they are paying for an intervention that wouldn’t have happened otherwise. “You have to look at, what part of the project is being built because they receive carbon removal credits?” Marianne Tikkanen, the co-founder and head of standard at Puro told me. “In this case, it was the capture part.” Previously, the emissions from the fermentation tank were considered to be zero, since the carbon started in the atmosphere and ended up back in the atmosphere. If you just look at the change that the sale of credits supported, those emissions are now negative.
But the logic of carbon credits may not be totally aligned with the point of carbon removal. Scientists generally see three roles for technologies that remove carbon from the atmosphere. The first is to reduce net emissions in the near term — Red Trail’s project checks that box. In the medium term, carbon removal can counteract any remaining emissions that we don’t know how to eliminate. That’s how we’ll “achieve net-zero” and stop the planet from warming.
But those who say these labels really matter are thinking of the third role. In the distant future, if we achieve net-zero emissions, but global average temperatures have reached dangerous heights, doing additional carbon removal — and lowering the total concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere — will be our only hope of cooling the planet. If this is the long term goal, there is a “clear conceptual problem” with calling a holistic process that emits more than it removes “carbon removal,” Chay told me.
“I think the point of definitions is to help us navigate the world,” she said. “It will be kind of a miracle if we get there, but that is the lighthouse.”
Red Trail may have been the first ethanol company to get certified to sell carbon removal credits, but others are looking to follow in its footsteps. Chay’s blog post, written in December, was responding to news of another project: Summit Carbon Solutions, a company trying to build a major pipeline through the midwest that will transport CO2 captured from ethanol refineries and deliver it to an underground well in North Dakota, announced a deal to pre-sell $30 million worth of carbon removal credits from the project; it plans to certify the credits through Gold Standard. In May, Summit announced it planned to sell more than 160 million tons of carbon removal credits over the next decade.
Decarbonization experts often refer to the emissions from ethanol plants as low-hanging fruit. Out of all the polluting industries that we could be capturing carbon from, ethanol is one of the easiest. The CO2 released when corn sugar is fermented is nearly 100% pure, whereas the CO2 that comes from fossil fuel combustion is filled with all kinds of chemicals that need to be scrubbed out first.
Even if it’s relatively easy, though, it’s not free, and the ethanol industry has historically ignored the opportunity. But in the past few years, federal tax credits and carbon markets have made the idea more attractive.
Red Trail’s CCS project has been a long time in the making. The company began looking into CCS in 2016, partnering with the Energy and Environmental Research Center, the North Dakota Industrial Commission Renewable Energy Council, and the U.S. Department of Energy on a five-year feasibility study. Jodi Johnson, Red Trail’s CEO, answered questions about the project by email. “Building a first-of-its-kind CCS project involved significant financial, technical, and regulatory risks,” she told me. “The technology, while promising, required substantial upfront investment and a commitment to navigating uncharted regulatory frameworks.”
The primary motivation for the project was the company’s “commitment to environmental stewardship and sustainability,” Johnson said, but low-carbon fuel markets in California and Oregon were also a “strategic incentive.” Ethanol companies that sell into those states earn carbon credits based on how much cleaner their fuel is than gasoline. They can sell those credits to dirtier-fuel makers who need to comply with state laws. The carbon capture project would enable Red Trail to earn more credits — a revenue stream that at first, looked good enough to justify the cost. A 2017 economic assessment of the project found that it “may be economically viable,” depending on the specific requirements in the two states.
But today, two years after Red Trail began capturing carbon, the company’s application to participate in California’s low-carbon fuel market is still pending. Though the company does sell some ethanol into the Oregon market, it decided to try and sell carbon removal credits through Puro to support “broader decarbonization and sequestration efforts while awaiting regulatory approvals,” Johnson said. Red Trail had already built its carbon capture system prior to working with Puro, but it may not have operated the equipment unless it had an incentive to do so.
Puro didn’t just take Red Trail’s word for it. The project underwent a “financial additionality test” including an evaluation of other incentives for Red Trail to sequester carbon. For example, the company can earn up to $50 in tax credits for each ton of CO2 it puts underground. (The Inflation Reduction Act increased this subsidy to $85 per ton, but Red Trail is not eligible for the higher amount because it started building the project before the law went into effect.) In theory, this tax credit alone could be enough to finance the project. A recent report from the Energy Futures Initiative concluded that a first-of-a-kind CCS project at an ethanol plant should cost between $36 and $41 per ton of CO2 captured and stored.
Johnson told me Red Trail does not pay income tax at the corporate level, however — it is taxed as a partnership. That means individual investors can take advantage of the credit, but it’s not a big enough benefit to secure project finance. The project “requires significant capital expenditure, operating expense, regulatory, and long-term monitoring for compliance,” she said. “Access to the carbon market was the needed incentive to secure the investment and the continuous project operation.”
Ultimately, after an independent audit of Red Trail’s claims, Puro concluded that the company did, in fact, need to sell carbon removal credits to justify operating the CCS project. (Red Trail is currently also earning carbon credits for fuel sold in Oregon, but Puro is accounting for these and deducting credits from its registry accordingly.)
All this helps make the case that it’s reasonable to support projects like Red Trail’s through the sale of carbon credits. But it doesn’t explain why we should call it carbon removal.
When I put the question to Tikkanen, she said that the project interrupts the “short cycle” of carbon: The CO2 is captured during photosynthesis, it’s transferred into food or fuel, and then it’s released back into the air in a continuous loop — all in a matter of months. Red Trail is turning that loop into a one-way street from the atmosphere to the ground, taking more and more carbon out of the air over time. That’s different from capturing carbon at a fossil fuel plant, where the carbon in question had previously been trapped underground for millennia.
Robert Hoglund, a carbon removal advisor who co-founded the database CDR.fyi, had a similar explanation. He told me that it didn’t make sense to categorize this project as “reducing emissions” from the plant because the fossil fuel-burning trucks that deliver the corn and the natural gas boilers cooking it are still releasing the same amount of carbon into the atmosphere. “If we say only processes that, if they're scaled up, lead to lower emissions in the atmosphere are carbon removal, that's looking at it from a system perspective,” he said. “I can understand where they come from, but I think it does add some confusion.”
Red Trail Energy and Summit Carbon Solutions defended the label, noting that this is the way carbon market registries have decided to treat biomass-based carbon sequestration projects. “The fact that emissions remain from the lifecycle of the corn itself is not the focus of the removal activity,” Johnson told me. “The biogenic CO2 is clearly removed from the atmosphere permanently.”
Sanchez, the Berkeley professor, argued that Puro’s rules are adequate because there’s a path for ethanol plants to eventually achieve net-negative emissions. They will have to capture emissions from the boiler, in addition to the fermentation process, and make a few other tweaks, like using renewable natural gas, according to a recent peer-reviewed study Sanchez authored. “That's not what's happening here,” he told me, “but I view that as indicative that this is part of the basket of technologies that we use to reach net-zero and to suck CO2 out of the air.”
(Red Trail is working on reducing its emissions even more, Johnson told me. The company is finishing engineering on a new combined heat and power system that will improve efficiency at the plant.)
In addition to teaching at Berkeley, Sanchez is a principal scientist for the firm Carbon Direct, which helps corporate buyers find “high quality” carbon removal credits. He added that he felt the project was “worthy" of the dollars companies are designating for carbon removal because of the risk it involved, and the fact that it would blaze a trail for others to follow. Ethanol CCS projects will help build up carbon storage infrastructure and expertise, enabling other carbon removal projects in the future.
Though there is seeming consensus among carbon market participants that this is carbon removal, scientists outside the industry are more skeptical. Katherine Maher, an Earth systems scientist who studies the carbon cycle at Stanford University, said she understood the argument for calling ethanol with CCS carbon removal, but she also couldn’t ignore the fact that capturing the carbon requires energy to grow the corn, transport it, and so on. “You really need to be conscious about, what are the other emissions in the project, and are those being accounted for in the calculation of the CO2 removed?”
Carbon180, a nonprofit that advocates for carbon removal policy, shares that perspective. “When it comes to ethanol with CCS, we want to see the actual net negativity,” Sifang Chen, the group’s managing science and innovation advisor, told me.
In the U.S. Department of Energy’s Road to Removals report, a 221-page document that highlights all of the opportunities for carbon removal in the United States, the agency specifically chose not to analyze ethanol with CCS “due largely to its inability to achieve a negative [carbon intensity] without substantial retrofitting of existing corn-ethanol facilities.”
It’s possible to say that both views are correct. Each follows a clear logic — one more rooted in creating practical rules for a market in order to drive innovation, the other in the uncompromising math of atmospheric science.
At times throughout writing this, I wondered if I was making something out of nothing. But the debate has significance beyond ethanol. Sanchez pointed out to me that you could ask the same question about any so-called carbon removal process that’s tied to an existing industry. Take enhanced rock weathering, for example, which involves crushing up special kinds of rocks that are especially good at absorbing carbon from the air. A lot of the companies trying to do this get their rocks from mining waste, but they don’t include all the emissions from mining in their carbon removal calculation.
Similarly, Summit Carbon Solutions noted that CarbonPlan supports claims of carbon removal by Charm Industrial, a company that takes the biomass left behind in corn fields, turns it into oil, and sequesters the oil underground. In that case, the company is not counting emissions from corn production or the downstream uses of corn.
Chay admitted that she didn’t have a great answer for why she drew the boundaries differently for one versus the other. “We don’t claim to have all the answers, and this back-and-forth illustrates just how much ambiguity there is and why it’s important to work through these issues,” she told me in an email. But she suggested that one point of comparison is to look at how dependent the carbon removal activity is on “the ongoing operation of a net emitting industry, and how one thinks about the role of that emitting industry in a net-zero world.” There is no apparent version of the future where we no longer have mining as an industry, or no longer grow corn for food. But there is a path to eliminating the use of ethanol by electrifying transportation.
It’s worth mentioning that this niche debate about carbon removal is taking place within a much larger and longer controversy about whether ethanol belongs in a low-carbon future at all.
Red Trail told me the company sees the adoption of electric vehicles as an opportunity to diversify into making fuels for aviation and heavy-duty transportation, which are more difficult to electrify. But some environmental groups, like the World Resources Institute, argue that a more sustainable approach would be to develop synthetic fuels from captured carbon and hydrogen. I should note that experts from both sides of this debate told me that carbon credit sales should not justify keeping an ethanol plant open or building a new one if the economics of the fuel don’t work on their own.
In Chay’s blog post, she presented real stakes for this rhetorical debate. If we call net-emitting processes carbon removal, we could develop an inflated sense of how much progress we’ve made toward our overall capacity to remove carbon from the atmosphere, which in turn could warp perceptions of how quickly we need to reduce emissions.
Peter Minor, the former director of science and innovation at Carbon180 who is starting a company focused on measurement and verification, raised the same concern. “When the definition of what it means to remove a ton of CO2 from the air is subjective, what happens is you get a bunch of projects that might have quite different climate impacts,” he told me. “And you may or may not realize it until after the fact.”
There’s also a risk of diverting funding that could go toward scaling up more challenging, more expensive, but truly net-negative solutions such as direct air capture. This risk is compounded by the growing pressure on carbon market players like Puro and Carbon Direct to identify new, more affordable carbon removal projects. Over the past several years, influential groups like the Science Based Targets initiative and corporate sustainability thought leaders like Stripe and Microsoft have decided that old-school carbon credits — the cheaper so-called “offsets” that represent emissions reductions — are not good enough. Now companies are expected to buy carbon removal credits to fulfill their climate promises to customers, lest they be accused of greenwashing.
As a result, the industry has backed itself into a corner, Minor told me. “We have come out as a society and said, the only thing that is worth it, the only thing that is allowed to be used is carbon removal,” he said. “So if that's the only thing with economics behind it, then yeah, like, magic! Everything is now all of a sudden carbon removal! Who would have predicted that this could have happened?”
The success of carbon removal depends, ultimately, on integrity — the industry’s favorite word these days. From the companies trying to remove carbon, to the carbon credit registries validating those efforts, to the nonprofits, brokers, and buyers that want to see the market scale, everyone is talking about developing transparent and trustworthy processes for measuring how much carbon is removed from the atmosphere by a given intervention. But how good is good measurement if experts don’t agree on what should be measured?
“There hasn't been a way to standardize the climate impacts that are being promised,” said Minor. “And so I think unless we solve that problem, I just don't see how we're going to build the trust we need, to create the economics that we need and justify an industry that can’t really exist outside of the millions or billions of tons scale.”
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On the Senate Finance Committee’s budget proposal, the NRC, and fossil-fuel financing
Current conditions: A brush fire that prompted evacuations in Maui on Sunday and Monday is now 93% contained • The Des Moines metro area issued its first-ever ban on watering lawns due to record nitrate concentrations in nearby rivers • For only the fourth time since 1937, Vancouver, British Columbia got no rain at all in the first half of June. The dry streak may finally break tonight.
The Senate Finance Committee published its portion of the budget reconciliation bill on Monday night, including details of its highly anticipated plan to revise the nation’s clean energy tax credits. Though the Senate version slightly softens the House’s proposed phase out of tax credits, “the text would still slash many of the signature programs of the Inflation Reduction Act,” my colleagues Emily Pontecorvo and Robinson Meyer write in their breakdown of the bill. Other changes to be aware of include:
There’s more, too, which you can read here.
President Trump fired Chris Hanson, a Democrat and his first-term appointee to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, on Friday. Trump “terminated my position … without cause, contrary to existing law and longstanding precedent regarding removal of independent agency appointees,” Hanson said in his announcement, published Monday. Since the creation of the NRC, which regulates nuclear power, no commissioner has ever been fired from the body.
After being appointed by Trump in 2020, Hanson was promoted to chair the commission by President Biden in 2021. His term ended in January, after which he returned to serving on the board, Notus reports. Trump’s decision to fire Hanson comes on the heels of his recent flurry of executive orders aimed at quadrupling U.S. nuclear capacity, including a measure seeking to “simplify and accelerate the NRC’s licensing procedure, giving the body 18 months to issue new rules and guidance designed to shorten the timeline for processing new applications to 18 months at the longest,” as my colleagues Matthew Zeitlin and Katie Brigham explained last month. News of Hanson’s firing was met with “serious dismay” by attendees of the American Nuclear Society conference underway in Chicago, per Katy Huff, an assistant professor at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. In a statement, ANS argued that a “competent, effective, and fully staffed [NRC] is essential to the rapid deployment of new reactors and advanced technologies.”
Banks increased fossil fuel financing by more than one-fifth in 2024, marking the first time that fossil fuel financing has failed to decline since 2021, a new report by the Rainforest Action Network and other environmental groups found. Among the world’s top 65 largest banks, coal, oil, and gas assets rose by $162 billion, to $869 billion, with JPMorgan Chase seeing the biggest increase of more than a third to $53.5 billion, followed by Citigroup, Bank of America, and Barclays. In a statement to the Financial Times, JPMorgan said it believed its own data “reflects our activities more comprehensively,” and said it provided $1.29 in clean-energy financing for every dollar financing fossil fuels. However, as the report argues, “Banks are abandoning their previously announced emissions reduction targets in favor of temperature trajectories that allow for more fossil fuel finance. Though they may also increase financing of renewable energy, banks’ continued fossil fuel finance entrenches climate chaos and undercuts clean energy development.” Read the full findings here.
Drivers in Europe are becoming more unwilling to consider switching to an electric vehicle, outpacing even the growing reluctance seen in the United States, according to a new survey published by Shell on Tuesday. In Europe, 41% of respondents said they’d consider switching to an EV, down from 48% last year, while in the U.S., the number fell only 3 percentage points, to 31%. “Europe surprised us,” David Bunch, Shell’s chief for mobility and convenience, said, per Reuters. “The single biggest barrier to entry is the cost of the vehicle.”
While Shell — the world’s second-biggest fossil fuel company by revenue and profit — might seem an unlikely source for an electric vehicle survey, the company also has the most extensive EV charging network in the UK. Its findings weren’t all negative, either: in China, interest in buying an electric vehicle was as high as 89%. Additionally, Shell found that nine in 10 EV drivers would consider purchasing an electric vehicle again, and 60% said they worry less about running out of charge than they did a year ago, Bloomberg reports. Separately, International Energy Agency data shows that electric vehicle adoption continues at a healthy pace worldwide, exceeding 17 million sales globally in 2024, or a share of more than 20%.
Global electric car sales, 2014-2024
IEA
The United Kingdom on Tuesday announced its commitment of £7.9 billion, or more than $10 billion, to the nation’s most extensive flood defense infrastructure program in its history. The program will not only include traditional construction, such as flood barriers, but also nature-based solutions like reforestation and wetland restoration, according to Business Green. In its announcement, the government said that for every £1 invested, it expected to prevent £8 in economic damage. “Protecting citizens is the first duty of any government,” Environment Secretary Steve Reed said in a statement, adding, “As our changing climate continues to bring more extreme weather to the nation, it's never been more vital to invest in new flood defences and repair our existing assets.” Separately, the U.K. Treasury also announced Tuesday a plan to spend £1 billion, or about $1.3 billion, on “funding to repair bridges, tunnels, and flyovers that are facing increased impacts from extreme weather and heavier vehicles,” Business Green adds.
Republicans in Los Angeles who don’t have air conditioning are “more likely to consider climate change a human-caused threat and more likely to support individual and government action to address climate change” than Republicans who have central air, a recent study published by the American Meteorological Society found. There was no similar divide among Democrats.
Wind and solar are out. Clean, firm power is in.
The Senate Finance committee published its highly anticipated tax proposal for Trump’s One Big, Beautiful Bill on Monday night, including a new plan to revise the nation’s clean energy tax credits.
Senate Republicans widened the aperture slightly compared to the House version of the bill, extending tax credits for geothermal energy, batteries, and hydropower, and preserving “transferability” — a crucial rule that allows companies to sell their tax credits for cash — for years to come.
But the text would still slash many of the signature programs of the Inflation Reduction Act. It would be particularly damaging for Republicans’ goals of creating a domestic mining industry, because it kills incentives for refining critical minerals while yanking away subsidies for the electric cars and wind turbines that might use those minerals.
Consumer tax credits for energy efficiency upgrades, including heat pumps, would still be terminated, as would credits for homeowners to lease or purchase rooftop solar. The Senate bill also cuts a tax deduction for energy efficiency upgrades in commercial buildings one year after the bill’s passage, which was not in the House version.
There was no mercy for the IRA’s tax credit to produce clean hydrogen, despite a last-minute appeal from more than 250 organizations in early June. That policy would still be terminated this year.
Here’s a rundown of the rest of the major changes.
Like the House bill, the Senate’s proposal would terminate tax credits for new, used, and leased electric vehicles. But while the House had extended the program by one year for automakers that had yet to sell 200,000 eligible vehicles, the Senate version would simply end the program in 180 days — or roughly six months — after the bill’s passage.
Depending on when the bill is passed, the Senate version could work out better for some experienced EV automakers, such as Tesla and General Motors. These automakers are set to lose their eligibility for tax credits on December 31 under the House text. But the Senate bill’s 180-day period could allow them to eke out another month or so of eligibility — especially if congressional negotiations over the One Big, Beautiful Bill Act go late into the summer.
Newer EV automakers, such as Rivian or Lucid, come out worse under the Senate text as compared to the House bill since they haven’t sold as many vehicles.
Homeowners interested in electric vehicle chargers would get a longer runway than the House had proposed — but a much shorter one than is on the books right now. Under current law, homeowners can claim the charger tax credit through 2032. The Senate version would terminate the 30% tax credit for installing a home charger one year after the bill is enacted.
The Inflation Reduction Act achieved massive greenhouse gas reductions by including a set of new “technology-neutral” tax credits that subsidized any new power plant as long as it didn’t emit carbon dioxide. Under current law, these new tax credits will remain effective and on the books for decades to come — expiring only when emissions from the country’s power sector fall about 95% below their all-time high.
The Republican reconciliation bills have dismantled these provisions. The House text proposed immediately winding down tax credits for all clean energy sources — except nuclear — and allowed just a 60-day “grace period” for new projects to start construction to claim the credits. Even then, new power plants would have to enter service by 2028 to qualify.
Senate Republicans have countered with a plan that is designed to maintain support for every electricity source that isn’t wind and solar. The GOP Senate caucus favors technologies that can provide power on demand around the clock — such as geothermal, nuclear, hydropower, and batteries — but technically the Senate text allows any zero-carbon, non-solar, non-wind source to qualify for the clean electricity tax credits for the next decade.
The Senate draft erases the provision in the Inflation Reduction Act that would have kept these tax credits in place until the entire United States power sector reduces its emissions. Instead, it adopts the IRA’s alternate phase-out period, with the tax credits beginning to wind down for projects that start construction in 2034.
Tax credits for wind and solar, however, would begin to phase down for projects that start construction next year, and terminate after 2027, with one big exception.
An odd addendum to the wind and solar phase-out would exempt projects that are at least 1 gigawatt, are at least partially on federal land, and have already received a “right-of-way grant or lease” from the Bureau of Land Management as of June 16. It’s unclear which, if any, projects would be helped by this provision. According to the BLM website, it has not granted a right-of-way to any projects that are 1 gigawatt or larger except for the Lava Ridge wind farm, which has been canceled. If the Senate changes the date, however, the Esmeralda 7 solar farm in Nevada may benefit, as the project is more than 6 gigawatts, and is in the final stages of its environmental review.
The Senate text would not do anything to change the eligibility timeline for existing nuclear plants to claim a tax credit, called 45U, designed to keep them solvent. It would keep the schedule written into the Inflation Reduction Act, which has the credit terminating at the end of 2031. It would, however, impose new foreign sourcing restrictions on nuclear fuel, forbidding existing power plants from claiming the tax credit if their fuel comes from Russia, China, Iran, or North Korea. (It makes an exception for power companies that signed a long-term contract to buy foreign fuel before 2023.) The United States formally banned the import of nuclear fuel from Russia last year.
The Inflation Reduction Act subsidized the production of certain clean energy equipment — including solar panels, wind turbines, inverters, and batteries — as well as some of their subcomponents. Under current law, those tax credits will begin to phase out by 25% increments in 2030, so companies can claim 75% of the credit in 2030, 50% in 2031, and zero in 2033.
The IRA also created a new permanent tax credit that covered 10% of the cost of refining or recycling critical minerals.
The new Senate text changes these phase-out deadlines, often for the worse. First, as in the House bill, wind turbines and their subcomponents would no longer qualify for the tax credit starting in 2028. Second, the tax credit for critical minerals would start phasing out in 2031. Under the new calendar, companies would be able to claim 75% of this credit in 2031, 50% in 2032, and zero in 2034.
In practice, this means that the Senate GOP text would end the IRA’s permanent tax credit for producing many critical minerals, which would damage the financial projects of many mineral processing and refining projects. Other types of equipment remain on the Inflation Reduction Act’s original phase-out schedule.
The new Senate text also slightly expands the type of battery components that qualify for the credit. And — in a potentially significant change for some companies — it forbids companies from stacking tax credits for their vertically integrated production process starting in 2027.
While the House did not touch the tax credit for carbon sequestration, the Senate has put forward a key change favored by many proponents of the technology. Under current law, project operators get the highest-value credit if they simply inject captured carbon underground for no other purpose than to keep it out of the atmosphere. Smaller amounts are available for projects that use captured CO2 to nudge more oil out of the ground, also known as “enhanced oil recovery,” or if they use the CO2 in products like cement.
Under the Senate proposal, all carbon sequestration projects, no matter the nature of the carbon storage, would qualify for the same amount.
The biggest clean energy killer in the House-passed bill was a strict sourcing rule for the tax credits that would disqualify projects that use any component, subcomponent or mineral from China. As Heatmap’s Matthew Zeitlin wrote last week, the rules appeared “unworkable” to many companies because they seemingly disqualified projects even if they used a relatively small amount of an otherwise irrelevant Chinese-sourced material — such as a spare bolt or a gram of steel.
Under the House bill, manufacturers would also not be allowed to license a Chinese company’s technology. This measure appeared to directly target Ford, which has proposed manufacturing electric vehicle batteries using technology licensed from the Chinese firm CATL, one of the world’s best producers of EV batteries.
The Senate proposal changes the House provision by adding a complicated new set of definitions about what might qualify as a federal entity of concern. It also introduces a new “safe harbor” formula describing the amount of Chinese-sourced material that can keep a project from receiving a tax credit. We’re still figuring out how these new rules work together, and we’ll update this article as we understand them better.
The House bill also would have severely curtailed a crucial component of the tax credit program called transferability, which allowed developers that couldn’t take full advantage of the subsidies to sell their credits for cash to other companies. The text stripped this option from the tax credits for clean manufacturing (45X), carbon sequestration (45Q), and clean fuels (45Z) beginning in 2028. Without transferability, most carbon sequestration projects will struggle to pencil out, my colleague Katie Brigham reported.
The Senate proposal would restore transferability for the duration of all remaining tax credits.
But it throws another wrench in plans to scale up nuclear, geothermal, and other large capital-intensive projects, because it restricts zero-carbon power plants’ ability to use modified accelerated cost recovery to fund their projects.
Trump just quasi-nationalized U.S. Steel. That could help climate policy later.
The government is getting into the steel business. The deal between Japan’s Nippon Steel and U.S. Steel, long held off by the Biden administration due to national security and economic concerns, may finally happen, and the government will have a seat at the table. And some progressives are smarting over the fact that a Republican did it first.
On Friday, Nippon Steel and U.S. Steel announced “that President Trump has approved the Companies’ historic partnership,” which would include $11 billion in new investments and “a Golden Share to be issued to the U.S. Government” as well as “commitments” that include “domestic production” and “trade matters.”
The New York Times reported that this “Golden Share” would give the president, including Trump’s successors, the ability to appoint or veto some of the company’s directors, and require the government to sign off on a wide range of corporate decisions, like moving production overseas or idling or closing plants or the procurement of raw materials.
The Trump administration will likely use its oversight to encourage domestic production of steel, in tandem with its tariffs on steel imports. The unique arrangement “will massively expand access to domestically produced steel,” Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick wrote on X.
While neither the administration nor the two companies involved in the deal have mentioned decarbonizing steel — and in fact existing steel decarbonization programs have floundered in the first months of the Trump’s second term — it is this government oversight of steel production that could, with a different administration, help steer the steel industry into greener pastures.
A future president could wield a golden share to encourage or require the significant capital investments necessary to decarbonize some of U.S. Steel’s production, investments that the Biden administration had trouble catalyzing even with direct government financial support.
And considering that steel makes up for some 7% of global emissions, decarbonization is a necessary — if costly — step to substantially reducing global emissions.
“It’s honestly embarrassing that Republicans beat us to actually implementing a golden share or something like it,” Alex Jacquez, who worked on industrial policy for the National Economic Council in the Biden White House, told me.
When the steel giant Cleveland Cliffs first hinted that it would not go forward with $500 million worth of federal grants to help build a hydrogen-powered mill, it cited “fears that there won’t be buyers for the lower-carbon product,” thanks to a 40% price gap with traditional steel, Ilmi Granoff wrote for Heatmap., This tracked what steel producers and buyers were telling the Biden administration as it tried to convene the industry to see what it needed to go green.
“The largest issue by far in advancing green steel production in the U.S. is demand. It’s still not price competitive and not worth capital investment upgrades, given where the market is right now and without stable demand from customers who are going to pay a premium for the product,” Jacquez said. “There’s no case to make to shareholders for why you’re investing.”
When the Roosevelt Institute looked at barriers to transition to clean steel, specifically a Cleveland-Cliffs project, among familiar community concerns like what it would mean for steel employment, there was “corporate inertia and focus on short-term shareholder value over long-term public value and competitiveness.”
While the Trump administration sees shareholder demands leading to insufficient domestic production of any steel, a future administration could be a counterweight to investors not wanting to make green steel investments.
Shareholder reticence is a “huge obstacle,” one of the report’s authors Isabel Estevez, co-executive director of the industrial policy think tank I3T, told me.
“Of course investors are not going to green light investments that don’t produce the same returns as doing nothing or doing something else would do,” Jacquez said.
And when green steel projects have gotten canceled, in the U.S. and abroad, it’s been dismal shareholder returns that are often the explicit or implicit justification, as well as the high cost of producing green hydrogen necessary to fuel green steel operations. “We are not only pushing the boundaries of what is technologically feasible with this project. We are also currently pushing the boundaries of economic viability. Or, as it stands today: beyond it,” the chief executive of ThyssenKrupp told the North Rhine-Westphalia parliament, according to Hydrogen Insight.
And the resulting Trump administration retrenchment from the Biden administration’s climate policy has made the environment even less friendly for green steel.
Earlier this month Cleveland-Cliffs scrapped the hydrogen-fuel steel project and said instead it would try to extend its existing coal-fueled blast furnace. And the Swedish company SSAB earlier this year withdrew from a prospective project in Mississippi.
Would these outcomes be any different with a “golden share”? When the Roosevelt Institute looked at steel decarbonization even full-on nationalization was considered as one of the “sticks” that could push along decarbonization (many steel companies globally are either state-owned or have some state investment). The golden share, at least as reported, will seem to put the government in the driver’s seat of a major player of the steel industry, while still maintaining its private ownership structure.
“Assuming the nature of the golden share allows the public sector to make certain requirements about the way that profits are used, it could be very valuable for encouraging U.S. Steel to use their profits to make important investments,” Estevez told me.