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A conversation with the author of The Cactus Hunters: Desire and Extinction in the Illicit Succulent Trade

It was questionable if we needed a second season of Tiger King — or, let’s be honest, a first season. Regardless, if Netflix ever decides it’s interested in a story that features surprisingly charming criminals, IWT violations, and yes, even possibly murder (but without the tabloid tone and mullets), producers might look in the future to Jared D. Margulies’ delightful debut, The Cactus Hunters: Desire and Extinction in the Illicit Succulent Trade.
Wait, illicit succulent trade? you might be wondering. Oh yes.
From the cliffs of California and the deserts of Brazil to the markets of Seoul and the private greenhouses of Czechia, Margulies follows the extraction and relocation of plants so rare that they might only exist in one valley or mountainside in the world. Weaving in ample philosophy and research about what drives these sorts of obsessions — as well as his personal reflections as he, in turn, is captivated by the lovable, spiky plants — The Cactus Hunters is just the right balance of edgy and academic.
Last week, I caught up with Margulies about the process of researching the book, being mistaken for an undercover cop by his subjects, and the lie that is “the green thumb,” among other topics. Our conversation has been edited and condensed for clarity.
You open The Cactus Hunters with a story about how you were going to study the illegal trade of tiger bones when you came across a story about saguaro cactus rustling that piqued your interest and sent you on this journey. What most stands out to you as the differences between the illegal trade of animals and animal products and the world of illegal cactus trading?
To clarify, I never actually got around to studying the illegal trade in tiger bones. I had encountered it a little bit in my past research on human-wildlife conflicts.
But there are a lot of important differences: One of the things that made the illegal plant trade so interesting to study, compared to illegal trade in animals, is that it receives a lot less attention, so there was just a lot more to learn that people hadn’t already researched. But also, the way that this material and these plants can move around the world — there are so many more options available because of the nature of plants. So if what you’re after is the genetics of the plant, to be able to grow them somewhere else in the world, there’s not just the one plant but there’s the cacti propagate, for instance. Pups. Their seeds. You can make cuttings of plants. None of these things are really available to people interested in illegal trade and animals. That affects supply chains and how these things can move around the world.
Also, because of the lack of attention to illegal plant trade compared to animal trade, the subject is a lot less criminalized. I would argue that my access to informants and research participants was a lot better because it did happen that, every now and then, people thought I was a cop. Or maybe, like, an undercover detective. But usually within pretty short order, they realized that wasn’t the case and I was generally interested in trying to understand their perspectives. I think that it would be a lot harder to develop trust within certain trades that are a lot more heavily criminalized.
Over the course of the book, you encounter the Indiana Jones of plants and the Robin Hood of cacti, among others. Can you talk a little about why these enthusiasts, who clearly care deeply about conservation, sometimes break the law by smuggling seeds or entire cacti out of the places where they naturally grow?
One of the fascinating things that really gripped me was this seeming contradiction, where you have people who are made out as conservation villains by certain actors seeing themselves as unsung conservation heroes. The reason for that is, for a lot of these collectors, they saw their community as really passionate people who wanted to get access to the plants that become objects of their desires. By and large, the people who want these plants aren’t trying to do harm to the species in the world, and they care a lot about them. But they also recognize that in their desire is something fairly insatiable and that people are going to go to lengths to get the plant that they have to go to.
For a lot of these collectors, they might see engaging in a kind of illegal activity as still a socially acceptable behavior, if it meant it got material out into the world in a way that people might want it. And the goal there, the long-term goal, is to try to reduce demand on wild harvesting of plants and wild populations. If you get a little bit of material out into the communities that delight in these plants, then you can start grafting them, propagating them, growing them from seed, and, in theory, get that material out into the world.
I wanted to take that perspective seriously. It’s a hard thing to study empirically and so it was important for me to try to be open to a really diverse set of opinions about the right way to do conservation.
You leave most of the sources in the book, including those working within the law, anonymous. Why did you make that decision?
The really short answer is, I was part of a larger research project called BIOSEC, which was run by Professor Rosaleen Duffy at the University of Sheffield in the Department of Politics and International Relations, and we were using a fairly symmetrical ethics approval process, or what in the U.S. we would call an institutional review board approval. Because a number of us were studying illicit economies, in order to ensure research-subject protection and anonymity and security, we were required to make all of our sources anonymous.
But this caused some issues because, on the one hand, it meant that everyone in the book is anonymous, even if they’re people who are law enforcement officials or botanists who would have probably really enjoyed having their names in the book. I regret that.
Most interesting, though, were the number of collectors who were mad at me because they’re also anonymous. One of the reasons for that was they saw anonymity as being suggestive of wrongdoing and for a lot of these people, they don’t feel like what they’re doing is wrong, necessarily, even if it’s against the law. They wanted their story told. I think one of the reasons I had good access to the kinds of interlocutors I had was because they felt like I was providing a space for them to get their version of the story out into the world.
You were asked to be an expert witness in a case against a South Korean smuggler who took thousands of plants from the California coast. How do you navigate moments like this, when your position as an illicit trade researcher is perhaps in tension with your own ethical code?
This was a really difficult decision for me, and I write about this. I went back and forth about whether or not to serve as an expert witness, which in this case just required writing a statement. I never had to go to court or, you know, be on a witness stand — thank goodness. But I go back and forth about if I would do it again.
I think that in the end, I chose to do it because I realized that my testimony would only serve to probably reduce the sentence that this person was facing. And I don’t say that because I think that what they were doing was okay. It was really bad and really harmful to this species of plant. I just don’t think that criminalization and incarceration actually do rehabilitative work or serve much function. It costs us a lot of money as taxpayers and causes harm.
It was complicated; I guess that’s how I would leave it. I debated whether or not to include [the story] in the book but I felt like, in the end, it would be wrong not to include it. I think that if people eventually found out I had served in that capacity, they might felt like I was trying to not disclose something. But yeah, I have some ambiguous feelings about it. In the end, what I was asked to actually do was very limited: I was just asked to put a value on these plants. But as I wrote in my letter to the judge, that value in monetary terms is such an arbitrary thing. The price of those plants has declined precipitously since I wrote that, and it had already gone down a lot since the person who sold them stole them. How interesting, though, that the court of law — at least in the United States — in order to assess the damage done to the state, it had to be valued in monetary terms.
I really liked the inclusion of the story. It’s interesting for a researcher of illicit and illegal trade to all of a sudden be dragged into the concrete legal system, and have it, you know, ask something of you.
Sometimes academics are hard on ourselves in that we think we put in all this work and do all this writing and no one actually reads it. And that’s not true. People do read your work when you publish it and you should think about who those people might be. They might be district attorneys for the state of California. People will use your work, and you should think from the outset about what the social implications of that might be. It was a big lesson for me.
At the end of the book, you write that your experiences in the cactus and succulent community have left you with hope that meaningful change is possible “not through the repressions of desire but through its celebration.” After spending so much time among people that some might call poachers, what makes you optimistic?
We have so many examples from other illicit economies where prohibition doesn’t work. I am concerned by a tendency to move in that direction. Given that we’re talking about plants — you know, as far as we know, this conversation could be different in 50 years — but we’re not having to really think about the welfare issues of, say, illegal trade in animals. There are pragmatic solutions to these problems. This material could get out into the world so that people who want these plants can get it in a way that doesn’t harm wild-growing species.
There’s still a ways to go in working through regulatory conventions to support those efforts. And importantly, in doing so, supporting the people who should have the most support, which I would argue are the communities in places in the world that have lived with these plants the longest.
I see hopeful promise in this, and I saw a whole lot of love. I really did. I saw a lot of love between people and plants, and what that can do for people in moving into developing more careful relations with plants and other species. I don’t have a large collection of cacti and succulents, but I do have some, and I have like a cactus right now that’s in flower. Do you want to see it?
Yes!
This is where I think it’s fun, to think about what plants can teach us—
Oh, it’s gorgeous!
This is a Mammillaria laui. Named for Alfred Lau, who I write about in one of the chapters of the book — a German who lived in Mexico, who has a lot of different species named after him. This is Mammillaria laui, subspecies subducta. It’s got this gorgeous crown of pink flowers.
I love having these plants. Specifically, I’ve started a small collection of plants that are associated with particular people that I wrote about, or that I thought about. Bringing some of that social history to our plants, I think, is a really nice thing that people can do. Learn about where our plants come from and the histories of how they got to where we are.
That’s kind of what set me off on this whole journey, anyway. I think there’s a lot of opportunity for thinking thoughtfully about the place of these plants in the world and how they travel and maybe, hopefully, that can help move us towards a more ethical kind of relation.
Are you worried now that once you collect all of the plants that are connected to your book, you’ll throw your whole collection out?
I don’t think I have a strong collector tendency, per se. I have been accused of being a low-key hoarder before. I’m excited to think about how I’m going to slowly develop a collection over time. Yeah, but your reference — the worst thing that can happen to a collector is completing a collection. Freud wrote about this in the context of completing his collection of statues and dying days later. This one collector who I went to see, I thought I was going to see a giant greenhouse of cacti, but I found a bunch of Mexican chili plants. Because he’d just tossed [the cacti collection] off, he was done with it. I don’t see myself going down that road but one never knows.
For someone reading this interview who might be interested in collecting, where would you say to start?
We need to get over this idea that cacti and succulent plants are great house plants because they don’t require any care. It’s not true. Everyone I know who’s had a succulent has killed it very quickly.
I killed mine.
Yeah, if you just throw a succulent on, like, a north-facing windowsill, it’s not going to do well, especially if you ignore it.
Also, get over the idea that there are natural people in the world with a green thumb — I think that is also nonsense. We just need to spend time learning about what these plants need. One of the ways you can do that is by paying attention to them.
In terms of obtaining material — you know, so much plant material can also just be found for free, gifted from friends or colleagues or the community. A lot of collector clubs, like, say, the Cactus and Succulent Society of America here in the U.S., I believe may even send you free seeds of cacti, and stuff like that.
The thing that I want to start doing is trying to grow cacti from seed. They’re slow-growing plants but I think it’d be really fun to actually watch that process unfold. And it’s quite easy to obtain seeds for a lot of these plants. Just, you know, be careful where you’re buying stuff from. Reputable nurseries are a good source. But be wary of buying from unknown people on the internet. That might be where people start to get into trouble.
Is there anything I haven’t asked you about that you’d like to let me know about your book or your experience writing it before I let you go?
I’m not too prescriptive at the end of the book about what I think the answer is. Some people may find that frustrating, like, “Oh, but you didn’t tell us like what should we do” or “What’s the right response?” One of the reasons for that was I just wanted to let people develop some of their own thoughts about this. But also it’s because the work isn’t done.
I’m developing some work right now dealing with illegal succulent trade in South Africa with some colleagues, both in South Korea but also in South Africa. I’m doing a new project on illicit Venus flytrap harvesting and the carnivorous plant trade. I’m trying to continue the process of thinking and learning with plants. But the work continues.
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Progressive candidate Jane Kim declared victory in the race for California Insurance Commissioner.
Few political wonks outside of California were likely paying much attention to the Golden State on Tuesday night, as Democrats’ anticipated blue wave crested. But the state did have one close, consequential race on the ballot: insurance commissioner. On Friday, Bernie Sanders-endorsed progressive Jane Kim won the race to lead the California Department of Insurance, which oversees the state’s $452 billion insurance market.
Kim declared victory over the more moderate State Senator Ben Allen, who was backed by the California Democratic Party, after reaching a nearly six-point lead on Friday. In a brief speech before supporters, Kim said Allen called to congratulate her that morning. (A spokesman for the Allen campaign confirmed the call to The Orange County Register.) Kim ran on a proposal for a state-run, single-payer insurance program that would cover homeowners against wildfire damage — though the plan would ultimately need approval from both the California legislature and Governor-elect Xavier Becerra.
The idea is that homeowners would automatically receive public coverage for wildfire-related losses, with payouts capped at roughly what it costs to rebuild a typical California home. Policyholders would keep their regular private insurance for other risks such as theft, burst pipes, or an ordinary kitchen fire. Kim says Californians wouldn’t pay more overall, since the money for the program would come from the share of premiums that already goes toward wildfire coverage, though each household’s bill would partly depend on its own wildfire risk.
“It would be nonprofit, and so any excess capital would stay in the state of California and would be used to drive down risk,” Kim told my colleague Matthew Zeitlin a few weeks ago. “That’s the most important piece about this actually, is that it would create another revenue stream for mitigation.”
The insurance commissioner job has taken on an increasing sense of urgency as wildfires — intensified by climate change — continue ripping through communities in California. Mounting losses from hotter, drier conditions combined with decades of new construction in the wildland-urban interface have squeezed insurers’ profits, leading many to drop policyholders in high-risk areas or simply stop writing new policies in the state altogether.
California’s homeowners insurance premiums climbed 84% between December 2020 and March of this year, according to Stanford researchers. Meanwhile, a growing number of residents have been pushed onto the state’s FAIR Plan, which my colleague Matthew described as “the barebones insurer of last resort.” The share of California’s single-family homes covered by the plan has nearly tripled over that same period, from under 2% to about 5%, as homeowners in even low- and moderate-risk wildfire areas increasingly find themselves with few alternatives.
The insurance crunch has become yet another front in California’s broader affordability crisis, alongside persistently high housing, electricity, and gasoline costs. Kim’s victory suggests frustrated voters are increasingly willing to support more radical solutions that once seemed politically out of reach. And while Kim doesn’t have a background in the insurance industry, she’s no stranger to public office. The former civil rights attorney served on the San Francisco Board of Supervisors from 2011 to 2019 before becoming a regional director for Sanders’ 2020 presidential campaign.
But throughout her run for the Insurance office, critics have continually questioned how, exactly, her plan would work. No state has attempted a public disaster insurance program like this before; critics argue there’s no relevant model to work off of, no white paper laying out the details, and no price tag attached to the idea. Kim herself acknowledges that there’s plenty of uncertainty surrounding the plan. “This is a concept and a proposal, and could look quite different by the time it works its way through the process,” she told Matthew. In other words, the program that eventually emerges from negotiations with lawmakers — if one does — could end up looking considerably different from what Kim campaigned on.
Her opponent, Allen, who chairs the state senate’s Energy, Utilities and Communications Committee, argued that creating a public wildfire insurance program would impose a significant financial burden on the state. The California Earthquake Authority, an agency that sells earthquake insurance and administers the state’s Wildfire Fund, examined the potential costs of such a program this spring, estimating it would require roughly $25 billion upfront to have a 75% chance of staying solvent for 20 years. But Kim points out in her policy brief that buying reinsurance — essentially insurance for the insurer — could cut that to about $6 billion.
Allen, on the other hand, pitched a series of reforms to the existing market, including speeding up rate reviews, rewarding homeowners and communities for wildfire mitigation, expanding financing for home-hardening projects, and discouraging development in high-risk areas.
Voters opted instead for the insurance revolution. But Kim argues that her plan isn’t totally without precedent. On the campaign trail, she frequently pointed to New Zealand, where the government’s Natural Hazards Commission provides homeowners with public coverage for disasters including earthquakes, landslides, volcanic eruptions, and tsunamis — though notably not ordinary wildfires. And while France and Spain also operate state-backed disaster insurance programs, these don’t cover wildfires either, a far more common occurrence in California than the comparably rare disasters these programs were built around abroad.
Ultimately, Kim’s ambitious plan will require a champion in the legislature to go anywhere. But in the meantime, there are other issues she could get to work on. On the campaign trail, she said she wants to push insurers to fund a disaster mitigation program run by the Department of Insurance, require companies selling auto policies in a region to also offer homeowners coverage there, and impose minimum loss ratios compelling home insurers to pay at least 65% of premiums in claims and auto insurers at least 70%. It’s unclear, however, whether Kim can implement either of the latter two proposals without new legislation.
Kim will also immediately face the question of what to do with outgoing Insurance Commissioner Ricardo Lara’s Sustainable Insurance Strategy reform package. Designed to entice insurers back to California, these new rules allow companies to set premiums using forward-looking risk models rather than relying on historical losses, and to pass a portion of their rising reinsurance costs onto policyholders. In exchange, insurers are required to write more policies in wildfire-prone areas.
Kim has criticized this approach, arguing that insurers have exploited loopholes to raise premiums on lower-risk customers while continuing to underserve high-risk communities, all without doing enough to address the underlying factors driving wildfire risk.
That leaves Kim in a tricky situation. Until she is able to secure legislative backing for some version of her proposed public insurance program, she’ll have to decide whether to scrap or simply build on the existing reforms. She hasn’t yet laid out any plan for doing so. But whatever direction she takes could ultimately reshape California’s insurance market well before a new state insurer gets off the ground.
They only ticked up by 5% this week.
Beyond the repudiation of Donald Trump, if there was one message voters sent on election night, it was that they really don’t like data centers.
Democrats who ran against rampant data center development won at both the gubernatorial level (Amy Acton in Ohio, Gina Hinojosa in Texas) and the senatorial level (Abdul El-Sayed in Michigan, Annie Andrews in South Carolina). The Wall Street Journal counted 125 Democrats nationwide who “targeted their opponents over data centers.”
“Data centers are the midterms’ other big loser,” according to Politico. “The Results Are In: Voters Hate Data Centers,” from Wired.
Commentators didn’t just notice that many anti-data-center candidates won, but that a number of local data center moratoria passed as well. “In nearly every case, it’'s about 67-80% opposing data centers. True in California, Ohio, everywhere,” Brad Carson, head of the artificial intelligence policy group Americans for Responsible Innovation tweeted. Added Democratic strategist David Shor on X, “Voters sided against data centers in 40 of 41 ballot measures, with basically no correlation to how red a county was.”
But as far as new legislation and ordinances go, November 3 was just another Tuesday in the long-running local campaign against data center development, Heatmap Pro data shows.
“Forty is a lot in one day,” Owen Curtin, a data analyst with our intelligence platform Heatmap Pro, admitted, but “in terms of the rate at which county governments are enacting legislation and the overwhelming public support for them, it’s not new.”
There have been over 830 restrictive measures passed this year, according to analysis from Heatmap Pro, which breaks down to just over 80 per month. The numbers picked up substantially in the summer and fall.

June 15 to 21 was the busiest week of the year for passing data center laws, at 35, and June the month with the most laws passed overall, with 133. Another95 restrictive laws were passed in July, followed by 86 in October.
Of the 40 ballot measures passed this week, only one applied at the county level (Morgan County, Illinois), where a great deal of data center permitting occurs. “While many municipalities permit data centers, a significant portion are permitted by county governments. Not all counties have the legal authority to pursue ballot measures, which is why most November 2 measures were at the municipal level,” Curtin explained.
“While the overwhelming support for local data center ballot measures is indicative of public sentiment (largely anti-data center), it doesn’t necessarily correlate with the regulatory landscape,” he went on. And here’s a fun fact: “There are over 19,000 municipalities in the U.S., so 40 bans are only 0.2% of all municipalities,” Curtain added. “If 40 municipalities banned data centers every day, it would take 475 days to ban data centers across the entire U.S.”
A conversation with Rep. Mike Levin of California
It’s crunch time for the Senate’s bipartisan permitting reform and transmission bill. In three days, the bill’s authors plan to put the Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act to a vote on the Senate floor. That means there’s probably only three days to finish up an amendment to the bill that addresses critics’ concerns without toppling the delicate balance the authors initially struck to foster bipartisan support.
BAAJA has major implications for climate policy, as it would make it much easier and cheaper to build high-voltage transmission lines that connect renewable energy from where it is generated to demand centers. It includes ratepayer protection provisions that require data centers to pay all of the costs of upgrading the grid so that they can hook up to it. The bill would also speed up permitting for energy projects of all stripes, from solar farms and geothermal plants to pipelines and liquified natural gas terminals.
The trade-offs, beyond the benefits for fossil fuels, include making it far more difficult — in some cases, potentially impossible — to revoke permits for a project once the federal government has issued them. While this might help solar and wind under Trump or a Trump-like president, critics are worried it will give Trump carte blanche to approve shoddy oil and gas projects with abandon in his remaining two years. The bill also limits public participation in the environmental review process, makes significant changes to landmark environmental laws like the Clean Water Act and the Endangered Species Act, and weakens tribal consultation under the National Historic Preservation Act.
Several Democratic Senators and House members who had yet to comment on the bill came out of the woodwork in the post-midterms glow to share where they stood. Ruben Gallego, the senator from Arizona and likely 2028 presidential candidate, told a Washington Sun reporter that the White House may not be so willing to negotiate six months from now after a possible impeachment. “Or maybe we get too close to an election and Vance doesn't want to negotiate, right?” he said. “So why not take this win now?”
Senator Mark Kelly, of Arizona, on the other hand, said he wants to wait and see if Democrats can get more of their priorities into the bill in the next Congress, according to Politico. That sentiment seems to be growing among Democrats in the House, where minority leader Hakeem Jeffries of New York has come out against the current iteration of the bill. “Leader Jeffries will not rubber-stamp legislation that emerges from the Senate without more constructive involvement with our Caucus as we fight to make life more affordable for the American people,” Jeffries’ spokesperson told Politico.
The political calculus on the bill is in the eye of the beholder. Proponents are sure this is the best chance Democrats are going to get to clear transmission bottlenecks that will open the door to a clean energy future. Skeptics are worried the risks are too great, or otherwise feel it’s worth attempting a better deal in the next Congress when Democrats have more power.
On Thursday, I spoke to Representative Mike Levin from California as he was coming down from the high of his own reelection win on Tuesday night. Levin told me he was decidedly undecided on the bill, and so we talked through how he’s thinking about it.
Let’s start with the big picture. What is your opinion of the legislation as written?
I think a few things. One, having such a huge democratic victory in the House and the Senate changes the dynamics around the deal and really around the negotiations — not just around permitting reform, but all the things that have been punted to the lame duck. I think there’s a list of like a dozen things.
The question is, do we choose to accept the permitting deal in its current construct with whatever technical changes there are in the manager’s amendment? Do we negotiate much broader changes this Congress with the massive vote we received on Monday? Or do we wait until the 120th Congress when Democrats have the pens?
The next thing we're going to learn, after we get the final numbers in the House and Senate, is what does the manager’s amendment actually look like? There’s risks to any of the options here. There are more conversations that our caucus needs to have on permitting in light of Tuesday. We’ve raised specific concerns to our colleagues in the Senate. I know others have as well, and I’m going to be watching closely to see if Martin [Heinrich] and Sheldon [Whitehouse] can address some of these concerns that we’ve raised.
What are your biggest concerns about the bill?
There’s a big picture test that I have, a three-prong test. First: Is it going to actually lower costs? This whole election has been about lowering costs for consumers. Second: Is it going to protect the environment, and specifically, will it promote clean air and clean water that communities need? And then, third: Will it actually do the job on access to clean energy?
And what I would say is: there are some real problems. I have a lot of good things to say about the transmission provisions. A lot of it mirrors what we’ve been working on in the Energy Bills Relief Act for a long time. But I think there are loopholes around project certainty language. I read my friend John Podesta’s phrase of “loaded Howitzer” in Heatmap. I see these loopholes as ripe for corruption and potentially allowing permits for fossil fuel projects, and that’s very concerning.
You have the historic preservation tribal issues, right? My friends in New Mexico have been very loud about that, and other places as well. They’re very unhappy about the [National Historic Preservation Act] process and tribal sovereignty.
And I worry in the context of the whole data center fight that there aren’t enough steps in here to improve transparency for the public through the permitting process. You can’t have projects that are shrouded in secrecy, and you need community engagement to lead to better and more successful projects. So those are a few things, and those are not small things.
What is your sense of the sentiment around the bill in the House in general? Are there House Republicans that are against it? Do you think it could get the votes in the House?
Mike Johnson obviously came out strongly for it, which may not help get House Democrats on board. I have to tell you, the fact that he was so enthusiastically for it — in my view that wasn’t a great tell.
In my own opinion, any bipartisan permitting bill or any bipartisan bill at all is going to require compromise, and we owe the negotiators the room to try to get to a deal to a certain extent. We shouldn’t let the perfect be the enemy of the good. But until we see the final text, it’s tough to take a stance on the bill, and that includes the managers’ amendment. And we need more assurances and progress from the administration than we’re getting.
Time is running out for that, it seems.
Yeah. They still refuse to implement our current laws in good faith, and that doesn’t give me confidence that they’re going to implement any new law in good faith.
The other thing that I don’t think really gets talked about in this context, but I see it as germane — at least in the behavior of the administration — is what happened on the Lindsey Graham sanctions bill. This bill was negotiated by the White House, and there were a lot of Dems that were for it. It was a close vote for me. I voted against because I could not trust the administration to proceed in good faith. I thought Trump would use the tariff authority and the sanctions waiver authority in an unintended way, and that’s exactly what happened. Lindsey Graham would never, in a million years, have been okay with how Trump waived sanctions on Russia using a bill intended to impose sanctions. Just the same, I could see a scenario where, with the permit-certainty language, it is in fact the loaded Howitzer that John Podesta described. That’s my two cents.
Some proponents of the bill have said the midterms are an argument to pass this bill because they showed how much voters care about affordability, and this bill, by their account, is all about affordability, and if newly elected Democrats want to do more on clean energy down the road, this is a prerequisite. What do you make of those arguments?
They want us to get stuff done. There’s no question about that. But I also think that they want us to get things done that actually are reflective of our priorities and our values. And in this case, the three things that I laid out are reflective of those priorities and values. Again, costs, environmental implications, and access to clean energy — and clearly there are big challenges with unintended environmental repercussions.
I found it interesting that in [the Rhodium Group’s] analysis, they basically omit the certainty provision from their analysis of the GHG impact because there’s really no way to know how the administration will interpret and potentially abuse that provision. There’s great potential for abuse with that provision; I think it needs to be reworked. And it’s naive to think all of a sudden that the Trump administration will behave any differently than they have in the first six years of their opportunity to run afoul of bedrock environmental law, kneecap clean energy, and double down on fossil fuels. I would expect more of the same.
The other thing I think is wrong is the presumption that everyone in the clean energy industry is all on board —you're not talking to enough actual project developers who may not be on board.
Do you see a clear pathway to do something like your Energy Bills Relief Act in the next Congress?
There's a tremendous opportunity to do the Energy Bills Relief Act in the next Congress. We obviously have to discuss with all of our many new and unexpected colleagues to get them on board, and we may have to make amendments to the bill as it was constituted in the 119th Congress. But we got 160 on board. We have lots and lots of new people, and we may, after making changes, find ourselves with a really strong number of people in support. And I’m not giving up on the Republicans that are left in the House, some of whom have claimed to be more pro-clean energy. We’ll get there, and in the meantime, there are things we can do right at the beginning around the war and tariffs — maybe around other ideas as Nikki Budzinski and I presented to Leader [Hakeem] Jeffries that I’ll let him run with as we scope out the first 100 hours, 100 days in the year of the new 120th Congress.
If you do have an opportunity to do something like the Energy Bills Relief Act next Congress, how do you get Trump to sign it? Or another permitting bill if this one doesn’t pass?
Well, I guess two ways. One is if you get the majority in the House and you get 60 votes in the Senate, you send it to the president’s desk. And if you were to get two-thirds in both houses, then it’d obviously be veto-proof. I would have thought veto-proof majorities to be incredibly difficult, but then we saw something on Tuesday I didn’t expect. We got 260, perhaps more, in the House, and you need 290 to get your two-thirds. And then in the Senate, we got 56, if we hold in Mississippi and Alaska, meaning you’d need 11 Senate Republicans. And you have a changed national mood, where I think a lot of those Republican senators who will be up for re-election — I'm pretty confident you probably could get four of them, but maybe you could get more, and you could get all the way to 11.
But if you were to send a bill to the president’s desk that, on balance, is positive. The president could do what he did for the Road to Housing Act — neither sign nor veto. He could go that route. So I think it’s a lot more possible now with the majorities that we have. What I don’t think we need to do is just accept that the only option is the current deal, have that pass into law with the downside that there are still some pretty stark environmental rollbacks, and the risk that we don't have any real indications that this administration will faithfully implement the bill.
There are two other options as well: Given what happened in the election, we can make our Senate colleagues come to the table and pass a bill that is more reflective of those things I mentioned — costs, environment, and clean energy.
Or a third option is my friend Jared Huffman, who says, ‘Wait until we retake the majority in January, try to strike a better deal,’ with the risk that Trump is not willing to work with us at all.
Another idea I've heard floated by proponents of the bill is: pass it as is, and if there are things that turn out to be really bad or that you want to change down the line, Congress can come at it again later on. What do you think about that strategy?
That's true. The challenge is how long would that take, and what damage would be done in the interim? If Trump does take the certainty sections and turns it into a free-for-all for fossil, then I think it’s going to be two years of some really bad stuff happening, two years of unintended consequences, and potentially longer than two years if you have a Republican winning the White House in 2028.
We’ve got to be clear-eyed about the deal as it stands. This is not the last time in human history that we will have Congress and the White House negotiating. It’s a great opportunity to try to get something done that will be very meaningful, particularly around the transmission piece. And again, I don’t believe in perfect being the enemy of the good, but I want to make sure that it’s actually good.
Just to make sure I'm 100% clear on where you stand on this right now, it sounds like you're still relatively undecided, given what the bill says at this moment?
I am waiting to take a stance on the bill until I see the final text. I am closely watching the Senate process, and again, I’m judging the bill by those three factors that I mentioned, and I won’t know where I stand until I see the final text. We also have to have family discussions back in Washington D.C. next week. It doesn’t do any good to negotiate with the press before we discuss amongst ourselves. I have seen a lot of my colleagues that are very, very interested in this. They reach out to me, and I give them the best information that I can. I can also tell you that I have tremendous respect for John Podesta’s opinion.
This interview was edited for length and clarity.