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It’s not easy to build a wind project. Many of the best spots for generating wind power are already occupied by turbines. Even if you do find a good one, then comes everything else — inflation in the supply chain, convincing a local community that they want a wind farm near them, leasing the land, and so on and so forth. The whole process can take as long as five years.
But what about just making an existing wind farm … better.
This option, known as repowering, is becoming more attractive to wind developers and operators as existing wind assets age — operators get a more efficient wind farm, and developers get to avoid the many headaches of starting from scratch. The topic came up Tuesday, in fact, at the American Council on Renewable Energy’s 2024 Finance Forum. There are “some real opportunities for repower,” said David Giordano, BlackRock’s global head of climate infrastructure, on a panel about scaling capital to meet demand growth for renewables.
“When you repower a project, oftentimes you can utilize some of the existing infrastructure. And that means that you can add new equipment without the full cost of a greenfield development,” Eric Lantz, director of the Wind Energy Technologies Office at the Department of Energy, explained to me. When you install more modern equipment, he said, “you have higher hub heights, you have larger rotors — you can capture more energy from that site.”
Even if you tear down everything and rebuild from the ground up, Lantz told me, repowering still means you can use the existing transmission and interconnection, meaning developers can get more generation without having to deal with infamously long interconnection queues, which can impose yet more years on the energy development timeline.
Lantz collaborated on a 2020 research paper with a trio of Danish wind researchers (Denmark has one of the largest and most advanced wind power industries in the world) and found that from 2012 to 2019, 38% of all wind energy development projects in the country involved replacing old equipment as opposed to building on new sites. Repowering can be attractive to both developers and local communities, the researchers explained, because larger and more efficient turbines can actually reduce the net number of turbines on a given site while generating the same or even more power, with less visual disruption and less maintenance required.
Last year, Wood Mackenzie estimated that repowering onshore wind assets would lead to more installed capacity than new offshore wind in 2025 and 2026. In 2022, the U.S. repowered 1.7 gigawatts of wind plants, mostly by upgrading rotors (blades) and nacelle components like gearboxes and generators, upping their total capacity to 1.8 gigawatts, according to the Department of Energy. Average rotor diameter increased from 93 meters to 112 meters, adding on about the length of an 18-wheeler to the typical rotor.
Repowering has been a favored strategy of some of the biggest renewable developers, who have large and aging fleets of wind turbines that often already occupy prime spots. At the massive Shepherds Flat site in Oregon, for instance, Brookfield Renewable Partners replaced more than 300 turbines — i.e. over 900 blades — with new ones that were about 90 feet longer, upping the site’s total generation by some 20%.
At a proposed repowering in Southern California, Brookfield wants to replace around 450 turbines with just eight, while a New York repowering increased generation by almost 30% “while maintaining the same number of units to minimize ground disturbance,” the company said.
The rationale for repowering, like everything in energy, is a mixture of mechanical and financial. Over time, wind turbines tend to degrade, with actual power generation falling off. Even just by restoring a wind farm’s initial generating capacity, repowering can increase output, with newer, more advanced equipment, capacity can notably increase. And when renewable developers have to answer to investors, that cheaper generation can look quite attractive.
The energy developer NextEra plans to repower 1.4 gigawatts of its wind projects through 2026, the company’s chief financial officer said in an April earning call, and in January said that it had repowered a quarter of its existing 24 megawatts of wind. At that time, NextEra chief executive John Ketchum told analysts that the cost had been “roughly 50% to 80% of the cost of a new build and starting a new 10 years of production tax credits, resulting in attractive returns for shareholders.”
“With over a decade to potentially qualify for repowering,” he added, “it represents a great opportunity set.”
Looking at wind projects from before and after 2012, Scott Wilmot, an executive vice president at Enverus Intelligence Research, calculated that average capacity factor increased from around 30% to around 40%. “Swapping new equipment right off the bat, you can get a plus-10 percentage point gain on capacity factor,” he told me.
And then there’s the tax incentives. Repowering “resets” the production tax credit that’s the lifeblood of the wind industry, allowing owners and developers to claim it for another 10 years. When Enverus looked at a hypothetical project that had been operational since 2011 and repowered in 2023, it was possible that its production tax credit for an additional 10 years could increase from $22 per megawatt to almost $28. “It really does make the economics look quite attractive,” he told me.
“If you can get close to 10 percentage point capacity factor gain, you blow pretty much any greenfield, new build project out of the water.”
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Rob catches up with the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Ilaria Mazzocco.
China’s electric vehicle industry, it’s now well understood, is churning out cars that rival or exceed the best products coming out of the West. Chinese EVs are cheaper, cooler, more innovative, and have better range. And now they’re surging into car markets around the world — markets where consumers are hungry for clean, affordable transportation.
On this week’s episode of Shift Key, Rob talks to Ilaria Mazzocco about her new report on how six countries around the world are dealing with the rise of Chinese EVs. Why do countries welcome Chinese-made EVs, and why do countries resist them? How do domestic carmakers act when Chinese EVs come to town? And are climate concerns still driving uptake?
Mazzocco is the deputy director and senior fellow with the Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Shift Key is hosted by Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap, and Jesse Jenkins, a professor of energy systems engineering at Princeton University. Jesse is off this week.
Subscribe to “Shift Key” and find this episode on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Amazon, or wherever you get your podcasts.
You can also add the show’s RSS feed to your podcast app to follow us directly.
Here is an excerpt from our conversation:
Ilaria Mazzocco: Chinese batterymakers have persisted in focusing on LFP batteries with some spectacular results, I would say. And partly I think that’s been thanks to just being able to deploy them at really large scale and just testing and getting them out there.
But I think BYD is really a great example of that. They invest so much in R&D that it’s really hard to compete with them on some of these things. That’s really the big challenge, where, if you want to make a cheap car, you need LFP. That’s why Ford sought out that licensing deal with CATL, was to acquire LFP battery technology. And LFP batteries are really something that Chinese batterymakers have really excelled at.
Now, there could be breakthroughs in other chemistries. There could be a catchup game with non-Chinese batterymakers that actually become good at making LFP. That’s entirely possible. But right now, if you’re an Indian carmaker and you want to make a cheap car, your best bet is probably to get it from BYD or CATL, or maybe Gotion or something like that. That’s really what you’re looking at.
Robinson Meyer: It also, though, really changes how we talk about a lot of the development of auto industries abroad. Because I mean, I realize this is how cars were made for a long time, but I think … basically like if you were to say, Oh yeah, we make our own internal combustion cars here, we simply import the engines from Detroit, and then we place them in our otherwise finished vehicles that we’ve made domestically, and then we put it under a domestic label. We’re very proud of that. That’s essentially what is happening when countries import batteries. The batteries are so central to the operation of the EVs and what the EVs are capable of that when you import your batteries, you’re really relying on your trade partner for a lot of the core physical capacity of that vehicle, and a lot of the core, underlying chemical engineering capability that that vehicle affords you.
It suggests to me that in terms of when you think about the global EV industry, there are companies that are dependent on some kind of Chinese battery export. There are companies that are dependent on some kind of Korean battery export. There’s a few American entrants — mostly Tesla. There’s a few European entrants. And that’s kind of it. Everyone else is piggybacking on the back of one of those core technologies.
Mentioned:
Ilaria’s new report: The Global EV Shift: The Role of China and Industrial Policy in Emerging Economies
Previously on Shift Key: How China’s EV Industry Got So Big
This episode of Shift Key is sponsored by …
Heatmap Pro brings all of our research, reporting, and insights down to the local level. The software platform tracks all local opposition to clean energy and data centers, forecasts community sentiment, and guides data-driven engagement campaigns. Book a demo today to see the premier intelligence platform for project permitting and community engagement.
Music for Shift Key is by Adam Kromelow.
A trio of powerful climate hawks are throwing their weight against the SPEED Act.
Key Senate Democrats are opposing a GOP-led permitting deal to overhaul federal environmental reviews without assurances that clean energy projects will be able to reap the benefits. Winning these lawmakers’ support will require major concessions to build new transmission infrastructure and greater permitting assistance for renewable energy projects.
In an exclusive joint statement provided Tuesday to Heatmap News, Senate Energy and Natural Resources ranking member Martin Heinrich, Environment and Public Works ranking member Sheldon Whitehouse, and Hawaii senator Brian Schatz came out against passing the SPEED Act, a bill that would change the National Environmental Policy Act, citing concerns about how it would apply to renewable energy and transmission development priorities.
“We are committed to streamlining the permitting process — but only if it ensures we can build out transmission and cheap, clean energy. While the SPEED Act does not meet that standard, we will continue working to pass comprehensive permitting reform that takes real steps to bring down electricity costs,” the statement read.
As I wrote weeks ago, there’s very little chance the SPEED Act could become law without addressing Senate climate hawks’ longstanding policy preferences. Although the SPEED Act was voted out of committee in the House two weeks ago with support from a handful of Democratic lawmakers, it has yet to win support from even moderate energy wonks in that legislative body, including Representative Scott Peters, one of the Democratic House negotiators in bipartisan permitting talks. Peters told me he would need to see more assurances dealing with the renewables permitting freeze, for example, in order for him to support the bill.
Observers had initially expected a full House vote on the SPEED Act as soon as this week, but an additional hurdle arose in recent days in the form of opposition from House conservative Republicans, led by Representative Chip Roy. The congressman from Texas had requested additional federal actions targeting renewables projects in exchange for passage of the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, which effectively repealed the Inflation Reduction Act. What followed was a set of directives from the Interior Department that all but halted federal solar and wind permitting. Roy’s frustration with the SPEED Act concerns a relatively milquetoast nod to renewables permitting problems that would block presidents from rescinding already issued permits. This upset appears to have delayed a vote on the bill in the House.
There’s an eerie familiarity to this moment: Almost exactly one year ago, the last major attempt at a permitting deal, authored by Senators Joe Manchin and John Barrasso, died when then-Majority Leader Chuck Schumer declined to bring it up for a vote in the face of opposition from the House. Unlike the SPEED Act, that bill offered changes to transmission siting policy that even conservative estimates said would’ve hastened the pace of national decarbonization.
Having Schatz, Heinrich, and Whitehouse — the three most powerful climate hawks in Congress — throw their weight against the SPEED Act casts serious doubt on the prospects for that legislation becoming the permitting deal this Congress. It also exposes an intra-energy world conflict, as it appears to position these lawmakers in opposition to American Clean Power, an energy trade group that represents a swath of diversified energy companies and utilities, as well as solar, wind, and battery storage developers.
Last week, ACP joined with the American Petroleum Institute and gas pipeline advocacy organizations to urge Congress to pass the SPEED Act. In a letter to House Speaker Mike Johnson and Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries, ACP and the fossil fuel industry trade groups said that the legislation “directly addresses” the challenges facing their interests and “represents meaningful bipartisan progress toward a more stable and dependable permitting framework.” The only reference to potential additions came in a single, vague line: “While the SPEED Act makes important progress, there are additional ways Congress can facilitate the development of reliable and affordable energy infrastructure as part of a broader permitting package.”
This letter was taken by some backers of the renewable energy industry to be an endorsement without concessions. It was also a surprise because just days earlier, American Clean Power responded to the bill’s passage with a vaguely supportive statement that declared “additional efforts” were needed for “transmission infrastructure,” without which “energy prices will spike and system reliability will be threatened.” (It’s worth noting that the committee behind the SPEED Act, House Natural Resources, has no authority over transmission siting. No other proposal has yet emerged from Republicans in that chamber for Republicans to address the issue, either.)
One of the renewables backers taken aback was Schatz, who took to X to sound off against the organization. “Congratulations to ‘American Clean Power’ for cutting a deal with the American Petroleum Institute, but to enact a law both the house and the Senate have to agree, and Senators are finding out about this for the first time,” Schatz wrote in a post, which Whitehouse retweeted from one of his official X accounts.
In a subsequent post, Schatz said: “I am not finding out about the bill’s existence for the first time, I am tracking it all very closely. I am finding out that ACP endorsed it as is without anything on transmission, for the first time.”
By contrast, the statement from the three senators aligns them with the Solar Energy Industries Association, which sent a letter from more than 140 solar companies to top congressional leaders requesting direct action to fix a bureaucratic freeze on permit-related activity that has already helped kill large projects, including Esmeralda 7, which was the largest solar mega-farm in the United States.
In its message to Congress, the trade association made plain that while the SPEED Act was a welcome form of permitting changes, it was nowhere close to dealing with Trumpian chicanery on the group’s priority list.
We’ll have more on this unfolding drama in the days to come.
One longtime analyst has an idea to keep prices predictable for U.S. businesses.
What if we treated lithium like oil? A commodity so valuable to the functioning of the American economy that the U.S. government has to step in not only to make it available, but also to make sure its price stays in a “sweet spot” for production and consumption?
That was what industry stalwart Howard Klein, founder and chief executive of the advisory firm RK Equities, had in mind when he came up with his idea for a strategic lithium reserve, modeled on the existing Strategic Petroleum Reserve.
Klein published a 10-page white paper on the idea Monday, outlining an expansive way to leverage private companies and capital markets to develop a non-Chinese lithium industry without the risk and concentrated expense of selecting specific projects and companies.
The lithium challenge, Klein and other industry analysts and executives have long said, is that China’s whip hand over the industry allows it to manipulate prices up and down in order to throttle non-Chinese production. When investment in lithium ramps up outside of China, Chinese production ramps up too, choking off future investment by crashing prices.
Recognizing the dangers stemming from dysfunction in the global lithium market constitutes a rare area of agreement between both parties in Washington and across the Biden and Trump administrations. Last year, a Biden State Department official told reporters that China “engage[s] in predatory pricing” and will “lower the price until competition disappears.”
A bipartisan investigation released last month by the House of Representatives’ Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party found that “the PRC engaged in a whole‐of‐government effort to dominate global lithium production,” and that “starting in 2021, the PRC government engaged in a coordinated effort to artificially depress global lithium prices that had the effect of preventing the emergence of an America‐focused supply chain.”
Klein thinks he’s figured out a way to deal with this problem
“They manipulated and they crushed prices through oversupply to prevent us from having our own supply chains,” he told me.
It’s not just that China can keep prices low through overproduction, it’s also that the country’s enormous market power can make prices volatile, Klein said, which scares off private sector investment in mining and processing. “You have two years, up two years down, two years up, two years down,” he told me. “That’s the problem we’re trying to solve.
His proposal is to establish “a large, rules-based buffer of lithium carbonate — purchased when prices are depressed due to Chinese oversupply, and released during price spikes, shortages, or export restrictions.”
This reserve, he said, would be more than just a stockpile from which lithium could be released as needed. It would also help to shape the market for lithium, keeping prices roughly in the range of $20,000 per ton (when prices fall below that, the reserve would buy) and $40,000 to $50,000 per ton, when the reserve would sell. The idea is to keep the price of lithium carbonate — which can be processed as a material for batteries with a wide range of defense (e.g. drones) and transportation (e.g. electric vehicles) applications — within a range that’s reasonable for investors and businesses to plan around.
“Lithium has swung from like $6,000 [per ton] to $80,000, back down to $9,000, and now it’s at $11,000 or $12,000,” Klein told me. “But $11,000 or $12,000 is not a high enough price for a company to build a plan that’s going to take three to five years. They need $20,000 to $25,000 now as a minimum for them to make a $2 billion dollar investment.” When prices for lithium get up to “$50,000, $60,000, or $70,000, then it becomes a problem because battery makers can’t make money.”
Both the Biden and Trump administrations have taken more active steps to secure a U.S. or allied supply chain for valuable inputs, including rare earth metals. But Klein’s proposed reserve looks to balance government intervention with a diverse, private-sector led industry.
The reserve would be more broad-based than price floor schemes, where a major buyer like the Defense Department guarantees a minimum price for the output from a mine or refining facility. This is what the federal government did in its deal with MP Materials, the rare earths miner and refiner, which secured a multifaceted deal with the federal government earlier this year.
Klein estimates that the cost in the first year of the strategic lithium reserve could be a few billion dollars — on the scale of the nearly $2.3 billion loan provided by the Department of Energy for the Thacker Pass mine in Nevada, which also saw the federal government take an equity stake in the miner, Lithium Americas.
Ideally, Klein told me, “there’s a competition of projects that are being presented to prospective funders of those projects, and I want private market actors to decide, should we build more Thacker Passes or should we do the Smackover?” referring to a geologic formation centered in Arkansas with potentially millions of tons of lithium reserves.
Klein told me that he’s trying to circulate the proposal among industry and policy officials. His hoped is that as the government attempts to come up with a solution to Chinese dominance of the lithium industry, “people are talking about this idea and they’re saying, Oh, that’s actually a pretty good idea.”